U.S. patent number 8,176,556 [Application Number 12/263,128] was granted by the patent office on 2012-05-08 for methods and systems for tracing web-based attacks.
This patent grant is currently assigned to Symantec Corporation. Invention is credited to Joseph Chen, Kamron Farrokh, Jamie Jooyoung Park.
United States Patent |
8,176,556 |
Farrokh , et al. |
May 8, 2012 |
Methods and systems for tracing web-based attacks
Abstract
A computer-implemented method for tracing attacks. The method
may include identifying a first website and determining that the
first website loads an attack remotely through a second website.
The method may also include determining that the second website
hosts the attack. The method may include performing a security
action, such as blocking downloads from the second website, with
respect to the second website. The attack may be a drive-by
download. Corresponding systems and computer-readable media are
also disclosed.
Inventors: |
Farrokh; Kamron (Beverly Hills,
CA), Park; Jamie Jooyoung (Los Angeles, CA), Chen;
Joseph (Los Angeles, CA) |
Assignee: |
Symantec Corporation (Mountain
View, CA)
|
Family
ID: |
46002231 |
Appl.
No.: |
12/263,128 |
Filed: |
October 31, 2008 |
Current U.S.
Class: |
726/23;
713/188 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L
63/1483 (20130101); H04L 2463/146 (20130101) |
Current International
Class: |
H04L
29/06 (20060101) |
Field of
Search: |
;726/22,23 |
References Cited
[Referenced By]
U.S. Patent Documents
Other References
"Enhanced Reputation Filtering Identifies Compromised and Exploited
Web Sites More Quickly and Accurately Than Traditional URL
Filtering"; IronPort Plugs Crucial Web-Security. cited by other
.
Sep. 22, 2008;
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2008/prod.sub.--092208b.html?CMP=AF17154&v-
s.sub.--f=News@Cisco:+News+Releases&vs.sub.--p=News@Cisco:+News+Releases&v-
s.sub.--k=1. cited by other .
Provos, Niels et al; "The Ghost in the Browser: Analysis of
Web-Based Malware"; (accessed May 18, 2009); Google, Inc.;
www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/papers/GhostInTheBrowser.pdf. cited by
other.
|
Primary Examiner: Zee; Edward
Assistant Examiner: Paliwal; Yogesh
Attorney, Agent or Firm: Advantedge Law Group
Claims
We claim:
1. A computer-implemented method for tracing attacks, at least a
portion of the method being performed by a computing device
comprising at least one processor, the computer-implemented method
comprising: identifying a first website; detecting an attack loaded
by the first website to the computing device, the first website
having loaded the attack remotely through a second website;
immediately upon detecting the attack loaded by the first website:
identifying at least one website link loaded by the first website;
tracing the website link to the second website such that the second
website is unable to prevent the computing device from examining
the second website; examining the second website to determine
whether the second website hosts the attack loaded by the first
website; determining, based on the examination of the second
website, that: the first website loaded the attack remotely through
the second website; the second website hosts the attack; performing
a security action with respect to the second website, wherein
detecting the attack loaded by the first website comprises
implementing a deobfuscation tool hooked into a browser of the
computing device to deobfuscate malicious code by: identifying at
least one function call associated with the first website as the
browser executes the function call; examining the function call to
determine whether the function call injects malicious code into the
first website.
2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein: the attack
is a drive-by download that attempts to download malware to the
computing device, the computing device having the browser that is
displaying the first website.
3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:
identifying the attack, wherein determining that the first website
loads the attack, determining that the second website hosts the
attack, and performing the security action with respect to the
second website are performed in response to identifying the
attack.
4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein determining
that the first website loads the attack remotely through the second
website comprises: determining that malicious code in the first
website loads a third website; determining that malicious code in
the third website loads the attack remotely from the second website
to the first website.
5. The computer-implemented method of 1, wherein the first website
is a legitimate website that has been compromised.
6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein: the first
website has been compromised by an iframe injected into the first
website; determining that the second website hosts the attack
comprises determining that the iframe loads the second website.
7. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein: the first
website has been compromised by a script injected into the first
website.
8. The computer-implemented method of claim 7, wherein the script
comprises at least one of: code programmed to drop an iframe,
wherein determining that the second website hosts the attack
comprises determining that the iframe loads the second website;
code programmed to run an attack from the second website, wherein
determining that the second website hosts the attack comprises
determining that the script runs the attack from the second
website.
9. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the security
action comprises at least one of: blocking communications with the
second website; blocking downloads from the second website; adding
the second website to a blocked-website list.
10. The computer-implemented method of claim 9, further comprising,
while blocking communications with the second website, allowing the
computing device to communicate with the first website even after
communications with the second website that hosts the attack have
been blocked.
11. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:
deobfuscating code in the first website to identify malicious code
injected into the first website.
12. A system for tracing attacks, the system comprising: a monitor
programmed to identify a first website and to detect an attack that
is made through the first website, the first website having loaded
the attack remotely through a second website; a tracing module
programmed to, immediately upon identification of the attack:
identify at least one website link loaded by the first website;
trace the website link to the second website before the second
website is able to prevent the tracing module from examining the
second website; examine the second website to determine whether the
second website hosts the attack loaded by the first website; the
tracing module being further programmed to determine, based on the
examination of the second website, that: the first website loaded
the attack remotely through the second website; the second website
hosts the attack; a database that stores an identifier of the
second website; a security module programmed to use the identifier
of the second website to block attacks from the second website; at
least one processor configured to execute the monitor, the tracing
module, and the security module, wherein: the monitor is programmed
to detect the attack loaded by the first website at least in part
by being programmed to implement a deobfuscation tool hooked into a
browser of a computing device to deobfuscate malicious code by:
identifying at least one function call associated with the first
website as the browser executes the function call; examining the
function call to determine whether the function call injects
malicious code into the first website.
13. The system of claim 12, wherein: the attack is a drive-by
download that attempts to download malware to the computing device
with the browser that is displaying the first website.
14. The system of claim 12, further comprising: a deobfuscator
programmed to deobfuscate code in the first website to identify
malicious code injected into the first website.
15. The system of claim 12, wherein: the first website has been
compromised by an iframe injected into the first website; the
tracing module is programmed to determine that the iframe loads the
second website.
16. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising
one or more computer-executable instructions that, when executed by
a computing device, cause the computing device to: identify a first
website; detect an attack loaded by the first website to the
computing device, the first website having loaded the attack
remotely through a second website; immediately upon detecting the
attack loaded by the first website: identify at least one website
link loaded by the first website; trace the website link to the
second website such that the second website is unable to prevent
the computing device from examining the second website; examine the
second website to determine whether the second website hosts the
attack loaded by the first website; determine, based on the
examination of the second website, that: the first website loaded
the attack remotely through the second website; the second website
hosts the attack; block the second website, wherein: the one or
more computer-executable instructions that cause the computing
device to detect the attack loaded by the first website comprise
one or more instructions that cause the computing device to
implement a deobfuscation tool hooked into a browser of the
computing device to deobfuscate malicious code by: identifying at
least one function call associated with the first website as the
browser executes the function call; examining the function call to
determine whether the function call injects malicious code into the
first website.
17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim
16, wherein: the attack is a drive-by download that attempts to
download malware to the computing device with the browser that is
displaying the first website.
18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim
16, wherein the one or more computer-executable instructions, when
executed by the computing device, further cause the computing
device to identify the attack.
19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim
16, wherein the first website is a legitimate website that has been
compromised.
Description
BACKGROUND
Attackers often use drive-by downloads to attempt to infect
innocent computers with malware. A drive-by download may be any
type of download that happens without the knowledge of a user.
Drive-by downloads may download spyware, computer viruses, or
various other types of malware to a user's computer without the
user's knowledge.
To evade detection and increase the ability to infect others'
computers, attackers who use drive-by downloads may inject iframes
in legitimate websites. These iframes, which may be so small that
the user does not notice them, may load a source website that
performs a drive-by download. Thus, a user visiting a legitimate
website may be attacked by a drive-by download.
Traditional anti-malware technologies may block legitimate websites
that have been compromised as described above. But these
anti-malware technologies have several disadvantages. For example,
attackers may infect numerous websites with iframes that point to a
single source, and the anti-malware technology may block some, but
not all, of the compromised websites that point to the source.
Another disadvantage of traditional anti-malware technologies is
that they do not distinguish between compromised websites and
source websites. Thus, these technologies may block a compromised
website while the underlying problem--the source website--may not
be blocked.
SUMMARY
Embodiments of the present disclosure trace attacks by determining
whether a website associated with an attack is a compromised
website (e.g., a website that indirectly loads a drive-by download)
or a source website (e.g., a website that hosts a drive-by
download). A browser on a computer may load a first website, and a
monitor may detect an attempted attack (e.g., a drive-by download).
A tracing module may determine that the first website loads the
attack remotely through a second website. The tracing module may
determine that the second website hosts the attack. Then, a
security module may perform a security action with respect to the
second website. For example, the security module may block
communications with the second website and/or may block downloads
from the second website.
In some embodiments, the first website may load a second website,
and the second website may load a third website. The third website
may host the attack. The first and second websites may be
compromised-legitimate websites, and the third website may be a
malicious-host website. The tracing module may backtrace the attack
through the first and second websites and determine that the third
website hosts the attack. Thus, the security module may block the
third website rather than blocking the first and/or second
websites.
Legitimate websites may be compromised in a variety of ways. For
example, a legitimate website may be compromised by an iframe being
injected into the legitimate website. The iframe may load a website
that hosts an attack. In other embodiments, the legitimate website
may be compromised by a script injected into the legitimate
website. The script may be programmed to drop an iframe that points
to a website that hosts an attack. In other embodiments, the script
may be programmed to run an attack from a malicious website. Thus,
to determine whether a website has been compromised, a tracing
module may determine whether a malicious iframe or script has been
injected into the website. Since malicious code may be heavily
obfuscated, embodiments of the present disclosure may implement
deobfuscation in determining whether a malicious iframe or script
has been injected into a website.
Features from any of the above-mentioned embodiments may be used in
combination with one another in accordance with the general
principles described herein. These and other embodiments, features,
and advantages will be more fully understood upon reading the
following detailed description in conjunction with the accompanying
drawings and claims.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The accompanying drawings illustrate a number of exemplary
embodiments and are a part of the specification. Together with the
following description, these drawings demonstrate and explain
various principles of the instant disclosure.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an exemplary network showing malicious
source and compromised websites according to certain
embodiments.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary system for tracing
attacks according to certain embodiments.
FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of an exemplary method for tracing attacks
according to certain embodiments.
FIG. 4 is another flow diagram of an exemplary system for
identifying compromised and malicious websites according to certain
embodiments.
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an exemplary computing system capable
of implementing one or more of the embodiments described and/or
illustrated herein.
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an exemplary computing network capable
of implementing one or more of the embodiments described and/or
illustrated herein.
Throughout the drawings, identical reference characters and
descriptions indicate similar, but not necessarily identical,
elements. While the exemplary embodiments described herein are
susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms,
specific embodiments have been shown by way of example in the
drawings and will be described in detail herein. However, the
exemplary embodiments described herein are not intended to be
limited to the particular forms disclosed. Rather, the instant
disclosure covers all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives
falling within the scope of the appended claims.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS
The instant disclosure generally relates to methods and systems for
tracing web-based attacks. The methods and systems disclosed herein
may attempt to identify the actual source of an attack and block
the source rather than merely blocking compromised websites that
may not be the source of an attack. As a result, embodiments of the
present disclosure may provide more comprehensive and focused
protection than previous solutions.
The following will describe, with reference to FIG. 1, how
attackers may inject iframes and scripts into innocent websites to
indirectly load attacks from the innocent websites. FIG. 2 shows an
exemplary system for tracing attacks. FIGS. 3 and 4 show steps that
may be performed in tracing attacks that are loaded indirectly.
Descriptions of an exemplary system and an exemplary network
architecture capable of implementing one or more of the embodiments
described and/or illustrated herein are provided in connection with
FIGS. 5 and 6.
FIG. 1 shows a network 100. Network 100 may include a source 110.
Source 110 may be a computing device, such as a server, that hosts
drive-by downloads. An attacker may inject code into other websites
that redirect to source 110. For example, iframe 112 may be
injected into a website A1 120. Website A1 120 may be a legitimate
website, and iframe 112 may load data from source 110 into the
background of website A1 120. Iframe 112 may be fixed at dimensions
of one by one, or at any other small dimensions, to prevent a user
from seeing iframe 112 and detecting the attack.
FIG. 1 also shows a compromised website B1 132. An attacker may
inject an iframe 111 into website B1 132. Iframe 111 may load a
website B2 130. Website B2 130 may also be a compromised website.
In other words, website B2 130 may be a legitimate website with an
injected iframe 114 that loads an attack from source 110.
Similarly, a website C1 144 may include an iframe 115 that loads a
website C2 142. Website C2 142 may include an iframe 113 that loads
a website C3 140, which may include an iframe 116. Iframe 116 may
load data from source 110, which may perform a drive-by download or
other attack on a victim computer.
As previously mentioned, traditional anti-malware technologies may
not attempt to trace attacks. As an example of a problem with
traditional anti-malware software, a user of a computer may visit
website A1 120, and the computer may be attacked by a drive-by
download hosted on source 110. After the attack, anti-malware
software may block website A1 120, but may not block source 110.
Thus, if the user visits website C1 144, the computer may be
attacked by source 110 again. FIGS. 2-4 present embodiments that
may address these and/or other deficiencies of prior anti-malware
technologies.
FIG. 2 shows components of a system 200. On or more of the
components of system 200 may trace attacks and/or block sources of
drive-by downloads. System 200 may include modules 202 and a
database 204. Modules 202 may include a monitor 210, a tracing
module 212, a security module 214, and a deobfuscator 216. Monitor
210 may be programmed to identify an attack that is made through a
first website. Tracing module 212 may be programmed to determine
that the first website loads the attack remotely through a second
website. Security module 214 may be programmed to use an identifier
of the second website to block attacks from the second website.
Database 204 may store identifiers of malicious source websites and
compromised websites.
In certain embodiments, one or more of modules 202 in FIG. 2 may
represent one or more software applications or programs that, when
executed by a computing device, may cause the computing device to
perform one or more steps for tracing a web-based attack. For
example, as will be described in greater detail below, one or more
of modules 102 may represent software modules configured to run on
one or more computing devices, such as computing device 510 in FIG.
5 and/or portions of exemplary network architecture 600 in FIG. 6.
One or more of modules 202 in FIG. 2 may also represent all or
portions of one or more special-purpose computers configured to
perform one or more tasks required to trace and block web-based
attacks.
FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of an exemplary method for tracing
attacks. As shown, a monitor, such as monitor 210 shown in FIG. 2,
may identify a first website (step 310). The monitor may identify
the first website by identifying an attack made through the first
website. The first website may be identified during a search for
websites that may directly or indirectly load drive-by downloads or
other attacks. The first website may also be identified when a user
visits a website that directly or indirectly loads a drive-by
download or other attack. The first website may be a legitimate
website, which may be a website that is not intended to be used for
malicious and/or illegal purposes. A legitimate website may be
compromised when it has been injected with an iframe, script, or
other code that directly or indirectly loads an attack.
As used herein, the term website may refer to any web page or
collection of web pages, text, images, videos, or other digital
assets hosted on one or more web servers. A website may contain a
web page, which may typically be written in a markup language, that
may be accessible via http or any other suitable protocol. Websites
may be sites available through the World Wide Web and/or various
other networks.
Turning back to the steps shown in FIG. 3, a tracing module, such
as tracing module 212 in FIG. 2, may determine that the first
website loads an attack remotely through a second website (step
320). For example, the tracing module may determine that the first
website has been injected with an iframe that loads a second
website. As used herein, the term iframe may refer to an inline
frame, which is an html element that may embed an html document
inside another html document. As previously mentioned, the size of
an iframe can be defined as being small so that a user does not
notice the iframe.
Determining that the first website loads an attack remotely through
a second website may also comprise determining that the first
website has been compromised by a script that is injected into the
first website. The script may be programmed to drop an iframe that
loads the second website. The script may also be programmed to run
an attack from the second website. The tracing module may also be
programmed determine that the first website loads an attack
remotely through a second website by identifying any other code in
the first website that may be used to load a second website for
malicious purposes.
Next, the tracing module may determine whether or not the second
website is the source website or the website that hosts the attack
(step 330). A website that hosts an attack may be a source website
of malicious code. For example, in a drive-by download attack, a
source website may connect to the computer being attacked and may
download malware to the computer.
A security module, such as security module 214, may perform a
security action with respect to the second website (step 340). The
security action may be any action to protect against attacks made
by the second website. For example, the security action may
comprise adding the website to a blocked-website list. Thus, when a
browser attempts to access the website in the future (either
directly or indirectly), security software may determine that the
website is blacklisted and may block the website. In some
embodiments, the blocked website may be included in a
blocked-website list created by a security software company and
distributed to clients of the company.
In various embodiments, the security action may comprise any other
suitable security action. For example, the security action may
comprise blocking communications with the second website and/or
blocking downloads from the second website. Thus, the source
website (i.e., the second website) may be blocked, and direct and
indirect attacks from the source website may be blocked. As a
result, legitimate websites, even if they have been compromised by
an injection of a malicious iframe or script that loads an attack
from the source website, may be allowed to load without risk of a
user's device being attacked.
FIG. 4 shows an exemplary block diagram of a method for identifying
compromised and source websites. A tracing module may load a
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) associated with a website (step
405). The tracing module may determine whether the website hosts a
drive-by download (step 410). If the website hosts a drive-by
download, the website may be determined to be a source, and the URL
may be determined to be a root-attack vector (step 425). This URL
may be added to a list of blocked URLs so that drive-by downloads
cannot be made from the URL.
If the website does not host one or more drive-by downloads, the
tracing module may determine whether the website loads one or more
drive-by downloads remotely (step 415). In other words, the tracing
module may determine whether code (e.g., an iframe or script) has
been injected into the website that directly or indirectly loads
another website that may perform a drive-by download. If the
website does not load one or more drive-by downloads remotely, the
tracing module may determine that the website (and therefore the
associated URL) is not a threat (step 430).
If the website loads one or more drive-by downloads remotely, the
tracing module may find all URLs loaded by the website and add them
to a queue as children of the URL (step 420). At step 435, the
tracing module may look at the queue and determine whether there
are additional URLs in the queue that need to be examined. If there
are, the process restarts at step 405. Thus, embodiments of the
present disclosure may trace through as many websites as necessary
to identify a source of a drive-by download or other attack.
As previously mentioned, as part of the process of tracing attacks,
a deobfuscator may deobfuscate malicious code that has been
obfuscated. In some embodiments, a deobfuscator may deobfuscate
scripts to search for malicious iframe drops and/or other code that
may facilitate an attack. In some embodiments, security software
may assume that all JavaScript code is heavily obfuscated and may
deobfuscate the script code to determine whether the code directly
or indirectly loads a drive-by download.
To perform deobfuscation, a security module may be integrated into
an existing deobfuscation tool, such as SYMANTEC CORPORATION's
CANARY engine. The deobfuscation tool may hook into a browser, such
as INTERNET EXPLORER, and may be capable of reading the function
calls and parameters as the browser interprets and executes them.
The parameters may be part of relevant script functions, such as
the JavaScript function document.write(string), that are commonly
used to drop extra code onto a victim website.
Source websites may block Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of any
device it attacks to prevent a tester from examining the malicious
code on the source website. Thus, if an attack is not caught when
it happens, a tracing module may not be able to trace the root
attack vector, resulting in a false negative. Thus, if the attack
is not caught when the attack happens, a tracing module may not be
able to trace the root attack vector, resulting in a false
negative. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the tracing module may
programmed to assume that is has only one chance to examine each
website and may therefore attempt to trace to a root attack vector
immediately after an attack is detected. As a result, a tracing
module may perform one or more of the steps of determining that a
first website loads an attack, determining that a second website
hosts the attack, and performing a security action with respect to
the second website in response to identifying the attack.
In other words, a tracing module may take action to trace an attack
immediately after the attack is detected. Tracing an attack right
after it is detected may be important because, as previously
mentioned, some source websites may block communications with IP
addresses of any websites it attacks to prevent security software
from examining malicious code on the source website.
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an exemplary computing system 510
capable of implementing one or more of the embodiments described
and/or illustrated herein. Computing system 510 broadly represents
any single or multi-processor computing device or system capable of
executing computer-readable instructions. Examples of computing
system 510 include, without limitation, workstations, laptops,
client-side terminals, servers, distributed computing systems,
handheld devices, or any other computing system or device. In its
most basic configuration, computing system 510 may comprise at
least one processor 514 and a system memory 516.
Processor 514 generally represents any type or form of processing
unit capable of processing data or interpreting and executing
instructions. In certain embodiments, processor 514 may receive
instructions from a software application or module. These
instructions may cause processor 514 to perform the functions of
one or more of the exemplary embodiments described and/or
illustrated herein. For example, processor 514 may perform and/or
be a means for performing, either alone or in combination with
other elements, one or more of the identifying, determining,
performing, blocking, adding, and deobfuscating steps described
herein. Processor 514 may also perform and/or be a means for
performing any other steps, methods, or processes described and/or
illustrated herein.
System memory 516 generally represents any type or form of volatile
or non-volatile storage device or medium capable of storing data
and/or other computer-readable instructions. Examples of system
memory 516 include, without limitation, random access memory (RAM),
read only memory (ROM), flash memory, or any other suitable memory
device. Although not required, in certain embodiments computing
system 510 may comprise both a volatile memory unit (such as, for
example, system memory 516) and a non-volatile storage device (such
as, for example, primary storage device 532, as described in detail
below).
In certain embodiments, exemplary computing system 510 may also
comprise one or more components or elements in addition to
processor 514 and system memory 516. For example, as illustrated in
FIG. 5, computing system 510 may comprise a memory controller 518,
an Input/Output (I/O) controller 520, and a communication interface
522, each of which may be interconnected via a communication
infrastructure 512. Communication infrastructure 512 generally
represents any type or form of infrastructure capable of
facilitating communication between one or more components of a
computing device. Examples of communication infrastructure 512
include, without limitation, a communication bus (such as an ISA,
PCI, PCIe, or similar bus) and a network.
Memory controller 518 generally represents any type or form of
device capable of handling memory or data or controlling
communication between one or more components of computing system
510. For example, in certain embodiments memory controller 518 may
control communication between processor 514, system memory 516, and
I/O controller 520 via communication infrastructure 512. In certain
embodiments, memory controller may perform and/or be a means for
performing, either alone or in combination with other elements, one
or more of the steps or features described and/or illustrated
herein, such as identifying, determining, performing, blocking,
adding, and deobfuscating.
I/O controller 520 generally represents any type or form of module
capable of coordinating and/or controlling the input and output
functions of a computing device. For example, in certain
embodiments I/O controller may control or facilitate transfer of
data between one or more elements of computing system 510, such as
processor 514, system memory 516, communication interface 522,
display adapter 526, input interface 530, and storage interface
534. I/O controller 520 may be used, for example, to perform and/or
be a means for performing, either alone or in combination with
other elements, one or more of the identifying, determining,
performing, blocking, adding, and deobfuscating steps described
herein. I/O controller 520 may also be used to perform and/or be a
means for performing other steps and features set forth in the
instant disclosure.
Communication interface 522 broadly represents any type or form of
communication device or adapter capable of facilitating
communication between exemplary computing system 510 and one or
more additional devices. For example, in certain embodiments
communication interface 522 may facilitate communication between
computing system 510 and a private or public network comprising
additional computing systems. Examples of communication interface
522 include, without limitation, a wired network interface (such as
a network interface card), a wireless network interface (such as a
wireless network interface card), a modem, and any other suitable
interface. In at least one embodiment, communication interface 522
may provide a direct connection to a remote server via a direct
link to a network, such as the Internet. Communication interface
522 may also indirectly provide such a connection through, for
example, a local area network (such as an Ethernet network), a
personal area network, a telephone or cable network, a cellular
telephone connection, a satellite data connection, or any other
suitable connection.
In certain embodiments, communication interface 522 may also
represent a host adapter configured to facilitate communication
between computing system 510 and one or more additional network or
storage devices via an external bus or communications channel.
Examples of host adapters include, without limitation, SCSI host
adapters, USB host adapters, IEEE 594 host adapters, SATA and eSATA
host adapters, ATA and PATA host adapters, Fibre Channel interface
adapters, Ethernet adapters, or the like. Communication interface
522 may also allow computing system 510 to engage in distributed or
remote computing. For example, communication interface 522 may
receive instructions from a remote device or send instructions to a
remote device for execution. In certain embodiments, communication
interface 522 may perform and/or be a means for performing, either
alone or in combination with other elements, one or more of the
identifying, determining, performing, blocking, adding, and
deobfuscating steps disclosed herein. Communication interface 522
may also be used to perform and/or be a means for performing other
steps and features set forth in the instant disclosure.
As illustrated in FIG. 5, computing system 510 may also comprise at
least one display device 524 coupled to communication
infrastructure 512 via a display adapter 526. Display device 524
generally represents any type or form of device capable of visually
displaying information forwarded by display adapter 526. Similarly,
display adapter 526 generally represents any type or form of device
configured to forward graphics, text, and other data from
communication infrastructure 512 (or from a frame buffer, as known
in the art) for display on display device 524.
As illustrated in FIG. 5, exemplary computing system 510 may also
comprise at least one input device 528 coupled to communication
infrastructure 512 via an input interface 530. Input device 528
generally represents any type or form of input device capable of
providing input, either computer or human generated, to exemplary
computing system 510. Examples of input device 528 include, without
limitation, a keyboard, a pointing device, a speech recognition
device, or any other input device. In at least one embodiment,
input device 528 may perform and/or be a means for performing,
either alone or in combination with other elements, one or more of
the identifying, determining, performing, blocking, adding, and
deobfuscating steps disclosed herein. Input device 528 may also be
used to perform and/or be a means for performing other steps and
features set forth in the instant disclosure.
As illustrated in FIG. 5, exemplary computing system 510 may also
comprise a primary storage device 532 and a backup storage device
533 coupled to communication infrastructure 512 via a storage
interface 534. Storage devices 532 and 533 generally represent any
type or form of storage device or medium capable of storing data
and/or other computer-readable instructions. For example, storage
devices 532 and 533 may be a magnetic disk drive (e.g., a so-called
hard drive), a floppy disk drive, a magnetic tape drive, an optical
disk drive, a flash drive, or the like. Storage interface 534
generally represents any type or form of interface or device for
transferring data between storage devices 532 and 533 and other
components of computing system 510.
In certain embodiments, storage devices 532 and 533 may be
configured to read from and/or write to a removable storage unit
configured to store computer software, data, or other
computer-readable information. Examples of suitable removable
storage units include, without limitation, a floppy disk, a
magnetic tape, an optical disk, a flash memory device, or the like.
Storage devices 532 and 533 may also comprise other similar
structures or devices for allowing computer software, data, or
other computer-readable instructions to be loaded into computing
system 510. For example, storage devices 532 and 533 may be
configured to read and write software, data, or other
computer-readable information. Storage devices 532 and 533 may also
be a part of computing system 510 or may be a separate device
accessed through other interface systems.
In certain embodiments, the exemplary file systems disclosed herein
may be stored on primary storage device 532, while the exemplary
file-system backups disclosed herein may be stored on backup
storage device 533. Storage devices 532 and 533 may also be used,
for example, to perform and/or be a means for performing, either
alone or in combination with other elements, one or more of the
identifying, determining, performing, blocking, adding, and
deobfuscating steps disclosed herein. Storage devices 532 and 533
may also be used to perform and/or be a means for performing other
steps and features set forth in the instant disclosure.
Many other devices or subsystems may be connected to computing
system 510. Conversely, all of the components and devices
illustrated in FIG. 5 need not be present to practice the
embodiments described and/or illustrated herein. The devices and
subsystems referenced above may also be interconnected in different
ways from that shown in FIG. 5. Computing system 510 may also
employ any number of software, firmware, and/or hardware
configurations. For example, one or more of the exemplary
embodiments disclosed herein may be encoded as a computer program
(also referred to as computer software, software applications,
computer-readable instructions, or computer control logic) on a
computer-readable medium. The phrase "computer-readable medium"
generally refers to any form of device, carrier, or medium capable
of storing or carrying computer-readable instructions. Examples of
computer-readable media include, without limitation,
transmission-type media, such as carrier waves, and physical media,
such as magnetic-storage media (e.g., hard disk drives and floppy
disks), optical-storage media (e.g., CD- or DVD-ROMs),
electronic-storage media (e.g., solid-state drives and flash
media), and other distribution systems.
The computer-readable medium containing the computer program may be
loaded into computing system 510. All or a portion of the computer
program stored on the computer-readable medium may then be stored
in system memory 516 and/or various portions of storage devices 532
and 533. When executed by processor 514, a computer program loaded
into computing system 510 may cause processor 514 to perform and/or
be a means for performing the functions of one or more of the
exemplary embodiments described and/or illustrated herein.
Additionally or alternatively, one or more of the exemplary
embodiments described and/or illustrated herein may be implemented
in firmware and/or hardware. For example, computing system 510 may
be configured as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
adapted to implement one or more of the exemplary embodiments
disclosed herein.
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an exemplary network architecture 600
in which client systems 610, 620, and 630 and servers 640 and 645
may be coupled to a network 650. Client systems 610, 620, and 630
generally represent any type or form of computing device or system,
such as exemplary computing system 510 in FIG. 5. Similarly,
servers 640 and 645 generally represent computing devices or
systems, such as application servers or database servers,
configured to provide various database services and/or to run
certain software applications. Network 650 generally represents any
telecommunication or computer network; including, for example, an
intranet, a wide area network (WAN), a local area network (LAN), a
personal area network (PAN), the Internet, a cellular network
(e.g., GSM network), or any other network.
As illustrated in FIG. 6, one or more storage devices 660(1)-(N)
may be directly attached to server 640. Similarly, one or more
storage devices 670(1)-(N) may be directly attached to server 645.
Storage devices 660(1)-(N) and storage devices 670(1)-(N) generally
represent any type or form of storage device or medium capable of
storing data and/or other computer-readable instructions. In
certain embodiments, storage devices 660(1)-(N) and storage devices
670(1)-(N) may represent network-attached storage (NAS) devices
configured to communicate with servers 640 and 645 using various
protocols, such as NFS, SMB, or CIFS.
Servers 640 and 645 may also be connected to a storage area network
(SAN) fabric 680. SAN fabric 680 generally represents any type or
form of computer network or architecture capable of facilitating
communication between a plurality of storage devices. SAN fabric
680 may facilitate communication between servers 640 and 645 and a
plurality of storage devices 690(1)-(N) and/or an intelligent
storage array 695. SAN fabric 680 may also facilitate, via network
650 and servers 640 and 645, communication between client systems
610, 620, and 630 and storage devices 690(1)-(N) and/or intelligent
storage array 695 in such a manner that devices 690(1)-(N) and
array 695 appear as locally attached devices to client systems 610,
620, and 630. As with storage devices 660(1)-(N) and storage
devices 670(1)-(N), storage devices 690(1)-(N) and intelligent
storage array 695 generally represent any type or form of storage
device or medium capable of storing data and/or other
computer-readable instructions.
In certain embodiments, and with reference to exemplary computing
system 510 of FIG. 5, a communication interface, such as
communication interface 522 in FIG. 5, may be used to provide
connectivity between each client system 610, 620, and 630 and
network 650. Client systems 610, 620, and 630 may be able to access
information on server 640 or 645 using, for example, a web browser
or other client software. Such software may allow client systems
610, 620, and 630 to access data hosted by server 640, server 645,
storage devices 660(1)-(N), storage devices 670(1)-(N), storage
devices 690(1)-(N), or intelligent storage array 695. Although FIG.
6 depicts the use of a network (such as the Internet) for
exchanging data, the embodiments described and/or illustrated
herein are not limited to the Internet or any particular
network-based environment.
In at least one embodiment, all or a portion of one or more of the
exemplary embodiments disclosed herein may be encoded as a computer
program and loaded onto and executed by server 640, server 645,
storage devices 660(1)-(N), storage devices 670(1)-(N), storage
devices 690(1)-(N), intelligent storage array 695, or any
combination thereof. All or a portion of one or more of the
exemplary embodiments disclosed herein may also be encoded as a
computer program, stored in server 640, run by server 645, and
distributed to client systems 610, 620, and 630 over network 650.
Accordingly, network architecture 600 may perform and/or be a means
for performing, either alone or in combination with other elements,
one or more of the identifying, determining, performing, blocking,
adding, and deobfuscating steps disclosed herein. Network
architecture 600 may also be used to perform and/or be a means for
performing other steps and features set forth in the instant
disclosure.
As detailed above, computing system 510 and/or one or more of the
components of network architecture 600 may perform and/or be a
means for performing, either alone or in combination with other
elements, one or more steps of the exemplary methods described
and/or illustrated herein. For example, computing system 510 and/or
one or more of the components of network architecture 500 may
perform a computer-implemented method for tracing attacks. The
computer-implemented method may comprise identifying a first
website, determining that the first website loads an attack
remotely through a second website, and determining that the second
website hosts the attack.
After determining that the second website hosts the attack, a
tracing module may perform a security action with respect to the
second website. In some embodiments, an attack may be a drive-by
download that attempts to download malware to a computer with a
browser that is displaying the first website. According to various
embodiments, the computer-implemented method may include
identifying the attack. In such embodiments, determining that the
first website loads the attack, determining that the second website
hosts the attack, and performing a security action with respect to
the second website may be performed in response to identifying the
attack. In other words these steps may be performed immediately
after identifying the attack such that no opportunity is lost in
being able to identify the attack if the attacker attempts to block
future attempts to communicate with the attacker for detection
purposes.
In some embodiments, determining that the first website loads the
attack remotely through the second website may comprise determining
that malicious code in the first website loads a third website and
determining that the malicious code in the third website loads the
second website. This is the example in which the first website
redirects to an additional website, which is referred to as the
third website, and the additional website redirects again to the
final source of the attack. In certain embodiments, a tracing
module may trace through more than two websites to find a source of
an attack.
In some embodiments, the first website may be a legitimate website
that has been compromised. In various embodiments, the first
website may have been compromised by an iframe injected into the
first website. In such embodiments, determining that the second
website hosts the attack may comprise determining that the iframe
loads the second website and identifying malicious code on the
second website. The first website, in some embodiments, may have
been compromised by a script injected into the first website. The
script may be programmed to drop an iframe. In such embodiments,
determining that the second website hosts the attack may comprise
determining that the iframe loads the second website. In other
embodiments, the script may be programmed to run an attack from the
second website. In such embodiments, determining that the second
website hosts the attack may comprise determining that the script
runs the attack from the second website.
According to various embodiments, the security action may comprise
at least one of blocking communications with the second website,
blocking downloads from the second website, and/or adding the
second website to a blocked-website list. In various embodiments,
the method may further comprise deobfuscating code in the first
website to identify malicious code injected into the first
website.
According to various embodiments, a system for tracing attacks may
comprise a monitor programmed to identify an attack that was made
through a first website. The system may also include a tracing
module programmed to determine that the first website loads the
attack remotely through a second website. The tracing module may
also determine that the second website hosts the attack. The system
may comprise a database that stores an identifier of the second
website and a security module programmed to use the identifier,
such as a URL, to block attacks from the second website.
In some embodiments, the attack may be a drive-by download that
attempts to download malware to a computer with a browser that is
displaying the first website. According to various embodiments, the
first website may be a legitimate website that has been
compromised. In certain embodiments, the system may comprise a
deobfuscator programmed to deobfuscate code in the first website to
identify malicious code injected into the first website.
According to various embodiments, the first website may have been
compromised by an iframe being injected into the first website, and
the tracing module may be programmed to determine that the iframe
loads the second website. According to at least one embodiment, the
first website may have been compromised by a script injected into
the first website.
In various embodiments, a computer-readable medium may comprise one
or more computer-executable instructions that, when executed by a
computing device, may cause the computing device to identify a
first website, determine that the first website loads an attack
remotely through a second website, determine that the second
website hosts the attack, and block the second website. In various
embodiments, the attack may be a drive-by download that attempts to
download malware to a computer with a browser that is displaying
the first website. In various embodiments, the one or more
computer-executable instructions, when executed by the computing
device, may further cause the computing device to identify the
attack.
While the foregoing disclosure sets forth various embodiments using
specific block diagrams, flowcharts, and examples, each block
diagram component, flowchart step, operation, and/or component
described and/or illustrated herein may be implemented,
individually and/or collectively, using a wide range of hardware,
software, or firmware (or any combination thereof) configurations.
In addition, any disclosure of components contained within other
components should be considered exemplary in nature since many
other architectures can be implemented to achieve the same
functionality.
The process parameters and sequence of steps described and/or
illustrated herein are given by way of example only and can be
varied as desired. For example, while the steps illustrated and/or
described herein may be shown or discussed in a particular order,
these steps do not necessarily need to be performed in the order
illustrated or discussed. The various exemplary methods described
and/or illustrated herein may also omit one or more of the steps
described or illustrated herein or include additional steps in
addition to those disclosed.
Furthermore, while various embodiments have been described and/or
illustrated herein in the context of fully functional computing
systems, one or more of these exemplary embodiments may be
distributed as a program product in a variety of forms, regardless
of the particular type of computer-readable media used to actually
carry out the distribution. The embodiments disclosed herein may
also be implemented using software modules that perform certain
tasks. These software modules may include script, batch, or other
executable files that may be stored on a computer-readable storage
medium or in a computing system. In some embodiments, these
software modules may configure a computing system to perform one or
more of the exemplary embodiments disclosed herein.
The preceding description has been provided to enable others
skilled in the art to best utilize various aspects of the exemplary
embodiments disclosed herein. This exemplary description is not
intended to be exhaustive or to be limited to any precise form
disclosed. Many modifications and variations are possible without
departing from the spirit and scope of the instant disclosure. The
embodiments disclosed herein should be considered in all respects
illustrative and not restrictive. Reference should be made to the
appended claims and their equivalents in determining the scope of
the instant disclosure.
Unless otherwise noted, the terms "a" or "an," as used in the
specification and claims, are to be construed as meaning "at least
one of." In addition, for ease of use, the words "including" and
"having," as used in the specification and claims, are
interchangeable with and have the same meaning as the word
"comprising."
* * * * *
References