U.S. patent application number 10/809498 was filed with the patent office on 2004-09-16 for recording medium, recorder, reproducer, cryptocommunication system and program license system.
This patent application is currently assigned to Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.. Invention is credited to Gotoh, Yoshiho, Koishi, Kenji, Moriya, Mitsurou, Oshima, Mitsuaki, Takemura, Yoshinari, Tanaka, Shinichi.
Application Number | 20040181488 10/809498 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 27278239 |
Filed Date | 2004-09-16 |
United States Patent
Application |
20040181488 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Oshima, Mitsuaki ; et
al. |
September 16, 2004 |
Recording medium, recorder, reproducer, cryptocommunication system
and program license system
Abstract
The operating and other procedures of an optical disk
application system of the type for which a network is used are
simplified. Optical disks have auxiliary data recording areas,
where different IDs for individual disks, and/or cipher keys and/or
decoding keys for ciphers are recorded in advance in a factory. By
using the IDs to release the soft ciphers, using the cipher keys
when sending the ciphers, and using the decoding keys when
receiving the ciphers, user authorization procedures are
simplified.
Inventors: |
Oshima, Mitsuaki;
(Kyoto-shi, JP) ; Gotoh, Yoshiho; (Osaka-shi,
JP) ; Tanaka, Shinichi; (Tuzuki-gun, JP) ;
Koishi, Kenji; (Sanda-shi, JP) ; Moriya,
Mitsurou; (Ikoma-shi, JP) ; Takemura, Yoshinari;
(Settu-shi, JP) |
Correspondence
Address: |
PARKHURST & WENDEL, L.L.P.
1421 PRINCE STREET
SUITE 210
ALEXANDRIA
VA
22314-2805
US
|
Assignee: |
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd.
Kadoma-shi
JP
|
Family ID: |
27278239 |
Appl. No.: |
10/809498 |
Filed: |
March 26, 2004 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
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10809498 |
Mar 26, 2004 |
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10418088 |
Apr 18, 2003 |
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10418088 |
Apr 18, 2003 |
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09475228 |
Dec 30, 1999 |
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6611820 |
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09475228 |
Dec 30, 1999 |
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08849468 |
Jun 9, 1997 |
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6081785 |
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08849468 |
Jun 9, 1997 |
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PCT/JP96/02924 |
Oct 8, 1996 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
705/56 ;
G9B/19.005; G9B/19.017; G9B/19.018; G9B/20.002; G9B/20.009;
G9B/20.027; G9B/20.03; G9B/23.006; G9B/23.087; G9B/23.088;
G9B/23.092; G9B/27.027; G9B/7.029; G9B/7.033; G9B/7.194 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G11B 20/00586 20130101;
G11B 19/12 20130101; G11B 20/00086 20130101; G11B 20/00195
20130101; G11B 2020/1259 20130101; G11B 19/122 20130101; G11B 20/10
20130101; G11B 20/1833 20130101; G11B 13/045 20130101; G11B
2220/2545 20130101; G06K 19/06028 20130101; G11B 20/00326 20130101;
G11B 20/00492 20130101; G11B 20/00253 20130101; G11B 13/04
20130101; G11B 20/00528 20130101; G11B 27/24 20130101; G06K 19/08
20130101; G06K 2019/06271 20130101; G11B 20/00347 20130101; G11B
7/0037 20130101; G11B 20/00268 20130101; G11B 7/00736 20130101;
G11B 19/04 20130101; G11B 23/0042 20130101; G11B 23/30 20130101;
G06K 19/14 20130101; G11B 20/00173 20130101; G11B 20/00137
20130101; G11B 20/00152 20130101; G11B 20/00514 20130101; G11B
20/0084 20130101; G11B 20/1252 20130101; G11B 20/00094 20130101;
G11B 23/284 20130101; G11B 20/00123 20130101; G11B 7/005 20130101;
G11B 7/26 20130101; G11B 2007/0013 20130101; G11B 20/00144
20130101; G11B 20/00181 20130101; G11B 20/00855 20130101; G06F
2221/0711 20130101; G11B 20/00188 20130101; G11B 20/00543 20130101;
G11B 20/0071 20130101; G11B 20/0021 20130101; G11B 20/1403
20130101; G11B 20/00115 20130101; G11B 20/1426 20130101; G11B
2220/2562 20130101; G11B 20/00224 20130101; G11B 20/0026 20130101;
G11B 20/00876 20130101; G11B 20/1217 20130101; G06F 21/10 20130101;
G06K 1/126 20130101; G06K 19/04 20130101; G11B 5/86 20130101; G11B
23/38 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
705/056 |
International
Class: |
G06F 017/60 |
Foreign Application Data
Date |
Code |
Application Number |
Oct 9, 1995 |
JP |
7-261247 |
Jan 23, 1996 |
JP |
8-008910 |
Aug 9, 1996 |
JP |
8-211304 |
Claims
What is claimed is:
1. An optical disk including a first recording area, where main
data are recorded in the for of pits, by a first method of
modulation, and a second recording area which is a predetermined
area in the first recording area, where a plurality of radially
long parts of a reflection film are removed partially, so that
auxiliary data are recorded by a second method of modulation, which
differs from the first method, the optical disk being characterized
by: the auxiliary data including a first identification data
recorded therein for identifying individual optical disks; and the
main data including an impermissible part recorded therein which
can be used with the first identification data and/or a specified
password.
2. The optical disk described in claim 1, and further characterized
in that it is a read only type optical disk.
3. The optical disk described in claim 1 or 2, and further
characterized by a specified password being obtained through a
specified operation with the first identification data.
4. The optical disk described in claim 1 or 2, wherein, in addition
to the first identification data for identifying individual optical
disks, a cipher key for a cipher and/or a decoding key for a cipher
is recorded in the auxiliary data.
5. The optical disk described in claim 1 or 2, and further
characterized by the first method of modulation being a method of
8-16 modulation, and the second method of modulation being a method
of phase encoding modulation.
6. A method of permitting the use of a program, the method being
characterized in that it comprises the steps of: reproducing an
optical disk including a first recording area, where main data are
recorded in the form of pits, by a first method of modulation, and
a second recording area which is a predetermined area in the first
recording area, where a plurality of radially long parts of a
reflection film are removed partially, so that auxiliary data are
recorded by a second method of modulation, which differs from the
first method, the auxiliary data including a first identification
data recorded therein for identifying individual optical disks and
a cipher key for a cipher and/or a decoding key for a cipher, the
main data including an impermissible part recorded therein which
can be used with the first identification data and/or a specified
password; reproducing the first identification data from the
auxiliary data; and enabling the impermissible part to be used and
outputting it with the first identification data and/or the
specified password.
7. The method of permitting the use of a program described in claim
6, and further characterized by the specified password being
obtained through a specified operation with the first
identification data.
8. A method of cryptocommunication characterized in that it
comprises the steps of: reproducing in a first computer an optical
disk including a first recording area, where main data are recorded
in the form of pits, by a first method of modulation, and a second
recording area which is a predetermined area in the first recording
area, where a plurality of radially long parts of a reflection film
are removed partially, so that auxiliary data are recorded by a
second method of modulation, which differs from the first method,
the auxiliary data including a first identification data recorded
therein for identifying individual optical disks and a first cipher
key for a cipher and/or a-decoding key for a cipher; reading the
first identification data and the first cipher key from the
auxiliary data; obtaining a first cipher which is a first data
enciphered with the first cipher key and cipher algorithm; and
sending the first cipher from a communication means of the first
computer through a network to a second computer.
9. The method of cryptocommunication described in claim 8, and
further characterized by the cipher algorithm being read from the
main data.
10. A method of cryptocommunication characterized in that it
comprises the steps of: reproducing main data from a first
recording area of an optical disk in a first computer; reproducing
auxiliary data from a second recording area, the auxiliary data
including a first identification data for identifying individual
optical disks and a first cipher key for a cipher and/or a decoding
key for a cipher; enciphering a first data in the first computer
with the first cipher key in the auxiliary data by cipher algorithm
to make a first cipher; connecting to the second computer of a
particular connection address through a network to send the first
cipher and the first identification data in the auxiliary data;
receiving the first identification data and the first cipher in the
second computer; selecting the first decoding key which is the
decoding key for the cipher corresponding to the first
identification data received from a first decoding key database,
where a relationship between the first decoding key and the first
identification data is stored; and decoding the first cipher on the
basis of the first decoding key to obtain the first data.
11. The method of cryptocommunication described in claim 10, and
characterized in that it comprises the further steps of: generating
with a first means for generating ciphers in the first computer a
second cipher key and a second decoding key paired with each other;
obtaining a third cipher which is the second cipher key enciphered
with the first cipher key in the first computer; and sending the
third cipher to the second computer.
12. The method of cryptocommunication described in claim 11, and
characterized in that it comprises the further steps of: decoding
the received third cipher with the first decoding key to obtain the
plaintext of the second cipher key in the second computer;
obtaining a fourth cipher which is the second data enciphered with
the second cipher key; and sending the fourth cipher to the first
computer.
13. The method of cryptocommunication described in claim 8, and
further characterized in that, at the step of reproducing two or
more cipher keys and/or decoding keys for public key cipher from
auxiliary data which include public key cipher, at least one of the
cipher keys and the decoding keys is an elliptic function
cipher.
14. The method of cryptocommunication described in claim 8, and
characterized in that it comprises the further step of using an
optical disk with auxiliary data including a connection address
data of the second computer, and reproducing the connection address
from the auxiliary data.
15. An optical disk recorder for modulating a main data by a first
method of modulation and recording the data by radiating a laser
beam through an optical lens on to the recording layer of a first
recording area of an optical disk, the recorder being characterized
by: reproducing, before recording, the auxiliary data in a second
recording area, where a first identification data and a first
cipher key for a cipher and/or a decoding key for a cipher are
recorded by a second method of modulation; making a main cipher
which is the main data enciphered with the first identification
data and/or the first cipher key and particular cipher algorithm;
and recording the main cipher in the recording layer of the first
recording area by the first method of modulation.
16. The optical disk recorder described in claim 15, and further
characterized by: receiving in a reception part the second cipher
which is the first data enciphered with second cipher algorithm and
a recording permission data permitting recording the first data in
an optical disks; obtaining a second decoded data through decoding
the second cipher with a second decoding means; making a main
cipher through enciphering the second decoded data with first
cipher algorithm different from the second cipher algorithm and an
auxiliary data in a cipher computing means; and recording the main
cipher in the first recording area of the optical disk only if the
recording permission data is present.
17. The optical disk recorder described in claim 16, and
characterized by: mounting an IC card having a computing unit
therein; inputting into the IC card the first identification data
for identifying the disk of the auxiliary data; computing the first
identification data with the computing unit; inputting the result
of the computation into the cipher computing means from the IC
card; obtaining a main cipher which is an enciphered second decoded
signal; and recording the main cipher in the optical disk.
18. An optical disk reproducer characterised by reading with an
optical head and a first means of demodulation an optical disk
including a first recording area, where a main cipher is recorded
by a first method of modulation, the main cipher being a first data
enciphered with a first identification data by a cipher means;
reproducing with the optical head and a second means of
demodulation an auxiliary data recorded in a second recording area
of the optical disk by a second method of demodulation; and
obtaining the first data by decoding the main cipher by means of
the decoding means with the first identification data in the
auxiliary data or a first auxiliary identification data which is
obtained from the first identification data through a predetermined
computation.
19. The optical disk reproducer described in claim 18, and further
characterized by the method of modulation-demodulation of the first
means of demodulation being a method of 8-16
modulation-demodulation, and the method of demodulation of the
second means of demodulation being a method of phase encoding
demodulation.
20. The optical disk reproducer described in claim 18, and further
characterized by the decoding means including a number "n" of
decoding keys, and selecting one of the decoding keys on the basis
of a decoding key identification data reproduced from the main data
in the optical disk.
21. The method of permitting the use of a program described in
claim 6, and characterized in that it comprises the further steps
of: connecting a first computer through a network to the second
computer with a particular address; sending to the second computer
the first identification data for identifying the disk in the
auxiliary data; computing in the second computer the first
identification data through a particular cipher operation, and
sending the resultant (obtained) password to the first computer;
computing the password and the first identification data in the
decoding operation part of the first computer, and sending the
resultant second decoding code to a cipher decoder; and enabling an
impermissible part of the main data in the optical disk to be used
with the second decoding code by means of the cipher decoder.
22. A method of inspecting the illegal installation of a program,
the method being characterized in that it comprises the steps of:
reproducing with a first computer an optical disk including a first
recording area, where main data are recorded in the form of pits,
by a first method of modulation, and a second recording area which
is a predetermined area in the first recording area, where a
reflection film is removed partially, so that auxiliary data are
overwritten by a second method of modulation, which differs from
the first method, the auxiliary data including a first
identification data recorded therein for identifying individual
optical disks, the main data including a first program, an
installation program for installing the first program in the hard
disk in the first computer, and a communication program recorded
therein; reproducing the first identification data from the
auxiliary data; installing the first program in the hard disk;
recording in the hard disk the first identification data or the
first auxiliary identification data which is obtained from the
first identification data through a predetermined computation; and
sending, when the installed first program starts or performs a
particular operation, the first identification data or the first
auxiliary identification data by means of the communication program
to a second computer connected through a network to the first
computer; or checking through the network the second identification
data which corresponds to the first identification data in the hard
disk of the second computer or the second auxiliary identification
data which is the second identification data computed through a
particular operation; and limiting the particular operation of the
first program or adding a particular operation when the first and
second identification data coincide or the first and second
auxiliary identification data coincide.
23. An optical disk including a first recording area, where main
data are recorded in the form of pits, by a first method of
modulation, and a second recording area which is a predetermined
area in the first recording area, where a reflection film is
removed partially in the form of radially long bars from which the
data cannot be read with the naked eye, so that auxiliary data are
overwritten by a second method of modulation, which differs from
the first method, at a lower recording density than the main data,
the optical disk being characterized in; that a first
identification data for identifying individual optical disks is
recorded in the auxiliary data; that a first data is recorded in
the main data in the first recording area of the optical disk, and
that a data associated with the first identification data is
printed as a merchandise bar code which can be read by a
merchandise bar code reader.
24. The optical disk described in claim 23, and further
characterized by the merchandise bar code being printed on the side
other than the reproduction side of the optical disk.
25. A method of permission to use the program of a first data in an
optical disk, the method being characterized in that it comprises
the steps of: reading a first identification data or a first
auxiliary identification data with a merchandise bar code reader in
a first computer from an optical disk including a first recording
area, where main data are recorded in the form of pits, by a first
method of modulation, and a second recording area which is a
predetermined area in the first recording area, where a reflection
film is partially removed, so that auxiliary data are overwritten
by a second method of modulation, which differs from the first
method, the auxiliary data including the first identification data
recorded therein for identifying individual optical disks, the main
data in the first recording area of the optical disk including an
impermissible part the use of which is not permitted, the optical
disk having a bar code printed thereon from which the merchandise
bar code reader can read the first identification data or the first
auxiliary identification data associated with the first
identification data; sending the first identification data or the
first auxiliary identification data through a network to a second
computer; computing with the second computer through a cipher
operation on the basis of the first identification data to make a
permission data which permits the use of an impermissible part;
sending the permission data to the first computer; and printing the
permission data on paper with a printing means by the first
computer.
26. An optical disk including a first recording area, where main
data are recorded in the form of pits, by a first method of
modulation, and a second recording area which is the first
predetermined area in the first recording area, where a plurality
of radially long parts of a reflection film are removed partially,
so that auxiliary data are overwritten over the pits in a low
frequency band for frequency separation from the main data, the
optical disk being characterized by: the auxiliary data including a
first identification data recorded therein for identifying
individual optical disks; and the main data including an
impermissible part recorded therein which can be used with the
first identification data and/or a specified password.
27. The optical disk described in claim 26, and further
characterized by being a read only type optical disk.
28. The optical disk described in claim 26 or 27, and further
characterized by the specified password being obtained through a
specified operation with the first identification data.
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The present invention relates to an optical disk, an optical
disk system and a cryptocommunication method.
BACKGROUND
[0002] In recent years, with the increased use of networks such as
the Internet and optical CD ROM disks, network soft key
distribution for optical ROM disks has increased. Also, electronic
commercial transactions have increased.
[0003] Soft key electronic distribution systems for CD-ROM media
have been used. In conventional systems, it is known to give
passwords and decipher the enciphered soft ciphers recorded on the
CD-ROMs in advance. When CD-ROMs are used, however, it is not
possible additionally to record on the disks, so that it is not
possible to individually set IDs for respective disks. Therefore,
one password would release the ciphers of all the disks
manufactured from the same original disk. For this reason, when
CD-ROMs are used, it is necessary to install the disks' IDs on the
hard disks of personal computers, or mail to users IDs prepared
centrally.
[0004] In electronic distribution systems with conventional optical
disks and/or optical disk systems, there is a need to provide the
disks and/or systems with IDs and/or cipher keys. It is an object
of the present invention to simply provide IDs and cipher keys for
ROM disks in electronic distribution systems.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0005] To achieve the objects of the present invention, the pit
portions of optical disks are provided with an additional recording
area or Burst Cutting Area (hereinafter abbreviated as BCA)
overwritten with a bar code and, when the disks are manufactured,
IDs differing for each disk and, according to the need, cipher keys
for communication and decoding keys for decoding key cipher texts
for communication, are recorded individually in the BCA areas. As a
result, when the disks have been distributed to users, the user ID
numbers, the cipher keys for transmission for communication, and
the decoding keys for reception are distributed automatically to
the users. It is therefore possible to omit some of the procedures
that complicate conventional systems. Also, cryptocommunication and
the identification of disks are made possible at the same time.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0006] FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an optical disk according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0007] FIGS. 2a-c are cross sections and results of trimming with a
pulse laser according to an embodiment of the invention.
[0008] FIGS. 3a-g show the signal reproduction waveforms at a
trimming portion according to an embodiment of the invention.
[0009] FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a reproducer according to an
embodiment of the invention.
[0010] FIG. 5a shows the waveform of a reproduced signal at a BCA
part according to the invention. FIG. 5b shows dimensional
relationships of a BCA part according to the invention.
[0011] FIG. 6 shows a method of cryptocommunication and a cipher
key method by means of a password according to an embodiment of the
present invention.
[0012] FIGS. 7a-c show the format of a BCA according to the
invention.
[0013] FIG. 8 shows a method of cryptocommunication and a method of
unlocking a cipher with a password according to an embodiment of
the invention.
[0014] FIG. 9 shows a procedure for operation of a disk, the
content part of which may have been licensed, according to an
embodiment of the invention.
[0015] FIG. 10 is a block diagram of an example wherein a BCA has
been recorded in a RAM disk according to an embodiment of the
present invention.
[0016] FIG. 11 is a block diagram of a method or system for
prevention of unauthorized copying according to an embodiment of
the invention.
[0017] FIG. 12 is a flow chart depicting preventing unauthorized
copying according to an embodiment of the invention.
[0018] FIG. 13a is a plan view and FIG. 13b is a cross section of
an optical disk, on the BCA of which an article or commodity bar
code has been printed, according to an embodiment of the invention.
FIG. 13c shows a method of producing an optical disk according to
an embodiment of the invention.
[0019] FIG. 14 is a block diagram of a POS settlement system with a
ROM disk having a BCA and a POS terminal according to an embodiment
of the invention.
[0020] FIG. 15 is a flow chart of cipher release in and between a
press company, a software company and a selling store, according to
an embodiment of the present invention.
[0021] FIGS. 16 and 17 are flow charts (Parts 1 and 2,
respectively) of steps of enciphering and decoding cipher data with
a disk ID and/or the like according to an embodiment of the
invention.
[0022] FIGS. 18, 19 and 20 are flow charts (Parts 1, 2 and 3,
respectively) of communication cipher key distribution and
cryptocommunication with a BCA according to an embodiment of the
invention.
[0023] FIGS. 21, 22 and 23 are flow charts (Parts 1, 2 and 3,
respectively) of an electronic settlement system with a BCA
according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0024] FIG. 24 is a block diagram of a method of recording and
reproducing for recording limitation to one RAM disk with a BCA
according to an embodiment of the invention.
[0025] At the end of this specification is appended a list
identifying items corresponding to the reference numerals used in
the aforementioned drawings, that listing being in consecutive
numerical order of the reference numerals.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
[0026] The present invention will be described on the basis a
number of embodiments. Herein, an additional recording area using
the BCA system is referred to as a `BCA area`, and data recorded in
a BCA is referred to as `BCA data`. In addition, first
identification data is referred to as `ID` or `disk ID`.
[0027] FIG. 1 shows a typical process for producing a disk with a
BCA. The first cipher key 802, such as a public key, is used by a
cipher encoder or scrambler 803 to encipher contents 777 into the
first cipher 805. An 8-16 modulator 917, such as a mastering unit,
modulates the first cipher 805. A laser records the modulated
signal as pits in the first recording area 919 of an original disk
800. A molding machine 808a uses the original disk 800 to mold
disk-like transparent substrates (not shown). A reflecting film
making machine 808b forms reflecting Al films, and makes
single-sided disks 809a and 809b which are each 0.6 millimeter
thick. A bonding machine 808c laminates these disks together to
make a completed disk 809. A trimming unit 807 modulates the disk
ID 921, the first cipher decoding key 922, or the second cipher key
923 for Internet communication in the second recording area 920 of
the completed disk 809, with a Phase Encoding-Return to Zero
(PE-RZ) modulator 807a, which combines PE modulation and RZ
modulation. A pulse laser 807b effects BCA trimming to make a disk
801 with a BCA. Because laminated disks are used, it is not
possible to alter the BCA inside, and thus the completed disk can
be used for security.
[0028] A BCA will next be explained briefly.
[0029] As shown in FIG. 2a, a pulse laser 808 trims the reflecting
aluminum films 809 of the two-layer disk 800 in a BCA to record a
stripe-like low reflection part 810 on the basis of a PE modulating
signal. As shown in FIG. 2b, BCA stripes are formed on the disk. If
the stripes are reproduced by a conventional optical head, the BCA
has no reflecting signal. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 2c, gaps
810a, 810b and 810c are produced, where the modulating signal is
missing. The modulating signal is sliced at the first slice level
915. But, the gaps 810a-c have a low signal level, and can
therefore be sliced easily at the second slice level 916. As shown
with the recorded and reproduced waveforms in FIG. 3, it is
possible to reproduce the formed bar codes 923a and 923b by
level-slicing them at the second slice level 916 by a conventional
optical pickup as shown in FIG. 3e. As shown in FIG. 3f, the
waveforms of the codes are shaped by a LPF filter so as to PE-RZ
decode the codes. As shown in FIG. 3g, a digital signal is
output.
[0030] With reference to FIG. 4, the decoding operation will be
explained. A disk 801 with a BCA includes two transparent
substrates, which are laminated with a recording layer 801a between
them. The recording layer may either be a single layer 801a or
include two recording layers 800a and 800b. If there are two
layers, a BCA flag 922 is recorded in the control data of the first
recording layer 800a, which is adjacent to the optical head 6. The
flag 922 indicates whether a BCA is recorded or not. Because a BCA
is recorded in the second layer 800b, the first recording layer
800a is focused on first, and the optical head 6 is moved to the
radial position of the control data 924 in the innermost edge of
the second recording area 919. The control data in main data, and
has therefore been Eight to Fourteen Modulation (EFM), 8-15 or 8-16
modulated. Only when the BCA flag 922 in the control data is `1`, a
single/double layer switching part 827 focuses on the second
recording layer 801b to reproduce the BCA. If the signal is sliced
by a level slicer 590 at the general first slice level 915 as shown
in FIG. 2c, it is converted into a digital signal. This signal is
demodulated in the first demodulation part by an EFM demodulator
925, an 8-15 modulator-demodulator 926 or an 8-16
modulator-demodulator 927. An ECC decoder 36 corrects errors, if
any, and outputs main data. The control data in the main data is
reproduced and only if the BCA flag 922 is 1 is the BCA read. When
the BCA flag 922 is 1, a CPU 923 orders the single/double layer
switching part 827 to drive a focus adjustment part 828, switching
the focus from the first recording layer 801a to the second
recording layer 801b. At the same time, the optical head 6 is moved
to the radial position of the second recording area 920, that is,
for the DVD standard, the BCA is recorded between 22.3 and 23.5 mm
from the inner edge of the control data. Then the BCA is read.
Reproduced in the BCA area is a signal with a partially missing
envelope as shown in FIG. 2c. By setting in the second level slicer
929 the second slice level 916 of which the quantity of light is
smaller than that of the first slice level 915, it is possible to
detect the missing parts of the reflecting portion of the BCA, and
a digital signal in output. This signal is PE-RZ demodulated by the
second demodulation part 930, and ECC decoded by an ECC decoder
930b so as to output BCA data, which is auxiliary data. Thus, the
first demodulator 928, operative according to, 8-16 modulation
demodulates and reproduces the main data, while the second
demodulation part 930 operative according to PE-RZ modulation
demodulates and reproduces the auxiliary data, that is, the BCA
data.
[0031] FIG. 5a shows the reproduced waveform before passage through
a filter 943. FIG. 5b shows the working size accuracy (precision)
of the slits of the low reflecting portion 810. It is difficult to
make the alit width less than 5 mm. In addition, if the data is not
recorded inward radially from 23.5 mm, it will not be properly
reproduced. Therefore, for a DVD, because of the limitations of the
shortest recording cycle of 30 mm and the maximum radius of 23.5
mm, the maximum capacity after formatting in limited to 188 bytes
or less.
[0032] The modulating signal is recorded as pits by the 8-16
modulation mode, and a high frequency signal such as the high
frequency signal part 933 in FIG. 5a is obtained. However, the BCA
signal in a low frequency signal like low frequency signal part
932. Thus, if the main data complies with the DVD standard, it in a
high frequency signal. 932 which is about 4.5 MHz or less, shown in
FIG. 5a, and the auxiliary data is a low frequency signal 933 which
is 8.92 ms in period, that is, about 100 kHz. It is therefore
relatively simple to frequency-separate the auxiliary data with a
LPF 943. A frequency-separating method 934 as shown in FIG. 4,
including the LPF 943 can easily separate the two signals. In this
case, the LPF 943, may be simple in structure.
[0033] The foregoing is an outline of the BCA.
[0034] With reference to FIG. 6, the overall system of a cipher
software unlatching system, narrowed down to the operations of
password issue, cryptocommunication, and orderer certification,
will be described. The steps in a press factory are nearly the same
as in FIG. 1, so the original disk 800 and the completed disk 809
are not shown.
[0035] In a press factory 811, a cipher encoder 812 enciphers the
data in the plaintexts 810 of the first to the `1-m`th contents or
scrambles the picture signals therein with the first to `1-m`th
cipher keys 813, respectively. The data or the signals are then
recorded on an original optical disk 800. Disk-like substrates 809
are pressed from the original disk 800. After a reflecting film is
formed on each substrate 809, the two disk-like substrates are
laminated together. Thereafter a completed disk 809 is made.
Recorded in the BCA areas 814 of completed disks 809 are different
IDs 815 and/or first cipher keys 816 (public keys) and/or second
cipher keys 817 (public keys) and second computer connection
addresses 818 so as to make disks 801 each with a BCA. The disks
801 are distributed to users.
[0036] The contents of these disks have been enciphered. Therefore,
in order to reproduce the contents of each of the disks, it is
necessary to get a password from a password issue center, an
electronic shop or a mall, by paying a charge. That procedure will
be described next.
[0037] In a user's first computer 909, if a reproducer 819
reproduces a distributed disk 801 with a BCA, a BCA reproduction
part 820 including a PE-RZ demodulation part reproduces the data of
the ID 815, first cipher key 816, second cipher key 817 and/or
connection address 818. In order to get a password, the connection
address 818 of the second computer 821a, which is the server of a
password issue center 821, is accessed through a communication part
822 via the Internet or another network 823, and the ID is
transmitted to the second computer 821a.
[0038] Here, the cryptocommunication procedure will be described.
The second computer 821a receives the ID 815 from the user's
reproducer 819. Then, the second computer or server 821a of the
password issue center 821, which is called a mall, or an
`electronic shop` has a cipher key database 824. This database
contains a table of the secret keys which are the decoding keys
corresponding to the disks' own IDs or the first cipher keys 816 of
the IDs, that is the first decoding keys 825 and the IDs. The
server can therefore search for the first decoding key 825 based on
the received ID. Thus cryptocommunication is completed from the
first computer to the second computer 821a. In this case, if the
first cipher key and first decoding key are common keys of a common
key cipher, not of an public key cipher, they are the same key.
[0039] If the user wants to use part of the enciphered contents
stored on the disk 801, which may be 1,000 in number, for example,
the content number 826 of which in `n`, the user sends to the
second computer 821a the cipher which is the content number 826,
that is, `n` enciphered with the public key which is the first
cipher key 816 by the first cipher encoder 827 composed of public
key cipher functions. The second computer 821a searches for the
first decoding key 825 for decoding this cipher as stated above. It
is therefore possible securely to convert this cipher into
plaintext. Thus, the cipher protects the privacy of the user's
order data.
[0040] In this case, a signature may be made by means of the secret
key of the public key cipher as the first cipher key 816. This
method is called `digital signature`. For a detailed explanation of
the operation of `digital signature`, see, for example, `Digital
Signature of E-Mail Security by Bruce Schneider 1995`.
[0041] Back to the cryptocommunication, the cipher is sent through
the communication part 822 and network 823 to the first cipher
decoder 827 of the password issue center 821. Thus the first cipher
decoder 827 decodes the cipher by means of the first pair cipher
key 825 pairing with the first cipher key 816.
[0042] In this case, because only the one disk has the public key,
it is possible to reject invalid orders from third parties' disks.
In other words, because each disk can be certified, it is possible
to certify the user who owns the disk. It is thus certified that
the content number `n` represents a particular individual's order.
It is therefore possible to exclude invalid orders of third
parties.
[0043] If the public key 816 is secret, this method can technically
be used to send a credit card number, or other accounting data
which requires high security. Generally shops called `malls`
however, do not settle users' accounting data electronically,
because there is no guarantee of security. Only the accounting
centers 828 of credit card companies, banks and the like can deal
with users' financial data. Presently, security standards such as
secure electronic transaction (SET) are being unified, so it is
probable that Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) 1024 bit public key
ciphers will be used and the encipherment of financial data will be
possible.
[0044] Next, the accounting data cryptocommunication procedure of
the present invention will be shown. First, by using the second
cipher key 817 of the public key cipher reproduced by the BCA
reproduction part 820, the second cipher encoder 831 enciphers the
accounting data 830 such as an individuals credit card number with
a public key system cipher such as RSA. The enciphered data is sent
from the communication part 822 through the second computer 821 to
the cipher decoder 832 of the third computer 828. In this case, if
there is a need for digital signature, the secret key 829 is used
as the second cipher key 817.
[0045] Similar to the procedure for the cipher key of the second
computer 821a of the password issue center 821, it is possible to
search the cipher key database 824a for the second decoding key 829
corresponding to the ID or the second cipher key 817. By using this
decoding key 829, the second cipher decoder 832 can decode the
enciphered accounting data.
[0046] If a digital signature is made by the second cipher encoder
831 with the secret key 829, the user's signature can be confirmed
in the second cipher decoder 832. The accounting center 828 can
thus get the user's credit card number, bank card number, bank
password, or other accounting data safely even via the Internet. In
open networks such as the Internet, security comes into question.
By means of this system, however, it is possible to make
cryptocommunication or certification without fault, because the
cipher key (public key) for cryptocommunication or the secret key
for digital signature has been recorded in the BCA. It is therefore
possible to prevent third parties' unauthorized accounting and
orders. In addition, because it is possible to use various public
keys for different disks, that is, different users, the
confidentiality of communication is improved, and the possibility
of users' accounting data leaking to third parties is reduced.
[0047] Referring back to FIG. 6, the procedure for issuing a
password and the procedure for unlatching with a password will be
explained. The password issue center 821 includes a password
generation part 834 with an operation expression of public key
ciphers etc. Part 834 generates a password on the basis of three
data fields, namely, the ID, the content number which the user
wants to unlatch, and the time data representing the period of use
allowed. The generated password is sent to the first computer 909.
In the simplest structure example, the second computer enciphers
with the public key for the public key cipher the data which is a
mix of the decoding key disk ID for releasing the cipher of the
`1-n`th content and the timing data, prepares at the password
generation part 834 the `1-n`th password 834a which is a mix of
secret keys for unlatching the enciphered data, and sends this
password 834a to the first computer 909. The first computer 909
receives the `1-n`th password, and decodes with the secret key the
mixed keys of the disk ID, the timing data and the `1-n`th content.
Here, the password operation part 836 checks the ID 835a of the BCA
reproduced from the disk, the present second timing data 835b, the
allowed ID 833a and the first timing data 833, and operates to
determine if they coincide. If they do coincide, they are allowed.
The `1-n`th decoding key 836a is output to the cipher decoder 837.
The cipher 837a of the `1-n`th content is decoded. The `1-n`th
content 838 then is output. The period of output is limited to the
time during which the first timing data 833 and second timing data
835b coincide. The password operation part 836 of the first
computer 909 computes three data fields, which are the ID, the
password 835 and the timing data from the clock 836b representing
the present time. If the ID and timing data are correct, the
correct decoding key is output as the result of the computation.
Therefore, the cipher decoder 837 decodes or descrambles the
`1-n`th cipher, outputting the plaintext data of the `1-n`th
content 838, or a descrambled picture signal or audio signal.
[0048] In this case, if the second timing data 835b of the clock
836b does not coincide with the first timing data 838 of the
password, the cipher is not correctly decoded and therefore not
reproduced. If timing data is used, it can be applied to time-limit
type rental systems, so that a movie can be reproduced for only
three days during a rental period.
[0049] While FIG. 6 shows the procedure in a block diagram, the
flowcharts of the procedure will be explained later with reference
to FIGS. 16-23.
[0050] Next, the system for the cipher key will be described. By
putting, as shown in FIG. 7a, both the first cipher key 816 and
second cipher key 817 in the BCA, it is possible to provide two
securities, for a commodity deal with a shopping mall and an
account settlement with an `accounting center`.
[0051] In this case, with respect to the security with an
accounting center, it is planned to unify standards such as SET, so
that an RSA 1024, that is 128 byte cipher key, will be stored in
the second cipher key area 817a. Then, because the BCA has only 188
bytes, only 60 bytes remain for the cipher key for dealing with a
shopping mall. An elliptic function system public key cipher is a
cipher function which is 20 bytes in magnitude and which has a
security level equal to that of 128 bytes of RSA 1024.
[0052] An elliptic function is used in the first cipher key area
816a of the present invention. An elliptic function can obtain 20
byte security, which is equivalent to RSA 1024. Therefore, by using
an elliptic function, it is possible to store both the first cipher
key 816 and second cipher key 817 in the 188 byte BCA area.
[0053] By applying a BCA to an optical ROM disk, as stated before,
it is possible to record a disk's own ID number, the first and
second cipher keys, and a connection address. In this case, if the
Internet is used, a mall is accessed automatically, and merely by
distributing disks with cipher keys recorded in the BCAs, security
is possible for distribution of commodities by releasing the
ciphers of contents, certification and keeping secret purchase of
goods, certification and keeping secret when accounts are settled,
and the like. Therefore, the method of cryptocommunication of the
present invention can, without lowering security, omit and
rationalize the conventional operations of using IC cards, floppy
disks and/or letters to distribute IDs and/or cipher keys to users.
This is a great advantage. Furthermore, a URL, which is an Internet
connection address, is not fixed, but changeable. The URL is
recorded in the original disk, and may be accessed. It is, however,
not efficient from the points of view of time and cost to vary the
original disk when a URL change is made. By having recorded the
changed URL in the BCA, and connecting the BCA connection address
931 instead of the connection address of the original disk only if
the connection address 931 is reproduced from the BCA, it is
possible to access the changed address 931 without preparing a new
original disk.
[0054] FIG. 6 shows a case where the first key of the public key
and the first key of the public key have been recorded in the
BCA.
[0055] FIG. 8 shows two diagrams, in one of which the first cipher
key 816 of the public key and the third decoding key 817a of the
secret key have been recorded in the BCA. In the other diagram, a
cipher key is produced for cryptocommunication. Because the
procedure is similar to that of FIG. 6, only different points will
be described. First, in a press factory, the first cipher key 816
and third decoding key 817a are recorded in the BCA. The third
decoding key 817a is used to receive the cipher enciphered with the
public key from an accounting center. In this case, the reception
security is improved.
[0056] First, with reference to FIG. 8, a more specific example of
cryptocommunication where a cipher key is generated will be
described. Because the first cipher key 816 is a public key, it is
necessary to record the third decoding key 817a for reception in
the BCA. But the BCA has a small capacity. In addition, the public
key needs processing time. Therefore, in FIG. 8, the cipher key
generation part 838a of the first computer 836 generates a pair of
a cipher key and a decoding key for the public key or a common key
by means of a random number generator or the like. An example of
the common key will be described. A common key K 838 is enciphered
with the first cipher key 816 and first cipher encoder 842, and
sent to the second computer 821a. The second computer uses the main
decoding key 844 to convert this cipher into plaintext by means of
the main cipher decoder 843, obtaining a common key x 838a. Because
both have the common key K, it is possible to make
cryptocommunication from a shop to a user, that is, from the second
computer 821a to the first computer 836 by delivering the common
key K to the second cipher encoder 842a and second cipher decoder
847a. Naturally, it is also possible to make cryptocommunication
from the user to the shop, that is, from the first computer 836 to
the second computer 821a by delivering the common key x to the
second cipher encoder 827a and second cipher decoder 845a. The
effects of the method of recording in the BCA the first cipher key
which is a public key and generating a cipher key will be stated.
First, it is necessary only to record the first cipher key, so that
the recording of the decoding key can be omitted. Therefore, the
small capacity of the BCA is not reduced. Second, because the
decoding key is recorded in the BCA, the security is improved. The
common key may be changed each time.
[0057] Because of the short operation time, the processing time is
short. In this case, if the cipher key generation part 838a has
generated a pair of a cipher key and a decoding key of a public key
cipher, not a common key, it is possible to make the security
higher than that with the common key, though the processing time is
longer, by cryptically sending the cipher key to the second
computer 821a, using this key as the cipher key of the second
cipher encoder 842a, and using the decoding key as the decoding key
of the second cipher decoder 847. If the performance of the
processing CPU is high, it is preferable that the public key be
used. If a new public is key is generated, only the public key for
the first cipher key is recorded in the BCA, so that no problems of
security arise. No capacity of the BCA is consumed either. In
addition, because it is not necessary to change the cipher key,
maintenance is easy.
[0058] This time, if the common key K 838 is defined at the second
computer 821a of the password issue center 821, the common key is
enciphered with the third cipher key 839 by the third cipher
encoder 840, and sent to the personal computer 836. By using the
third decoding key 837 which is the secret key reproduced from the
BCA, the third cipher decoder 841 of the personal computer 836
makes a translation into plaintext to obtain a common key K 838b.
In this case, because only this user has the third decoding key
817a which is the secret key, it is possible to prevent the
contents of communication from the center to the user from leaking
to third parties. The format of this case is shown in FIG. 7b. If
an elliptic function is used, the third decoding key 839b may be 20
bytes, and can therefore be stored in the BCA.
[0059] FIG. 9 shows a system for reducing the costs of preparing an
original disk by using a BCA in an encipherment disk.
[0060] If there is a number `n` of, for example, 1,000 plaintext
contents 850, the cipher encoder 852 enciphers them with the first
to the `m`th cipher keys 851, respectively. The ciphered first to
the `m`th contents 853, the decoding program 854a for the first to
`m`th contents, and the second cipher decoder 861a, which is the
program for decoding the second cipher, are recorded as pits in an
original disk and then molded into a substrate, and a reflecting
film is formed. Thereafter, two substrates are laminated together
to complete an optical disk 801. The second cipher encoder 860
enciphers the decoding data 854 such as the password for unlatching
the `1-n`th, for example, the first content, and the decoding key.
Recorded in advance in the BCA of the first disk are the disk's own
identification data, that is, the ID 855 and the second cipher
which is the enciphered decoding data. Then, in the reproducer, the
second cipher is reproduced from the BCA reproduction part 820. The
second cipher decoder 861 is reproduced from the data reproduction
part 862, which reproduces the ordinary recorded data other than
the BCA. Therefore, the second cipher decoder 861 is used to decode
the second cipher, reproducing the ID 855a and `1-n`th password
854a. The cipher decoder 855b uses the decoding program 854a for
the `1-n`th content reproduced from the data reproduction part 862,
and uses the ID 855a and password 854a to decode the first cipher,
obtaining the plaintext 855a of the `1-n`th content and the
identification data 855a. For a personal computer, the content and
ID are recorded on the hard disk 863. This ID 855a checks to
determine if there is no same ID on a network when the program has
started, and the ID 855a actuates the network protection. It is
therefore possible to prevent the software from being illegally
installed. This is yet another advantage of the present invention.
For example, if 1,000 enciphered contents are stored and decoding
data such as a password corresponding to a particular software
application are recorded on an original disk, this is equivalent in
substance to the preparation of an optical ROM disk for a
particular content. It is possible to obtain with one original disk
the same effect as in the case where original disks for 1,000 kinds
of software are out. It is therefore possible to reduce the costs
and time or labor for preparing an original disk.
[0061] Described with reference to FIG. 10 is the procedure for
enciphering contents with a BCA when recording them on a RAM disk.
First, the BCA reproduction part 820 reproduces the BCA data from
the RAN disk 856, outputs an ID 857, and sends it through the
interfaces 858a and 858b and the network to the encipherment part
859. The cipher encoder 861 of the encipherment part 859 enciphers
contents 860 or scrambles picture and sound signals by means of a
key including the ID 857. The enciphered contents are sent to the
recorder/reproducer, where the recording circuit 862 records them
on the RAM disk 856.
[0062] Next, when this signal is reproduced, the data reproduction
part 865 demodulates the main data to reproduce the enciphered
signal, and the cipher decoder 863 decodes the reproduced signal.
The BCA reproduction part 820 reproduces data containing the ID 857
from the BCA area of the RAM disk 856. The reproduced data is sent
as part of the key to the cipher decoder 863. If normally copied,
the cipher key recorded in the RAM disk is a normal disk ID. The
RAM disk ID, also, is a normal disk ID. Therefore, the cipher is
decoded or descrambled to output the plaintext 864 of the `1-n`th
content. For a graphic data, for example, the MPEG signal is
extended to obtain a picture signal.
[0063] In this case, the disk ID is the key for encipherment.
Because each disk is unique, it can be copied on only one RAM
disk.
[0064] If a disk ID is copied from a normal RAM disk to another RAM
disk, ID1 which is the original normal disk ID differs from ID2
which is the disk ID of the other, unauthorized, RAM disk. If the
BCA of the unauthorized RAM disk is reproduced, ID2 is reproduced.
The contents are ciphered with ID1, however, so that, even if
unlatching is attempted with ID2 at the cipher decoder 863, the
cipher is not decoded because the key differs. Thus, the signal of
the illegally copied RAM disk is not output, so that the copyright
is protected. The present invention uses a disk ID system.
Therefore, by reproducing with any drive the normal RAM disk copied
normally only once, it is possible to unlatch the cipher. The
encipherment part 859 may, in place of the center, be an IC card
with a cipher encoder.
[0065] With reference to the block diagram of FIG. 11 and the
flowchart of FIG. 12, the method of preventing copying will be
described. At Step 877a, the installation program is actuated. At
Step 877b, the BCA reproduction part 820 outputs the ID of the
auxiliary data from the laminated optical disk 801. At Step 877d,
the data reproduction part 865 reproduces the contents and network
check software 870 from the main data. The contents and the ID 857
are recorded on the HDD 872. At Step 877c, the ID 857 is encoded
with a particular secret cipher so as not to be altered illegally,
and is recorded as a soft ID in the HDD 857. Thus, the soft ID 873
is recorded together with the contents on the HDD 872 of a personal
computer 876. Here described is the case where the program is
started at Step 877f of FIG. 12. When the program is started, the
procedure goes to Step 877g, where the soft ID 873 of the HDD 872
is reproduced, and the soft ID 873a in the HDD 872a of another
personal computer 876a on a network 876 is checked through the
interface 875. At Step 877h, a check is made to judge if the soft
ID 873a of the other personal computer and the soft ID 873 are the
same number. If so, the procedure goes to Step 877j, where the
start of the program of the personal computer 876 is stopped or a
warning message is displayed on the screen.
[0066] If the soft ID 873a of the other personal computer and the
soft ID 873 are different, the contents are not installed in the
plurality of the computers on the network. It is therefore decided
that there are no illegal copies. Then the procedure goes to Step
877k, where the start of the program is permitted. In this case,
the soft ID 873 may be sent to other personal computers through the
network. This personal computer can detect illegal installation by
checking duplication of the soft IDs of the personal computers. If
there is illegal installation, a warning message is sent to the
appropriate personal computer/s.
[0067] Thus, by recording the ID in the BCA, and recording the
network check program in the pit recording area, it is possible to
prevent multiple installation of the software of the same ID on the
same network. In this way, simple protection from illegal copies is
realized.
[0068] By, as shown in FIG. 13a, applying a write (writing) layer
850 of white material, on which characters or the like can be
written, it is possible to not only print characters and write a
password or the like with a pen, but also prevent the substrates of
the optical disk from being damaged because the write layer 850
thickens. The disk ID 815, which is part of the BCA data 849
recorded by trimming in the BCA area 801a above the write layer
850, is translated into plaintext. The plaintext is converted into
alphanumeric characters 851. By printing the characters 851 and
general bar code 852, it is possible for the store and/or user to
confirm and/or check the ID with a POS bar code reader and/or
visually, without reading the BCA with a reproducer. The visible ID
is not necessary if the user informs the center of the ID through a
personal computer. If, however, the user communicates the ID
aurally by telephone to the center, it is possible to inform the
center of the ID without inserting the disk in a personal computer,
by printing the ID identical with the BCA ID in visible form on the
disk, because the user can visually read the ID. With reference to
the flowchart of FIG. 13c, the steps for making an optical disk
will be explained. At Step 853d, disks are molded from an original
disk, and substrates in which pits have been recorded are made. At
Step 853e, aluminum reflection films are made. At Step 853f, two
disk substrates are laminated with an adhesive so that a DVD disk
or the like is completed. At Step 853g, a label is printed by
screen printing on one side of each disk. At this step, the
original disk's own identification data is recorded in the form of
a bar code. At Step 853h, an ID and/or other identification
information is printed in the format of a bar code for POS on each
disk by an ink jet bar code printer or a thermal-transcription bar
code printer or the like. At Step 853i, the bar code is read by a
bar code reader. At Step 853j, a BCA data corresponding to the
identification data is recorded in the second recording area of the
disk. According to this method of manufacturing, the BCA data is
recorded after all the steps including the POS bar code and
excluding the BCA are finished and then the disk identification
data is confirmed. The BCA can be read only by reproducing the
disk, but the POS bar code, which is low in density, can be read by
a commercial bar code reader. The disk ID can be discriminated at
every step in the factory. By recording the disk ID in the form of
a POS bar code before the BCA trimming, it is possible to almost
completely prevent the BCA and the POS bar code from being
illegally recorded.
[0069] The method of using a BCA will be stated by which secondary
recording and tertiary recording, too, can be made by the BCA
method. As shown at Process 2 in FIG. 15, a software maker can also
secondarily record a pirated edition prevention mark and a check
cipher. At Process 2, disks 944b may be made in which different ID
numbers and/or cipher keys for secret communication with users have
been recorded. It is possible to replay the disks 944c and 944d
without entering the passwords.
[0070] For another application, at Process 3, an enciphered or
scrambled MPEG picture signal and/or other data is recorded on a
disk 944e. The operation of the MPEG scramble will not be explained
in detail. At Process 4, the software company makes a disk 844f in
which a sub-public key for decoding the ID number and the scramble
release data have been BCA-recorded secondarily. It is not possible
to replay this disk solely. At Process 5, the selling store, after
receiving the money for the disk, makes a password with the
sub-secret key paired with the sub-public key, and records it
tertiarily on the disk. Alternatively, a receipt on which the
password has been printed is given to the user. Thereafter, the
password has been recorded in the disk 844g, so that the user can
replay it. This method prevents a disk not paid for from being
replayed normally, even if the disk is shoplifted, because the
scramble of the image is not released. As a result, shoplifting
renders a useless product and thus decreases.
[0071] If a password is BCA-recorded permanently in a rental video
store or another store, a shoplifted disk can be used. In this
case, as shown at Process 6, the BCA is read by a POS bar code
reader in the store. A password for releasing the scramble is
issued at Step 951g, printed on the receipt at Step 951i, and
handed to the customer at Step 951j. The customer enters, at Step
951k, the password on the receipt in a player with numeric keys at
his/her house. At Step 951p, the disk is replayed for a
predetermined number of dais. If a user rents a disk, given a
password for only part of the software in the disk, and when he/she
wants to view other part of the software, he/she can replay it by
being informed of the password for this part by telephone at Step
951u, and entering the password at Stop 951k. A rental video store
has been shown as an example. When a piece of enciphered software
for a personal computer is sold at a personal computer software
store, the password may be printed by a POS terminal and handed to
the buyer.
[0072] The operations of Processes 5 and 6 in FIG. 15 at a selling
or rental store will be explained in more detail with reference to
FIG. 14. A selling store receives an enciphered and/or scrambled
disk 944f from the software maker. After the store confirms its
receipt of money from a user, it sends from its bar code recorder
945 the ID number of the disk 944f and the data on the sub-public
key via its POS terminal 946 to the password issue center 952. For
a mall-scale system, the password issue center, that is, the system
including the sub-secret key of the sub-public key may exist in the
POS terminal. The password issue center inputs the disk ID number
and the time data at Step 951q, computes them at Step 9518,
enciphers them with the sub-secret key at Step 951t, issues a
password at Step 951g, and sends it through the network 948 and POS
terminal 846 to the BCA bar code recorder 945. Then the recorded
disk 944g is handed to the customer. The disk 944g can be replayed
as it is.
[0073] For rental stores and personal computer software stores, ROM
disks 944f the ciphers and/or scrambles of which have not been
released are displayed in stores. If a customer designates a
particular ROM disk 944f, the bar code of the reflection layer by
the non-reflection part 915 of the disk 944f is read, so that the
disk ID number is read, by a person holding a circular bar code
reader 950 with an integrated rotary optical head 953 for spirally
scanning, and pressing it on the center of disk 900 in a
transparent case. By printing the commodity bar code of the disk ID
as shown at 852 in FIG. 13, it is possible to read the code with an
ordinary POS terminal bar code reader. Alternatively, the pressed
circular bar code recorded in advance on the original disk may be
read. These data including the disk ID are processed by the POS
terminal 946. The charge is settled by credit card. The password
issue center issues, at Step 951g, a password associated with the
ID number as stated above. For rental use, a password is made by
enciphering the disk ID number with date data added as used at Step
951r in order to limit the number of days for which the disk can be
replayed. For this password, the disk can operate on only
particular days. It is therefore possible to set a rental period,
which may be three days, for instance, in the password.
[0074] The thus issued password for descrambling is printed at Step
951i together with the date of rent, the date of return and the
rental title charge on the receipt 949, and handed with the disk to
the customer. The customer takes the disk 944j and receipt 949
home. At step 951k, the customer enters the password with the
ten-key input part 954 of the first computer 909 in FIG. 6, so that
the password 835 is computed with the ID number 835a and input into
the cipher decoder 837. Then, the password is converted into
plaintext by means of the decoding key. Only if the password is
correct, will the cipher decoder 837 descramble the program data
and supply image output.
[0075] In this case, if the password includes time data, the data
is checked with the date data of the clock part 836b. The password
is descrambled for the coincident dates. The inputted password is
stored together with the associated ID number in the nonvolatile
memory 755a of the memory 755. Once the user enters the password,
it is descrambled without being entered again. It is thus possible
to lock and unlock the disk electronically in distribution.
[0076] With reference to FIG. 16, the method of decoding the
software of a disk which has been recorded as cipher data will be
explained in detail.
[0077] Step (Process) 865 represents the overall flow of
distribution of cipher data and individual IDs to users. First, at
Step 865a, a number `m` of data enciphered with the secret first
cipher key and a program for decoding the enciphered data are
recorded in the ROM area of an original disk. At Step 865b,
substrates are molded from the original disk, and then the
substrates with reflection films added thereto are laminated in
pairs to make completed ROM disks. At Step 865c, the decoding data
(the disk identification data different for the pressed disks,
respectively, and/or the decoding key for the cipher data)
necessary to decode the enciphered data is recorded in the
auxiliary recording area (called BCA), which cannot be rewritten,
of each completed disk by a method of modulation different from
that for the ROM area. At Step 865d, a user replays the distributed
disk, selects a desired enciphered data `n`, and starts the
decoding process. At Step 865e, the user's first computer
reproduces the enciphered data and the decoding program from the
ROM area, and reads the decoding data from the auxiliary recording
area (BCA). If, at Step 865f, the second decoding data is not
obtained on-line, then, at Step 871a of FIG. 17, the ID and/or
other auxiliary decoding data are displayed on the screen. At Step
871b, the user obtains the second decoding data such as the
password associated with the ID, and enters it into the first
computer. Carried out at Step 871c is a particular operation of an
open-key cipher function with the disk identification data, the
second decoding data, and the enciphered data `n` If, at Step 871d,
the result is correct, then, at Step 871f, the `1-n`th data is
translated into plaintext, so that the user can make the software
of the data `n` operate.
[0078] Next, with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 18, the method
of cryptocommunication essential to the Internet and/or the like
using a BCA will be described. Step (Process) 868 is the routine of
the method of distributing the communication program and cipher key
for communication to users. First, at Step 868a, at least the
communication program and/or connection data are recorded in the
ROM area of an original disk. At Step 868b, substrates are molded
from the original disk, and the substrates are laminated in pairs
to make completed ROM disks. At Step 868c, the disk identification
data different for the pressed disks, respectively, and the cipher
key for cryptocommunication are recorded in the non-rewritable
auxiliary recording area (BCA) of each completed disk. According to
circumstances, the connection address of the second computer and/or
the decoding key for cryptocommunication is recorded by a method of
modulation different from that for the ROM area. At Step 868d, the
user's first computer reproduces the communication program and the
decoding program from the ROM area, and reads the disk
identification data and the cipher key for communication from the
auxiliary recording area. The process continues at FIG. 19. At Step
867a, it is judged if there is a connection address in the BCA
area. If yes, the second computer is accessed, at Step 867b, on the
basis of the connection address such as the BCA area URL. If there
is no connection address, the computer of the connection address in
the ROM area is accessed at Step 867c. At Stop 867d, the transmit
data is input. At Stop 867e, it is judged if there is a cipher key
for cryptocommunication in the BCA area. If so, the transmit data
is enciphered, at step 867g, with the cipher key for
cryptocommunication in the BCA area to make a third cipher. If not,
the data is enciphered, at step 867f, with the cipher key for
cryptocommunication in the ROM area or HDD to make a third
cipher.
[0079] In FIG. 20, Step (Process) 869 represents the routine of
generating a decoding key for the cipher received from the second
computer 910. First, at Step 869a, the first computer judges if a
decoding key for communication is necessary. If necessary, the
process goes to Step 869b, where a check is made to judge if there
is a decoding key for communication in the BCA if there is no
decoding key, the process goes to Step 869c, where a pair of second
cipher key for communication and second decoding key for
communication is generated newly with the program for generating
the cipher key/decoding key reproduced from the ROM area, by the
user keying or with data from a random number generator and the
second encoder reproduced from the ROM area. At Step 869d, a fourth
cipher is made which is the second cipher key for communication
and/or the user data enciphered with the cipher key for
communication recorded in the BCA and the encipherment software
reproduced from the ROM area. At Step 869e, the fourth cipher and
the disk identification data and/or the user address are sent to
the second computer of the connection address reproduced from the
disk. The process of the second computer includes Step 869f, where
the fourth cipher, the disk identification data and the user
address are received. At Stop 869g, the decoding key for
communication paired with the disk identification data is selected
from the decoding key data base, and the fourth cipher is decoded
with the selected key to obtain the plaintext of the second cipher
key for communication. At Step 869h, the fifth cipher which is the
server data including part of the user data and enciphered with the
second cipher key for communication is sent through the Internet
908 to the first computer. At Step 869i, the fifth cipher (and disk
identification data) is (are) received, and decoded with the second
decoding key for communication and the decoding function recorded
in the ROM area to obtain the plaintext of the server data. In this
way, the method of Step 869 in FIG. 20 realizes two-way
cryptocommunication between the first and second computers.
[0080] In FIG. 21, Step (Process) 870 represents the routine of
receiving accounting data. If, at Step 870a, the accounting data is
input, the third cipher key of the public key cipher for accounting
communication is requested from the second computer. At Step 870b,
the second computer requests the third cipher key from the third
computer. The third computer 911 sends the ID and third cipher key
to the second computer, though the exchange step is omitted. At
Step 870c, the second computer receives the ID and third cipher
key. At Step 870e, the seventh cipher which is the third cipher key
enciphered with the second cipher key for communication and/or the
like is sent to the first computer. The first computer receives the
seventh cipher at Step 870f. At Step 870g, the received seventh
cipher is decoded with the second decoding key for communication 80
as to obtain the third cipher key (public key of public key
function). At Step 870h, the third cipher key is recorded on the
HDD according to circumstances. This is used for the next
transmission. At Step 870i, it is judged if a credit card number, a
password for settlement and/or other secret accounting data are
input. At Step 870j, the eighth cipher which is the accounting data
enciphered with the third cipher key is sent via the second
computer to the third computer. At Step 870k, the second computer
receives the eighth cipher and transfers it again to the third
computer. Only the third computer 912, which is, for example, at a
banking institution, has the decoding key for the third cipher, so
that the second computer, which is an electronic store, cannot
decode it. At Step 870m, the third computer determines from the
cipher key data base the third decoding key associated with the
third cipher key by using identification data on the disk and/or
the like, and decodes the eighth cipher with the third decoding
key, which is the secret key of the public key cipher, so as to
obtain the plaintext of the accounting data. At Step 870n, a check
is made to judge from the user's credit data, deposit remains
and/or other banking data whether the money can be received. At
Step 870p, the third computer informs the second computer of the
result of the search. The second computer, which is an electronic
store, judges at Step 870q if the money can be received. If not,
the process goes to Step 870r, where the article and/or the key for
decoding the cipher software is not sent. If the money can be
received, for a key provision system as shown in FIG. 16, the
process goes to Step 870s, where the cipher software decoding key,
that is, the article is sent via Internet 908 to the user's second
computer. At Step 870t, the first computer receives the cipher
software decoding key. At Step 870u, the cipher of the `1-n`th
enciphered software is released. At Step 870w, the plaintext of the
software is obtained. In this way, a content key provision system
is realized.
[0081] The method of Step 870 in FIG. 21 requests the third
computer, that is, a banking institution to issue according to the
need a public key for the third cipher key, which needs high
security for accounting data. It is not necessary to record the
public key in the BCA in advance. It is therefore possible to use
for the third cipher key a stronger RSA system cipher key of 256
bytes of RS2048 without consuming the BCA capacity. Further,
because there is no need for recording in the BCAs of all disks in
advance, the total of the issued third cipher keys decreases, and
the computer CPU time taken to compute the third cipher keys
decreases. In addition, because the third ciphers do not exist in
the BCAS, they are not opened, so that the security is improved. In
this case, the role of the BCA is, as shown in FIGS. 19 and 20, to
record the identification data of a secret communication disk by
means of the cipher key of the RSA1024 grade. Only one BCA disk
realizes cryptocommunication with the second computer, so that the
effect is high.
[0082] With reference to FIG. 22, Step (Process) 872 of
cryptocommunication in a case where the cipher key and the decoding
key both for communication have been recorded in the BCA will be
described. At Step 872g, the first computer 909 sends to the second
computer 910 the ninth cipher which is the user data enciphered
with the cipher key for communication reproduced from the BCA, the
basic identification data recorded in the ROM area when the
original disk was made, and the disk identification data recorded
in the BCA area. At Step 872b, the second computer receives the
ninth cipher, the disk identification data and the basic
identification data. At Stop 872c, the decoding key for
communication paired with the disk identification data from the
decoding key data base is retrieved, and the ninth cipher is
decoded to obtain the plaintext of the user data. At Step 872e, the
second cipher key associated with the disk identification data is
selected from the cipher key data base. In addition, the second
computer sends to the first computer the tenth cipher which is the
server data enciphered with this second cipher and the third cipher
key received from the third computer by the procedure described in
FIG. 21 and enciphered with the second cipher. The first computer
receives the tenth cipher at Step 872f. At Step 872g, the received
seventh cipher is decoded with the second decoding key for
communication recorded in the BCA, to obtain the plaintext of the
server data and the third cipher key (public key of the public key
function). At Step 872h, according to the need, the third cipher
key is recorded on the HDD. At Step 872i, it is judged if the
accounting data is input. If so, the process goes to Step S72j,
where the eleventh cipher which is the accounting data enciphered
with the third cipher key is sent via the second computer to the
third computer. At Step 872m, the second computer sends the
eleventh cipher again to the third computer. At Step 872m, the
third computer determines from the third cipher key data base, the
third cipher key paired with the identification data on the disk
and/or the like, and decodes the eleventh cipher to obtain the
plaintext of the accounting data. At Step 872n, the possibility
that the money can be received from the user is checked. At Step
872p, the result of the search is sent to the second computer. At
Step 872q, the second computer checks to judge if the money can be
received from the user. If so, for a key provision system as shown
in FIG. 16, the process goes to Step 872s, where the cipher
software decoding key, that is, an article is sent via the Internet
to the user's second computer. At Step 872t, the first computer
receives the cipher software decoding key. At Step 872u, the cipher
of the `1-n`th enciphered software is released. At Step 872w, the
plaintext of the software is obtained. In this way, a content key
provision system is realized.
[0083] The merit of the effect of the method of Step 872 in FIG. 22
is that, because both the cipher key and the decoding key are
recorded in the BCA area, it is not necessary to transmit the
decoding key and/or the cipher key necessary for reception from the
second computer. The maximum BCA capacity is 188 bytes. A public
key and/or another cipher function needs only 128 bytes, and can
therefore be recorded. Further, it is possible to bidirectionally
encipher the grade in RSA512. Because seven or eight elliptic
functions can, as shown in FIG. 7, be stored, elliptic functions
are more effective.
[0084] With reference to FIG. 23, the operation and effect in a
case where the first and third cipher keys have been recorded in
the BCA in advance will be explained. Because Steps 872a through
872w in FIG. 22 are nearly identical with Steps 873a through 873w
in FIG. 23, only the different steps will be explained.
[0085] The third cipher key for protecting the security for
accounting data and/or other banking data has been recorded in the
BCA. Therefore, at Step 873e, the second and third computers do not
need to generate and send the third cipher key. At Steps 873e, 873f
and 873g, the twelfth cipher is sent and received. At Step 873j,
the third cipher key is read from the BCA area, and the user's
accounting data is sent via the second computer to the third
computer. The method of FIG. 23 does not need the third cipher key
generated, sent and received at all, so that the procedure is
simple.
[0086] In the case of electronic settlement systems, in general,
there are a plurality of accounting centers representative of
credit companies. Therefore, naturally, there is a need for a
plurality of third cipher keys, which are public keys. As explained
with reference to FIG. 7b, there is a need for an RSA1024 grade or
more, that is, 128 bytes or more if an RSA cipher function is used.
The third cipher key 817b can therefore enter only one place of 188
bytes of the BCA. However, elliptic-function cipher keys (elliptic
ciphers) which have appeared in recent years give, with small
capacity, security equivalent to that of RSA. In recent years, RSA
function RSA1024 has been the lowest standard of banking data
security. While an RSA function needs 128 bytes, it is said that an
elliptic cipher needs only about 20 through 22 bytes for equivalent
security. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 7c, it is possible to store
in the BCA seven, eight or fewer third ciphers which deal with
banking data. The use of elliptic functions realizes a
BCA-application electronic settlement system which can deal with a
plurality of essential banking centers. Explanation has been made,
concentrated on the third cipher, but even if an elliptic cipher is
used for the public key for the first cipher key, its effect is
similar because high security is kept in relation to a plurality of
electronic stores.
[0087] With reference to FIG. 24, the RAM disk recorder/reproducer
with a BCA explained with reference to FIG. 10 will be described in
more detail. As an embodiment, the procedure for recording in a RAN
disk in a so-called pay-per-view system will be described. First,
with its program transmitter 883, a CATV company or another
software company enciphers movie software or other contents 880 by
using the first cipher key 882 in the first encoder to generate a
first cipher 900, and sends this cipher to a decoder 886 such as
each user's CATV decoder. If the decoder 886 sends a request for a
particular program through a network to a key issue center 884, the
center sends the first decoding data 885a to the first decoding
part 887 of the first decoder 886. The first decoding data 885a is
a particular piece of software such as the scramble release key for
the particular decoder system ID number and particular timing data
903, and includes a recording permission card 901 for a RAM disk.
The first decoding part 887 decodes the first cipher 900 with the
system ID 888 and first decoding data 885a. In the case of a
picture signal, the signal descrambled once and scrambled further
with another cipher to protect the signal from being copied is
output from the third cipher output part 889. The picture can be
viewed and listened to on a general TV 899, though the original
signal is guarded from being copied. If the recording permission
code 901a is NO, it is not possible to record in a RAM disk 894. If
OK, however, it is possible to record in only one RAM disk 894.
This method will be explained.
[0088] In the decoder 886, an IC card 902 is inserted, and the BCA
reproduction part 895 reads the BCA of the RAM disk 894 in a RAM
recorder. Then the disk ID 905 is sent to the IC card 902. The IC
card 902 checks the recording permission code 901a and the present
time data 904 obtained from the disk IC 905 and the decoder 886,
and makes a two-way hand-shake type copy check 907 with the third
cipher output part 889. If the recording permission code and copy
checks are OK, the second auxiliary encoder 891 in the IC card 902
issues a second cipher key 906. The second encoder 890 enciphers
the third cipher again to generate a second cipher, which is the
contents 880 enciphered with the disk ID of a particular disk. The
second cipher is sent to the RAM recorder 892, where it is 8-15 or
8-16 modulated by the first modulation part in the recording means
893. The second cipher 912 is recorded in the first recording area
894a of the RAM disk 894 by means of a laser. In this way, the data
of the RAM disk 894 is enciphered with the particular disk ID
number.
[0089] When the reproduction signals in this disk are 8-16
demodulated by the first modulation 896a using a normal
reproduction means 896, the second cipher of the contents is
output. The second decoder 897 has second decoding keys 898a, 898b
and 898c, which correspond to the cipher keys of the IC cards
different for CATV stations or other is program supply companies,
respectively. In this case, the decoding key identification data of
the decoder 868 or IC card 886 has been recorded in the first
recording area 894a. The reproducer reads the decoding key
identification data 913 from the first recording area 894a. The
decoding key selection means 914 automatically selects out of the
decoding keys 898a through 898z the second decoding key 898a
corresponding to each cipher key. With the disk ID 905a as a key,
the second decoder 897 decodes the second cipher. An IC card having
a particular decoding key might be used. In the case of an image,
it is possible to obtain a normal image descrambled at a TV
899a.
[0090] In the system of FIG. 24, a disk ID 905 is sent to the IC
card inserted into the decoder in each user's home to encipher
picture image data and/or the like. It is therefore not necessary
for the software company 883 to individually change the cipher of
the contents for distribution to users. Consequently, when
broadcasting scrambled pay-per-view images to a great number of
viewers as is the case with satellite broadcasting and CATV, it is
possible to permit recording in only one RAM disk per user.
[0091] If, at the same time when recording is made in a disk in the
system of FIG. 24, an attempt is made to illegally copy, that is,
record in a second disk, that is, a RAN disk of another disk ID, it
is not possible to alter the disk ID because two-layer disks are
used for BCAs. Therefore, unauthorized copying in the second disk
at the same time is prevented. It can be considered that during
another time period, a simulated or dummy recording permission code
901a and/or a third cipher is sent to the decoder and/or IC card
and data is recorded in a RAM disk of another disk ID. Even against
such unauthorized practice, the decoder time data control part 902
in the IC card compares the time of the timing data 903 of the key
issue center 884 and/or the time of the time data of the contents
and the present time of the time data part 904a in the decoder to
judge if they coincide. If so (OK), the IC card 902 permits the
encipherment of the second cipher computing unit 990.
[0092] In this case, a hand-shake type time check method might be
used which makes the second encoder 890 and first decoder 887
exchange check data bidirectionally.
[0093] In the case of the hand-shake type, the second cipher
computing unit 890 including the IC card, the first decoding part
887, and the third cipher part 889 confirm the cipher data
bidirectionally. This prevents the unauthorized copying during the
other time periods outside the time when the contents are sent.
[0094] In this way, in each user's decoder 886, the software
company's contents are recorded in only one RAM disk 894 for each
particular disk ID. This disk can be reproduced by any RAM disk
reproducer. Even in the case of recording in a RAM disk by the
method of FIG. 24, the software company's copyright is protected.
Althoughthe encipherment and decoding have been explained with
reference to the cipher encoders and cipher decoders, respectively,
in the detailed description of the drawings, the cipher algorithm
and the decoding algorithm are practically used with programs in a
CPU.
[0095] Industrial Applicability
[0096] By thus recording in advance the cipher key and/or the
decoding key for an ID and/or a cipher in the BCA area of an
optical disk, it is possible to release the cipher of enciphered
contents by a simpler procedure in addition, the secrecy of
communication is realized without a conventional procedure for
registration. By storing a network check program in contents, it is
possible to prevent pieces of software of the same ID on the same
network being installed. Thus, there are various effects on the
improvement of security.
Reference Numerals
[0097] 801: disk with a BCA
[0098] 802: fixed key
[0099] 803: cipher encoder or scrambler
[0100] 804: recording means
[0101] 805: contents
[0102] 806: ID
[0103] 807: trimming unit
[0104] 808a: molding machine
[0105] 808b: reflecting film making machine
[0106] 808: bonding machine
[0107] 809: completed disk
[0108] 809a: single-sided disk
[0109] 809b: single-sided disk
[0110] 811: press field
[0111] 813: fixed key
[0112] 814: BCA area
[0113] 815: disk ID
[0114] 816: first cipher key (secret key)
[0115] 817: second cipher key (secret key)
[0116] 818: connection address
[0117] 819: reproducing unit
[0118] 820: BCA reproducing section
[0119] 821: password issue center
[0120] 822: communication section
[0121] 823: network
[0122] 824: cipher key DB
[0123] 825: first decoding key
[0124] 826: contents number
[0125] 827: first cipher decoder
[0126] 828: accounting center
[0127] 829: second decoding key
[0128] 830: accounting data
[0129] 831: second cipher encoder
[0130] 832: second cipher decoder
[0131] 833: timing data
[0132] 834: password producing section
[0133] 835: password
[0134] 836: personal computer
[0135] 837: third decoding key
[0136] 838: common key
[0137] 839: third cipher key
[0138] 840: third cipher encoder
[0139] 841: third cipher decoder
[0140] 842: main cipher encoder
[0141] 843: main cipher decoder
[0142] 844: main decoding key
[0143] 845: first cipher decoder
[0144] 846: cipher encoder
[0145] 847: cipher decoder
[0146] 849: BCA data
[0147] 850: writing layer
[0148] 851: character
[0149] 852: general bar code
[0150] 853: decoder
[0151] 860: second cipher encoder
[0152] 861: second cipher decoder
[0153] 862: data reproducing section
[0154] 863: ROM area
[0155] 864: additional recording area
[0156] 865: decoding flowchart
[0157] 890: second cipher computing unit
[0158] 894a: first recording area
[0159] 908: Internet
[0160] 909: first computer
[0161] 910: second computer
[0162] 911: third computer
[0163] 912: second cipher
[0164] 913: decoding key identifying data
[0165] 914: decoding key selecting means
[0166] 915: first slice level
[0167] 916: second slice level
[0168] 917: PE-RZ modulator
[0169] 918: transparent substrate
[0170] 919: first recording area
[0171] 920: second recording area
[0172] 921: disk ID
[0173] 922: BCA flag
[0174] 923: CPU
[0175] 924: control data
[0176] 925: EFM demodulation
[0177] 926: 8-15 modulation-demodulation
[0178] 927: 8-16 modulation-demodulation
[0179] 928: first demodulating section
[0180] 930: second demodulating section
[0181] 931: connection address
* * * * *