U.S. patent number RE36,310 [Application Number 08/644,286] was granted by the patent office on 1999-09-21 for method of transferring data, between computer systems using electronic cards.
This patent grant is currently assigned to Kommunedata I/S. Invention is credited to Jorgen Bjerrum, Sven Kjaer Nielsen, Steen Ottosen.
United States Patent |
RE36,310 |
Bjerrum , et al. |
September 21, 1999 |
Method of transferring data, between computer systems using
electronic cards
Abstract
When transferring data, an electronic document or the like from
a first computer system (100) to a second computer system (200) via
a data transmission line (300), e.g. a public data transmission
line, a first output and input station (122) comprising a first
electronic card (124) and a second output and input station (222)
comprising a second electronic card (224) are used. The data is
transferred to the first electronic card (124) from the first
computer system (100) via the first station (122) and is encrypted
in the first electronic card (124), whereupon the data is output
from the first electronic card (124) in encrypted form and
transferred via the first station (122) to the first computer
system (100) and therefrom to the data transmission line (300). The
data is received by the other computer system (200) in encrypted
form and is transferred to the second electronic card (224) via the
second station (222), whereupon the data is decrypted in the second
electronic card (224) and is output from the second electronic card
via the second station (222) to the second computer system (200).
As the data transfer between the first and the second computer
system is carried out between the first and the second electronic
card, no third parties have neither authorized or unauthorized
possibility of interfering with the data transmission and possibly
changing the data or the electronic document. The first and second
electronic card (124, 224) constitute a coherent set of cards
comprising coherent encryption/decryption keys input into the
internal storages of the cards.
Inventors: |
Bjerrum; Jorgen (Oure,
DK), Ottosen; Steen (Odense So, DK),
Nielsen; Sven Kjaer (Albertslund, DK) |
Assignee: |
Kommunedata I/S (Copenhagen,
DK)
|
Family
ID: |
27094447 |
Appl.
No.: |
08/644,286 |
Filed: |
May 10, 1996 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
Issue Date |
|
Reissue of: |
772372 |
Jun 7, 1990 |
05311595 |
May 10, 1994 |
|
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Current U.S.
Class: |
713/168; 713/170;
380/278 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G07F
7/1008 (20130101); G07F 7/1016 (20130101); G06Q
20/40975 (20130101); H04L 9/3234 (20130101); G06Q
20/341 (20130101); H04L 2209/56 (20130101) |
Current International
Class: |
G07F
7/10 (20060101); H04L 9/00 (20060101); H04L
009/12 () |
Field of
Search: |
;380/23,25 |
References Cited
[Referenced By]
U.S. Patent Documents
Foreign Patent Documents
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0114368 |
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Aug 1984 |
|
EP |
|
0147716 |
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Jul 1985 |
|
EP |
|
0194839 |
|
Apr 1986 |
|
EP |
|
0277247 |
|
Aug 1988 |
|
EP |
|
0285520 |
|
Oct 1988 |
|
EP |
|
0396894 |
|
Nov 1990 |
|
EP |
|
166541B1 |
|
Mar 1991 |
|
EP |
|
2526977 |
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Jun 1988 |
|
FR |
|
3681797 |
|
Mar 1988 |
|
DE |
|
1399020 |
|
Jun 1975 |
|
GB |
|
Other References
"Smart Credit Cards: The answer to cashless shopping" IEEE Spectrum
pp. 43-49, Feb. 1984..
|
Primary Examiner: Cangialosi; Salvatore
Attorney, Agent or Firm: Merchant Gould Smith Edell Welter
& Schmidt
Claims
We claim:
1. A method of transferring data from a first computer system to a
second computer system via a data transmission line by use of a
coherent set of electronic cards, wherein for said transfer
a first station is used for outputting data from and inputting data
into a first electronic card, said first station being connected to
and communicating with said first computer system and furthermore
being connected to said data transmission line via said first
computer system and interfacing means, and
a second station is used for outputting data from and inputting
data into a second electronic card, said second station being
connected to and communicating with said second computer system and
furthermore being connected to said data transmission line via this
second computer system and interfacing means,
said first and second electronic card each comprising a central
data processing unit, an internal storage means, an input/output
gate for communication with said corresponding station as well as
an encryption/decryption means and together constituting the
coherent set of electronic cards comprising coherent encryption and
decryption keys input into said internal storages of said cards in
such a way that the cards are able to communicate with each other
and encrypt and decrypt data transferred from the first card to the
second card and vice versa, said method comprising the steps
of:
transferring said data to said first electronic card from said
first computer system via said first station and said input/output
gate of said first electronic card, and inputting and temporarily
storing said data in said internal storage of said first electronic
card,
outputting said data from said internal storage of said first
electronic card and encrypting said data in said first electronic
card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first
electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
outputting said data from said first electronic card in encrypted
form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card and
transferring said encrypted data via said first station to said
first computer system and therefrom via said interfacing means of
said first computer system to said data transmission line,
receiving said data by said second computer system in encrypted
form via said interfacing means of said second computer system,
transferring said encrypted data to said second electronic card via
said second station and via said input/output gate of said second
electronic card, and inputting and temporarily storing said data in
said internal storage of said second electronic card,
outputting said data from said internal storage of said second
electronic card in encrypted form and decrypting said data in said
second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means
of said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card, and
outputting said data from said second electronic card in
.[.encrypted.]. .Iadd.decrypted .Iaddend.form via said input/output
gate of said second electronic card and via said second station to
said second computer system.
2. A method according to claim 1, further comprising the steps of
making a verification of the authenticity of said first electronic
card relative to said second electronic card and vice versa prior
to said transfer of said data from said first computer system to
said second computer system.
3. A method according to claim 1, further comprising the step of
making a verification of the integrity of said data at said
transfer of said data from said first computer system to said
second computer system.
4. A method according to claim 1, wherein said inputting into, said
outputting from, said encryption and said decryption and possibly
said authenticity and integrity verification is controlled
autonomously by said central data processing unit of said
individual card.
5. A method according to claim 4, wherein said transfer of said
data is made in accordance with the LECAM protocol.
6. A method according to claim 2, said authenticity verification
comprising the steps of:
generating a first set of data in said first electronic card,
inputting and storing said first set of data in said internal
storage of said first electronic card, and encrypting said first
set of data in said first electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said
encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first
electronic card,
outputting said first set of data from said first electronic card
in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first
electronic card, transferring said first set of data via said first
station to said first computer system and therefrom via said
interfacing means of said first computer system to said data
transmission line,
receiving said first set of data by said second computer system in
encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer
system, transferring said encrypted first set of data to said
second electronic card via said second station and via said
input/output gate of said second electronic card, and inputting and
temporarily storing said encrypted first set of data in said
internal storage of said second electronic card,
outputting said first set of data received by said second computer
system in encrypted form from said internal storage of said second
electronic card, and decrypting said encrypted first set of data in
said second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption
means of said second electronic card and said decryption key(s)
stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said second
electronic card, said first set of data received by said second
computer system in encrypted form and decrypted in said second
electronic card,
generating a second set of data in said second electronic card, and
inputting and storing said second set of data in said internal
storage of said second electronic card,
generating, in said second electronic card, a first combination of
said first set of data received by said second computer system in
encrypted form, decrypted and stored in said internal storage of
said second electronic card and said second set of data stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card, and inputting
and storing said first combination in said internal storage of said
second electronic card,
encrypting said first combination in said second electronic card by
means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic
card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of
said second electronic card,
outputting said first combination from said second electronic card
in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said second
electronic card, and transferring said encrypted first combination
via said second station to said second computer system and
therefrom via said interfacing means of said second computer system
to said data transmission line,
receiving said first combination by said first computer system in
encrypted form via said interfacing means of said first computer
system, transferring said encrypted first combination to said first
electronic card via said first station and via said input/output
gate of said first electronic card, and inputting and temporarily
storing said encrypted first combination in said internal storage
of said first electronic card,
outputting, from said internal storage of said first electronic
card, said first combination received by said first computer system
in encrypted form, and decrypting said encrypted first combination
in said first electronic card by means of encryption/decryption
means of said first electronic card and said decryption key(s)
stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said first
electronic card, said first combination received by said first
computer system in encrypted form and decrypted in said first
electronic card,
decombining said first combination stored in said internal storage
of said first electronic card for producing a first set of data
retransmitted to said first electronic card and a second set of
data transferred to said first electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said first
electronic card, said first set of data retransmitted to said first
electronic card and said second set of data transferred to said
first electronic card,
comparing said first set of data stored in said internal storage of
said first electronic card to said first set of data retransmitted
to said first electronic card and stored in said internal storage
of said first electronic card for verification of identity between
these sets of data for verification of the authenticity of said
second electronic card relative to said first electronic card,
generating a third set of data in said first electronic card,
inputting and storing said third set of data in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
generating, in said first electronic card, a second combination of
said second set of data received in encrypted form by said first
computer system, decrypted and stored in said internal storage of
said first electronic card and said third set of data stored in
said internal storage of said first electronic card, and inputting
and storing said second combination in said internal storage of
said first electronic card,
encrypting said second combination in said first electronic card by
means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic
card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of
said first electronic card,
outputting said second combination from said first electronic card
in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first
electronic card, and transferring said second combination via said
first station to said first computer system and therefrom via said
interfacing means of said first computer system to said data
transmission line,
receiving said second combination by said second computer system in
encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer
system, transferring said encrypted second combination to said
second electronic card via said second station and via said
input/output gate of said second electronic card, and inputting and
temporarily storing said encrypted second combination in said
internal storage of said second electronic card,
outputting, from said internal storage of said second electronic
card, said second combination received by said second computer
system in encrypted form, and decrypting said encrypted second
combination in said second electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said
decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said second
electronic card, said second combination received by said second
computer system in encrypted form and decrypted,
decombining said second combination stored in said internal storage
of said second electronic card for producing a second set of data
retransmitted to said second electronic card and a third set of
data transferred to said second electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said second
electronic card, said second set of data retransmitted to said
second electronic card and said third set of data transferred to
said second electronic card, and
comparing said second set of data stored in said internal storage
of said second electronic card to said second set of data
retransmitted to said second electronic card and stored in said
internal storage of said second electronic card for verification of
identity between these sets of data for verification of the
authenticity of said first electronic card relative to said second
electronic card.
7. A method according to claim 3, said integrity verification
comprising the steps of:
generating a compacted version of said data in said first computer
system or said first electronic card, and inputting and storing
said compacted version in said internal storage of said first
electronic card,
generating, in said second computer system or in said second
electronic card, a compacted version of said data transferred to
said second computer system, and inputting and storing said
compacted version in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
outputting, from said internal storage of said first electronic
card, said compacted data version stored in said internal storage
of said first electronic card, and encrypting said compacted data
version in said first electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said
encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first
electronic card,
outputting, from said first electronic card via said input/output
gate of said first electronic card, said compacted data version
encrypted by said encryption/decryption means of said first
electronic card, and transferring said encrypted and compacted data
version via said first station to said first computer system and
therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system
to said data transmission line,
receiving, by said second computer system via said interfacing
means of said second computer system, said encrypted and compacted
data version transferred from said first computer system,
transferring said encrypted and compacted data version to said
second electronic card via said second station and via said
input/output gate of said second electronic card, and inputting and
temporarily storing said encrypted and compacted data version in
said internal storage of said second electronic card,
outputting, from said internal storage of said second electronic
card, said compacted data version received by said second computer
system in encrypted form, and decrypting said compacted data
version in said second electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said
decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said second
electronic card, said decrypted, compacted data version received by
said second computer system in encrypted form and decrypted by said
second electronic card, and
comparing, in said second electronic card for verification of the
integrity of or identity between said data transferred from said
first computer system and said data received by said second
computer system, said compacted data version stored in said second
electronic card to said decrypted, compacted data version received
by said second computer system in encrypted form and decrypted in
said second electronic card.
8. A method according to claim 3, said integrity verification
comprising the steps of:
generating a compacted version of said data in said first computer
system or in said first electronic card, and inputting and storing
said compacted version in said internal storage of said first
electronic card,
generating, in said second computer system or in said second
electronic card, a compacted version of said data transferred to
said second computer system, and inputting and storing said
compacted version in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
outputting, from said internal storage of said second electronic
card, said compacted version stored in said internal storage of
said second electronic card, and encrypting said compacted version
in said second electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said
encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
outputting, from said second electronic card via said input/output
gate of said second electronic card, said compacted data version
encrypted by said encryption/decryption means of said second
electronic card, and transferring said encrypted and compacted data
version via said second station to said second computer system and
therefrom via said interfacing means of said second computer system
to said data transmission line,
receiving, by said first computer system via said interfacing means
of said first computer system, said encrypted and compacted data
version transferred from said second computer system, transferring
said encrypted and compacted data version to said first electronic
card via said first station and via said input/output gate of said
first electronic card, and inputting and temporarily storing said
encrypted and compacted data version in said internal storage of
said first electronic card,
outputting, from said internal storage of said first electronic
card, said compacted data version received by said first computer
system in encrypted form, and decrypting said encrypted and
compacted data version in said first electronic card by means of
said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and
said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said
first electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said first
electronic card, said decrypted, compacted data version received by
said first computer system in encrypted form and decrypted by said
first electronic card, and
comparing, in said first electronic card for verification of the
integrity of or identity between said data transferred from said
first computer system and said data received by said second
computer system, said compacted data version stored in said first
electronic card to said decrypted, compacted data version received
by said first computer system in encrypted form and decrypted in
said first electronic card.
9. A method according to claim 7, wherein said transfer of said
compacted data version generated in said first computer system or
in said first electronic card from said first electronic card to
said second electronic card is made simultaneously with said
transfer of said data itself, and said data and said compacted data
version are combined and encrypted as a whole before said
transfer.
10. A method according to claim 8, wherein said transfer of said
compacted data version generated in said second computer system or
in said second electronic card from said second electronic card to
said first electronic card is made simultaneously with a
retransmission of said data received from said first electronic
card from said second electronic card to said first electronic
card, and said data to be retransmitted and said compacted data
version are combined and encrypted as a whole before said
transfer.
11. A method according to claim 8, wherein
said transfer of said compacted data version generated in said
second computer system or in said second electronic card from said
second electronic card to said first electronic card is made
simultaneously with a retransmission of said compacted data version
received by said second electronic card from said second electronic
card to said first electronic card,
said transfer and retransmission of compacted data versions are
made simultaneously with a retransmission of said data received by
said second electronic card from said second electronic card to
said first electronic card, and
said data to be retransmitted and both compacted data versions are
combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.
12. A system for said transfer of data from a first computer system
to a second computer system, which second computer system is
autonomous in relation to said first computer system via a data
transmission line, according to the method of claim 1, said system
comprising a first station and a second station, which are
connected to and communicate with said first and said second
computer system, respectively, and which furthermore via said first
and said second computer system, respectively, and corresponding
interfacing means are connected to said data transmission line, as
well as a first and a second electronic card, which constitute a
coherent set of cards comprising coherent encryption/decryption
keys input into said internal storages of said cards in such a way
that the cards are able to communicate with each other and encrypt
and decrypt data transferred from the first card to the second card
and vice versa.
13. A system according to claim 12, said first and said second
electronic card being of the type DES Smart Card (Philips), Super
Smart Card (Bull) or CP8 Smart Card (Bull).
14. A method according to claim 2, further comprising the step of
making a verification of the integrity of said data at said
transfer of said data from said first computer system to said
second computer system.
15. A method according to claim 6, wherein
the encryption key used for encrypting the first set of data and
the second combination is made by use of a first signature key
stored in the first electronic card,
the decryption key used for decrypting the encrypted form of the
first set of data and the encrypted form of the second combination
is made by use of a second verification key stored in the second
electronic card and a publicly known identification of the first
electronic card,
the encryption key used for encrypting the first combination is
made by use of a second signature key stored in the second
electronic card, and
the decryption key used for decrypting the encrypted form of the
first combination is made by use of a first verification key stored
in the first electronic card and a publicly known identification of
the second electronic card.
16. A method according to claim 1, wherein the encryption and
decryption keys used for encrypting and decrypting the transferred
data are generated from a first set of data generated in an
authenticity verification which is made prior to the transfer of
the data as described in claim 6.
17. A method according to claim 16, wherein the authenticity
verification further comprises the method of claim 16.
18. A method according to claim 7, wherein the integrity
verification further comprises the steps of:
outputting, from said internal storage of said second electronic
card, said compacted version stored in said internal storage of
said second electronic card, and encrypting said compacted version
in said second electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said
encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
outputting, from said second electronic card via said input/output
gate of said second electronic card, said compacted data version
encrypted by said encryption/decryption means of said second
electronic card, and transferring said encrypted and compacted data
version via said second station to said second computer system and
therefrom via said interfacing means of said second computer system
to said data transmission line,
receiving, by said first computer system via said interfacing means
of said first computer system, said encrypted and compacted data
version transferred from said second computer system, transferring
said encrypted and compacted data version to said first electronic
card via said first station and via said input/output gate of said
first electronic card, and inputting and temporarily storing said
encrypted and compacted data version in said internal storage of
said first electronic card,
outputting, from said internal storage of said first electronic
card, said compacted data version received by said first computer
system in encrypted form, and decrypting said encrypted and
compacted data version in said first electronic card by means of
said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and
said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said
first electronic card,
inputting and storing, in said internal storage of said first
electronic card, said decrypted, compacted data version received by
said first computer system in encrypted form and decrypted by said
first electronic card, and
comparing, in said first electronic card for verification of the
integrity of or identity between said data transferred from said
first computer system and said data received by said second
computer system, said compacted data version stored in said first
electronic card to said decrypted, compacted data version received
by said first computer system in encrypted form and decrypted in
said first electronic card.
19. A method according to claim 9, wherein the compacted data is
generated by use of a common compression key prestored in the
electronic cards.
20. A method according to claim 9, wherein
the compacted data version is encrypted by use of a first signature
key, which is stored in the first electronic card, before being
combined with the data and further encrypted as a whole, and
the encrypted compacted data version is decrypted by use of a
second verification key stored in the second electronic card and a
publicly known identification of the first electronic card after
the combination of the data and the compacted data version has been
transferred and decrypted as a whole.
21. A method according to claim 9, wherein the encryption and
decryption keys used for encrypting and decrypting the combination
of the data and the compacted data version are generated from a
first set of data generated in an authenticity verification which
is made prior to the transfer of the data as described in claim
6.
22. A method according to claim 21, wherein the authenticity
verification further comprises the method of claim 15.
23. A method according to claim 10, wherein the compacted data is
generated by use of a common compression key prestored in the
electronic cards.
24. A method according to claim 10, wherein
the compacted data version is encrypted by use of a second
signature key, which is stored in the second electronic card,
before being combined with the data to be retransmitted and further
encrypted as a whole, and
the encrypted compacted data is decrypted by use of a first
verification key stored in the first electronic card and a publicly
known identification of the second electronic card after the
combination of the data to be retransmitted and the compacted data
version has been transferred and decrypted as a whole.
25. A method according to claim 10, wherein the encryption and
decryption keys used for encrypting and decrypting the combination
of the data to be retransmitted and the compacted data version are
generated from a first set of data generated in an authenticity
verification which is made prior to the transfer of the data as
described in claim 6.
26. A method according to claim 25, wherein the authenticity
verification further comprises the method of claim 15.
27. A method according to claim 7, wherein the compacted data is
generated by use of a common compression key prestored in the
electronic cards.
28. A method according to claim 8, wherein the compacted data is
generated by use of a common compression key prestored in the
electronic cards.
29. A method according to claim 18, wherein
said transfer of said compacted data version generated in said
first computer system or in said first electronic card from said
first electronic card to said second electronic card being made
simultaneously with said transfer of said data itself, said data
and said compacted data version being combined and encrypted as a
whole before said transfer,
said transfer of said compacted data version generated in said
second computer system or in said second electronic card from said
second electronic card to said first electronic card being made
simultaneously with a retransmission of said compacted data version
received by said second electronic card from said second electronic
card to said first electronic card, said transfer and
retransmission of said compacted data versions also being made
simultaneously with a retransmission of said data received by said
second electronic card from said second electronic card to said
first electronic card, said data to be retransmitted and both
compacted data versions being combined and encrypted as a whole
before said transfer.
30. A method according to claim 29, wherein the compacted data is
generated by use of a common compression key prestored in the
electronic cards.
31. A method according to claim 2, wherein
the encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first
electronic card include(s) a first encryption key made by use of a
first signature key stored in the first electronic card,
the decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second
electronic card include(s) a second decryption key made by use of a
second verification key stored in the second electronic card and a
publicly known identification of the first electronic card,
the encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second
electronic card include(s) a second encryption key made by use of a
second signature key stored in the second electronic card,
the decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first
electronic card include(s) a first decryption key made by use of a
first verification key stored in the first electronic card and a
publicly known identification of the second electronic card,
and
the authenticity verification comprises the steps of:
a) generating a first random number in the transmitter,
b) encrypting the first random number by use of the first
encryption key to obtain a first authenticity message within the
first electronic card,
c) transmitting the first authenticity message to the second
electronic card,
d) decrypting the first authenticity message within the second
electronic card by use of the second decryption key to obtain the
first random number within the second electronic card,
e) generating a second random number in the receiver,
f) combining the received first random number with the second
random number to obtain a first combination within the second
electronic card,
g) encrypting the first combination by use of the second encryption
key to obtain a second authenticity message within the second
electronic card,
h) transmitting the second authenticity message to the first
electronic card,
i) decrypting the second authenticity message within the first
electronic card by use of the first decryption key to obtain the
first combination within the first electronic card,
j) separating the received first combination within the first
electronic card,
k) comparing the value of the first random number generated in the
transmitter with the value of the first random number received from
the second electronic card and stored in the first electronic card,
and in case the two values are equal verifying the authenticity of
the identity of the second electronic card,
l) generating a third random number within the transmitter,
m) combining the received second random number with the third
random number to obtain a second combination within the first
electronic card,
n) encrypting the second combination by use of the first encryption
key to obtain a third authenticity message within the first
electronic card,
o) transmitting the third authenticity message to the second
electronic card,
p) decrypting the third authenticity message within the second
electronic card by use of the second decryption key to obtain the
second combination within the second electronic card,
q) separating the received second combination within the second
electronic card,
r) comparing the value of the second random number generated in the
receiver with the value of the second random number received from
the first electronic card and stored in the second electronic card,
and in case the two values are equal verifying the authenticity of
the identity of the first electronic card.
32. A method according to claim 3, wherein
the encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first
electronic card include(s) a first encryption key made by use of a
first signature key stored in the first electronic card,
the decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second
electronic card include(s) a second decryption key made by use of a
second verification key stored in the second electronic card and a
publicly known identification of the first electronic card,
the encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second
electronic card include(s) a second encryption key made by use of a
second signature key stored in the second electronic card,
the decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first
electronic card include(s) a first decryption key made by use of a
first verification key stored in the first electronic card and a
publicly known identification of the second electronic card,
a common compression key is stored in the internal storage of the
first electronic card and in the internal storage of the second
electronic card,
the encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first
electronic card and in the internal storage of the second
electronic card include(s) a random encryption key made by use of a
previously exchanged random number,
the decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second
electronic card and in the internal storage of the second
electronic card include(s) a random decryption key made by use of a
previously exchanged random number, and
the integrity verification comprises the steps of:
a) generating a first compacted document of the data within the
transmitter by use of the common compression key,
b) encrypting the first compacted document by use of the first
encryption key to obtain an encrypted first compacted document
within the first electronic card,
c) combining the data and the encrypted first compacted document to
a first combination and encrypting this first combination by use of
the random encryption key to obtain a first integrity message
within the first electronic card,
d) transmitting the first integrity message to the second
electronic card,
e) decrypting the first integrity message within the second
electronic card by use of the random decryption key to obtain the
first combination within the second electronic card,
f) separating the first combination within the second electronic
card,
g) generating within the receiver a second version of the first
compacted document of the received data by use of the common
compression key,
h) decrypting the received encrypted first compacted document
within the second electronic card by use of the second decryption
key to obtain a first version of the first compacted document,
i) comparing the obtained results of the first and second version
of the first compacted document, and in case the two versions are
equal verifying the integrity of the transmission of the data from
the first electronic card to the second electronic card,
j) generating within the receiver a second compacted document of
the first combination by use of the common compression key,
k) encrypting the second compacted document by use of the second
encryption key to obtain an encrypted second compacted document
within the second electronic card,
l) combining the first combination and the encrypted second
compacted document to a second combination and encrypting this
second combination by use of the random encryption key to obtain a
second integrity message within the second electronic card,
m) transmitting the second integrity message to the first
electronic card,
n) decrypting the second integrity message within the first
electronic card by use of the random decryption key to obtain the
second combination within the first electronic card,
o) separating the second combination within the first electronic
card,
p) generating within the transmitter a second version of the second
compacted document of the received second combination by use of the
common compression key,
q) decrypting the received encrypted second compacted document
within the first electronic card by use of the first decryption key
to obtain a first version of the second compacted document,
r) comparing the obtained results of the first and second versions
of the second compacted document, and in case the two versions are
equal verifying the integrity of the transmission of the data from
the first electronic card to the second electronic card.
33. A method according to claim 32, wherein the previously
exchanged random number has been exchanged in an authenticity
verification as described in claim 31.
Description
The present invention relates to a method of transferring data, an
electronic document or the like from a first computer system to a
second computer system via a data transmission line, e.g. a public
data transmission line.
Several techniques and standards are known for transferring data,
electronic documents or the like from a first computer system to a
second computer system via different data transmission lines such
as high speed communication lines, private or public data
transmission lines, etc. If the data transmission line itself is
not secured against third parties with or without authorization
being able to tap the data transferred via the data transmission
line or the electronic document transferred via the data
transmission line, it is a conventional technique to provide an
encryption of the data or the electronic document in accordance
with encryption/decryption techniques well-known per se, which
techniques may comprise either symmetrical or asymmetrical
encryption algorithms, secret or public keys. In this context
reference is only to be made to the well-known DES algorithm (Data
Encryption Standard), developed by IBM in cooperation with the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS), USA. As an example of a
data/document exchange protocol mention is here to be made of the
data/document exchange protocol--LECAM--developed by FRANCE TELECOM
in connection with the Minitel computers used widely in France, in
accordance with which the data/document transfer may take place in
encrypted and not encrypted form (further specifications of the
protocol are given in S.T.U.C.A.M--Specification Techniques
d'Utilisation du LECAM, .COPYRGT.Decembre 1987, FRANCE TELECOM,
Teletel). Such an encrypted data transmission presupposes, however,
that the transmitter and the receiver can agree to establishing a
mutual set of encryption/decryption keys, as the parties involved,
transmitter and receiver, invariably have to reveal details
concerning security levels, etc. Such an agreement requires,
however, that both transmitter and receiver fully trust the other
party. Even if the two parties, who are to make a transfer of data
or a transfer of one electronic document from a first computer
system to a second computer system, can agree to such an exchange
of encryption/decryption keys for use in connection with an
encryption/decryption algorithm agreed upon, not even such an
encrypted data transmission ensures that the data sent from the
first computer system or the electronic document sent from the
first computer system is received correctly by the second computer
system, as it will be possible to manipulate the data or the
electronic document in connection with the execution of the
encryption algorithm in the first computer system, just as the
receiver after decryption can manipulate the data or the electronic
document. Such an encrypted data transmission does not in itself
ensure that the transfer taking place is the intended or desired
transfer of the data or the electronic document, that the data
received by the second computer system or the electronic document
received by the second computer system, in the form in which the
data or the electronic document exists in the second computer
system after transfer, is identical to the data sent from the first
computer system or the electronic document sent from the first
computer system. Such an encrypted data transmission via a public
or private data transmission line does neither in itself ensure
that the two computer systems communicating with each other are the
correct, intended parties of communication.
The object of the present invention is to provide a method of the
type defined above, according to which method it is possible to
establish immediately a secure data or document transfer between
two computer systems without having to exchange
encryption/decryption keys between the computer systems, reveal
details concerning security levels, etc., and according to which
method it is ensured that the desired data or document transfer
actually takes place, as it is ensured that it will not be possible
for either of the parties or for a third party to interfere with
the data or document transfer. The object of the present invention
is thus more explicitly to provide techniques ensuring that at the
transfer of data or an electronic document from one first computer
system to a second computer system via a data transmission line,
e.g. a public data transmission line, it is guaranteed that the
data received by the second computer system or the electronic
document received by the second computer system is identical to the
data sent from the first computer system or the electronic document
sent from the first computer system and vice versa.
This object is obtained in accordance with the invention by means
of a method of the type defined above, which method in accordance
with a first aspect of the invention is characterized in that for
said transfer
a first station is used for outputting data from and inputting data
into a first electronic card, said first station being connected to
and communicating with said first computer system and furthermore
being connected to said data transmission line via said first
computer system and interfacing means, and
a second station is used for outputting data from and inputting
data into a second electronic card, said second station being
connected to and communicating with said second computer system and
furthermore being connected to said data transmission line via this
second computer system and interfacing means,
said first and second electronic card each comprising a central
data processing unit, an internal storage means, an input/output
gate for communication with said corresponding station as well as
an encryption/decryption means and together constituting a coherent
set of cards comprising coherent encryption and decryption keys
input into said internal storages of said cards,
said data or said electronic document being transferred to said
first electronic card from said first computer system via said
first station and said input/output gate of said first electronic
card, being input into and being temporarily stored in said
internal storage of said first electronic card,
said data or said electronic document being output from said
internal storage of said first electronic card and being encrypted
in said first electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said
encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first
electronic card,
said data or said electronic document being output from said first
electronic card in encrypted form via said input/output gate of
said first electronic card and being transferred via said first
station to said first computer system and being transferred
therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system
to said data transmission line,
said data or said electronic document being received by said second
computer system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of
said second computer system, being transferred to said second
electronic card via said second station and via said input/output
gate of said second electronic card, being input into and
temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
said data or said electronic document being output from said
internal storage of said first electronic card in encrypted form
and being decrypted in said second electronic card by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said
decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card, and
said data or said electronic document being output after decryption
in said second electronic card from said second electronic card and
output to said second computer system via said input/output gate of
said second electronic card and via said second station.
In accordance with the first aspect of the invention, the data or
document transfer from the first computer system to the second
computer system is established by means of two coherent electronic
cards, which by themselves ensure the necessary data transmission
security during data transmission in encrypted form, as the use of
two coherent electronic cards at the same time relative to both
transmitter and receiver, guarantees that the data output from the
second electronic card or the electronic document output from the
second electronic card is identical to the data input into the
first electronic card or the electronic document input into the
first electronic card.
As the data transfer between the first and the second computer
system is carried out between the first and the second electronic
card, no third parties with or without authorization are able to
interfere with the data transmission and change the data or the
electronic document. As will be clear, this data or document
transfer in accordance with the teaching of the invention is
possible, without having to make any other modification in the
connection between the first and the second computer system than
the supplementing (which is characteristic to the invention) of
both the first and the second computer system with associated input
and output stations, which are used for input and output of data in
the respective electronic cards belonging to the coherent set of
cards. Such coherent set of cards can be issued immediately, hired
out or sold by a neutral and outside card issuer, who thus without
neither transmitter or receiver having to provide information about
data transmission secrets such as encryption algorithms, security
levels, etc., can enable the transmitter and the receiver to
transfer data or electronic documents between the corresponding
computer systems without any risk that the data received by the
receiver or the electronic document received by the receiver is not
identical to the data sent by the transmitter or the electronic
document sent by the transmitter.
In accordance with the present invention it is furthermore possible
to ensure that the transfer takes place between computer systems,
the authenticity of which is verified relative to one another, as a
verification of the authenticity of the first electronic card
relative to the second electronic card and vice versa is preferably
made prior to the transfer of the data or the electronic document
from the first computer system to the second computer system.
In accordance with the method according to the invention it is
furthermore possible to verify that the data or document transfer
is correct, i.e. to verify that the data received by the receiver
or the second computer system or the electronic document received
by the receiver or the second computer system is identical to the
data sent from the first computer system or the electronic document
sent from the first computer system, as in accordance with the
invention a verification of the integrity of the data or document
transfer is preferably made at the transfer of the data or the
electronic document from the first computer system to the second
computer system.
The utilization of a coherent set of electronic cards which is
characteristic of the invention, via which the data and document
transfer takes place, makes it possible for the data or document
transfer to proceed completely autonomously without any possibility
of interference or corrupting from neither the computer systems
involved, persons, including operators, who with or without
authorization try to change the data or the electronic document
being transferred, as in accordance with the method of the
invention, the inputting into, the outputting from, the encryption
and the decryption and possibly the authenticity and integrity
verification are preferably controlled autonomously by the central
data processing unit of the individual card.
In accordance with a special aspect of the present invention, the
actual transfer of the data or the electronic document between the
first and the second computer system is preferably made in
accordance with the above-mentioned LECAM protocol either in
encrypted or decrypted form.
According to a first embodiment of the above described authenticity
verification it is preferred that
a first set of data being generated in said first electronic card,
said set of data being input into and stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card and being encrypted in said
first electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means
of said first electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in
said internal storage of said first electronic card,
said first set of data being output from said first electronic card
in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first
electronic card, being transferred via said first station to said
first computer system and being transferred therefrom via said
interfacing means of said first computer system to said data
transmission line,
said first set of data being received by said second computer
system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second
computer system, being transferred to said second electronic card
via said second station and via said input/output gate of said
second electronic card being input into, and temporarily stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card,
said first set of data received by said second computer system in
encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said
second electronic card and being decrypted in said second
electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of
said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card.
said first set of data received by said second computer system in
encrypted form and decrypted in said second electronic card being
input into and stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
a second set of data being generated in said second electronic
card, said second set of data being input into and stored in said
internal storage of said second electronic card,
a first combination of said first set of data received by said
second computer system in encrypted form, decrypted and stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card and said
second set of data stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card being generated in said second electronic card,
said first combination being input into and stored in said internal
storage of said second electronic card,
said first combination being encrypted in said second electronic
card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second
electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal
storage of said second electronic card,
said first combination being output from said second electronic
card in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said second
electronic card, being transferred via said second station to said
second computer system and being transferred therefrom via said
interfacing means of said second computer system to said data
transmission line,
said first combination being received by said first computer system
in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said first computer
system, being transferred to said first electronic card via said
first station and via said input/output gate of said first
electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in said
internal storage of said first electronic card,
said first combination received by said first computer system in
encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said
first electronic card and being decrypted in said first electronic
card by means of encryption/decryption means of said first
electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
said first combination received by said first computer system in
encrypted form and decrypted in said first electronic card being
input into and stored in said internal storage of said first
electronic card,
said first combination stored in said internal storage of said
first electronic card being decombined for producing a first set of
data retransmitted to said first electronic card and a second set
of data transferred to said first electronic card,
said first set of data retransmitted to said first electronic card
and said second set of data transferred to said first electronic
card being input into and stored in said internal storage of said
first electronic card,
said first set of data stored in said internal storage of said
first electronic card being compared to said first set of data
retransmitted to said first electronic card and stored in said
internal storage of said first electronic card for verification of
identity between these sets of data for verification of the
authenticity of said second electronic card relative to said first
electronic card,
a third set of data being generated in said first electronic card,
said third set of data being input into and stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
a second combination of said second set of data received in
encrypted form by said first computer system, decrypted and stored
in said internal storage of said first electronic card and said
third set of data stored in said internal storage of said first
electronic card being generated in said first electronic card, said
second combination being input into and stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
said second combination being encrypted in said first electronic
card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first
electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
said second combination being output from said first electronic
card in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first
electronic card, being transferred via said first station to said
first computer system and being transferred therefrom via said
interfacing means of said first computer system to said data
transmission line,
said second combination being received by said second computer
system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second
computer system, being transferred to said second electronic card
via said second station and via said input/output gate of said
second electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card,
said second combination received by said second computer system in
encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said
second electronic card and being decrypted in said second
electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of
said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card,
said second combination received by said second computer system in
encrypted form and decrypted being input into and stored in said
internal storage of said second electronic card,
said second combination stored in said internal storage of said
second electronic card being decombined for producing a second set
of data retransmitted to said second electronic card and third set
of data transferred to said second electronic card,
said second set of data retransmitted to said second electronic
card and said third set of data transferred to said second
electronic card being input into and stored in said internal
storage of said second electronic card, and
said second set of data stored in said internal storage of said
second electronic card being compared to second set of data
retransmitted to said second electronic card and stored in said
internal storage of said second electronic card for verification of
identity between these sets of data for verification of the
authenticity of said first electronic card relative to said second
electronic card.
In this authenticity verification the first, the second and the
third set of data serve in a unique and logical way relative to the
first and the second electronic card to verify that the transfer of
data or the electronic document has taken place correctly and thus
that the data or the electronic document which is received by the
second electronic card, is identical to the data sent by the first
electronic card or the electronic document sent by the first
electronic card and further to ensure that the transmitter and the
receiver are authorized transmitter and received, respectively, and
also that the transmitter and receiver are what they pretend to
be.
According to a first embodiment of the invention the integrity
verification is made by
a compacted version of said data or said electronic document being
generated in said first computer system or said first electronic
card, said compacted version being input into and stored in said
internal storage of said first electronic card,
a compacted version of said data transferred to said second
computer system or of said electronic document transferred to said
second computer system being generated in said second computer
system or in said second electronic card, said compacted version
being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
said compacted version stored in said internal storage of said
first electronic card being output from said internal storage of
said first electronic card and encrypted in said first electronic
card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first
electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
said compacted data or document version encrypted by said
encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card being
output from said first electronic card via said input/output gate
of said first electronic card, being transferred via said first
station to said first computer system and being transferred
therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system
to said data transmission line,
said encrypted and compacted data or document version transferred
from said first computer system being received by said second
computer system via said interfacing means of said second computer
system, being transferred to said second electronic card via said
second station and via said input/output gate of said second
electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in said
internal storage of said second electronic card,
said compacted data or document version received by said second
computer system in encrypted form being output from said internal
storage of said second electronic card and being decrypted in said
second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means
of said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in
said internal storage of said second electronic card,
said decrypted, compacted data or document version received by said
second computer system in encrypted form and decrypted by said
second electronic card being input into and stored in said internal
storage of said second electronic card,
a comparison of said compacted data or document version stored in
said second electronic card and said decrypted, compacted data or
document version received by said second computer system in
encrypted form and decrypted being made in said second electronic
card for verification of the integrity of or identity between said
data transferred from said first computer system and said data
received by said second computer system or of the integrity of or
identity between said electronic document transferred from said
first computer system and said electronic document received by said
second computer system.
According to a further and alternative embodiment the invention the
integrity verification is made by
a compacted version of said data or said electronic document being
generated in said first computer system or in said first electronic
card, said compacted version being input into and stored in said
internal storage of said first electronic card,
a compacted version of said data transferred to said second
computer system or said electronic document transferred to said
second computer system being generated in said second computer
system or in said second electronic card, said compacted version
being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second
electronic card,
said compacted version stored in said internal storage of said
second electronic card being output from said internal storage of
said second electronic card and encrypted in said second electronic
card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second
electronic card or said encryption key(s) stored in said internal
storage of said second electronic card,
said compacted data or document version encrypted by said
encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card being
output from said second electronic card via said input/output gate
of said second electronic card, being transferred via said second
station to said second computer system and being transferred
therefrom via said interfacing means of said second computer system
to said data transmission line,
said encrypted and compacted data or document version transferred
from said second computer system being received by said first
computer system via said interfacing means of said first computer
system, being transferred to said first electronic card via said
first station and via said input/output gate of said first
electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in said
internal storage of said first electronic card,
said compacted data or document version received by said first
computer system in encrypted form being output from said internal
storage of said first electronic card and being decrypted in said
first electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means
of said first electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in
said internal storage of said first electronic card,
said decrypted, compacted data or document version received by said
first computer system in encrypted form and decrypted by said first
electronic card being input into and stored in said internal
storage of said first electronic card,
a comparison of said compacted data or document version stored in
said first electronic card and said decrypted, compacted data or
document version received by said first computer system in
encrypted form and decrypted being made in said first electronic
card for verification of the integrity of or identity between said
data transferred from said first computer system and said data
received by said second computer system or of the integrity of or
identity between said electronic document transferred from said
first computer system and said electronic document received by said
second computer system.
In accordance with the presently preferred embodiment, the
integrity verification is, however, made by transferring a
compacted data or document version from the first electronic card
to the second electronic card as well as from the second electronic
card to the first electronic card and comparing both transferred,
compacted data or document versions to stored, compacted data or
document versions in the two electronic cards.
According to alternative embodiments of the method according to the
invention, said alternative embodiments constituting combinations
of the authenticity and integrity verifications, said transfer of
said compacted data or document version generated in said first
computer system or in said first electronic card from said first
electronic card to said second electronic card is made
simultaneously with said transfer of said data or said electronic
document itself, said data or electronic document and said
compacted data or document version being combined and encrypted as
a whole before said transfer, or alternatively said transfer of
said compacted data or document version generated in said second
computer system or in said second electronic card from said second
electronic card to said first electronic card is made
simultaneously with a retransmission of said data or said
electronic document received from said first electronic card from
said second electronic card to said first electronic card, said
data or electronic document to be retransmitted and said compacted
data or document version being combined and encrypted as a whole
before said transfer.
According to a combination of these alternative integrity and
authenticity verifications, a simultaneous retransmission of said
compacted data or document version received by said second
electronic card and generated in said first computer system or in
said first electronic card is made at said transfer of said
compacted data or document version generated in said second
computer system or in said second electronic card and said
retransmission of said data or said electronic document from said
second electronic card, both compacted data or document versions
and said data or said electronic document to be retransmitted being
combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.
The above stated objects are alternatively obtained in accordance
with the invention by a method of the type defined above, which
method in accordance with a second aspect of the invention is
characterized in that
for said transfer
a first station is used, which is secured against illegal entry,
i.e. a so-called "tamper-proof" station, for outputting data from
and inputting data into
a first card, said first station being connected to and
communicating with said first computer system and furthermore being
connected to said data transmission line via said first computer
system and interfacing means, and said first station having a
central processing unit, an internal storage, an input/output means
for outputting data from and inputting data into said first card as
well as an encryption/decryption means, and
a second station is used, which is secured against illegal entry,
i.e. a so-called "tamper-proof" station, for outputting data from
and inputting data into a second card, said second station being
connected to and communicating with said second computer system and
furthermore being connected to said data transmission line via said
second computer system and interfacing means, and said second
station having a central data processing unit, an internal storage,
an input/output means for outputting data from and inputting data
into said first card as well as an encryption/decryption means
said first and second card constituting a coherent set of cards
comprising coherent data input into said cards concerning said
coherent encryption/decryption keys stored in said internal
storages of said corresponding stations,
said data or said electronic document being transferred to said
first station and being input into and temporarily stored in said
internal storage of said first station,
said data or said electronic document being output from said
internal storage of said first station and being encrypted in said
first station by means of said encryption/decryption means of said
first station and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal
storage of said first station,
said data or said electronic document being output from said first
station to said first computer system in encrypted form and
therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system
to said data transmission line,
said data or said electronic document being received by said second
computer system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of
said second computer system, being transferred to said second
station, being input into and temporarily stored in said internal
storage of said second station,
said data or said electronic document received in encrypted form
being decrypted in said second station by means of said
encryption/decryption means of said second station and said
decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second
station, and
said data or said electronic document in said second station being
output from said second station after decryption to said second
computer system.
This alternative method according to the second aspect of the
invention is preferably in accordance with advantageous embodiments
of the method implemented in accordance with the above stated
embodiments of the method according to the first aspect of the
present invention.
The present invention furthermore relates to a system for
transferring data, an electronic document or the like from a first
computer system to a second computer system, said second computer
system being autonomous in relation to said first computer system,
via a data transmission line, e.g. a public data transmission line,
in accordance with the method according to the first aspect of the
invention, which system in accordance with the invention is
characterized in that it comprises the first station and the second
station, which are connected to and communicate with the first and
the second computer system, respectively, and which furthermore via
the first and the second computer system, respectively, and the
corresponding interfacing means are connected to the data
transmission line, as well as the first and the second electronic
card, which constitute a coherent set of cards comprising the
coherent encryption/decryption keys input into the internal
storages of the cards. The coherent set of cards used in this
system according to the invention preferably comprises cards of the
type DES Smart Card (Philips), Super Smart Card (Bull) or CP8 Smart
Card (Bull) or at least a card implemented on a printed circuit
card, a thick-film substrate, a thin-film module, etc.
The present invention furthermore relates to a system for
transferring data, an electronic document or the like from a first
computer system to a second computer system, said second computer
system being autonomous relative to said first computer system, via
a data transmission line, e.g. a public data transmission line,
said system being characterized in that it comprises said first
station and said second station, which are connected to and
communicate with said first and said second computer system,
respectively, and which furthermore via said first and said second
computer system, respectively, and corresponding interfacing means
are connected to said data transmission line, as well as said first
and said second card, which constitute a coherent set of cards
comprising said coherent data input into said cards concerning said
coherent encryption/decryption keys stored in said internal
storages of said corresponding stations. The coherent set of data,
which is used according to the system and the method according to
the second aspect of the invention can be a magnetic card as well
as an electronic card which again can be of above-mentioned type.
In accordance with this aspect of the invention, any other medium
can furthermore be used.
The present invention furthermore relates to an electronic card
comprising a central data processing unit, an internal storage, an
input/output gate for communication with a associated station for
outputting data from and inputting data into the electronic card as
well as an encryption/decryption means, which card according to the
invention constituting a first electronic card of a coherent set of
cards comprising the first electronic card and a second electronic
card, which electronic cards have coherent encryption/decryption
keys and are designed to be used in accordance with a method
according to the first aspect of the invention.
The encryption made according to the invention can be made
according to arbitrary known technique and comprise symmetrical or
asymmetrical encryption/decryption algorithms such as DES
algorithms, RSA algorithms or the like. The encryption/decryption
algorithms can furthermore be combined .
The invention will now be further described with reference to the
drawing,
in which FIG. 1 shows a system according to the invention
comprising a first computer system and a second computer system
communicating with each other via a data transmission line for
carrying out the method according to the invention,
FIG. 2 schematically shows the structure of the software of the
system shown in FIG. 1,
FIG. 3 schematically shows a system according to the invention
comprising two computer systems communicating with each other via a
data transmission line, and furthermore a mini computer,
FIG. 4 schematically shows an enlarged system comprising three
computer systems, which according to the teaching of the invention
communicate with each other via a data transmission line, and one
of which furthermore communicates with two terminals or Minitels
via appropriate interfacing means and the data transmission
line,
FIG. 5 shows a block diagram of an authenticity verification,
and
FIG. 6 shows a block diagram of an integrity verification.
In FIG. 1, a system according to the invention for carrying out the
method according to the invention is shown schematically, which
system comprises two autonomous computer systems, a first computer
system shown in the left-hand part of FIG. 1 and designated the
reference numeral 100 in its entirely, and a second computer system
shown in the right-hand part of FIG. 1 and designated the reference
numeral 200 in its entirety. The two computer systems 100 and 200
are shown schematically comprising the same types of elements,
which for the two computer systems are indicated by the same two
last digits of the reference numerals, the reference numerals for
elements belonging to the first computer system 100 beginning with
the digit 1 and the reference numerals for elements belonging to
the second computer system 200 beginning with the digit 2. The two
computer systems 100 and 200 thus each comprises an "inhouse" main
computer, 102, 202, respectively. These main computers 102 and 202
communicate via data lines 104, 204 with terminals or personal
computers (PC's) 106, 206, which each comprises a keyboard 108,
208, a computer section 110, 210 and a computer screen 112, 212.
The terminals or the PC's 106, 206 furthermore communicate with the
associated diskette stations or optical disc store 114, 214 as well
as hard disks 116, 216 with associated back-up diskette stations or
optical disc store 118, 218. The terminals or the PC's 106, 206 are
furthermore via respective data transmission lines 120, 220
connected to respective stations 122, 222 for input and output of
data in respective electronic cards or chip cards, so-called Smart
Cards, which are indicated by the reference numerals 124, 224.
Together with the associated peripheral equipment comprising the
diskette stations or optical disc store 114, 214, the hard disks
116, 216, the back-up diskette stations or optical disc store 118,
218, the associated stations 122, 222 as well the associated
electronic cards 124, 224, the terminals or the PC's 106, 206 are
contained in the blocks 126, 226 indicated by dotted lines.
The task or object of the invention is to provide a possibility of
transferring data from the first computer system to the second
computer system, by which data transfer it is ensured that the data
sent is identical to the data intended to be sent, that the data
received is identical to the data sent, and preferably furthermore
that the transfer only takes place between parties specifically
intended to send and receive data, that receipt of the data is
acknowledged by the receiver and furthermore that receipt of the
receiver's acknowledgement is acknowledged by the sender relative
to the receiver. In the following description, the data transfer is
meant to take place from the first computer system 100 to the
second computer system 200, but it is of course clear that the data
transfer can also take place in the opposite direction. According
to the invention the data transfer can furthermore consist in an
exchange of data between the two computer systems, i.e. comprise a
transfer of data from the first computer system 100 to the second
computer system 200 and transfer of data from the second computer
system 200 to the first computer system 100. Neither of the
respective sides of the two computer systems 100 and 200 has any
knowledge of security levels, transmission protocols,
encryption/decryption algorithms etc. of the other computer system.
Via interfacing means contained in the associated terminals or PC's
106, 206 and the associated data transmission lines 128, 228, the
two computer systems 100 and 200 are connected to a public data
transmission network, which is collectively indicated by the
reference numeral 300. Instead of a public data transmission
network, e.g. an X25 data network, the data transmission network
300 can be a private network or comprise combinations of public and
private computer networks and furthermore via associated modems
(modulators/demodulators) be connected to e.g. telephone lines or
other signal or transmission lines.
In order to ensure that the above stated requirements for data
transfer are met, the data transfer is made by the data to be
transferred from the computer system 100 to the computer system 200
first being output from the main computer 102 of the computer
system 100 to the terminal or the PC 106 and being transferred to
the station 122. From the station 122 the data is transferred to
the electronic card 124 via the input/output gate of this card,
whereupon the data is processed exclusively by the electronic card
124. Similar to the card 224, the card 124 has in addition to the
above-mentioned input/output gate, a central processing unit or
CPU, an internal storage, an encryption/decryption block which
controlled by the internal central processing unit of the card is
able to encrypt and decrypt the data by outputting data from the
card or by inputting data into the card, respectively, by use of
one or more encryption/decryption keys input into the card in
advance, as will be described in greater detail below in a detailed
system/software description. For the transfer of data between the
cards, the cards 124, 224 have been issued together and constitute
a coherent set of cards being preprogrammed as regards
encryption/decryption algorithms and keys in such a way that the
cards are able to communicate with each other and decrypt data
transferred from the first card to the second card and vice
versa.
In the electronic card 124, an encryption of the data input is then
made, the encrypted data is transferred via the station 122, the
data transmission line 120, the terminal or the PC 106, the
associated interfacing means and the data transmission line 128 to
the data transmission network 300, from which the data via the data
transmission line 228, the interfacing means of the terminal or the
PC' 206, the terminal or the PC 206, the data transmission line 220
and the station 222 is transferred to the electronic card 224, in
which the data is decrypted by means of the encryption/decryption
key(s) stored in the card corresponding to the
encryption/decryption keys of the card 124. After decryption of the
data in the card 224 the data can be output in clear text from the
electronic card 224 to the station 222 and be transferred via the
data transmission line 220, the terminal or the PC 206 and the data
transmission line 204 to the main computer 202. As the data
transfer from the first computer system 100 to the second computer
system 200 only takes place between the two electronic cards 124
and 224 it is ensured that the data version output from the
electronic card 224 is identical to the data version input into the
electronic card 124. Hereby it is ensured that the data transferred
to the second computer system 200 is identical to data intended to
be sent from the first computer system 100, and seen from the point
of view of the first computer 100 it is also ensured that the data
version which the computer system 200 has received is identical to
the data which was initially sent from the first computer system
100.
In the below system description it will furthermore be explained
how an authenticity verification between the two electronic cards
124, 224 is made prior to the actual transfer and furthermore how
acknowledgements containing compacted data versions are signed for
integrity verification, which acknowledgements are transferred
between receiver and sender, i.e. between the card 224 and the card
124.
In FIG. 2 the software design of the main computers 102, 202 of the
computer systems 100 and 200 and the terminals or PC's 106, 206 is
shown schematically. It is to be realized that the software design
is only intended to be illustrative and explanatory and in no way
to be construed limiting the scope as defined in the appended
claims. Each main software comprises an "inhouse" software 130,
230, a communications protocol 132, 232 for transfer of data to the
associated terminal or PC 106, 206 via the data transmission lines
104, 204 (e.g. an asynchronous RS 232 communications protocol), two
software converter or compiler blocks 134, 234 and 136, 236 for
conversion or compiling from "inhouse" format to the transmission
protocol determined by the block 132, 232 and from the transmission
protocol determined by the block 132, 232 to "inhouse" format,
respectively. The main computer software 102, 202 may further
comprise a further block 138, 238, a so-called Edifact software,
which will be described below.
The terminals or the PC's 106, 206 contain the following software
blocks: a communications protocol 140, 240 for communication with
the main computer 102, 202 via the data transmission line 104, 204,
an internal central software 142, 242 controlling the functions of
the terminal or the PC in question, a converter or compiler
software 144, 244 corresponding to the software block 138, 238 of
the main computer 102, 202, a communications protocol 146, 246,
e.g. an X25 protocol, which protocols constitute the interfacing
means of the terminal or the PC to the associated data transmission
line 128, 228, a software block 148, 248 for communication with the
associated peripheral equipment of the terminals or the PC's such
as the diskette stations and hard disks 114, 214 and 116, 216 shown
in FIG. 1, a software block 150, 250 containing information
regarding e.g. "black lists" etc. and finally a software block 152,
252 for communication with the associated station 122, 222. The PC
program may further comprise a block corresponding to the blocks
138 and 238 discussed above and comprising Edifact software.
It is to be noted that the data transfer comprising
authenticity/integrity verification etc., which is characteristic
of the invention, can be implemented with an integrated circuit
card constituting a combination of a station and an electronic card
such as a combination of the station 122 and the card 124 or of the
station 222 and the card 224. Such printed circuit cards are shown
in the lower part of FIG. 2 and designated the reference numerals
160 and 260, respectively. The printed circuit card 160, 260 thus
constitutes a complementary card relative to the second printed
circuit card or relative to an electronic card for use in
connection with an associated station. Thus the printed circuit
card 160 can be a circuit card complementary to the printed circuit
card 260 or a card complementary to the electronic card 224.
Correspondingly the printed circuit card 260 can be a card
complementary to the electronic card 124 or a card complementary to
the printer circuit card 160.
In a further alternative embodiment of the invention the above
described data transfer from the electronic card 124 to the
electronic card 224 can be established between corresponding
security modules 170, 270, which are shown in the lower part of
FIG. 2. These security modules or security terminals constitute
so-called "tamper-proof" stations, i.e. stations which due to their
special physical design make it impossible to open the system and
thus reveal material as well as software. Similar to the electronic
cards 124, 224, these security modules contain an input/output
gate, a central processing unit, internal storages and
encryption/decryption blocks. In contrast to the electronic cards
124, 224 and the printed circuit cards 160, 260 integrating
stations and cards, the internal storages of the security modules
can contain more encryption/decryption keys, which are addressed to
a given data transfer by means of a card, e.g. an electronic card
or a magnetic card, which similar to the electronic cards 124, 224
and printer circuit card 160, 260 integrating stations and
electronic cards are issued by a card issuer, who corresponding to
the electronic card or magnetic card in question issues a
corresponding magnetic card or an electronic card or a printed
circuit card for use at data transfer from a security module
addressed by the magnetic card in question to a security module
addressed by an associated electronic card and finally to a printed
circuit card or vice versa.
In FIG. 3, a system which is enlarged as compared to the system
shown in FIG. 1 is shown schematically, and which in addition to
the two computer systems 100 and 200 comprises a mini computer
which is designated the reference numeral 306 in its entirety and
has a keyboard 308, a central processing unit 310 and a computer
screen 312. The mini computer system 306 can furthermore comprise
peripheral equipment such as a diskette station or a tape station,
a printer, etc. Such peripheral equipment is not shown in FIG. 3.
For transfer of data to one of the computer systems 100 or 200 or
for reception of data from one of these computer systems in
accordance with the teaching of the invention, the mini computer
system 306 is connected to a station 322, corresponding to the
stations 122, 222 shown in FIGS. 1, 2 and 3, via a data
transmission line 320 corresponding to the data transmission lines
120 and 220 shown in FIG. 1. Via a data transmission line 328
corresponding to the data transmission lines 128, 228 via an
interfacing means contained in the central data processing unit 310
of the mini computer system and furthermore possibly via a modem,
which is not shown in FIG. 3, the mini computer system 306 is
connected to a public telephone network 330. The public telephone
network 330 is via a modem, which is neither shown in FIG. 3, and a
data transmission line 332 connected to a converter 346 containing
converter or compiler sub-blocks 334, 336 corresponding to the
software blocks 134, 234 and 136, 236 shown in FIG. 2 and which via
a data transmission line 338 is connected to the network 300.
By means of two coherent cards one of which is received in the
station 322, and another one of which is received in the station
122 or 222 of the computer 100 or 200 respectively, it is possible
in accordance with the teaching of the invention possible to
transfer data to and from the mini computer system 306 from and to
the computer system in question, respectively, the associated card
station of which computer system has received an electronic card,
not shown, corresponding to the electronic card received in the
card station 322. Similar to the mini computer system 306, the
computer system with which the mini computer is communicating can
have its electronic card integrated with the corresponding station
in a printed circuit card, similar to the printed circuit cards
shown in FIG. 2 and designated the reference numerals 160, 260
belonging to the computer systems 100, 200, or have a security
module or security terminal which is addressable by means of an
electronic card or a magnetic card as explained above.
In FIG. 4 an alternative computer system configuration is shown
which in addition to the above described computer system comprising
the first computer system 100 and the second computer system 200
which are interconnected via the network 300, includes a number of
mini computer systems, in the present case two mini computer
systems 406 which are preferably so-called Minitel computers,
communicating with an associated host which is shown in the upper
central part of FIG. 4 and designated the reference numeral 400 in
its entirety, and which constitutes a computer system. The mini
computer systems 406 and the host 400 constitute a so-called
videotex system which will be explained in greater detail below in
the system/software description. The communication between the
Minitel computers 406 and the host 400 is preferably made in
accordance with the LECAM protocol developed by FRANCE TELECOM. The
computer system 400 constitutes a computer system corresponding to
one of the computer system 100, 200, and between the computer
system 400 and one of the computer systems 100, 200 data can be
transferred both ways in the above described manner by means of two
coherent cards, especially two coherent electronic cards. Thus the
computer system 400 is basically of a structure equivalent to the
structure of the computer systems 100, 200 and comprises a central
processing unit 402, which is connected to a communications block
426 corresponding to the blocks 126, 226 via a data transmission
line 404, which block 426 is connected to the network 300 via a
data transmission line 428 corresponding to the data transmission
lines 128, 228. The computer system 400 furthermore comprises a
hard disk 460 or disc store, a computer screen 462 and a card
reader 464. The card reader 464 is adopted to receive an electronic
card of the above described kind, especially a so-called smart
card, at transfer of data to and from the Minitel computer 406, as
will be explained in greater detail below in the system/software
description. The card reader or the station 464 on the other hand
has no connection to the external computer systems 100, 200, as the
data transfer between the computer system 400 and one of the
computer systems 100, 200 is controlled by the communication block
426 in the above described way. The individual Minitel computers
406 has a keyboard 408, a computer screen 412 and a card reader
422, which like the card reader 464 is adopted to receive an
electronic card, which makes it possible to transfer data to and
from the Minitel computer 406 from and to the computer system 400,
respectively. The connection from the individual Minitel computer
406 to the computer system 400 is established via a data
transmission line 428 connecting the individual Minitel computer
406 to a public telephone network 430 by means of appropriate modem
units, a connection from the public telephone network 430 to the
computer system 400 being established via a first data transmission
line 432, a converter or compiler 446 and a second data
transmission line 438.
The Minitel computers shown in FIG. 4 first of all serve the
purpose of distributing electronic document "mail" internally
within the Minitel system belonging to the computer system 400, as
data or document transfer is made from the individual Minitel
computer 406 via the public telephone network 430 and the network
300 by means of an electronic card issued by the institution which
runs the computer system 400 to the station 464 of the computer
system 400. The computer system shown in FIG. 4 furthermore
provides the possibility of transferring data or documents from the
individual Minitel computer 406 to the computer system 400, from
which system data or documents can be transferred again to a second
computer system, e.g. the computer system 100 or the computer
system 200 via the data transfer block 426 with associated
electronic cards, in accordance with the above described data
transfer.
EXAMPLE
A computer system of the type shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 was
implemented with:
Personal Computer:
At 10 MHz with 640 kbytes storage, 40 Mbyte hard disk, 2 serial
RS232 gates, Danish keyboard, black/white screen including
adapter.
Type: Philips P3204.
The following software was used:
MS-DOS operating system version 3.3.
Type: Microsoft
RTOS Real Time Operating System version 4.00.
Type: Dansk Informations Teknologi X.25 Communication card--16
gates:
Type: Stollmann SICC-PC-X25.
SmartCard reader with power supply and RS232 interface cable:
Type: Philips/Control Data Laserdrive 510 DT
For this system implementation, software was used developed by
Net-plus (.COPYRGT.1989). The software is developed in C, Pascal
and Assembler.
In the computer system, data and documents in encrypted and not
encrypted form were furthermore exchanged between a Minitel
terminal of the type shown in FIG. 4 with the reference numeral 406
and a computer system of the above described type in accordance
with the principles of the invention by means of the LECAM protocol
developed by FRANCE TELECOM (.COPYRGT.December 1987--FRANCE
TELECOM--TELETEL).
A detailed system and software specification will be described
below concerning both data transfer from the first computer system
to the second computer system, e.g. from the computer system 100 to
the computer system 200, and data transfer to and from a Minitel
computer 406 to and from the computer system 400, respectively.
System and software description:
The system has an interface to a large surrounding world, which is
not under control under all circumstances. This implies that it
must be ensured that unauthorized persons do not get unauthorized
access to or insight into the system. Below, the security of the
system is described and the requirements which are furthermore made
to the system, so that this can be of practical use.
There are security systems which are impossible to break, but which
are useless in practice, but also security systems which are
commercially available and appear to be of practical use, but which
unfortunately are also easy to break.
A number of security requirements which the system fulfils will be
described now:
1. Large key room
2. No real or statistical possibility of finding a key on the basis
of clear text and crypto text
3. No clear text in crypto text
4. Stratified structure of the transmission network
Re 1. The number of keys must be so large that it is not
practically possible to find the right key by exhaustive search. It
must be required that two different keys encrypt the same clear
text into different crypto texts. Exactly how large the key room
must be, naturally also depends on the resources which are
available to a potential "enemy". For the transactions mentioned in
this system, 56 bits as in DES are sufficient, as it on average
will take at least 4 months to decipher a crypto text with the
fastest available computer power. As a new key is used for each
transmission, it will be practically impossible to obtain full
insight.
Re 2. Even though many coherent clear text messages and
corresponding crypto text messages are known, it must not be
possible to determine the applied key on the basis of this.
Re 3. In the crypto text there must be no statistical significant
trace of the clear text. If there is no such trace, the "enemy's"
only weapon is exhaustive search, if only the crypto text is
available.
Re 4. The interface specifications for the transmission network via
which the encrypted data or text has to be transmitted, normally
also prescribe transmission of operational control information
which should of course not be encrypted similar to address fields
and the like for the data mentioned. Problems may arise, if the
interfacing means does not have a stratified structure or if it is
not quite clear at which level the encryption is to take place.
Use of chip cards and the DES algorithm provides a solution in
which 1. the size of the key room is sufficient, especially as
different keys are used for different transfers, and the key for
exchange of encryption key is safely hidden in the chip card,
2. it has no practical value to find a key on the basis of both
clear text and crypto text, as this key is only used for one
transmission, and
3. DES encryption of the documents ensures that there is no clear
text in the crypto texts.
When using chip card and DES algorithm in this way, the public X.25
network as well as a teletel videotex network are used. Both these
networks facilitate a transparent transfer of encrypted text. There
are various protocols for transfer, which are followed in
connection with the document transfer. For the videotex network,
the LECAM protocol is used.
Symmetrical/asymmetrical systems
Wherever possible, simple methods are used for securing data,
however, without reducing the security. Accordingly a symmetrical
system (e.g. DES) is preferred to an asymmetrical system (e.g.
RSA), as an asymmetrical system, such as RSA requires far more
computer power than a symmetrical system, such as DES. A
symmetrical system, such as DES, on the other hand, requires
greater security concerning keys. (Concerning DES and RSA see
above).
1. Symmetrical crypto systems
2. Asymmetrical crypto systems
3. Speeds
Re 1. A symmetrical crypto system is characterized in that the same
key is used for encryption and decryption. A much used and safe
algorithm for this use is the DES algorithm.
The DES algorithm (Data Encryption Standard) was developed by IBM
in cooperation with the National Bureau of Standards NBS) and
published in 1977. DES is only used for civilian encryption and is
today the most widespread crypto system. In particular, DES is very
much used within the banking world, also in the
"DANKORT"-system.
In the DES algorithm, encryption is made in blocks of 64 bits by
means of a key of 56 bits. First, the 64 bits to be encrypted are
subjected to a permutation, which serves to mix the bits, as input
in the typical application consists of 8 bytes. Following this, 16
iterated encryptions are made by means of various keys, derived
from the chosen key and the clear text, as the 64 bits before each
iteration have been divided into a left-hand side Li and a
right-hand side Ri, each consisting of 32 bits. In the i+1st
iteration Ri is transferred as the next left-hand side Li+1, and
the new right-hand side Ri+1 is produced as XOR of Li and 32 other
bits, which appears as a complex, but completely described function
of Ri and Ki+1, where Ki+1 is a key of 48 bits, which is derived
from the chosen key of 56 bits.
The function itself can be described as follows: the 32 bits in Ri
are changed to 48 bits by bitshifting and are then permuted. XOR of
Ki+1 is generated. The resulting 48 bits are counted 6 at a time in
8 families, which by means of S-boxes are converted to 8 families
with only 4 bit in each, so that 32 bits are delivered. After a
fixed permutation of these, the above 32 bits are found.
After 16 iterations, the 64 bits are permuted with the inverse
permutation of the initial one. This is necessary to ensure that
the subsequent decryption of the crypto text can be made by simply
performing the DES-algorithm again, but with the 16 derived keys in
inverse order.
Re 2. The difference between a symmetrical crypto system and an
asymmetrical crypto system is that it is not possible in an
asymmetrical system by way of calculation to find the decryption
key, even though the encryption key is known, and vice versa.
Instead of "encryption" and "decryption" it is therefore more
correct to speak of a secret transformation key SK (Secret Key) and
a public transformation key PK (Public Key). In particular, it is
required for all messages, X that
An asymmetrical crypto system can be used for both concealment and
authenticity, and even for generation of digital signatures. It
must, however, be pointed out that for each individual user A who
chooses a key or rather a pair of keys (PA, SA), A can use SA for
receipt of secret messages as well as for his own digital signature
and other persons' public keys to send concealed messages. In
return, other persons can use A's public key to send concealed
messages to A.
One of the best known asymmetrical crypto systems is the RSA crypto
system (named after the fathers of the system: Rivest, Shamir and
Adelman). It is based on experiences which mathematicians have
obtained over several thousand years concerning prime numbers. It
is relatively easy to decide whether a specific, chosen number n is
a prime number or not, but if it turns out that it is not a prime
number, the difficulties of finding the prime number divisors
increase exponentially with the magnitude of the number. Even when
using all the artifices which mathematicians have developed in the
course of time, it has not been possible to find a simple way of
deducing the prime number divisors. There are extremely many
numbers of hundred digits or less (the limit today is about 90),
which are practically impossible to resolve into prime factors.
In the RSA crypto system, the origin is two randomly chosen prime
numbers p and q of approx. 100 digits each. These prime numbers
must be strong prime numbers, which have the effect that it by
means of known methods will take billions of years to find the
divisors in n on the basis of n=pq (p and q are kept secret). It is
necessary that these properties are available because of the
security of the system. Then a number e is chosen, which must be
prime with (p-1) (q-1). Knowing p and q it is possible to find
another number d with the following properties:
Given a random number m less than n, the remainder of m.sup.d e
(i.e. m multiplied by itself (d multiplied by e) times) by
subsequent division of integers with n, will again give the number
m.
It is possible in several ways to divide messages into blocks,
which can be represented uniquely as numbers between 1 and n, e.g.
by means of ASCII codes. A clear text m, represented in this way,
is thereafter encrypted as
i.e. the remainder of m multiplied by itself e times, by subsequent
division of integers with n.
Decryption of c is made by calculating
which according to the above is equal to m.
The pair of numbers (e, n) can, of course, be used to specify a
public key, viz. the key
whereas the pair of numbers (d, n) specifies the secret key
(it is only d, which must be kept secret, together with p and
q).
Hereby a public key system results.
Re 3. An important requirement for crypto systems is often that a
certain speed is guaranteed. Hardware equipment where the algorithm
is stored in a specially designed chip, operates with far greater
speed than software equipment. It may be a question of a factor of
hundred or more, depending on the equipment.
As an example it is to be mentioned that DES in software in e.g.
equipment with an INTEL 8086 processor and a clock frequency of 4,7
MHz encrypts at a speed of approx. a few thousand bits per second
(there is a possibility of considerable variations depending on the
implementation).
As regards software implementation of RSA the fastest 32 bit chips
today, e.g. MOTOROLA 68030, with a clock frequency of 20 MHz, will
produce an RSA block encryption of 512 bits in approx. 4. sec. and
a decryption in approx. 1 sec. (by means of a minor mathematical
artifice). By means of so-called "digital signal processing" chips,
this can be reduced even further, presumably to 1 sec. or less for
an encryption.
On the market today "black boxes" are available containing
encryption chips, which can make an encryption with a high security
level. One of these is a so-called SCP-box which in addition to
being a Chip-card reader with keyboard for PIN-code control also
comprises a display, a relatively fast CPU, 128 Kb RAM and the DES
as well as RSA algorithms. The box is designed in such a way that
it destroys itself when it is attempted to gain physical access to
the electronics, i.e. it is so-called "tamper-proof" box. It has an
encryption capacity of about 40,000 bytes per minute with the DES
algorithm. By using this box the ability of the Chip card to store
keys is used to ensure authenticity and by means of a table in the
RAM storage in combination with the chip card, keys can be worked
out, which are unique to the individual encryption and transfer of
information.
Chip cards
From a cryptogical point of view, the explosive development of very
small chips has facilitated a very interesting development, viz.
the chip card. This card has the same shape and size as a magnetic
card, but contains furthermore as mentioned above a small processor
and a small storage (typically 1-2 kbyte), which may e.g. be of the
type EEPROM (Electrically Eraseable Programmable Read Only Memory),
so that both input and output access can be obtained via a card
reader.
Such a card is particularly suitable for storage of e.g. a secret
key. It is furthermore possible to protect this key efficiently by
an encryption controlled by a PIN code, and by securing the key so
that it cannot be read from the card, but only be used for
encryption and decryption. It is also possible to let the card
destroy itself (logically) if a wrong PIN code is used more than
e.g. three times, and to give it a definite lifetime (a certain
number of applications).
Detailed description of chip cards
The chip card contains a micro processor, data and program storage
and an I/O gate, secret information and protected information being
hidden or stored in a data memory. As the I/O gate is controlled by
the micro processor, all reading of information is controlled by
the micro processor. Reading of secret data is not possible and
reading of protected data is only possible after positive
validation of the PIN code of the card. With correct PIN code it is
possible to encrypt and decrypt data and to generate temporary
keys. For encryption and decryption, the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) is used. In addition to the operating system for the micro
processor the program memory also contains the encryption algorithm
DES. This has the result that the card can in fact be used to
encrypt and decrypt data, even though it is quite a slow process
(approx. 128 bytes per second).
The chip card in its present versions (DES Smart Card (Philips) and
CP8 Smart Card (Bull)) can contain up to 1024 bytes information
including various "headers". This corresponds to 500-800 bytes of
user information, depending on the structure of the information in
the card.
For different types of cards exist:
Batch card: this card is received together with the new cards and
is used when personalizing these.
Root card: This card is used during the personalization to decrypt
the application keys and the personal keys, before they are written
into the chip card. This has the effect that the personal keys can
be stored in a file in encrypted form and will only be known in the
memory of the personalizing system during the execution of the
personalization. The root card contains for each type of personal
key a corresponding Root key.
Rehabilitation card: Is used when rehabilitating a Transaction
card.
Transaction card: This is the card which is handed out to the
users. It is used to store and protect personal keys and for
generation of temporary keys for access control and encryption and
decryption.
The lifetime of the chip card is divided into different phases:
1. Pre-personalization
2. Personalization
3. Active
4. End-of-life
5. Rehabilitation
Re 1. Pre-personalization
In this phase the card is empty apart from production information.
The only information contained in the card at this time is a
production key and information as to which "batch" the card belongs
to. In order to obtain access to the memory of the card, it is
necessary to know or gain access to the production key, which can
only be obtained by having in one's possession the so-called Batch
card which belongs to this particular "batch".
This ensures that only the holder of the Batch card can personalize
cards and that the batch card holder only can personalize cards
belonging to the "batch" in question.
Re 2. Personalization
When the production key is presented to the chip card, it is
possible to input information into the memory. Information can e.g.
be secret keys, DES identification, the names of the card holder
and the card issuer, etc. When this phase is over, the card enters
its active phase.
Re 3. Active
In this phase, the card is used by a user for encryption and
decryption and for generating temporary keys.
The card can be used until one of three situations appear:
a) The card is invalidated by an end-of-life instruction.
b) One the control zones of the card is full. The card contains
three special zones: production key control zone, application key
control zone and PIN control zone. In the first two zones a bit
will be placed when an error has been made when presenting a key.
In the last zone a bit is placed, each time a check is made for the
PIN code. If the last zone runs full, the card enters the
end-of-life phase. This will happen after a maximum of 6000
presentations of the PIN code. The contents of this zone are
reduced when user information and service keys are input into the
card.
c) Three consecutive incorrect PIN code inputs cause the card to be
locked. The card can be opened again by rehabilitation.
Re 4 End of life
In this phase, the card cannot be used. The card can be
rehabilitated, if incorrect PIN code has been used.
Re 5. Rehabilitation
The card can be rehabilitated if the card holder still remembers
the correct PIN code, otherwise not. Rehabilitation should be made
by the card issuer and card holder jointly. In order to
rehabilitate a chip card, a card is used which is specially
designed for this purpose, viz. the rehabilitation card.
The design of the chip card provides a possibility of storing keys
protected by PIN code, possibly encrypted and dedicated use of the
keys (e.g. only decryption). At the same time the inputting of
information and keys in a chip card depends on whether you have
access to both the Root card and the Batch card, i.e. that only
specific persons have access to input keys/information.
Administration of keys
One of the largest problems in connection with a crypto system of
practical use is the actual handling of keys, as the keys are the
"interface" of the system towards the users and constitute the
weakest link of a system.
When a user is to have a key handed out or registered, it must be
possible to identify him in a satisfactory way. The key is kept on
a chip card, which can be allotted a definite lifetime, and which,
as mentioned above, also destroys itself, when a wrong PIN code has
been used three times.
The more a key is used, the greater the risk for the key becoming
known. It is therefore necessary to change the key at frequent
intervals. As the number of users becomes large, and arbitrary
users must communicate with each other in encrypted form, the users
are equipped with keys which are not used for data and file
encryption, but only for exchange of the real encryption keys.
An administration is created around the security system and the
handling of the keys, which
a) ensures that the used keys are kept secret,
b) ensures a possibility of being able to recreate used secret keys
and provides a possibility of verifying that a certain key has been
used for a specific purpose,
c) gives a simple and safe allocation of keys, and
d) prevents swindling with the allocation of chip cards by a stable
and hermetic procedure.
The procedures for setting up the keys in connection with a chip
card comprise:
1. Generation of keys
2. Inputting keys and desired information into chip cards
3. Distribution of cards
4. Renewal/withdrawal of cards
Re 1. Generation of cards
The keys for inputting information into the chip card are generated
in such a way that they are both different and generated from
random numbers. Accordingly, it is not possible to predict or guess
the value of a key. In order to start the program for generating
keys, a chip card must be presented (secured by a PIN code). The
keys generated are stored in encrypted form in a file by means of
this card.
Re 2. Inputting keys and desired information into the chip card
The data (keys and possible information) which are to be input into
the cards, as provided by an application from the file in which
they were arranged previously. The application sees to it that this
data can only be transferred from the encrypted file to a chip card
by two different persons with two different chip cards each having
its own PIN code. The first card is a card which has been alloted
to the card issuer and the contents of which are known exclusively
by the manufacturer producing the "empty" chip cards. The second
card is a card which follows the batch of cards being prepared.
Accordingly, the person(s) generating the keys and the information
has/have no possibility of inputting the keys and the information
into the chip cards. On the other hand, the person(s) inputting the
data into the chip cards has/have no possibility of learning what
is being input into the cards. When the cards are being prepared, a
logging to an encrypted file will be carried out. This file will be
error tolerant and the mirror of an alternative physical position.
The file will be secured by means of an appropriate security
routine.
Re 3. Distribution of cards
Traditionally, the cards are issued to the users in batches. The
card is sent separately and the PIN code is sent separately. The
PIN code is sent or delivered after accept of receipt of the
card.
Re 4. Renewal/withdrawal of cards
When a card has run out for one reason or another, it must be
returned to the card issuer as far as possible. The card issuer
destroys it and possibly issues a new card to replace the old card.
For security reasons it is preferred that when changing cards, a
new card is produced which is different in terms of the input keys
from the card which has run out. If a user ceases to use the chip
card, the card must be returned to the card issuer. Under all
circumstances the card is blocked electronically. A possibility of
blocking the card at the first presentation after the blocking can
be input.
Observation of these precautions ensures that one person alone
cannot produce a chip card, that only the card issuer can input
information and keys, that keys can be produced at any time for
verification of the use of a card which has run out and that the
right user gets possession of the cards without any risk that the
card is used by unauthorized persons.
Authenticity
The authenticity, i.e. security that the parties involved,
transmitter/receiver are who they pretend to be, can be ensured in
various ways, depending on whether the system is
1. a symmetrical system or
2. an asymmetrical system
Re 1. Symmetrical crypto system
In order to ensure that a transmitter (A) and a receiver (B) are
who they pretend to be, A sends a number in encrypted form to B,
and B verifies that the number comes from A. Then B sends a
combination of a part of the number which B received from A,
together with a number generated by B in encrypted form to A. A can
hereafter verify that the combination has come from B, and at the
same time A can check the part of the number which was generated by
A. A now encrypts the number which A received from B and sends it
back to B, who after verification can see that B has received the
same combination as B sent to A. Below, it is outlined how a chip
card can be used to ensure authenticity. When using the symmetrical
crypto system a faint risk must be anticipated of a key being
broken and data being read by third parties. This risk arises if a
former member of the system with a thorough knowledge of the type
of initial exchange of messages is in possession of a valid chip
card and if this member taps the connection between transmitter and
receiver and is in possession of the used crypto program.
Such a person will be able to decrypt the documents which are
exchanged, encrypted with the described key in the transmission in
question. However, it will not be possible to change the contents
of the document and a renewed deciphering will also have to be made
when tapping the next document transfer, as a new key is used for
this transfer.
In the system according to the invention, a chip card reader 122,
222 and 426, respectively, is connected to each computer system or
each host, the computer systems 100, 200 and 400.
The two computer systems constituting transmitter and receiver, the
computer systems 100 and 200, respectively, shown in FIGS. 1-4, are
equipped with authorized chip cards and are authorized to use
these.
Each card 122 and 222 has two service zones for this purpose:
A service zone with a "Verification key" (Vk) which is used to
verify that the encryption which the opposite party has used is
correct.
A service zone with a "Signature key" (Sk) which is used for
encryption of the communication.
Vk can only be used for decryption and Sk can only be used for
encryption.
In the procedure shown in FIG. 5, the following abbreviations are
used:
VkA: Verification key for A or the computer system 100
SkA: Signature key for A or the computer system 100
.[.VkN.]..Iadd.V.sub.k B.Iaddend.: Verification key for B or the
computer system 200
SkB: Signature key for B or the computer system 200
E: Encryption
D: Decryption
R1, R2, .[.R2.]..Iadd.R3.Iaddend.: Random numbers
M1, M2, M3: Transferred messages
IdA: The publicly known identification for A or the computer system
100
IdB: The publicly known identification for B or the computer system
200
The procedure appears from FIG. 5.
Re 2. Asymmetrical crypto system
The authenticity verification described above with reference to
FIG. 5 is solely based on the application of an encryption system
based on DES, but for the sake of completeness, the asymmetrical
system is briefly described below.
If A or the computer 100 is to send a clear text M, which is to be
kept secret when being transmitted, to B or the computer system
200, A uses B's public key PB, which B has made public to everyone,
and sends
Only B can decrypt, as only B knows his private key 40 and
SB(C).fwdarw.M.
If A is to send a clear text X to B in encrypted form in such a way
that B can check that the message comes from A, A sends
B then tries with A's public key PA and finds
If X is meaningful, then SA must have been used, as only A can
encrypt in such a way that PA can decrypt into anything meaningful.
It should be noted that authenticity is only ensured the first time
the message X is signed. In practice therefore, such a message must
be unique, e.g. by indicating the time of the day.
Both properties can be obtained in the following way:
If A wishes to send M to B, so that B is sure that the message
comes from A at the same time ensuring that only B of all people
can decrypt the message, A sends
The only way in which M can be deduced as follows:
Integrity
The integrity ensures that data is not changed during or after a
concluded transmission. This is ensured by calculating the
transmitter's (A) signature and the receiver's (B) signature,
adding these to the document and having both A and B verify these
signatures. With the DES algorithm, signatures are produced which
can be encrypted and verified by means of chip card:
In the system according to the invention, a chip card reader is
connected to each computer system or each host. The two computer
systems constituting transmitter and receiver, 100 and 200
respectively, shown in FIGS. 1-4, are equipped with authorized chip
cards and are authorized to use these.
For this purpose, each card has three service zones:
A service zone with a so-called "Verification key" (Vk), which is
used for verifying the signature which the opposite party has added
to the document.
A service zone with a "Signature key" (Sk) which is used to encrypt
the signature.
A service zone with a "Compression key" (Ck) which is used to
produce the signature (MAC).
Vk can only be used for decryption and Sk can only be used for
encryption. Ck is identical in all chip cards and can be used for
compacting the document to the signature.
In the procedure shown in FIG. 6, the following abbreviations are
used:
VkA: Verification key for A or the computer system 100
SkA: Signature key for A or the computer system 100
MacA: The compacted document seen from A's side
EmacA: The encrypted MacA
VkB: Verification key for B or the computer system 200
SkB: Signature key for B or the computer system 200
MacB: The compacted document seen from B's side
EmacB: The encrypted MacB
Ck: Compression key
E: Encryption
D: Decryption
C: Compression
R1: Random numbers exchanged previously
M1, M2, M3: Transferred messages
IdA: The publicly known identification for A
IdB: The publicly known identification for B
The procedure appears from FIG. 6
The integrity is ensured as both transmitter and receiver are
certain that (have a possibility of checking) that the document has
not been changed before or after the transmission without possible
changes being unambiguously ascertainable. The function *A2 is
built up in such a way that the chip card can produce a key by
means of a publicly known identification which can decrypt the
encrypted B/Mac and thus provide a basis for checking that the Mac
which is added to the document is valid, i.e. calculated on the
basis of the document received by the expected transmitter. The
same applies in the opposite direction to the function *B2.
It is important that the Mac's produced are hidden in the document,
as they are the unique signatures of the parties.
Security of access to the videostex system is shown in FIG. 4
This security is ensured by using chip cards for automatic log-on
to the videotex system:
1. Automatic presentation of identification and password
2. Encryption of communication between terminal and videotex
server
3. Security in the videotex server as regards the individual user's
access to the individual mail boxes and the applications of the
system.
Re 1. Automatic presentation of identification and password
A chip card reader 422 of the type LECAM connected to a Minitel 409
has an intelligence which has the effect that it reads in a certain
position on the card searching for data for an automatized
dialling. When the dialling has been made, the application which is
running on the videotex system will transfer a program to the RAM
storage of the chip card reader. This program will then find
identification and password in the card, ask for the PIN code to be
entered and communicate with the application on the videotex
server. If the PIN code is stated incorrectly, the program has no
possibility of collecting information in the chip card.
Re 2. Encryption of communication between terminal and videotex
server
The program which is transferred to the chip card reader, finds the
key which is to be used for encryption, by looking up the chip
card. The videotex application looks up a table in the host or the
computer system 400 and finds a corresponding key. Encryption is
made on the basis of this key for the whole communication between
Minitel 400 and Host 400. It is expedient to use this encryption
key to encrypt the exchange of the randomly chosen key which is
used for encryption of the rest of the communication, as this has
the result that a different encryption key is used for each
individual communication.
Re 3. Security in the videotex server as regards the individual
user's access to the individual mail boxes and the applications of
the system
The access to mail boxes, data and applications in the videotex
server is ensured by the "log-on" which is made on the basis of the
information residing in the chip card. As the exchange of
identification and password takes place in encrypted form, it will
not be possible by tapping the line and the terminal to reconstruct
these. In other words, it will not be possible to get in contact
with the mail boxes without possessing a chip card with a secret
PIN code (which is only found in the card).
After access has been obtained to the video tex system, it is
secured that access cannot be obtained to a basic host computer.
This is done to avoid that data hackers by an error in the video
tex system can obtain access to the operating system of the host
computer.
Security when exchanging documents
The security system sees to it that documents which are built up
according to the EDIFACT standard can be transferred securely
between connected hosts.
It is ensured
1. that the documents can be endorsed with signature,
2. that the documents cannot be forged,
3. that the documents can only be read by/transferred to the person
authorized, and
4. that it is possible to produce unambiguous evidence in
connection with a possible dispute
Re 1. The documents can be endorsed with a signature
The transmitter goes through the document or parts thereof in order
to generate an abbreviated expression of the document (e.g. a 64
bit key). This expression contains at least a serial number, date,
time and all the sensitive data. This expression is encrypted by a
chip card with a key which is found in the card and which cannot be
read but only used for encryption or decryption in the card. The
encrypted result (MAC--Message Authentification Code) is unique to
this document and this transmitter, and the MAC is added to the
document, whereupon it is ready for "dispatch".
Re 2. The documents cannot be forged
If changes are made in the document after the transfer is
considered to be concluded, it will be possible to ascertain this,
as the MAC's which are included in the document can be validated,
whereupon the document is accepted or considered as invalid.
Re 3. The documents can only be read by/transferred to the
authorized person
Both transmitter and receiver make sure that they are in contact
with the right person, whereupon the document is encrypted by means
of a key which is known by transmitter and receiver exclusively and
which is arbitrary and only applies to this one transfer.
Re 4. Possibility of producing unambiguous evidence in connection
with a possible dispute (MAC)
This is ensured by the card issuer's keeping the issued keys in a
satisfactory way so that it can be decided at any time whether
there is identity between a document and the associated MAC's.
EDIFACT definition
EDIFACT (Electronic Data Interchange For Administration, Commerce
and Transport) is a standardised method of electronic transfer of
all business related documents, which have an organized structure.
The standard--which is approved by ISO (International Standard
Organization)--is meant for exchange of documents between computer
systems on both a domestic and a foreign level; the standard is
therefore not dependent on language. The standard does not
prescribe how the actual network communication must be carried out;
it is a technically independent standard.
An EDIFACT document can be divided into certain parts or modules,
which are called segments. Each segment has a specific purpose in
the document in question, and the position of the segment in the
message is prescribed by the standard for the document type in
question. All segments are identified by a 3-letter code as
prescribed by the standard. A message consists of many different
segments which together contain all the information which is
necessary to create the document.
A segment may e.g. look like this:
CUX is a segment head; CUX means type of currency
+ is data element punctuation mark
DEM means German marks--the value can be anything else; arbitrarily
definable as long as both transmitter and receiver agree to the
meaning of the codes
: is a data component punctuation mark
IN is an abbreviation of INvoice--also arbitrarily definable
' designates the end of a segment
The contents of a segment can be divided into data elements. A data
element is divided into one or more data components. In the above
example with the segment CUX, only one data element is found. This
data element consists of 2 data components, viz DEM and IN.
: is the punctuation mark separating coherent data components,
whereas + is the separator for the individual data elements in a
segment. This technique of describing information in a document is
general and is used in all EDIFACT segments.
The data which follows a given segment head, is defined in the
standard and is therefore unalterable. It is, however, not all data
which is compulsory--quite a few can be omitted depending on the
need.
To a very large extent, codes are used in the individual segments.
By this is meant e.g. DEM in the above example which means German
marks.
Both parties to the communication (transmitter and receiver) must
agree to the application of these, as these are not covered by the
standard.
* * * * *