To: | Surface-Tech LLC (alison@slindenelson.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90022722 - ACE - N/A |
Sent: | February 12, 2021 01:59:58 PM |
Sent As: | ecom121@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 Attachment - 44 Attachment - 45 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90022722
Mark: ACE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Surface-Tech LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: February 12, 2021
This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued on September 22, 2020 in connection with this application. The assigned trademark examining attorney inadvertently omitted a refusal of registration and an advisory relevant to the mark in the subject application. See TMEP §§706, 711.02. Specifically, Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion and Section 2(f) Acquired Distinctiveness.
The trademark examining attorney apologizes for any inconvenience caused by the delay in raising this issue(s).
The issues raised in the previous Office action are satisfied. See TMEP §713.02.
The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:
• NEW ISSUE: Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• NEW ISSUE: Section 2(f) Acquired Distinctiveness
Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action. 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02. If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned. 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark is the wording “ACE” appearing in standard characters. Registrant’s mark is the stylized wording “ACE”. Applicant’s mark is highly similar to registrant’s mark(s) in appearance, sound, and commercial impression.
A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Here, since the applied for mark could be shown in any manner, it could be shown in a way identical to the registered mark. Therefore, that the applied for mark appears in standard characters will not obviate confusion. These marks are in effect identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. Because the marks are highly similar, purchasers are likely to believe that the goods emanate from the same source. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar, and the first prong of the likelihood of confusion test is met.
Comparison of the Goods
The second prong of the likelihood of confusion test is a comparison of applicant’s and registrant’s goods.
Applicant’s goods are:
NON-WOVEN POLYMER FIBERS COMBINED WITH WAX AND USED TO STRENGTHEN AND REINFORCE BUILDING MATERIALS
Registrant’s goods are, in relevant part:
Class 019: BLACK TOP SEALERS; DRYWALL JOINT COMPOUND; GLAZING COMPOUNDS; MATERIALS CONTAINING LATEX AND SMALL AGGREGATES FOR FILING HOLES AND CRACKS IN DRIVEWAYS; PLASTIC AND LIQUID DRIVEWAY CRACK SEALERS COMPOUNDS; SPACKLING COMPOUND; TILE GROUT
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
In this case, applicant’s goods are closely related to registrant’s goods.
The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from http://www.homedepot.com/, http://www.emisupply.com/, and http://www.acehardware.com/, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
The evidence shows that purchasers are accustomed to encountering the goods of the applicant and registrant offered under the same mark. Therefore, purchasers are likely to believe the goods emanate from the same source. Accordingly, the goods of applicant and the registrant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis, and the second prong of the test is met.
Conclusion
Because the marks are highly similar and the goods are closely related, there is a likelihood of purchaser confusion as to the source of the goods. Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).
SECTION 2(F) ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVENESS
Applicant may withdraw this claim by instructing the trademark examining attorney to delete it from the application record. See id. If applicant does not withdraw the claim, it will remain in the application record and be printed on the registration certificate. See TMEP §1212.10.
A claim of acquired distinctiveness may be construed as a concession by applicant that the entire applied-for mark is not inherently distinctive. See Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1358, 92 USPQ2d 1626, 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1577, 6 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1212.02(b).
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Christopher Renneker/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 121
571-272-8045
christopher.renneker@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE