U.S. patent number 6,965,816 [Application Number 10/260,525] was granted by the patent office on 2005-11-15 for pfn/trac system faa upgrades for accountable remote and robotics control to stop the unauthorized use of aircraft and to improve equipment management and public safety in transportation.
This patent grant is currently assigned to Kline & Walker, LLC. Invention is credited to Richard C. Walker.
United States Patent |
6,965,816 |
Walker |
November 15, 2005 |
PFN/TRAC system FAA upgrades for accountable remote and robotics
control to stop the unauthorized use of aircraft and to improve
equipment management and public safety in transportation
Abstract
This invention, a Protected Primary Focal Node PFN is a Trusted
Remote Activity Controller TRAC and mobile communication router
platform that provides accountable remote and robotics control to
transportation vehicles by interfacing with the vehicles E/E
systems. It connects each vehicle either on the earth's surface or
near the earth's surface with application specific intranets for
air, sea and land travel, via either host commercial servers or
agency providers through wireless communication gateways and then
further interfaces these vehicles in a larger machine messaging
matrix via wireless and IP protocols to further coordinate movement
assess and manage equipment use and impact on the world resources,
societies infrastructure and the environment. This filing focuses
directly on PFN/TRAC System use to augment and upgrade public
safety and security in the Airline Industry and restrict any
unauthorized use of an aircraft. Additionally, this application and
related filings teaches the PFN/TRAC System.TM. use for all vehicle
platforms to increase safety and security in a free society like
the United State of America. The other related filings instruct in
the technology's use for robust and accountable remote control for
personal applications, stationary equipment and standalone
functions, and coordinates them and interfaces them within the
communication matrix. The TRAC controller also performs translation
and repeating functions across a wide variety of communication
protocols to complete a more mobile flexible matrix or web. This
connected communication matrix of computers and humans provides an
enhanced Human Machine Interfacing HMI scenario both locally and
systemically in real-time for improve equipment management and
world stability.
Inventors: |
Walker; Richard C. (Waldorf,
MD) |
Assignee: |
Kline & Walker, LLC
(Potomac, MD)
|
Family
ID: |
26984983 |
Appl.
No.: |
10/260,525 |
Filed: |
October 1, 2002 |
Current U.S.
Class: |
701/16; 244/189;
701/2 |
Current CPC
Class: |
B64D
45/0031 (20190801); G07C 5/008 (20130101); B64D
45/0034 (20190801); B64C 13/20 (20130101); B64D
45/0059 (20190801); G08B 27/008 (20130101); G08B
31/00 (20130101); B64D 45/0053 (20190801); B64D
45/0015 (20130101); G08B 13/1965 (20130101); Y02T
50/40 (20130101) |
Current International
Class: |
B64C
13/00 (20060101); B64C 13/20 (20060101); B64D
45/00 (20060101); G06F 019/00 (); G06F
007/00 () |
Field of
Search: |
;701/3,36,2,29 ;180/170
;713/200 |
References Cited
[Referenced By]
U.S. Patent Documents
Primary Examiner: Black; Thomas G.
Assistant Examiner: Mancho; Ronnie
Attorney, Agent or Firm: Donner, Esq.; Irah H. Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Parent Case Text
RELATED APPLICATIONS
This application claims priority from U.S. Provisional Patent
Application No. 60/325,538 filed Oct. 1, 2001 and U.S. Provisional
Patent Application No. 60/330,085, filed Oct. 19, 2001.
This application is related to U.S. Patent Application No.
60/330,088, filed Oct. 19, 2000; 60/200,872, filed May 1, 2000;
60/176,818, filed Jan. 19, 2000; 60/139,759, filed Jun. 15, 1999;
60/140,029, filed Jun. 18, 1998; Ser. No. 08/975,140, filed Nov.
20, 1997; PCT Application No. PCT/US 97/21516, filed Nov. 24, 1997
and 60/032,217, filed on Dec. 2, 1996, all of which are hereby
incorporated by reference.
Claims
What is claimed is:
1. An aircraft management system including at least one 1A PFN/TRAC
aircraft controller/router, that interfaces at least one of
essential flight controls, existing flight controls and system data
streams to detect a troubled aircraft and determine a federal
access control technology (FACT) event condition, including a
Systems Under Control (SUC) to the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit,
said aircraft management system optionally providing at least one
of Remote Control (RC) and robotics to incrementally decrease
public safely risk by at least one of thwarting the unauthorized
and reducing the un-safe use and collateral damage of the troubled
aircraft, by locking down local human flight controls and
initiating a preprogrammed robotics flight plan stored in secured
resident flight computer responsive to the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC
unit, the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit sensing and regulating
cabin and flight deck compartment atmosphere, and optionally
treating fuel compartments and dumping unnecessary fuel prior to
impact or a FACT landing at a safe location and being responsive to
commands given by at least one 1A PFN military RC pilot in an
assist or escort aircraft and accepting same from local RC commands
after a hand off protocol to the safe base remote control pilot for
any final glide path RC and landing commands to return to the
surface at a designated secure safe base (SB) and stop at a special
position, the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit including at least one
application specific to a FACT event flight determined by continual
real-time telemetry transmitted to the surface so an optional local
response includes at least one of bagging the aircraft and storing
the aircraft in an isolation hanger until at least one of a
biological and chemical hazard have been checked and optionally
identified and toxins when present at least one of neutralized and
further contained and further reported, optionally via a TSA/FACT
Department of homeland security matrix of intranets and the Center
for Disease Control CDC; the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit
optionally performing additional functionality responsively with
other portions of a PFN/TRAC system and terrestrial PFN units
optionally via at least one of the matrix of intranets, dedicated
short range communications and geo/time synced portable networks
configured in real-time to connect a specific group of responding
PFNs from cross applications optionally into a FAA/AOC/TSA FACT
security Air intranet and first responder communication loop for
close in air to ground responsiveness to clear impending crash or
unscheduled landing area via local wireless networking; and the at
least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit posting the aircraft terrestrial contact
define the condition of the aircraft and or the extent and nature
of any debris field via surviving wireless and sensing still intact
and responding to determine how best to manage safely the
aircraft's responder's effort to assist the FACT event
aircraft.
2. An aircraft management system according to claim 1, wherein said
at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit further comprises at least one of a
hardware combination, interfacing, connection, augmentation and
software development to effect a FACT flight event response,
optionally including a protocol for at least one of hijacking of an
aircraft and unsafe use, and including application specific
functionality for interfacing of at least one of OEM avionics,
aircraft bus and E/E systems, and to further include interfacing of
at least one of sensors, audio, video, digital, analog, automation,
actuators, augmentation, and customization, providing protection to
complete a protected locally and remotely automated flight,
optionally standardized as at least one of policy, protocol, rule
and rules, and made into code or implemented via government mandate
with regulations, and law for at least one of commercial air travel
transport applications, private aviation and general aviation, and
optionally for government and military aviation via the at least
one of RC and robotics and networking via the at least one of
electronics, avionics, security, operations and management
innovations and accountable recording, reporting and recovery
innovations.
3. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising a protected remote management system at least
one of dispersed and centralized singular in function and redundant
for reliability and to accountably perform remote control and
robotics via at least one protected memory storage, both locally
and reported to additional data storage devices, and additionally
reported to a AOC/TSA FACT NORAD Air CINC command intranet and to a
TSA FACT Department of Homeland Security command center en route
associated with the PFN/TRAC system and FACT security program.
4. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least one protected Primary Focal Node (PFN)
and Trusted Remote Activity Controller (TRAC) to perform at least
one of accountable robotics and remote management, optionally as a
local system and responsive to at least one accountable remote TRAC
system and comprising at least one of System On Chip (SOC)
technology, and further including at least one cross environmental
application, and interfacing with the PFN/TRAC management System
and FACT terrestrial machine messaging units and intranets.
5. An aircraft management system according to claim 4, wherein the
at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit interfaces into air fames via a
hybrid construction of the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit and at
least one stand alone self powered PFN configured as a portable
unit and designed specifically to receive via a non invasive
wireless receiver circuit at least one of ATM and wireless aircraft
transmitted avionics flight data reported to FAA/AOC flight
operations and to an acceptable isolated wireless unit in real-time
to at least one TSA FACT terrestrial monitoring terminal to be
located with AOC systems to help coordinate TSA/air marshal with
ground security and air operation, and to test more robust and
aggressive implementation of accountable remote control technology
isolated from real-time flight controls.
6. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least one DSRC wireless interfacing including
bluetooth to be interfaced in either the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC
aircraft unit, the progressive air marshal unit, and a tester
interface in such a manner access and control all wireless,
handheld or carry on devices, cellular phones, navigational aids,
personal computer products, Laptops, PDAs and restrict their use
during flight and use their CDMA and TDMA or any other wireless
longer range or short communications and send FACT EAM messages to
the surface TSA/FACT Security intranet via the TSA Air FACT
intranet and any such translation processing between wireless
protocols.
7. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least five FACT event Safe Bases (SB) across
the United States, to be accompanied by at least five safe air
space routes and programmable flight plans to include approach
glide paths and landing software using AbS systems and PFN
transponder enhancements to effect the robotics flight and landing
of aircraft and in time to include all aircraft.
8. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least one Safe Base to be equipped with
emergency medical personnel and appropriate equipment to handle
bio-hazards, chemical toxins, nuclear toxins and traditional
explosives, and including at least one of the functionality of:
skilled squadrons of remote control (RC) pilots with stations that
are constructed optionally from hybrid flight simulator technology
and interfaced real-time data delivered from the aircraft to
provide close in real-time flying skills during approach and
landing of a troubled FACT flight responsive to the 1A PFN/TRAC
aircraft unit performing robotics serving the RC link; and an
escort assist aircraft with a second pilot, an additional RC pilot
to include cockpit station for controlling the troubled plane after
an automated robotics take over and in flight rendezvous that is
accompanied by a second plane and specialists for the FACT
emergency, and accessing the aircraft in a preplanned special
manner to best protect public safety and preserve national
security.
9. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least one of medical tracking and bio sign
telemetry to include robust remote control to deliver automated at
least one of treatment and medication via a repeater function of
the at least one 1A PFN/TRAC unit and TRACker operated by TSA/FACT
security in conjunction with TRAC FACT command and control
protocols, while at least one of the aircraft is on the surface and
airborne and to include any wireless connected or routed
communication via the PFN/TRAC system or via any systems interfaced
therewith.
10. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least one of a robust remote control and
preprogrammed robotics weapons or hijack countermeasures that
incapacitate, render unconscious, change the behavior or destroy
the perpetrator by gas, projectile, electrical shock, chemical
substance, or other physical means.
11. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least one means for providing at least one of
a protected incapacitating injection of a debilitating substance,
an incapacitating electrical shock mechanism, an automated
projectile mechanism embedded in an application specific location
in the airframe or in the essential flight control human interfaces
or pilot seats and responsive to the at least one of the 1A
PFN/TRAC unit and TRACker approved for this interface function and
remotely triggered or energized via robotics.
12. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising at least one proprietary PFN/TRAC/FACT protocols
and teachings for the progressive interfacing of hardware, software
and wet ware Human implementations as a response structure
including procedures, policies and the development of programs,
protocols and law increasing public safety and national security
while remaining constitutionally structured to maintain and insure
freedom of movement with a free and respectful society.
13. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising automatic lock down of all local flight controls
when seat defense measures have been deployed, and additionally the
at least one 1A PFNTRAC System has initiated a FACT event and the
aircraft flight controls would be under robotics safe base
programming, with coordinates reported to the surface and escort RC
pilot in route to intercept the robotic flight for close in support
and further flight management and control.
14. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising a Remote Control surface based Pilot to take a
controlled handoff off of the FACT flight via at least one 1A
PFN/TRAC robotics flight programming and RC recognition capability
to interface the air born assist RC chase pilot the surface RC
pilot and any real-time error correcting robotics or AI for the
final approach, landing and parking of the aircraft.
15. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising a surface remote control pilot station to be
more rapidly configured from existing appropriate flight simulators
that receive direct flight data from the actual troubled FACT
flight aircraft and the simulator provide a virtual real-time RC
pilot experience due to the short transmission distance generally
4-5 miles or less and basically for the final glide path and
landing.
16. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising a safe base 7/24 duty ready squadron of RC
pilots qualified on various aircraft with application specific
interface software for the compromised flight and specific aircraft
with the, squadron made up at least one of commercial companies
posting employees to this duty and military NORAD the North
American CINC Air command supplying and staffing the squadron, with
special TSA pilots.
17. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further comprising assist jets with RC pilots and troop support air
first responders with specialist and squadrons and with their
location determined by DOD/NORAD/FAA/TSA and the Department of
Homeland security with a 24/7 readiness to be scrambled on any
TRAC/FACT flagged flight respective of intercept coordinates via
FACT/DES in real time communications and AIR CINC/NORAD command and
the pursuit aircraft closest either airborne or surface ready.
18. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further receiving data from the TRAC unit flagged with a FACT
emergency event like a scenario to down load telemetry data from
the troubled aircraft to prescribe specific ground response at the
safe bases, and to be in continual flight control via the
preprogrammed robotics flight for ground support and surface waning
to clear any impact areas to eliminate as much collateral damage as
possible.
19. An aircraft management system according to claims 1 or 2,
further receiving protected accountable event recordings during a
FACT event both in airborne FACT Ball receptacles, and regionally
on the surface via downloads established to local surface
repositories by geo time synced recognition algorithm running GPS
data interfaced in the at least one 1A PFN or TRACker unit and
AOC/TSA/FACT Security known locations preprogrammed with
connectable links as part of a PFN/TRAC/TSA/FACT protocol to have
exact configurations, application and use determined for the
structuring and implementation of appropriate rules regulations
standards requirements codes or law.
20. A PFN/TRAC system of controller and routers as a series of
protected local interface platforms for a multiple of wireless
technologies to: route/translate signals via conversion software
programming operating at a higher level application to which the
disparate protocols have written code; route/translate message
content via a universal Emergency Action Message content conversion
software library that can be transferable between any of the many
different wireless protocols to specially process Emergency Action
Messaging, FACT EAM messages; employ a host equipments E/E system
to provide a stable primary power source for PFN/TRAC/FACT
operations and to maintain supplemental power supplies for reliable
service; recover locally generated data from equipment, bodies and
accessories interfaced to include, a vehicle/baggage tug 1SV PFN or
a car DRC PFN, a piece of equipment a metal detector or conveyor
belt via 1E PFN, a person, a guard, a worker via a 1P PFN belt,
bracelet, band, or impregnated in a garment or a stand alone
digital cam and microphone via 1Ps PFN with a solar array or a
injected or implanted chip and automated medicator and sensor via
1PI PFN and the TRACker in passive report and test mode accessory
interfaced with a GPS receiver/ and or number or type of sensors;
operate activity controls either via AI robotics use of data
recovered and or preprogramming or by remote and automated command
and control with or without local human collaboration and with
reliability enhanced by emergency/supplemental power available for
completed operations to include a multiple event storage with
protected limited and authorized access to FACT record storage in
the PFN/TRAC configuration whether centrally configured or a
dispersed configuration performing the functions of local
networking and or responding to a larger matrix or network of
intranets to for the TSA FACT Security network for the Department
of Homeland security.
21. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 20, for a 1E equipment
PFN/TRAC unit to be attached to stationary equipment and derive
primary power, machine messaging data, via the attachment to the
equipments E/E system and control machine activities and provide an
accessory interface platform for further interfacing either wired
or wireless components to translate, route report and record
messaging and commands to remote locations.
22. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 20, for 1SV PFN vehicle
platforms automotive, industrial and rail PFN/TRAC unit to be
attached to mobile equipment and derive primary power, from at
least one of the vehicle E/E system and vehicle bus system and to
access and process machine messaging data, and control machine
activities as well as, provide an accessory interface platform for
further interfacing and processing either wired or wireless to
translate, route report and record messaging and commands to remote
locations.
23. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 20, further comprising a
progressive DRC PFN automotive vehicle PFN/TRAC unit to interface
telematics technologies and vehicle E/E systems or automotive CAN
bus technology to connect all private and commercial vehicles to
the PFN/TRAC system and develop the FACT security program for
automobiles and commercial motor carriers and buses to provide
seamless homeland security for everything on or near the earths
surface via increasing the Driver Resource Center's interface and
management service capability to include carryon cellular phones
and other wireless device, and manage them in conjunction with OEM
collision avoidance programs and the PFN/TRAC system of movement
management to reduce driver distraction and easy driver workload
with total vehicle integration in time by providing additional
capacity for accessory interfacing for either wired or wireless and
processed, translated, routed, reported and recorded as messaging
and commands to remote locations, and in a process to become a
compete and protected 1SV PFN/TRAC unit.
24. A PFN/TRAC system according to claims 1, 2 or 20, further
comprising at least one carryon configuration of COTS products PC
software designed to determine application specific final design
for PFN/TRAC interfaces, and to serve as a stop gap technology or
an implementation filler for the PFN/TRAC System and FACT Security
program, wherein the TRACker first enters the system with passive
parallel and redundant messaging and then processes more robust
activity commands and control to disconnected actuators in a test
and record analysis mode for safety sensitive applications to
include but not limited to air travel, rail road applications,
interactive highway systems to determine the best more permanent
design and then placed into service with the proper application
specific PFN/TRAC unit.
25. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 20, further comprising a
1M PFN/TRAC marine platform unit to have all the appropriate
wireless telephony DSRC and satellite wireless in a PFN/TRAC unit
interface and Bus connectable to the crafts E/E systems to control
and manage the craft's operation via at least one of robotics and
remote control and be responsive in the PFN/TRAC System and FACT
security matrix.
26. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 20, further including a
1Ps PFN equipment interface PFN/TRAC unit to be a stand alone PFN
interface and derive power from self contained batteries and solar
regeneration converted to electrical power and perform all the same
interfacing and wireless routing and translation functions in the
PFN/TRAC System FACT Security matrix of intranets for Homeland
security.
27. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 20, further including a 1P
PFN configured on at least one of a belt, a bracelet, and a
bracket, in the form of at least one of a PDA and woven into
garment either dispersed oft consolidated, self powered, and
connect with a human via various external and subcutaneous
interface devices and sensors and to support automated remote and
robotics or preprogrammed control function to sense body functions
and deliver medication and record and report position and telemetry
to remote intranets and to other larger PFNs in the area via DSRC,
the unit can derive additional power, via connecting with larger
units physically to retrieve data and or auxiliary charging and
solar cell hats and shoulder scabbards to do mobile charging, with
further interface capacity to connect hand held and portable
devices Keyboard, displays readers sensors additional wireless
devices and GPS and deliver data generated to the PFN/TRAC system
network and FACT security matrix to include EAM translations and
message and signal repeating.
28. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 20, further including a
1PI PFN reduced in size to a SOC chip version of the PFN with a low
power requirement and DSRC which is injected subcutaneous under the
skin or surgically implanted and provides an identifier signal and
telemetry array from sensors wired or wirelessly interfaced via
other mini inject able 1PI devices that can operate in harmony to
perform an automated muscular tetanus via computerized
synchronization to perform physical robotics or remote controlled
kinetic movement where nerve pathways are non existent or
functioning poorly, thus actually interfacing a 1PI PFN/TRAC unit
as a cybernetic local Al device to further integrate the technology
with human biological systems and perform bionic movement.
29. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 28, further including a
power source using the body as an electrolyte and two contrasting
pieces of metal to create potential and applying an exterior
encasement of a 1PI PFN implants the body can generate current for
the mini PFN unit as a Soma Voltic cell to either energize the
proprietary 1PI PFNs or minimal current RFID injectable
technology.
30. A system for interfacing a limited range RFID passive and
active tag technology with PFN/TRAC units to first interface reader
portions of the technology and capture RDID data identifier and
stored tag data and process it through the TRAC processor running
RFID programming with a higher level converting algorithm to
modulate the data into the appropriate wireless data packets for
delivery via the PFN/TRAC System TSA/FACT Security intranets to
track and retrieve telemetry of materials in transit and to use the
tags as a messenger service or archive file program by interfacing
the encoder section of the RFID technology with the PFN and
delivering important transport data to the tag for later recovery
and use during the transport process.
31. A FACT Chip apparatus comprising at least one chip and a RFID
chip is impregnated into a circuit board and delivers
identification data to the PFN having a reader antenna interfaced
as part of the PFN to identify the components and then check a FACT
registry for any legal status notices posted in the applicable FACT
registry for the part before interfacing it, and wherein data is
stored on the RFID tag by a PFN and if not cleared of any special
encoding the last encoding from the previous PFN would be
recognized and initiate an alert through the system and back to the
FACT registry identifying the unit as unauthorized and possible
stolen.
32. A circuit that provides distinct signals as a FACT chip
modality and comprising a RFID and smart chip technology including
flexible interfacing in PFN/TRAC various units providing a
plurality of options to be utilized in the PFN/TRAC system and FACT
security matrix.
33. A PFN/TRAC system comprising: protective enclosures configured
in an application specific manner for rough service and interfacing
with at least one of industry standards, governing regulations and
code and to protect electronic contents and the memory and to
restrict unauthorized access, to include identifiable access
electronically and electrical and electronic seals and physical
restrictive access panels and locks.
34. A protective PFN/TRAC system comprising: an electronics
protective packaging incorporating a spherical shape constructed of
at least one hard but light impact, dent, and heat resistant
material coated in a fluorescent friction free coating that is
capable of withstanding impacts due to high velocity and containing
at least one of: a memory storage, recording device, wireless
communication device, a power supply, locating technology, a
sensor, digital cam, audio pick up, a visible light source, an
audible alert an impregnated antenna, an external physical
interface connector, an internal physical interface connector,
storing any object requiring such protection, a heat resistant
insulating material inside the sphere to protect the contents from
further heat and impact, a tamper resistant and tamper detective
seal and special threaded and heat seal.
35. A PFN/TRAC system according to claims 1, 2 or 20, further
comprising at least one automated portable network function to
cross manage intranet movement data via a process that links and
routes all data streams from responsive wireless tracking
technologies into smart cell processing pockets, that are geo and
time synced to define at least one given group marriage from time
to time forming automated portable networks of mindful machines,
smart freight and HMI with people via individual 1P PFN
devices.
36. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 35, further comprising a
multiple of different PFNs from different Intranets to receive and
process each other's DSRC or wireless messaging into either special
coded FACT priority or TRAC movement management digital report
packets and format them in available wireless protocols for a
transmission confirmation to the appropriate intranets or another
responding set of PFNs; and if unsuccessful, the PFN will store the
data packet in memory/buffer to remain there until the unit is
quarried by a specific Intranet for a lost asset, or message
disregard and delete command, as a normal TRAC movement inventory
function; and if a FACT application message continues a timed broad
cast beacon signal of the data packet TSA FACT hail to connect with
any of the TSA/FACT Intranets, also to include GPS, and direct
request activated transmissions of any FACT data packet stored as
an automated monitoring program, and with a confirmed transfer
store the FACT data packet into the units long term memory until
TSAFACT Intranet sends a delete command through out the system or
the unit memory or buffer is full and request a download sequence
with any TSAFACT mass data handling and storage facility.
37. A PFN/TRAC system according to claim 35, further comprising a
series of flexible WLAN portable network to be used to monitor
movement and provide telemetry via the linked matrix of TSA/FACT
intranets and TRAC intranets, where data is shared and assets can
become FACT events or passed back to TRAC movement management.
38. A PFN/TRAC movement management system, comprising: intranets
with a TSA/FACT Homeland security program running through and
forming a security matrix to monitor and mange at least one of
machines, vehicles equipment, materials, structures facilities,
objects, and any other asset via a responsive FACT and TRAC
connectivity and programming and to include various Intranets and
sub intranets, and optionally not limited the PFN/TRACFACT
intranets for air travel, land rail and interactive highways, and
sea inland waterways inner coastal and the high seas and well as
ports, airports, stations and terminal and fixed security
facilities as part of any TSAFACT matrix of intranets.
39. A universal Emergency Action Messaging (EAM) system comprising:
at least one system that translates emergency communications via a
multiple of wireless and hardwired communication technologies in a
multiple of known human languages to inform a diverse public, first
responders and security personnel in at least two definable levels
of security via encryption and predetermined identification
requirements.
40. A system according to claim 39, wherein the Emergency Action
Messages include at least one of SEAM, TEAM and PEAM messages.
41. A system according to 40, wherein the EAM messaging programs to
be deliverable by at least one of globally understood universal
images, for local display, uniquely diverse but universal audible
alerts and audio information to be communicated globally,
translated in a multiple of languages and responsive via voice
recognition algorithms and or text conversion algorithms for audio,
audio read, read write, read or type displays and or keyboard or
audio video response per any HMI interface means available.
42. A system according to claim 41, further comprising a
non-emergency use of EAM messaging developments, to include any
software, translation, components, firmware, hardware
configurations for at least one of entertainment, commercial,
social, educational use.
43. A FACT registry system, comprising: devices to maintain and
monitor equipment and material via an automated software program
that queries PFN/TRAC units and extracts a copy or deletes data of
a relevant nature and additionally records equipment interfaced for
a compare list function of lost or missing assets and supported by
a system wide down load to the PFNs via the various Intranets for
lost and found and law enforcement operations and to detect FACT
events flags.
44. A PFN/TRAC movement management system as a complete inter modal
transportation management system, comprising: a TSA/FACT security
network for moving objects and provides federal access and control
technology through out a PFN/TRAC/FACT system, a matrix of
intranets that performs real-time auto convergence of a security
network encompassing government agencies and their FACT modified
sovereign intranets with duty specific registries and various mass
data and storage facilities; monitor and management means for
monitoring and managing objects, consumption, use, to analyze and
discover any misuse, abuse and unauthorized or unsafe for any
application to better insure seamless security, public safety,
efficient movement, freedom and accountability; an instrument of
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security for the real-time
constitutional application of a national threat response mechanism
that can be set into automated preprogrammed procedures and
protocols for the appropriate monitoring, FACT network management
and control to directly meet the threat level set by the national
color codes; Red Severe, Orange High, Yellow Elevated, Blue
Guarded, and Green low; and flag means for flagging automatically
in at least one of TRAC and FACT programs running in PFN/TRAC units
or the PFN/TRAC system and changing between cost efficient
commercial PFN/TRAC standard management /routing of data and remote
communications and the higher FACT level direct connections and
remote control commands though the PFN units connected in both
commercial and governmental intranets.
45. An interface of a single conductor digital transmission
technology, comprising: a TRAC/FACT and EAM machine messaging
providing at least one signal propagated and coded via a portable
or permanent PFN/TRAC processor and signal generator circuit
interfaced or integrated and in contact with, to incorporate, the
chassis of a transport vehicle or shipping container's steel walls
as a conductor in a circuit to deliver the signal configured for by
the PFN to include at least a minimal 1Ps stand alone PFN interface
supporting a sensor array inside the truck, container or
compartment of an aircraft to monitor the contents and conditions
during shipment and when contact of the metal chassis was made with
another PFN the transmitted signal would be received via metal deck
plates, or storage racks, or bins on board ship, or in a facility,
or in a plane, or truck or via the metal hooks of a port Crain, or
forks of a industrial tuck at the airport or rail car on the
railroads through direct contact such that the signal would be
harvested by the new PFN TRAC unit and the appropriate TRAC/FACT
intranet would be detected and routing configured by the receiving
1E equipment PFNs, 1M boat PFN, 1P personal PFNs via hand held
contact readers connected to a person's 1P PFN belt interface, or a
1SV surface vehicle PFN or DRC PFN prime mover transporting the
container and any, and TSA/FACT EAM messages received or generated
during transit would be recognized and forwarded by more direct
wireless as well as, deliver local warnings from the containers PFN
and internal sensors flagging an alert to the receiving PFNs.
46. A PFN/TRAC system for wireless satellite routing to provide
voice service and data communications with accompanying accounting
function in the system and in the PFN unit, comprising: COTS DSP
wireless telephony technology software/hardware developmental
integration and interfacing kits and including a turnkey
development system that supports the industry-standard DSP's, and
the PFN/TRAC unit interfacing with routing COTS products including
at least one of a hybrid set of accountable interface communication
technologies and the PFN/TRAC technology programming written
application specific for wireless telephony.
Description
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
1. Field of the Invention
The nature and scope of this patent is to be the air travel portion
of a national transportation and security matrix that will span the
globe. This filing is an invention that is specific to aviation air
travel and air transport. It relies on prior filings to incorporate
the specified technology to complete a Federal Access Control
Technology (FACT). FACT is a security matrix in and around the
airport and gate to gate in the skies. The other related patents
are designed to other vehicle platforms for complete national
transportation management and security system. Because enter modal
transportation occurs in each industry with technology overlaps
this application addresses the interfaces and overlaps, but
specifically to how it relates to air travel and transport. In
commercializing the PFN/TRAC System and FACT security program it
has proven commercially necessary to develop separate corporate
structures to match up with the specific industries and government
agencies and to create the complete movement management and
security system termed the PFN/TRAC system with FACT Security. FACT
stands for Federal Access and Control Technology. All the related
patent filings are specially designed and written to separate
commercial development to respectfully operate in a democratic free
society and meet constitutional guidelines for their
commercialization. The separate inventive portions (patent filings)
are constructed specifically not to be a monopoly, but instead an
accountable workable interface to combine present day dispersed and
disparate technologies and systems via a coordinated network of
wireless communications, machine controls, data handling and human
machine interfacing.
This intellectual property and all inventions determined
patentable, either granted or protected or inherent due to prior
related filings must defer to that related technology holder(s) for
additional licensing if other than aviation and air travel related
(e.g., 1E, 1P, tracker and 1SV PFN/TRAC units, or system and FACT
program, etc.) used for terrestrial vehicles and equipment 5 miles
outside of any airport and/or for other operations and functions
than aviation related or for a FACT purpose. However, included is
any standard set for reasonable wireless contact to protect the
public at the airport via FACT control center operations that will
monitor and manage transport coming and going from the terminal
and/or air travel and transport operations.
This is to be clearly understood by all to rely on and develop form
inherited PFN/TRAC technology filed earlier and therefore the
innovations default to the industry specific patents and their
holders for any licensing, sale or implementation of the technology
outside the air travel air transport industry. With that
understood, this application is an extension to benefit inheritance
from the related patents. This is a necessary statement for the
system to be as extensive as it has to be and to be
constitutionally appropriate to be commercialized in the United
States effectively. All must understand clearly the operational and
commercial boundaries of each intellectual property filing of the
PFN/TRAC technology: the public, government agencies, the SEC, the
court system, legislators and the investor in each of the specific
corporate entities developing the technology.
It is important that the system does not develop as a commercial
monopoly for communication and data messaging and mining or have
any one dominating influence, but instead provide accountable
interoperability with regard to the various industries that will be
interfacing to create the entire system. This is done to protect
the public's interest in the technology. Its use and quality of
use, as a greater public utility technology. It is being structured
to commercially insure free enterprise in its continual development
process from the contributing technologies interfaced. This is
addressed throughout the filing as "La technique" or the
implementation teachings of the specification to make it applicable
to industry.
With this application specific use of the invention understood by
the reader, this filing and the other related filings will be
licensed and/or sold specific to industry application or purpose in
a connected commercial structure, that will encourage cooperative
networking for efficient development and use of the PFN/TRAC system
and FACT Security program. This is accomplished via serial numbered
joint venture agreements representative of the related patent and
protected technology area defined in the joint venture agreement
and then written into a tracking program, maintained by the
specific company and Kline & Walker, LLC the current patent
holder. This tracking will become part of the inventions
accountable business practice and maintained system wide with
respect to all corporate entities generated to commercialize the
invention.
Special files held in a nationally secure location(s) (to be
determined) will be maintained by FACT Security, LLC. Commercial
arrangements via (joint ventures) will be made with FACT, LLC. For
this administrative function and for all other related PFN/TRAC
companies for any FACT technology that is military or high security
sensitive and involves secret status for public safety and/or
national security.
2. Related Technology
The prior related patents have covered accountable automated and
remote control of all vehicle platforms, equipment and machines,
including human, animal tracking and telemetry and stand alone
sensing and management functions as part of a great machine
messaging matrix. This local accountable Primary Focal Node
interface was invented for more freedom, public safety and better
management of the earth's resources, environment and machines, and
to help fulfill social/individual needs for a new economic tool to
value use and impacts.
Due to the recent terrorist events both in New York and Washington,
D.C., it has become imperative to step up the development of
protected remote control and robotics in aircraft and commercial
air travel systems. The PFN/TRAC System is an ideal technical
choice for this scenario as it was created to stop and control the
unauthorized use or unsafe use of vehicles and equipment via
accountable remote control. Additionally, the technology
incorporates existing technology as it exists in a present
distributed architecture and coordinates and manages the essential
function to stop and control an unwanted event and improve public
safety. This requires hardware, software and wet-ware (people)--the
procedures and protocols). The PFN TRAC system is a technology well
grounded in a Science, Technology and Societal approach or STS
approach to be effective and commercially acceptable for aircraft
and air travel.
This invention from the first stop and control box system to
restrict unauthorized use of a vehicle has addressed responsible
and accountable machine intelligence as a very important equipment
control option and unique quality to perform remote or shared
control of any vehicle or equipment in a free society through
responsibly recording events.
Historically, avionics has had flight recorders, processors, flight
computers wireless communications, navigational systems, autopilots
and protective containers for electronic packaging. Even in
aircraft hobbies and in the military there have been remote control
or robotic drones. However, shared controls or total robotics
control of an aircraft with humans on board has always struck a
watershed of unacceptability for a host of good and valid social
economic reasons. And not just in the air, but on the ground as
well. This is where the PFN/TRAC System fits into humanities
present technical management needs and can be a progressive
security enhancement for machine management. It can harness
existing technology and apply constitutional procedures in
real-times as preprogrammed protocols via local machine robotics
and remote human/equipment control to prevent the hijacking, thwart
the hijacking, manage all behavior in the plane, control and lower
the planes destructive crash potential, or safely land the plane
via the PFN/TRAC System including the PFN/TRAC protocols. This
option is obtainable in a variety of modalities and progressions
and this patent application teaches this unique technology in a
variety of modalities.
This specialized quality of socially structured technology that
coordinates disparate and distributed technologies in an acceptable
and usable architecture starting from existing COTS products and
consolidating an acceptable structure and set of operational
protocols into one management system is uniquely the PFNTRAC
system. It in no way competes with existing technology it merely
enhance those technologies interfaced via a larger more acceptable
machine messaging matrix of mindful machinery with accountable
artificial intelligence.
The nine earlier prior related patent filings addressed the use of
the PFN Trusted Remote Activity Controller in flight and surface
applications to augment the aging FAA system, as a communication
control unit. PFN/TRAC in aviation has always been thought of as a
parallel data transfer technology to all the major transportation
systems to get a foot hold in combining the disparate systems into
one DOT management System. Therefore for aviation the car-plane
invention was considered a futurist application for PFN/TRAC GPS
and timing to coordinate air highways and surface traffic movement
in an integrated traffic management level than in airports today.
However the technology has been prepared for general aviation and
to improve the choking point in today's airport management and
security crisis. Additionally, it is perfectly set up to remain
isolated in early generations, but improve movement and provide
seamless security both on the ground and straight through the gate
and up into the air space to enhance and meet the current security
needs of the Air Traffic management system and back down to the
tarmac through the gate in the destination airport and through that
terminal as well to the passengers vehicle and baggage leaves the
system.
The inventor and founders remained committed to the following:
Due in no small part to the sad events of 9/11, Kline & Walker
Remote Management System, the assignee of the PFN/TRAC System
wishes to work in any collaborative effort with all commercial and
governmental interests to safe the skies and build back the trust
in the flying public. This spirit of cooperation has always been
basic to the reason for the invention and the development of this
technology to a trusted and accepted management system first and
foremost by increasing public safety, individual freedom and
national and global security. This invention addresses
environmental, social and commercial uses of all equipment and
resources. The invention is designed to account for all machines,
vehicles and equipment and their socio-economic and environmental
impact worldwide.
"It is widely believed with the proper awareness--that this
technology could provide, and the real-time communication this
invention could help to provide--that the global inhabitants might
find a way to make a life together". HopefullyJ rcw/bk.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 This diagram of the PFN/TRAC System.TM. shows one objective.
The goal to control the unauthorized use of an aircraft. It
represents the technology and the human activities necessary to
effectively respond to an airplane hijacking.
FIG. 2 is a Power Point slide highlighting the important
characteristics and benefits of the PFN/TRAC invention; as a
timeless interface technology that incorporates new technology into
an architecture that provides accountable aggressive automated and
remote control via existing technologies.
FIG. 3 is an application specific integrated circuit for an
avionics PFN/TRAC System interface.
FIG. 4 discusses the product development differences between first
and second-generation PFN/TRAC systems.
FIG. 5 The initial 1A PFN flight and landing software library will
be for 5 selected safe bases to include emergency response
procedures and protocols where specialists are available to
remotely control any incoming aircraft and handle any FACT flight
emergency condition.
FIG. 6 An airborne emergency response team/swat team with
medical/bio/chemical/explosive and fire, team members are to catch
up with the airliner and follow the flight to the air base ready to
parachute from their troop carrying aircraft if the aircraft has an
earlier termination than the safe base.
FIG. 7 illustrates the 2 basic technology sections; the plane and
the ground control system to perform PFN/TRAC robotics and the
Remote Control via RC pilot in the center of the figure.
FIG. 8 This map shows the eastern half of the United States Ambient
population.
FIG. 9 expresses the need for public awareness to the threat the
nation faces from terrorism
FIG. 10 displays the first aircraft router/test PFN/TRAC interface
platform "The TRACker".
FIG. 11 The 1a TRACker will use a quality COTS laptop computer
product.
FIG. 12 Drawings of two products 1a TRACker and FACT Ball.
FIG. 13 More description on the FACT Ball.
FIG. 14 More description on 1a TRACker.
FIG. 15 The TRACker circuit.
FIG. 16A figure stating the need for cooperation from all the
stakeholders.
FIG. 17 The Trusted Remote Activity Controller.
FIG. 18 The FACT Security Program in layers.
FIG. 19 This figure shows the basic wireless communications being
considered for the first responders.
FIG. 20 illustrates a multiple receiving scan process.
FIG. 21 illustrates a wireless tracking network locating a lost
child.
FIG. 22 shows two basic free wheeling terrestrial platforms.
FIG. 23 Transportation machine matrix with a world of machines
having PFN/TRAC units.
FIG. 24 ASIC for all the surface applications to include 1SV for
surface vehicles 1E for the stationary vehicles and 1Ps PFN for
standalone and 1P for the personal PFN processors.
FIG. 25 is a simple drawing showing the general approach to the PFN
structure or encesement.
FIG. 26 The different PFNS are commercially flexible for the
various technologies and companies to interface, access and control
any or all of the airport equipment e.g. ground service people,
different airlines, private security contractors, local police and
the TSA etc.
FIG. 27 is an overview of the TSA FACT 1100 command center for TSA
at the airport.
FIG. 28 discusses the need and how the PFN/TRAC system can help
form a cooperative environment in working with all manufacturers
and industries.
FIG. 29 shows a man walking on earth and his position derived from
GPS Satellites.
FIG. 30 illustrates the use of pager technology, specifically 2 way
paging interface in the invention.
FIG. 31 shows cellular use in the invention.
FIG. 32 shows the share ware cellular application and multiple
applications.
FIG. 33 shows the 1 P PFN belt system.
FIG. 34 shows another 1P PFN Belt configuration.
FIG. 35 shows the injectable 1 PI Chip PFN for implantation into a
body.
FIG. 36 discusses the government's role in the technology's
development.
FIG. 37 shows the data telemetry monitored in the local TSA FACT
airport command center and the various other monitoring
stations.
FIG. 38 FACT CHIP and soft ware functions in the system.
FIG. 39 FACT CHIP and soft ware functions in the system.
FIG. 40 FACT CHIP and soft ware functions in the system.
FIG. 41 FACT CHIP and soft ware functions in the system.
FIG. 42 FACT CHIP and soft ware functions in the system.
FIG. 43 FACT CHIP and soft ware functions in the system.
FIG. 44 FACT CHIP and soft ware functions in the system.
FIG. 45 Portable networking application to keep a running inventory
of a shipments contents and placement.
FIG. 46 Portable networking Application to keep a running inventory
of a shipments contents and placement.
FIG. 47 Portable networking Application to keep a running inventory
of a shipments contents and placement.
FIG. 48 Portable networking Application to keep a running inventory
of a shipments contents and placement.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
PFN/TRAC technology provides the capacity to organize, record,
report, relay and control data and equipment from a local protected
control/router to create a large machine-messaging matrix. Sharing
or replacing local and standard Human Machine Interfacing HMI with
accountable automated human assist controls, robotics and/or remote
control accomplishes this. Additionally, the networking of various
wireless technologies can be interfaced via a unique routing and
translation process powered by stable current supplies from the
machines, vehicles and equipment they are attached too.
This filing and use of PFN/TRAC controllers/routers deals with
transportation and specifically avionics and air travel. It employs
other similar PFN/TRAC ASICS and technology from separate
applications, but specifically to complete an air travel and
transport management system with the FACT Security program. This
management and security system manages and monitors all equipment,
materials and personnel through the airport and gate to gate in the
skies.
This advanced human machine interface provides for accountable
remote and automated control of all machinery interfaced and
controls traffic flow and movement on and near the earth's surface.
The PFN/TRAC units and system also records and reports all use and
impacts and can proactively stop the unauthorized use or unsafe use
of vehicles, aircraft and equipment. Further auto evaluations
performed by the PFN controller/router and networks interfaced can
determine tampering and improper interfacing in real-time.
Diverse interfacing and processing capability includes all types of
sensing, video and audio monitoring and displays, keyboards, number
pads, drives, identification technologies, card swipes, RFID memory
storage, telemetry technologies, various wireless technologies and
their protocols, the electronic payment industry, vehicle aircraft,
equipment and machine interfaces and stand alone interfacing,
processing and routing.
Terminology of the Invention
The following are basic terms and definitions used:
The PFN is a Protected Primary Focal Node (a protected accountable
interface connected with a controller and communication router).
This combination is a PFN/TRAC unit TRAC stands for Trusted Remote
Activity Controller and termed so because it performs accountable
robotics and remote control. FACT stands for Federal Access Control
Technology. RC means Remote Control, WoJack means War ops and Jack
is taken from hijacking.
TRUSTED for this invention means, accountable, and acceptable by
all the public (the citizenry, industry and government standards).
It also means to all reading this specification interfaced
equipment must be reliable. All interfaces and interfaced equipment
must pass reliability testing and be accountable for their specific
use and service in any PFN/TRAC system. The PFN/TRAC System and all
components must be trusted and pass industry and governmental
standards for as a condition of accepted use and performance in the
PFN/TRAC System.TM..
How the Technology Applies to Aircraft
Of particular value right now, TRAC technology can be embedded into
aircraft (at the design stage or after-market) and perform
accountable functions for the purpose of gaining control and
stopping the unauthorized or unsafe use of an aircraft. Known as
the PFN/TRAC System.TM., the architecture utilizes existing
Commercial Off the Shelf COTS aircraft technology to create some of
the first robotics flight and remote controlled landings with an
absentee pilot for these emergency scenarios. However, in a
hijacking the lack of flying skill is not the only concern. The
aircraft might well be commandeered and deliberately used as a
human guided missile for its destructive potential like on 9/11 in
the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In
this scenario it is necessary to restrict the local flying controls
immediately upon detection of an unauthorized pilot and flight
path, unless they can be authorized and approved under some
extenuating circumstances.
Basic Challenges to Accomplish the Invention in the Various
Airframes
Fly by wire control conversion to exclude a local pilot on board
the aircraft can be achieved far faster than those still using
physical links. Total hydraulic systems and hydraulic assist
systems can be converted to exclude local controls easier than
physical link systems, but still more difficult than fly by wire
systems. Systems and modalities for physical lockouts on human
controls and the automation of those controls is taught in prior
related filings so that anyone skilled in the art (engineers) can
shop up the necessary devices to construct and protect an RC
capable or robotics flight aircraft.
The next major hurdle is system redundancy and control of the
dispersed isolated systems. Aircraft, because of the catastrophic
results of a flight control failure have duplicate systems to
insure flight controls and the operations of essential systems
during flight. These systems have to be controlled enough to insure
that the aircraft cannot be used in an unsafe and unauthorized
manner. This increases the challenges to complete and construct the
invention for aviation. It also enhances the system options for the
PFN controller/router to evaluate. Evaluate and choose faster than
a human could to achieve good or adequate performance and in many
cases affect more options down to the component level, which would
be unobtainable by humans during flight.
As unique as avionics is from other electronics and computer
processing, the invention uses a PC architecture and application
stack for the translation of messaging to interface flight systems
and controls and protects this process in structures termed PFNs.
PFNs house the trusted remote activity controllers or TRAC
controllers and routers which make up a portable network. A matrix
of secure, protected, redundant, automated controls and system
management on the aircraft. Automated management for flight assist,
robotics flight, and remote controlled flight. The local PFN/TRAC
routers also interface wireless communications and transfer that
data into Internet Protocols specific to the applications they are
intended for and wireless protocols needed to transmit them. Data
and commands are transmitted locally between the aircraft PFNs via
dedicated short range communications to harmonize management of
flight controls, and also transmitted to the earths surface by
longer range wireless (e.g. RF) interfaced in the PFNs. Local 1A
aircraft PFNs are likewise hardwired and dispersed to any
appropriate avionics bus for flight system activity control,
redundancy and integrity checks. There are also separate
applications specific to PFN combined actuators for hard to secure
flight controls or for legacy aircraft or special applications.
The General Robotics and Remote Control Procedures and Proprietary
Safe Base Process
The initial goal after eliminating local control is to stabilize
the plane's flight path. This second objective is accomplished via
robotics (chosen for better real-time responsiveness for long
distance control scenarios) to fly the plane to a Safe Base via
special preprogrammed and isolated flight paths. This control
protocol PFN/TRAC System is secured and secluded onboard with
preprogrammed software (5 preprogrammed flight plans available to
the 1A PFN/TRAC processor or OEM automated flight systems if they
can be secured during flight. The TRAC processor is interfaced with
the essential E/E system bus to operate the planes flight control
surfaces (with RF back up) to guide it to the best specific
emergency response Safe Base (SB). All available location systems
and communication systems are interfaced with the 1A PFN/TRAC
processor. Additional controls interfaced with PFN/TRAC are to be
the cabin and cockpit air pressure controller to restrict any air
exhausted from the aircraft by either routing the air through
carbon dioxide scrubbers/converters, as well as adding fresh air
(O2). The removed and compressed atmosphere is canned. This
un-recyclable air or waste air is then presented to a sensor array
to detect biohazards and toxins. Once transducers have converted
any molecular substance to an electrical signature, the signal is
analyzed for recognition by the PFN/TRAC/FACT security system
software library. It is recorded and reported to the surface by any
secure on board 1A PFN/TRAC unit progressively programmed to
complete this function for the surface Safe Base system to
prescribe the appropriate safe base response to the incoming
troubled FACT flight. Informed decisions to determine whether to
terminate a FACT flight, bag it, and sterilize it or how to unseal
it on the ground) are essential. Also, connected to the ventilation
system the TRAC processor controls a valve with debilitating gas
(sleep gas or chloroform) that can be activated from the ground or
robotically. These are the worst-case scenarios and are termed the
Wo Jack scenario or FACT protocol. Optimally the aircraft will be
assisted in a positive manner and landed safely with the passengers
and crew spared any injury or some worse fate. But this emergency
scenario is inherently dangerous and this discussion is
necessary.
During the final approach to the designated safe base landing zone
the robotics flight and glide path control does a hand off to a
Remote Control RC pilot in a surfaced based converted flight
simulator receiving secure and redundant essential data streams via
a the PFN/TRAC protected communication system to maintain the
greatest real-time responsiveness of the aircraft. (heightened by a
guardian/profit software program--an algorithm developed using the
speed and time of data transmissions and skew the data for
projected real-time response using onboard sensing, forward seeking
radar and Doppler and weather radar at the base to enhance the RC
station and on board robotics). Ideally, the result will be an
intelligent aircraft with an accountable autopilot and Remote
Control RC pilot.
Additionally, another in flight Remote control pilot would be
flying second in a pursuit aircraft and NORRAD dispatched. Special
training for RC pilots would have to be done of course. However in
this scenario the pursuit/escort/assist aircraft would be in
contact with the troubled robotics flight with in minutes of the
FACT event take over. This pursuit/assist flight would be able to
determine control of the aircraft and critical data while in
flight. This is one immediate advantage for the nations security
and the flying public. There is a standing executive order to the
military to defend the nation's airspace against the hostile use of
a commercial airliner. The invention provides some options to the
shoot down scenario.
Intent and Purpose of this Filing
This application is reliant on the former applications cited, and
therefore focuses explicitly on the first generation products to
meet immediate needs for the nation to have improved efficiency and
security in the nations 429 airports. One embodiment of the
invention is a seamless security system termed FACT for Federal
Access Control Technology a security program of the PFN/TRAC system
for transportation and Homeland Security. All PFN/TRAC units are
mobile communication router platforms that provide accountable
remote and robotics control to transportation vehicles and other
operational and security equipment via the interface with the
vehicles or equipment's E/E systems to obtain a stable power source
and additionally to control the attached piece of equipment.
Each vehicle and/or machine either on the earth's surface or near
the earths surface is connected to its application specific
intranets for air, sea, and land travel, via either host commercial
servers or agency providers through wireless communication
gateways. These vehicles and equipment are further interfaced with
a larger machine messaging matrix via wireless and IP protocols to
further coordinate movement assess and manage equipment and
vehicles and their use and impact on the world resources, societies
infrastructure and the environment. However this filing focuses
directly to augment and upgrade public safety and security in the
Airline Industry and restrict and/or document any unauthorized use
or unsafe use of any aircraft. It also teaches acceptable methods
to remotely manage baggage handling and security equipment on the
surface.
Progressive Development
In the aircraft the first generation 1A aircraft controllers will
be shadowed with the development of the 1a and 1bTRACker units to
prototype much of the 1A ASIC detailed in FIG. 3. The Carryon
TRACker series is to be a reporter interface only system with
isolated devices from actual flight control systems. TRACker is set
up to support limited testing of new avionics technology in an
Isolated format so that the proper analysis taking generally eight
years can be systematically reduced with real flight testing with
the units working separately, while a security link is maintained
with Aeronautical Operations centers and used as a device for air
marshals to keep TSA security on the surface informed on flight
activities.
Additionally, this application and related filings teaches the
PFN/TRAC System.TM. use for all vehicle platforms to increase
safety and security in a free society like the United State of
America while retrieving and securing private data and statistical
data in appropriate procedures/protocols to insure the protection
of individual rights. The other related filings instruct in the
technology's use for robust and accountable remote control for
personal applications, stationary equipment and standalone
functions, and coordinates them and interfaces them within the
communication matrix. TRAC controller/routers perform translation
and repeating functions across a wide variety of communication
protocols to complete a mobile flexible matrix or web. This
connected communication matrix of computers and humans provides an
enhanced Humanity Machine Interfacing HMI scenario both locally and
systemically in real-time for improve equipment management and
world stability.
This application is introduce a number of application specific
integrated communication and control circuits to include a special
memory storage device (The Memory Ball a revolutionary black box
technology that physical encasement can also be used to house a
complete PFN/TRAC unit if desired) with a hybrid progressive
innovation of two of the four basic PFN/TRAC circuit designs
presented to create a seamless security link from the flight deck
and airframe cabin through and to include the nations surface
responders and air ports.
History of the Technology
This technology is well documented for it aggressive remote and
automated response to the unlawful and unsafe use of vehicles and
equipment. But it is important to remember that these security
aspects are based first on a good operational management system and
the invention is and always will be a management system first. The
inventor feels strongly if the world populous can manage a life
together n this hydrosphere sharing the resources they need in a
satisfactory manner for all the security issue would be mute. So
good security must start with good management of resources, space
and movement. This requires knowledge, a means to organize that
knowledge, and a means to find agreement on the use of the
knowledge organized and the means to affect that use. This is the
nature, scope and purpose of the PFN/TRAC System. FACT security is
only to be the enforcement arm of the people. To protect and serve
the public will, it's safety and our national security.
Not just individuals claiming to represent a mandate or to speak
for the public or have the public voice. This invention provides
the means to accountably poll the public on issues and should be
used to give the populous more trust in their system of government
and give their representatives their directives--that will be the
real public voice.
The following excerpt stresses this point to keep a healthy social
perspective. It is from the earlier related filing Ser. No.
08/975,140, filed Nov. 20, 1997, and PCT Application No. PCT/US
97/21516, filed on Nov. 24, 1997.
The reader is encouraged to read the other filings to get an
overview of how the technologies and innovations are integrated.
Further descriptions of the related teachings are available and
incorporated herein by reference.
The invention uniquely interfaces a network of separate devices
and/or interfaced IC circuits together, to create a "Primary Focal
Node" (PFN) (in some form on every piece of equipment in the
world). This is an interactive control center (ideally secured and
protected) and connected with many peripheral devices and sensors
interfaced and that can be remotely controlled and monitored via
this (PFN). The (PFN) is able to, record and play back various data
of different mediums, report this data back, or communicate it with
off board "Gateways" into computer networks (like servers do on the
WWW) and/or receive signals from these gateways/servers such as
commands to restrict the unauthorized use of equipment. Or affect
normal use of that vehicle/equipment in relationship to its cost
and/or legitimate operation in society and the environment.
Thereby, regulating the vehicle/equipment, to a compliance level
with any legal parameters and/or commercial contractual agreements
in real time. The invention uniquely provides the control device
for society to fairly and accurately monitor and control the impact
of equipment use on the world's environment and a nation's
infrastructure.
This is accomplished via hardware, hardware embedded software
(firmware), software programming, peripherals device and sensors on
board, with wireless communication and locating devices. Which in
turn connect with computer network systems to do monitoring and
accounting and accountability business in a realistic and fair
manner socially and economically, all aspect of a transaction are
re-viewable. The invention is a composite of a number unique
interface innovations to include other commercial products to
develop a complete accounting and management system for machines,
vehicles and equipment use, some are described in this application
and others are in related filings as other innovations.
A great deal of explanation and specification is necessary to
explain how the world's societies can utilize the total invention
as a management tool with all the application specific innovations
in an optimal manner. This discussion has been based on humanities
state of existence; technically, commercially and socially and how
the invention can best be thought of as a complete management and
economic tool for societies to fairly make and assess the crucial
questions and make the correct decisions to enjoy a healthy
existence together. Especially, with a doubling world populous in
the next forty years and no increase in space.
It is important to keep in mind that this invention is a versatile,
composite set of innovative interfaces for existing products,
devices, and components to be net worked and span the globe. These
unique embodiments of the invention satisfy the qualities to make
it a timeless technology. Societies will still develop their own
specific ways to manage their lives but also be able to coordinate
their choices with the rest of the world on environmental and
economic issues via nation and industry specific technologies that
would no longer be disparate. And in this process develop
responsible management and security via accurate data and
accountable remote control. From basic accountable machine
messaging to full robotics and remote control, many unique
interfaced innovative products have been created and developed and
are also described and commercially detailed for development in
this application and the other two filings The primary goal has
been to provide innovative technical and commercial options for
humanity to cost effectively govern its technologies through a
responsible, accountable and informative management system, both
the individual and the public.
"We the people", have to and can, accept this responsibility for
their freedom and use of our free enterprise system; and insure
that our economic values are in line with our democratic values as
well as, our environmental and social responsibilities. Bearing
theses responsibilities and respecting everyone's right to freedom,
and the pursuit of happiness is basic to United States citizenry;
and also the main purpose of the invention as well as the
parameters of it's nature, and scope. This technology was invented
to provide information and the means for humanity to make a healthy
and happy life together not to rule over or govern another.
BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
Human Machine Interfacing HMI is what the PFN/TRAC system is all
about. The technology is an invention of management and security
for societies to better operate and improve their quality of life
on this planet. As a management tool one function is to acquire
meaningful data and deliver it to mass data handling and storage
centers. The network of PFN/TRAC units also stand ready to receive
programming from these centers and act on it locally via direct
connect machine controls. Considered essential to the technology's
success is the public's acceptance as a TRUSTED system. For this
reason it was envisioned and invented as an accountable technology
and system so that all voices in society can find justice and good
reason to make a peaceful, healthy and prosperous life
together.
In teaching this invention, the inventor has had a personal
struggle with the intrusion of this technology and other IT
technology into the personal rights of privacy. However, this right
has always had a mathematical survival component for human life to
sustain itself on earth. Obvious e.g. our present world population
has doubled in the last 50 years and is projected to double in the
next 40 years. Data will be essential to good management of
resources and even for survival--our massing endangers activity
planning and other individual freedoms).
Sheer numbers of people and their activities in the same amount of
place are going to raise the world's temperature and reduce our
landmasses crowding the earth even more. The use of the dirty
machinery and greenhouse gasses pale as the contributor to poor
atmosphere, compared to the quantity of thermal heat from even the
cleanest running future equipment and carbon dioxide our masses
will generate.
Our personal biological data alone will become a barometer to
humanity's quality of life. Personal biological data will become
important data for all of humanity to know and plan from. Privacy
will be difficult and via this invention replaced with amenity and
individual respect via levels of secure accountable access to
memory storage, with the strictest of professional procedures,
protocols and penalties for any improprieties, so as the need
arises to handle specific personal data in statistical applications
the system will be trusted by and accountable to public. Already to
day after 911 we really do not know how to move forward with
seamless security for our nation and protect these rights in an
acceptable manner.
The most important portion in the MODE to carry out the invention
is the technology is TRUSTED.
More important than any of the circuit design is that this
technology be TRUSTED for the unique and different way it has been
designed to preserve our free society and govern technology to
respect that. This understanding is not just for the skilled in the
arts, but also for all who know and use this invention or any
portion of it. All must be consulted in the writing of standards,
laws, rules regulations and code. Especially, programmers and code
writers, they should know their constitution and law, as they are
the last before installation and implementation of any running
programs. Obviously, programming will be changeable and the court
system will be reviewing and doing that from time to time. But
before implementation research and public deliberation to define
procedures, protocols and programming should be in place. It is
everybody's responsibility as citizens to review the use of the
technology. The technology was designed to be an interactive
gateway for the public voice to be heard so this technology stays
current with the society it serves.
The FAA and avionics has always been an intricate part of the
PFN/TRAC technology transportation and mobile management section
and has been planned for in the development of this machine
messaging matrix for humanity to better manage it's machines with
the earths environment. Additionally, the PFN/TRAC System was
created to provide a stable artificial intelligence for the
abnormalities experienced from our different individual learning
curves, behaviors or individual terms of existence through out the
world. The system is designed to enfranchise all and help,
provision for all with fair and just management by all, while
maintaining public safety for all. No small task indeed, so it
requires all of us.
For those of us that fear the real dangers in robotics and machine
intelligence, and for planners and programmers, I am listing a
quote I used in my earlier writings to the DOT on collision
avoidance systems and enhance Human Machine Interfacing HMI to
manage driver distraction do to many carryon electronic devices
(e.g., cellular phones).
This quote is taken from the Handbook of Robotics, 56 edition and
should be integrated in any programming construct or an operating
system when writing code for any mindful machinery in the future.
It is a good conceptual basis for artificial intelligence to write
constitutional code to, an optimum logic tree for shared
Human/Machine control scenarios and for total robotics.
"The Three Laws of Robotics (for any Artificial Intelligence)
1. A Robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction,
allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A Robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except
where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect it's own existence so long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws."
Obviously a peacetime model, war, hostilities and homeland security
will have programming applicable to that threat and those
applications. (A sad human reality) But the reason for the
following PFN/TRAC innovations for today's air travel.
DETAILED FIGURE DESCRIPTIONS
FIG. 1 is a diagram of the PFN/TRAC System.TM. shows one objective.
The goal to control the unauthorized use of an aircraft. It
represents the technology and the human activities necessary to
effectively respond to in flight emergencies, including an airplane
hi-jacking. To reach this goal pilot assist systems must advance in
robotics and remote control to fly and land an aircraft without a
skilled pilot on board. This application for invention provides a
series progressions to accomplish this via proper testing, While,
providing immediate management, safety and security enhancements to
the air travel industry today.
The figures and specifications coupled with the related filings of
PFN/TRAC technology provide guidance and feasible modes for those
skilled in the arts of: avionics, electronics, mechanical
engineering, computer engineering, communications, system
integration and component engineering. This application focuses on
aviation transport and to meet the specific challenges to obtain
this goal. It is important to keep in mind that feasible modalities
for final and specific designs to construct the remote control of
the invention will vary with respect to the diverse aircraft that
exist. All airframes and modalities discussed are generally used
for examples. They are not meant to limit the nature and scope of
the invention or the capability of any component engineer tasking
to design and construct safe and functional avionics, aircraft
parts and systems.
It has become essential to national security to achieve real-time
accountable flight control to restrict unauthorized use of an
aircraft. For this to happen, it has to be part of a seamless
security system that is interfaced with ground security and part of
a total air traffic management ATM system coordinated with the
Transportation Security Agency TSA. The PFN/TRAC System is such a
management system and it provides Federal Access and Control
Technology or FACT security to monitor and manage machines,
materials and people through the nations 429 commercial airports
and 2000 flights a day. The invention monitors and manages flow
through the terminal and gate-to-gate in the skies.
Number 101 is a 1 A protected PFN/TRAC unit. The Application
specific circuit is further detailed in FIG. 3. Number 102 is a
land based remote control station. These ground control units will
originate from or be modeled after existing flight training
equipment and/or adaptable simulators. These remote control (RC)
stations will be linked via broad band wireless to actual flight
controls and systems like existing auto pilots and flight computers
that intern are interfaced through the protected PFN/TRAC unit on
board the aircraft. The PFNs are protected and seclude or
camouflaged if need be as well as impregnable during flight. They
must be application specific in physical appearance and structure
and teaching for their construction can be found through out all
the related PFN/TRAC filings with reference details in this
application for convenience. FIG. 44 shows an enclosure with a
multiple wall structure for rough service and harsh environment
protection. This structure will change per application meeting and
becoming standard as part of the nature and scope of the
invention.
The lower half of the figure is the ground support network linked
by wireless telephony, satellites, landlines and Internet
protocols.
103 is the DOD NORAD or North American (NA) military air CINC
command center or center (S) and their data bases in Colorado and
across the nations at the various air bases and special Safe Bases
(SB). Their responsibility is to scramble any pursuit or escort
aircraft, and in the case of the invention any Remote Controller
assist aircraft in the event that an aircraft has been hijacked and
needs a pilot while still in flight. First generation 1A PFN/TRAC
will link and control hardware and software to robotically fly the
plane to designated safe zones and landing bases of high security,
there will be the capability to eliminate local flight controls,
there will be the capability to land the plane at designated safe
bases via remote control flying, there will be the ability for
multiple communication with the aircraft and continual tracking,
there will be the capability to dump the fuel remotely and
robotically. There will be a means to incapacitate passengers and
crew, there will be real-time audio and video to ground and escort
assist aircraft with RC, there will be isolation capability for
cabin air, there will be a capability to terminate the flight if
the need arises.
Dual use of Commercial Avionics Data Links for the U.S. Air
Force--Gihard
This air link is being quoted to show that the civil Aviation ATM
GPS system can be used by aircraft to accurately dock their
aircraft for refueling aloft. With this in mind this data link can
be used through a 1A PFN/TRAC units or TRACker interface to
coordinate security activities and better coordinate movement
between commercial air craft and close air support to a troubled
airliner.
Military Civil Air Link
The Air Force JEFX99 Initiative 99-018 demonstrated the use of
civilian avionics data links to support air operational command and
control communications.
Terms
Air Mobile Command AMC, Air Force Research Labs (AFRL), (CNS)
systems to improve air traffic management (ATM). This new CNS/ATM
concept relies heavily on specific avionics data links qualified to
transmit air traffic control messages. This would require that the
military equip their aircraft with dual beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS)
data links, and in the long term, line-of-site (LOS) data links. In
times of crisis means that military aircraft must operate in
aeronautical mobile satellite services (AMSS). Denial of the best
oceanic tracks, including optimal altitudes, and certain mission
critical airspace may lead to serious degradation in DOD mission
accomplishment.
In 1996, the U.S. Air Force's Electronic Systems Center (ESC)
carried out a study for Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC)
which assessed the requirements, primarily for large transports,
for operation in the new communication environment [1,2,3]. HQ AMC
specified the need for the communications capabilities for
airlift/tanker aircraft, and in 1997 the Air Force created a global
air traffic operations/mobility command and control (GATO/MC2) ICAO
has recently completed the Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) for an HF data link (HFDL) which will allow it to be
evaluated by civil aviation authorities as an ATS data link. The
Minimum Aviation Systems Performance Standard (MASPS) and Minimum
Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) for HFDL are also under
development by the avionics industry.
The military, along with several airlines, are encouraging this use
of HFDL as a backup BLOS data link due to the large installation
cost of the Inmarsat system and since many military aircraft are
already equipped with HF radio systems for voice operation.
Communications: Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication
(CPDLC)--obviously there is much more to connecting two in fight
aircraft for coordinated robotics flight and remote control but
this coordinated use of commercial ATM systems is an ideal modality
to interface the two. Away to introduce this for the PFN/TRAC 1A
PFN aircraft units is the immediate application in the passive PFN
version the TRACker as a parallel reporting system only and have
these communication links integrated into TRACker to explore
possibility and test non flight connect actuators first while air
born with sensors to evaluate real-time performance with out flying
the plane
Commercial military contractors ESC, and a variety of commercial
vendors including ARINC, Honeywell, Bremer, and AlliedSignal.
Section.
There are a number of Federal, DOD, and USAF documents that require
military aircraft to comply in peacetime with civil aviation
requirements in civil-controlled airspace. In order to comply, the
military is beginning to equip with CNS/ATM data links.
Manufacturers are addressing the use of civil data link systems on
military aircraft by developing solutions that port the civilian
HFDL hardware and software onto circuit cards for installation into
military HF radios. The addition of VDL Mode 2 and VDL Mode 3
protocols to military radios is being handled in a similar manner
for VHF radios. Interfaces to a commercial off-the-shelf CMU are
also being developed for military radios and for the
military-specific flight management systems. In remote control
flying, the addition of these mandated CNS/ATM capabilities to the
USAF fleet via the ESC/GATO MC2 SPO activity enables an USAF AOC
capability applied to command and control issues. One such issue to
day is the Remote control of an air lined This link can be used
with TSA Homeland Security and air command NORAD in close Remote
Control of a troubled airliner via the PFN/TRAC units and FACT
security system for public safety and national security for the air
travel industry.
Since 911 an obvious necessity to coordinate air space activities
between commercial air liners and military aircraft has now become
a need to integrate flight controls for a number of good and sound
reasons to include the capability to stop the unauthorized use of
an aircraft. The PFN/TRAC unit can be the commercial direction and
implementation to link both civil and military avionics for
cohesive and coordinated real time responsiveness and local remote
control of a troubled airliner. Initially implementation would
occur by first sharing this data link via the technologies carryon
TRACker interface platform for air to air and air to ground
security links in an isolated format and to develop further it's
integration into commercial airframes avionics for automated flight
functions like robust robotics flight and close in RC.
Flight computers in some aircraft will hold the five flight plans
that would first activate by a FACT event flag for compromised
control of an aircraft and provide the best real time
responsiveness with the flight controls, prior to escort RC assist
aircraft's arrival. FACT flight plan software would recognize
course deviation and quarry the flight deck staff to authorize and
confirm the needed alteration and new course. If the change was
unjustified or if communications to a legitimate pilot could not be
established with confirmations in real-time that this same
individual identified as authorized was indeed the one operating
the aircraft; the aircraft PFN unit and surface TSA FACT
command/NORAD would have a FACT flagged event in progress and an
immediate Homeland Security code red/severe condition with an
eminent threat status to public safety and national security. The
local 1A PFN aircraft unit on board the troubled aircraft would
robotically take control of the flight and begin it's unscheduled
automated flight to a safe base with escort assist aircraft
scrambled via NORAD/NA AIR CINC across the nation. Many protocols
will have to be programmed for FACT management and the WoJack
programming to an RC landing at a safe base is just one scenario.
Flight contamination or illness might be another reason for
robotics flight to remote control coordinated management from an
escort assist aircraft.
The 1A PFN TRAC unit will have it's own protected back up power or
utilize any that meets the technology's protected standard. In
fact, all systems in place that can perform or be brought up to
PFN/TRAC standard for protected operation and security access will
be incorporated in the first generation to perform accountable
automated and robotics flight. The ASIC in FIG. 3 and any TRACker
will be progressively put in place and address avionics as
described in the alphabetical avionics terms and definition section
and implemented per standards and aircraft being converted for
robotics and remote control flight.
The title words Wo Jack means War Operations for hi Jacked aircraft
and it is the PFN/TRAC/FACT procedures detailed in this
application. Procedures to become protocols for human response and
software programming in the event that a commercial or private
aircraft has been commandeered or deemed to be operating in an
unauthorized manner. The basic scenarios and procedures are
discussed throughout this specification to set the stage for a
standard with the use of the PFN/TRAC System and interface units
for these aggressive remote control scenarios. All the dispersed
and disparate communications and mass data handling systems are
coordinated to perform accountable real-time machine and equipment
control. Specific to aviation and air travel for the most part, but
coordinated with all the other PFN/TRAC innovations in other
industries to manage movement, improve public safety and secure the
nations porous boarders.
Computer station 104 represents the 200 FAA AOC commercial Air
Operations Centers spread across the United States. Some are
navigational hubs east of the Mississippi and some are in free
flight areas west of the Mississippi where GPS allows straighter
flight paths. They are all responsive via the various ATM providers
(Air Traffic Management commercial wireless communication
companies) like ARINC and Boeing via their low earth orbit LEO
Satellites, VHF and new broadband data links for continental flying
and overseas.
The bottom mass data computer network 105 in this drawing
represents the TSA for Transportation security Agency's computer
network. Thes TSA/FACT monitoring and management terminals will be
matched to the FAA AOC stations across the nation and interfaced
with NORAD or CINC military AIR command and assist as part of the
Federal Access and control Technology's air wing of the PFN/TRAC
system for transportation management and security.
Additionally, any number of mass data systems can and will have all
sorts of controlled access to the FACT (Federal Access and Control
Technology) network and data will be mined from all types of PFNS
through out the PFN/TRAC System. This will be further detailed
throughout this application. In FIG. 7 there will be greater detail
given to the robotics and remote control of commercial aircraft to
special safe bases to land and handle the special conditions of a
troubled flight.
Any changes to aircraft or flight systems requires a great deal of
time in testing before it is allowed in regular flight scenarios.
With this understanding the invention has been designed to
accomplish robotics and remote control flying in a progressive
manner and teaches a progression from commercial off the shelf or
COTS products thru specific ASICs (application specific integrated
circuits) to SOC technology with the necessary integration and
consolidation of entire systems to chip technology through out this
filing and the related applications. For this reason it is
important for the reader, examiner or reviewer to comprehend the
use of existing technologies and parts and appreciate how they are
innovatively interface and uniquely combined for functionality with
present and legacy technologies to develop real product and test
platforms for future consolidated versions with forward engineering
for generations of enhanced protected and trusted PFNs to perform
accountable machine control and secure communication routing for
lifetimes.
FIG. 2 is a Power Point slide highlighting the important
characteristics and benefits of the PFN/TRAC invention; as a
timeless interface technology that incorporates new technology into
an architecture that provides accountable aggressive automated and
remote control via existing technologies;
This early bullet point figure states the advantages of the 1A
PFN/TRAC controller/router as a physically protected impregnated
integrated part of airframe and aircrafts electrical bus system.
However, as stated in figure one the time period for any such
physical connections to avionics electrical buses normally take
eight years.
The PFN TRAC System was designed to function immediately as an
isolated parallel system and in sensitive situations unconnected
and passive. This application was first conceived for terrestrial
PFN applications, specifically for light and heavy rail transport.
One immediate benefit to this approach is that a real-time, real
life test platform is created to evaluate prototype technologies in
the field. Additionally, inexpensive wireless redundant to monitor
and progressively manage and control operations as a backup is a
decided advantage when using legacy technologies and/or max-ed out,
or over taxed systems. Plus testing can be an ongoing process, from
beta testing to pre-production testing and through to include in
service evaluation of components and system analysis.
Progression is built by working examples. First by interfacing
Commercial Off The Shelf Products (COTS) in a functional prototype
like the 1a TRACker unit depicted in FIG. 11 with it's general
purpose described in FIG. 10. This carry on brief case unit routes
all aviation communications and data through other acceptable
wireless technologies to deliver operational and security data and
video to the ground in real time to parallel to ATM air traffic
management data provider to the Air Operations Center (AOC). It
accomplishes this without being connected to the aircraft.
FIGS. 12 through 13 describe the consolidation and integration of
the circuit design into an ASIC that is shown in FIG. 15 and
earlier in FIG. 3 as the 1A aircraft ASIC for a Trusted Remote
Activity Controller (TRAC) and/or router. The final circuit design
and components are determined via these Brief case carry on TRACker
unit evolutions which start by employing a Laptop in the processor
to run the necessary programming to complete the interfacing.
Ideally set up to handle windows programming which is acceptable to
many of the (COTS) sensor arrays and transducer software. Likewise
a PDA can perform this function in the same capacity and be used as
the Air Marshal TRACker unit's processor to interface wireless and
video interfacing.
The 1a TRACker does not perform remote control via direct
connection to the aircrafts avionics. However it is capable of
receiving all critical flight data via hybrid wireless chipsets
interfaced to the laptop/PDA (first generation TRACker unit) which
is also interfaced with the public GTE airfone system or another
acceptable wireless technology to relay critical flight data to the
Transportation Security Agency (TSA) along with additional security
telemetry such as EDS Explosion Detection sensors and cabin video
and audio data that is also, recovered by approved Dedicated Short
Range Communication (DSRC) another wireless interface to the
TRACker unit.
This innovative prototype (The 1a TRACker Brief case unit) is
further detailed in this specification for those skilled in the
arts. Additionally, it is a wonderful example of the progressive
aspect of this invention. The PFN/TRAC technology was envisioned
with the capacity to self evolve from the generated data. The unit
and the system enhance it self by mining recovered, recorded, and
reported data at three levels in an ongoing process to refine and
re-invent the PFN/TRAC architecture.
FIG. 3 Function Description for Programming
This application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) is to interface
avionics with the PFN/TRAC System of wireless routing and computer
networking on the surface. The circuit design is for complete
robotics and remote control of an aircraft. This circuit is not
just a simple record and report isolated monitoring function like
another product the "1a Tracker" a related embodiment of the
invention, which is discussed later in FIGS. 13,14, and 15. It is
intended to interface into specific avionics flight control systems
and data handling circuits and systems and be the functional
control component during a Federal Access and Control Technology or
"FACT" event.
1A PFN aircraft controllers will manage back up systems as well as
primary flight systems on board. The benefits of system redundancy
will be incorporated for the safest of robotics and remote control
flights. In many simple and legacy aircraft the 1A PFN/TRAC
controller/router may the only other system capable of performing
redundant activities. The essential flight systems will be
interfaced via a higher-level interface program running in the 1A
Aircraft PFNs. Multiple 1A PFN/TRAC units may well be part of any
specific aircraft's avionics and they will have intercommunications
by wireless and hard-wired connections. These multiple PFNs will be
harmonized to insure un interrupted and coordinated control of the
aircraft for those authorized to manage the flight aloft and on the
surface.
The architecture provides for translation programming between
disparate communication protocols for universal emergency
messaging. Additionally provided for, is the necessary programming
for essential E/E avionics bus systems to be interfaced to harvest
data and manage flight via any on board flight computers, collision
avoidance systems and autopilots. Or, by direct connection with
activity control components (any appropriate flight control surface
actuator) via 1A PFN units or actuator specific stand alone PFNs.
The robotics and remote control performed is to be a large scale
PFN/TRAC unit integration with aircraft systems. It will be a
progressive one with initial interfacing of current COTS dispersed
systems and components into a protected processor and protected
actuator architecture. Future consolidation miniaturization and
reduction in weight will be accomplished through Systems On a Chip
or SOC technology. Of course, all versions will have to meet
current standards, rules, regulations and codes as a necessary part
of FAA testing and to be in compliance with the nature and scope of
invention (the PFN/TRAC System.TM.) as detailed in related
filings.
In concept this ASIC gives direction to those skilled in the arts
to plan the various control scenarios involving hardware, software
and firmware. This figure lists the basics to construct the
aircraft controls to fly five pre-programmed flights and Safe base
landings. Enough to operate the aircraft with the necessary
real-time flexibility to flight conditions available equipment,
with no flight personnel and to land at one of five specified safe
bases. Obviously, this scenario will not be absolutely safe but
better than no pilot or the wrong one. Later; Flight and glide
paths in programmed library data bases will exist for more
airports, but FACT troubled flights will still land at special
bases designed to protect the public and national security, and
these scenarios will never be absolutely safe).
The preprogrammed flight and landing programs can be stored on
board or up loaded to an aircraft in need for automated assistance
in returning to the surface. Possibly this could of aided an in
experience pilot like JFK Jr. if a PFN controlled all the automated
flight controls in his aircraft and he was in communication with a
ground data base AOC center that could have down loaded specific
programming to land at Martha's vineyard. Or had he had the
opportunity and ability to download these programs before lift
off.
Due to the many onboard systems and computers in present commercial
avionics the PFN/TRAC System will initially and continually monitor
current and future systems for failure by wireless interfacing and
performing integrity checks for abnormalities and tampering. This
progressive unit will be able to control any essential peripherals
during a failure event via local programming and robotics while it
receives remote up loads from the surface in real-time. Future
generations will provide more system protection and consolidation
as well as redundancy of dispersed PFN/TRAC units that communicate
and operate in harmony. The first PFN generation of aggressive
robotics and remote control will be thoroughly tested to insure no
false activation of the system and components. This is to be the
primary objective for any PFN/TRAC interface component before being
offered commercially--no false activations. Then, it will be
offered to the authorities and the public in general with the
understanding; that it will not falsely activate. However, outcomes
for authorized activations during hostile aircraft takeovers or to
counter for local catastrophic flight control loss in real-time are
at best just another option to a flight in trouble with no
guarantees for a safe landing.
Basic for Public Understanding Concerning all FACT Activations:
When federal access and control of a piece of equipment occurs,
that piece of equipment is being operated in an unauthorized or
unsafe manner and any intervention is at best designed to limit the
time any particular negative activity can transpire. Secondarily,
exists the possibly to augment the outcome positively via genuine
human effort and the proper technical options available. It is
important to remember this is only a chance to improve the safety
of a particular public at risk or the public in mass. There are no
sure safety measures for unexpected dangerous operation of
equipment, especially if it is a result of intended misuse like a
terrorist event.
Sample Circuit Description
This figure is not to be considered specific or restrictive of any
PFN ASIC architecture. The technical teachings of this patent for
the PFN/TRAC System are discussed in an alphabetical avionics
acronym list later in this application and three subsequent
aviation filings. The terminology section helps organize the
individual areas to progressively develop the technology via
separate components and specific applications for the various
aircraft. The accountable robotics and remote controls of the
invention is the bases for the operating systems purpose, both in
the FACT ground system and in 1A PFN aircraft avionics for flight
management systems. The various events that will fag a FACT
activation are discussed with the response and activity controls as
they apply to the named through out the application and in this
section
The boxes on the left side of the green block are used to give
examples of the communication and data interfaces essential to TRAC
processing and should be controlled via the PFNs in a FACT event.
Top Box CEPT-Cellular is the commercial cellular frequencies
approved for use in flight applications like GTE's Airfone system
used in the United States aircraft for passengers to place calls
from the aircraft. This system works off of LEO satellites and does
not interfere across the commercial surface cellular system of
towers flooding ground telecommunication systems from a dispersed
signal from above. Systems will be used to send parallel data
streams to TSA and security links with real-time flight operation's
data, in the other 1aTRACker product and could be used by this 1A
PFN ASIC to send security telemetry recovered by the 4th block
labeled DSRC for dedicated short Range communications, which may
driving onboard close circuit video/audio and/or other sensor array
security applications. The 5th box blue tooth that is a commercial
Off The Shelf DSRC system for wireless carryon devices. This
chipset with appropriate protocols will be interfaced as a hybrid
substrate as stated to the left of these basic communication inputs
on the FIG. 3 block.
A PFN/TRAC unit will be capable of controlling and using all
standard carry on wireless devices and recognizing other non
interfaced transmissions via It's scan function and frequency
counting algorithm, that will constantly monitor an appropriate
number of the 40 antennas that are on board a traditional
commercial aircraft to adequately survey for an rogue or
unauthorized transmissions.
The second block on the left CNS/A & ATM The Communications,
Navigation, and Surveillance/Airborne system is linked by wireless
hybrid transceiver/protocol chipsets. This configuration is
displayed in other similar figures. The above 1A PFN/TRAC circuit
recovers any data generated by the aircraft. All systems carrying
voice transmissions analog or digital will have voice recognition
software applied to transpose any verbal communication into digital
format for transmission by other wireless protocols (e.g. airfone)
interfaced and/or as text to be recognized and read at the
appropriate application level in any TSA, AOC, ATM monitoring
terminal, either locally or from remote locations. The ATM portion
of this block would be also another Hybrid Chipset for the Air
Traffic Management provider like ARINC or Boeing with all the
necessary receiver, protocols, codec and translation programming to
receive this data locally in the 1A PFN/TRAC unit(s) and relay this
data via any number of acceptable or needed wireless technologies
on board the air craft or via another digital configuration and
modulation within the broad band width of the ATM service provider
for the specific aircraft.
The TRAC controller/Router would determine the best means to
transmit any needed data and how to under any circumstances.
Redundant back ups on traditional frequencies and the not so usual
frequencies is all available to the 1A PFN TRAC controller/router
and the FACT/TSA/CINC North American Air command. These agencies
will generally be located with the AOC. But when not the agencies
will be able to network with AOC and commercial ATM programs in
real-time. ASCPC Air Supply and Cabin Pressure Controllers is an
exemplary accessory System Under Control or SUC to 1A PFN/TRAC unit
and FACT programs. or at lease certain functions will be. The air
supply to the cockpit and passenger cabin is to be monitored for
contaminants e.g. Bio, chemical (EDS) and physical property sensor
arrays smoke detection, Audio/Video/Thermal/radiation sensor arrays
and various transducers, which send specific signals to the 1A PFN
ASIC. These individual devices are operated and processed by the
proper divers and programs installed in the 1A PFN and translated
by conversion interface algorithms to format the signal for
transmission to the surface and TSA terminals via the appropriate
onboard wireless. Some such sensing capability exist on
sophisticated aircraft already and these data streams would be
interfaced with the PFN/TRAC units on board to harvested their data
and enter it in to the 1A PFN/TRAC units monitoring program and on
to the TSA system and other agencies via internet protocols and/or
connected via direct wireless gateways. The FACT (IP) security
matrix combines national and global transportation, law enforcement
and security Intranets. These security agencies are responsible for
continual layers of automated and human data mining and
analysis.
The 4th and 5th blocks on the left are all the short-range
interface protocols DSRC or stand alone PFNs with dedicated short
range communications, RFID radio frequency ID products like (EZ
pass) and Blue tooth another short range RF technology for wireless
telephones to interface with some automotive telematics.
These are existing technologies interfaced via the PFN platform in
the ASIC and would have the appropriate hybrid chip sets
interfacing these technologies to track, identify and sense
materials, equipment and people approaching and entering the
aircraft and the aircraft's cabin and compartments. Via, these
connections the 1A PFN or series of 1A PFS on board the aircraft
and working in harmony will identify carryon wireless devices
through ESN recognition and look for equipment alerts from FACT
Security and TSA down loads to the local 1A aircraft PFN as well as
manage the use or restrict any such use of the recognized cellular
phone or other wireless carryon device as determined best for
flight safety security by the legitimate flight crew or the 1A
PFN/TRAC unit. This connectivity via Blue tooth or 802.11 DSRC to
standard commercial cellular phones will be used as an emergency
communication asset to the surface.
RFID
Mentioned above the RFID Tag technology is a short-range
identification system that also can be interfaced into the PFN/TRAC
interface platform's to repeat or digipeat as a report function to
FACT and TSA terminals and deliver data to distant remote mass data
repositories. The PFN would supply plug in connection for RFID
transceiver chipsets to drive their special antenna or magnetic
transceiver portion of the RFID architecture. Then the EZ pass tag
could pass through the antenna array and be identified. Antenna
hardware could be concealed in the air fame passageways and
compartments. The gathered data would be passed on via PFN
interfaced--long distance wireless technologies--either wireless
telephony or other RF depending on the application. Additionally,
the mined data from the tag's flash memory would be redundantly
stored locally by the Primary Focal Node's Trusted Remote Activity
Controller/Router's extended memory for accountability and
accounting purposes with a flagged event. Or to compared to any
boarding list of known materials that was checked in and tagged
with RFID technology for transported to a particular aircraft that
matched a specific passenger travel plans and movement for example.
Or the recognition of suspect packages being tracked by law
enforcement and was matched in the PFN processor from downloaded
data from FACT/TSA or other agencies in the national security
matrix tracking material movements. This technology can be used to
identify and track mobile inventory for security and for commercial
applications and billing applications, etc and communicated in
real-time via the PFN machine-messaging network.
However, to step it up a notch the use of the stand alone PFN a
version of the 1P personal PFN will provide sensing data of the
material being moved and the state it is in and transmit this data
to the 1A PFN and other equipment and vehicle PFN units like the 1E
equipment and 1SV surface vehicle controller router which
rebroadcast this data to FACT TSA centers. These units and their
ASICs are detailed in other drawings with the defining difference
being they have limited in power and distance and ability to handle
high current applications, otherwise they can give the same
telemetry as the equipment PFNs and more telemetry than the RFID
technology (basically jus an ID tracking technology.
Scanning is another interfaced technology in all the PFNs. Scanning
like Bar codes and the PFN/TRAC's own Bag sign where the 1A PFN
ASIC via the proper chipsets and drivers (hybrid substrate) will
recover images from personal bags, in this case of the PFN/TRAC bag
sign product the passengers own signature which is placed on the
bag by the passenger via invisible signatures made with special
markers detected only by ultraviolet light and a hooded video
scanning device. The images are converted to a distinct digital
signal and are checked via a comparison handwriting algorithm in
the PFN to confirm Bag and passenger match and location via video
Iris or other personal ID recognition technology in real-time
throughout the air travel/transport experience, through the airport
and gate to gate through the skies
RFID tag technology is an example of a technology that would be
enhanced by a PFN interface. PFN/TRAC System increases RFID
technology track and deliver more real time data to many IP systems
for monitoring and management of material movement both for
commercial purposes and security reasons. This technology is an
excellent Commercial Off The Shelf Technology example of COTS
interfacing being enhanced via the wireless PFN interface
connection. The PFN/TRAC unit and System becomes a flexible
security sensing matrix with these types of technologies interfaced
and is likewise enhanced in it's capacity. Additionally, much more
relevant data can be added to the RFID tag data during PFN
processing such as PFN GPS or fixed address and time and passed on
to command centers and first responders dial ups to NENA numbers or
wireless gateways to IP protocols DES/DET/TSA and homeland defense
and security--if applicable as well.
PFN Diverse Use Wireless Communications Use Like Blue Tooth
(DSRCs)
As part of this invention's nature and scope these DSRC Systems
Under Command/or SUC technologies would write interface code into
their protocols to immediately transfer PFN/FACT directives and
data via any cellular service they were resident with in the same
wireless device. These phone providers would be part of a priority
emergency action messages EAMs network that delivered this packet
data to the surface IP/TSA gateways and dialups for FACT's homeland
security matrix. The troubled aircraft would provide a continual
down load of identifiable data packets and information to surface
receivers or satellite in route for further data resources in
real-time to critical assist agencies and for later analysis.
Special arrangements with these providers to support secure
gateways into this IP security matrix of FACT/TSA security and
other agencies would have to be arranged and constructed. These
providers would use their existing peta mass data handling and
storage systems with special FACT/TSA security storage programming
and storage, or they would be outfitted with special PFN/TRAC/FACT
Memory repositories to capture all local down loaded data as part
of a FACT equipment register system described in later figures and
earlier related filings
A Byproduct Advantage to Local Interfacing-System Connected
While the invention uses existing technologies and better
coordinates their use in cross environmental applications it also
manages the host equipment more efficiently by coordinating
movement of vehicles on or near the earths surface with the data
processed. The technology does not infringe on existing art, it is
enhancing it by interfacing it into the PFN/TRAC architecture where
it enjoys a wider market base of applications. It is important for
the reader or reviewer to keep in mind that the above wireless
technologies are examples and this group of interfaces will change
per aircraft and later in the terrestrial ASIC designs by
application. The invention was not design to compete with existing
technologies or infringe on prior art. It has always been conceived
as an interface platform to coordinate these dispersed and
disparate technologies and commercially work with these
technologies to better manage equipment and route data for an
improved the quality of life for humanity.
CNSA & GPS along with CRZ cruise tracking technologies are
other inputs interfaced with the PFN via any necessary protocol
chipsets. Exact flight path data will be gathered from onboard
smart determination technologies and ground surveillance and
communication systems and compared to preprogrammed flight plans.
All in flight changes will be verified by surface and aircraft data
telemetry and unauthorized flight will be FACT flagged and
immediately result in a Safe Base flight plan via FACT event
protocols. Constant communications with the aircraft and the order
for escort and assist aircraft for any troubled FACT flight will be
a part of this immediate response and directed by DOD homeland air
defense CINC AIR COMMAND/NORAD.
CPDLC-AP The cockpit data link and autopilot box in the figure are
the direct and primary data inputs and flight controls feed back.
During a FACT event they will be SUC to the 1A PFN or group of 1A
PFNs or Trusted Remote Activity controller/communication routers
(this is a TRAC ASIC above the terrestrial PFN/TRAC ASICs are in
subsequent figures), along with any sub specific application PFN
ASICs which operate any necessary dispersed actuators to control
flight control surfaces over any of these systems if they can not
be secured from human control while the aircraft is in flight.
Avionics Translations
It is important to remember that the system under control has to
translate avionics bus activity controls in digital format to the
PFN operating program so along with all the hybrid chip sets there
will be one to synthesize protocols like the 429 maintenance
interface does for 737 to convert from the avionics digital signal
messaging to a PC platform and windows applications for
maintenance. This is not specifically shown here in this ASIC
because of the space in this figure. But this is the type of
translation programming that will occur in the CPU with the codecs
stored and conversion programming stored in memory.
Other figures and the other related patent applications describe
direct from the PFN separate actuators as well that are part of the
technology's protected operations. The skilled in the art have to
construct functionally appropriate designs to meet any code and
specifications known in the industry for the specific airframes.
Acceptance of the PFN/TRAC system architecture in general must be a
process by the appropriate industry and government experts to test
accept and standardize these constructions.
Many analog systems and physically controlled aircraft to day will
see its first automated fight controls via PFN/TRAC unit avionics
and actuator components. Actuator controls are covered in earlier
related filings.
Basically, the 1A PFN and PFN/TRAC network of units if so needed in
any particular airframe will operate to form a seamless
connectivity of flight controls from first existing systems like
the flight computer, collision avoidance systems, forward seeking
radar, weather radar and any autopilot controls. These systems will
be interfaced and use to fly the plane un interrupted and
appropriately with current robotics However, in the event that the
plane is not responding as it should the assist remote control
pilot in an escort plane and/or the ground RC pilot in the
simulator station or the 1A PFN TRAC Unit onboard will be deferred
to-to control the aircraft via PFN robotics and via the network of
specific PFN ASIC flight control actuator circuits. (Either
wireless and encrypted or wired and with encrypted commands from
protected PFN robotics or remote command).
Clock distribution. Is coordinated in each PFN by LEO satellites or
the GPS interfaced or other wireless communications with redundant
systems and local clock updates to keep all moving and stationary
objects placed in synchronized time and space for movement
management on and near the earths surface. This will be tied into
collision avoidance programming and be used by the FACT program TSA
and homeland defense/DOD to control robotics flights and coordinate
and control movement in the air and on the ground. This clocking
will be the bases for programmers to write algorithms to account
for signal trans mission times and conditions to obtain the optimum
performance for near real-time control of any aircraft under remote
control. It will also provide 1A PFN/TRAC unit benchmarks for
preprogrammed and timed responses performed by robotics in
conjunction with ground controls. It is to be system wide
synchronized timing and is augmented by geographic position
coordinates and updated by consistent redundant sources. This
process is part of the FACT construct program running in the 1A PFN
to determine if a flight is positioned on time in the exact place
and the correct altitude at a particular second in space and time.
It is the electronic equipment placement police for an aircraft in
the sky with a connected system partner on the ground all the way.
The ATM and AOC as well as the TSA are linked nationwide and would
include the areas of free flight west of the Mississippi.
Protocol Translation & CODEC
APU & APC APU Auxiliary Power Unit will be specially protected
for the first generation of PFNs and also for PFN additional APUs
or emergency power packs, which inherently reside in special
protected compartments for the 1A PFN/TRAC unit and any FACT
interface components to fly the aircraft (as detailed in earlier
related patents). The APC the auto Pilot computer is listed in this
block for the initial 1A PFNs to incorporate as much as possible
the auto flight systems with secured power supplies and increase
their protection to make them impregnable. Separate maintained
power sources are inherent to PFN/TRAC system to insure the trusted
remote activity controllers operation and essential for the
activity components as well. These emergency power sources are of
the highest quality lithium batteries and are maintained at full
power by the aircraft generators and the airframe's electrical bus.
The charging current is regulated and surge protected as well as
one directional and can not be shorted externally to discharge or
damage the emergency battery or negatively affect it's normal life
(detailed in related filings). The standard self-contained PFN
emergency battery self monitors and reports to the 1A PFN the
battery condition. All PFN units and flight critical components are
self-powered in an emergency. All actuator PFN circuits, control
circuits like the 1A PFN ASIC or trusted remote activity controller
and any of the connectable are protected physically, and employ
secured data links, wired and wireless with redundancy, and have
individual service current available locally to complete their
specific tasks form authorized signals. Additionally,
To integrate as part of the PFN/TRAC system performing FACT
security programming, all other APUs on board must be configured to
report their condition via regular integrity checks conducted by
the 1A PFN unit. These regular system checks and PFN system data
then downloads will to authorized service and maintenance centers
for the APUs and PFN emergency power packs. All aircraft components
essential to flight and PFN/TRAC/FACT operations will have these
service integrity checks run on their performance, and these
downloads will also go to manufactures. There is a FACT system
auditor/inventory program locally run on the aircraft via the PFNs
and a system wide redundant backup program done nationally/globally
for everything that flies in commercial and general aviation via
the FACT Registry discussed in FIGS. 37, 38, 39, 40. This portion
of the FACT registry is operated by the FAA, TSA,
Preliminary FACT FAA Tracking Registry Program
Basically, the FACT registry tracks the use of electrically
interfaced components and any equipment desired inventoried on the
aircraft PFN file (e.g. tires type lot number) as a quality
assurance program, and quick security and safety comparison check.
A running program in each 1 A PFN aircraft checks all known
components to be on board with no alerts downloaded from FACT
AOC/TSA registry during pilot ACARS, during any service of
components and periodically. New item recognition is flagged data
and routed to the specific center for analysis.
For example, a suspect piece of baggage is evaluated through the
airport terminal FACT flow data base and appropriately responded
to, while an aircraft circuit or new transmission is processed
through the FACT FAA central registry and compared to known
inventory and assigned RF equipment) In this respect It can be used
to counter terrorism, antitheft and monitor the sale and resale or
reuse of aircraft and components, much as the FACT registry is used
for terrestrial PFN/TRAC units for automotive marine and rail
vehicles and products. Additionally required are specially
qualified service personnel and controlled progressive program with
security clearance for all work perform, as authorized service will
have to be in place for service on any PFN/TRAC units and their
responsive components operating in any FACT portion of the system.
Ultimately, all PFNs will be operating in conjunction with the FACT
system for national security in a transportation matrix.
The APU/APC are Separate Interfaces
APC is the Autopilot Computer and it must be protected with an
uninterrupted power supply to be part of any PFN/TRAC/FACT system
so it can carry out the preprogrammed FACT flights. Whatever
augmentation is needed to complete this protective task to qualify
the APC for PFN/TRAC technology must be made to perform to make it
an accountable robust robotics flight and remote control component
or a Trusted Remote Activity Control portion of any PFN/TRAC/FACT
system. Progressive use of existing components and technology are
encouraged for rapid development of secured robotics and remote
controlled flight, but it has to be securable and protect able to
qualify or it must be SUC to 1A PFNs on board. If employed the APC
will be used to handle the 5 safe base fights initially and
continually, but there will be self powered back up actuator
controllers via dispersed PFNs operating in a harmonious matrix to
provide ultimate control to the authorized authority, even if that
authority is artificial intelligence (AI on board robotics in a 1A
PFN) periodically.
Regardless, of 1A PFN overrides, the autopilot must be impregnable
to unauthorized personnel during flight (standard to be determined
and application specific).
Personnel identification is accomplished via the communication
systems and data transfer systems interfaced with the 1A PFN
controller. They would include smart card swipes, finger print and
Iris scanning, voice recognition, thermal sensing, blood pressure
readers and even EKGs via hand sensors and finger thaws on the yoke
and instrument panel swipes as well as full biometrics transmitted
via DSRC systems or 1P personal PFNS with body sensing harness
belts, bracelets, watch type bands, or sensing clothing worn by the
pilot and flight crew and interfaced. Individual biometrics can be
used to identify a capable pilot in real-time via automated
algorithms with pre-logged personal data in both the local
monitoring program in the 1A aircraft and also in the AOC/TSA
centers on the surface for real-time comparison and response.
This Robotics flight guardian program will maintain the approved
flight plan via monitoring aircraft systems and progress with
respect to authorized activity and conditions and continually check
the pilots condition and flight crew if desired. This approval
process can clear any legitimate pilot and provide proper access to
the controls of the aircraft in emergencies by having all qualified
personnel in the FACT registry. Local 1A PFNs will be updated with
this list. However, an alert flag will be sent to FAA
FACT/TSA/NORAD/AOC where final tracking and override is maintained.
In absence of such an alternative the already flagged FACT flight
will be programmed to the appropriate SB safe base via robotics and
flight assist RC needed via the 1A PFN TRAC unit on board.
Most other portions of this ASIC are self explanatory to those
skilled in the art of avionics, electrical engineering and computer
processing. However, there will be sections in this specification
and related filings that further define out functions performed by
the specific components of this sample circuit. Additionally, there
are similar circuit designs that further the reader's concept of
this PFN Trusted Remote Activity Controller/Router unit and it's
application as a primary Focal Node (PFN local connection point) to
perform universal accountable interfacing with stable wireless
connectivity and equipment control.
Obviously airframes, and terrestrial vehicles have different
electronics and disparate properties that can hinder any effort to
coordinate them. This is one main reason for the Primary Focal Node
(PFN controller/router) being placed as a receiving PC processing
platform in vehicles and machines where they have access to stable
power sources; they then can perform wireless translation, and
relaying or routing functions for the various forms of wireless
communications, as well as, store pertinent data locally and
remotely for commercial billing and accountability for commands
delivered and resulting in remote control of the machines they are
attached too. This creates a matrix of machine messaging and
management that is coordinated and useable in real-time and can
also be socially and commercially acceptable. Data is locally
harvested/stored and/or sent on via the appropriate wireless and IP
applications with encryption to the appropriate systems terminals
and application programming for decryption and use.
General Function Summary of the 1A PFN/TRAC/FACT ASIC Unit
It is important to remember that the essential controls and
communications will be determined by the security agencies, the FCC
and FAA and industry standards efforts. The remote control
communications will be ded or dedicated digital channels for
individual activity controls for flight surfaces. Probably on
special military (possibly DES communication channels) that will be
used form aircraft to aircraft and for close to (SB) landing
applications. (Safe bases (SB). Otherwise robotics flight will be
employed to maintain the highest level of real-time responsiveness
for aircraft performance in relation to the real-time flying
environment. This is proprietary to the FACT programming and this
sequence of activities is part of what defines a FACT event. Unless
a local assist aircraft is accompanying a troubled flight, the
PFN/TRAC unit will fly with robotics when activated to one of the 5
preprogrammed FACT flight paths that are stored in the PFN software
library (or memory storage) to the pre arranged Safe Bases (SB)
determined by location of the aircraft via (GPS and/or other smart
location determining technologies on board) and/or the nature of
the emergency that has been flagged as a FACT event flight (for
Federal Access and Control Intervention).
To insure absolute maximum redundancy in communication from the
plane to the surface, blue tooth, or 802 wireless or any applicable
DSRC interfaced will provide contact from any and all of their air
travel carryon devices that interface with other long range
communications so that any wireless device can be used by the 1A
PFNTRAC processor(s) and the FACT system. PFN/TRAC must have the
capacity to activate any such devices and call NENA/FACT numbers in
route for first responders and for direct downloads to the FAA
homeland security's hot operations center (e.g. Herdon Va. With
TSA/AOC) or flight Command Controller air operation center(s)
(NORAD, TSA, AOC AIR CINC) and download all data that is recovered
on board by the 1a PFN/TRAC unit. More than one 1A PFN/TRAC unit
can be interfaced in the aircraft and to an aircrafts various
electrical bus systems with each having a separate FACT ESN or
electronic address and communication protocol to coordinate any
flexible master slave relation ship and to insure continual service
via protected secure controls of the plane via the various non
accessible and secluded units. All automated flight control systems
will have a slave relation ship to the 1A PFN/TRAC process on board
the aircraft. These systems will be subsystems or Systems Under
Control or SUC. to the PFN/TRAC units and any network. Many
automated controls (auto pilots, flight computers flight and voice
recorders sub system controllers exist in a distributed
architecture in present and legacy aircraft. These systems are
reliable trusted and well engineered and there is no real need to
eliminate or replace them. The first goal and basic modality of the
invention is to progressively create the PFN/TRAC System with an
organized accountable interface platform via a progressive
architecture to increase security and pilot back up for human
controls in commercial aircraft to improve public safety and
national security. This can be accomplished in a number of ways
with all the various aircraft.
The Properties and Qualities of the 1A PFN Unit
First generation PFN/TRAC units will link and control hardware and
software to robotically fly the plane to designated safe zones and
landing bases with special security and support services to handle
most all imaginable emergencies aloft and on the surface.
There will be the capability to eliminate local flight
controls.
There will be the capability to land the plane at designated safe
bases via remote control flying.
There will be the ability for multiple communications with the
aircraft and continual tracking. There will be the capability to
dump the fuel remotely and robotically.
There will be a means to incapacitate passengers and crew.
There will be real-time audio and video to ground and escort
aircraft.
There will be isolation capability for cabin air.
There will be the capability to treat the breathable air in the
aircraft.
Because realistically the invention's development and deployment
will be varied and progressive earlier generations retrofits and
legacy aircraft will not have all the functions desirable. Those
not obtainable through hardware and software integration and
interfacing will be obtained through well-trained and
security-cleared personnel until such systems are available or as
standard operations for specific aircraft. For this reason FIG. 3
is going to change over time and for specific aircraft.
There will be a capability to terminate the flight if the need
arises. This technology is designed to be timeless, because it will
evolve and become more consolidated integrated and protected. The
ASIC translator and processor will be interfaced with IC hybrid
substrate chipsets for the varied communication protocols. The
chosen systems as standards will inevitably be converted to system
on a chip or SOC technology and housed in cans or specialized
containments that have electronic security packaging and tamper
detection. Most importantly present manufacturers have direction to
move forward in cross-environmental applications via the PFN/TRAC
system and better coordinate their product's use with others.
Additionally, their markets are expanded and their negative
cross-environmental impact can be managed. Allowing them to freely
produce their special products to an organized structure in place
that is compatible to their industry, business, and government
regulatory concerns, which will also improve public safety and
national security.
The Aggressive response question for the public and government-this
is always done for the Trusted Remote Activity controller/router to
be trusted and accepted technology standard. It is a basic and
unique element of the PFN/TRAC technology. In all the patent
applications the invention address the social and constitutional
issues and impacts it will makes as an advanced Human Machine
Interface Technology. The following is a major issue for the People
of United States to understand and accept as well as any peoples
globally that will use the invention in the following manner.
Issue
In a hostile take over of an aircraft a disabling aerosols could be
released into the ventilation system of an aircraft if this is
determined advantage. The 1 A PFN controller could be programmed to
control a responsive solenoid valve (wired or wireless on
compressed gas containers and release this gas to sedate all
occupants; if robotics flight and remote controlled landing proved
the most ideal scenario for a portion or all of the public's
safety. The data recovered and the course of action taken along
with the geographic location and condition of the aircraft and
occupants could be the determining factors in writing the software
for the robotics flights and/or remote controlled landings as well
as the human responses, and procedures taken both aloft or on the
surface. Personal 1P PFNs could monitor the known medically
compromised passengers and regular crew for any near fatal results
for this aggressive remote control action as well as, cabin and
cockpit video systems Adjustments could be made robotically or
remotely by medical staff in the TSA centers or on the surface. As
outlandish as it sounds even to this inventor these might be
necessary options to insure the greater public safety and national
security against terrorist events like the 9.11.01 terrorist
act.
In keeping with the nature and scope of the invention, the
employment of this function and similar ones involving the PFN/TRAC
system and these FACT security system possibilities need to be
known and the publics voice heard. And, not just government
agencies and the public and legislative branches of government, but
all the public. These are decisions that can have dire consequences
and first deliberated on by the public and then developed into
acceptable standards, standard actions, regulations, procedures
and/or protocols with respect to this aspect of the invention or
any other public issue of the invention. Programming must reflect
how a democratic society has decided to employ the invention for
public good, safety and national security.
The inventor suggests objective reviewers like the Kettering
Institute and their National Issues forum and Civil Liberties to
objectively frames the issues and quarry the public and report to
the public wishes to government. The hardest of issues might well
be served with a public polling during stand elections. With the
public pulse on these issues incorporated before standard groups
meet and/or legislative committees take up planning and make
regulations, laws, procedures and protocols; the software code
writers and programmers can construct these sensitive programs of
the invention in an acceptable and trusted manner. One that has the
trust of the public and can serve as invented.
Industrial Applicability, Commercial Progress and Component
Review
1A PFN series) Aircraft Controllers is the first of a number of
related aviation PFN/TRAC products with FACT Security that make up
this management and security invention for air travel and
transport.
Commercial efforts are underway seeking government support and
assistance to include funding, aircraft, and technical transfers in
an effort to partner up with major aircraft manufacturers and
avionics companies to develop the 1A PFN/TRAC unit a protected
equipment control technology. Informal discussion with Boeing's ATM
people pointed to a long process to physically interface the 1 A
ASIC with commercial aircraft. This aggressive of a control system
on board an aircraft has its proponent and opponents. But Boeing
and others did not dismiss the possibility, nor the need for more
technical options to poor human flight control when it is taking
place. Most would rather stay focused on pilot assist systems for
as long as this has the least reactionary approach.
More initial interest has been shown for the fist progressive stage
the of the PFN/TRAC technology. The "1a TRACker" which is a carryon
brief case air marshal connection to ground security and TSA is not
interfaced directly to the aircraft's electrical system. It begins
by recording and reporting via an isolated wireless communication
system. This 1a TRACker laptop design and the 1b "Tracker) which
has the same circuit design as 1A PFN/TRAC units in FIG. 3 is also
listed and defined later in this application as FIG. 15 and
considered a progressive step for the PFN/TRAC System and FACT
security system into the Aviation Industry. The 1a carryon TRACker
evolutions discussed later will be the first product to market. The
TRACker ASIC (FIG. 15) is similar to this proposed integrated 1A
aircraft TRAC circuit. The 1a carryon TRACker brief case series
will be responsible for final and specific 1A PFN ASIC in FIG. 3
for the robotics flight and the remote control interface
configurations via appropriate testing in real-life passive use.
This is to be as a tool to design PFN/TRAC interface avionics for
retrofitting and legacy aircraft and new design as well. It is a
perfect example of the progressive aspects of the invention to
uniquely employ existing technology and refine any design for
future PFN/TRAC unit's ASICS and related accessories.
Regardless of this associated first commercialization the 1A
PFN/TRAC aircraft unit will be prototyped at the earliest
opportunity as the market is so diverse in airframes no work
rendered in this area will go unused or be fruitless. So in summary
the invention in every aspect has industrial applicability.
The (FACT) security program of in the PFN/TRAC System of
controllers remotely controls specifically to counter the
unauthorized or unsafe use of all equipment. Boeing and others, TRW
have shown strong interest and a willingness to help the inventor
and the companies commercializing this invention to include "TRAC
Aviation Inc." get into the right programs and with the correct
manufacturers to develop the terrestrial sections of the invention
as well for the nations air transport system and airports. They
also have strong interest and are willing to help develop the
portable PFN tracking and telemetry network provided by the relay
function of the PFN for short-range communications to longer-range
communication links to maintain a mobile inventory for materials
and baggage in transit. Other applications will be discussed
latter.
FIG. 4 projects product development differences between first and
second-generation PFN/TRAC systems. Whether there is a distinct
product development difference between first and second-generation
1A PFN/TRAC units depends on application cost and aircraft
variations. This figure discusses some of the attributes and goals
that will progressively be accomplished for all aircraft, however
the time frames are flexible to say the least. The distinction
between different 1A PFN units in the different airframes will be
quite drastic, ultimately; the system will be miniaturized into
protected SOC technology.
Redundancy, trusted technology is another goal and these more
perfect versions will be much cheaper as market volume increases
and standards are defined and refined. Mass acceptance will evolve
a more universal technology for the management of shared controls
with people and equipment. This will reduce cost for the technology
by economy of scale. Making more sophisticated controls available
for less sophisticated and light aircraft.
Another planed development for the technology is to be forward and
backward engineered. Generally speaking second generation systems
will go from the early PFN systems that combine COTS dispersed
systems and will move to more centralized protected PFN
architecture where complete PFN/TRAC protected technology will be
the base operating system and duplication and distributed
components will be on for redundancy and reliability. However,
standards and component designs will always be determined by the
experts, the skilled artisans, and engineers within industry and
government.
FIG. 5 is the initial 1A PFN flight and landing software library
will be for 5 selected safe bases to include emergency response
procedure, protocols and personnel. Specialists will be available
to remotely control any incoming aircraft and handle any FACT
flight emergency. Second generation software flight and landing
libraries will be developed for all 429 commercial airports and
more and more different types of aircraft to help skill deficient
pilots at their controls fly safely and return to the surface in a
safe and controlled manner. Additionally, the nation's 8000 private
and general aviation airports will also have approach and landing
programs developed as an ongoing process. There will exist the
capacity in this second generation to wirelessly upload to a 1A PFN
flight controller in real time software flight programs. The
PFN/TRAC unit operated with the appropriate wireless chipsets and
the system part of the FAA/AOC with commercial ATM programs can
assist and robotically land the troubled flight. Where the pilots
skills dose not match the flying challenge but the equipment exists
on board to assist the pilot or do the job.
First generation flight and landing at the 5 safe bases will employ
COTS software for commercial or military airliners with their
existing automated flight, glide path assist and advanced landing
systems. Additionally these Safe Bases will be equipped with the
latest systems like Denver's automated decent and landing systems.
Data links from these systems will be incorporated, along with
existing automated flight simulator programming to mimic real-time
flight conditions via conversion software algorithms that provide
the RC pilot on the ground at the safe base realist simulation of
the inbound FACT flight. This converted simulator responsive to
real flight conditions at the 5 Safe Bases will be the initial RC
pilot stations and part of the first generation FACT Flight
protocols performed by the 1A aircraft PFNs. The 1A PFNs will
permit the hand off for the RC pilot to take control from the
autopilot for final landing. Second generation may be completely
automated with robotics and have the capability to land itself.
Regardless the RC stations will be refined and specially trained RC
pilots will be staffed at these airbases as part of a regular air
wing of the North American military AIR CINC Command/or NORAD.
There also is to be airborne Remote Control for the incoming FACT
flight. The airborne RC pilot sits in a specially outfitted fighter
for RC operations. He is in direct contact with the troubled FACT
flight that is responsive to his commands via the 1A PFN aircraft
controller on board the troubled airliner. It is suggested that the
airborne RC pilot be seated in the front seat Or have un impeded
visibility) with a high visibility TFT display below his wind
screen (sun shielded) with all data from the FACT flight instrument
panel displayed. Additionally yoke/stick and rudder pedals. Ideally
a fly by wire system that can be switched from the FACT aircraft to
the pursuit aircraft in an emergency. Meanwhile, the other pilot in
this pursuit/assist aircraft is flying the pursuit jet as his main
job. Both pilots have the means to terminate the flight and
protocols for any such decision need to be determined and put into
place.
The decision to hand off the controls to the land based RC pilot is
one that will also have to be determined by testing and specific
circumstance and then made into procedures and protocols, that are
both reflexive and thoughtful where they should be.
This branch of the nation's air defense will train for all sorts of
aircraft and there will be special RC pilots that will be assigned
to bases as squadrons. Some of which are RC air born pilots and
others that are ground based RC pilots. Skill is the determining
factor and cross aircraft training is a necessity. With the same
vigilance as NORAD staffed and defended the Due line during the
cold war--so should it maintain available support aircraft flight
staff and first responder specialist at these five safe bases (and
en route stations) to handle any airborne emergency, aircraft and
circumstance. The Remote control Pilots and the 5 Safe Bases are
part of this invention's proprietary FACT flight procedures to be
made into national air defense policy and protocols. They are part
of the PFN/TRAC system with FACT security for Air travel and
transport management and security.
There will be more details as to the technical responses at the 5
safe bases in the figures to follow.
FIG. 6 There also may need to be more than five safe bases to cover
the nation. They should be placed so no flight in process is no
more than 500 miles for a Safe Base landing or not more than an
hour in the air after a FACT event has occurred on a flight--if
possible). Even though when a FACT event occurs the aircraft via 1
APFN robotics climes or descends to a special unoccupied altitude
and airway on a special controlled flight path with no on board
control a possible hour flight is still incredibly long. For this
reason along with the pursuit assist aircraft launched to the
troubled flight an airborne emergency response team/swat team with
medical/bio/chemical/explosive and fire team members are dispatched
immediately when the FACT event occurs. This figure shows such a C
type troop carrier military aircraft. It has assist rockets for a
quick air born assent. Additionally all specialty gear would be
stored on board the aircraft ready specifically for any number of
responses and enough aircraft, personnel and equipment would be on
stand by for immediate departure to meet any specific need.
Possible the new osprey will have the bugs worked out of it and
would provide the best service for these applications. The
objective of these assist services are to catch up with the
airliner and follow the flight to the safe base and be ready to
parachute from their troop carrying aircraft if the aircraft has an
earlier termination before the safe base. Additionally via the
PFN/TRAC/FACT/TSA/NORAD system, first responders on the surface
would be notified via the system and could coordinate efforts with
the specialist parachuting into the scene including transporting
any dispersed team members to the crash site.
The Safe Base Runway Tunnels
FIG. 7 illustrates the 2 basic technology sections; the Plane and
the ground control system to perform PFN/TRAC robotics and the
Remote Control via RC pilot in the center of the figure.
FIG. 7 Overview:
General
Like in FIG. 1, there are 2 basic sections to this drawing the
Plane and the ground control system interfaced via the PFN/TRAC
robotics unit which performs the FACT functions on board and with
the Remote Control RC pilot in the center of this figure. In the
lower front of the aircraft is a green lock box, the 1A PFN/TRAC
unit. It is a protected interface node that cannot be compromised
during flight and has the primary control over vital aircraft
controls. (Any essential flight and landing component, programming
and communications). This 1APFN controller and/or any redundant
PFN/TRAC control/routers on board are the only command and control
units in connection and responsive any ground control system during
a FACT event. This includes ultimate control over all voice
systems. PFN units can and will be duplicated and placed wherever
appropriate throughout the aircraft. They will be secluded as well
as protected and interface as necessary with the aircraft's
electrical bus in any fashion determined suitable to command,
control all essential flight systems and security functions on
board; and to back up any of those component or systems to meet
standards or as determined appropriate by component and system
engineers. Additionally, connected to the 1A PFN/TRAC unit or
harmonized network of PFNs is any and all of the various antennas
on board any aircraft. PFNs scan a necessary amount of system to
receive and count frequencies to determine any and all transmission
on board an aircraft. Additionally, they control all wireless
communications to include hand held carryon devices such as
cellular phones, personal navigational devices, other personal
PFNs, mobile office units, personal computers, PDAs or palm pilots.
The immediate purpose for this is to be able to terminate the use
of these devices during critical flight operations at the will of
authorized flight deck personnel via the PFNs, and especially,
during a FACT event robotically. Additionally, the authorized pilot
and trained crewmembers to include sky marshals can utilize these
systems as emergency wireless links to the surface during where
they respond to wireless IP gateways and data storage receptacles
in an emergency.
The dominant 1A aircraft PFN operating at a any given point will be
deferred to as the master controller in a control matrix that
coordinates all other PFNs on board the aircraft either physically
or permanently integrated and/or any carried on PFN versions for a
specific purpose and flight. This process will start during pilot
ACARS before take off and be part of a running integrity program in
all PFNs. All other PFNs and aircraft systems will be systems under
control by the master 1A PFN controller. It becomes the
communication router and activity controller and can use any all
communication links to down load data to the surface, including
special direct and indirect communication pathways that report to
appropriate NENA numbers per geographic location for any specific
first responders and the FAA/AOC/TSA/DOD/NORAD and any appropriate
ATM commercial wireless gateway provider.
With the detection of compromised flight controls (a FACT event
e.g. unauthorized aircraft activity) the 1A PFN sends an immediate
Emergency Action Message EAM to AOC Air Command center in Herdon
Va., NORAD/all North America military AIRCINC air defense centers
and safe bases that the aircraft is departing from it's present
course and has a new heading to the closest or most appropriate
safe base via a preprogrammed FACT flight. At this point the
pursuit and assist aircraft and personnel are scrambled and the
appropriate level of Homeland security is increased to the
appropriate level (Color code and how it applies to everyone for
this event to be determined). Specifically, not just to all safe
bases but throughout the FACT connected system servicing all of the
nations transportation means and their security agencies.
Operational and specific information will be processed through the
system to provide the most relevant data for particular an
emergency and heightened security level. General alerts from the
FACT/TSA homeland command center regarding transportation security
and safety will be issued in real-time or near real-time to allow
for the appropriate formatting for optimum public safety responses.
Other informative transportation management data will be passed to
public media and websites via the inventions proprietary and
protected technology, detailed in earlier related filings.
Specific
The FACT/TSA network needs to be put into parallel with the AOC
centers nationwide as shown if FIG. 10 and NORAD and North American
air command CINC and configured in progressive steps to achieve
FACT control of all commercial and private aircraft. Additionally
these FACT robotics flights have to be developed with military
planners, aircraft manufacturers and security contractors to
include isolated DES chipset in the 1A PFN controller to assure
complete military supremacy of the FACT flight. The military are
charged with homeland defense and they alone must have the sole
capacity control and terminate a FACT event. All other agencies and
authorities stand second to military control and the President's
Executive Orders. Other essential agencies like CIA, FBI, NSA, NSC
pentagon, CDC, TSA, FAA, and NTSB will be incorporated into the
Homeland Security Matrix and connected via wireless and IP
connections as indicated in this figure. Special government and
security contractors have to develop for the procedures and
protocols and code written for these specific agencies to have
accountable access to this PFN/TRAC/FACT system and control matrix.
All access must require agency specific and individual encoding
with identification verification at each and every PFN or access
terminal either wireless or hardwired to be recognized and gain
access. All access will be audio, video and data monitored and
recorded locally as well as, time and GPS or location stamped then
sent and stored in regional and national FACT Security mass data
repositories. (The special encrypted encoding to be developed and
written with specific agency authorization must comply with any
control procedures and specific protocols determined by DARPA and
DOD software research and development operations like in Omaha
and/or the appropriate military and security contractors)(TS to be
considered in this process are proprietary to the PFN/TRAC System
invention and specifically the FACT Security program to manage the
nations airways and transportation assets safety and security).
Things to Do
Flight and landing program libraries for the Safe Bases SBs for the
different airliners need to be written--Virtual RC pilots need to
be trained for ground and the air pursuit aircraft. Five ground RC
simulator stations with RC communication links need to be
constructed at the five Safe Bases across the nation. The Five safe
bases, the air routes/airspace have to be determined, facilities
and aircraft have to be determined, arranged, secured, out
fitted/supplied, and manned with trained personnel for the first to
respond to a troubled fact flight.
Understanding the Extent and Impact of the Innovation
For they are to be complete air space security all commercial,
general and private aircraft have to have a 1A PFN/TRAC controller
in place with the aircraft responsive to the FACT Security program.
This requires; all aircraft manufacturers, airlines, government
agencies hardware software avionics companies to work in a
collaborative manner and a progressive one to standardize this
effort and to meet the specific needs to construct the 1A PFN/TRAC
architecture correct for everything that flies. As part of this
progressive process and until it is accomplished on each and every
aircraft, human security and support operational staff will have to
be trained specific and employed to fulfill any deficiencies to
enforce the FACT option to fly and land at the desired
NORAD/TSA/FACT conversion safe bases. The bases will precede all
the aircraft converted to 1A PFN controllers, including the hybrid
systems utilizing existing COTS avionics. Initially Air Marshals,
pilot and crew will be assisted by the educated
citizen/passengers.
However, not all security will be manual and technically deficient.
Part of the PFN/TRAC progressive architecture is to provide the
appropriate steps to grow from, no remote and automated controls or
passive remote control only to accountable aggressive robotics,
shared HMI control and full remote control. From the invention,
this is accomplished in a series of PFN/TRAC System products. These
products first interface via one-way wireless reception of standard
aircraft data transmissions to the surface. Additionally they
interface non-flight related security telemetry Audio/Video/GPS and
assorted sensor functions, remote control monitoring and testing
for future PFN remote control and robotics flight components and
systems. These initial product ASICS are similar to the final PFN
trusted remote activity controller/routers for each application
(e.g. 1A aircraft PFN). At least as they are projected in the
current patent writings and teachings.
Understanding the Progressive Embodiment of the Invention
The reader is ask to remember that all final designs are and must
be flexible in this process to complete the nature and scope of the
invention due to the enormity of this management and security
system, which includes all the nation's aircraft, vehicles,
machines and equipment not to mention all the personal and stand
alone PFN applications as well.
This same progressive development is used for all PFNs in every
application. The process starts by interfacing COTS electronics and
computer products to determine the basic components and programs
for any specific application. Then the TRAC ASIC controller is
assigned by computing requirements. This to may be of COTS origin
like PC 104 architecture Then further development and testing as
router via an interfaced plug and play hybrid chipset platform of
the desired transceivers, activity controls, sensors communication
protocols software and firmware to construct a final PFN/TRAC unit
as desired architecture is identified standardized and made more
universal these ideal components and software and systems will be
constructed and burned into a chip as SOC technology-miniaturized
integrated and protected in a can or appropriate encasement to meet
the PFN/TRAC System Standard as determined by industry and
government experts.
All the way through this process commercial product like the 1 a
TRACker (a brief case Laptop configuration) will be generated
tested, accepted and used as a trusted controller/router to perform
accountable remote control, robotics and communication routing via
protected and secure wireless and Internet protocols.
Getting FACT in the Air with TRACker for Seamless Security in Air
Travel
Isolated form the air operation avionics the 1a carry on brief case
TRACker unit can forego the long test period to be placed on an
aircraft and provide critical flight data early to all related
security personnel and systems. TRACker's noninvasive recovery of
critical flight operations data and security monitoring technology
processed with GPS location and time data helps immensely to plan
and coordinate a security response that is relevant to the threat.
1a TRACker organizes translate, records locally, reports and relays
data to the surface. This data is mined locally by the crew and air
marshal on board with out having to converse with the flight deck
or crew, Displayed on a personal DSRC PDA or special 1 P PFN
display unit)
Two Products for PFN/TRAC Unit Development in Aircraft
TRACker is to coordinate security efforts gate to gate in the skies
with surface security/TSA and NORAD early on to develop the FACT
monitoring system with present available security measures and grow
the PFN/TRAC architecture. Another such versatile PFN/TRAC
proprietary research and development product is the "FACT BALL"
which basically gathers data and provides post analytical
evaluating data in a protected storage vessel (an enhanced black
box that can be set up to monitor anything without a lot of hard
wiring--It also can perform as a driver interface platform to test
equipment, monitor, recorder driver other devices (data gathering
devices and actuators). However, this unique enclosure structure
can be used to house a complete 1 S PFN/TRAC unit (a Standalone
version of the 1P Personal PFN--these two types of PFNs are
distinguished by requiring self contained power sources to operate
them). Both the TRACker and the FACT Ball are precursors to the 1A
PFN and they are further detailed in FIGS. 10,11,12,13,14, and
15.
Further discussion of FIG. 7 teachings disclose the planned
development of the 1A PFN/TRAC router unit
The drawing above shows the aircraft with a more a detailed
description than FIG. 1 a line on the bottom of the aircraft
culminating in the exemplary 1A PFN lock box, but running to all
the flight control surfaces is the aircraft control and data bus
system. These are redundant and dispersed bus networks in many
cases and as a result would all require interfacing (SUC) to the
PFN control system on board. Additionally, another wider line
running through the center of the aircraft and culminating in the
1A PFN is an antenna to communicate with dedicated short range
communication systems or DSRC technologies like Blue tooth, RFID,
802.2 and many of the 5 GHZ wave links being approved for short
range broad band applications by the FCC (e.g. 5.7 GHZ short range
communication approved for DOT applications and interactive highway
applications) However, this antenna is conceptual and any and all
of the forty separate antenna on a normal passenger aircraft may
well be interfaced with the conceptual 1A PFN unit (singular as in
this figure for clarity--but also in number of 1A PFNs for any
specific aircraft to complete a PFN FACT matrix and perform any and
all of the communication control applications detailed in this
specification).
All wireless devices carried onboard the aircraft and integrated in
the aircraft are to be controllable via the 1A PFN on board
controller/router on board the aircraft. Close circuit video as
well as audio and all sorts of security sensor arrays are to be
processed via the 1A PFN and relayed to surface security and air
operations with time, GPS and Unit and aircraft identification. GPS
receivers are generally part of any PFN architecture and this
technology as well as other intelligent positioning technologies
will be interfaced and used to confirm aircraft positions and
flight path as one determining factor to detect unauthorized flight
and will result in a programming flag triggering a FACT event and
FACT robotics flight response in the 1A aircraft PFN.
The middle of the figure names the interfaced systems that will be
detailed more extensively through out this specification and
figures. However, from the middle of the drawing over to the right
is the FACT Safe Base Remote Control Station receiving telemetry
from the troubled FACT event aircraft, the five preprogrammed FACT
robotics flights and the escort assist aircraft, that are all
activated simultaneously in a FACT event. The exact activation and
scrambling of aircraft is to be determined for most proficient use
of equipment and personnel for each emergency and these procedures
are to be made into protocols taught and programmed into the system
where relevant. The ultimate objective is the highest public safety
and national security and the least collateral damage for any and
all decisions.
Commercial Operation Applicability Risk Management and Insurance
for FACT Events
These are tough decisions at best and if proper procedures are
followed responsibly; there should be no personal liabilities, even
if a better methodology is determined post any event) (any and all
persons genuinely performing in these FACT event procedures should
be interified and deserve all the respect the nation can give them.
Whether life or limb is at risk they will be emotionally affected
more than most in a lifetime by even single event. The system and
its manufactures likewise should be indemnified if their
development and construction has been properly performed. Insurance
and risk management plans should be developed and incorporated by
government and the private insurance companies. The PFN/TRAC/FACT
system of accountable reporting should provide all commercial
bidders fair but guarded access to essential data in their effort
to bid for these granted policies. However, they must have secret
clearance facilities, personnel and policies in place to protect
any sensitive information during their evaluations even if they are
not privy to the most sensitive FACT program information.
FIG. 7 The lower half of the figure is the matrix of security
computer systems and mass DATA handling and storage. That is made
up from the PFN/TRAC system of PFN controller/routers and existing
mass data systems. Together, this will make up FACT security
program and a real-time real-life matrix for homeland defense and
security. It will involve the TSA, NSA, secret service, CIA, CDC,
FBI, DOD, and local first responder, just to mention a few.
More of the PFN network and FACT security system is illustrated in
a transportation matrix overview in FIG. 22 for the entire DOT
network. It can and will involve all or only government agencies
and/or commercial industry via specific connections in real-time;
and/or the public with limited access and/or total access to
specific areas, and/or, no access to specific areas; to be
determined and processing determined for real-time and/or near
real-time reporting. But one endemic fact is that any and all
access is to be totally identifiable, traceable and accountable, to
include the nature of the access and use and content including
quantity of data affected. (All protocols even top secret must be
determined and deal with this absolute accountability process for
access and use of the PFN/TRAC System and FACT Security Program (no
exceptions and redundantly protected). This is what makes it a
TRUSTED architecture to gain the Public's Acceptance; and it is a
crucial embodiment of the invention's nature and scope.
In the bottom center of the figure surrounded by the PFN/TRA/FACT
IP matrix is the globe showing five safe bases across the
continental United States a CDC with a nurse and soldier in the
center. This represents the five specific air bases converted to
Safe bases, (these protected campuses should be 20-30,000 acres of
protected space at least with the highest state of the art
technical and personal security and defense possible. Additionally,
all types of emergency responders should be staffed and ready to
respond for any FACT flight event. Much thought as to the placement
and construction of these safe bases have been done and will be
held as trade secrets (TS) at this point for National security
reasons. It is important to keep in mind that enough of the FACT
flight program has been explained for those skilled in the arts
both in government and the private sector to construct a secret
program like FACT and also to claim this practice and any derived
procedures and protocols proprietary to the PFN/TRAC system and
this FACT security invention regarding air travel and transport for
public safety and national security.
Acronyms Repeated that Relate to FIG. 7 and FIG. 1 for
Convenience
The following are basic terms and definitions used for this
invention: The PFN is a Protected Primary Focal Node (an
accountable controller/routing wireless interfaced unit. The PFN
contains TRAC a Trusted Remote Activity Controller to perform
accountable & reliable robotics and remote control. FACT stands
for Federal Access and Control Technology. RC=Remote Control,
WoJack=Wo War ops and Jack is taken from hi jacking.
TRUSTED for this invention means; reliable, accountable, and
acceptable to all the public. (The citizens, government, and
commerce all the public).
Points of Implementation
Of particular value right now, TRAC technology can be embedded into
aircraft (at the design stage the 1A aircraft PFN architecture
should be developed immediately so it can perform accountable
functions for the purpose of gaining control and stopping the
unauthorized or unsafe use of our newest aircraft. 1A PFN
development for retrofitting should be initiated immediately as
well for present and legacy avionics and aircraft. The 1a TRACker
with the laptop or PDA processing in a brief case carryon unit
should be developed immediately and this inventor has discussed
this option with Boeing already. Ideally beta testing can be done
in one of their test aircraft or FAA's test aircraft.
The 1A PFN Aircraft Control Challenge
In a hijacking the lack of flying skill is not the only concern.
The aircraft might well be commandeered and deliberately used and
guided for it's destructive potential (e.g. a human guided missile
like the WTC and pentagon events). In this scenario it is necessary
to restrict the local flying controls immediately.
Major Types of Controls
In the above scenario, conversion of fly by wire controls to
exclude a local control on board the aircraft can be achieved far
faster than those aircraft still using physical links. Total
hydraulic systems and hydraulic assist systems can be converted to
exclude local controls easer than physical link systems, but still
more difficult than fly by wire systems. Physical lockouts on human
controls and remote control automations are workshop tasks for
those skilled in the art; and there is no minimization of the size
and enormity of this task being inferred. However,
engineers/technicians can construct a secure RC operated or
robotics aircraft from existing aircraft and aircraft avionics via
the specification and their knowledge base. Aircraft automation and
computer controls are quite advanced today. One big jump is
psychological to TRUST an automated system with the well-respected
job of pilot.
However, it might prove easier to protect, make operate
consistently and secure a small electrical control package in
comparison to all insuring performance variables with humans and
protecting the cockpit and flight controls. (Let it be well
understood--there is no suggestion of a pilot-less aircraft and the
inventor would not fly on one) This is an issue of pilot assist and
options.
The 1A PFN TRAC aircraft package will be backed by a massive
mindful machine-messaging matrix of coordinated human and
artificial intelligence to help the pilot deal with any of today's
emergencies. Pilots will be carrying guns to protect their position
behind the yoke. These highly skilled aircraft operators are not
stagecoach teamsters rocking across dusty trails at 15 to twenty
miles an hour tops for a few short minutes trying to lean back and
shoot at hostiles trying to hold up the coach. Pilots are flying
sophisticated machines traveling at 400 knots 30,000 feet above the
earth's surface.
These scenarios while quite possible today would still take eight
years to get them on board functional in a commercial air craft
with the current government and industry approval rate. However,
their development today is essential and necessary. The TRACker has
been created as a first step in this process as it does not
interfere with the flight controls or interface with the aircraft.
It is essential however to complete the remote control scenario for
the complete invention and protocols to be understood and the
objectives and goals to be appreciated
The initial goal after eliminating local control is to stabilize
the planes flight path. This second objective is accomplished via
local robotics for better real-time responsiveness in flying the
plane a distance to a predetermined Safe Base. The TRAC processor
will have five preprogrammed flight plans. TRAC is interfaced with
the essential E/E bus to operate the planes flight control
surfaces. Additional controls interfaced with PFN/TRAC are to be
the cabin air pressure controller. TRAC can restrict any air
exhausted from the cabin by either routing the air through carbon
dioxide scrubbers/converters. TRAC will also add fresh air (O2-?).
Removed cabin air will be compressed and canned. This un-recyclable
air or waste air is then presented to a sensor array to detect
biohazards and toxins. Once transducers have converted any
molecular substance into an electrical signature, the signal is
transmitted to TRAC. TRAC running recognition software will analyze
it locally. If not identified by the local software library it is
recorded and reported to the surface by any secure on board TRAC
interfaced communication if the deed frequencies are compromised.
The data is to be used locally for emergency in flight options and
on the surface for the Safe Base system to prescribe the
appropriate safe base response for the incoming troubled aircraft.
Informed decisions will be made to terminate flight, bag it when it
is down, sterilize it, or how to unseal it on the ground and deal
with it). Also, connected to the aircrafts ventilation system will
be a TRAC controlled valve with debilitating gas (sleep gas or
chloroform, etc.?) that can be activated from the ground or
robotically for what is termed a Woo Jack scenario or FACT
protocol.
During the final approach to the designated safe base landing zone
the robotics flight and glide path control gets a hand off to a
Remote Control RC pilot in a surfaced based converted flight
simulator receiving secure and redundant essential data streams via
a protected multiple digital control channels for the greatest
real-time responsiveness of aircraft. Additional control is added
by a software algorithm (fuzzy logic) for a heightened and more
accurate glide path; a TRAC guarding angle function. The result is
an intelligent airplane with an accountable autopilot and RC pilot
performing an uneventful landing with sleeping occupants. Worse
case scenarios being the bad guys have their own air supply.
However, their hostages will be dead weight and un-reactive to
their commands terror tactics, which in some circumstances could
lower collateral damage due to passenger's erratic movement when
the plane is boarded by swat teams. TRAC can always change the
atmosphere and revive the passengers if this proves more beneficial
to a security protocol.
Abhorrent RC and Robotics Options
The 1A PFN/TRAC unit will have the ability to dump any fuel from a
remote location or via preprogrammed robotics and/or accountable
remote control. There may be good reason to dump the fuel or
release a treating agent into the fuel supply that reduces the
flammable characteristics of the fuel supply. Obviously, the 1A PFN
could perform many undesirable functions including the ultimate
destruction of the aircraft via remote control if this was
determined the best public safety alternative. A proper decision
tree has to be determined for these difficult RC choices like the
Wo Jack scenarios before emergency FACT software protocols can be
programmed, code written and in stalled in a function 1A PFN
controller/router unit. PFN/TRAC was created to improve human life
and public safety in transportation.
Software Challenges
Obviously, the programming cannot and will not ever be the same
throughout the PFN/TRAC system handling this FACT Security program.
However the PFNs will operate on a PC platform as much as possible
with windows applications for most all human interfacing components
(Displays, etc.). Individual PFNs will be tested and certified when
placed into service, as accessories and new programs are added and
from time to time to insure they comply to a minimum processing
speed and have their safeguards in place to prevent over taxing the
unit's capacity to be responsive and reliable in running programs
and driving essential activity controls for safe robotics and
remote control. Integrity checks and continual anti virus programs
will be done and down loaded from the FACT Mass data centers
service and maintenance divisions as well. The unit will be
isolated for service from the system and the owner notified. With
each unit recording its activities locally these isolated units can
be accessed and contacted by isolated wireless remotely and
quarried in real-time by the FACT cyber police computer to
immediately detect tampering or hacking event and any virus
recognized and introduced to the unit. The physical unit will be
picked up and replaced along with the access ID perpetrator or at
least the ID imposter scheme will be discovered.
Governing Law on Tampering
As detailed in earlier related filings the protected PFN/TRAC unit
should have especially stringent laws and severe punishment applied
to anyone caught deliberately tampering with a PFN unit. This is an
accountable shared control technology with humans to perform
machine activities as a whole system and deliberate and malicious
destruction or damage to a PFN causes great risk to the public in
general. It is a great assist technology for humanity and humanity
deserves this kind of protection from anyone seeking to do this
kind of harm to the populous via tampering with PFNs.
Software Cont.
All other languages and protocols will have translation algorithms
developed and either have burnt in firmware in plug and play
chipsets to complete interfacing or have installable software and
drivers for the desired accessory or device connected to include
the various wireless protocols. Most all the major wireless
manufacturers offer the experimenter products to construct
programming for prototype projects and this will be the modality
used in many cases to coordinate a translation processing done by
the specific PFNs between the present wireless protocols and
machine messaging. Some has already been done and some is done in
PC format and wireless protocols, (automotive can bus systems
j1939.j1850 and the latest automotive bus--the 429-737 air bus
maintenance program for avionics, etc but
There will be the need for real collaboration to achieve the
universal translation throughout the PFN/TRAC system for the FACT
program to really function well.
FIG. 8 This map shows the eastern half of the United States ambient
population. It is easy to see how densely populated the country is
east of the Mississippi. The arrows show some possible FACT flight
lanes across the US where the least amount of the citizens would be
affected. There are no good choices for bad outcomes, but limiting
the extent of a bad outcome begins is all of our responsibility
starting with these visions and inventing and continuing with good
planning, construction, training, implementation, performance,
evaluating the results, refining the products and process and
reinventing if need be.
This is one inventor, who is proud to be a US citizen first and
foremost and realizes this invention requires all of us at our best
for each other to come into being. We can and we will achieve this
technology together. We will also use it wisely, fairly and justly
for all; in that great tradition of freedom and democracy that the
United States stands for.
Operational Flight Policy
The eastern area is still navigated by flying to hubs and as stated
earlier west of the Mississippi is flown by GPS. With the ATM
providers becoming more proficient in aircraft positioning and data
transfer via 2 GHZ broad band data pipes) tracking and telemetry
for a 1A PFN controller router will be more and more doable.
Flights will be easer to track and movement easier to manage with
less fuel needed via direct free flight flying, rather than hub
flying. This will help to quickly ascertain a corrupted flight and
control it to safe FACT flight lanes. The ones shown in this map
are only concepts. Population concentrations are only but one
consideration to planning safe base flight paths. There are
prevailing winds and real-time weather and environmental conditions
to consider for specific emergencies (e.g. airborne bio and
chemical toxins, etc) However west of the Mississippi has much more
space to accommodate the size of a SB landing facility a fact that
cannot be overlooked. Another point is when military installations
are considered, they off times boarder National forest already
government land and this should be considered in choosing a
desirable base for the availability of other government owned land
that can be combined to provide the appropriate space and area
needed.
There is more that could be detailed in this figure as to SB
location options, structure and certain design characteristics but
these details are being retained as (TS) for the appropriate
authorities and the appropriate time as they may prove useful to
the nation. This innovative FACT Security program for the PFN/TRAC
machine management technology in air travel and transportation
should be completely understandable to the skilled artisans who
will have to complete their respective secret and top secret tasks
and to substantiate this specification and teachings of the
innovation.
FIG. 9 FIG. 9 is a slide done for a promotional Power Point
presentation introducing the PFN/TRAC system with FACT Security to
the different government agencies after 911. It was made part of
this filing because the technology is all about public involvement
not just for security but for the management of machines, vehicles
and their movement, use and impact and how this all effects society
and the environment. The most important part of good management is
a safer more secure and better quality of life for all. That comes
from knowing how to properly operate technology and operate around
technology and the responsibility for vigilant citizenry to insure
we all respect the proper use of our technology. This slide points
to the citizen's responsibility to each other to protect our
freedoms by working together.
It also is a call to the individual to rally and put the pre
PFN/TRAC/FACT procedures and protocols to fill the gaps in
protected flights until the first generation of the 1A PFN FACT
unit is in place. Much of the early security will require vigilant
observation and a willingness to get involved and stop terrorist in
any manner necessary as systems are being developed. One such
citizen step might involve the aggressive physical thwarting of a
hijacking and assault on the cockpit. (And already has taken
place).
Information bulletins should instruct the passengers how to take an
aggressive option with fellow passengers and trained personnel on
board. They should be educated before flying and warned of the
risks of action and inaction in hijackings. Additionally, citizens
should be educated to observe radical groups and report any such
questionable behavior to the proper authorities. In flight they
should be ready to be enlisted by the any air marshal or trained
flight crewmember and work in conjunction with the data and service
the 1a TRACker unit can provide to gain control and maintain a
stable passenger cabin and secured cockpit to land the troubled
aircraft at an appropriate FACT (SB).
Update
It is just one year from 911 and much of the public and personal
security measures are being implemented, however the flying public
has not returned to the skies and those that have are traveling are
being plagued by very slow terminal process to clear airport
security and enter the aircraft. Sensing and explosives detection
technology is being developed slowly and government TSA personnel
are also being trained very slow. Only 1/3 of TSA is staffed as of
the writing of this formal filing and baggage handling and security
sensing is uncoordinated at best in the terminal and not capable of
tracking the luggage with the passenger to the aircraft and through
the next airport. All 429 airports are not working with the same
equipment, so they cannot interface data through any one system for
good operational flow and security.
Answer
The PFN TRAC System with FACT security can link these disparate
systems and personnel can be trained in a uniform manner for one
architecture that can universalize data management for disparate
technology to organize the movement of machines, materials and
people. This can be done for local terminals and for a national
security system. Additionally the public and be informed and
educated to how the system works and is working in real time as
well as what is expected from the every step through their travel
experience. Then they to can help the air travel system operate
smoothly and safely. This will relieve a lot of public frustration,
build their trust and improve the financial state of the commercial
air travel/air transport carriers and aircraft manufacturer.
FIG. 10 The No. 10 FIG. displays the first aircraft router/test
PFN/TRAC interface platform "The TRACker". The TRACKer Units are in
the form of a carry on mobile office or brief case and operate
completely independent of the aircraft to provide flight telemetry
and more. The Laptop also has GPS, audio and video devices and
wireless modems interfaced with the appropriate drivers and
programming protocols installed. The Laptop is running a routing
program to process data recovered from the various aircraft data
inputs/security telemetry, which intern is combined and processed
into data packets and protocol chosen to transmit this data by
wireless to the closest dedicated surface gateway serving the TSA
computer network. This is the 1a Tracker receiver router
proto-typer development/service package. It is to be a functional
unit as a prototype tester to perform basic security telemetry, and
a functional parallel security link with in a year in 2500-3000
commercial aircraft as shown in FIG. 10. This unit will determine
what flight data is critical from each aircraft and transmit it to
the surface security as well as, provide a direct link from the
surface security-to-security flight staff or air marshal. The
flight deck can also be provided this data or it can be with held
(procedure and protocols to be determined per optimum FACT event
policy).
The second in this series of TRACker units is the 1b TRACker. As
exact data streams are determined the interface, receiver chips and
protocol chips will be supported on a PC 104 plug and play
accessory interface board. Additionally PC 104 mini computer
architecture will be employed to maintain the PC processor platform
and windows programming for HMI applications. This software
programming is becoming more and more prevalent in operating COTS
sensors, actuators and devices with COTS customized PC programming
available for most every application. Additionally, manufacturers
are choosing this to convert their OEM programming for maintenance
analyzers and windows for human machine interfacing (to drive
displays). This is the ideal universal platform to convert to as
early in the data mining process and therefore chosen for the local
PFN processors. Finally, it is best suited for systems
compatibility to enter the matrix of computer networks and Internet
protocols worldwide. (As a general rule to improve reliability for
the PC platforms and MS window products--this architecture will be
tested for minimums of extra computing capacity to maintain
proficient speeds with the highest of frequencies. Isolated
programming for functions will be redundant, confirmable with
memory surplus and corruption and tamper detection programming to
insure reliability and accountability. Additionally, rough service
and EMF protection will be built in to maintain reliability and
accountability in each PFN and through out the PFN/TRAC system and
FACT security matrix. The 1b TRACker units will be based and
interfaced according to the ASIC design in FIG. 15. There will be
1C TRACkers as solid state proprietary constructions with IC and
surface mount architecture prior to this ASIC as a SOC
constructions and these developments will be used evolve the
PFN/TRAC technology in all facets of avionics progressively. This
step method of development is to accommodate forward and backward
engineered for interfacing and flexible for the diverse design in
the aircraft industry. During this process into smaller encasements
like a PDA these 1CTRACker units will be placed in structures like
the FACT ball discussed in the next few figures for test scenarios
of interfaced products. These smaller more personal applications or
hand carried devices will also be easier for the air marshals to
carry and conceal with them on the aircraft and have complete
wireless information form the aircraft and ground operation with no
passengers being wise to their activities. These units are 1P PFN
units and well documented in earlier related filings and
applications. In this application one is seen in a ground
application in FIG. 37 (lower right) being held by a TSA officer at
the airport checking baggage identity information and sensed data
recovered through the FACT Security program operating in the
PFN/TRAC sensing system in the terminal.
By definition "The 1a TRACker" for aviation is a commercial off the
shelf Laptop PC platform secured in a carrying case with several
wireless interfaces to route data through the laptop to surface
security. This FACT product is planned to be first in commercial
flight to accomplish three goals. To create an isolated
communications link to surface operations for mission critical data
and security specific data to create a seamless security link with
airport flow operations, surface law enforcement with gate to gate
security in the skies to continue to monitor people, equipment and
material, movement. The second objective is to introduce a
redundant communication technology that can accountably perform
control functions from a protected secure architecture to assist
authorized flight of an aircraft. Thirdly perform testing and
monitoring needed appropriately to introduce future designs of
accountable robotics and remote control technology in aviation.
Every product is a method to the next progression of machine assist
and automated flight and a way to test and gain acceptance for the
PFN/TRAC systems as a tried and true trusted technology. One to be
standardized in time and for a time and for specific aircraft and
applications in a progressive development process to enhance human
machine interfacing.
In this application a noninvasive relay function is performed by
having the same multiple band wireless receiving capacity as the
Aircraft and Aeronautical Operations Centers AOC on the surface via
an inter changeable hybrid substrate chip set for the specific
aircraft (respective of the various ATM global communication
systems commercially available today (BSS, ARINC, EURCOM etc). The
aircrafts signals are received and processed locally via the PFN
programmable processor, that is additionally interfaced with a
second wireless technology acceptable for cross environment use in
aviation. (Possibly commercial Cellular, and/or Satellite phone, or
other RF technology VHF, GPS, etc.). The signal is then re
transmitted to wireless gateways en route located on the surface
that connect with the FAA FACT security intranet and terminals via
wires data packets and IP protocols. These signals and data are
reconstituted to provide geographic position on calibrated maps of
the aircraft and the location of person or materials or substances
in the aircraft during flight as well as, serve as redundant
aeronautical operational data link to provide flight telemetry. One
immediate benefit of TRACker is that it provides a marriage of
security data and tactical mission data for the flight without
interfering with normal approved flight communications, data links
and operations for safer more secure focused flying. The system
design is to support audio and video with the appropriate,
bandwidth, physical properties, drivers and programming as well as
support various detection transducers and sensor arrays.
TRACker's Operational Characteristics for Considerations
Controlled by identifiable authorized Flight Crew members to
include TSA air marshals will operate from a protected but
accessible area by authorized personnel
Consists of approved wireless interfaces for use in air aviation
(COTS).
The Unit is not physically interfaced to aircraft's electrical
system.
Self Powered and Emergency backup power.
Event Data Recorder in an integrated via Memory Ball innovation
(enhanced black box technology).
Controlled by authorized airborne and surface security (Flight
crew).
It has a Plug in chip set interfacing technologies capacity (for
analog digital protocols via (Hybrid substrates and COTS
products).
Has an individual ESN and ID capacity that recognizes Aircraft call
sign and ESN and reports back both to FACT surface security.
Performs FACT auto integrity checks of interfaced electronics and
reports status to FACT registry to include new interfacing with
component ID.
All component changes sent back to TSA-FACT AOC FAA NTSB FBI via
Herndon Va. Mass data Center for handling and storage.
It compares Unit configuration to data stored in the unit inventory
memory.
Local or regional data handling, storage and buffers are possible
for local first responders in real-time use).
As illustrated in FIG. 10, the ATM/AOC operations across the nation
are matched up with TSA/NORAD and first responders. TSA and NORAD
can monitor what is going on in the aircraft via separate
communications to develop public safety and national security
scenarios for a troubled flight while AOC, pilots and air traffic
controllers focus on the flight of the aircraft.
This isolated data source can help authorities filter what the
public needs to hear about a troubled flight and what should remain
FACT event proprietary information at any given time, while flight
operations stays focused on the flight performance and all other
aircraft. The PFN/TRAC system from the earliest related filings has
supported a proprietary data reporting and information service to
public media and web pages for an integrated intelligent
transportation management system. This can be real-time or near
real-time data displayed to aid in public movement, safety and
national security. System costs will be defrayed by accompanying
advertisement for this service with a priority alert and processing
for viewing special alerts or Public-Emergency Action Messages
PEAM. Additionally, via commercially supported public media
messages, the wireless technologies like GTE Airfone providing an
encrypted download service can have their operational cost defrayed
thereby providing lower cost or even complementary cellular phone
use to passengers reducing the temptation or need to use personal
wireless products, which are prohibited in flight and disruptive
surface communication.
The hybrid chip set modality in the TRACker receiver portion is the
same as the aircrafts standard radio frequency avionics to the
surface. TRACker receives the transmissions locally processes data
and voice to the appropriate message format and re broadcasts them
for security purposes along with other isolated security data, to
include GPS sensing other sensor arrays e.g. explosion detection
sensors, audio and video, etc. The transmissions are clocked with
mission critical Aeronautical Operations and Air Traffic data
transmissions for as close as possible synchronization on the
ground for real-time decision making for a compromised flight. On
the surface trajectory and purpose can be quickly surmised to
reduce collateral damage on the surface and best support safety and
security activities a loft. The data received is filtered to the
public for Websites to include airlines, and general public sites.
First hand high-level data (could be delayed during an event for
security and discriminately provided airline executives,
manufacturers, and secondary component suppliers and government
agencies. These emergency applications can make security links to
surface NENA Numbers like the 911 system (but special numbers) via
the TRACker dial up program and GPS factoring for local first
responder notification tracking and telemetry.
The chip sets in the local TRACker unit may or may not have the
protocols and codecs to decipher and present the data in the local
unit (to be determined by application). This is possible but needs
to be determined by airline procedures and protocols and if it is a
tester unit or performing security functions. They may just merely
receive packet data and rebroadcast it via the wireless interfaced
to gateways and landlines, cable, microwave or satellite with
Internet protocols to any monitoring computer center. (Application
e.g. surface service stations) The how and when data is processed
and reconstituted is to be determined by the those responsible for
framing the issues and those responsible for signing security
procedures and protocols into law for a flexible color code to rate
the nations security state. The TRACker can be programmed to do
this if this is deemed desirable and it can be flexible in this
capacity by operating with in desired realms via security
clearance.
There are a number of different ATM data communication systems and
the security link has to be universal to provide consumers a free
choice of products and providers. On the ground wireless gateways
form all the diverse ATM communication systems and can transmit
their individual flight data to the appropriate AOC tracking
station as they cross the nation and nationally via IP protocols as
depicted in FIG. 10. In time and with testing ATM communication
links will be used to carry needed security data as well, but they
are not approved to do this function outside AOC flight operations,
(the air operation centers network). There are also proprietary
commercial hurdles including some airline policies involved. The
FACT/TSA/NORAD/FIRST RESPODERS and FACT AIRPORT SECURITY System
need to be an isolated security matrix unto itself and away from
Flight operations in the cockpit and from Air Traffic Management
and operational centers on the surface. They all need to be close
and coordinated, but both jobs require specific and dedicated
skills and focus in a FACT event (hijacking etc.) The separate
communication links can serve as another redundancy for both
operations as well. The 1a TRACker is a way for on board air
security to stay linked with the ground security matrix and not be
a bother to standard air operations. Proper human interface
procedures first between security and flight staff and then
technical joining of these systems and personnel can come via
appropriate testing protocol development and programming.
Critical Questions that Justify PFN/TRAC Management System and FACT
Security
Air Travel proficiency--where is it after 911?
What is missing in commercial air travel today?
Answer
"Organized and efficient security" and "A plan to achieve it."
Critical Awareness
The question is not what security is needed--everyone knows or has
an idea--that is for sure.
The real question is: How do we use all these ideas proficiently
together?
Answer
The progressive PFN/TRAC System with FACT Security
The Qualities, Properties and Mode of Progression
It fills the voids and does not interrupt well designed in place
management in the process.
It's implementation parallels technical architecture in place.
It augments and enhances what is there and working.
In Air Travel and Transport
It will match each technical step in air traffic management with a
separate security component
It will monitor not hinder present operations first It then
processes data for analysis
It improves equipment integration
Equipment controls
Material recognition
Material movement
Human coordination Identification Activities
All the time TRACker helps maintain a productive efficient secure
air traffic management across the nation.
This same process is continuous for airport management and flow
where PFN/TRAC terrestrial products with FACT security programming
and functions are married to the same database and computer network
that the 1a TRACker is. Both air and terrestrial movement data is
coordinated to manage secure movement on and near the earth's
surface.
This filing will detail technical modalities, point out and
describe the options and discuss the impact issues. For this reason
there cannot be final design as exact function must be determined
by the public and formal review, however, the technology has to be
an agreed upon standard in aviation as part of the nature and scope
of the invention. The technology is forgiving in that it can be
reprogrammed rapidly. But solely by authorized personnel to change
procedures or preprogram protocols if the proper authority the
public determines this to be proper and necessary. This should
include the capacity to deactivate any component, unit or portion
of the system determined unacceptable. Continuously, explained is
the component and specific instruction for those skilled in the art
to understand and construct the PFN structures and PFN/TRAC
System.TM. to support the FACT Security. A separate program, but
parallel with FAA AOC Aeronautical Operations Centers and the
different Air Traffic Management ATM systems. Interfaced with the
rest of the surface transportation system in a Department Of
Transportation DOT Matrix is national and local law enforcement for
Homeland Security. This DOT Network is detailed in earlier related
filings and displays the interagency connections (IP) that are made
accountable, but does not compromise individual agency
sovereignty/security and in fact adds to their existing fire wall
protection secure interagency connectivity.
The PFN/TRAC System has always been a complete wireless
machine-messaging network for movement management and security
invented to set standards and be constructed by and with standards.
As the nation implements the technology, FACT is well detailed in
prior related patent applications and will be further described in
this application to meet the nation's needs to implement this
technology to improve equipment management and security. The result
will be one integrated system with plenty of parallel, and
redundant backups. Included are more secure communications with
real action plans that are both informative and robust with remote
control and robotics. They will give the new national threat color
code system real protective power. Via, proactive homeland security
operating in concert with the citizen and having all of the United
States technical power governmental, public and private organized
and ready for implementation for real-time security and
defense.
The TRACker Unit is in a personal PFN configuration. It's looks
like a brief case, or a mobile office. But operates completely
independent of the aircrafts avionics and is responsive to the
flight decks control (if desired). It provides aircraft flight
telemetry and more. It performs a noninvasive relay function,
having the same multiple band wireless receiver capacity as the
aircraft and Aeronautical Operation Centers on the surface.
Universal versatility is accomplished by constructing the unit to
accommodate plug and play interchangeable hybrid substrate receiver
chip sets for a specific aircraft's avionics to include their
various ATM global communication systems. Some systems commercially
offered today (BSS, ARINC, EURCOM etc.). Software in TRACker would
recognize the aircraft's identifiers when the unit was placed in
service and then locked with an authorized code. (ESN, Call signs
and any Specific electronic address, etc recognized). The unit
would self program, specific to the aircraft during pilot ACARS and
repeat integrity checks each time even shadowing aircraft data
streams in AOCs if desired. The signals are received, identified,
clocked and processed locally and encrypted via the processor and
programming in the TRACker unit. The unit is additionally
interfaced with a second wireless technology acceptable for use in
aviation. (possibly aviation's own commercial Cellular GTE's
Airfone technology, and/or the abandon cellular frequencies or
Satellite phone technologies like (Iridian), or other RF technology
approved for in flight use today). The signal is then retransmitted
to wireless gateways en route on the surface, either directly or by
satellite (oceanic applications) that connect with
FAA/Security/Eurocom ETC. (GPS determined) to be responsive in a
FACT surface security intranet. Information could be in wireless
data packets or streamed depending on the capacity of any approved
isolated transmission technology, modems and the surface equipment
receiving and processing it. The data signals are then
reconstituted in terminals (application specific with decryption
programming (to be determined) and provide geographic position on
calibrated maps and other vital aircraft telemetry useful for
public safety planning on the surface and for an incoming troubled
flight. Additionally, data on persons, materials, and substances in
the aircraft, sensed during the flight could be interfaced with
TRACker via acceptable Dedicated Short Range Com Links, or directly
connected to a TRACker unit.
E.g., a Boeing-777 is used as the airframe example to show some
specific avionics that would be interfaced and monitored by
reception only locally via the carryon brief case series of
units.
ADF--Automatic Direction Finder
AFDS--Autopilot Flight Director System
CPL--HF Digital Antenna Coupler
DME--Distance Measuring Equipment
GLU--Multi Mode Receiver--Global Landing System
HFS--HF Data Radio
LRA--Low Range Radio Altimeter
MAT--Maintenance Access Terminal
SAT--Satellite Communication System
SI--Standby Indicators
TCAS--Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TPR--Mode S Transponder
VHF--Very High Frequency Transceiver
VOR--VHF Ommi-directional Range/Marker Beacon Receiver
WXR--Weather Radar System WXR-700X--Weather Radar System
The PFN/TRAC technology begins with a benign approach to interface
with aircraft avionics and other critical operations in
transportation like the nations railroads. First generation PFNs in
these applications supply parallel redundant data to improve public
safety initially then progressively perform additional isolated
functions with new robust activity controls in the field until the
technology is well tested and TRUSTED under real-life
circumstances. Then it may be either interfaced with existing
systems or a hybrid design may evolve to accommodate the most
optimum configuration via the Trusted remote activity
Controller/router.
Aviation alone takes an average of eight years to test and
implement new technology into aircraft. The inventor hopes to
safely reduce this test period for new interfaces and to safely
find the way for more remote control and robotics flight.
Additionally, through these early carryon relay PFNs more public
safety and national security data can be harvested via approved
dedicated short range communications with the additional
interfacing of transceiver chip sets in the PFN for approved
wireless sensors and video systems on board aircraft. The Primary
Focal Node Trusted Remote Activity Controller/router is an ideal
architecture to progressively develop operator/pilot assist systems
both locally and systemically for legacy and current technology and
to forward engineer future artificial intelligence in avionics and
all other fields.
FIG. 11 Functional and Experimental the 1a TRACker Prototype
The 1a TRACker will use a quality COTS laptop computer product with
a custom multiple pin PCMCIA docking station (embedded modem that
supports an avionics receiver ASICS, compact antenna and wireless
protocol chipsets and modem connection to the laptop. These first
to market units are commercial off the shelf Laptop PCs in a
protected carrying case with several essential wireless
technologies interfaced for communications routing of aircraft data
to surface security and the reception of critical security data for
display to the air marshal while in flight. Also, the Laptop has
GPS, audio and video devices and other wireless modems interfaced
with the appropriate drivers and software, either through the
PCMCIA multi-pin docking station or any other data interface port
connection available as shown in the center section of FIG. 11. (to
capture data from inside the aircraft).
The Laptop is running a routing program that operates above and
simultaneous with the other interfaced COTS device programming.
These interfaced data streams are harvested and formatted for
display via a COTS windows application software via a developed
routing program. However to determine what needs to be routed and
when, flexible testing has to occur. This implementation is
accomplished by Macro preprogram instructions like "Hot Keys" to
initiate multiple simultaneous programming in the TRACker computer.
The data recovered from the various inputs, telemetry, and wireless
is combined and processed into timed data packets by a windows
program like WARPS (Windows Automated Radio Positioning System,
and/or other appropriate protocols (NEMA) to transmit this data
modulated and in data packets via wireless to the appropriate
surface gateway providers serving the TSA FACT computer
network.
Basic concept has the laptop running the routing program to
processes data recovered from these inputs in timed data packets
into the protocol chosen to transmit this data by wireless to the
surface gateway provider serving the TSA computer network. The
Laptop will probably utilize a 56 k modem interfaced with the GTE
Airfone or the higher commercial data interface provided by GTE
system architecture). Air line wireless transmissions carrying
desired flight operational data for security application will be
received locally by the appropriate receiver chips interfaced to
the laptop via the special PCMCIA plug in receptacle board to
receive these hybrid substrate receiver chipsets with their
protocol firmware to process and prepare the data for local
recovery for human review and to process it to the GTE airfone
protocol for rebroadcast to the surface. If the software does not
exist to display this data in a PC platform ideally windows
application a translation or conversion algorithm will have to be
written from the code keys to a windows program. How ever much of
this exists at the service level at leas for avionics analysis.
Viewing FIG. 11 vertically all the laptop's com ports in the middle
of the figure can be used for any wireless by additional modem and
receiver chipset connection and interfacing to include existing ATM
communication systems and therefore a universal PFN COTS interface
that falls with in the nature and scope of the invention. This
deign is for immediate application in the troubled aviation
industry and to determine the exact interfaces and data streams
desired for security purposes in the air. This is the purpose of
the 1a Tracker receiver router prototype development package. It is
planned to be a functional unit and be a benign prototype tester
for basic needed functions. Designed to be put into service with in
a year from the time the program is started with some specific
physical packaging and commercial use to frame the FACT reporting
system in parallel to AOC operations as shown in FIG. 10.
This unit is to determine what flight data is critical from each
type of aircraft to transmit to surface security. How it is to be
prepared and processed transmitted delivered and/or displayed. It
is invented to be inexpensive and a rapid experimental platform
with the ability to universally interface disparate communications
and avionics messaging into the most widely used human interface
software MS windows to review the data streams.
Other Interfaces Shown Right of Center in FIG. 11
The Laptop has GPS, audio and video devices and wireless modems
interfaced via the appropriate drivers, protocols and
programming.
Aircraft machine messaging interfaced via the PCMCIA modem router
plug in docking board will recover aircraft data from the This unit
is to determine what data is critical to transmit to the surface
security and how it is to be prepared and delivered. It is invented
to be inexpensive a rapid experimental platform with the ability to
universally interface disparate communications and machine
messaging data stream into the most widely used human interface
software MS windows. It is designed to achieve this locally on
board the aircraft via conversion software like 429 maintenance
codes to windows conversion algorithm for analytical and diagnostic
avionics system assessment and alerts on the 737, that can also be
sent via wireless telephony and Internet protocols to the surface
in real-time for handling and storage.
While initially offering safe product and a platform to evaluate
new products with in less time than eight years period. Ultimately,
1A units will evolve to be a reliable back up to any or all mission
critical functions.
1a Tracker should be configured to use any acceptable wireless
communication to the surface. The feasibility model uses the GTE's
AirFone system already approved for aviation applications. 1a
TRACker construction includes copper shielding the unit, secured
placement in an appropriate area of the plane, and approved signal
transmissions directed downward away from aircraft instrumentation.
Any approved wireless application, that can stream data may be
interfaced and used to make the wireless gateway connections to the
parallel FACT/TAS security network on the surface completing the
security links shown in FIG. 10.
FIG. 12 The left side of drawing 12 continues a brief case
configuration for the Carryon TRACker router unit. However, this
version does not use a Laptop or PDA mini or microcomputer, but
instead uses a PC 104 minicomputer architecture. There are many
processor variations and computing power to application would be a
major determining factor in the choice or processors used. The
circuit in FIG. 15 would be the basic architecture to be achieved
and rather than employing the 104 architecture the circuit could be
constructed. Never the less the 1b programmable version would have
language and software chosen that best suits the application from
the 1a TRACker experimentation phase beginning in FIG. 11. This
local Tracker routing unit can be constructed with software code
written to provide any type of interfacing via software processing
that translates between different avionics messaging, wireless
communications and standard computer languages like Java script.
Data transmitted by Internet protocol will also be encrypted as
determined appropriate using PGP to DES level security applied by
the local Tracker routing and directing messaging to the
appropriate secure terminals or DETs for decryption and application
level decoding. The units can be configured to interface with most
any electrical device to report or record any data generated or
even send command signals if desired to automated controls. (Not
avionics controls unless especially approved).
Because all units router, controllers or both are interfaced with
DSRC technologies like Blue tooth, all these components can
communicate as a mobile portable network. The carryon routers or
permanently placed units will route and relay data to the next
generation of 1PS PFNs the personal or stand alone units or the
DSRC 1c PDA/PFN product for short range HMI with some use as a
local remote controller. Basically, these units are reactive in
application specific networks via the short range communication
connection (e.g. air travel air transport industry), however
recognizable through the FACT Security matrix of PFN/TRAC routers
nationally or globally as determined appropriate via ESN they can
be authorized in real-time or deactivated and located. The hand
held PDA configurations will have various models and capacities.
Some will physically connect or rely on DSRC/ESN recognition to
interface with belts like the IP personal PFN utility belts for
airport and aircraft personnel shown in the later FIGS. 30-34 from
earlier related patent filings. These will be more for display and
keyboard message functions. The 1C PFN PDA that is an extension of
this air marshal TRACker function in FIG. 14 could range from short
range communications to interfacing with many wireless technologies
as a SOC architecture fully responsive in the PFN/TRAC system as a
1Ppersonal PFN.
More on the 1b TRACker in the Brief Case or Other Encasement
The brief case can support keyboard, audio voice recognition, video
dedicated short range and application specific wireless reception
translation and/or re-transmitting functions, sensor array
interfacing either by hard wire connectable or wireless. This
diagram is by no means to be considered limiting as to the nature
and scope of the invention and it's configuration. It is merely
designed as a carryon system to be in immediate support to OEM
flight systems and provide an isolated security link. The
technology is progressive as desired and tested. The encasement
might be changed for the type of environment and various
containments are discussed in this application and the other
related filings.
Still the Same Important Characteristics as the 1a TRACker
It is isolated from the aircraft's avionics completely and
basically serves as a reception and relay station in parallel to
the standard communications and data links provided by commercial
companies like ARINC and Boeing and Eurocom via their ATM
connections with AOC. TRACker is not interfaced with the aircraft
physically, nor are the 1P PFNs PDAs or belt systems. It still
performs as a benign receptive unit that receives translates and re
transmits to the surface by approved secondary communications like
the GTE Air phone (mentioned to prove feasibility of design not to
limit the nature and scope of the TRACker wireless router
innovation). Additionally, these TRACkers will have the capacity to
test out future avionics and flight actuators in a disconnected
state without compromising flight operations and lives (procedures
and protocols to be determined for these scenarios). Most likely
these testing TRACkers and (FACT Ball interface controllers used
for the same purpose would not be the same units performing crucial
air security links. But another TRACker that would interface with a
component to be tested and operate it in a disconnected state from
the aircraft and report back the performance in real-time to FAA
Atlantic City, N.J. research center, service centers and/or
manufacturers performing R&D on new the designs or analyzing
failed part applications. The company departments and agencies
would be connected as part of specific purpose computer network and
delivered data directed by the local TRACker router via
preprogrammed wireless to IP gateway commands to complete the
connections.
The TRACKer Unit (in this) is a personal PFN in a mobile office
configuration, that operates completely independent of the aircraft
to provide flight telemetry and more. It performs a non-invasive
relay function by having the same multiple band wireless receiving
capacity as the Aircraft and Aeronautical operations Centers on the
surface via an interchangeable hybrid substrate chip set for the
specific aircraft (respective of the various ATM global
communication systems commercially available today (BSS, ARINC,
EURCOM etc.). The aircrafts signals are received and processed
locally via a programmable processor, that is additionally
interfaced with a second wireless technology acceptable for cross
environment use in aviation (possibly commercial cellular and/or
satellite phone, or other RF technology). The signal is then
re-transmitted to wireless gateways en route located on the surface
that connect with the FAA FACT security intranet and terminals via
wires packet data and IP protocols. These signals and data are
reconstituted to provide geographic position on calibrated maps of
the aircraft and the location of person or materials or substances
in the aircraft during flight as well as serve as redundant
aeronautical operational data link to provide flight telemetry. One
immediate benefit of TRACker is that it provides a mirage of
security data and tactical mission data for the flight without
interfering with normal approved flight communication, data links
and operations for safer more secure focused flying.
FACT Memory Ball
On the right side of the drawing is another first generation
accountable memory product for aviation. The "Memory Ball" or "FACT
Memory ball" in this application is shown as the extended event
memory preserved in a special protected spherical receptacle for
aviation applications. The FACT Memory Ball's construction is as
important an innovation in this application as any electronic
component and is and extension of the protected vessel concept for
accountable data and communications for remote management. The
design is made to maintain survivable service and protect event
data for the FACT system to operate in the harshest of environments
and perform analytic functions to any equipment and human failures
and/or any criminal investigations.
FACT Ball Properties
The properties are hard and light, to obtain a low inertial energy
coefficient value when in motion (like being transported in an
aircraft at 500 knots). Both to limit damage to other objects
caused by an engineered release of the ball on impact and also to
limit internal damage to the FACT ball's components, like the event
memory and beacon transmitter stored in side. The ball must also be
capable of withstanding high heat and radiation or EMFs generated
in explosive terminations of flights. The outer shell must be
constructed of dent resistant material but resilient enough to
resist cracking due to impact with hard and sharp objects (possibly
titanium for the shell). This outer shell is to be covered or
coated in Teflon and the internal electrical components are to be
stored in a carved or molded cradle to form, fit, support and
cushion the electronic package inside. Suggested material to use
for this application is the thermal tile developed for the NASA'
space shuttles shaped to fit the concave contour of the FACT Memory
Ball's interior. Additionally, the internal insulation may
incorporate two hemispheres--pillow pockets of fire resistant jell
that the space tile ball is surrounded by between the FACT ball's
metal shell. These flexible insulating pillows also serve as shock
absorbers on high impact. If though testing the jell proves to be
too heavy CO.sub.2 gas pillow pocket packets will surround the fire
tile sphere between the outer shell.
Internally any number of 1PS PFN variations could be stored inside
this high impact transportation encasement. The EDR Electronic Data
Recorder or memory storage device, power source and mini beacon
location transmitter is the original design purpose for the FACT
memory ball as an enhancement to the Black box technology that
exists today in aviation. The antennae is impregnated in a
lamination form to be a sheet over one coat and under another of
the Teflon coating, which also seals the ball against moisture. The
Metal shell underneath the coating is the negative or chassis
ground for the antenna and the device. For the FACT Ball, the
Teflon serves five purposes.
First to help the ball slid out of harms way
Second to be the first heat resistant shield
Third to be a plastic base to impregnate the antenna into
Fourth to seal external seams, and access ports
Fifth to mix a day glow or a light energy absorbent and radiant
component so that the FACT Memory Ball can absorb ambient light
energy and release it at night to aid searches to recover the EDR
ball.
Other heat insulator materials and flame retardant materials are
also within the nature and scope of the invention and have been
detailed in earlier filings and considered inherent to this
application; such as SMOKE and Gypsom and even Dyper gel. However,
this application is concerned with electrical conductivity and
weight so these issues have to be addressed in any application
specific choice of materials as well as, floatation, water
proofing, special security seal and access, data is to be stored in
any standardized format desired for application and the FACT Ball
will store private and statistical data in the appropriate
protocols as detailed in other related filings. The Data will be
encrypted and/or compressed--transparent and in any format deemed
appropriate for the application and any technology of memory
storage all of which is considered with in the nature and scope of
the invention and determined specific to application.
E.g., of PFN/TRAC system design for technology sharing to
progressively construct invention.
This FACT Memory Ball innovation for the accountable PFN/TRAC
controller/router is also ideal protection for other rough service
applications involving the packaging of electronics outside the
aviation and air travel industry. In this respect, these other
applications, like for this technologies terrestrial transportation
product and PFN commercialization would enjoy this product
enhancement with no obligation to any corporate entity that owned
all or part of this intellectual property filing, because this
enhancement to the PFN encasement relies on earlier designs and
related patents to establish the concept and need for this level of
protection for the PFN type applications, Therefore this is an
example of industry specific technology development that will be
shared by the other corporate entities in their specialty areas
creating the PFN/TRAC system to support FACT Security for the
nation and the globe. For this reason, special joint venture
arrangements to sell across industries will be structured for the
companies owning and developing the PFN/TRAC System to work with
one another to complete the system. This is indigenous and
necessary to the PFN/TRAC system to insure the consistent
progressive development of the technology for FACT security and
considered an embodiment of the technology--the commercial La
Technique of the invention.
Separation in corporate service is intended and to be specific to
the industry to develop the PFN/TRAC system and FACT security in
harmony with industry and the different government agencies.
However commercialization, marketing and sales is to be universally
open to all corporations owning PFN/TRAC System technology. Special
protocols for sales coordination and integration of PFN/TRAC
technology development and manufacture will be put in place with
appropriate corporate structure.
It is important to remember that practical design and
implementation for the best human machine interface structure per
application will forever be changing and evolving with PFNs. But,
the invention--the PFN/TRAC portable network system with FACT
security program for aviation will be the same and that all these
enhancements and variations will be integrated and are with in the
nature and scope of this invention.
FIG. 13 The benefits to a more universal architecture for limited
use applications.
Other applications for TRACker use may be in private and general
aviation, where some aircraft and operations are technology starved
restricting their use, and safe performance form time to time. In
many cases, these are cost related issues involving expensive
avionics products in limited markets. With the PFN/TRAC System
architecture expanding over so many industries and being designed
and constructed to perform accountable remote control and robotics
for all types equipment to provide trusted and reliable service.
These more universal product designs will enjoy expanded markets
and reduce the cost with higher quality and more sophisticated
equipment. This positive PFN/TRAC technology development will
improve the nation's transportation management system with greater
security and better public safety. And also result in improving
areas of aviation where there is limited resource revenue to update
technology.
This is another reason to recognize the importance of the
commercial PFN/TRAC embodiment to provide economy of scale
technology for more universal use and standards to meet the
nation's need for a more coordinated management in networking a
future destine to be named "The Smart Machine Age". This design
method for progressive technology interface development is a sound
economic course as well. One that will benefit the people, keep the
industries strong, marry up well to government agencies, reduce the
learning curve for all machine use, continue competitive product
development and allow for rapid security access and control
augmentations nationwide though out all the industries.
It also makes it easier to write, codes, rules, and regulations, to
create standards procedures and protocols for handling personal and
statistical data recovery storage. With uniform technical
architecture to apply constitutional law for data recovered,
Investigations can proceed with protected data that is acquired,
stored and used justly prior to and via the discovery process and
any legal action with accountability for all access and action to
insure equal and fair and just access and use.
Application, Placement, Qualities and Properties of the Memory Ball
FIG. 13
The memory ball as stated in FIG. 12 is built light in weight, with
a resilient, Teflon-coated metal shell. It then can reside in a
breakaway Velcro sock or sack that sticks to sponge laminated
adhesive on one side of the sponge and glued Velcro hooks on the
other side of the sponge. This holds the fact ball in place in the
aircraft and is in the top right of FIG. 13. The carton to just
left at the top right can hold the FACT ball as well for
concealment as a normal package and be placed into a certain area
for surveillance interfacing to the FACT data recovery system and
additional sensing connected if desired. Of course it can be placed
into the TRACker applications as an extended memory component or
the memory component with special protection to provide
accountability among other functions. It can also be placed in with
any other PFN application and/or be used to provide protective
service for other vital components.
Additionally, teflon is prepared with a light absorbent day glow
radiant color and an embedded antenna to retrieve data by wireless
and send a beacon signal for recovery of the vessel. The Ball can
receive local data transmitted from the aircraft, through either
direct connection to a tracker unit (as shown in FIG. 13 via
watertight breakaway connectable--(final configurations to be
determined and tested). Or the FACT Ball can be stored isolated and
outfitted with a receiver/processor chipset (a SOC) and receive
data via DSRC. However, the FACT ball structure can be made in
various sizes to accommodate anything that is determined to require
this type of protection. It can also provide a safe environment for
a complete PFN/TRAC controller/router if desired. With that in mind
it can have long and short-range communications integrated into its
electronics structure allowing it to connect with equipment and
systems via hardwire and wireless. Adapters connectors and
conversion products will be made as inherent by products of the
invention and any such technology should be considered proprietary
and with in the nature and scope of the invention and related
filings. (this would include short adapters, cable connections and
wireless connections and interfaces to include existing COTS
combinations, when used for service with the invention or
innovation of the invention to serve the inventions full purpose
(to provide accountable interfacing, communications/messaging and
robotics and remote control) Application specific, and
preprogrammed the memory ball monitors and records relevant flagged
events in a permanent memory for safe storage. They can be
constructed flexible in application and size as displayed and
stated in FIG. 13. Additionally, data recovery--memory storage
technology with regards to the PFN/TRAC technology is well covered
throughout the related filings for every type of memory storage to
meet any of the many various applications that PFN/TRAC
controller/routers are applied to, including these FACT Memory Ball
configurations. They are inexpensive to add surveillance
applications and record investigative telemetry from new sensors
interfaced, video or audio as isolated security pods in the FACT
system, either for later data recovery or equipped to have
real-time responsiveness in the FACT security matrix. Additionally
they can be controlled by the Flight deck if desired.
For most applications by merely receiving data from aircraft
wireless transmissions they are non invasive to critical flight
operations. The ball's dedicated, short-range beacon and separate
power source, makes it responsive to specific search/quarry
signals, as well as the capacity to send timed signals (to conserve
power), an effective distance for a typical search process.
Proactive FACT Ball Functions
And with new photocell technology of reduced size and increased
power out put, the addition of photocells to regenerate beacon
power when exposed to solar energy is feasible and inherent
throughout all the PFN/TRAC technology applications as stated in
related filings. These solar cells would be impregnated into the
Teflon coat and may well be destroyed on impact or positioned away
from the sun. In this event the emergency self-contained power
source would be the default power source. Some positional weight
displacement technology that auto-motivates the sphere via an
attached micro-servo motor and existing current is an option to
improve effectiveness of this regenerative power source (TS). This
function will be employed to auto articulate the sphere for the
strongest solar source reception and likewise be used to position
the antenna for best signal reception via sensing current levels
generated and signal strengths in any micro processor or mini
computer inside any given FACT memory ball. Additionally, thermal
sensors/converters in the Teflon-also impregnated maybe used to
convert heat energy into electrical power and/or to sense harmful
heat sources and activate the auto movement function of the FACT
ball. This auto-motion function may be activated by the search team
remotely to visually gain a fix on the FACT Memory ball when they
are in the local vicinity. This facet of FACT balls may be used in
only some applications and/or replace the jell packs space. Some
other FACT Ball attributes are It; floats on liquids, fire proof,
non chaffing with other objects, low inertia value, high impact
resistance and impact deflective, visible at night and day, special
integral seal to maintain spherical geometric integrity, tamper
resistant and detective. Advantages and characteristics include;
non-invasive to other equipment systems, application specific of
very diverse and easy to install with limited skill into an
aircraft. The seal is made for the FACT ball by having two
hemispheres that are threaded. One is internal and one external
that marry with a special seal ring for tamper detection.
TRAC Aviation Inc is talking to major aircraft Manufacturers about
creating a line of Memory balls. TRAC Aviation will seek out
aircraft and avionics manufacturers.
FIG. 14 The 1b TRACker in FIG. 12 will evolve the exact data
streams for each airframe and appropriate TRACker unit. With the
exact data streams determined the interface, receiver and protocol
chips will be supported on a PC 104 plug and play accessory board.
Additionally PC 104 mini computer architecture will be employed and
the PC platform and windows programming continued. Software
programming is becoming more and more prevalent in operating COTS
sensors, actuators and devices with PC COTS customized programming
available and manufacturers choosing this to convert their OEM
programming to for maintenance analysis and human machine interface
applications. This is the Ideal universal platform to convert data
to at the local level to enter it into the wireless security matrix
with internet protocols worldwide. As a general rule to improve
reliability in this architecture minimums of extra computing
capacity will be determined and maintained per device with isolated
programs of redundancy and enough reserve memory available to
detect corruption and stalled locked up programs. Rough service and
EMF protection will be established to maintain reliability and
accountability per unit application and with in the PFN/TRAC system
and FACT security matrix 1b TRACker units will be based and
interfaced on the ASIC design in FIG. 15. However their will be 1C
TRACkers as solid state proprietary constructions and surface mount
versions as well as SOC constructions and these developments will
evolve into smaller encasements like PDAs and the Mini FACT ball
structures and even smaller inject able units.
FIG. 14 shows a PFN PDA of which a 1c would be a full miniaturized
1 P PFN/TRAC controller/router. This determination is made by
having more than one wireless technology interfaced. For example
long and short-range wireless. In FIG. 14 the pilot's PDA might
well be a complete 1P PFN device using many of the interfaces
detailed in FIG. 15. Regardless, the pilot or air marshal with
their 1 PFN PDAs would be able to communicate with all aspects of
FACT security at the airport in the aircraft and on the surface via
all the equipment PFNs communicating with this 1P PFN PDA. All law
enforcement would have this immediate connection capacity and
recognition to the FACT system. Whether they are a customs agent,
TSA, airline mechanic, a local policemen a register policemen from
another country their unit ESN and individual identification
confirmed would allow them to have contact with local FACT control
and to interface with surrounding equipment. The 1P PFNs would be
multi-access remote controllers as well of the surrounding
equipment. Obviously these accesses and controls have procedures
and protocols to be determined by the appropriate authorities.
Earlier versions and applications of 1 P PFNs and tracking units
are discussed in FIG. 21. Here the PDA applications may be displays
and HMI system interfacing functions and not complete PFNs like
this 1c unit the pilot is using. As it is not clear what exact
configuration will best serve individuals and their job
performance. For example a simple LCD display plugged into a belt
system like the four belts discussed later may be the best for
craftsmen like mechanics or to connect to a watchband view screen.
These application specific configurations will come in time.
If not, carry on TRACker units can provide plug, and play and
program architecture to include software embedded hard ware or
firmware that can be quickly configured when plugged in to receive
the specific aircrafts broad casts (and Identify this aircraft as
(HOME) by identifying RF coefficients such as proximity, strength
of signal, the specific aircrafts call sign or ESN or component S/N
signatures if existing, or any specific RF address of the aircraft
and retransmit the data in appropriate packets after being
processed by TRACker through a modem and data splitting program for
the Airfone protocol. The surface IP gateways to this FACT security
system will be running the application specific Airfone software to
reconstitute the data into IP packets if necessary and the specific
coedecs to reconstitute the data into a comprehendible format or
usable form for automated use at the desired destinations.
ATM can be Linked to FAA TAS Security
The Tracker allows for telemetry to the manufacturer and supply
liners to evaluate their product performance through the regular
phone system and internet. The public can be provided filtered data
as to time and place of aircraft and even educated and given
interesting web presentations of flights in progress (videos if
public data release can be done by agreement in real-time to
protect the invasion of privacy). The TRACker wireless interface
will be used first and for most for the FACT Security system
evaluation of passenger professionally and with in constitutional
guidelines. However, other TRACker units could be employed to
gather public data for commercial applications and public
enjoyment.
FIG. 15 The 1a TRACker units even though they are COTS lap tops and
Mini hand held computers their interface design and testing will
attempt to create this ASIC in FIG. 15 in function at least. 1b
TRACker will also try to achieve this integration using commercial
off the shelf PC 104 architecture and 1c TRACker will be the first
proprietary manufacture of the ASIC specific to airframes using
surface mount technology and protected in a can or appropriate
encasement. The second 1c TRACker generation of the refined and
miniaturized circuit will be a SOC or Systems on a Chip technology
of the 1c TRACker and with the capacity to interface direct with
avionics electrical bus systems on board and will be used in beta
testing to determine the 1A PFN/TRAC aircraft unit in FIG. 3 for
accountable remote and robotics control of an aircraft. These
miniaturized versions could be designed to physically be placed
into avionic bus cables and secluded. The intention is that this
progressive evolution for avionics will accomplish more synergy
with terrestrial equipment controls, wireless communications and
computer networks.
With telematics and automation in terrestrial platforms equaling
avionics sophistication, the same level of reliability and
accountability will be required for automated machine operations
and movement. This common ground will allow for a lot of parallel
developments that can be coordinated through the PFN/TRAC System,
also a praised and analyzed through the system to insure more
synergy between the technologies and related industries via quicker
commercial coordination for universal interfacing. Along with
security movement management and coordination will be the driving
forces. Position in space on or near the earth's surface--speed and
direction are all becoming more universally determined and
automatically navigated through the same intelligent positioning
technology GPS. This technology could also provide the universal
timing component to synchronize all the PFN and TRACker clocks to
provide the portable network the means to locally and remotely
determine collisions and coordinate counter measures
automatically.
Review of Chipset and/or Wireless/Protocol Interfacing
The boxes on the left side of the green block are used to give
examples of the communication and data interfaces essential to TRAC
processing and should be controlled via the PFNs in a FACT event.
Top Box CEPT-Cellular is the commercial cellular frequencies
approved for use in flight applications like the Airfone system
used in the United States. This system works off of LEO satellites
and does not interfere across the surface cellular system of towers
flooding ground systems from above. These systems will be used to
send parallel data streams to TSA and security links on the flight
operations, as well as any security telemetry recovered by the 4th
block DSRC dedicated short Range communications. Or the 5th box
blue tooth that is DSRC for wireless carryon devices. This chipset
with appropriate protocols will be interfaced via a hybrid
substrate as stated to the left of the basic inputs on the left of
the block. A PFN/TRAC unit will be capable of controlling and using
all standard carry on wireless devices and recognizing other non
interfaced transmissions via It's scan function and frequency
counting algorithm that constantly runs monitoring an appropriate
number of the 40 antennas that are on board a traditional
commercial aircraft. The second block on the left CNS/A & ATM
The Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Airborne system is
linked by wireless hybrid chipset displayed in other similar
figures to the above 1A PFN/TRAC circuit to recover any data
generated by this system. All systems that carry voice have voice
recognition software applied to transpose any verbal communication
into digital format for transmission by other wireless protocols
(e.g. airfone) interfaced and/or as text to be recognized at read
at the appropriate application level in any TSA monitoring
terminal, either local or from remote locations. The ATM portion of
this block would be also another Hybrid Chipset for the Air Traffic
Management provider like ARINC or Boeing with all the necessary
receiver, protocols, codec and translation programming to receive
this data locally in the 1A PFN/TRAC unit(s) and relay this data
via any number of acceptable or needed wireless technologies on
board the air craft. The TRAC controller/Router would determine the
best means to transmit the needed data and how under the
circumstances. ASCPC Air Supply and Cabin Pressure Controllers will
be a System Under Control or SUC to TRAC monitoring and FACT
programs. or at lease certain functions will be. The air supply to
the cockpit and passenger cabin is to be monitored for contaminants
e.g. Bio, chemical (EDS) and physical property sensor arrays
(Audio/Video/Thermal/radiation sensors) and various transducers,
which send specific signals to the 1A PFN ASIC. They are operated
and processed by proper divers and programs in the 1A PFN and
translated by conversion algorithms to format the signal for
transmission to the surface and TSA terminal via the appropriate
onboard wireless. Some such sensing capability exist on
sophisticated aircraft already and these data streams would be
interfaced with the PFN/TRAC units on board to harvested their data
and enter it in to the TSA system via internet protocols. Or the
FACT (IP) security matrix combing national and global
transportation Intranets and security agencies for continual layers
of automated and human analysis.
The 4th and 5th blocks on the left--DSRC dedicated short-range
communications, RFID radio frequency ID program (EZ pass) and Blue
tooth a short range RF technology for wireless telephones to
interface with some automotive telematics. These are existing
technologies interfaced via the PFN platform in the ASIC and would
have the appropriate hybrid chip sets interfacing these
technologies to track, identify and sense materials, equipment and
people approaching and entering the aircraft and the aircrafts
compartments. Via, this connection the 1A PFN or series of 1A PFS
on board would work in harmony to identify the carryon device (ESN
recognition and look for alerts) as well as manage the use or
restrict any such use of cellular phones and other wireless carryon
equipment as determined best for flight safety. As part of this
invention's nature and scope these SUC technologies and systems
would write code into their protocols to immediately transfer all
PFN/FACT directives via access through any cellular service that
the phone provider is part of for emergency action messages to be
delivered into the surface IP/TSA gateways. This gives a continual
down feed of identifiable data packets and information of a
troubled flight to surface receivers or satellite connected to data
receivers/receptacles for further data resources in real-time and
for later analysis. Special arrangements with these providers to
support secure gateways into this IP security matrix of TSA and
other agencies will have to be arranged and constructed.
CNSA & GPS along with CRZ cruise tracking technologies are
other ASIC inputs interfaced with the necessary protocol chipsets
to the 1A PFN. Exact flight path data will be gathered from onboard
smart determination technologies and ground surveillance systems
and compared to preprogrammed flight plans. All in flight changes
will be verified by surface and aircraft data telemetry and
unauthorized flight will be flagged and immediately result in a
Safe Base flight plan via FACT event protocols. Constant
communications with the aircraft and the order for escort and
assist aircraft for the troubled FACT flight will be a part of this
immediate response and directed by DOD homeland air defense CINC
AIR COMMAND/NORAD.
CPDLC-AP The cockpit data link and auto pilot are the direct
sensory inputs and flight controls that will be SUC to the 1A PFN
or group of 1A PFNs or Trusted Remote Activity
controller/communication router (this is a TRAC ASIC above--the
terrestrial PFN/TRAC ASICs are in subsequent figures), along with
any sub specific application PFN ASICs which operate any necessary
dispersed actuators to control flight control surfaces over any
these systems if they can not be secured from human control while
the aircraft is in flight. The reader must remember that the system
under control and Avionics Bus interfaces are inherent for activity
controls (along with any hybrid chip sets to synthesize protocols
like (the 429 maintenance interface for 737 to go from the avionics
signal messaging to a PC platform and windows applications) and is
not shown here in this ASIC because of the space in this figure.
Other Figures and the other related patent applications describe
the separate actuators as well and the need for protected
operations. The skilled in the art have to construct them to
function appropriately and to meet any code and specifications
known or the appropriate industry and government experts
standardize that in acceptance of the PFN/TRAC system architecture.
Basically, the 1A PFN and PFN/TRAC network of units if so needed in
any particular airframe will operate to form a seamless
connectivity of flight controls form first existing systems like
the flight computer, collision avoidance systems forward seeking
radar, weather radar and any autopilot controls and use them to fly
the plane un interrupted and appropriately with these current
robotics. However, in the event that the plane is not responding as
it should the assist remote control pilot in an escort plane and/or
the ground RC pilot in the simulator station or the 1A PFN TRAC
Unit onboard will be deferred to control PFN robotics via the
network of specific ASIC actuator circuits, with either wireless
and encrypted or wired and encrypted commands from protected PFN
robotics or remote command.
Clock distribution. Is coordinated in each PFN by LEO satellites or
the GPS interfaced or other wireless communications with redundancy
locally (local clock as well that is system integrated as
determined adequate and backed up wireless synchronization) to keep
all moving and stationary elements synchronized in their movement
on and near the earth's surface. This will be tied into collision
avoidance programming and to be used by the FACT program TSA and
homeland defense DOD to control robotics flights and coordinate and
control movement in the air and on the ground. This clocking will
be the bases for programmers to write algorithms to account for
signal transmission times and conditions to obtain the optimum
performance for near real-time control of an aircraft with under
remote control command. It will also provides 1A PFN/TRAC unit
bench marks for preprogrammed and timed responses performed by
robotics in conjunction with ground controls It is a system wide
synchronized timing and is augmented by geographic position. This
process is part of the FACT construct program running in the 1A PFN
to determine if a flight is positioned on time in the exact place
and the correct altitude at a particular second in time. This is an
electronic equipment policeman for an aircraft in the sky with a
connected system partner on the ground all the way. The ATM and AOC
as well as the TSA are linked nation wide and would include the
areas of free flight west of the Mississippi.
Protocol Translation & CODEC
APU & APC APU Auxiliary Power Unit will be specially protected
for the first generation of PFNs and also additional APUs or
Emergency power packs will reside in special protected compartments
for the 1A PFN/TRAC unit and any FACT interface components to fly
the aircraft. The APC the auto Pilot computer is listed in this
block for the initial 1A PFNs to incorporate as much as possible
the auto flight systems with secured power supplies and increased
protection. Separate maintained power sources are inherent to
PFN/TRAC system trusted remote activity controllers and essential
activity components. These emergency power sources are of the
highest quality lithium and are maintained at full power by the
aircrafts generators and electrical bus. The system self monitors
batteries, their condition and reports their condition via regular
integrity checks conducted by the 1A PFN unit and regular system
checks and downloads this information to service and maintenance
centers. Specially qualified security service personnel perform all
service on PFNS. Additionally, all circuits are monitored for their
current levels. The light shaded diode symbol on the power ports is
to instruct designers that power surge and shorting protection are
required for circuit protection, to guard against, tampering and
efforts to disable or harm the unit.
APC is the Autopilot Computer and it must be protected with an
uninterrupted power supply to be part of any PFN/TRAC/FACT system
so it can carry out the preprogrammed FACT flights. Whatever
augmentation is needed to complete this protective task in the
prescribed manner with PFN/TRAC technology must be made and is
required to perform accountable robotics flight and remote control.
The APC will be used to handle the 5 safe base fights initially and
continually, but there will be self powered back up actuator
controllers or dispersed PFNs in a harmonious matrix to follow
through with ultimate control. Regardless of 1A PFN overrides, the
autopilot must be impregnable to unauthorized personnel during
flight. Personnel identification is accomplished via the
communication systems and data transfer systems interfaced with the
1A PFN controller and include smart cards, finger printing Iris
scanning, voice recognition thermal sensing and blood pressure
readers in hand sensors and finger thaws on the yoke and instrument
panel as well as full biometrics transmitted via DSRC from IP
personal PFNS and body sensing harness belts or clothing worn by
the pilot and flight crew. A Robotics flight guardian program will
maintain the approved flight plan during any real-time approval
process needed to clear any legitimate pilot access to the controls
of the aircraft. In absence of such an alternative the already
flagged FACT flight will be programmed to the appropriate SB safe
base via robotics and flight assist RC needed.
The other portions of this ASIC are self explanatory to those
skilled in the art of avionics, electrical engineering and computer
processing. However, there will be sections in this specification
and related filings that further define out functions performed by
this similar circuit design to further the readers concept of the
PFNTAC unit being a universal accountable interface platform for
wireless routing and equipment control. Obviously airframes, and
terrestrial vehicles have different electronics and disparate
properties that can hinder them being used in a coordinated
fashion. This is one main reason for the Primary Focal Node (PFN
controller router) being placed as a receiving PC processing
platform in vehicles and machines where they also have stable power
sources. They then can perform wireless translation, the relaying
and routing of various communications, as well as, store data
locally for accountability and commercial billing and deliver
accountable commands to the machines they are attached too. This
creates a matrix of machine messaging and management that is
coordinated and useable in real-time. Data is locally
harvested/stored and send on by the appropriate wireless and IP
applications with encryption to the appropriate systems terminals
and application programming for decryption and use.
General Function
It is important to remember that the security agencies, the FCC and
FAA and industry standards efforts will determine the essential
controls and communications. The remote control communications will
be ded or dedicated digital channels for individual activity
controls for flight surfaces on special military possibly DES
communications that can take place form aircraft to aircraft and
for close in landing applications at the Safe bases (SB). Otherwise
robotics flight will be employed to maintain the highest level of
real-time responsiveness for aircraft performance in relation to
the real-time flying environment. This is proprietary to the FACT
programming and sequence of activities in a FACT event. Unless a
local assist aircraft is accompanying a troubled flight, the
PFN/TRAC unit will fly with robotics when activated to one of the 5
preprogrammed FACT flight paths that are stored in the PFN software
library (or memory storage) to the pre arranged Safe Bases (SB)
determined by location (GPS and other smart location determining
technologies on board) and/or the nature of the emergency that has
flagged the flight--a FACT flight or Federal Access and Control
Intervention.
To insure absolute maximum redundancy in communication from the
plane to the surface, blue tooth, or 802 wireless or any applicable
DSRC will provide contact to any and all carryon devices to
interface all communication devices via the 1A PFNTRAC processor(s)
and the system. PFN/TRAC with the capacity to activate any such
devices can call NENA/FACT numbers in route for direct or download
to the FAA homeland security's hot operations center (egg. Heron
Va. With TSA/AOC) or flight Command Controller air operation
center(s) with (TSA, AOC AIR CINC) and download all data that is
recovered on board by the 1a PFN/TRAC unit. More than one 1A
PFN/TRAC unit can be interfaced in the aircraft and to it's various
electrical bus systems with each having a separate FACT ESN or
electronic address and communication protocol to coordinate any
flexible master slave relation ship to insure continual protected
secure control of the plane via the various non accessible and
secluded units. All automated flight control systems will have a
slave relation ship to the TRAC process on board the aircraft.
These systems will be subsystems or Systems Under Control or SUC.
to the PFN/TRAC units and any network. And provide the needed
immediate security links and management between movement on the
earth and Flow through the sky.
All wireless like STDMA, CDMA and TDMA digital cellular, analog
wireless telephony and radio and Blue tooth or 802.11, Dedicated
Short Range Communication DSRC wireless technologies via chip set
and antenna to identify all wireless carryon devices turn them off
and record their ESN and use will be a progressive development of
the wireless transceiver circuit. The scanner, translation between
protocols, signal repeating and interface and connection structure
is all part of this communication function on the left side of the
FIG. 15 ASIC. Part of Tracker's experimental development is to
manage personal wireless phones during flight as a beta test focal
routing center on board the aircraft. The first object is to
control unattended or poorly attended wireless devices during
mission critical flight situations like take off and landings from
the flight deck and as part of the air marshal and/or crew's
function to detect, be aware of and eliminate any unauthorized,
unwanted or any unsafe transmissions as physically feasible in
flight and in real-time.
The TRACker unit will explore first and foremost the development of
DSRC routing to specific cellular phone addresses via these DSRC
frequencies that might better be contained to limited areas and
other equipment effected (with low powered signals). This is to be
accomplished to allow commercial wireless handsets to be utilized
via the TRACker router interface via approved broadband wireless
connections to the surface and satellites during flight. Of course
with the cooperation and approval of the commercial and
governmental interests e.g. cellular phone manufacturers witting
their ID and tracking codes to be processed to Blue tooth DSRC or
other DSRC platforms and government agencies like FCC and FAA
approving the design and testing, as well as organizations like the
Commercial Pilots Association and EIA/Avionics organizations
specifically condoning and writing standards for the technology'
use, procedures and protocols.
Many different RF possibilities are named as they are approved in
aviation or they are in the process of approval. One such example
is Boeing's recently received license for 2.GHZ satellite
transmission. This technology, also could support a channel or side
band that could serve as a security data link format for gate to
gate air security for new aircraft and retrofit existing
technologies e.g. Rockwell Collins Avionics data links with any new
transceiver, protocol chipsets (antenna) appropriate or needed.
Also other ATM communication providers like ARINC and Eurocom could
have their communication protocols via hybrid chipsets plugged in
and programmed into any 1a,b or c series TRACker unit on board to
compete a master communication monitor function to progressively
determine the 1A PFN/TRAC aircraft controller/router architecture
to perform accountable, reliable remote control and robotics
flight.
Scanning and Routing Function
The Federal Access and Control Technology FACT is to have the
ability via PFN or TRACker routers to scan for all sorts of
electromagnetic frequencies and EM wave propagations/transmissions
or random oscillations in any specific application deemed
appropriate to control the air wave environment for public safety
and national security. The use of the NASSA deep space or radio
signal search for intelligent life algorithm customized to filter
out known transmissions and to look for only unauthorized or never
detected before RF occurrences. This programming could be applied
to the proprietary frequency scanning programs to be developed and
written for these PFN/TRAC unit applications.
Background Facts and Technology to Construct the Wireless
Interfacing:
Wireless Technology,
Eighteen major types of wireless technologies exist, containing a
large number of subset technologies that range from ATM-protocol
wireless based. This ATM is wireless traffic routing management not
Avionics These ATM. Links to this system cost approximately
$200,000 per data link. Additionally, local-area network WLAN sell
for $500,000 per data link). Frequencies of the different
technologies travel between several hundred feet (wireless LAN) and
25 miles (MMDS). PFNs and TRACker will be used to provide a less
expensive, more comprehensive, secure and stable mobile platform to
transfer data. The development of wireless interfacing via the
PFN/TRAC portable WLAN network carrying a multitude of protocol
interfacing programs will create a flexible universal communication
matrix or wireless by Internet protocol. The system will always be
diverse and need planning to insure enough of the properly
programmed PFNs or more universal PFN units are present for
adequate coverage of all types of wireless. This evolving process
will always be one of forward and backward engineering, however,
the flexible interfacing via plug, play and program architecture
(proprietary to the PFN/TRAC system) will aid immensely in this
process. (costly upkeep of the system will be reduced by more
involved in maintenance. As standards emerge and technologies merge
specific technology will be refined and miniaturized into SOC
configurations, but always with a flexible plug, play and program
interface capacity to grow and keep current the PFN/TRAC System and
FACT security network. The FACT network via it's industry specific
government registries must be programmed and capable to recognize
all new interfacing and system augmentation and provide a review
process and integrity check both at the local interface and with
system wide checks and alerts to any anomalies for FACT program
flagging (public safety and national security).
The wireless technologies progressively to develop TRACker units
and will be the designs tools to construct any specific 1A PFN/TRA
aircraft Controller Router.
Another early COTS product to track people and packages and
materials is the RFID technology developed by Texas Instruments. A
basic RFID system consists of three components:
An antenna or coil
A transceiver (with decoder)
A transponder (RF tag) electronically programmed with unique
information
The antenna emits radio signals to activate the tag and read and
write data to it. Antennas are the conduits between the tag and the
transceiver, which controls the system's data acquisition and
communication. Antennas are available in a variety of shapes and
sizes; they can be built into a doorframe to receive tag data from
persons or things passing through the door, or mounted on an
interstate tollbooth to monitor traffic passing by on a freeway.
The electromagnetic field produced by an antenna can be constantly
present when multiple tags are expected continually. If constant
interrogation is not required, the field can be activated by a
sensor device.
Often the antenna is packaged with the transceiver and decoder to
become a reader (a.k.a. interrogator), which can be configured
either as a handheld or a fixed-mount device. The reader emits
radio waves in ranges of anywhere from one inch to 100 feet or
more, depending upon its power output and the radio frequency used
(tested first for use with avionics on specific aircraft. When an
RFID tag passes through the electromagnetic zone, it detects the
reader's activation signal. The reader decodes the data encoded in
the tag's integrated circuit (silicon chip) and the data is passed
to the PFN or TRACker computer for processing.
RFID tags come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. Animal
tracking tags, inserted beneath the skin, can be as small as a
pencil lead in diameter and one-half inch in length. Tags can be
screw-shaped to identify trees or wooden items, or credit card
shaped for use in access applications. The anti-theft hard plastic
tags attached to merchandise in stores are RFID tags. In addition,
heavy-duty 5- by 4- by 2-inch rectangular transponders used to
track intermodal containers or heavy machinery, trucks, and
railroad cars for maintenance and tracking applications are RFID
tags.
RFID tags are categorized as either active or passive. Active RFID
tags are powered by an internal battery and are typically
read/write, i.e., tag data can be rewritten and/or modified. An
active tag's memory size varies according to application
requirements; some systems operate with up to 1 MB of memory. In a
typical read/write RFID work-in-process system, a tag might give a
machine a set of instructions, and the machine would then report
its performance to the tag. This encoded data would then become
part of the tagged part's history. The battery-supplied power of an
active tag generally gives it a longer read range. The trade off is
greater size, greater cost, and a limited operational life (which
may yield a maximum of 10 years, depending upon operating
temperatures and battery type).
Passive RFID tags operate without a separate external power source
and obtain operating power generated from the reader. Passive tags
are consequently much lighter than active tags, less expensive, and
offer a virtually unlimited operational lifetime. The trade off is
that they have shorter read ranges than active tags and require a
higher-powered reader. Read-only tags are typically passive and are
programmed with a unique set of data (usually 32 to 128 bits) that
cannot be modified. Read-only tags most often operate as a license
plate into a database, in the same way as linear barcodes reference
a database containing modifiable product-specific information.
RFID systems are also distinguished by their frequency ranges.
Low-frequency (30 KHz to 500 KHz) systems have short reading ranges
and lower system costs. They are most commonly used in security
access, asset tracking, and animal identification applications.
High-frequency (850 MHz to 950 MHz and 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz) systems,
offering long read ranges (greater than 90 feet) and high reading
speeds, are used for such applications as railroad car tracking and
automated toll collection. However, the higher performance of
high-frequency RFID systems incurs higher system costs.
The significant advantage of all types of RFID systems is the
noncontact, non-line-of-sight nature of the technology. Tags can be
read through a variety of substances such as snow, fog, ice, paint,
crusted grime, and other visually and environmentally challenging
conditions, where barcodes or other optically read technologies
would be useless. RFID tags can also be read in challenging
circumstances at remarkable speeds, in most cases responding in
less than 100 milliseconds. The read/write capability of an active
RFID system is also a significant advantage in interactive
applications such as work-in-process or maintenance tracking.
Though it is a costlier technology (compared with barcode), RFID
has become indispensable for a wide range of automated data
collection and identification applications that would not be
possible otherwise.
Developments in RFID technology continue to yield larger memory
capacities, wider reading ranges, and faster processing. It is
highly unlikely that the technology will ultimately replace
barcode--even with the inevitable reduction in raw materials
coupled with economies of scale, the integrated circuit in an RF
tag will never be as cost-effective as a barcode label. However,
RFID will continue to grow in its established niches where barcode
or other optical technologies are not effective. If some standards
commonality is achieved--whereby RFID equipment from different
manufacturers can be used interchangeably--the market will very
likely grow exponentially.
With the advent of more PFN/RFID interfacing either transmitter
antenna protocols directly supported in the PFN or COTS reader
interfaced with PFNs the history of sensing an item in transport
can be reported in real-time to the FACT system and re burnt in the
memory of and active Tag and stored locally in the PFN the tag is
passing. Real-time reporting and accountable history will be useful
for first responders stop a FACT event and to analytical
investigations prior to and god for bid after an event has occurred
(e.g. terrorist act) that threatens public safety or national
security.
This technology barcode scanners the proprietary PFN/TRAC bag sign
technology will help track and recover sensed data during transit.
And the 1Ps stand-alone PFNs will be able to drive active sensing
internal of a container or package to deliver FACT event data to
other PFNs or communicate to a tag to insure multiple data recovery
for a flagged event in transport. (e.g. Chemical or Bio toxins--to
EPA CDC Customs local hazmat, police TSA homeland security FBI to
be agency factored and nationally factored to increase or decrease
security color code a long with resulting in the appropriate
response by all contacted agencies).
Further communication systems interfaced first as COTS and then in
more integrated architecture
Another wireless data routing possibility for a separate data link
is Honeywell's Email to air craft MediaSolv, MediaSolv partner and
distributor Seattle Lab, and aircraft supplier Honeywell (NYSE:
HON) have teamed together to provide passengers access to their
messages, contacts, and calendars by plugging their laptops into
phone jacks at their seats or just by turning on their wireless
devices--including PDAs or WAP phones. Still to be approved but
this broad band Data pipe to aircraft might serve well to deliver
stream video and other data from the troubled aircraft down to the
surface. In any event this service should be interfaced with and
controlled by TRACker and any future 1A PFN aircraft
controller/router to evaluate and control messaging during a FACT
event.
911 proved one thing about cellular phones in air travel--it was a
feasible way to communicate when all other flight communication
systems were compromised by the hijackers via pilot
elimination.
The question facing cellular phone use is how should it be
controlled and used so as not to interfere with normal flight
operations. Additionally, there will not be a total band on
Cellular phone use world wide for long--so the question is how to
insure the safe controlled use of this technology in the airborne
environment.
As expected the PFN TRACker can be a solution for this problem.
Allowing machines to police them selves and thus reduce workload
and the possibility of interference with flight operations from
wireless devices. First generation TRACker units would have the
capacity to receive cellular transmissions (with a set of local
wireless protocol data links chipset). Identify their ESN address
and terminate their use locally if they were unauthorized, or
experiencing mal functions, or in an un obtainable area in flight,
or were detected to have interfered with any avionics systems via
the wireless FACT Memory Balls and resident integrity program
running in it's isolated format through out the airframe and
communicating via approved DSRC to the authorized TRACker unit
intercepting and controlling the wireless transmission.
One collateral value of the accountable receptive FACT Balls will
be to help isolate, detect and document interference from all types
of electrical oscillations. To put to rest what RF propagations
negatively affect flight avionics in what specific aircraft. The
FACT Ball receiver units configured to sense and receive
broad-spectrum EMWs noise and record and time it as an event with
GPS in space. The Fact Balls could be tuned and/or programmed to
receive only new or unusual events as well for recording and
reporting purposes. More accurate determinations can be made as to
the actual effect these signals on flight operations and systems to
help design future systems.
Another Data Link is the AirCell Phone Systems to FACT/TSA Ground
Security Matrix
"Data link" currently is the hot topic in aviation circles. Quite
simply, the problem often cited these days is the limited
availability of radio spectrum frequencies. Enter AirCell, with 50
megahertz of radio spectrum frequencies that were originally
allocated for terrestrial communications, and are now also approved
for AirCell equipped aircraft. With wide bandwidth and clear
line-of-sight signals, AirCell is the fastest, most valuable method
of delivering data to and from your aircraft. Imagine hooking up to
the internet for the latest NexRad weather updates, or checking on
the latest airport conditions and flight advisory services. Imagine
updating your charts and maps in real time. With AirCell, you get
much more than a high quality telephone . . . you get a total
personal communications system for your aircraft."
The TRACker.TM. unit would employ this approved wireless
transceiver technology and any packet data protocol to IP
conversion codec both in the TRACker.TM. unit and in the receiving
ground station gateway or connected terminal to the FACT/TAS or ATM
security system via the appropriate dedicated gateway. (The reason
for the many names and technologies mentioned is to show the
flexibility of the system to interface with the various wireless
technologies and avionics. And still since the 911 incident there
is a lot of confusion on how to deal with security data needs and
how to deal with flight operational situations with out negatively
affecting each other).
As mentioned earlier another possible Cell link to try out the
TRACker.TM.: Airfone Unlike other cell phones, the casings of
so-called air phones are sealed with copper to keep the frequencies
from interfering with cockpit controls. In addition, the
frequencies are directed to a receiver in the plane's belly and
then down to specific ground radio base stations in North America,
according to GTE Airfone, part of Verizon Communications.
Calls made 200 miles beyond the U.S. coastline run on a satellite
system, where calls are sent to a satellite earth station rather
than a radio base station", the company said. Also taken from the
Airfone commercial publications. They also can handle data--There
would be a protective copper sheath for the carryon Tracker unit to
fit its use. The system (cost could be defrayed by ticket tax
structured as is the 911 and NENA today. Additionally, data
presented on web sights with advertisers can lower GTE Airfone cost
for regular use--blue tooth local routing to identify customer ESNs
and route calls to the Airfone in the seat closest to the wireless
customer. With higher application for use in security and public
web sites and through airlines and aviation manufacturers the cost
will be reduced by economy of scale for these data link services as
new business in new markets".
This technology is a chosen portion of the modality to build a
prototype of the TRACker unit that will be tested in a Boeing Jet
with the FAA and George Washington University if all parties agree
on a joint effort. For this or any wireless telephony to be used to
complete the wireless connection to IP connection via gateway to a
TSA beta TRAC computer test center on the ground in Herdon, Va.; it
must employ the appropriate codecs and run an appropriate digital
data splitting program to create data packets from the airline
recovered data to the communication protocols to stream the data
through the interfaced wireless IP.
Data Capacity Concerns
First a simple system such as phase shift keying (PSK) for it's
very robust and easy to implement qualities will be used to test
the concept with limited flight data because this technology has
low data rates. In PSK modulation, the shape of the wave is
modified in neither amplitude nor frequency, but rather in phase.
The phase can be thought of as a shift in time. In binary phase
shift keying (BPSK), the phases for the sine wave start at either 0
or 1/4. In BPSK modulation, only 1 bit is transmitted per cycle
(called a symbol). In more complex modulation schemes, more than 1
bit is transmitted per symbol. The modulation scheme QPSK
(quadrature phase shift keying) is similar to the BPSK. However,
instead of only two separate phase states, QPSK uses four (0, 1/2
1/4, 1/4, and 3/2 1/4), carrying 2 bits per symbol. Like BPSK QPSK
is used because of its robustness. However, because it modulates
only 2 bits per symbol, it still is not very efficient for
high-speed communications. Hence, higher bit rates require the use
of significant bandwidth. Many modern fixed microwave communication
systems are based on quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM). These
systems have various levels of complexity. Although 64-QAM is very
popular in both cable and wireless broadband products, 256-QAM is
also being tested. The higher the density in QAM, the higher a
signal-to-noise (s/n) ratio must be maintained to meet the required
bit-error rates (BERs). These are the important physics of the
cellular products that have to be considered for interfacing with
the shorter-range product like blue tooth and 802.11. and the 5.7
GHZ Broadband frequencies for terrestrial interactive highway
systems.
Any routing program between different wireless technologies will
have to package data in factored packets so that when then reach
their IP address they can be appropriately integrated and
reconstituted no matter how they are routed. How the data is
encoded also plays an important part in the equation. The data is
usually scrambled, and a significant amount of forward error
correction (FEC) data is also transmitted. Therefore, the system
can recover those bits that are lost because of noise, multi-path,
and interference. A significant improvement in BER is achieved
using FEC for a given SNR at the receiver. These are with in the
present wireless protocols of today's cellular systems. Developer
kits for those skilled in the art will provide the needed data to
write programming code to construct proper routing between DSRC
Broad band and long range broad band wireless technologies
interfaced in the PFN via the plug in hybrid substrate chipsets and
any translation programs running in the Trusted remote activity
controller/router for Emergency Action Messaging that is translated
between disparate protocols. This is termed a (TEAM message and
proprietary function of the PFN/TRAC system for FACT Security and
first responders.
A wide enough broad band pipe will be needed for what ever data is
considered essential to security services during a flight. This may
not be an option for these first units with the frequencies
available. But these units will determine all the exact
specifications to get FAA and FCC approval for the appropriate
bandwidths or they will open the door for these security data
streams through existing data links to the surface in an isolate
and protected architecture (e.g. PFN or TRACker unit).
TEAM Messaging is for Disparate Wireless Translation
One Translation program that will be in all PFNs and TRACker units
is the Translation Emergency Action message or TEAM program for
interfacing all the local wireless technologies with disparate
protocols. This a universal emergency vocabulary of identifiable
terms and action codes (to include the national color codes applied
and including DES and military levels of threat corn if
appropriate). These are sent as distinct identifiable signals to
any PFN/TRAC unit that receives them. They are in turn rapidly
converted to the same content message in a different wireless
protocol and displayed or routed to the address requested or
processed as a command function and performed as a remote control
command. Also interfaced in the same PFN/TRAC controller/router is
the necessary ID technologies to authorize restricted data to the
correct individual to view and interact with the PFN unit and FACT
security system. Some will be public alert and warnings and others
could be a high security message for a specific person.
Developer kits exist with programmer key codes and hybrid chip sets
may also exist for messaging into alphanumeric messages in displays
via existing IP text protocols for most all the wireless
technologies. The TEAM Message library is what has to be developed.
These messages will not only be in text format but audible verbally
as well (COTS text to speech algorithms exist but special ones well
be used from the telecommunication industry and wireless payment
industry and different languages by verbal request, either
preprogrammed from past use, or FACT personal contact request
and/or downloads in real-time from FACT mass data center (e.g. INS)
if not enough local memory to hold all the entire language
conversion library (these translation programs should be developed
by the US government State Department, CIA and (echelon program).
The programs should also run voice recognition and identification
via digital oscilloscope algorithms to match prerecorded voices as
well as psychological profiling software programs as are used by
the FBI to detect stress and deception as well as panic and other
emotions of excited human states. PFN and TRACker units with
displays will also display a set of universal symbols pictures
(video) and color codes will be written from algorithms developed
for all types of emergency messages to cover for the level of alert
with the best description of any emergency and/or suggested
responses or specific directions for the individual or individuals
interacting with the specific PFN. E.g. for a mass TEAM message--It
would be possible to tie in the Doppler radar projections into the
PFN/TRAC GPS system and activate a tornado alert not only on every
PFN device but every known wireless device operating around the PFN
and provide alphanumeric audio alerts, give directions and a count
down to impact every ground zero position the storm was going to
have.) The PFN/TRAC system and FACT security program is big brother
and big mother and it has the accountability for all the activities
performed. But it requires responsible citizenship. We the people
can and must demand responsible and just use as authorized and
proper use of the technology monitoring and management
capacities.
There are many freedoms in our life and with each freedom comes
specific responsibilities. We the people want all the freedoms so
We the people have all the responsibilities for those freedoms
(individually and not just as rights). The PFN/TRAC system is a
wonderful tool and it can provide a wonderful quality of life for
all of us, but we all have the responsibility to make sure it does.
We and All have the Freedoms and Responsibilities. And the
Responsibility to maintain the freedom and freely pass it on as the
greatest gift to our fellow beings in what sometimes appears to be
the most costly process of becoming a good soul. This is the best
product We The People have to export and the one to provide us the
greatest security.
Our Responsibility is Our Insurance Policy
Our challenge is to empower more individuals with freedom and
responsibility and replace frustration, fear and the behavior of
fanatical following. To replace the narcotic of ritualistic thought
(blind following) with a genuine pursuit of happiness and a sense
of well being (critical awareness). That allows for the healthy
questions of existence to result in awareness and answers to share
life with others openly and freely.
We the people have to start this with a genuine effort to
understand the real fears and poor life conditions of the terrified
and address their real and just fears as well as take just blame if
we are responsible in some way. And help with a positive and
helping hand, not token, but real nation building with them and
with them as the architects and us the guidance and support. And
with noninterference and no usury or profiteering)(e.g. Afghanistan
can be a start) Iraq looks like the next effort to make change. Can
we do it and not for the 10% sweet oil in the world either.
Not to look accurately at the issues makes us blind followers, and
We the people are not fanatics in our pursuit of happiness. Our way
of life and use of oil is no narcotic, We need it correct, but I is
not an obsession, We are not dependent on it like a narcotic, we
could give it up tomorrow correct. This is the hard decision when
it comes down to perspective and way of life issues. The use of
resources and provisioning of what the earth has to offer us is the
real issue. These are the tough management decisions we are being
judged by those who have less. Of course we can justify our need
with our rationalization and when we have commandeered Iraq's
national prospect to generate wealth for it self and we have put
the other oil producing profiteers back in there place in the sand
box; we will make a free life with Iraq--I would like to think
so--How about you? Do you think We the People management will place
another Mosquito monarch in Iraq so we can suck the oil dry?
Separate Modality--History on regular cellular phones in air
travel; While presently commercial cellular phone use in the
aircraft is prohibited in this country, it may not be always and
especially in other parts of the world. For this reason they are
considered interface capable communication links for the TRACker
and the future aircraft interfaced 1A PFN/TRAC units These are the
questionable reasons for the band on cellular phone use while
flying.
FARS Quote: "while there is no definitive proof that cellular
phones pose safety risks on airplanes--the devices should stay
banned as a precautionary measure. The Federal Aviation
Administration's Thomas McSweeny testified that restricting the use
of these devices prevents an extremely remote chance of a disaster
from taking place.
The FCC's Engineering and Technology Chief, Dale Hatfield, WOIFO,
also testified. Hatfield says Commission rules also prohibit
cellular transmissions aboard in-flight aircraft. That, he says, is
because calls made from high altitudes keep phones on the ground
from being able to use the same cellular telephone base station
frequencies. Representative James McGovern urged the FAA to promote
technology, which detects emissions from inside an aircraft cabin
that could produce electromagnetic interference.
Only by Accident
FCC Law Do Not Apply to Sprint and ATT
"The ban does not extend to Sprint PCS and AT&T wireless phones
because of an FCC "oversight," according to a former FCC engineer.
Sprint PCS and AT&T wireless phones use a different frequency
than other cell phones. The oversight might imply that a user of
either phone could use them in flight, but most, if not all,
airlines adhere to FAA guidelines and prohibit all mobile phones
anyway. "No agency--not even the RTCA--has come up with definitive
evidence of portable electronic devices interfering with a plane's
instruments.
For this reason the memory ball the innovation was created to
capture and record EMW and time and record them with the rest of
the aircrafts avionics performance to better discern the cross
environmental impact of these devices.
Other Views Globally on Cellular Use During Air Travel
Scandinavian Airlines System will test a wireless local area
network called 802.11--or Wi-Fi--Additionally, this inventor wishes
to explore with Motorola or Boeing if they have purchased the old
iridian satellite phone technology of LEO satellites with the
acquisition of the Hughes Satellite corporation--now the Boeing
Satellite System BSS as another data link to be used for this
application to supply a parallel security link for the AOC and
Boeing ATM system A Possibly--the old lrridian Satellite phone
system Low Earth Orbit satellites? Or BSS new 2 GHZ license and
satellite system.
Obviously for their to be a seamless system on the ground and in
the air space the system has to provide the architecture to
interface all the competing technologies that are approved today
with the flexibility to change in the future and to handle all the
cross environmental controls need for carryon devices. With this
simple fact their needs to be real-time policing and accountability
for wireless use in aircraft in light of all the potential benefits
and dangers from misuse and deliberate inappropriate use of these
technologies. For that reason alone there is the need for an
electronics policemen over wireless use in air-travel and the
TRACker router and PFN/TRAC controller/router make perfect sense
for national security and public safety in air travel and
elsewhere.
In-Flight Network LLC is a joint venture entity formed by News
Corporation (NYSE:NWSROK), a world leader in aviation electronics.
Boeing and their avionics supply liners and others like ARINCs
Communication Systems and Rockwell Collins (NYSE) just to mention a
few, will all be approached to help develop and construct the
PFN/TRAC units and TRACker units in any commercial arrangement that
can work. The primary goal of TRAC Aviation Inc is to help the
United States of America and her airline industry regain the public
confidence and full use.
Additionally, cellular providers without question will want to
enter the aircraft to serve their customers and having a platform
that can handle and route these calls via one controller helps to
eliminate the noise and reduce complaints both from interference on
the surface and a loft and from lack of service or cost.
Another commercial off the shelf interface is a cellular router
that has been designed for boats to funnel and route normal cell
phones interfaced with tracker but miniaturized
The Technology is >Britany Ferries-new Inter-wave communications
system--BF "has contracted with Menlo Park, Calif.-based (Nasdaq:
IWAV) to install a digital wireless base station on board the ship.
The station will link into a VSAT (very small aperture terminal)
satellite-based system from Geolink.
Private-branch telephone exchanges that are fed by satellites have
been available on ships for several years, but Brittany Ferries
said this is the first time a GSM base station has been installed
on a cruise ship for passenger use.
Passengers use their regular mobile phones on and around the ship,
just as if they were using a land-based network. The difference is
that calls made outside the ship's cellular zone will be routed
through a satellite
install an Interwave "GSM Network in a Box" system
Interwave's base station, the Wavexpress, is contained in a PC
tower-sized unit that weighs about 50 pounds. The system uses four
hardware modules: the CPU card, radio card, switching trunk card
and the antennae connection card.
System Supports 16 Channels All of the modules use the same central
processor unit and switching trunk modules, as well as the same
core of library applications. Each Wavexpress can be configured to
support up to 16 mobile phone channels.
The satellite capabilities and the GSM compact network system will
enable the Val de Loire to provide its passengers with a service
similar to international roaming on their phones, said Claude
Barraud, president of Group Geolink, in a press release.
In September, Interwave joined BT A&M, an aeronautical and
maritime telecommunications software producer, in a successful
trial of a wireless communications system for P&O Cruises'
flagship Aurora.
Other Cellular Applications Encroaching in to Airspace
Wireless on aircraft: use of mobile phones is forbidden by airlines
because of concerns that it can interfere with an aircraft's radio
and navigation systems.
BAE, which was created in November 1999 by as a result of a merger
between British Aerospace and GEC Marconi Electronic Systems,
intends to provide safe airborne wireless connections by equipping
an aircraft with an antenna that is a scale model of the radio
antenna used in terrestrial base stations
Air-to-ground wireless service may not be limited much longer to
pilots or passengers in private aircraft. BAE Systems is now moving
toward deploying a technology that enables calls on commercial
flights.
BAE and Scandinavian airline SAS announced in August they were
developing an in-flight mobile phone service for aircraft named
Cabin Call, which uses Interwave's wireless networking technology.
The airline's systems are expected to be deployed in August.
These historical and present trends in wireless technologies are
another reason for the TRACker to manage airwave traffic in the
skies. They are also additional COTS interfacing that can enhance
routing functions via the accountable protected TRACker unit.
Industrial applicability to manage these technologies is
demonstrated and TRACker technology offers characteristics and
properties needed to standardize wireless routing, management for
all applications in use around the globe. A flexible standard for
different avionics and national laws via the PFN/TRAC System and
FACT Security Program is programmable and scalable.
FIG. 16 This figure was placed into the patent directly after 911
in keeping with the nature and scope of the invention to enlist and
initiate joint cooperation from government, industry and the
general public. Still today the Air travel/transport industry is
hurting immensely in light of the terrorist acts of 911. The
inventor and forming business associates of TRAC Aviation Inc. is
carry forth the current thrust for the PFN/TRAC System and FACT
Security program in aviation. This includes in roads with DOD and a
major military contractor to develop this technology and to help
insure safe secure movement in military transportation and
commercial shipping. Additionally, TRAC Aviation Inc. has met with
commercial aircraft manufacturers and government officials to move
forward with all the innovative products of the PFN/TRAC System for
safer more secure air travel. As FIG. 16, illustrates TRAC will
maintain a commitment to those commercial, government and public
interests to work hard and in a cooperative manner with all to safe
the nation's skies and build back public trust in aviation
transport. The intent of the invention is to provide the
organizational platform for all the stakeholders and for all
technologies to coordinate efforts for a free, safe and secure
United States and World air travel system.
A Thought from a Life with Man and Machine:
Awareness
Whether innovating total industries or innovating a single company
with automation and enhancing that automation with Artificial
intelligence (AI) and Information Technologies (IT) via computer
management; the difficulty has never been one of equipment or
technical barriers. It invariably is human machine and human
interfacing that makes or breaks an operating system. Success,
performance and final out come of any design is a direct result of
human acceptance and willingness to work with others the design and
any improvements needed.
Before designing any technology, one has the responsibility to
seriously walk in the shoes of all those affected by any
innovation. And always plan for progressive adjustments, that are
inclusive and proficient to be acceptable by all. With this said,
the best invention or innovations are only possibilities and
direction. It always takes the skills of leadership to empower all
the stakeholders to join in a collaborative effort to make vision
and innovation a reality and an improvement in life.
The PFN/TRAC invention and innovative FACT Security program
provides feasibility and direction for good management on the
earth. To complete this management system and make it functional,
it will require everyone in FIG. 16. And to develop it's use with
responsibility and respect, it will require everyone in the
world.
Whether it will be a completed technical plan to operate a more
secure and fulfilling life together depends on our own leadership
and courage and ability to change. In a life together we are both
leader and follower, which requires good timing and respect. Timing
can be organized with good technical planning. Respect is hard
learned and hard earned--this and change we are in charge of?
AWARENESS rcw
FIG. 17 The Trusted Remote Activity Controller provides all local
vehicle or device control and event storage relative to PFN
(Primary Focal Node) operation. It interfaces to an RF telemetry
link, which may consist of a one or two way paging system. More
sophisticated links could be used such as digital cellular or PCS
(Personal Communication System) or application specific wireless.
Typically, a Remote Management System (which may be as simple as a
single page, or as complex as a controlling PC or Server) initiates
a TRAC function, such as an automated guidance control, slow, stop
and secure sequence involving terrestrial vehicles, equipment and
aircraft. The signal or command is received securely (via
encryption) and decoded by the TRAC. Optionally, a local display or
audio speaker may provide local status of the TRAC function being
executed, with appropriate progress tones, voice queues or displays
to provide a local operator feedback relative to the progress of
the function. In performing the function, all Activity controls are
initiated by the TRAC and monitored by the TRAC from start to
finish. This is accomplished through feedback sensors. The TRAC may
interface with plug, play and program connectable technology and
drive other sensors, other wireless communications audio and video.
Sensors may be electrical, mechanical, fiber optic, infrared or
other technologies. Since the function being performed requires a
high level of accountability and trust that the sequence was in
fact executed properly, every step of the process is monitored
through appropriate feedback sensors and programming to attain the
reliability and trust required. This positive feedback in the TRAC
is the key feature which distinguishes the TRAC from other
electronic or software controllers; making it a fully "trusted"
system for the task being accomplished. Additionally, all events
and status relative to the function are recorded locally in the
Local Event Storage Memory. This is termed the System Function
Data. The level of redundancy in storage of System Function Data
and the level of additional feedback and checking required in order
to verify the Activity or function was accomplished properly, is
directly related to verification requirements. These requirements
may be regulated and approved by local or federal law, law
enforcement or insurance agencies, World Bank, EPA, ICC, SEC, FAA,
FCC FBI, DOD, DOT, TSA, DOE or other regulatory agencies.
This process in aircraft is greatly complicated with a more robust
three environment and diverse air fames. The avionics details for
the TRAC processing and progression of system under control SUC to
perform robotics flight and remote control flying and landing is
addressed through this application and two others avionics. FIG. 17
is to show the general architecture of TRAC/FACT reporting and
responsiveness. The drawing explains the properties of accountable
robotics, remote and shared machine controls via the TRAC
design.
From earlier related filings it serves several functions for those
skilled in the arts of electronics/wireless and computer
networking. The figure shows a scalable technology from local and
regional wireless remote control to national and global IP
management as a network of interfaced FACT Intranets. Beginning,
with sub set webs at each of the 429 airports that intern are
connected via telecommunications, cable, satellite, microwave and
fiber to FAA/AOC/TSA center (to be developed at air operations) in
Herdon Va. A base for the FACT/TSA Aviation intranet is created The
200 AOC/TSA terminals are also linked to TSA/Herdon Center as shown
in FIG. 10. And each terminal acts like a TRAC intranet in a
greater portable network that is flexibly connected to each passing
aircraft. Further, The TRAC is a mini hub for routing data and will
send data packets via diverse communications determined by local
routing algorithms (discussed through out the text). These software
routing programs are running in the local TRAC processor stored in
the protected PFN interface that receives stable power from every
piece of equipment interfaced with a PFN unit and each unit
maintains an emergency power supply for (completed operations).
These local PFN/TRAC processors and data storage receptacles are
the means for a trusted accounting processes and the acceptable use
of remote and shared equipment controls in society. Identifiable
data packets (wireless/IP/encrypted) generated by the routing
program in a TRAC unit are held in local in memory buffers and each
buffer of every server in a FACT network for a time (to be
determined by network engineers). Standard processing and packet
tracking for completed messages (IP) will be employed with the
exception of data storage of transparent messaging being securely
stored at all levels until authorized FACT termination of data
directives have been received to clear buffers. A secondary backup
processing program at the appropriate application level use of
recovered data will do a near real-time integrity check on data
received via other dispersed communications system connected. This
is to be engineered to be a very robust process for
confirmation.
All real-time remote control wireless communications are dedicated
and real-time sensitive by the synchronized clock time locally and
systemically. There is a number of developed algorithms and
software technologies being developed for this function and will be
needed in TRAC RC processing programming to determine exact
position in space and time with respect to other known objects and
their movement in specific air space. Real-time dedicated
communications with local robust robotics are to be priority and
default operational backup or failsafe aspects of TRAC technology.
To be used together with each other (exact relationship and
programming to be determined specific to application, by those
skilled in the art).
Processing Confirmation for Accountability
Interim progress of the sequence, activity or routing function may
be optionally transmitted back to the remote management system
through a 2-way phone, wireless, RF, or paging link. This may occur
as the function is executing or may be programmed to occur after
completion of the sequence, with accumulated data.
In the case of billing for service data routing will be stored
locally in some cases and downloaded to wireless billing mass data
centers in off hours depending on communications traffic. Or may be
transmitted in real-time command string or headers accompanying the
data packets, and directed for operational billing programs running
in the commercial service providers infrastructures. Additionally
these practices may change and will be determined by providers and
their business requirement and protocols and any standards efforts
rules regulations or law. In any event, local, redundant storage of
both types of events is always contained within the PFN for
subsequent or simultaneous retrieval of event information and proof
for accountability purposes. The PFN enclosure and TRAC monitoring
with tamper sensors guarantee the information has not been
compromised and can be TRUSTED. These physical protections and
electronic protections are detailed in related PFN/TRAC filings.
Other types of information to include System Function Data (SFD
file) may be stored in the TRAC Local Event Storage Memory for
analytical or investigation recoveries.
Other Data may include digital or analog data not directly related
to a function being monitored and executed by a host machine. But
information gathered via authorized sensing technologies or
accessories interfaced with the PFN/TRAC unit.
These may be fore the purposes of evaluating and determining of
legal liability or be a useful tool for the collection of evidence
or to recover impact data on the environment. The public and their
legislators will determine what, how and when data can be recovered
stored and used: The industry standards efforts and government
agencies will develop, standards, code rules and regulations, the
system analysts and integrators, the component engineers, the
programmers and code writers will final design the hardware
software and construct the architecture, the public will implement
it and the courts, justice department and law enforcement (specific
to application e.g. DOT/TSA) will professionally police operations
to insure the will of the people is maintained in the
implementation of the TRAC.
Examples of public monitoring include road conditions via
surveillance audio and/or video, bio and chemical toxins, explosive
detection and radiation etc and not just on the nations highways
but in every aspect of life that there is movement
(Transportation). All of which can be supported via interfaces with
The TRAC unit and PFN protective structure. The use and application
still has to be prescribed as stated in the above process. This
critical point is a most important embodiment of the technology,
This self-integrity capacity of the unit and system to detect
tampering and access and determine the impacts of that action can
serve to make the perpetrators accountable.
Additionally the invention and other technologies impacts on
society and societies infrastructures as well as the world's
environment and resources can equally be evaluated. Any injurious
practices can be stopped or augmented in programming downloads in
near real-time. To complete this task monitoring and management
operation must be broad and professionally accomplished with the
proper respect for privacy and personal injury. This cannot be over
stated if this technology is to find use in a free society like the
United states and should be applied and understood by all the
stakeholder areas of interests. This is why it is threaded into the
inventions specification fabric. Part of the technology of any
invention is the technique to operate it and what to expect from
that operation. Most invention specifications are far too
irresponsible in this regard.
Data Handling and Storage
Special standards efforts involving those skilled in the legal arts
and constitutional law to frame issues for public deliberation on
personal and statistical data acquisition, handling and storage is
an intricate portion of the invention's (La Technique). As
mentioned earlier, to be trusted and accepted by society The TRAC
has to be subject to review from it's inception and continually
while in use. So will any process used to handle and store data.
E.g. professional procedures need to be in place so that sensitive
data for legal use recovered and disclosed E.g. discovery processes
procedures that do not compromise and keeps pristine data until
court convenes.
Other issues the different handling for statistical data and
personal or private data handling.
Statistical data recovered without personal identifiers being used
by the public for better public management. E.g. a 1P PFNTRAC unit
a personally worn device doing biometrics reports on an
individual's heart rate at the top of a long subway stair well via
a DSRC as the individual passes a 1E PFN on an escalator out of
service. The research program being run on cardiovascular research
also asks for the persons age, sex, race, nationality any weight
data their sex and any known medical conditions or medications data
stored in the 1P PFN memory. However, no personal identifiers like
name social security numbers health care or insurance data or
address phone numbers or email can be accessed.
The data recovered is to be specific to statistical research to
better plan a safe and healthier environment and warn citizens at
risk of over taxing conditions from a movement task in their
environment (like the stairs vs. an escalator for the
cardiovascular compromised. The monitoring is done first to
research real-life situations that might be hazardous to ones
health and then warn them in discrete ways of the danger with
general public notices and/or through a earpiece attached to the 1P
PFN and delivered in an audio message to a particular person. A
similar statistical data recovery for automobile use and highway
system evaluation may be used with warnings of dangers in traffic
movement. Then a 1E PFN driven sensor might pick up unusually high
levels of gamma radiation and quarry all area PFNs and video
attached systems with and without other radiation and explosive
sensor arrays. Employing technologies like the Noise an order
detection technology that can detect odors at the molecular level
some 2000 times greater than a human's noise.
In this latter case the Local FACT event programming is initiated
and personal PFNs are quarried to see who is in the area and what
does the telemetry and video time synchronized images look like for
the flagged radiation event being tracked. Telemetry like, what is
the intensity of the radiation and what is the geographic position
with audio video a list of PFN/ESN and remote control assets and
human intervention assets like police special first responders all
on one screen with individual screens being specifically monitored
in TSA/FACT command center. Both of these scenarios are good
reasons for acquiring data for public safety and national security,
but how will it be used and how can we make sure the accountability
of the TRAC serves the public good to protect our freedoms and does
not invade them or harm us. This is the hard part to get right the
human machine and human interfaces of the technology.
Inventor's Suggestion
Obviously, Civil Liberties should weigh in early and as an on going
in process through the court system. But this alone does not keep
time with the real-time nature of the invention and other IT
technologies today
Other groups should be sought out and funded to put a permanent
public review process in place to feel the publics pulse and advise
lawmakers to change the use of the invention as conditions warrant.
Groups like The Charles F. Kettering Foundation or The National
Issues Forums Institute--NIFIG. Org with their deliberative process
on national issues. Another organization is Public Agenda, they to
quarry the public to help determine public policy. Additionally,
local efforts that seek to gain public opinion in shaping national
and community oriented public policy need to be funded and put in
place. Programs run by universities and community colleges like
Maryland's Montgomery College's "Center for Community Leadership
Development and Public Policy with their NIF deliberative Format
and other human resource services.
All portions of the public should weigh in together as much as
possible on policy implemented. The invention it self can function
to quarry the public on issues and even set up issue framing data
from logged comments and performs initial survey programs via unit
and system programming and people participating in the process.
E.g. One issue could be what are acceptable levels of police video
monitoring to provide national security?. The Reason for this
question--Possibly to determine the correct procedures and
protocols for PFN/TRAC/Fact programming to match the national color
codes and how to inform the public of these diminished rights of
privacy and how they should be applied.
Implementation
TRAC implementation may be accomplished in many ways, depending on
space or funding constraints and level of integration required for
the system to control and to route. A PC-based system may be in the
form of a desktop system, laptop, palmtop (PDA), personal
communication unit (PCU) or (PC 104) or embedded system with a
dedicated DOS or Windows based TRAC program, consisting of machine
language, Basic, C, C++, Visual Basic, Visual C or C++, or other
high level language which accomplishes the TRAC function through
software control. Interfaces to the System Under Control (SUC) may
be accomplished through appropriate I/O cards, either analog or
digital, plug and play chipsets with protocols in firmware or PC
compatible Modems or Cellular phone interfaces (or chipset) provide
the interface to the Remote Management System (RMS) and for routing
options. SUC and RMS interfaces may be in the form of ISA, PCI,
PCMCIA, VME, Compact PCI, Future Buss, or other commercial
interfaces compatible with the PC-based system used. More compact
and custom implementations of the TRAC may consist of dedicated
state machine controller implementations in which TRAC functions
are executed through embedded firmware These implementations may
incorporate multi-chip (or Hybrid) solutions using EPROM or EEPROM
interfaced to Arithmetic Logic Units (ALU), I/O ports and discrete
memory elements. They may also be microprocessor or microcomputer
based. A large variety of board level products are commercially
available for such an implementation. Single chip or high-density
implementations might consist of Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) or Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) based
devices and Systems On a Chip or SOC technology. Additionally,
wireless router functions and signal relaying (digipeating) might
be accomplished with the different wireless protocols in hybrid
chipsets and firmware on Plug and play (PC 104) interface board or
I/O cards and would be developed from developer kits provided from
the 18 most frequently used wireless telephony protocols. The same
process (developer kits) would be used by the skilled in the art to
develop a universal routing software program termed (TEAM
translation software) to provide flexible Translation of Emergency
Action Messages (or TEAM messages) for FACT Security communications
within the PFN/TRAC controller/router architecture.
Universal Communicator Program
This master routing/translation software package is to processes
same content message data between disparate wireless protocols via
a universal library of specific emergency messages and repeat them
through out the PFN system as routed. These same universal messages
are to be translated into all known human languages. This same
program is to have a voice recognition algorithm to identify
languages spoken and a universal audio and video set of pictures to
accompany these TEAM messages.
All TRAC implementations may incorporate all sequencer, firmware,
I/O and storage functions on a single device and would provide the
highest level of integration and smallest size. Display, Video and
Audio (Auxiliary Data) for the TRAC can be in many forms and types.
These may range from analog systems, in which tape or other
magnetic media store the analog signal, to digital systems in which
data is stored on hard disks, EEPROM or RAM. Data format may be
modulated through FM or AM, compressed, packetized or otherwise
encoded for reduced bandwidth or for transmission over the Internet
(packet audio and video).
The vast amount of possibilities and form for the TRAC are
deliberately designed into the PFN interface and will be a
continuing effort to be as inclusive as possible of all
technologies to provide versatility and universality for the public
and the free market system.
Hardware Implementation are to be Progressive and Flexible
Trusted Remote Activity Controller is First
COTS Based PC--Programmable Controller (PC 104)--Custom Logic
Sequencer mP (Micro processor) FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array)
Custom Gate Array (ASICs) Systems On a Chip (SOC)
TRAC Features
Industry Accepted and Trusted System, Uses "Industry Standard"
Interfaces, Provides Accountability Requirements, Aggressive Remote
Control Functions, It is Programmable & Modular, Scaleable,
provides Level of Redundancy, Event Storage, Algorithm Type is
Dependent on Application Accountability Requirements, Resides in
PFN (PFN Provides Physical Security) Remote Management Command
Authentication, Local System Control and Event Storage,
Software/Algorithms Bank/Stock Exchange Transaction Products &
Algorithms RPV (Remotely Piloted Vehicle) Technology, Security,
Commercial: 128/64 bit Encryption (Web Transactions), Military: DES
(Data Encryption Standard) and all the FACT Program functions
programmed in the different software protocols to operate on local
hardware and PFN/TRAC system architecture
Interfaces
Automotive industry standardization efforts, IEEE standardization
efforts, avionics standardizations efforts, rail standardization
efforts, marine standardization efforts, electronics
standardizations efforts, computer standardizations efforts, H-Rel
connectors, actuators, sensors, signal levels
Wireless Telephony and Data Interfaces
Digital Cellular, PCS, 56K Modem, RF & Pager Technology, all
the approved aviation wireless technologies, all marine,
interactive highways all DSRC, all emergency frequencies AIP,
Airline Control Protocol, Data link layer polled protocol that runs
in full-duplex mode over synchronous serial (V.24) lines and uses
the binary-coded decimal (BCD) character set., Airline Product Set
ALPS circuit, And a communication path across a TCP connection
between a host reservation system and an ASCU. When MATIP
encapsulation is used on an ALPS circuit, it is equivalent to a
MATIP session., ALPS Tunneling Protocol airline protocol, Generic
term that refers to the airline reservation system data and the
protocols, such as P1024B (ALC), P1024C (UTS), and MATIP, that
transport the data between the mainframe and the ASCUs., Airline
X.25.
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), [RFC-2131], a framework
for passing configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP
network
Time of Day Protocol [RFC-868], to obtain the time of day
Data or network
Edge or access router
DSP medium
RF medium (coax, modulator/demodulator, antenna)
RF management software
Wireless Standards Effort
PFN/TRAC units will provide a less expensive, more comprehensive,
secure and stable mobile platform for the development of wireless
routing and interfacing with equipment, via the portable WLAN
network created. The system is to start Internet data packet
routing at the earliest point data is generated and apply this
technology universally across the wireless spectrum. The system
will always remain diverse and need planning to insure enough of
the properly programmed PFNs or more universal PFN units are
present for adequate coverage of all types of wireless. The process
will always be an evolving one of forward and backward engineering.
However, the flexible interfacing via Plug, play and program
architecture at local routing interfaces (proprietary to the
PFN/TRAC system) will aid immensely in this process. With more
dispersed maintenance to include the individual public to lower
industry cost. The PFN/TRAC System was invented to be the machine
messaging system for the United States to automate all equipment
controls. As standards emerge and technologies merge the specific
technology will be refined and miniaturized into SOC
configurations.
There is always to be a flexible plug, play and program interface
capacity to grow and keep current with new technology and
accommodate legacy technologies in the PFN/TRAC System and FACT
security network. The FACT network via it's industry specific
registries must be programmed and agency staffed and capable to
recognize all new interfacing and system augmentation and provide a
review process and integrity check; both at the local interface
PFN/TRAC unit and system wide to check for alerts or anomalies.
Either because of FACT programming or to write code to flag events
as FACT alerts and upload any critical data to all effected
PFN./TRAC units for the most real-time preprogrammed
responsiveness.
At least 18 different types of wireless are in commercial use
today. Therefore, as PFN/TRAC technology becomes more mainstream,
many of the applications will migrate to specific architectures and
product interfaces The different types of wireless are quite unique
to each other on numerous levels, and require specific types of
expertise to deploy, use, and maintain them in deployment.
Like every access medium or technology, wireless has its pros and
cons. The pros include these:
It's much less expensive to deploy than hardwiring.
It's much quicker to deploy--.
Wireless can go in inaccessible terrain.
It involves an inherent high degree of security, and additional
security layers can be added.
Wireless provides broadband mobility,
PFN/TRAC wireless link will be a fully featured router, which means
that it must provide VPN, enterprise toll bypass, and MDU/MTU
access services where these are not present by commercial providers
interfaced in the local unit to include with cross protocol
routing. The fundamental elements remain relatively constant
between the wireless providers allowing PFN/TRAC router access to
translate between the protocols retrievable at Layer 2 of the
wireless protocol stack. The majority of wireless vendors access
the wireless stack at layer 2 some at Layer 3 as well like Cisco
Systems routing. Depending on application any specific PFN/TRAC
unit would have programming at least for one may be both accesses
layers to the stack. And somewhere in any specific intranet e.g.
FACT/TSA airport terminal a PFN/TRAC unit in the relay matrix would
have both access to digi-peat messaging.
A Data Handling Modality for Wireless PFN Machine Messaging
The protocol stack implemented could be based on the DOCSIS
standards developed by the Cable Labs consortium. The principal
function of the wireless portions of the TRAC unit is to transmit
Internet Protocol (IP) packets transparently between TRAC
controller/routers and the FACT security control matrix via direct
dial ups or through local intranets. Ideally, certain management
functions could also ride on IP to include spectrum management
functions (for identification, addressing, accounting) and software
downloading. Both ends of any wireless link are to be IP hosts on
the network matrix, and they fully support standard IP and Logical
Link Control (LLC) protocols, as defined by the EEE 802 LAN/MAN
Standards Committee standards wherever appropriate (for wireless
telephony). The commercial servers generally support the IP and
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) protocols over DIX and SNAP link
layer framing.
The primary function of the wireless system is to forward packets.
As such, data forwarding through the commercial servers is done
with transparent bridging or network layer forwarding such as
routing and IP switching. Data forwarding through the PFN/TRAC
system could be accomplished with link layer transparent bridging
based on IP. Forwarding could be similar to [ISO/IEC10038] as per
any applicable DOCSIS specifications. Both ends should then support
any spanning-tree protocols to include capability to filter 802.1 d
bridge PDUs (BPDUs) with out loops in specific intranets and
support for Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) multicasting.
FACT and special encryption applications would be above the network
layer, This transparent IP capability will be bearer for
higher-layer services. Additional translation programming between
protocols should run at these higher levels. Use of these services
will be transparent at the unit level unless the unit is running
these higher applications by authorization and identification (e.g.
DES or special TSA set as PFN/TRAC DET terminals), In addition to
the transport of user data, several network management and
operation capabilities are supported at both ends of any intended
messaging.
The Primary Focal Node access wireless architecture as a router
allows it to serve as a hub or mini relay station serving other
nodes (PFN/TRAC units in a WLAN or portable network. In the above
described application It is a point-to-multipoint architecture in
the sense that the entire bandwidth on the upstream and downstream
is shared among all the responsive PFN/TRAC units. The protocol
stack implemented to make all this work is based on the DOCSIS
standards developed by the Cable Labs consortium. This one proposed
modality of routing via the PFN/TRAC controller/router to construct
the flexible web.
PFN/TRAC Unit Characteristics in FACT TSA Air Travel Network
They have local event memory storage in protected containments;
report to mass data management and storage centers at the airport;
they can have wireless and wired connections; and multiple
communication technologies and protocols; and have automated radio
frequency scanning and translation between different wireless
protocols. In addition, PFN's have back up power supplies; they
provide the means to add electrical functions to legacy equipment;
interface separate equipment and existing security systems into one
management system; and respond locally and to repeat messages and
signals to and from each other as well as to the remote portions of
the system; they provide their physical location (GPS or recoded
fixed address) with the data they report; and can drive audio and
video equipment and other data recovery devices; they can operate
automated robust actuators and equipment controls; they perform
real-time remote control with accountability; they perform their
own integrity checks and of assets interfaced and inventory with
them; they can perform self maintenance checks and diagnostics; and
affect repairs automatically and remotely; they can detect
tampering; can operate encrypted programming PGP and DES; as well
as operate independently preprogrammed and robotics functions; they
can operate electronic payment industry programs and ID programs;
and drive Card swipes; Explosive Detection Equipment, and all sorts
of transducers, sensor arrays; PFN/TRAC router functions--Network
data flow to the remote management system and provide local robust
broad spectrum data and communications routing
Elements of a Total Management and Security Network Solution for
Transportation
Premises networks
(PFN Portable Network) e.g. Airports, Ports, Rail Terminals,
Installations, Borders
Access networks
E.g. Primary Intranet FACT/FAA/TSA Terminal Command Center and
National Air Travel
Core networks DOT/FACT/TSA National Mass Data handling and storage
matrix of intranets for air, land, sea, boarder customs, and
national security agencies homeland security
Network management PFN/TRAC System and FACT program
Billing/OSS PFN/TRAC system, electronic payment industry, etc
A fully comprehensive wireless solution must also include the
issues of deployment, maintenance, legacy, migration, and value
propositions. The scope of what comprises a fully comprehensive
solution is addressed in this filing and the related filings.
FIG. 18 In FIG. 18 the FACT Security Program is to have layers of
redundant reporting from multiple pathways that are time and
geographic synchronized as well as, identifiable in nature, origin
and communication path through out a homeland defense/security
matrix. The very top bock is only exemplary of the security
agencies network via IP at this level. The list is long to include
NSC,NSA, Secret Service, CIA and the special security responsible
components of the three branches of Government Executive,
Legislative and Judicial. (possibly a new judicial function into
the procedures and protocols for an interactive accountable use of
the FACT security program). At This highest-level procedures, will
need to be determined and agreed upon to maintain the balance of
powers and protect the public's interest.
Accountability
Personal and agency identifiers with traceable data telemetry for
system access, use and commands will be reported and recorded
through out the entire system to include this the highest national
security FACT Command level. The access to this data will be denied
and transparent--system wide when classified Secret, Top secret
and/or to include any of the appropriate terms used for classified
data. Application viewing and access to data can be controlled via
personal ID clearance and Data Encrypted PFN/TRAC interface
Terminal protocol (to be determined and approved by each security
agency for agency specific data as a data handling software
directive and added to the data packets).
Seam
This message program is to provide guarded mobile and flexible
access to the highest level of security from almost anywhere. This
program messages will be termed SEAM messages for Security
Emergency Action message. They of course will be transparent in the
system and use compatible wireless transfer and translations to
maintain accurate and complete content delivery when messages are
passed through different wireless protocols. No transcribing
through the universal TEAM language libraries, here. However, there
will always be real-time total access to the universal
communication program if security command agencies require this to
complete operations.
Generally, the plan is for a central homeland security command, but
this could be modular and/or transferable to different locations as
well as the master control staff changed E.g. Enchelon, NORAD
combined with TSA AOC and Emergency response Center or dispersed.
Procedures and protocols need to be determined and these protocols
need to remain top secret as well as be altered with all the
necessary encryption algorithms for coded commands from time to
time and done with integrity checks before activation of any
changes. (integrity check protocols will need to be determined as
well).
TRAC/FACT is all about accountability to be trusted and respected
by the public. National Security has to act responsible to that
ideology and way of life, both, professionally and respectfully as
a member of that public. With that said the individuals performing
these tasks deserve the highest respect and appreciation in their
efforts to protect the public/the nation.
Freedom of Information or FOIA is a special attention issue for the
release of any data that could be used to place judgment on the
individuals serving the nation and the public at all levels of the
FACT program. Improprieties (e.g. negligence, deliberate intrusion
of privacy with out cause or for personal reason will be
intolerable and criminal, but risk management studies must be
conducted to determine the liability/insurance issues and indemnity
policy for personal performance for these inherent tough decisions.
Additionally rational limits for damages have to be determined and
standardized for real-life accidents and unforeseen equipment
failures.
The second block termed "Customs" layer is an example of all the
individual government agencies law enforcement and security
departments interface Layer. The flow is interactive and
multidirectional throughout all the layers and all the directions
through all that is interface. However, there are responsibilities,
procedures and protocols to be determined for this interaction.
The four big blocks below the second layer are the basis of the TSA
matrix to monitor movement and mange that movement. These intranets
for the FACT Security matrix are only indicative of all the
intranets public and private that will someday be interfaced.
Transportation applications have been chosen because the management
of movement is basic to security to push back our borders and
internally continue to enforce our border policies. This is a
flexible and doable architecture for Homeland Security. The concept
being good efficient traffic management in all transportation
platforms and their choke points frees up movement (helps the
economy and provides the infrastructure to support seamless
security throughout the nation.
All agencies/department intranets responsive in the FACT security
matrix will support a FACT registry operation applicable to the to
their appropriate regulatory duties. The four intranets shown in
FIG. 18 are displayed here for illustration purpose not to be
considered a final inclusive design. DOT alone with FAA, NTSB AOC,
etc would be just some of the agencies for the AIR FACT intranet
displayed in FIG. 18. All these separate agencies or responding sub
set intranets would have message capacity to the other agencies in
the other blocks. Additionally, these areas are also chosen for
their basic commercial and industrial design to be the basis of
support for the hardware interface platforms (PFN/TRAC router unit)
at the component level.
The local first responder bar or bottom block is part of this local
WLAN or portable network that is receiving automated FACT event
alerts do to Preprogramming in the individual PFNs. They are also
receiving data from FACT TSA Security command. Specific scenarios
and responses have to be projected an determined in an on going
process to develop the most optimum and consistent results and use
of the PFN/TRAC system and FACT Security program.
FIG. 19 This figure shows the basic wireless communications being
considered for the first responders to have access via local 1E,
1SV, 1Ps and the TRACker units through responsive connections with
their 1p 1Ps personal communication interface belts or other
personal PFN configurations; supported by the PFNTRAC/router
architecture. The wireless interfaced will be available for FACT
Security functions. Incoming data to a FACT event area will be
supported by every working PFN/TRAC unit and have that data and
information delivered on interfaced displays, and audio systems for
the best possible human to machine interface and control.
Additionally to these wireless services would be various DSRC
communication and would include in some cases infrared and laser
communications for local LOS or line of sight machine access and
control functions. These applications are detailed in earlier
terrestrial PFN/TRAC applications for local law enforcement tools
as part of the Federal Access and Control Technology.
Example Application
1E PFN equipment controllers coupled with building security
systems, can make above wireless links responsive with public
address systems as well as mass phone and computer messaging system
to wam civilians of impending danger. All initiated from an early
warning triggered by a flagged flight trajectory processed in an
ATM/AOC system from a TRACker unit) Other security markers would be
used as well in a FACT program (pilot/passenger panic signal and
video surveillance surface monitored) to determine a flight threat
and coordinate surface response from FACT/TSA command system
processing of GPS/geographic preprogrammed high probability target
profiling that updates homeland security colors in all HMI Display
units and communication mediums for general response and specific
area responses. Then local tactical command gives minute by minute
optimal instructions to manage emergency evacuation procedures to
the weakest link--the properly trained citizen.(just
kidding)--humanity responds remarkably well under pressure--when
properly trained to use a technology--this training is
quintessential) A total response could include operating People
Transport devices (elevators and access ways) as well as fire
prevention, smoke and ventilation controls remotely and optimally
to save lives. Additionally, People would be specifically trained
to perform virtual fire fighting from special command support
centers locally (safe position) and from remote locations. Support
and assistance through building robotics and building occupants
that were educated in Civil Defense procedures and protocols could
help immeasurably.
Personal PFN units with their GPS coordinates calibrated on command
center map displays as mobile assets, coupled with public safety
radio and commercial TV coverage delivered directly to the first
responder and all area wide PFNs will also aid immensely to
coordinate the rescue effort. Hopefully, coordinated communications
in all remote command centers with all the individuals responding
locally can limit the loss of life experienced by NY firefighters
responding to the WTC-No.1 Tower.
With coordinated well informed communications and the lessons of
911 learned, we can help protect the brave men and women that
perform so special of a public safety service for our homeland
safety and security. (Action plans that corTelate with HS color
codes in response to data received and processed can alert everyone
to work together and well planned procedures and protocols with
every citizen working with the first responders and coordinated
equipment will give more of us and hopefully all of us the edge we
need in any FACT event.
FIG. 20 The drawing 20 illustrates a multiple receiving scan
process. As stated in earlier figures a multiple of wireless
protocols are interfaced to the TRAC processor in a number of ways
depending on the nature of the hardware and development of the
technology. Basically this scan process is the first stage of the
PFN receiving wireless communications. The PFN/TRAC unit is
configured with the appropriate antenna to accommodate all the
wireless interfaced and in some cases a broad-spectrum antenna for
counting frequencies. A scan program either running in the
transceiver circuit section (e.g. chipsets or TRAC processor
section interfaced or integrated recognizes messages in a frequency
band of one of the wireless interfaced in the PFN/TRAC unit. If the
signal has a particular address not relevant to the unit ESN or ID
it scans past to the next activity.
One function of the scan process is for the unit to do
environmental EMF and EMW surveying for security control and
management of remote control functions and to do environmental
research on areas to maximize and/organize transmissions and
reception and to address health and safety issues regarding
electromagnetic fields, presence intensity and any PFN correlated
sensed facts as to their effects. This data is to be maintained in
a buffer and memory storage or the TRAC PFN processor or extended
memory receptacle.
Another function of the scan process involves a TEAM messages which
could be received on one or more wireless technologies actively
interfaced and with simultaneous signal reception one is stored in
a buffer for near-real-time review while the best signal is
processed immediately.
Universal Communicator Program
This master routing/translation software package running in the
TRAC processor but augmented by with TEAM programming in the
wireless software interfaced in any particular PFN/TRAC unit
processes same content message data between disparate wireless
protocols via a universal library of specific emergency messages
and then routes or repeat them to another wireless interfaced to
complete the translation process in and through out the PFN system.
These same universal messages are to be translated into all known
human languages as well and available to the appropriate persons
along with public TEAM messages. This same program is to have a
voice recognition algorithm to identify languages spoken and a
universal audio and video set of pictures to accompany these TEAM
messages.
And be Delivered by These Interfaced Accessories
A third function is the portable network. Part of the FACT function
is to inventory interfaced components and to maintain a working
inventory of associated materials. In this case the PFNs are mini
repeating stations to those agency intranets in FIG. 19 support
FACT registries for every electronic component that can be
interfaced with a car, plane, boat, train, machine or piece of
equipment. This is true for 1Ps standalone PFNs as well. This is
the basis for the traceable portable network a machine messaging
matrix or web that is flexible and mobile. For example a number of
materials could be transported across the country and their
preprogrammed imed communications would quarry each other to see if
they were in the same area and recognize when the wer not and
report it back direct to the FACT control center for that intranet.
This data would be re transmitted to all the intranets by IP and
all intranets would up load this data to their PFN assets so when a
scanning PFN identified the lost signal it would report the
interrogating PFN GPS if the signal did not provide tracking e.g.
an RFID interface not another short range PFN.
Forth is locating program for non-GPS units. The scan process would
have an algorithm that recognized time reception of the same signal
and strength and be able to apply it's known position history
(fixed address or GPS coordinate) with other PFNs in the WLAN and
determine position of the non GPS asset.(automate triangulation
algorithm running in the scanner program and driven by the wireless
receptions and frequencies counted.
Fifth Scanning Routing Function with FCC FACT for System Integrity
and Proper Use of the Airwaves
The Federal access and control technology--specifically FACT/FCC
will need to approve this PFN/TRAC scan function and employ it. All
PFNs or TRACker routers could be configured to scan for all sorts
of electromagnetic frequencies and EM wave
propagations/transmissions or random oscillations as a precursor
and maintenance procedure to safely perform wireless access and
control of communications and machinery to protect the public's
safety and national security. With terrorist looking for ways to
harm the united state we have to safe and protect our remote
controls and airwaves. The PFN/TRAC system is all about protection
and detection and this scanner function is but one electronic
policemen on the job looking for unwanted and unauthorized
transmissions.
By design this is to be part of the FCCFACT regulatory process and
their registry program for the communication commission to review
data generated by their FACT program when making licensing
decisions or enforcing it's regulations. PFNs could deliver clear
evidence of over saturated areas with high noise and help the FCC
delineate how best to license the airwaves and protect and mange
this public asset.
Additional Scanning Program
The Technology plans to explore the use of the deep space radio
telescope signal search program to discover intelligent life in
space. The average public was asked to help provide processing
power (PC Based software) to run the software algorithms. For the
PFN/TRAC system this would be reduce or customized with known
transmissions filtered out in some cases and only looking for
unauthorized or never detected occurrences (or special FACT event
anomalies).
FIG. 21 FIG. 21 This Figure illustrates a wireless tracking network
locating a lost child. The same process would be used at an airport
to track human movement and interface directly with the machines
vehicles, equipment and aircraft in the PFN/TRAC management matrix
and seamless security network. All types of 1P PFNs or 1ps
Standalone (totally self powered units) communicate with the 1 E
equipment, 1SV surface vehicle PFNs 1a tracker units and 1A
PFN/TRAC units. The personal PFNs can be belts like the ones used
later to detail types of wireless communications and they can be
placed on or in people, equipment, machines, materials, baggage, to
for a portable network to track a desired mass of assets traveling
or being transported together or a way to follow each and every
piece of material anywhere. These self powered 1 P PFNs are
generally limited is size, amount of wireless options and their
responsive distance, therefore the repeating and relaying of
messaging is a major function of the system.
Small low powered transceivers transponders and technologies like
RFID tag, are able to function through the repeating function of
the PFN/TRAC units in each vehicle and equipment platform where
there is stable current to energize functions and re-energize
emergency batteries to insure a consistent reliable and redundant
network function through mass mini repeating stations or routing
nodes. Not only for tracking and telemetry of movement but to
perform bidirectional accountable remote control via the machines
that hosts these PFN units.
When the personal PFN/TRAC units attached to individuals
communicates with equipment, machines, vehicles and other PFNs
capable of repeating emergency messages through translation or
repeat communication protocols and relay messages via more powerful
equipment PFNs with long range communications and stable energy
sources their limited range is given far greater reach to deliver
data. The flexible mobile web allows for endless tracking and
accountable robust remote activity control if deemed necessary.
For an example, personal units can be designed for criminal
applications (and indeed some similar devices could operate to
increase their distance through FACT network and PFN/TRAC repeat
technology. Other applications include; child tracking, medical
telemetry with automated medication and/or for the criminal or
criminally insane being transported by air transportation. Even
debilitating responses in an emergency can be sent if considered a
viable solution (These are at best near real-time though--it would
be ideal to have real-time monitoring at least) These units could
interface through aircraft, cars, trains, a bull dozer, a printing
press or any machine using PFN/TRAC Unit and FACT programming
allowing for the tracking through out a national matrix of
responsive PFNs. Possibly used with illegal immigrants that may
have questionable intentions in their visit and/or the
conditionally released to provide more freedom of movement with an
improved level of public safety. (Uses to be determined legally and
practically)
These devices can be configured to provide Biometrics from the
individual wearing them and with scanners and sensors interfaced to
these units (and other PFNs) these units could recover the same
kind of data from others if the need be (e.g. applications like
nurses, doctors, EMTs, stewards, pilots, police and even the
mechanic or service personnel for ID purposes via the Biometric
data transfer. 1P personal units would have value for flight crews
to determine healthy authorized flight staff or the medically ill
when transported by air, or for tracking children traveling alone,
pets and/or those with diminished mental capacities. The specific
intranet systems could always be in contact via the matrix of
equipment and 1P PFN/TRAC units.
Additionally these personal units if only DSRC will translate and
relay to Cellular in on board TRACker units and/or 1A PFN/TRAC
controller/routers to link personal body telemetry (Heart and
respiration) via fabric sensors supported by belt, bracelet and/or
band mounts or implanted in a personnel to feed critical data to
surface security and/or medical experts providing real-time
connectivity with the most up dated information to act upon. These
systems will support ID sensing systems so that Flight crew and
airport authorities and legitimate work personnel can process any
individuals ID information or data. Either digital Iris scan/face
scan or magnetic swipe or canvas for data via smart card or finger
print or DNA technologies. The units provide for sensor arrays to
be powered and to process their data back to the TRACker Unit or
any other PFN/TRAC unit 1E 1A or another 1P PFN in the machine
messaging matrix either aloft or terrestrially through the terminal
matrix and elsewhere via long distance dialups to special NENA data
gateways via cellular interfaces for all specific intranets. This
creates multiple modalities of connectivity for redundancy.
Description of Triangulation and Miniaturized Personal PFNS
The equipment units fixed positions are known or determined from
interfaced GPS receivers that apply location data and the units
electronic identifiers ESN or other industry standard for tracking
in the unit via the appropriate FACT intranet and registry. The
identifiers accompany any retransmission as well as a strength of
signal received coefficient for processing and display via the
application specific programming in a capture window (of txt,
video, audio, graphics, and with any warning alerts on a calibrated
campus map and/or terminal floor plan displays in the FACT'TSA
terminal center. With a number of 1 E, 1 SV and TRACker PFNS
providing (strength of signal coefficients) from their known
locations to be factored by a triangulation algorithm running in
the FACT Security program, seamless inexpensive tracking of the
less powerful & simplistic transmitters can be accomplished.
The software would adjust through the real time multiple receptions
to the varying strength of the power source in the weaker short
range personal PFNS and the location is determined by strength and
timing of the signal vectoring to known PFN locations with a
reception history from these specific coordinates.
The actual received signal might be a combination of a primary
signal and several same signal echoes recovered by a PFN. Because
the distance traveled by the original signal is shorter than the
bounced signal, the time differential causes two signals to be
received. Fixed addressed PFNs or with hot GPS readings would
archive and compare a number of signals received from these minimal
current 1 P PFNs or COTS RFID unit (twin antennas interfaced in the
portable network matrix of PFNs). These signals are overlapped and
combined into a single one. In real life, the time between the
first received signal and the last echoed signal is called the
delay spread, which could be as high as 4 .mu.sec (not RFID). The
echoed signal is delayed in time and reduced in power. Both are
caused by the additional distance that the bounced signal traveled
over the primary signal. The greater the distance, the longer the
delay and the lower the power of the echoed signal. You might think
that the longer the delay, the better off the reception would be.
However, if the delay is too long, the reception of an echoed
symbol S1 and the primary symbol S2 can also interact. Because
there may be no direct path for the incident signal in
non-line-of-sight (LOS) environments, the primary signal may be
small in comparison to other secondary signals. In analog systems
such as television, this multi path situation can actually be seen
by the human eye. Sometimes there is a ghost image on your
television, and no matter how much you adjust the set, the image
does not go away. In these analog systems, this is an annoyance. In
digital systems, it usually corrupts the data stream and causes
loss of data or lower performance. Correction algorithms (fuzzy
logic etc) must be put in place to compensate for the multi-path,
resulting in a lower available data rate. With this algorithm
written in to the translation and routing program running in
receiving PFNs the mini data packet recovered from these minimal
personal PFN units or inject able PFN SOC units can be accurate and
used to locate the exact position of the 1 P PFN transmission in
comparison to the receiving equipment PFN (bigger PFNs with GPS)
This multi-path signal propagation has it's signal strengths
evaluated by the program running in each equipment PFFN receiving
the signals. Each equipment PFN sends its processed position
evaluation to FACT central in the airport terminal in this case for
the FACT system computer to final process all received signals from
the equipment PFNs.
This tracking modality is piggy backed on the data translation and
error correcting software program and can be evolutionary in the
important effort to miniaturize singular purpose PFNs with no GPS
to minimally powered tracking and telemetry units. This will
enhance tracking immeasurably in the PFN/TRAC portable network,
resulting in simple application specific SOC telemetry or
transponders that can be concealed in or on a mobile object or
garment or even implanted via injection or with minor surgery into
an individual and report biometrics with location from all the PFNs
receiving and tracking monitoring and recovering and reporting
telemetry and location to the FACT Security system or managing
movement of material and people via the PFA/TRAC System. On
application for these 1 P PFNs is for mission critical flight
personnel--to insure a healthy authorized pilots are interfacing
with the aircraft controls monitored by ground and air security via
the Isolated TRACker unit on board picking up the 1P units signal
another 02.2 grant application).
FIG. 22 This diagram shows two basic variations to terrestrial
PFNs. The 1SV PFN/TRAC controller/router shown here for the air
travel industry and the DRC PFN/TRAC unit for the automotive
industry development. The 1SV PFN and DRC unit in the illustration
is universally discussed for future versions of both and to better
explain the progression and entire set of innovations applied in
this figure. As sections are discussed the progressive development
to this protected robust robotics and remote controller/router for
all land vehicles will unfold. For regular automotive applications
the PFN has been termed the DRC meaning Driver Resource Center. DRC
PFNs in cars and trucks have a little different commercial
progression than the industrial 1SV PFNs (like for an airport
intranet or local matrix). They also may have different wireless
technologies interfaced.
The first discussion will be about the regular automotive, DRC PFNs
first generation DRC 1. And specifically how the regular car is
going to be first interfaced into the federal access and control
technology TSA FACT command center at the airport.
Before the 911 incident telematics in vehicles was beginning to be
developed through programs like GMs Onstar, Chrysler Daimler's
TeleAid and Ford's "Wingcast" program with sprint wireless for
private cars. Additionally, for a number of years GPS truck
tracking has been developing as private intranets interfacing
cellular telephony and GPS in some cased and other wireless
location reporting technologies like Lojack. And some of these
networks (Intranets) are run by major freight companies and
delivery companies like Highway Masters, UPS, FEDEX, etc. The first
generation DRC PFN would interface these existing systems (PFN
their wireless units) and interface their wireless protocols to
immediately provide the network fabric and platform for the TSA
FACT command centers; at the airports, terminals, ports, along
boarders, tollbooths weigh stations and inspection stations. This
would be a direct access connection through these vehicles wireless
technologies when these vehicles were in a certain range of let say
an airport facility. Additionally there would be certain FACT
software that would be downloaded to these units. (Pre-programmed
or real-time updates) In time hardware sensing in these vehicles
would be increased (EDS, etc) and the diverse types of equipment
and dispersed system architecture would evolve into a more
universal protected DRC. A primary focal node with a TRAC processor
to support all the interfacing necessary with flexibility to be
commercially viable and applicable at all times. During this
progressive process the vehicle controls will become more automated
with collision avoidance and driver assist systems and require
accountable machine messaging and remote commands to be acceptable
to society. All the PFN/TRAC system companies will push to set
standards in vehicle controls and advance HMI to reduce driver
workload with the DRC or protected PFN/TRAC local architecture.
The 1SV PFN for industry will interface legacy vehicle electronics
in much of the material handling, mobile baggage transport for the
airport facility equipment and be the most sophisticated
electronics on these vehicles. The other major difference is the
types of wireless technologies interfaced. However, early on in the
development of the DRC PFN and the 1P PFN they will have plug and
play multi-pin docking to accept different wireless by installing
chipset with the appropriate protocols in an accommodating
transceiver board (universal with an automated scan function). The
ASIC in all the application figures sustains the architecture
desired for routing SEAM, TEAM and EAM messaging in all local
PFNTRAC routers.
The progressive integration of all the automotive telematics
intranets begin with an IP systems connection to the larger Rail
and highway TRAC/FACT/TSA registry which intern delivers data to
the highest security command layer (center(s) in FIG. 18. DOD and
DOT will be the lead agencies in development and implementation of
this critical national infrastructure. And they need to be funded
well and staffed with some real doers.
DOD/DARPA and the national security and law enforcement agencies
will be responsible for developing the hardware standards and
software procedures and protocols and the writing of the operating
FACT program to identify agency/user access and for the FACT
registries.
DOT will be responsible for structuring the transportation FACT
registries via all their departments and sub agencies like National
Highway Traffic and Safety Administration NHTSA and the FMC Federal
Motor Carriers just to mention a few. It is important to mention
that DOT monitors transportation and writes regulations specific to
vehicle platforms. This is how the agencies and divisions are
structured. These vehicle frames have different
electrical/electronics E/E system and bus architecture. They
require different monitoring and reporting as well as law and
regulation enforcement, so the different intranets that track
theirs assets geographically already will have their sensing and
telemetry increased for TSA and homeland security immediately.
These intranets would also have IP connections to the specific
agencies monitoring portions of their commercial activities e.g.
EPA/Colorado watching for Blue smoke from diesel trucks could
receive data from the DRC PFN via interfaced vehicle sensors in the
exhaust stack and this data would then intern be routed to ICC the
state police/EPA/hazmat officials locally where the truck was
operating. This and passive reporting through the registries will
be ongoing and near real-time unless a FACT event flag occurs. Then
the system can respond another way in emergencies--via direct dial
in or dial out with FACT/TSA command centers. PFN/DRC units
responsiveness is different during a FACT event where explosives
are sensed on a vehicle on an interstate that is not suppose to be
carrying them.
FACT implementation and commercial development will request the
wireless intranets to be discussed to station one of their control
hubs at each of the 429 airports across the nation and link them to
TSA/FACT command center servers. Or arrange for their technology to
be interfaced and integrated into the FACT/wireless gateway router
at airports. PFN/TRAC TSA FACT wireless router (WR) is illustrated
in the bottom left corner of drawing 22. TSA/FACT with the (WR) is
to be a giant protected Primary Foal Node mass data handling,
routing and storage center for critical FACT data at the airport. A
physically protected facility (Capacity and protocols interfaced to
be determined) This air terminal TSA FACT hub/router transceiver
unit (WR) would be vaulted and protected with a versatile docking
structure to interface the above intranets wireless and the above
telematics wireless protocols. As a base or center to link these
present systems directly to FACT security at the terminal to
provide immediate local responsiveness via the local PFN units.
The top third of the page is the TSA/FACT airport terminal command
center communicating with all mobile objects via the various
PFN/TRAC wireless interface router functions. All the PFNs on all
the above transportation platforms are receiving GPS data from the
above array of geo-synchronized orbit satellites illustrated by the
satellite in the upper right corner. Additionally each PFN/TRAC
circuit clock is updated and synchronized via software (firmware)
in the TRAC ASIC directing the use of this data received form the
GPS/NEMA data packets (or another stable wireless time providing
technology) to locally plot movement harmony for any portion of the
mobile matrix of 1SV and DRC PFNs.
The Figure
No. 1 the car in the right is communicating with the little car to
the left via DSRC and specific vehicle identifiers (ESN PFN DRC,
etc). However, all the vehicles and people having PFNs are passing
through a sea of communications all the time. It is the recognition
and use capacity to retrieve this critical information and
precipitate it's use into appropriate movement that is unique and
creates the PFN/TRAC traffic management system and base construct
program for a TSA FACT robust security matrix.
In the figure the two cars, the bus left of the terminal and the
women riding the bicycle are all part of an instantaneous
interactive portable network that performs a mixture of robotics
and remote control (RC). Positioning software is running in each
PFN unit monitoring and demarking certain distances from other
objects relative to all objects velocity (speed and direction or
signals from a stationary object via--a fixed 1E PFN beacon or
beacon signal program running in an unattended parked vehicles DRC
PFN or 1SV PFN).
All of the above vehicles are in communication with each other and
the TSA FACT local command center at the airport. This allows the
left car's DRC to be aware of the cyclist No.3 and the driver is
warned of the bikers location (via IP PFN or RFID tag etc).
Secondly the car would not be able to turn towards the curb to park
as a result of this remote telemetry and robotics. If any of the
drivers were not paying attention and there was going to collision
their car would automatically adjust in micro seconds and warn the
driver by audio message or stop the car if the algorithm in the
movement program was satisfied via rear sensors (radar) there was
no vehicle detected closing distance from the rear. The satisfied
safe condition algorithm is that at all times no two known objects
can be projected by velocity to occupy the same geo-space and time
coordinates. If this state is factored--parameters in the software
are to warn the operator and eliminate the condition without
colliding with any other known asset identified in the local
environment.
Additionally, as an advanced HMI assist system, an operational
evaluation program is always running in the DRC to sense over
steering, slow braking, slow acceleration slow reflexes, etc. and
archive a personal driving history of the identified authorized
driver's necessary skill to operate the vehicle proficiently. Using
this assessment program the DRC automated collision avoidance
programming is to override operator control and effect the
collision avoidance option. There are more and more collision
avoidance technologies being developed and these are to be systems
under control SUC to the DRC PFN. Additionally driver performance
can be transferred by smart cards or data transfer devices so that
each PFN recognizes upon energizing a host vehicle for authorized
use (like a personal key). The new vehicle would be given
performance parameters for the known driver and the driver assist
programs would be there to assist all the way up to full robotics
driving in real time for those situations that required it.
Providing more freedom for the physical and mentally
challenged.
Initially, PFN/TRAC programming for this function can be initiated
from the GPS commercial off the shelf products that can follow a
vehicles movement now and provide vocal instructions to a driver
for the next change in direction. Or the software algorithm can be
written from any number of intelligent positioning technologies and
their software programs. These technologies have developer kits and
PC software kits to write code from to develop assist verbal
warning and base RPV programming and algorithms as desired for
these applications. The goal is total vehicle robotics via first
incorporating driver assist systems and not to stop human driving
but to continue freedom of safe movement for more people--people
age--However, "we all know we are perfect drivers". The level of
driver assist and robotics will be real-time variable--just for
those times we just might not be perfect. Another reason is
cellular phones and driver distraction. Other existing commercial
off the shelf technologies need a safe cross environmental
interface to manage their use and the vehicle while in transit-the
DRC PFN is a total management system for this purpose and the
progression to full vehicle robotics through assist driving
technologies will increase public safety and national security via
insuring authorized healthy and real-time capable operators and
operation of vehicles equipment, machines and aircraft.
Other collision avoidance data on the newer cars (e.g. proximity
detectors, forward radar, and infrared night vision would have
their data streams processed to interface into the movement
management software, which will be the base program for automated
guidance of a vehicle via direct connection to crucial actuators or
via vehicle bus system interfacing as detailed in the center
section of this figure and throughout all the PFN/TRAC System
filings since 1996.
If the PFN or DRC has a specific preprogrammed travel plan the
portable network will better be able to plot and direct movement
both at the local PFN level and systemically from this exemplary
TSA/FACT Command center at the nation's 429 airports. DSRC
frequencies have been granted to the DOT by the FCC--(5.7 GHZ).
Presently, standards efforts for the use of this broadband
frequency or other suitable bandwidth (FCC approved and dedicated)
have to get underway immediately with FAA/AOC/TSA and the
automotive electronic and avionics wireless device manufacturers
for cross-environmental application standards, procedures and
protocols. Their focus is to develop an agreed upon messaging and
directives protocol for optimum movement on and near the earth's
surface. A three dimensional road map and operator
manual/operations program for terrestrial vehicle platforms on the
roads and in and out of air ports (intermodal communications and
recognition protocols to be tied into aircraft traversing the
tarmac with service vehicles--both vehicle 1SV PFN possibly DRC
loal police cruiser and aircraft TRACker unit need to have the
proper wireless chipsets to be cross tied into their collision
avoidance systems and TSA FACT's seamless security for contact or
near contact with any aircraft).
Automated movement algorithms must process the movement data
universally, but specific to individual vehicle, time, place and
surroundings in PFN/RPV programming to remote piloted vehicles with
robotics. (RPV is the major embodiment of the local TRAC processor,
preprogrammed robotics for reliability and responsiveness is
another portion so software has to be written for this condition as
well. Robotics algorithms will determine the safest commands to
respond, to, to include; local human, RC commands or
auto-determined movement alternatives. (procedures and protocols to
be determined for these preprogram situations).
The satellite above also symbolizes that low earth orbit or LEO
satellites used in the PFN/TRAC system for wireless communications
and include Air Traffic Management ATM and wireless telephony as
other possible near earth communications interfaced in local PFNs
and to link the intranets.
The vehicle platforms and airframe above the airport's TSA FACT
command center are mostly all ISV PFN specific to the airport
intranet with all the appropriate wireless interfaced through the
PFN for TEAM messaging. Many of these units could be capable of
SEAM messaging (to be determined).
Used as an example of cross environmental telemetry, the airport
police cruiser in the upper left is a good example of a vehicle
applications that could and should carry a full complement of
wireless protocols to both function outside the airport in any
TSA/FACT Interactive Highway application of the PFN/TRAC system and
also with the TSA/FACT/FAA/AOC Intranet as part of seamless
security. This has a dual function as well as a dual purpose. First
seamless reporting is accomplished to follow a FACT event and
second to have accountable remote management and control capability
with intranet demarcation and cross-environmental integration.
Example of purpose, a local police pursuit that has entered the
airport facility should have immediate FACT programming
responsiveness in each PFN with command center integration so a
real time authorized officer recognized via his 1P PFN-ESN, etc.
confirming his or her personal ID then can use his/her command
interfaced pad or voice to activate automated gates, baggage
handling equipment and vehicles and/or stop their unauthorized use
providing seamless security. (Procedures and protocols to be
determined) This accountable machine-messaging network creates a
security matrix of redundant human and automated monitoring with
real-time accountable remote control to manage safe secure and
efficient movement at airports and can build public confidence in
air travel.
Initial Commercial Cooperation Needed
FACT control will have a real-time placement on calibrated mapping
displays of all moving assets on the airport campus (monitoring
procedures and response protocols to be determined). This will be a
unique security advantage and main reason for requesting commercial
cooperation in constructing a multiple access local wireless
routing hub of all known wireless protocols at each airport. And
for combining it with the PFN/TRAC automated frequency counting
scan program to identify unwanted and unauthorized transmissions in
the airport vicinity. This is how TSA can be really responsive via
a FACT sensory and command control center at each of the 429
national commercial airport terminals. A security system that is
based on good efficient management of vehicle movement. One, that
can identify exact location time and space and directly issue
remote commands for reliable accountable interdiction by using
interfaced automated equipment, that is locally coordinated with
human security at the air port.
In the center of the drawing a sample of the Systems Under Control
SUC in the vehicle are illustrated to perform wireless routing,
Robotics RC and RPV for the vehicle. As stated earlier this can be
accomplished via direct connection to the DRC or via interfacing
with the CAN Bus. These various modalities are well documented in
earlier filings and therefore basically listed in this figure. To
instruct those in the arts what accessories must be connected or
constructed to effect RC and robotics activity as a result of the
programming functions detailed for each application and to include
the progressive teachings to complete the integration for the local
PFN and the PFN/TRAC system.
In the figure left and center on the E/E CAN Bus are the vehicle
displays and alerts. They would be PFN constructed or if OEM in
place, they would be used to deliver messages, TEAM, SEAM and/or
emergency action messages for the general public--public service
messages termed EAM messages).
Data provided to the instrument panel critical to vehicle
operations would also be basic I/O interfaced via the vehicle CPU
or retrieved from the bus redundantly. Driver controls would be PFN
automated and/or interfaced with newer drive by wire technologies
or connected by traditional can bus interfacing. Ultimately every
E/E connection critical to vehicle operation and/or designated or
regulated by government as a TSA FACT Security concern must be
priority routed and protected consistent with PFN/TRAC System
technology. If these specifications are deemed necessary an result
in any standards or regulation or are improved on by any government
agency or standards effort they are still considered to be within
the nature, scope and purpose of the invention if to provide
reliable accountable remote control and FACT security for TSA and
the Department of Homeland Security.
Public Safety in Driving
Items 4 and 5 in the center show wireless carryon devices into a
car. These devices are a great asset to the traveler but they also
cause driver distraction. In earlier filings the interfacing of
these carryon units is well discussed technically and also for
their cross environmental impact and causing driver distraction.
For this reason they have been interfaced through the DRC PFN to
have there use and vehicle operation optimized while maintaining
the safest vehicle movement. The DRC can be a real-time assistant
or auto/Co-pilot to the operator, either distracted, over taxed,
tired, ill, intoxicated, or bored with driving and desiring to do
something else while traveling. The actuators would be attached to
the activity controls listed left of number 6. Number 7 is the DRC
PFN and contains the plug and play wireless interfaces to sere as a
router in a specific intranet as well as retrieve dedicated
short-range communications.
A specific universal DSRC frequency and protocol should be
determined for a universal chipset connectivity through all PFNs
and across all wireless devices to create the portable flexible
integration network of messaging described. It must be broadband
and all PFNs have to receive it. It must be standardized or each
PFN must carry all the various DSRC transceiver/protocols with
specific device identifiers (ESN) and special routing instructions
for the receiving PFN.
To the center right shows all the vehicle sensing audio and video
to include any infrared, laser, heat imaging data, distance
sensors, sound, locating systems, Lojack, GPS, Lorenz etc. lane
highway detector, DSRC beacons edge sensors optical lane sensors
that are; light, reflective, magnetic, optical to video signal
recovery with software algorithm to follow, lines, oil
discolorization or vehicle discharge during regular use on the
highway. The communications are 5.7, DOT DSRC, or they could be any
DSRC determined necessary and having a large enough data pipe.
The earlier mentioned FACT ball or 1Ps stand alone data orbs that
supply critical highway environmental data and conditions either
preprogrammed or real-time sensed to the PFN DRC, and/or COTS RFID
technology used in a reverse application-Specifically the TAGS
passive and active would be imbedded into the road and placed along
the road system as data suppositories and deliver critical data
instructions from firmware on the driving environment to the
receiver antenna portion or reader of the RFID technology connected
to the vehicles DRC PFN.
This application of RFID technology or other such applications or
technologies used and interfaced to create a portable sensing
network and a data atmosphere for RC and robot Other DSRC are Blue
Tooth and 802.11 DSRC to deliver data, etc).
This sea of detectable data is delivered to all the PRIMARY FOCAL
NODES PFNs for processing by TRAC, the TRUSTED REMOTE ACTIVITY
CONTROLLER/communication router. A PFN or PFN DRC is a machine
brain--A. I. artificial intelligence for mindful machinery to
perform trusted RC and robotics.
As these protected and secure PFNS pass through an atmosphere or
ether of environmental information they can sense and process the
environment, and equipment movement much like a person does when
walking or driving. In time these mindful machines linked locally
in a machine messaging matrix (PFN/TRAC System) will operate
vehicles more accurately and move people and materials more safely
with better coordination.
OBD Sensors I,II,III, J1850, J1939, ISO all the automotive CAN bus
networks to include the latest DSRC ether nets, single wire digital
transmissions, fiber optics vehicle or equipment E/E systems are
all to be systems interfaced and under control by the local PFN or
DRC PFN. This is necessary to perform TRUSTED RC, RPV and robotics,
socially, commercially and governmentally with large-scale
integration and accountability.
Through out the PFN filings all type of ID technologies can be
interfaced with the TRAC processors, iris scans, face scans
(video), finger scan, voice recognition ID programs, Smart card or
chip technologies, biometrics from 1P personal PFNs via DSRC, or
the earlier RFID tags worn or implanted as with the PFN SOC ID and
biometrics implants, or non invasive DNA acquisition transducers
processing sample cells recovered and converted into a digital
signal or (DAC or ADC as necessary in the sensor or the PFN), and
the identification technology list could go on and on with new ID
technologies developed and interfaced with the PFN/TRAC units and
system for the FACT Security.
Number 9 card swipes in cars and on 1SV PFNs or DRCs. Obviously as
stated earlier this can be used to recover identity information.
But it is also part of creating a new economic tool for the nation
and world to develop management and controls over the dispersed and
hard to track energy use by equipment using alternative power
sources. The PFN provides a stable data recovery mechanism for
appropriate taxing for the impact of this equipment on the
environment and societies infrastructures to include smooth
interfacing with our oil based economy now. It also allows for
flexible transition between the different energy sources to
maintain a stable economy and hopefully to help some with world
politics (a human responsibility we all share) by providing a good
socio-economic mechanism for stable cross investment with all the
energy sources.
With this in mind the PFNS will run electronic payment industry
software protocols and be physically protected and electronically
secure to be better trusted for these activities. The PFN can also
have the capacity to read credit cards/smart cards as stated in the
figure.
At the airport rental cars and real time purchase of accessories
and services for those vehicles are made easy to effect via the PFN
(cellular phone service wireless IP connection for laptop
computers, sending video back to home computers, receiving real
time directions, best routes, activate robotics driving, etc). Card
swipes in cabs receiving fairs rather than cash are a safer
economic tool than the dollar bill. It makes the accounting and
management of assets and use of those assets respect to revenue
returns easier to track for the cab companies (or for all fleets).
Also cabs, limos, airport shuttles, light rail subways, buses,
delivery companies and any services entering the airport facility
have to have all their wireless intranets supported locally to the
FAA/FACT command center Transceiver router. TSA FACT command
control is immediately contacted by all arriving and departing
vehicles with wireless as well as, all wireless devices carried by
persons via DSRC to stationary perimeter PFNS (either stand alone
or with solar or other power sources to include any of the
application specific PFNS.
At the bottom left is the airport TSA/FACT airport command center
and directly above it the wireless router WR that has the correct
antennae tower and satellite reception capacity to feed the TSA
FACT router with all known wireless protocols interfaced. This
tower receives data from every know wireless transmitting and the
router processes data to the address recognized in the data packets
via special routing protocols (COTS) or by signal recognition or
identifier modulated in an analog propagation. The router is a
serviceable link or wireless gateway to land, lines and fiber
optics to also provide rapid message delivery to all the desired
FACT/TSA related operations and national command center and NORAD
Homeland security (as appropriate--e.g. TEAM and SEAM messages).
Also shown connected via the PFN/TRAC System are other intranets
via IP connections land line and satellite. These other intranets
may be provided data in real or near real-time as TRAC system
reporting e.g. (accounting operations will be processed second to
SEAM and TEAM messaging at the routing level. Some broad band and
broad spectrum routing is done today and protocols are becoming
more universal and standard for wireless and cable transmissions,
They still are not interrelated will enough to form one flexible
roaming web for all the wireless, this is what is a unique function
of the PFN/TRAC system. Many are still to proprietary and
application specific.
CISCO systems/Motorola and Simens are some of the existing
corporations that will be contacted to collaborate and construct
the PFN/TRAC TSA/FACT Command center wireless router through COTS
interfacing and TRAC architecture with their products and others
COTS routing products. All wireless must be known to operate
legally at the airport and the automated frequency scanning program
running in local PFNS create a sensing fabric to eliminate
authorized transmissions and triangulate on unauthorized
propagations for analysis and investigations.
A Responsible Modality to Achieve the Invention in Every
Application (La Technique)
The progression always starts with existing COTS and then continues
to develop the PFN/TRAC unit and system to support FACT security
for better public safety, national defense and Home land security
and then to improve and refine the technology. Money and backing
are essential for such a large undertaking. This is the reason the
technology is explained with application use and impacts. Issues
and use have to always be at the forefront of any system or unit
design, programming and implementation. This is a Science
Technology and Society (STS) utility teaching for patent. It is
meant to maintain a thinking process with all the public as each
skilled individual embarks on their respective task to realize the
impact that they are responsible for and act professionally and
with respect for their fellow citizens in the development and use
of the invention. Cooperation and collaboration is sought for the
development from all stakeholders. TRAC Aviation will seek
government support and assistance to include funding, technical
expertise, and technical transfers in an effort to partner up with
major vehicle and equipment manufacturers to develop (vehicle
PFNS).
FIG. 23
Transportation Machine Messaging Matrix
FIG. 23 is too taken from earlier an related patent filing and
shows the Transportation machine matrix with a world of machines
having PFN/TRAC units communicating with wireless intranets and
being connected to a transportation machine messaging matrix
including the FAA/TSA and other networks via IP protocols and
telecommunications. These intranets will provide for greater
equipment management and traffic movement as well as improve the
data acquisition for government agencies and their ability to
monitor safe use of robotics and remote control equipment for
public safety and home land security. This invention meets the
challenge our technologies is impacting on us n the century. Both
here in the united States and all around the world. This system
operated by a responsible public, both those in government service
and those serving in the private sector can provide greater
proficient use of equipment with a more rapid public safety
notification system and quicker government response to emergency
situations. It can provide the private sector the organizational
platform to coordinate safe and profitable ways to do business and
stand ready to defend and serve the nation's needs. There can be
greater coordination between government agencies with tighter
communication and understanding between industry and government and
our public at large. The invention is a structure to build trust
and respect throughout the world to include an individual's freedom
and rights to privacy. It can be a fair and just management system
for processing machine and resource use along with evaluating
impacts on the world and humanity. Not to stop technical
development but to know better what we are doing with it. The
PFN/TRAC system could open a new era as to how we efficiently do
good and safe business. One worthy of universal global respect and
a willingness to emulate rather than one that causes jealousy
dislike and distain. Especially from those not well franchised in
any method to improve the quality of their lives. If knowledge is a
power for change, people are the instruments for that change. It is
redundant to say it, but it takes us all to make a good and
positive difference in any change. Decent is as important as
consent in any life decisions. The system provides structure
and/organization to gather and deliver knowledge and a public means
of analysis and implementation a necessary requirement for all
humanity to determine what kind of life they want together. (This
illustration is well documented and is self explanatory, but
provides understanding of the intranet connected by the system in
the transportation matrix) Uniquely different from today's
dispersed computer networks is the multiple mailing of data packets
sent to these dispersed intranets from the local level that are
data recovered by the individual PFN/TRAC processor/router. It is a
complete nervous system for the nation, both to sense and perform
motor functions (automated activities).
FIG. 24 This diagram shows the standard wireless interfaces for all
the surface applications to include 1SV for surface vehicles 1E for
the stationary vehicles and 1Ps PFN for standalone and 1P for the
personal PFN processors. They could range from very simple tracking
operations and ID telemetry to extremely sophisticated robotics
processing and communication routers. The ASIC in FIG. 24 is
different in power sources with 1E PFN/TRAC being energized by
building current transformed to computer control voltages and
service current to drive silicon relays, motor starts and high low
voltage solenoids to perform remote and automated activities
controls on a host piece of equipment.
These 1 E PFN controller routers are used on stationary equipment
applications in and around the airport and come from earlier
related patent filings. These circuits and applications are
detailed more extensively in these earlier filings. These separate
filings explain the technology and the specific cross-environmental
use for larger scale integration into a machine-messaging matrix.
This discussion is deliberately detailed to illustrate and isolate
the Aviation intranet applications for these circuit designs.
1SV PFN will have all the same wireless for in and around the
airport and the milti-pin connector or interface to connect up to
the automobile CAN bus system and/or drive direct connections to
actuators and service power control circuits for activity controls.
Power requirements are to energize the processor and recharge the
emergency power. Vehicle power to be transformed ranges in DC
current from power supplies from 12 volts DC to 48 DC volts DC and
the power is transformed to operate the PFN/TRAC processor and
electronics at computer voltages
The circuit concept is the same for the 1P and 1PS but the level of
complexity varies immensely and is explained throughout the
filing.
The six squares to the left in the ASIC represent the interface
protocols from the various wireless communication technologies that
are connected in a plug in hybrid substrate chip set and can be
changed to meet the application specific need of any specific
primary focal node PFN. This drawing is exemplary and in no way
should limit the reviewer or reader as to the nature and scope of
the invention to create any specific intranet or support local
interfacing for cross environmental communication links as a local
router. This ASIC shows CAN Bus interfacing if used for automotive
to include J1850, 1939 ISO and any of the other new LAN Vehicle Bus
systems. Local clock time is updated by the GPS--Satellite or
communication technologies. Tamper detection is an earlier FACT
integrity check procedure detailed as a security process protocol
in earlier related filings. Most all is self explanatory in the
circuit design. It is understood that systems will be consolidated
via SOC technology and this event is within the nature and scope of
the invention.
Many types of encryption are available today (PGP, DES, the
wireless payment industry has more as well. FACT is to be a
security program format that code will have to be written too and
the types of codecs and encryption standards for high security and
commercial and private security communications as well as public
statistical information protocols have to de determined legally
first as well as these frequencies will have to be approved by FAA
and FCC and law enforcement agencies. The technology has a
multitude of modular configurations to support these options for
most any discriminatory programming and data processing along with
an evolutionary capacity of the technology to interface with
present and legacy systems and to consolidate and integrate,
combine these linked circuits and systems into SOC technology or
systems on a Chip for future applications when proven beneficial
and a worthy advance after reviewing their impact in isolated
operations. Then they can be drawn up and constructed as SOCs to
reduce hardware size and weight and increases proficiency and
capacity. Providing for entire systems to be less expensive and
redundant to safe air travel with multiple options. RFID radio
frequency ID program (EZ pass) and Blue tooth a short range RF
technology for wireless telephones to interface with some
automotive telematics. These are existing technologies interfaced
via the PFN platform in the ASIC and would have the appropriate
hybrid chip sets interfacing these technologies to track, identify
and sense materials, equipment and people approaching and entering
the aircraft and the aircrafts compartments. Via, this connection
the 1A PFN or series of 1A PFS on board would work in harmony to
identify the carryon device (ESN recognition and look for alerts)
as well as manage the use or restrict any such use of cellular
phones and other wireless carryon equipment as determined best for
flight safety. As part of this invention's nature and scope these
SUC technologies and systems would write code into their protocols
to immediately transfer all PFN/FACT directives via access through
any cellular service that the phone provider is part of for
emergency action messages to be delivered into the surface IP/TSA
gateways. This gives a continual down feed of identifiable data
packets and information of a troubled flight to surface receivers
or satellite connected to data receivers/receptacles for further
data resources in real-time and for later analysis. Special
arrangements with these providers to support secure gateways into
this IP security matrix of TSA and other agencies will have to be
arranged and constructed.
FIG. 25 FIG. 25 is a simple drawing showing the general approach to
the PFN structure. There are ten separate filings with descriptions
of PFN protection specific to application and innovative product
and calling for those skilled in hr art to use standards for the
specific industry and application in the final design of any
particular enclosure. Even in this application the FACT ball is
another complete description of a specific enclosure for aviation
applications. Here the specific protective encasement has to take
high impact and protect the even memory and electronic
components.
Generally speaking the memory storage is the most import part
protected to analyze what the unit was doing at the time of any
critical event or failure. However, the Primary Focal Node is a
Protected primary focal note and so are all the actuators to
perform accountable remote control and robotics. For this reason
the electronic circuits and connections are made for robust and
rough service and the coverings and encasement designs are
constructed for the same purpose. Reliability is the other major
reason the structures are made for rough service. And another is
that the PFN/TRAC unit is made to restrict the authorized use of
equipment and vehicles to include aircraft. Therefore its
management system has to be impregnable while a vehicle is being
operated. So if it is operated in an unsafe and unauthorized manner
the PFN can control the equipment to a safe shut down.
To the left in FIG. 25 the outer wall can be constructed of any
material suitable for the application however must of the 1SV, 1E,
and 1A PFNs will have some kind of a metal exterior resistant to
drills and sharp objects with heat resistant plastics like poly
suphone for antenna ports like internal or patch antennas that are
impregnated into the unit. The exterior wall might have a Teflon
coating or special electrical insulator or rely on a metal chassis
to make a ground connection with a host machine.
Rough service plastics and composites may be used for some
applications. The inner section between the two walls is and
thermal section and will be filled with insulators like solid smoke
the space shuttle tile material, gypsum, dyper jell or just an air
space.
Once again the inner wall like the outer wall can be constructed of
whatever materials best serve survivability of the electronic
package and the application desired.
Engineers will consult standards for explosion proof and firebox
and black box standard when configuring suitable protection for the
1A aircraft PFNTRAC ASICs. All PFNs have restricted access and
physical locking as well as unique electronic locking and tamper
resistant as well as tamper detection technology built right into
the encasement design and the same is true for the electronic
designs as well. These devices are well documented and detailed
throughout all the related filings.
No design or configuration detailed in this filing or any PFN
related filing should be construed as the only protective
embodiment or all the protective means for the invention. Any and
all protective means to maintain reliable and accountable remote
control and robotics falls within the nature and scope of the
invention.
FIG. 26
These applications could involve wireless or direct connect data
links to interface all the machines, equipment and vehicles in a
specific area. The different PFNS are commercially flexible for the
various technologies and companies to interface, access and control
any or all of the airport equipment e.g. ground service people,
different airlines, private security contractors, local police, and
the TSA etc. The individual PFNS represented in FIG. 26 recognize
new vehicles people and materials transported as they enter their
geographic area via GPS, triangulation or other positioning
technologies and/or other senor arrays and technologies interfaced
e.g. RFID. The 1E Routers have all the various and relevant
communication interfaces and can translate emergency messages
across the various communications interfaced (SEAM, TEAM PEAM and
EAM messages etc.) and router via TSA FACT 11OO Command control
center at the airport to each PFN unit as part of the FACT Security
Program. Each machine, vehicle or personal PFN is a broad local
receiver and broadcast station in the FACT security and PFN/TRAC
Management system. They have stable and reliable power in redundant
form with emergency battery backup. The following outline provides
prototypical examples of the types of equipment and personal
accountable wireless controllers that the TRAC Aviation Company
will provide to air travel and aviation traffic management and
security both aloft and on the surface. The product lines are: the
(1a,b, c TRACker) (1A PFN Series) Aircraft controllers, (1E PFN
Series) Equipment controllers stationary applications, (1SV PFN
Series) Surface Vehicles, (1 P PFN Series) Personal
Communicator/Controllers, and the FACT.TM. Security program (1100
FACT-AV) Aviation Controlled Security and Management Intranet for
TSA. All equipment and personnel are linked in a seamless security
for Homeland Security It is transportation with law
enforcement.
FIG. 27
Is an overview of the TSA FACT 1100 command center. The planes, the
security cruiser, the shuttle bus and video are all connected to
application specific PFNs that can interconnect with other assets
and the FACT command and control center. This creates a flexible
sensory web or network at the airport and an integrated system.
Additionally, many equipment and vehicle PFNS are running the
automated frequency scan technology and can identify all electronic
devices in proximity and most especially identify unauthorized
signal or wireless activities. This is a necessity if there is to
be reliable and accountable remote control.
Frequency counting and recognizing is an important part of FACT
Security as well for example. Even the plane in the picture TRACker
unit or 1A PFN is detecting movement around it and identifying with
known ESNs etc. This would include mechanics wearing PFN belts,
bracelets, bands or implants or RFID Tags.
Also, baggage is being sensed as well via 1Ps stand alone PFNS,
RFID technology, barcode readers and the proprietary bag sign
technology. This data rendered by other PFNS is transmitted back to
FACT control at the airport to follow and match up materials and
people traveling together or suppose to be e.g. The air craft
TRACker unit discovers a piece of left behind carryon luggage when
a passenger departs the air craft. Additionally much of the
equipment having PFNs attached to them is material handling pieces
of equipment, tugs, and forklifts baggage elevators, conveyor
belts, shuttles. They too are scanning materials and luggage by the
added sensor array that can be interfaced with their PFN/TRAC unit
and the sensor software if not unit firmware can run and is
supported by PFN/TRAC processor. This data recovered is all part of
the data assimilated in the FACT command an control center and then
acted on immediately via direct connect through the WR wireless
router station in the Protected center and the individual hybrid
chip sets interfaced in the Plug and play portion of the optimal
individual PFN transceiver to effect a response. Of course local
operators and security are notified as well.
Additionally, the 429 TSA FACT airport command centers will have
alternative power both onsite diesel generators and battery backup
as well as solar and wind where applicable. The compound is to be
fenced and jersey walled and the operations centers must be able to
withstand a reasonable attack with explosives (traditional Block
house or under ground construction with concrete reinforced walls.
Antenna towers and satellite dishes are to be fenced and jersey
wall protected and guarded. A reasonable restricted area has to be
put in place. The compound t include the restricted area is to have
PFN/TRAC unit driven or interfaced video and audio surveillance and
detection technology with thermal and infrared heat sensing, light
and movement sensing and a state of the art electronic Id access
set of systems. A well trained and armed defending force must
maintain 24 hour guard 7 days a week for ever and not become
involved in any other security functions or duties at the airport
no matter what. There has to be two of every thing at all times
Servers, Memory storage displays and monitors communication
components and reserve equipment to insure the redundancy in case
one of anything goes down. The protecting force should have all the
necessary small arms and bio chemical nuclear hazmat and protection
gear and hand held stinger missiles and a battery of patriot
missiles and/or phalanx machine cannon should be in place with in
the compound as well to protect against incoming radar and
transmission tracking missiles. (This may seam a bit extreme to
protect the 429 TSA FACT command centers at the commercial airport
at this level, but this is to be a progressive process and
ultimately, these centers will house remote control stations to fly
FACT flights and they need to be protected at the highest level to
insure we do not have any unauthorized people interfering with
aircraft aloft or the people who are aiding these troubled flights.
Initially there will be 5 FACT Safe bases planed and they will be
thoroughly guarded, but ultimately as flight and landing software
libraries are developed guiding a trouble flight to the nearest
commercial airfield may be a desirable choice to help an
inexperienced pilot, like JFK Jr. If we have the capacity to
operate an aircraft from the airport we have to guard that control
system properly. And this invention is all about flying a troubled
aircraft remotely and robotically to a safe landing if at all
possible.
FIG. 28
This is the biggest challenge for the PFN/TRAC System. To develop a
cooperative environment for working with all manufacturers and
industries to construct this vast machine messaging matrix and make
it efficient. This technology was created to solve, the unsafe and
unauthorized use of vehicles and equipment and reduce driver
distraction from cellular phones and carryon wireless devices via
navigational aids interfaced with driver assist programming and
remote control. Virtually anything making machines and vehicles
more robotic to assist human workload in operating, equipment,
machines, vehicles and aircraft use are to be interfaced with the
invention the PFN/TRAC system and specifically this innovation in
air travel management with FACT security. The main object is to
coordinate and control movement on and near the earth's surface for
more; safety, better security, efficient use of resources, a
healthier world environment, and more stable economy to improve the
quality of life. Since the recent terrorist events in New York and
Washington, eyes have been opened and American cooperation between
corporations in the aircraft industry and the airlines have been
very responsive. But it is somewhat stifled for the need of an
excellent organizational plan. One that can pull all of our great
technologies together. This baffled state is nothing for our great
nation to be ashamed of. Nor, should there be blame thrown around
at the government organizations and agencies like the newly formed
TSA or the fledgling homeland security program orphan for a year
and jus becoming a Department with a cabinet position in the
executive branch of government.
The first real step in any effort starts with architecture of good
management. This is the PFN/TRAC System with FACT Security FIG. 28
states what needs to happen commercially to begin to correct the
problems facing the country. STEP 2 is that coordinated effort to
construct the organizational management system for the lasting type
of security America deserves and the world needs this invention can
truly help America's security and economy to include the world
economy and quality of life for a more stable and secure existence.
It can help us address our individual needs and differences and
properly mine and distribute resources through an organizational
architecture and accountable machine-messaging matrix.
FIG. 29
Shows a man walking on earth and his position derived from GPS
Satellites to a GPS receiver on a belt system that is interfaced
with a wireless telephony (in this case a 2 way paging system--via
a stamp computer or microcomputer or Motorola COTS Creat a link II
product). This figure is shown to introduce the personal 1P PFNs.
The GPS data (NEMA data) is modulated into data packets and paging
protocols and transmitted back to a monitoring program displaying
the man's position on a calibrated map via the commercial paging
service and protocols to a land line dial up server retrieving the
data packets at the application level deciphering them via the
appropriated Paging and GPS programming and driving the view
monitor to see a representative maker of the man walking on
earth.
FIGS. 29 through 35 are expansions on this first personal tracking
device. It has been taught in filings with different RF
technologies and to include cellular telephony and not just for
tracking. It has been specified with event memory and local
interface capacity and indeed products like the TRACker and the 1Pc
PFN PDA are personal 1 P PFNs. They interface multiple wireless and
perform routing functions they have event memory storage and
perform accountable remote control. E.g. administer medication from
a doctor's remote command.
In the next figures, personal PFNS will be detailed in depth as the
relate to the airport sensing matrix and FACT security network.
Even this 1997 first personal PFN repeater tracker unit could be
functional at the airport. With paging protocols interfaced in the
TSA/FACT 1100 Wireless Router and in the individual PFNS. Of course
this relies on the protocols developed and implemented by the pager
company to process EAM SEAM TEAM and PEAM messages and then these
signals and individual identifiers would be delivered to the matrix
via the pager signal and displayed on FACT airport commands
calibrated mapping screen.
This drawing's parts are not detailed as they are detailed in
earlier filed applications and used here to introduce the air
travel 1p personal PFN products.
FIG. 30 illustrates the use of pager technology specifically 2 way
paging coupled to GPS. Motorola reflex 2 ways paging via their
Creata link II technology providing a minimal microprocessor to
allow for remote activation of a limited number of accessories
interfaced via the belts electrical bus and connectors. Other more
sophisticated processors can be interfaced with reflex II paging
protocol products, or Rim, and Europe's Ermies paging technologies
in other PFN/TRAC applications.
This figure is also from another filing and it is the interface
belt concept focused on in the next five figures that is of most
importance. These commercial tracking/telemetry products were
created to perform accountable remote control and be accountable
remote controller units. They could be the last and only critical
link at times for local or nearby human machine interface with
controls via equipment PFNS and vehicle PFN controller routers.
For these 1P belt applications they have one or a multiple wireless
technologies interfaced, however size, weight and power
requirements are always going to be considerations. The important
point is universal inclusiveness of all the wireless technologies
that exist today in the aviation and air travel industry. The belt
interfaces allow for a plug and play combination of wireless
devices and connectable to be interfaced via the 1P PFN TRAC
processor to be responsive in TEAM.SEAM, PEAM and EAM messages.
FIG. 30 has a 2 way pager connected to the 1 P PFN TRAC processor
17 via pager data port cradle connector. Additionally, the GPS 16
would be connected to deliver time and hot geographic coordinates.
All the pagers have a data access port now. The processor is
connected or has embedded protected and secluded event storage. In
fact the belts, bands, etc can be as complete as the ASICs in FIGS.
24, 25 and miniaturized to a SOC in the future, or as simple as a
RFID passive tag, however probably at least an active tag with the
power available and minimal processor and memory (if desired).
Additionally, concealed passive RFID Tags or FACT Chips discussed
later and in earlier related filings are to be used on each belt as
a double check for tampering with the 1P PFN belt unit. These
assigned electronic identities have to jive in the local 1P PFN
TRAC processor running a FACT compare program and also in the
intranet registry of known equipment signatures on file or there is
a level one FACT flag and the belt system is marked for inspection
as well as the person wearing it. Other identity checks to include
pin codes and video and face or iris scans through out the security
matrix from time to time can be requested from TSA FACT Command/or
as one passes through the facility wearing the belt.
Normal Operations
The real advantage is that this already in use paging technology
has it's wireless power used to increase the capacity of TSA
Security via the interface PFN/TRAC belt and FACT sensing network
of communications. Now other readers sensors, digital cams that
capture snapshots jpegs, can download to the TRAC processor and
simple ID card swipe data can be connected to the TRAC processor
and buffer to deliver packet data into the FACT system via paging
microwave frequencies to the local WR router hub at the TSA Fact
command center or through the 1E,SV PFNS with chipsets capable
Additionally two way messaging protocols will have their higher
application translated for the family of emergency action messages.
In the lower right corner is a minimal PDA display that can be
interfaced to receive a Jpeg photo (snap shot image for a FACT
security alert delivered to the belt buffer or to a more
sophisticated 1Pc PDA PFN.
Microwave commercial paging signals migrate through buildings very
well and are a chosen modality to send directives to preprogrammed
and robotics programs running in equipment and vehicle PFNs that
just need an initiation signal to a specific address and/or cut off
signal. These 1Ps stand alone PFNs with or without any other
interfaces may receive there signals by this modality.
Additionally, in the monitor display is TRACs public information
products to help manage flow in relation to real time equipment
operations in the airport (windows applications). TSA FACT center
can release statistical movement figures and screen security data
for public information. Additionally commercial service and airline
companies can efficiently communicate with each other and maintain
privacy as well as they provide flow traffic to the FACT security
matrix that is also monitoring movement.
These pager products functioning in normal airline and airport
operations are given a more robust role via their communication
capacity and PFNTRAC belt interfacing.
FIG. 31 One initial point is that in the FACT center all data and
mobile assets will be displayed on the same screen for easy
tracking, however the individual wireless intranets could support
their assets on intranet monitors and TV screens as well. As is the
case with the pager the belt will provide a securement and
connection of the COTS cellular phone on the belt with data access
connections to the TRAC processor. GPS is also TRAC interfaced and
there is additional memory and power to interface a host of other
sensors readers and direct connection with or the PFN equipment and
down load or up load data and programs as is necessary. Displays
PDAs as well as keyboard number pads, finger print technologies and
full digital cam can be interfaced with the belt and TRAC
processor. Here again is the awesome power of the cellular phone
service being used at the air port by airlines and law enforcement
by simply plunging it in a 1 P PFN interface belt and it is
recognized logged and connected to the TSA/FACT security matrix
immediately.
This drawing as well is from the earlier PFN/TRAC writings so an
overview of this specific belt is given to explain its use in the
PFN/TRAC System of FACT Security at the airport.
In 31 this specific system is more COTS embedded. This is a
cellular PCMCIA Complete modem.TM. #5 interfaced on the belt 7 with
a 104 microprocessor or mini computer. 6 with also GPS #7 unit that
modulates packetized position data to the left monitor 1 which
receives transmissions from the belt through total wireless at both
ends. This is a mobile-to-mobile real-time transmission and can
carry digital cam images or receive them from the TSA FACT command
Center. In the right the No. 3 monitor is a stationary application
in the TSA FACT command center and receiving these CDMA, TDMA STDMA
and analog wireless telephony via the master universal wireless
router interfaced with the TSA FACT command and control center
servers (redundant).
Local displays on the belt can be connected directly or if DSRC is
integrated in the PDA display device and the 1P PFN cellular belt
the image can be delivered by wireless.
FIG. 32 interfaces the latest cellular protocols like Nextel, and
ATT uses Motorola's shareware protocols with digital paging,
digital 2 way radio and TDMA digital cellular ARINC and Motorola's
iDen share 2 way radio function text messaging and cellular phone
service systems are shown on the 1P PFN belt configuration and
interfaces a transceiver unit with a processor or micro computer
and GPS with an event memory and utilizes this technologies
wireless capacity to report to TSA/FACT and deliver commands to a
mobile asset interfaced or perform RC for 1Ps stand alone units or
perform remote control to a human or animal. Any wireless
technology can be used to deliver data back to the FACT system in a
number of ways. They can be interfaced with the belt as earlier
detailed either by hardwire connectables or DSRC like blue tooth of
802.11 these modalities are all detailed in the patent and
protected writings of the PFN/TRAC System. And not all the numbers
will be detailed in this figure either.
Basically the Nextel products can be connected to the TRAC
processor via their data connection port as well and other
interfaces can be made to transfer data back to the TSA/FACT
Wireless routing stack at the airport or port or any facility
desired to support a multiplex router for the PFN/FACT System FACT
Security matrix.
This diagram is suppose to display multiple wireless interfacing
with 31 being a pager and 30 being cellular phone or DSRC and/or FM
radio. All of could be carried and interfaced through the belt bus
and TRAC processor. Once again the PDA and keypad assembly can be
interfaced and allow the belt wearer to send DSRC signals to
surrounding equipment and give local remote control commands. These
commands can be given audibly by the person into a microphone
interfaced or repeater system. Earphones can be interfaced to allow
the wearer to hear information privately. 22 shows the TSA/FACT
monitor simplified for illustration purposes. And 26 shows the
upper commercial and public information stack the PEAM and EAM
messages where the TSA/FACT or Department of Homeland Security
public filter is asking for assistance. To the left is the TSA
secret data
FIG. 33 shows a top and side view of the belt system and
accessories that can be interfaced through the personal PFN. 33 is
a special electronic lock connecting with 39 that transports a
special digital signal randomly generated in the PFN to insure when
the belt is applied it can not be removed with out sending a signal
to FACT control. 43 is a finger thaw print reader connected to the
interface belt bus 37 which is connected to 42 the processor. 49 is
a card scanner, smart chip reader and digital camera. 38 is the
power source, 40 the wireless transceiver, 41 GPS if used, 45 local
memory storage, 36 sensor array with other biometric connected
options. These are the normal 1P PFN utility belts. It has an
electronic lock where a signal has to be provided from 42 and
received from FACT command control to release or lock the belt on.
This to guarantee the person has been identified before their shift
and the authorized person is wearing the device. 36 is a
perspiration sensor that can detect acidic and salt changes to
detect alcohol and some drug/chemical use or exposure. All sorts of
biometric devices can be connected to the belt or send their data
via DSRC and even be implanted internally to include RFID tag
technology. Sensors attached to implants of course can deliver
positive evidence to a persons identity and relative health
condition in real time and these applications would be used for
pilots and other mission critical operations and security
personnel.
On the other side of the law, criminals being transporter by public
air transportation would have the belt locked on before they depart
from their lockup with automated medication vessels and delivery
systems charged and interfaced with 39 the belt electrical bus
(medication known not to be an allergen to the prisoner) 35 is an
electrode contactor either connected to the skin or 1/6 pin prick
extension upon being energized by the TRAC processor and providing
a Tazer type shock to the unruly prisoner provided by a capacitor
and the power pack (High voltage low amp (and the prisoner' cardiac
health, any history of ellipse or health conditions known to be
life threading is known by the authorities tracking with GPS and
telemetry to include audio and video of the transported criminal
any remote controlled subduing application performed locally by the
attending guard or remotely would be performed to protect the
public.
(Protocols and procedures to be determined) This is not like house
arrest technologies this is a full accountable remote control PFN
unit managing and following the criminals movement anywhere and
everywhere the security matrix exists All security will know where
this individual and have all their vitals and photo during the
transport process.
In a more positive application the belt system can be worn by those
requiring close monitoring for compromised health and can have
cardiac sensors interfaced and deliver telemetry to the doctor's
computer server and alert the physician that his patient at 40,000
feet is going into ventral fibula ion and needs to have the
automated mediator deliver adrenalin to jump stat the art beat and
eve have a paddle pad adhered to the patients chest wall and can
activate the adequate charge to start his heart. I this case the
personal PFN would route through the TRACker unit or 1 A PFN/TRAC
controller router in the aircraft. In the airport it could be the
metal detector relaying the signal or more likely the FACT Center
Router.
In the best case scenario would be the implementation of the 1PFN
belt system as a personal routing platform to all the airport and
aviation equipment routers. This means all workers and regulars at
the airport would wear one. Then all transients or passengers or
visitors could be if the nation was at a high tend security level
issue magnetic paper passes read license magnetic information RFID
everyone entering the airport barcode them use bag sign to have
their identity easily fast and with readers connected to the belts
keep track of people and bags in transit. The belts of course would
enter their recovered data with TSA FACT Command to be transferred
to TRACker and applied to the individual's destination with all the
identifiers and materials Baggage in transport as an accountable
portable network and inventory.
Additionally, all types of scanners and detector could be attached
to these belts to detect Nitrates for EDS explosive detection
sensors, Geiger sensors and radiation transducers for radiation
detection, and bio hazards with gas spectrometry and resonate
imaging. Additionally the nose could be used. This technology
detects odors 2000 times that of the humans nose and generate a
digital signal that can be compared to known toxins and dangerous
substances in an electronic library either in the TRAC processor in
the belt and/or reported to the FACT command and control center at
the air port or dial direct to CDC for a substance they have
download to all FACT intranets and PFNS. This is the responsiveness
of the PFN/TRAC system for seamless FACT security via 1P PFN 1Ps
PFN, 1E PFN 1SV PFN, 1a,b,c TRACker unit, the 1PsPFN FACT ball and
the FACT 1100 command and control intranet for TSA and the
Department of Homeland Security.
Current Effort to Commercialize This Technology
4. 1 P PFNS Series) Personal Communicator/Controller Fourth of Four
Aviation PFN Products with FACT Security
TRAC Aviation seeks government support and assistance to include;
funding, technical expertise, and technical transfers in an effort
to partner up with major electronics and telecommunications
manufacturers in developing (personal PFNS), a patented and
protected accountable remote control and personal tracking
technology. (FACT), a security control component of the PFN/TRAC
System, performs security functions through PFN belts or personally
secured units. These miniature Trusted Remote Activity Controllers,
TRAC units, will be constructed as Systems on a Chip or SOC
technology. They will be responsible for personal security and
identity checks in and around the airport facility pertaining to
human movement. Federal Access Control Technology (FACT) receives
direct communications from personal PFNS and through aircraft (1A)
PFNS, equipment (1E PFNS) surface vehicles (1SV PFNS), by having
their signals relayed from these other PFNS more powerful
transceivers. Personal PFNS have improved communications and
confirmed tracking via the repeating capacity of this airport
machine-messaging network (FACT). All PFNS have a GPS component and
redundantly verify location via automated triangulation software in
the relay and routing process. (FACT) security is a real-time human
machine interactive accountable security matrix for surface and
airborne activities with real-time interagency coordination to
enhanced public safety and national security as well as build
public confidence in air travel.
FIG. 34 This original PFN figure is likewise from an earlier filing
but displays the more universal configuration of the IP personal
PFNs. It shows a protective enclosure 53 (with an appropriate
robust construction per size and weight possibly and/or concealed
in the belt or band structure) a self contained power source 52
with a current and E/E bus system that integrates the components
provides a plug in connections and additional external interfaces
indicated by the units upper left components like, Skin contact
sensors, breathalyzer, transducers, finger print ID, iris scan,
pulse sensor & galvanic sensors. As an example of belt
interfacing with the PFN/TRAC unit, this shows an individual
biometrics array and related application for guarded medical
conditions or for the conditionally released or guarded during
transported (the criminal).
However, this invasive 1P biometrics 1P PFN application is proposed
for TSA FACT security and all that work at the nations 429
airports, all airport operations personnel, all flight crews, all
airlines personnel, all service personnel, material handling and
baggage personnel, local law enforcement, and commercial venders,
and at all Safe Bases across the nation. To first interface all
these disparate communications and then identify them continually
in the AOC/TSA FACT security system at the local airport and
through out the TSA FACT security matrix across the nation. To
include; all seaports and/or ports of entry into the country, at
boarder crossings and worn by TSA/Customs/Immigration
nationalization system checkers INS (other applications than
commercial air travel and air transport require additional
licensing from the intellectual property holder(s) of these related
application(s) patented or protected filings).
These units, rather than a COTS device connection would be the ASIC
constructed in a more embedded circuit board (surface mount or
event chip configuration (hybrid substrate and/or with SOC
technology). Commercial COTS components as discussed for the other
PFNs can be used as well e.g. (PC 104 architecture for certain 1P
and 1Ps PFN/TRAC ASICs (or for Tracking elephants, J) As a general
rule the miniaturization and reduction in weight is the progressive
direction for these product innovations with size and rugged
constructing being replaced by seclusion and short range position
detection and data recovery. The following figure is the reduction
of the PFN/TRAC circuit to a SOC chip and insertion or surgical
implantation into a person with the introduction of a unique power
source--the human body as an electrolytic cell.
The types of communication interfaced have been covered and would
depend on the application, but the options are vast. Encryption is
necessary and would also be determined by the application but the
personal belt would be configured to be connected in
cross-environmental applications for TSA/FACT applications with at
least one DSRC wireless or a universal one if and when one is
chosen and standardized.
DSRC for TSA/FACT Standardization is a possibility--not a
requirement for cross environmental and cross Intranet connectivity
for DOT TSA FACT homeland security matrix between the intranets of
Air, Sea, Rail or Interactive Highways, etc. for intermodal
coverage example (seamless security).
Additionally the multi-wireless units will have a capacity to
direct connect to the different levels of the FACT security matrix
from local at the air port to the regional services by state or
area depending on the government agency and service the
PFN/TRAC/FACT unit programming is attempting to connect with or the
Nation Homeland Security Command/or it could contact all
simultaneously with each computer server and terminal decrypting
and ciphering the application buffers for complete real-time
messaging on any receiving end.
The belt systems are not to limit the configuration of the IP
personal PFN/TRAC units They may have their components dispersed in
garments either connected by hard wire or wireless portable mini
networks with DSRC technologies and daisy linked set of micro
processors. All are with in the nature and scope of the invention
to connect with the PFN/TRAC system and FACT security web.
Track a Con.COM an earlier detailed PFN/TRAC product parole boar
and Law enforcement intranet always interfaced with FACT Security
This system would allow for parolees to be back in society, while
their movements and activities were monitored and governed by an
automated computer system that would track physical movement
through GPS, or LoJack or Cellular and/or RF triangulation on a
personally carried device that monitors body temperature, pulse
rate and provide for positive identification, e.g., fingerprint or
eye iris evaluation The device would be controlled by the master
controller and support local Web page access and hyper-link
capability. Tactile and galvanic sensors would be capable of
detecting chemical changes in perspiration and determine the
chemical equivalent for a specific person drinking and provide a
specific electrical signal that is transmitted back to the parole
center for a convict beep and directions to either report in or
take a skin prick check or a breathalyzer.(earlier belt system)
Locations of area liquor dispensing or known drug activities and be
plugged in as trail markers on the GPS programs to flag a convict=s
questionable activities or ask for the above checks or a phone
call.
Prior victims of crimes that an ex-con is convicted for will be
notified via a beep or their 1P PFN/TRAC unit that the TRACK A CON
is in close proximity and the police will be alerted and the
conditionally released picked up for interrogation. The convict
will be given a reasonable distance to stay away from the victims.
Once again the appropriate trail markers will be posted as GPS,
etc. Geographic coordinates and will notify authorities and victims
of flagged improper movements. The convict will be alerted as will
and warned to report in and move out of the area. Additionally, the
victims can be outfitted with a mobile page and/or Track system
warned directly of a past ex-cons close proximity. Additionally,
the victim and community can track the parolee on a public system
by contacting their state and local web page. Or this information
could be restricted to school offices or just police precincts
(protocols and procedures to be determined) These issues and
technology are well covered in prior related filings and defer to
those applications for licensing outside the safe and secure
commercial and public Air Travel and Air Transportation
industry.
FIG. 35 These 1PI PFN-PFN Implants and 1PIsb--Soma Battery PFNs
which uses a person's body as the power source are subcutaneous
inserted and/or injected under the skin or into soft non vital
adipose or fatty areas of a person's or animals body. They are a
miniaturization of the 1 P Personal PFN circuit that is first
miniaturized from COTS products on a belt to a smaller version
placed on a belt, band, bracelet and/or woven into garments and
then reduced in size further to a SOC micro chip circuit for
implantation in to living animals. The encasement is made of high
quality surgical stainless steel or noble metals or coated by them
that are known to be non allergenic and safe for internal use in
the body. The chassis ground current will be contact with the
conductive noble metal which in turn is in contact with allow the
body's internal moist conductivity properties to enhance the
minimal signal and patch antenna. Then a personal carrier of a 1 PI
& 1 PIsb can just touch the chassis of another host machine or
PFN to complete a ground side connection and deliver data in the
PFN/TRAC System matrix with the most minimal current levels (ID and
GPS data)(person and last known location).
These 1PI and 1PIsb PFN versions first and foremost have a DSRC
dedicated short range communication wireless connection that can
normally transmit hundreds of feet or up to a mile effectively to
deliver a EAM (emergency action message) to all other 1 E-1SV and
1A PFN and equipment PFNs in the PFN/TRAC machine messaging matrix
and FACT security and registry data bases. At this point local
first responders are to be notified immediately with the IP
notification of all relevant agencies and FACT registry data bases
(e.g. Local police and regional and national FBI computer networks
for a lost child or person scenario as well as directions and info
uploaded to any local amber alert system or intelligent highway
system, public media, civil alert system and web page alert.
Special security applications include military, police, fireman,
mental and medically at risk persons. (e.g. For military--these 1PI
family of PFNs and their EAMs may be used to identify friendlies
and combatants and release or with hold for use a remote controlled
military asset on a battle field or base) or used to locate a lost
person or one requiring medical assistance or even provide that
medical assistance from a remote location via automated medicators
also inserted in the body and interfaced)
Body Function Remote Control and Robotics (Cybernetics)
The PFN/TRAC unit is to give mindless machines a Brain or
artificial intelligence and also to share activity controls in an
accountable manner with humans for equipment to assist them when
unsafe operation is transpiring. Why then should it stop there? Why
not have this remarkable movement management system help those who
do not have control over their motor functions to move as the
desire. (e.g. the paraplegic and quadriplegic) (this portion defers
to the prior healthcare and conditionally released PFN/TRAC
telemetry and remote and automated control technology filed
earlier).
1PI PFN unit sets would be constructed as a harmonious set of
dispersed of SOC circuits interoperating by wireless and gaining
their power from pacemaker type batteries or other power source
technologies. Then they can be used to deliver a measured
electrical charge to nerve bundles to stimulate a radiating
synaptic response and cause a proportional tetanus in the muscle
for controlled contractions by recognizing the amount of muscle
contraction. (cybernetic robotics via local RC from the set of 1PI
PFN/TRAC components. Thereby returning controlled movement where
nerve function is absent. Via additional connected or wireless
inter-muscular sensor implants sending a digital signal for
processing by the local TRAC processor 1PI implant running a
special individual movement algorithm, initiated and managed by the
patient learning how to control bio-feed back tones for the desired
muscle activity (to stretch and twist/turn walk and run. Also an
audio implant for bio feed back would be implanted in the auditory
canal or a hearing aid style of receiver outfitted. Also, muscle
fatigue sensors for lactic acid build up are required. So sensors
also implanted into muscle bundles to detect the PH would be done
by injection or surgery. Then this conductivity change world
provide a digital tone to the individual so that when the muscle
was fatigued prior to cramp or damaging spasm. This change in
conductance would be monitored and if the transfer of the potential
energy between any over worked muscle and other portion of the body
could result in the generation and storage of electricity in the
PFN power supplies via the contrasting electrode innovation
discussed above a charging circuit would be real-time constructed
by energizing it via the monitoring program in the TRAC processor
(or power supply firmware). This could also rapidly dissipate the
toxic PH levels for the effected muscle group as well.
The only problem with these cybernetic is that the implanted
individual would have to wear aluminum foil close for when they are
driving a car through a radar trap or they might leap though the
roof of the car by false activationsJ just kidding, but the system
would have to be well engineered to reduce the chance of casual
environmental RF noise EMF and EMW affecting the system These
application specific to the Air travel air transport industry,
might apply for any of the conditionally released or physically
and/or mentally compromised. As a condition of transport of
dangerous criminals injected motor controls over the physical
actions by remote control may prove necessary. A hostile act
detector may be constructed and might read adrenalin levels and
other biometrics and restrict muscle movement via antagonist muscle
stimulation to a detected aggressive blow for example. Obviously
there is a number scenario that need the public to deliberate on
and the inventor has stressed this already. But the possibilities
are endless in controlling human activities and body functions, as
well as machines. This is also why the innovations are divided
application specific; to keep the stakeholders and public voices
appropriately a lined to develop a reasonable good and free
movement management system with security. And not just a monopolize
and dominate with a master control technology that could be
improperly applied by the few. That is not and cannot be a TRUSTED
technology Commercial dispersion of the technology into the
specific government and industries companies is a necessary element
and so is a coordinated collaboration in system integration so they
have to have a relationship to do business. Special structured
Joint venture agreements and licensing will be in place to try to
insure this diverse property of the technology. (Total
Accountability all the time must be there).
FIG. 36 These 1PI PFN-PFN Implants and 1PIsb--Soma Battery PFNs
that uses a person's body as the power source are subcutaneous
inserted and/or injected under the skin or into soft non-vital
adipose or fatty areas of person's body. They are a miniaturization
of the 1 P Personal PFN circuit that is first miniaturized from
COTS products on a belt to a smaller version placed on a belt band,
bracelet and/or woven into garments and then into a SOC micro chip
circuit for implantation. The encasement is made of high quality
noble metals that are known to be non allergenic and safe for
internal use in the body. The chassis ground current will be
contact with the conductive noble metal which in turn is in contact
with allow the body's internal moist conductivity properties to
enhance the minimal signal and patch antenna. Then a personal
carrier of a 1PI & 1PIsb can just touch the chassis of another
host machine or PFN to complete a ground side connection and
deliver data in the PFN/TRAC System matrix with the most minimal
current levels (ID and GPS data)(person and last known
location).
These 1PI and 1PIsb PFN versions first and foremost have a DSRC
dedicated short range communication wireless connection that can
normally transmit hundreds of feet or up to a mile effectively to
deliver a EAM (emergency action message) to all other 1 E-1SV and
1A PFN and equipment PFNs in the PFN/TRAC machine messaging matrix
and FACT security and registry data bases. At this point local
first responders are to be notified immediately with the IP
notification of all relevant agencies and FACT registry data bases
(e.g. Local police and regional and national FBI computer networks
for a lost child or person scenario as well as directions and info
uploaded to any local amber alert system or intelligent highway
system, public media, civil alert system and web page alert.
Special security applications include military, police, fireman,
mental and medically at risk persons. (E.g. For military--these 1PI
family of PFNs and their EAMs may be used to identify friendliness
and combatants and release or with hold for use a remote controlled
military asset on a battle field or base) or used to locate a lost
person or one requiring medical assistance or even provide that
medical assistance from a remote location via automated medicators
also inserted in the body and interfaced)
Body Function Remote Control and Robotics (Cybernetics)
The PFN/TRAC unit is to give mindless machines a Brain or
artificial intelligence and also to share activity controls in an
accountable manner with humans for equipment to assist them when
unsafe operation is transpiring. Why then should it stop there? Why
not have this remarkable movement management system help those who
do not have control over their motor functions to move as the
desire. (E.g. the paraplegic and quadriplegic) (This portion defers
to the prior healthcare and conditionally released PFN/TRAC
telemetry and remote and automated control technology filed
earlier).
1PI PFN unit sets would be constructed as a harmonious set of
dispersed of SOC circuits interoperating by wireless and gaining
their power from pacemaker type batteries or other power source
technologies. Then they can be used to deliver a measured
electrical charge to nerve bundles to stimulate a radiating
synaptic response and cause a proportional tetanus in the muscle
for controlled contractions by recognizing the amount of muscle
contraction. (Cybernetic robotics via local RC from the set of 1PI
PFN/TRAC components. Thereby returning controlled movement where
nerve function is absent. Via additional connected or wireless
inter-muscular sensor implants sending a digital signal for
processing by the local TRAC processor 1PI implant running a
special individual movement algorithm, initiated and managed by the
patient learning how to control bio-feed back tones for the desired
muscle activity (to stretch and twist/turn walk and run. Also an
audio implant for bio feed back would be implanted in the auditory
canal or a hearing aid style of receiver outfitted. Also, muscle
fatigue sensors for lactic acid build up are required. So sensors
also implanted into muscle bundles to detect the PH would be done
by injection or surgery. Then this conductivity change world
provide a digital tone to the individual so that when the muscle
was fatigued prior to cramp or damaging spasm. This change in
conductance would be monitored and if the transfer of the potential
energy between any over worked muscle and other portion of the body
could result in the generation and storage of electricity in the
PFN power supplies via the contrasting electrode innovation
discussed above a charging circuit would be real-time constructed
by energizing it via the monitoring program in the TRAC processor
(or power supply firmware). This could also rapidly dissipate the
toxic PH levels for the effected muscle group as well.
The only problem with these cybernetic is that the implanted
individual would have to wear aluminum foil close for when they are
driving a car through a radar trap or they might leap though the
roof of the car by false activations J just kidding, but the system
would have to be well engineered to reduce the chance of casual
environmental RF noise EMF and EMW affecting the system These
application specific to the Air travel air transport industry,
might apply for any of the conditionally released or physically
and/or mentally compromised. As a condition of transport of
dangerous criminals injected motor controls over the physical
actions by remote control may prove necessary. A hostile act
detector may be constructed and might read adrenalin levels and
other biometrics and restrict muscle movement via antagonist muscle
stimulation to a detected aggressive blow for example. Obviously
there is a number scenarios that need the public to deliberate on
and the inventor has stressed this already. But the possibilities
are endless in controlling human activities and body functions, as
well as machines. This is also why the innovations are divided
application specific; to keep the stakeholders and public voices
appropriately a lined to develop a reasonable good and free
movement management system with security. And not just monopolize
and dominate with a master control technology that could be
improperly applied by the few. That is not and cannot be a TRUSTED
technology Commercial dispersion of the technology into the
specific government and industries companies is a necessary element
and so is a coordinated collaboration in system integration so they
have to have a relationship to do business. Special structured
Joint venture agreements and licensing will be in place to try to
insure this diverse property of the technology. (Total
Accountability all the time must be there).
FIG. 37 FIG. 37 is the FACT terminal display. The entire FACT event
will be viewable on a wall size screen in the TSA/FACT Airport
command center at the airport with separate monitors breaking up
specific data to present it for specific handling by trained
professionals. For example, all the known ID data on the suspect
women's passport is checked possibly by INS, while the FBI is
running the face scan/iris scan data and recorded smart chip data
from the pass port against all known records for a match. The first
database is links to terrorism because her bag lower left of the
monitor screen has triggered a flag alert as it passed an explosion
detection sensor EDS connected to a PFN/TRAC equipment PFN on the
baggage conveyor. The special ultraviolet light motorized video
reader read her invisible to the eye signature on her bags and
pulled up her travel file which was telecommunicated to all the
airports on her ticket (this process could have started overseas
and all relevant TSA FACT Security Airport intranets would have
been preloaded via telecommunications and IP protocols to track her
and her luggage identifiers by her projected flight plan, traceable
technologies could include; RFID this proprietary Bag sign product
or a 1P PFN combination of traceable ESNs and data sensing minimal
telemetry product applications. Bar code readers and tags can be
interfaced and read. The PFN PC platform is set up to run most
every sensor software and drivers or to interface via the device
controller and E/E bus to recover the data for the FACT Security
System.
Once a FACT event is initiated the entire system is quarried to
locate all components of the suspect transport party, any persons,
their separate luggage and any groups traveling together should be
identified if possible and in the appropriate manner. In the upper
left corner of FIG. 37 is the woman who owns the bag that triggered
the PFN EDS sensor on the luggage conveyor. The video cam at the
airport exit doors captured her image and is running a face scan
algorithm and an iris scan for a positive match with the luggage
Travel file data recovered on her when she and her baggage entered
the Air trans port intranet. Additionally, a TSA officer in the
airport parking area visually sees her and confirms her image on
his PDA/PFN or PDA display plugged into his 1P PFN utility belt and
moves to detain her with backup already on the way. Her identity
was also discovered at the airport exit when she passed her travel
card with magnetic strip or her passport smart card or chip through
the card reader (left center of FIG. 37). Or her RFID tag
impregnated into her passport delivered her ID telemetry to a RFID
reader antenna in the door jam which is interfaced with the 1E PFN
in the card reader or responsively connected to the 1 E PFN in the
automated doors for remote control and locking of the exit door.
But in this scenario just recorded her exit microseconds before the
FACT Flag from the conveyor initiated the process, so instantly
searches the loop memory storage and notifies all TSA FACT security
of her exit alerting the TSA officer to look up at the exit and
spot the women.
If the conveyor flag hadn't gone up by the EDS sensor that Exit
procedure would have quarried the materials registry of the airport
air intranet for a travel file on her anyway And if the exit
telemetry indicated she was going to leave the airport, while here
luggage was still in the terminal and in this case booked on flight
SD333 to San Diego through from Yemen to Heathrow and she was
exiting the Kennedy Airport FACT flag would have been issued at
this point.
Mean while the suspect bag has been removed via automated discharge
actuators that have placed it into a mobile robotics explosive
containment chamber via RC and robotics. The bag is whisked away in
an underground conduit to a containment vault with chain-linked
ceiling and rupture-able membrane that empties into a containment
tank (bladder) that intern is pumped down under vacuum. Then
robotics opens the bag and if it explodes or has toxins in it they
are read by sensor arrays protected first during the opening
procedure and exposed after the bag is opened the bladder like wise
has sensor arrays to include radioactive, Bio or chemical toxins
and also the "Nose" sensing technology is a good choice for this
application. Obviously the containment chamber would be closed
before the bag opening procedure was initiated.
Back to FIG. 37, the national alert classification is shown on the
screen and the local alert level appears on the computer monitor as
well and in this case National Home land security is at orange
"high threat" and local alert with the bag incident has jumped to
RED "Severe".
With the women detained and all her traveling assets located
quarantined within ten minutes and during TSA questioning the rest
of the traveling public continues to their known location with no
delay or in some case any knowledge of the event.
This is all hypothetical, but the PFN/TRAC units set up an easy way
to organize and link many disparate data generating technologies
and isolated security devices with out a lot of hard wiring. It
enhances their service to provide robust federal access and control
defense for a free traveling public.
Additionally, when
1100 FACT-FAA/TSA Security project industrial applicability
report
Commercial efforts are underway with government (DOD) in an effort
to partner up with major military and security contractors
initially for national air space defense. Other efforts are
underway with commercial wireless technology providers, sensor
technologies, computer/software manufacturers and system
integrators to develop the appropriate wireless to 1P interface
gateways, servers and connections to construct the TSA FACT
Security network for the nation and to write code to the determined
programs,
FIG. 38 These regular system checks and PFN system data then
downloads will to authorized service and maintenance centers for
the APUs and PFN emergency power packs. All aircraft components
essential to flight and PFN/TRAC/FACT operations will have these
service integrity checks run on their performance, and these
downloads will also go to manufactures. There is a FACT system
auditor/inventory program locally run on the aircraft via the PFNs
and a system wide redundant backup program done nationally/globally
for everything that flies in commercial and general aviation via
the FACT Registry discussed in FIGS. 38, 39, 40,41,42,43,44,45.
This portion of the FACT registry is operated by the FAA, TSA,
Preliminary FACT FAA tracking registry program. Basically, the FACT
registry tracks the use of electrically interfaced components and
any equipment desired inventoried on the aircraft PFN file (e.g.
tires type lot number) as a quality assurance program, and quick
security and safety comparison check. A running program in each 1A
PFN aircraft checks all known components to be on board with no
alerts downloaded from FACT AOC/TSA registry during pilot ACARS,
during any service of components and periodically. New item
recognition is flagged data and routed to the specific center for
analysis. For example, a suspect piece of baggage is evaluated
through the airport terminal FACT flow data base and appropriately
responded to, while an aircraft circuit or new transmission is
processed through the FACT FAA central registry and compared to
known inventory and assigned RF equipment) In this respect It can
be used to counter terrorism, antitheft and monitor the sale and
resale or reuse of aircraft and components, much as the FACT
registry is used for terrestrial PFN/TRAC units for automotive
marine and rail vehicles and products. Additionally required are
specially qualified service personnel and controlled progressive
program with security clearance for all work perform as authorized
service will have to be in place for service on any PFN/TRAC units
and their responsive components operating in any FACT portion of
the system. Ultimately, all PFNs will be operate in conjunction
with the FACT system for national security in a transportation
matrix.
This is a general flow chart of a self contained PFN TRAC/FACT
management system that will be utilized by every piece of
equipment. PFN=s may have all the listed components or any number
of them; however no mater what is electrically interfaced it will
have to be approved and registered as it is activated or
deactivated. The very first triangle at the top numbered 4-500
refers to the one and two-way pager systems detailed in the FIGS. 4
and 5 of an earlier patent application detailing the pager
interfaces like reflex I and II discussed in this application.
These pagers as is true with all components will ultimately be
provided FACT software to identify their activity and especially
for those technologies that are responsible for providing
communication data for remote control activities. The second
triangle is for cellular phone systems more sophisticated
communication systems and capable of handling and delivering very
good data signal but narrow band Good enough for video, etc. The
3rd triangle ( )-infinity frequency refers to any and all kinds of
Radio Frequency equipment including DSRC The 4th triangle with the
word locate can be either cellular phone proximity tracking, GPS,
Lorands, LoJack or part of any interactive highway control system
or master surface transportation net work and system receiver
and/or transceiver. Along with this locate system triangle the 5th
triangle is a miscellaneous communication receiver and/or
transceiver that is responsive to light, sound or any discernable
electromagnetic wave or transmission.
All of these PFN communication triangles devices or modalities
shown as upside down triangles are not shown in FIG. 39 as having a
FACT chip but they would also be provided with FACT software to
report their activation and any specific role played in any remote
controlled event as either as a receiver and/or any type of
transmitting device. As is displayed in the drawing they are
connected to the uni-bus connector O/I/ it could be a plug and play
multi-pin docking station for hybrid chipsets with a modem and
transceiver circuit etc. Any interface components that connect to
the circuit are recognized by the unit and ultimately the entire
FACT registry system via inventory integrity checks run locally and
systemically. This first happen as the interfaced components
connect to the PFN/TRAC controller/router and accompanying memory
storage units. There is software with the resident FACT program to
compare interfaced component electronic ID signals upon install,
boot up and periodically. This local fact program can be updated
and the TRAC is capable of storing and retrieving data back from
its accompanying data storage. As detailed through out earlier
related applications these PFN control circuits are sophisticated
mini computers with extremely efficient processors like the various
PC 104 boards.(from earlier filing). The TRAC processors are
explained in all the technologies and are subject to the Improved
capability and speed in processors is in the major reason for
maintaining a flexible pug and play capacity to ensure flexible
updating for future and legacy technology. TRAC has a modular based
programming of which FACT the Federal Access and control Technology
plays an intricate and unique role in recognizing and reporting new
interfacing. These programs are run by the PFN min-computers and
they send their commands and direct the data received by the uni
buss to the appropriate data storage. Either a hard drive or the
specially preserved non-volatile FACT memory that can either be
down loaded or physically removed to be used in a court of law in
the proper manner as determined by any rule regulations or laws
governing evidence and its acquisition, preparation and
presentation for a society. Both on the left side and right side of
the uni-buss are all the interfaced controls. Accessories, personal
items and electronic possessions and alternative data communication
devices. These devices are coded in the upper corners with the
initials or first letter of the words that describe their boxes as
examples of connectable interfaces employing the individual FACT
Chip. This becomes more evident in FIG. 39 where the bottom of the
page supplies numerous octagon stop sign shapes filled with these
same initials indicating FACT applications and tracking. Also
before leaving FIG. 39 it is important to remember that in the ram
memory of the mini computer the Fact ESN will be stored for all
memory devices and the memory will always require the processors
ESN or any comparable ID technology for any further or final review
by the appropriate authorities or to comply with any legal
proceeding. It should be also understood that this universal Buss
can extend outside any protected area with the immediate electronic
protected capability to recognize and protect against any
deliberate shorting or questionable interface. At the bottom of
FIG. 38 the universal buss illustrates its capability to handle
power as well as in put and output control transmissions. It is
also important to make clear that this involves a universal
secluded antenna buss or reception will be provided for by certain
types of physical structural elements in the PFN=s structure to
allow for patch antennas or physically small profile antenna
structure to function with in any standard regulation or legally
prescribed manner.
FIG. 39 At the top of FIG. 39 there is a box to the left called the
National Government Activation and Check System. From there--there
is an arrow showing a Data Base Connection (DBC) or a world wide
web Internet connection (encrypted if applicable) with the number
300 above indicative of any local and regional network as is
evident between the left national box and the box on the right side
of FIG. 38 which is termed Local Government Activation and check
System. These most generally are the primary sources to PFN
supplied data and/or to act on any SEAM,TEAM EAM and/or PEAM
messaging data received that involves National security. However,
simultaneously data is delivered to the National Homeland Security
FACT command center if FACT fagged an event in the local PFN or at
the regional level. Otherwise the data is delivered to the specific
intranet operating the specific FACT regulatory registry for
registration/activation and integrity check clearance for use of a
component or piece of equipment with a FACT identifier chip or
registry requirement before registration.
The National Registry will be a large routing system for mass
management with a FACT alert data share processing and storage
protocol in each system server/computing center, PC terminal and
PFN/TRAC unit. All responsive levels of processing will handle data
in a prescribed and secured manner through the 6 transparent IP
layers to the appropriate seventh FACT application layer (or hybrid
higher layer to be determined) where it is transposed by the
specific agency intranet codecs and tracking software applications
to include special encryption with agency specific message coding
and personal identifiers (pin codes) for secure but accountable
access to private and/or sensitive national security data to
maintain professional processing and storage in every data base.
This will be the same for all forms of communications wired and
wireless as they are processed through their respective
communication centers to IP gateways via the licensed wireless and
IP data providers and servers, through the landlines, fiber optic
cable systems or land cable systems from the PINS in the field to
the individual databases. First for accounting and billing but most
importantly to serve the and provide the management of the agencies
Intranets FACT registries and services to the new to be formed
Department of Homeland security.
The center three blocks are the technical connections and primary
functions of the national and local registries to provide the
specific government service Intranets, to develop security for the
nation and provide better public safety and build trust within the
populous, as a result accountability, fairness and just policies
and practices. This is a safe guard system for man and machine
messaging that should be review able by all of society.
As stated earlier Internet dialog and media awareness for mass and
individual input will spawn a much more involved individual citizen
and functional democracy. Obviously some critical FACT event data
will be maintained at the highest of security levels and may never
be shared with the general public. However there should be a review
process in place that protects the publics' interest and involves
the balance of powers to determine if nation a particular issue
withheld is a National Security Risk.
Note
The inventor also suggests that one man and one women should be
randomly chosen by the social security computer, per issue to serve
with an Executive branch representative, legislative branch
representative, a representative from the supreme court, and the
two random citizens for a total of five. These FOIA issues forums
can be called by the populous petitioning for it on a regular
ballot during regular elections or any of the three branches
calling for a FACT event issue to be disclosed and at one branch
refuses to comply. Of course procedures and protocols need to be
developed. Back to the Figure.
The first center block is termed AUTHORIZED INSTALLATION REGISTRY.
This may be a network of secured computers in different locations
or it might be one system in one location (at first it will be
dispersed and it might well stay that way by the serving agencies
responsive to FACT Homeland security but not housed under the same
roof so to speak. The inherent account in system allows each agency
to prove their involvement and participation and yet maintain
sovereignty for the duties they were created fore. The inventions
purpose is to create a realistic functional modality that can
create this national and local registry progressively and in the
best configuration and to maintain a level of flexibility and
redundancy to protect and secure and safe public government and
continual service. Specifically for the Transportation industries
to insure good and safe movement. The Actual structure of course
will be part of a large standards and on going effort and civil
legislative effort.
Total purpose goal: The base system is to create a national
directory of all products sold and re-sold in a country to better
track their impact on economy, resources, environment, health and
infrastructure all around the world and at the same time to allow
nations to have a FAIR frame work to develop and use imported
products, which are needed. The PFN system can help to develop
trust to insure an accountable answer to all of Societies
legitimate concerns first for individual survival and then to be
part of a mutually healthy co-existence with all of humanity. The
Authorization Installation Registry function is to record and make
available by request and/or to recognize any PFN use of an
electrical device in conjunction with the PFN and first run a
compare function to any and all legally known produced, and
legitimately marketed products in a legitimate sovereign locality
through local and/or toll free telephony or RF or MISC.
communications technology employing isolated network connection
and/or the Internet (IP). To agency specific intranet
registries.
The authorization installation will require a complete OEM
specification and description that can be used to specifically
identify individual devices and/or components. Requirements to be
determined by the sovereign nations. This data will provide
depreciating value levels and integrity checks that will be
beneficial in tracking use and varying performance for securing
public safety. Also the depreciation schedule will enjoy a
diminished cost of operational tax relevant to the products prior
use and/or time of use. This provides a use tax not a sales tax for
governing structures to apply to real time use. These generated
fees are fair and just and help defer the revenue generated by fuel
taxes to lessen the economic need for a gallon of gas or barrel of
oil. This frees the Internet to trade and free communication for
general transactions and allows for the legitimate taxing structure
for actual impact on society=s infrastructure and environment by
machines and the work they do.
Shaping the Economy for Greater Security
These are some of the transition mechanisms in the PFN/TRAC System
It is to function as a economic tool to provide commercial
feasibility and opportunity to exploit alternative energy sources
and not just continue to pay 41 cents a gallon of gas in tax to
support our road system. The invention provides a quality of life
and an opportunity for the oil-invested money to peacefully
reinvest in other PFN measurable commercial energy technologies.
This single event would do more to bring peace to the middle east
and stop humanities 100-year wars over "who owned the oil economy"
(and Power). Now that would be a security system, and the best use
of the invention in the mind of the inventor. And we could fly
planes on hydrogen converted from water (H20 in real-time) and the
WTC 911 event would have been reduced to a crash with a splash and
10% of the losses.
Then again we might have the same relationship with the oil rich
countries that help delude the minds of the 4 substitute pilots on
911 either. Security sounds better already. There is no doubt good,
fair and just management of the world's resources, and environment
is the best security. And management that shares knowledge and
opportunity for an improved quality of life can sell and be the
best export product we have.
Back to 38 the second block is the Restricted Authorization or
Crime Registry. Once again this data is supplied by everyone and
anyone but primarily cleared and reviewed by the national and state
or regional governing agencies maintaining their intranets and
servers. The really great part of this section of the system is
that the private individual can in real-time participate in a
personal injury theft by telephony with scan data or through
personal contact with law enforcement agencies. With total
accountability all parties will have to face their own actions in
the proper legal settings. And basically there will be no use or
miss--use of stolen property.
Basically, the stolen parts or components when interfaced with a
new vehicle or piece of equipments E/E system are recognized by the
local PFN or DRC, etc specifically mass contacted by the governing
industry registries that are always uploading missing material data
that is in turn down loaded in to the specific PFNS that always
runs a system integrity check on parts inventoried or installed to
the unit and/or interfaced with it. This also allows the FACT
System a base to analyze the equipment that is being used in the
country and be on the look out for anomies or FACT event Flags, for
an example; the Department of Home land security has a bus blown up
do to a specific type of wireless device attached to the DRC PFN
carryon device. The DRC PFN protected memory recorded the DSRC blue
tooth program contact with the cellular device and the alphanumeric
signal sent to trigger the explosion. This recovered data and all
similar ESN devices would locate and check automatically the total
ownership and recent sales along with suspected perpetrators and
dispatch this information to first responders as well as kill the
services of all suspect wireless and retrieve them from all known
locations if this was deemed appropriate. Additionally,
manufacturers will be encouraged to install in their firmware an
integrity program that FACT alerts the unit if there is tampering
detected. The third center block deals with the communication
capability. Ideally this will be accomplished by toll free
telephony or RF nodes for the public in using the publics=privately
owned equipment and PFN link ups as a hospitable commercial service
with all other gained accessible service options and provided free
by government or public providers for the tax and public interest
provisions. The 4th block in the center of FIG. 39 is the Protected
Primary Focal Node or PFN created as a protected electrical
interface platform to merge, focus all host equipment=s,
accessories and component=s power and control circuits into one
local accountable control and communication center. This PFN on
every vehicle or piece of equipment is then linked, coordinated and
managed with all other machine use and activities by a greater mass
communication and management set of computer network systems
(through RF, telephony and nodes or gateways) either for surface
(land and sea) coordination and/or for aviation and for TSA and
homeland security all inclusive.
However in this figure we are concerned with developing an
understanding of the FACT software in the PFN and/or possibly
individual CHIPs that are at the bottom of the page as octagons or
(mini-stop signs). Once again these might well be in the form of
physical hard ware and read only firm ware or they might be
integrated software programs interlaced and inter-reliant on the
PFN/TRAC/FACT security encryption both in the PFN and in the
National Registry systems. What is nice with the PFN/TRAC unit and
system is that a multiple wireless routing translation station is
coupled to computer terminal to have the same versatile receiving
and transmitting power and capacity on both ends of the network.
This forgiving architecture provides the opportunity for incredible
versatility interfacing of all sorts of electronic technologies and
with the traceable links reporting and recording function totally
accountable a real deterrent for hackers.
Through out this entire drawing, FIG. 39 there is descriptive of
two-way communication form the individual chips or FACT programs to
the national government activation and check process. However, the
PFN gives the commands to the individual chips via the universal
plug and play buss. And retrieves their essential operational data
e.g. ESN, and/or MIN and production Identification and seventh
layer application security instructions in the ISO OSI networking
Model. If for example a stolen audio or sound unit is connected to
the uni-buss of a vehicle. The PFN computer will signal or request
information from the individual FACT chip in the sound system
(SS-ESN-F). This can either be sent by isolated control hardware
(wires, etc.) or by sending a modulated digital signal on one of
the power legs or it can be accomplished by short range
transmissions if this modality is employed in future wireless
vehicle and equipment control systems to ease plug and play
capability and reduce the need for so much hard wiring. No mater
the means the PFN will inquire for an individual fact chip as soon
as it senses current draw. If there is a change in current from a
normal operational level the PFN will request and/or review vehicle
conformations for any trouble codes logged in the charging system
or any battery draws or charging problems. This is performed by a
TRAC software algorithm and standard current sensing micro chips in
the uni-buss and in the host equipment=s electrical system, which
can generate either analog or digital signal that the PFN/processor
can receive and recognize through any of the above in vehicle
communication modalities. This current sensing system is part of an
anti-tamper system of the PFN. It will give driver alerts to the
abnormal draw unless an individual component FACT chip sends an ESN
and data signal that is recognized for a specific authorization or
security protocol. At the very least all components can be
individually judged for their current draw and reported to the
display or checked against their OEM manufactured specifications
(Data delivered by the individual FACT CHIP to increase security
that a component has not been altered after manufacturing. Even a
individual resister chip like that used in the present vehicle keys
could be installed secluded in the board with the FACT Chip to add
even greater security and integrity checks. While this idea is
creative and new the technology to make these combined innovation
are available as electrical components and any one who is skilled
in the art could from reading this section create the necessary
circuitry to complete these security tasks. All the components are
listed through out my related patent applications for the trickster
circuits and the security seal activation switch. The universal
plug and play Buss as always stated will have to be a standardized
effort for the most optimum development. The little octagon stop
sign FACT chips at the Bottom f the page have letters on the top of
the sign like AC-F which means (Activity controls-function). These
correspond to FIG. 38 left and right blocks. Once again all the
components operating in or though the PFN will have to have FACT
chip identity capability, communication processors, data storage as
well as all these listed that access the uni-buss. The RFID
technology can be imbedded into a circuit board and maintain a
component memory function for the life of the component reporting
to the DRC PFN directly or via any other device interface or other
PFN or as quarried by an RFID reader capable PFN. (These
applications of RFID and other COTS tags and smart chips used to
track component use if done for an organized theft detection of
electronic devices and parts self reporting to a computer network
or security registry as described is considered proprietary to this
technology and within the nature and scope of the invention. (All
applications outside Commercial air travel and air transport
industry require additional licensing and coding for accounting and
billing by the prior related PFN filings).
FIG. 46 This figure state the attributes of PFN/TRAC intermodal
monitoring and tracking. As detailed in FIG. 37 for tracking
persons and their baggage as well as detecting their condition and
contents during transit can be done for materials and shipment in
transit from boats to rail to trucks to aircraft to trucks and
delivery vehicles again. There is however, a unique set of
circumstances to each of the mode of transportation. As shown in
FIG. 18--ground transportation internets involve both rail and
roadway vehicle platforms and their special transportation
machinery. These therefore are separate intranets.
The Railroad industry like aviation does not like rapid change or
any physical interfacing with the E/E systems either on the train
or to the rails. This is why the wireless TRACker unit is also
employed in the passive receive and repeat function initially and
more physically interfaced in time. Firs as a redundant system and
then as a continual progressive and working interface with inherent
redundancy and accountability. This is true for the Interactive
highway internets that are infantile in their traffic messaging and
public alerts the amber alert system of signs.
Obviously the PFN/TRAC will be much more of a tracking and
telemetry service as Telematics in cars incorporate the PFN DRC
Driver resource Center and rail cars the 1SV PFNs and inter modal
containers are constructed and/or retrofitted with 1Ps PFN as well
as components shipped in these vehicles and containers are packaged
with 1Ps and 1Ps Soc units as well as RFID technology.
The PFN/TRAC system of wireless relaying supports a floating
network inventory function for real-time accountability. When a
shipment is prepared and logged into any intranet, to include
secret or military shipment being transported on commercial
carriers or some times on a commercial carriers the PFN DRC, 1 SV
PFN rail 1 M PFN marine 1 E stationary PFN would be receiving
signals from the passing minimal DSRC and would report these
positions and telemetry via packet data to the wireless gateway for
1P routing encoded in the data packet. Prior to being shipped a
shipping plan would be filed in the intranet. As the separate
components went their different paths their beacon signals or
quarried signal from the system would constantly provide their
exact position to be compared with known shipping routes and
practices. Alerts for misdirected transport and/or the absence of
an asset in transit would or could trigger a FACT alert and system
wide up load of the missing 1Ps PFN RFID tag or bar code marked
package and the Air internet, Sea internet Rail internet and
Interactive highway to include Onstar etc. Would be downloaded the
missing ESN or code number signal for the missing shipping
component.
All the shippers like UPS, FEDEX, DHL, the motor carriers and major
rail and fright lines and cruise lines would all have responsive
PFNs on the vehicle Platforms and all would be responsive to
PFN/TRAC lost and found registry for commercial search and FACT
registry for criminal investigations and/or National security FACT
events.
The lost and found registry would be virtual and made up of all the
stakeholders intranets. They would be notified if a tracer was sent
out by a specific shipper or recipient and their intranet would
notify all parties of the miss shipped piece
FIG. 47 PFN/TRAC provides a portable network of repeating PFNs with
sensor and wireless interfacing. It performs wireless sensing and
relays data as part of a federal access and control technology for
national security and public safety. The PFN on each prime mover
harvests data continually from all the materials being carried and
routes data recovered to the appropriate monitoring terminals in
the various intranets as per pre programming or remote control
requests.
FIGS. 48 Obviously, some shipment components are more valuable
and/or sensitive than other components. For this reason The
PFN/TRAC System integration provides for minimal tracking and
telemetry to be cost effective and extensive tracking and telemetry
to insure public safety and national security. And sometimes the
more sophisticated tracking and telemetry applications used during
shipping survive the transport phase and are retained as
interactive equipment PFNS for permanent use in reporting through
the PFN/TRAC system to a specific FACT security intranet. FIG. 48
is an example of the myriad of possible components shipped and the
diverse types telemetry technology interfaced in the complete
PFN/TRAC controller router to provide the management and security
matrix or web.
Not just proprietary 1Ps stand alone PFN units with some of the
most extensive sensing and remote control capability interfaced and
stored in the shipment component to report position and condition
of a asset in transit. But also including existing technologies
like, Texas Instruments RFID technology for a little less data
recovery their (active) tag and basically ID recovery their
(Passive Tag) product. Also PFN interfaced are bar code readers and
the proprietary Bag sign technology. Mostly, interfaced by DSRC
wireless to the prime mover PFNs or TSA/Customs/Law
officer/Dockworker/UPS man/Mechanics/receiving clerks/mailroom
people/baggage handlers/ticker writers/Pilots/doctors/nurses
janitors/via their 1P PFN belt or 1P PFN PDA or another more
powerful 1Ps PFN possibly solar reenergized for more sophisticated
stand alone repeater router operations to complete the flexible
portable network of connections to locate any lost assets position
and condition in transit.
Human movement is traced via by ID and surveillance technologies
interfaced in the same manner. This is total movement management
and seamless security for everything that moves is good for
airports, ports, train stations, border crossings, state road
inspection stations, interactive highway systems and on and on.
FIG. 40 This figure will detail the registry system in general. At
the very top of the page is a small box that says World
Organizations. This is the present state of World affairs with the
national government agencies in control of the data involving any
and all mechanized civil and industrial uses of equipment and any
impact data specific to national sovereignty. Ultimately the PFN
TRAC system can help to develop trust and fair play in the use of
the world's resources and equipment as well as free humanity in an
efficient manner. When humanity matures past present survival fears
and accompanying paranoia to address only the real fears of
peaceful co-existing the PFN management system will serve its
greatest function. However, now it is best used and developed in
the individual nations to reach this point of world peace. As
communication and understanding is increased the natural sharing of
data will take place and is already transpiring on the Internet.
For the present all government agencies will serve to clear all PFN
data that is earmarked for their attention through the National
Registry and be responsible for its dissemination worldwide. The
Departments of Defense and Homeland security will have control over
all questionable data for final release at the highest FACT Command
level. This is to include the National security agencies the
President and (any congressional national security committee
advisement group?). (this is regularly an Executive Branch
operation and function of government)
This is why the big black triangle ends up with National Government
Agencies for security. Additionally, taxation can be performed
directly from every PFN(Sale and/or use tax) for the state and
National government as has been described and addressed in earlier
applications. Also credits can be applied back to the user or
citizen for any community service performed by their equipment via
the accurate accounting in place. Also aid can be applied with
re-education programs carried out through PFN terminals for
industries going through retooling wear old job skills resulted in
lay offs. These attributes and commercial products and new
industries are detailed in related filings. The bottom of the
triangle has LOCAL GOVERNMENT in big bold letters. This is done for
two reasons. First the local node (Subset of intranets with
gateways and servers will keep cost down for Registry networking.
The great advantage to the PFN/TRAC system supporting the FACT
registries is that the PS base of Processors and at each level
allows for data and processing to remain locally responsive from
the PFN to the mass data systems to service the existing dispersed
networks immediately. And second regional state and local
government is the agencies that impact the individual in most
cases. As has been detailed in earlier filings all the government
agencies are now maintaining web pages and data phone nodes and
through basic routing using ISDN and high-speed fiber optics (Cisco
routing Systems) the capability for these agencies to process data
and network efficiently is excellent. Data management for local
regional and national Data base connectivity allows for fast local
discrimination of data as well as provide much more data storage
locally making the general availability of data in the intra nets
much more responsive to web information products for the public or
through the media while separating the sensitive data from the
local PFN and through out the system. Below the local government
registry are the FACT Management & Memory for commercial
servers. And to the right side the same FACT Management but
provided by public provider nodes. The difference being that
individual commercial servers will be providing more fee for
services from emergency service to computer down loads and the
public nodes basically will be for government services FACT
operations. Basically the PFN will use both systems commercial and
public. It will do it automatically at the local PFN level via pre
programming. An important note is that both these systems TRAC and
FACT will provide accountable memory as does the PFN at the very
bottom of the page, which is responsible for activities performed
and authenticating the activities. As shown and discussed in FIG.
39 via landline wireless and satellite communications.
FIG. 41 This is a flow chart to detail FACT software in the PFN on
a host piece of equipment and also the interaction with agency FACT
software programming in the main registry. For a new install the
process is started by plugging the component via one of the
discussed interface connections. As illustrated by the second block
down the PFN/TRAC/FACT software recognizes the Components Fact chip
and calls a predetermined number. The call in number can be a
commercial server or a public provided node that access the
specific agency national registry (either locally first or vice
versa or simultaneously as detailed earlier. The right half of the
page is exemplary of FACT operational software in the main registry
system. This is at both the national and state government registry
system, which does clocked data updates to maintain uniform
integrity throughout the system. The call received by the PFN data
generated from the new component check process compares the ESN and
manufacture data to OEM supplied registry lists and known crimes of
stolen property entered in the registry by citizens and the
automated UCR and IBRS programs converting voice recognition
recordings generated in the onsite police investigation into a
digital signal and text if desired from a DRCPFN repeater in the
responding police cruisers. UCR and IBRS are FBI justice department
crime reporting programs in existence. Their forms and format would
be automated as a bases for their report-operating program. The
data would be dispersed at the local level by the crime coding
already established to reduce over loading the system. FACT event
data would be proprietary and statistical would be assimilated in
local accounting programs and passed on in data bundles at off
times.
If all is clear the registry approval is given and transmitted back
to an approved registration program in the PFN. The component is
listed as its appraised value is taxed and shown on the display for
the operator and/or owner of the host piece of equipment. The same
redundant data is sent to the appropriate governing revenue agency
intranet and a tax bill is prepared, unless the operator decides to
pay in real-time with either a credit card or bank debit card in
the card reader on the PFN. In which case the electronic payment is
sent to the cash receivables database in the Bank for the state
treasury and National IRS if appropriate. In any event the entire
transaction is timed dated and the run status is added to the
inventory list of the vehicle or piece of equipment. If hard copies
of the transaction are required a return E-mail address can be sent
to a home unit for printing or memory storage or printed on
location from the PFN or downloaded to a laptop or portable
printer. If a component is flagged with an alert it will be
accompanied with specific software commands or additional alerts
depending on the severity of the situation. A simple theft protocol
might activate the unit normally with out notifying the user and
alert the appropriate local authorities to the location of the
stolen property and then regain custody of the stolen property and
inquire as to how the person in possession received that property.
If there is a Terrorist alert to a particular component as soon as
the person installs the unit the alarms will be activated in all
emergency responding agencies and even kill all power to the PFN
and/or set off alarms and warnings.(if this procedure and protocol
are determined desirable) This depends on the nature of the
emergency and will allow for on the spot real-time commands to
augment any response. As mentioned earlier FACT can provide a
stealth eves dropping mode so that operator owner and occupants
cannot tell that they are being monitored and/or recorded but this
access mode will require a signed judges order and his personal
real-time access codes derived from a synchronized pin number
generator to electronically sign the writ or search. Once again any
miss use or abuse will of this access activity will be accountably
recorded and encrypted locally and in remote locations and abuse
should meet with the most serious criminal and civil penalties.
This activity is for FACT Homeland Security or severe public safety
threats from known dangerous criminals. Freedom of information act
will apply to any legal own of their PFN controlled equipment and
they will be able to down load their individual memory that will
show a complete access and use of their system coded with the
agencies ID (local and national as well as for commercial access)
(In light of 911 these exact applications and use have to be review
but the nature of any abuse should not be minimized and the most
profession use should always prevail.
The Exception is the court/FACT-ordered stealth surveillance: All
normal government contact with personal or private DRC PFNS or
other commercial contacts must first announce their access, to be
recognized by the own/occupant and agree to the open communication
process or it must be a time of national emergency, marshal law or
a crime in progress. In any event all will be recorded and
accountability will be part of any process to use or not use the
PFN record as evidence in a court of law. The exact use of
recordings and the preceding announcements or Miranda rights will
be part of a legal standards effort. Also a redundant record will
be kept in a remote location either in a licensed commercial FACT
server or in government mass storage. These systems are detailed in
earlier related patents. As the spider eyes and green eye software
programs. These are the law enforcement (spider eyes) and
environmental analysis programs (Green eyes) of the FACT Security
program detained in earlier related patents. The Fact program will
basically be operated with the Justice Department the FBI IBSR
incident base Reporting system and The UCR the Uniform Crime
Reporting system and it will be part of this technologies Spider
Eyes system and will be totally accessible to local law enforcement
and even the general public through national state and local agency
editing as justified and presentation on the web or for public
media notifications (PEAM and EAM messages).
However, all crime activity will be given ID=s either IBSR-UCR or
local and all data can be retrieved from the mass data in any
discovery to make everyone accountable for all decisions and use of
data including editing from the public. MS is the mass storage in
the TRACS/FACT system. Basically this drawing is self explanatory
and I have outlined in writing what would be incorporated in any
software algorithm as well as how humanity will be able to legally
use this technology in a constitutional way. The deliberative
process with the public should be fully engaged and the extent of
personal privacy invasion should be closely monitored known by all
and mirror The homeland Security threat codes. Red Severe, Orange
High, Yellow Elevated, Blue Guarded, and Green low.
Obviously what actions are warranted for which level of threat
requires further exploration with those skilled in public safety
and national security and a good hard look and understanding by the
public at large--This security portion of the technology is all
about trade offs and freedoms and responsibility. With, that said
this inventor joins responsibly with his fellow citizens to make
the hard choices and work hard to minimize the negative impacts on
our freedoms and rights.
FIG. 44 PFN/TRAC/FACT/ESN Operation Basic to the concept of
operations of the TRAC and PFN, is a unique Electronic Serial
Number or ESN, which maybe either installed by a device at the
manufacturer, or programmed at the point of sale. Every component,
device or subsystem within the accountability matrix (Local PFN)
has an electronic identifier and in some cases a secure electronic
power or processor cut off for FACT function. The ESN allows each
element within the matrix to be securely and accurately tracked,
inventoried or controlled, either through a local control loop or
remotely, by an authorized FACT application or agency. An example
of a remote application might be local law enforcement personnel
disabling a vehicle being chased by police officers. In many ESN
applications, proper security measures would obviously need to be
taken to prevent replication or copying of device or system ESNs
for the purposes of fraud, unauthorized control or interception of
data, or other criminal or terrorist activity. The FACT ESNs would
also be the basis for digital encryption of information passed
between the PFN device and the controlling entity (A National set
of agency Intranets for a complete FACT Registry) with local
network processing nodes through public communications channels
such as the phone lines or Internet initiated in many cases
wirelessly from mobile PFNs accompanied by their Mobile
Identification Number (MIN). This technology is nearly equivalent
to that used in today=s wireless systems and will incorporate many
of the COTS encrypted security systems at the application level.
Therefore it will require little research and development to
implement; only modification of currently used commercial
technology is needed to expand these applications of ESN/encryption
technology to other areas (components, devices, equipment)
interfaced through the PFNs. The adoption of standards that allow
multiple vendors to inter operate is of primary importance and
should be pursued in appropriate standards organizations such as
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), International
Standards Organization (ISO) or others such as the Institute for
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Electronic Industry
Association (EIA) and Consumer Electronics Manufacture Association
(CEMA). As well as all the industry specific manufacturers and
their associations e.g. for Automobiles.
The PFN provides for flexible interfacing during this process but
agreed upon standards to further refine and define the variables is
essential.
The importance of security in these systems cannot be under
emphasized. While communications privacy within the PFN matrix is a
concern, it pales beside the threat of spoofing of such systems.
Digital has virtually ended spoofing as was experienced with analog
system. And PFN accountability will system hackers NEW FACT CHIP
General purpose possible modality to prove feasibility Component
FACT chips are a micro-controller chip and/or smart chip that is
integrated and/or interfaced with a silicon switching relay in
every power regulating circuit or send the necessary data signal
for any and every electronically controlled piece of equipment,
devices and/or commercially available circuit. The FACT system will
be able to interface into any control circuit and restrict
operation through a chip or software and direct all input signals
to a designated onboard memory that is also provided time, date,
location and the author of command (pin finger print ID or iris
eye) as well as the command strings and all responses there to; be
they automated or due to human activities.
The individual software will be capable through PFN interface
communications to provide their stored data (firmware or flash
memory to the National Registry upon a new installations and will
be able to immediately in real-time report this data. Once the data
is receive and processed it will be checked to see if it has
tripped any alert flags. If there is no criminal or suspect
security flags the registry will record the new FACT component
installation with accompanying (PFN operating inventory) to the
appropriate PFN file in the main registry and apply the appropriate
taxes and fees for the product installation. This will be
accomplished through a publicly provided registry phone none or a
licensed and bonded commercial server that is registered and
periodically inspected and reviewed to have and provide a secure
Data Base Connection or encrypted Web connection with the
appropriate government agencies (the National Registry, FCC, FBI
etc.). This is all part of the Trusted Remote Activity Controller
System. This FACT program will provide a secure command string and
access path from the origination to any mass memory storage system
that is search-able from the National Registry by any appropriate
authority or agency. Some failsafe security for the system is
provided by the component software of FACT at the application level
establishing a handshake with local memory in the PFN and
legitimate remote registry equipment and a secondary integrity
check from prior legitimate registry contact data. (possibly a
Random code number established in the last contact with the PFN and
Registry. The registry will provide all public providers and
commercial servers with the alert flag data so any receiving system
will be able to inform the PFN of national security alerts for
potentially dangerous devices (terrorist altered components that
could be used to activate explosives, chemical, or bacterial or
viral microbes contaminants) through the commercial (PFN) remote
and management control systems. Of course the appropriate
authorities would be alerted to any of the national security
high-risk installation attempts in real-time. The immediate action
could be performed by either predetermined automated protocols or
by real-time commands handled directly by the appropriate
authorities. Because, the exact piece of equipment can be ID by its
FACT chip along with all its Original Equipment Manufacture OEM=s
firmware (Lot No. and any security codes, etc.) and of course this
would be updated by any additional or subsequent use such as
re-sales, retrofits or re-installments. An accurate record shall be
provided with in the chips firmware or flash memory and in the
national registry (mass storage to be either provided by public
government or commercial servers licensed). This process will be
readily supported to provide tracking for commercial trading of
legitimate products (new and used) giving government the economic
taxing tool for real transactions and real-time product use for new
and used devices components products and total equipment packages
such as (cars). This will also allow for immediate component
analysis for any criminal activity and a clear record of component
ownership and use through PFN/TRAC/TRACS/FACT programming.
TRACS/FACT programming will be issuing Stolen alert bulletins,
and/or any security alert flag at periodic times for PFN=s to do
internal integrity and security tests as this information is
reported or becomes available. Otherwise, any device, system and/or
component will be assessed for its legitimacy and real-time use at
the time date location of installation along with the PFN ESN and
whatever other data is determined to be applicable. At this time it
will be appraised and billed to the responsible party for its use
and impact on society, its infrastructure and the environment.
Obviously it is necessary to identify the host piece of equipment,
and, any and all components the new installation is interacting
with, as well as, all interactions from communication devices,
control circuits, actuators, and responsible monitors, control an
or management centers all of which is recorded in the PFN secure
memory (recording devices) for (accountability) and in at least one
remote mass storage facility for accountability. The primary
purpose of this singular identity component chip is to track any
and all use of the attached device and/or component that it has
been incorporated into and to report any and all data in a complete
and integral fashion, as prescribed by any code, regulation, law,
and/or standard decreed by any sovereign or governing authorities.
Number 2 in FIG. 16 is the SMART CHIPS and/or a magnetic strip can
be provided as part of the components unit packaging and/or a bar
code so that an immediate check of the component can be search
either by a OCR scanner or a hand held magnetic strip reader. With
the more extensive amount of data handled by smart cards and chips
this is another inexpensive modality that will help in tracking and
reporting stolen materials. A hard or plastic card would be issued
to the purchaser of any TRACS/FACT device so that they could scan
their stolen property data to the National Registry.
Number 3 is the universal plug and play buss inside the PFN
containment that create the electrical interface platform for all
the components. This buss will carry the appropriate power
connection and control connections from the PFN/TRAC/FACT
controller to activate, deactivate or specifically control any and
all components. Power can be cut off to a specific component
through the BUSS or it can instruct the individual component=s FACT
CHIP to intercept power (power input or regulator circuit. All the
electrical connections in vehicles and equipment are need of
standardization and I have written to this in all my previous
applications and these are areas that will be a standardization
effort in each industry and/or application specific use of
accountable remote and automated control. I have addressed how to
complete these functions with present hardware connections firmware
and software and have created some new modalities to interface all
the present devices. However as shown in FIG. 6a the components and
technologies are merging and this universal plug and play BUSS in
the PFN is an ideal way to make compatible this electrical
interface platform.#4 of 16 is just pointing out that the
individual component FACT CHIPS must provide firm ware or stored
data of identity, OEM data, last application, etc. to comply with
any standard or regulation developed for a national registry or any
such security system. Because FACT is a major part of the main
operating system in TRAC its software is also modular and can be in
any form or hardware application. The hardware chips and firmware
modality detailed in this application should in no way be
considered the only modality to create a nation wide security and
management that is capable of real-time control of individual
components, devices, and equipment. However, any other modality
should be considered within the nature and scope of this invention.
And this is area #6 of FIG. 16. The chip also can perform
activation and deactivation of the component and that is what is
meant by saying it A must provide control.
Note: In the description of the FACT component in this invention as
described as a chip, does not have to be in every case, It can be
as firmware in a chip or software programs loaded. That way the
best form of security for data management is open to each
individual manufacturer=s best options with their particular
products to provide this function so long as it is approved by any
governing standards for this use. It is obvious that a physical
chip could be replaced or compromised in its firmware so additional
means will be utilized to insure security, such as the random code
exchange discussed above at the last legitimate contact or string
of contacts with the Registry allowing only appropriate one-way
communication at the time for the PFN compare list or component
compare list is running to validate a legitimate registry contact
or vice versa for the registry computers being accessed by a new
PFN component application.
FIG. 45 This figure state the attributes of PFN/TRAC intermodal
monitoring and tracking. As detailed in FIG. 37 for tracking
persons and their baggage as well as detecting their condition and
contents during transit can be done for materials and shipment in
transit from boats to rail to trucks to aircraft to trucks and
delivery vehicles again. There is however, a unique set of
circumstances to each of the mode of transportation. As shown in
FIG. 18--ground transportation internets involve both rail and
roadway vehicle platforms and their special transportation
machinery. These therefore are separate intranets.
The Railroad industry like aviation does not like rapid change or
any physical interfacing with the E/E systems either on the train
or to the rails. This is why the wireless TRACker unit is also
employed in the passive receive and repeat function initially and
more physically interfaced in time. Firs as a redundant system and
then as a continual progressive and working interface with inherent
redundancy and accountability. This is true for the Interactive
highway internets that are infantile in their traffic messaging and
public alerts the amber alert system of signs.
Obviously the PFN/TRAC will be much more of a tracking and
telemetry service as Telematics in cars incorporate the PFN DRC
Driver resource Center and rail cars the 1SV PFNs and inter modal
containers are constructed and/or retrofitted with 1Ps PFN as well
as components shipped in these vehicles and containers are packaged
with 1Ps and 1 Ps Soc units as well as RFID technology.
The PFN/TRAC system of wireless relaying supports a floating
network inventory function for real-time accountability. When a
shipment is prepared and logged into any intranet, to include
secret or military shipment being transported on commercial
carriers or some times on a commercial carriers the PFN DRC, 1 SV
PFN rail 1 M PFN marine 1 E stationary PFN would be receiving
signals from the passing minimal DSRC and would report these
positions and telemetry via packet data to the wireless gateway for
IP routing encoded in the data packet. Prior to being shipped a
shipping plan would be filed in the intranet. As the separate
components went their different paths their beacon signals or
quarried signal from the system would constantly provide their
exact position to be compared with known shipping routes and
practices. Alerts for miss-directed transport and/or the absence of
an asset in transit would or could trigger a FACT alert and system
wide up load of the missing 1Ps PFN RFID tag or bar code marked
package and the Air internet, Sea internet Rail internet and
Interactive highway to include Onstar etc. Would be downloaded the
missing ESN or code number signal for the missing shipping
component
All the shippers like UPS, FEDEX DHL, the motor carriers and major
rail and fright lines and cruise lines would all have responsive
PFNs on the vehicle Platforms and all would be responsive to
PFN/TRAC lost and found registry for commercial search and FACT
registry for criminal investigations and/or National security FACT
events.
The lost and found registry would be virtual and made up of all the
stakeholders intranets. They would be notified if a tracer was sent
out by a specific shipper or recipient and their internet would
notify all parties of the miss-shipped piece.
The interfacing between internets and shippers and recipients can
be made locally regionally and nationally via DSRC to the multiple
application specific wireless.
FIG. 47 Obviously, some shipment components are more valuable or
sensitive than other components. For this reason The PFN/TRAC
System integration provides for minimal tracking and telemetry to
be cost effective and extensive tracking and telemetry to insure
public safety and national security. And sometimes the more
sophisticated tracking and telemetry applications used during
shipping survive the transport phase and are retained for permanent
use as a PFN reporting through the PFN/TRAC system to a specific
FACT security intranet. FIG. 48 is an example of the myriad of
possible components shipped and the diverse types telemetry
technology interfaced in the complete PFN/TRAC controller router
provides forming the management and security matrix. Not just
proprietary 1Ps stand alone PFN units with some of the most
extensive sensing and remote control capability but also including
Texas Instruments RFID technology for a little less data recovery
(active) and basically ID their (Passive Tag) products and to
include Bar code readers interfaced and the proprietary Bag sign
technology. All interfaced by DSRC wireless most of the time to the
prime mover PFN or TSA/Customs/Law officer/Dockworker/UPS
man/Mechanic 1P PFN belt or 1Ps more sophisticated stand alone
repeater router unit to complete the flexible portable network
connections to locate lost assets in transit. Human movement traced
via by ID and surveillance technologies interfaced in the same
manner. This is total movement management and seamless security for
that movement for airports, ports, train stations, border
crossings, state road inspection stations interactive highway
reporting and on and on.
FIG. 49 This figure illustrates the FACT security program via PFNs
locating a missing military asset from another shipment. In this
case a military shipment lost a hand held rocket launcher that had
a 1ps PFN unit imbedded in it for shipment. When a tandem tractor
trailer carrying the launcher swerved to miss a stalled vehicle on
an overpass the launcher was dislodged and ejected to the road
below, where it landed on an open top dump truck going 60 miles an
hour perpendicular to the tractor trailer on the elevated road.
Immediately the tractor trailer DRC PFN via DSRC running a timed
radio quarry program ask by RF for a return signal from all 250
known assets in the shipment on both trailers. Additionally do to
the extreme truck movement recognized in the DRC PFN of the tractor
another Flag in the on board FACT surveillance program was
satisfied for the radio handshake. The DRC PFN interfaced with the
vehicles E/E system processed a sway sensor recording the movement
that was connected to the trucks J1939 can bus in the tractor. The
DRC tractor sent an alert signal to the driver of the
tractor-trailer and also to the nearest TSA FACT Motor carrier
telemetry center and to all appropriate personnel instantly
including the local police who are routed to the truck-traveling
blow that ended up with the lost launcher. Because the launcher
signal was retrieved in the Dump trucks DRC PFN and relayed to the
TSA FACT center additionally the driver was notified and asked to
pullover in the closest safe shoulder section on the right. This is
just a hypothetical example of how the matrix keeps track of
objects in motion even with out GPS.
Avionics Acronym List and Definitions as It Relates to PFN/TRAC and
FACT Security.
The initial acronym list was taken from the "Allied Signal Terms
and Definitions of Avionics" offered on the internet. It is used to
key note, begin discussion and direct the specification of the
PFN/TRAC System in aircraft implementation for the DOD, FAA,
Airlines and major Aircraft Manufacturers. The PFN/TRAC System by
design is a living work or work in progress. It is meant to serve
as a tool to address the issues, teach and improve this technology
in aircraft for optimum public safety on a continuing basis. The
basic invention is well defined in this application seven related
filings. This and three other applications specifically deal with
the specific problems facing the air travel industry today and for
the foreseeable future. The focus is protected accountable machine
controls, artificial intelligence (robotics), communication and
data routing and system interfacing with an inherent concern for
impacts on humans and the environment.
This list of definitions is edited to deal with aircraft systems,
ground systems and the affecting, sovereign nations, their
government agencies, their rules, regulations, law, protocols and
standards. The PFN/TRAC System is designed to organize and make
more universal and secure interfacing between machine systems,
people and their societies; both on the surface and near the
surface of the earth to increase public safety and to protect the
environment for a free, respectful and peaceful world
The Following is:
A 220 page white paper (manual) included with the best mode of
carrying out the invention and to be used with the drawing
descriptions and when viewing the figures.
This portion of the specification is for those skilled in the art
of avionics, air travel and transport to reference familiar terms,
components and systems and better understand the drawings and how
to construct this movement management hardware and software
interfacing and FACT security system. The section, describes remote
control and accountable robotics implementation via an alphabetical
listing of avionic terms and descriptions for system integrators,
code writers, and component engineers to structure and base the
operating system's integration and interface designs for the
various aircraft and terrestrial systems linked. Because, of the
diversity of aircraft the alphabetical list of avionics and viable
modalities to accomplish specific protected, automated and
accountable FACT flights and landings will be expansive, especially
in this general format. But essential in light of the terrorist
acts of 911 and why this document follows the FAA report made in
April of 2001. The PFN/TRAC System can carry the nation in the
proper technical direction to insure and better secure our freedom
of movement and respect our privacy in air travel.
There will be optimum modalities and redundant systems for each
aircraft. Some such systems may prove universal across the boards
and be standardized in all aircraft. Then there will be very
individual aircraft engineering challenges to accomplish the same
desired FACT function for everything that Flies. Standardization of
accountable remote control and robotics in any transportation
platform is basic to the nature and scope of the invention the PFN
and The PFN/TRAC System.TM..
This tool provides the means for those skilled in the art to assess
any aircraft and airport facility along with all related equipment
to determine the best way to construct and implement the PFN/TRAC
movement management system with FACT Security. The teachings of
this patent filing and related filings provide a set of options and
system interfaces to help proficiently out fit America's aircraft
with a progressive development in remote control and security.
Additionally, the work provides DOD and the FAA the system
architecture to construct and implement at least 5 national Safe
Base airports (SBs) that are coordinated with air to air remote
control and robotics flight of compromised aircraft, and to provide
final approach and surface/flight control systems to locally
control landings, thus providing, greater public safety and
national security, both in the air and on the ground.
The technology goal is to teach a progressive architecture to
advance accountable robotics and Remote Control (RC) flight as and
enhanced Humanity Machine Interfacing technology. A Science
Technology Society or STS HMI to include ground system flight
controls and management appropriately interfaced with real-time
flights. First with present technology, and then plan for future
integration and consolidation of systems to systems on a chip or
SOC technology for the optimum circuit and system interface
combinations. For this reason the PFN/TRAC architecture or ASIC
design will always provide a secure and protected plug and play
access capacity for future engineering concerns and flexible
component interfacing which also is responsive, recognized and
accounted for in the FACT system as change occurs.
Bold face print in the following describes the relevant
combinations and teachings to construct and implement the
PFN/TRAC/FACT system with respect to commonly known avionic terms
and acronyms, which are defined prior in small print. The terms are
used to stimulate dialog and understanding at the component level
for skilled artisans to engineer and construct the PFN/TRAC machine
messaging network, interfaces, human participation, and support
machinery and equipment use, to include traffic flow and security
through the airport and gate to gate in the skies. There are
specific specifications to envision and construct the invention.
However, the specific technical architecture in many instances has
been deliberately left open so as not to restrict component
engineering and to systemically accommodate a with variety of
aircraft and machinery in today's air travel industry.
A
3D, 4D Three or Four Dimension
4096 Code The octal base, four-digit code used between framing
pulses of a reply to identify the aircraft or for general use and
emergency codes (XPD). XPD use and adaptation for TRAC FACT
protocols; Federal Access & Control Technology FACT is a
emergency communication and computer program used in all equipment
and vehicle platforms and coordinates all the necessary government
agencies in a secure Transportation matrix of transportation
intranets for surface transportation land &, sea and also air.
Aviation in general is much more technically developed in
communications and computers or telematics then land transportation
as a general rule. With 4096 code and XPD in existence, this secure
communication link can be used to fulfill the first generation FACT
program in aviation. Ultimately many different communication
protocols will be interfaced via the PFN/TRAC system to include
cellular telephony and special encrypted FACT software
communications will be developed.
A300 Airbus Industries Model 300 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days
FACT gen 1
A310 Airbus Industries Model 310 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days
FACT gen 1
A319 Airbus Industrie Model 319 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT
gen 1
A320 Airbus Industrie Model 320 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT
gen 1
A330 Airbus Industrie Model 330 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT
gen 1
A340 Airbus Industrie Model 340 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT
gen 1
AAAE American Association of Airport Executives To take part in the
planning of the Safe Bases and the safe procedures employed in the
regular commercial airports as well as standard FAA operations
AAC Aeronautical Administrative Communications to be connected to
PFN/TRAC/FACT FAA/home land security central control
AAL (1) American Airlines all C&D classified aircraft TRAC/FACT
in 60 days FACT gen 1
(2) Above Aero Dome Level
AAMP Advanced Architecture Micro-Processor TRAC processors/ASIC
hybrid substrate SOC, custom
AAS Advanced Automation System Developed to lock out local flight
controls and automate protected flight controls for FACT robotics
and RC flying and landing
AAT FAA Air Traffic Control Service to be subservient to FACT
regional and national FACT Flight command center either as a hybrid
for existing FAA national flight control, or newly created, as part
of homeland security in a lager transportations matrix of intranets
for surface, land, sea, and air traffic control and management. The
installment of PFN/TRA/FACT provides a more robust, accountable
response via each aircraft compromised as an enhancement, not as a
replacement, to an already great aviation control system.
AATT Advanced Air Transportation Technology (NASA Program) NASA to
help develop PFN/TRAC/FACT for traditional aircraft via it's
progressive and architectural implementation of organizational
structure of artificial intelligence technologies already being
utilized in many aerospace applications.
A/B Auto Brake
A-BPSK Aeronautical Binary Phase Shift Keying
ABRV Abbreviation
ABS Absolute
Absolute The altitude of the aircraft above the terrain.
Altitude Also known as AGL (above ground level) Data provided by
the various on-board sensors to the TRAC/FACT processor for FACT SB
flights and landings via robotics and RC piloting.
AC (1) Advisory Circular
(2) Alternating Current
A/C Aircraft
ACAC Air-Cooled Air Cooler
ACARS Airborne Communications Addressing and Reporting
System ACARS OOOI to be the program differentiating points for
protocols and course of action for the FACT robotics system and the
PFN/TRAC/FACT procedures in the aircraft and in the ground or
surface management system. Much is detailed out in this Patent as a
white paper, however the inventor realizes the actual software
programming and procedures are to be determined by many skilled
professionals and the public as to the implementation of the
PFN/TRAC/FACT invention for robotic and Remote Control RC flight
with real aircraft.
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System is to be a part of the
robotics flight and RC landing system in all application specific
aircraft as sub systems and Systems Under Control of the TRAC/FACT
system and program.
ACC Active Clearance Control to be under the command of the
PFN/TRAC/FACT-FAA air command control center in a FACT event.
ACCC Area Control Computer Complex will be flexible intranets IP
created by event protocols to coordinate agency and systems in
real-time through a higher application level of software termed
FACT for all PFN/TRAC applications in a large transportation matrix
or secure encrypted isolated internet but capable of accessing the
web and providing public secure data via the WWW.
Acclrm Accelerometer as well as other velocity an speed sensing
devices and systems will provide data locally, on board aircraft to
the TRAC/FACT program, and report data to the surface system the
PFN/TRAC System running FACT software for robust remote control and
robotics flying of a compromised flight
ACE (1) The control character meaning technical
Acknowledge will be certified as TRAC/FACT approved with secret and
security clearances to be the pros working on the TRAC processor,
interfaces and protected connectables and actuators.
(2) Actuator Control Electronics will be protected to perform
lockdown of local controls and to automate the flying controls on
board in unobtainable modalities while in flight for humans to
tamper with
(3) Advanced Certification Equipment a must for all TRAC/FACT
equipment and component applications
ACI Airports Council International to help develop the GPS or
geographic handoffs for the separate FACT control software and to
help structure the implementation of PFN/TRAC/FACT technology
globally.
ACI-NA Airports Council International-North America to help develop
the implementation of the PFN/TRAC/FACT system and technology in
the United States/Canada and Mexico and establish the handoffs
needed for national Federal control programs.
ACIPS Airfoil and Cowl Ice Protection System
ACK The control character meaning technical acknowledgment of an
uplink, used in an ACARS system Same concept for the up link to
FACT programs running in TRAC but probably encrypted for both the
surface and the on board TRAC/FACT processor to confirm a
legitimate FACT message for robotics and RC flight and landings as
well as in flight robust aggressive but accountable activity
controls e.g. sleep gas activation for a confirmed FACT/Wojack
event.
ACM Air Cycle Machine connected to a sensor array to detect
contaminants on board and airborne Bio or chemical HAZMAT
ACMF Airplane Condition Monitoring Function interfaced to TRAC
process/processor and FACT monitor for FACT event software
program
ACMP Alternating Current Motor Pump
ACMS Aircraft Condition Monitoring System tied to or interfaced an
protected as needed to TRAC/FACT system as a SUC system to TRAC
ACNSS Advanced Communication/Navigation/Surveillance
System interfaced and/or integrated with the TRAC/FACT protected
robotics and RC flying and landing systems
ACP Audio Control Panel recorded for a real-time FACT event and
interfaced to monitor with voice recognition technology a voice ID
technology for the TRAC/FACT system to be responsive to.
ACR Avionics Computer Resource the whole PFN/TRAC/FACT system is
made up of the entire aircrafts ACR with the essential systems
protected and more integrated via upper level ACR software FACT
interfacing and processing TRAC applications to provide enhanced
and accountable human machine interfacing of human and machine
intelligence both in the aircraft and on the surface insuring
better public safety in flying and landing the aircraft under the
most trying of circumstances.
ACS Active Control System TRAC/FACT is the ACS in a FACT/WoJack
event, but active with accountability all recorded with command
strings in a number of Event Data Recorders both in the aircraft
and reported to the surface buffers and mass data handling and
storage facilities.
ACU (1) Apron Control Unit to provide signals in the OOOI first ON
stage on the ground as a ACARS FACT triggered event recognition and
progression to deal with a WoJack or Fact event condition--to help
make a decision to stay on the ground most likely--however, flight
to safe base controlled isolated area might be a possible scenario
if the safe transport of the threat can be assured or deemed a
greater public safety options (e.g. a sealed for flight
contaminated aircraft) these are scenarios that all mentioned
organizations, government agencies, and the public have to weigh-in
on as to acceptable policy and procedures to be programmed as
software in robotics & RC FACT systems and protocols.
(2) Autopilot Control Unit is to be interfaced with the TRAC/FACT
process and protocols and interfaced and protected as an integrated
system, first starting as an adaptive auto pilot with the 5 safe
flight to safe zone areas and SBs for possible semi-controlled
landing and boarding.
(3) Antenna Control Unit TRAC the process, or processor, will have
as a SUC-RF equipment in scanning activity and checking readiness
to include any internal and external antennas and/or their controls
on board the aircraft. A major function of the TRAC system is the
capability to use all forms of communications in a FACT emergency
to afford the maximum and optimum communication and data exchange
between the surface and the troubled aircraft for humans and
machine systems.
A/D Analog-to-Digital and DAC digital-to-analog conversion
equipment will be part of any PFN/TRAC/FACT system to incorporate
and interface all the avionics providing electrical signal on board
the aircraft and within the surface control and data management
loop.
ADA Computer Programming Language Standard IP protocols and
wireless protocols via firmware in chipsets/hybrid substrates and
electronics modalities will be incorporated in the first generation
of TRAC/FACT processing and protocol application. However, the
majority of interfacing will be accomplished for the specific
PFN/TRAC architecture via higher-level FACT software including
special encryption for accountability and secured management. Part
of the software developed is an emergency translation software
algorithm that all communication protocols can be operated and
linked to create a flexible vast matrix of communication and data
messaging without compromising subsystem securities and
operations.
ADC Air Data Computer (Direct TRAC interface)
ADF Automatic Direction Finder (Direct TRAC interface)
ADI Attitude Direction Indicator (Direct TRAC interface)
ADIRS Air Data Inertial Reference System (Direct TRAC
interface)
ADIRU Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (Direct TRAC interface)
ADLP Aircraft Data Link Processor (Direct TRAC interface)
ADM Air Data Module The seven above-defined categories are
interfaced and subsystems or SUC to TRAC/FACT protocols. The data
is used in the determination of proper flight path and a FACT event
and in the robotics flight of a plane in trouble.
ADMS Airline Data Management System
ADP Air Driven Pump
ADRAS Airplane Data Recovery and Analysis System
ADS (1) Automatic Dependent Surveillance ADS will be preformed by
TRAC/FACT process or ASIC processor as a standard procedure for
subsystems SUC to TRAC/FACT on boot up and periodically.
(2) Air Data System
ADSB Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast TRAC/FACT
subsystems and ultimately integrated and interfaced and used as
needed between surface and aircraft unit.
ADSEL Address Selective. A SSR system electronically arranged to
address each transponder selectively. Only a particular transponder
will respond, thus obviating garbling. ADSEL uses a mono-pulse
technique to provide more accurate bearing measurement. ADSEL is
compatible with DABS. (Refer to Mode S transponders.) All automated
markers and their data to be used by the TRAC process and FACT
software for plane verification of position and to fly the aircraft
by robotics and remote control.
ADSP Automatic Dependent Surveillance Panel Videoed and recorded
with the electronic signals processed in the TRAC process and
ultimately the TRAC ASIC and recorded locally and remotely
ADSU (1) Automatic Dependent Surveillance Unit Any such devices
will be automated with TRAC/FACT software and interfaced in the
system to monitor for a FACT event and to better implement FACT
protocols and programming.
(2) Automatic Dependent Surveillance System
AECU Audio Electronic Control Unit will be interfaced with the
PFN/TRAC system onboard the aircraft with voice recognition
software and ID voice software to allow for hands-free commands as
determined necessary for FACT programs and protocols. The system
will support other voice dependent technologies, interfaced
cellular telephony etc.
AED Algol Extended for Design
AEEC Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee will review and
approve all the TRAC/FACT processes and using existing hardware and
their interfacing as well as future generations of integrated
ASICs, SOCs and hybrid substrates for TRAC processors.
AEP Audio Entertainment Player (interfaced and controlled as needed
by TRAC) to deliver FACT instructions to the passengers and crew
during an event and to interrupt the entertainment programming as
needed.
AERA Automated En Route traffic control (Direct interface with
TRAC) for monitoring for a FACT event like a WoJack incident and to
re-program a RC flight or robotics FACT flight.
AES Aircraft Earth Station
AFC (1) Automatic Frequency Compensation all automated radio
control technology to improve transmission and reception for the
auto scan TRAC processor and the FACT communication needed during
an event will be fully utilized in the construction of subsystems
and their interfaces to create the initial TRAC/FACT process and
the ultimate ASIC or SOC system developed in the future.
(2) Automatic Frequency Control used for TAC/FACT performance to be
optimal
AFCAS Automatic Flight Control Augmentation System will be
responsive to the TRAC/FACT processes or processor running FACT on
board the aircraft and the surface systems monitoring the
questionable flight in progress or a FACT event and ready as a
subsystem or fully integrated and protected FACT function to
control the aircraft to a safe Base via safe flight route by
robotics immediately.
AFCEA Armed Forces Communications & Electronics
Association will help develop the DES/DET and FACT interfaces for
standard and commercial avionics and communication to insure the
compatibility to work responsively during any FACT event.
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System is to be interfaced with the
onboard TRAC/FACT process to determine a FACT event and operate the
automate FACT flights.
AFD Adaptive Flight Display videoed and the electronic signals
provided the TRAC/FACT process and recorded and reported to the
surface.
AFDC Autopilot Flight Director Computer to be made part of the
TRAC/FACT adaptive auto pilot for the first generation FACT program
detection and flight to SBs and the following landings.
AFDS Autopilot Flight Director System incorporated as an adaptive
autopilot to perform the FACT flights to the SB landing zones and
SBs
AFEPS ACARS Front End Processing System to be incorporated in the
FACT OOI from ACARS segmented process to monitor the take offs and
initial management of a FACT robotics flight takeover.
AFIS (1) Automatic Flight Information Service
(2) Airborne Flight Information System both these 2 above terms
will be incorporated as SUC to the TRAC/FACT system and protocols
and will vary from aircraft and equipment involved and changes over
the course of time. Through the TRAC/FACT system the system will be
more fully automated and diverse.
AFS Aeronautical Fixed Service will be used traditionally with
other position and location/communication service interfaced to
better track and guide the aircraft.
AFSK Audio Frequency Shift Keying will be employed, recorded, and
reported for accountability as it is presently utilized, be used to
carry FACT emergency translated messages from other communication
protocols, and additionally be decoded and provide emergency
messages translated to other interfaced communication links.
A/G Air-Ground continual communication links will provide for dual
processing and redundant storage in real-time as part of the
PFN/TRAC/FACT system of accountable robotics and remote
control.
AGACS Automatic Ground-Air Communication System (also known as
ATCSS, or DATA LINK) will be directly interfaced as part of the
TRAC/FACT first generation system as described directly above. If
this does not exist for all aircraft, it will be created, as part
of the qualifications to be an accountable TRAC/FACT systems so it
is inherent that this AGACS would be a sub-system and SUC to TRAC
and the automated TRAC scan function.
AGARS Advanced General Aviation Research Simulator will be used to
practice FACT programs and procedures and design the TRAC process
and ASIC processor. The options are so numerous in wireless
communications, LAN, Ethernets, and computer interfaces in just one
aircraft--let alone the vast amount of possibilities for all the
individual planes--the AGARS is a logical choice to experiment with
the myriad possibilities.
AGC Automatic Gain Control. AGC is used to maintain the output
level of the receiver. This function will be a TRAC/FACT
communication control, automated in the TRAC/FACT system, as a SUC
subsystem for already existing technology or for any future RF
architecture designed for the PFN/TRAC units.
AGL Above Ground Level
AGS Air/Ground System an integrated real-time link for the FACT
event aircraft, the chase assist aircraft, the surface support en
route command center FAA/homeland security, the surface SB RC crew,
and terminal tower.
AHOE Air/Oil Heat Exchanger
AHRS Attitude Heading Reference System the electronic signal
provided for the TRAC system doing processing and running the FACT
programs to determine flight deviation and correct FACT headings to
SB via Safe fly zones for the troubled aircraft.
AI Alternative Interrogator will be a common practice for the FACT
program to determine a Flight course deviation via the many
position, speed, and heading generating systems SUC to the TRAC
process/processor and operating FACT software.
AID Altered Item Drawing. A drawing that details what alteration or
change is made to an already existing component. Examples may be
shortening the shaft of
a variable resistor, or adding a program to a circuit card to
produce a programmed circuit card. The TRAC/FACT system will
generate many AID drawings for existing devices and avionics
technology to create the TRAC process construct, the ASIC, or
interface existing processors and micro-circuits, as well as take
the form of software flow-charts to structure the higher FACT
language or code, including encryption. There is a great deal of
AID drawings in the related 7 patent application for the PFN/TRAC
System and there will be more to structure the accountable, robust,
remote control and robotics necessary to operate this next
generation of automated aircraft.
AIDS Aircraft Integrated Data System is to be a major function of
the TRAC/FACT system in aircraft and for air travel, as part of a
larger machine-messaging matrix for data acquisition, equipment
management, and data storage for humanity to better manage
vehicle/equipment use and environmental and societal impact of
equipment use on the infrastructure.
AIEM Airlines International Electronics Meeting conducted for many
organizations and agencies to test, review, and write standards,
rules, regulations, and code for TRAC architectural development in
ASIC design, integration, and interfacing with existing aviation
avionics.
AIL Aileron automated and controlled by the TRAC processor with
respect to FACT programs running.
AIMS Aircraft Information Management System will be an integrated
function in the PFN/TRAC/FACT System and TRAC has always been
designed to perform this function as part of a large
machine-messaging matrix and management system.
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication AIPs will be a basic
medium to inform those in the arts of aviation and avionics about
the characteristics of TRAC/FACT in aviation and to help network
interface across the varied flight platforms and avionic
architecture to get the most economic and efficient configuration
for any particular aircraft.
AIRCOM Digital air/ground communications services provided by SITA.
A system similar to ACARS. All such dedicated RF services will be
coordinated to interface and be SUC to FACT. This is done because
the automatic take-over of the aircraft in robotics will be the
highest level of secure accountable encrypted function taking place
in US airspace and all communication and computations, or
processing, need to be sub-systems to a more focused control and
management system. This is a basic characteristic of the PFN/TRAC
system and FACT protocols for all equipment and transportation
management. As stated earlier, aircraft is far ahead of surface
vehicles and stationary equipment in terms of equipment control,
but the need for a completely organized management system of
accountable robust controls is great and can be accomplished via
the PFN/TRAC/FACT machine messaging matrix of specialized intranets
communication linked with wireless and IP protocols.
AIR DATA Those parameters that can be derived from knowledge of the
air mass surrounding the aircraft. Air Data is provided to the
robotics flight control whether it is a drafter autopilot, flight
computer, adapted autopilot, flight computer, a specifically
designed ASIC, a custom processor, or any hybrid interface the
TRAC/FACT processor running FACT flight plans and FACT control
technology is provided in a protected state.
Airways The standard ICAO IFR routes will be monitored by FACT
surface control, and for planned flights en route, for deviation.
However, once a FACT event has occurred, a dedicated team is
assigned to the troubled flight and the scrammed flight assist and
pursuit aircraft along with the troubled aircraft is robotically
flown to a safe airspace away for all other air traffic and
sensitive surface areas as an en route FACT flight program to the
assigned safe base. The Safe Base is chosen by proximity and can be
overridden by surface command, if the troubled aircraft poses a
unique threat that requires special handling. However, SBs and safe
flight zones will be designed to handle most everything.
AIS Aeronautical Information Services will be supportive of
FACT/FAA/homeland security command central.
AISC Aeronautical Industry Service Communication will be a standard
method to inform the industry and personnel of TRAC/FACT technology
available and developed.
AIV Accumulator Isolation Valve this will be a system used to
divert hydraulic local controls pressure when a FACT event is
sensed and activated to keep the system ready for local controls to
be reinstalled and to absorb the activation of such controls
isolated and/or otherwise dead-headed by the protected solenoid
diversion-valve, providing hydraulic supply to the TRAC/FACT
protected auto pilot control valve or vein pump flying the FACT
flight plan, by delivering the appropriate hydraulic fluid to
activate the flight surfaces in a hydraulically controlled
aircraft.
A/L Autoland
ALC Automatic Level Control. A circuit used to maintain the output
of a transmitter regardless of variations in the attenuation of the
system. A sub-system to the TRAC/FACT process/processor to that
must be protected and unobtainable by human hands during a FACT
event.
ALS Advanced Landing System to be integrated into the TRAC/FACT
landing and approach with robotics-operated or part of a RC system
in a assist aircraft or on the surface as a flight station
simulator at the SB.
ALT (1) Airborne Link Terminal to be integrated into the FACT
system and monitored by the FACT homeland security and full
functions and interfacing to be determined in the development of
the FAA/FACT command and control center.
(2) Altitude
Altitude A continuous return across the display at a range Ring
equivalent to aircraft altitude (WXR).
ALTS Altitude Select The three lines above refer to the elevation
of the aircraft and all such data is relevant to flight of the
aircraft and is provided, protected, to the process FACT is running
in.
ALU Arithmetic and Logic Unit
AM Amplitude Modulation. A signal where the carrier signal is
varied in amplitude to encode voice or data information. These duel
communication functions will be used in TRAC/FACT and scanned for
as well as done with other frequencies to allow for the greatest
amount of communication a data transferred, timed, and recorded
together both in the aircraft and surface systems.
AMASS Airport Movement Area Safety System
AMC Avionics Maintenance Conference To aid in the development of
the TRAC/FACT process in all existing avionics and legacy aircraft
and help plan for the ASIC or future integrated SOC technology of
combined systems. Especially in deciding aircraft placement of the
protected TRAC/FACT processors and memory storage and the protected
links leads and interfaces needed to insure the uninterrupted
service of FACT components during a FACT event. And finally, AMC
will assist in determining the proper security and training for
technicians, designers, and programmers for the TRAC/FAC system and
protocols in aviation.
AMCP Aeronautical Mobile Communications Panel to be videoed with an
audible recording, including time and dated records, to coordinate
and review with other timed and dated records of a FACT event data
nature. Additionally, all communications will be placed into a
hierarchy of communications controlled by FACT surface-to-air
communication links, in an affected area. Capable of handling a
number of communications on any given ded frequency--this is for
all frequencies and communication links during a FACT event.
(Surface FACT control Master all other communication link
subservient subsystems or SUC to FACT control).
AME Amplitude Modulation Equivalent. An AM-type signal that
processes the modulated information signal and carrier frequency
separately, then reconstructs the two signals to make an equivalent
AM signal. Any modulation function needed to complete a FACT
communication link can and will be configured for FACT use by FACT
communications control on both ends of the transmission. If AME
proves to be a good modality to code and decode or send encrypted
messages/data in an efficient more secure manner, it should be
used. These and other uses of AME will be reviewed by FCC and the
FAA as well as all organizations, professional associations, and
government agencies required to determine the correct use of any
AME frequency for FACT System use.
AMI Airline Modifiable Information FACT reviewed during an event
and for any publication on policies and procedures provided to the
public and professionals.
AMLCD Active Matrix Liquid Crystal Display used as applicable for
HMI with TRAC/FACT equipment and programming.
AMOSS Airline Maintenance and Operations Support System will have a
special division with FACT-approved and qualified technical teams.
This will include technicians and security personnel teamed up in
an unpredictable rotation schedule for each work schedule
and/ordered service. This procedure involves the unsealing of any
restricted FACT system on an aircraft, the protected actuators
sealed processors any interfaces and connections or access to any
programming or recording device or memory storage. To be determined
is how and if these individuals will be provided or financed by the
airlines the federal government or both. They must be trained
through federal programs and pass a FBI security clearance check
initially, annually, and periodically as well as pass drug test and
have the most extensive ID information on file for automated
security test by the individual FACT units being serviced. Systems
will have fingerprint, iris, DNA, and pin-number checks for the
whole team and the service is to be videoed and viewed by FACT
surface control supervisors also on a random assignment. All FACT
personnel are to be continually passed though an alert list
augmented by every security agency deemed appropriate to look for
any known terrorists, criminals, or other security risks.
Additionally, photo recognition (or face ID print) is to be on file
for personnel working in FACT or that are known to be suspects, as
detailed above. All forms of security can be employed and reviewed
for error or improper use, to include profiling, as per possible
FACT event alert. Any questions are to be handled in a review
process with no loss of pay but an interruption in the individual's
capability to service or be in proximity of FACT systems or
components until cleared.
AMP Audio Management Panel recorded and monitored by TRAC/FACT and
SUC to FACT for PA purposes.
AMPL Amplifier
AMS Apron Management Service will be tied into the FACT surface
system and control TRAC/FACT robotics and RC on the ground.
AMS(R)S Aeronautical Mobile Satellite (Route) Service to be used,
monitored for TRAC/FACT events
AMSS (1) Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service Same
(2) Aeronautical Mobile Satellite System Same All geographic and
communication links are to be accessible and SUC to TRAC/FACT event
and the appropriate control systems.
AMTOSS Aircraft Maintenance Task Oriented Support System.
An automated data retrieval system will be incorporated to include
TRAC/FACT systems and be responsive and interfaced with FACT data
storage.
AMU Audio Management Unit SUC to TRAC/FACT system on board.
AMUX Audio Multiplexer part of TRAC/FACT process and ASIC
processing when constructed application specific for each
aircraft.
A/N Alphanumeric used to locate TRAC/FACT involvement in this
avionics list of definition. However, A/N data will be used as
needed for HMI coordination in TRAC/FACT programming and
messaging.
Aneroid An evacuated and sealed capsule or bellows with a Capsule
that expands or contracts in response to changes in pressure. Any
sensing technology for atmospheric pressure will be used as needed
and transduced with an electric signal to be processed by FACT
interfaced avionics or TRAC ASICs or micro processors to determine
a FACT event, or to fly and land the aircraft via FACT robotics and
RC.
ANC Air Navigation Commission will help determine the safe flight
plans to the safe bases that will be programmed software for the
robotics FACT flight. They will also help to determine the cafe
crash and landing zones as well as the technology used to determine
a FACT event as well as fly the FACT aircraft and land it.
ANP Actual Navigation Performance will be a real-time event in the
TRAC/FACT airborne process or ASIC processor and in the monitoring
Surface command center.
ANPRM Advance Notice of Public Rule Making will be done for most
all TRAC/FACT implementation. However there will be secret policies
and technology due to better public safety and national security.
These secret portions of the technology must have documentation AND
APPROVAL BY OVER SIGHT COMMITTEES AND OTHER SECURITY PROTOCOLS TO
RETAIN A PRIVATE STATUS.
ANS (1) Area Navigation System all area navigation systems will be
linked for a national/FAA/homeland security command and control
center to access and provide position data to individual aircraft
and other FACT platforms.
(2) Ambient Noise Sensor will record and compare normal sounds and
report unusual sounds to be reviewed for FACT flags in the software
program; a trained human ear's review.
ANSI American National Standards Institute will help to create
TRAC/FACT standards, codes, rules, regulations, and law.
ANT Antenna protected and kept serviceable to TRAC as much as
possible.
ANTC Advanced Networking Test Center to aid in the creation of the
TRAC/FACT FAA aviation intranet for FACT command and controls--both
in the aircraft and on the surface nationally, regionally, and on
the SB.
AOA Angle Of Attack to be defined for aircraft boarding as per
condition and current state of the aircraft--and for the successful
termination of a doomed flight.
AOC (1) Airport Operational Communications all SUC to FACT during a
FACT event.
(2) Air/Oil Cooler
(3) Aeronautical Operational Control SUC to FACT as a subsystem
(4) Airport Obstruction Chart data provided to FACT as a subsystem
data I and part of any flight plan
(5) Aircraft Operational Control an accountable protected FACT
robotics and RC flight and landing function--from the troubled
aircraft via robotics and to include RC from other assist air craft
and surface control systems
AOCC Airline Operation Control Center SUC to TRAC/FACT FAA command
and control center
AODC Age of Data Clock (GPS term) The FACT program will always
receive the hottest GPS or location data from all such systems on
board.
AODE Age of Data, Ephemeris (GPS term) All data will be evaluated
by TRAC for the necessary FACT event flags and the GPS will be used
to help synchronize all area clocks.
AOG Aircraft On Ground
AOHE Air/Oil Heat Exchanger
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association an organization to be
consulted for advice and input in the development, use, and
application of TRAC/FACT system protocols and procedures.
AOPG Aerodrome Operations Group IP connected with TRAC/FACT
aviation intranet.
AOR Atlantic Ocean Region to be connected in surveillance and
tracking of aircraft traveling around and over the ocean to any
country TRAC/FACT system with all bordering ocean countries alerted
for a FACT event ready to take the handoff for a FACT response in
their area. If the flight is in neutral air space over the ocean,
an air assist crew will be dispatched from a close pre-arranged,
allied country of the troubled aircraft's host country and flown to
the appropriate pre-arranged SB. The TRAC/FACT response and policy
should be directly linked to international treaties and agreements
for airspace use and shared airspace and be adjusted in perspective
to relations between countries to provide for the most consistent
application of civil law for any illegal act perpetrated in a FACT
event. Ideally, all countries via the United Nations and other
international treaty organizations will set specific rules and
regulations that are consistent for a FACT response.
A/P Autopilot. A computer commanded system for controlling aircraft
control surfaces. This device will be adapted for the TRAC/FACT
system by being protected from Human contact in flight. The fight
surfaces it controls will also be protected from in-flight
tampering. The A/P a direct sub-system of the TRAC process, or
processor, will operate the 5 safe base flight plans on a FACT
event flag. This whole system has to be protected prior to any
flights requiring SB automation for security.
APA Autopilot Amplifier all such assist sub-systems to the
autopilot have to be protected if they can influence the
performance of the flight or the aircraft. Any surface guidance
system for auto pilot technology has to be securely protected on
the surface and be connected to the FAA/FACT homeland security
command control center. If need be, all components will include
surface transponders (on flight and landing) are to have their
signals monitored and protected armed guard with sign replacement
equipment and the ability to take out malfunctioning equipment. New
transponder equipment to be sent reconfigured FACT encrypted signal
to initiate encrypted FACT location data transmissions with
tracking group confirmation.
APALS Autonomous Precision Approach and Landing System will be
incorporated in the TRAC/FACT/FAA/homeland security command control
center at each SB and at any air field used in a FACT event OOOI
triggered emergency landing and regional mobile FACT response--a
specialized containment area at the end and side of the runway away
from the terminal and of the highest security and containment.
(Plane bags and windscreens with all the equipment to securely
ventilate the aircraft and contain the waste air. Additionally a
Bummed explosive bunker parking area.
APANGPRIG ICAOAsia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and
Implementation Regional Group will plan their TRAC/FACT programming
and procedures for a FACT event. It is hoped that cooperation among
nations can reduce phobias and address the real fears of
unauthorized and unsafe aircraft flights and will able to
coordinate their efforts.
APB Auxiliary Power Breaker No power switching mechanism is to be
available to the in-flight passengers or crew that services FACT
reliant automated technology. Automatic fuse/breaker systems with
redundant backups for connectables/leads are integral for any
TRAC/FACT system to include self-contained, completely protected,
emergency power and service to actuated flight surfaces to complete
the FACT flight as per direction of the FACT control center, on the
surface.
APC (1) Autopilot Computer is to be protected and made part of the
initial TRAC/FACT system and carry the preprogrammed FACT flights.
Whatever augmentation is needed to complete this task in the
prescribed TRAC technology requirements is the first step in
providing FACT flights to safe fly-handling zones and a first step
in the implementation of robotics flight for public safety.
(2) Aeronautical Public Correspondence to be open to suggestions
and complaints on the TRAC/FACT system. An important characteristic
of PFN/TRAC System technology is that all TRUST it. Obviously, any
management system having this real-time control over life and death
in the air and on the ground will have to be open to discourse in a
free society to be TRUSTED.
APEX IMA Application/Executive Software Interface The TRAC/FACT
software will interface and run at the highest level and control
via software command all other sub-systems in a FACT event.
APP Approach Control will interface data and voice commands or
dialog to TRAC/FACT command center of the SB and to all homeland
security system's IP connected for real-time coordination.
APPR Approach monitored and managed by TRAC/FACT robotics and RC at
the Safe Bases.
APU Auxiliary Power Unit will be accessible in any so-equipped
aircraft with a specially protected APU for the FACT interfaced
systems.
APUC Auxiliary Power Unit Controller Managed as a SUC system for
TRAC/FACT system but not reliant and to put at risk, via these
connections.
AQP Avionics Qualification Procedure This procedure will be made
flexible with the equation of public safety and national security
the delineating factor. TRAC/FACT control capability will be
required for anything that flies. If the systems are not fully
airworthy or poof-tested and used, they must err on the side of
robotically flying the aircraft to a safe crash zone to be dealt
with by the FIRST FACT teams. Obviously, these flights should not
take place at all and any anyone on them should have to sign off
that they understand these deployable conditions of flight exist
and they wish to go on the flight at their own risk. Equally
obvious, all aircraft is not going to be fully ready for robotics
flight and landing in the next 60 days. So these are the conditions
of flight as a minimum requirement for FACT automation. Another
parallel security measure is trained security for all FACT under
equipped aircraft. This is a procedure that is in place
presently.
A-QPSK Aeronautical Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
AQS Advanced Quality System a commercial by-product of TRAC/FACT
technology. This system will allow for better coordination between
surface and air transportation to better serve the flying and
driving public, long overdue management and coordination in
real-time for emergency weather conditions, holidays, as well as
more direct flying routes.
ARA FAA Research and Acquisitions to help develop and get in place
the PFN/TRAC system in the aircraft and as a surface flight
management system
ARES Advanced Railroad Electronics System will be interfaced in IP
protocols via the PFN/TRAC/FACT transportation matrix of different
transportation platform intranets.
ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
ARF Airline Risk Factor will be an ongoing process for different
scenarios that must be played out by investigators, researchers,
engineers, insurance companies, law enforcement, and the military
prepare and become efficient in use of the TRAC/FACT system for
protecting life in the system and on the ground. Complete risk
assessment needs to be done on a continuing basis.
ARP Air Data Reference Panel videoed and data provided to FACT
command control and any in flight TRAC system.
ARS Automated Radar Summary chart. These are hourly-generated
charts showing location and intensity of radar echoes. Continually
monitored in real-time with projected flight pans and watched by
the TRAC/FACT Command center for a FACT event by an automated
computer-tracking program.
ARSR Air Route Surveillance Radar to monitor all registered flight
plans for FACT events.
ART Automatic Reserve Thrust
ARTCC Air-Route Traffic Control Center. Approximately 20 centers
cover the air traffic routes in the United States using numerous
radars and radio communication sets. These RADAR systems will be
linked to the FAA/TRAC/FACT command and control center to monitor
flights in progress for the FACT event and robotics flight
activations.
ARTS Automated Terminal Radar System interfaced with FACT IP system
of computers locally in the SBs and for the essential agencies
nationally.
ASA (1) Autoland Status Annunciator (AFDS) all automated voice or
audible alert activations will be recorded during a FACT event.
(2) Aircraft Separation Assurance any such sensed data essential to
FACT robotics flight and landing must be interfaced.
ASCPC Air Supply and Cabin Pressure Controllers SUC to TRAC process
and FACT programs.
ASD Aircraft Situation Display videoed and interfaced in FACT
system for RC or robotics augmentation in real-time and recorded in
the aircraft and in surface systems.
ASDE Airport Surface Detection Equipment interfaced in TRAC/FACT
system for enhanced collision avoidance on the surface via FACT
robotics and RC commands.
ASDL Aeronautical Satellite Data Link interfaced into FACT command
center.
ASECNA Agency for the Security of Aerial Navigation in Africa
and Madagascar to set up their own TRAC/FACT system and
protocols.
ASG ARINC Signal Gateway
ASI Avionics System Integration into the TRAC/FACT system would
include the automated lockout of local flying controls in the
aircraft.
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit the design of the TRAC
processor as well as many other processors.
ASM (1) Airspace Management
(2) Auto throttle Servo Motor SUC to FACT flying and protocols
ASP (1) Altitude Set Panel Videoed and interfaced data in the TRAC
processors monitoring and FACT flying and landing and dual
recording.
(2) Aeronautical Fixed Service (AFS) Systems Planning for data
interchange to include the PFN/TRAC system and upper level FACT
programming.
ASPP Aeronautical Fixed Service (AFS) Systems Planning for data
interchange Panel to include the PFN/TRAC system and upper-level
FACT programming.
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems to
include the PFN/TRAC system and upper level FACT programming.
ASR Airport Surveillance Radar to include the PFN/TRAC system and
upper level FACT programming and monitoring.
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System to be an ongoing, progressive
analysis of FACT implementation to improve application safety for
each system.
ASSTC Aerospace Simulation and Systems Test Center To help develop
TRAC/FACT systems from previously tested and proven technology and
aid for the rapid implementation of state of the art FACT systems
for robotics flight and landing.
ASSV Alternate Source Selection Valve Any selection valve for fuel
or hydraulic or airflow in the aircraft has to be SUC to FACT
during a FACT event.
ASTA Airport Surface Traffic Automation to be SUC to FACT command
control during a FACT event--either locally or remotely to be
determined.
A/T Auto throttle SUC to TRAC/FACT systems
AT (1) Air Traffic SUC to FACT/FAA homeland security command and
control center.
(2) Air Transport subject to FACT implementation and special cargo
sensing and PFN/TRAC communication units.
ATA Air Transport Association to help in designing and setting
standards rules, regulations, codes, and laws for FACT and TRAC
system use in the industry.
ATC Air Traffic Control Ultimately handled by FACT/FAA/command
control center.
ATCA Air Traffic Control Association to help set the tracking and
handling of aircraft in and around a FACT event and to help set up
the handoff of the troubled aircraft to the FACT system.
ATCC Air Traffic Control Center to be incorporate as the FAA/FACT
command center or at least a handoff and isolated control center
for each FACT event.
ATCRBS Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System interfaced into FACT
tracking and monitoring and used to follow FACT flights.
ATCSCC ATC System Command Center, the base development area for
FAA/FACT command and implementation.
Inventor note: There is no attempt to replace or eliminate existing
systems only to augment them into robotics and RC capability as the
next best option to highly skilled and qualified humans working
with exceptionally good equipment to provided the safest to date
mass transportation industry. In the spirit of looking for the best
an safest in air travel, TRAC/FACT is being created form COTS
existing and proven air travel technology to offer more choices for
public safety in our free and mobile society.
ATCSS Air Traffic Control Signaling System. A system to provide
information between the pilot and air traffic control using the VHF
communications transceiver in conjunction with data link equipment.
Interfaced with the TRAC/FACT system.
ATCT Airport Traffic Control Tower
ATE Automatic Test Equipment (A TRAC Performance check protocol
w/failure flag)
ATIS (1) Automatic Terminal Information System
(2) Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATIS (1) Automatic Terminal Information System
(2) Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATNP Aeronautical Telecommunications Network Panel (TRAC
Accessible)
ATOMS Air Traffic Operations Management System (control TRAC
protocol)
ATP (1) Acceptance Test Procedure (Air Transport)(Confirmation test
of TRAC)
(2) FAA Air Traffic Rules and Procedures Service
ATP (1) Acceptance Test Procedure (Air Transport) Confirmation test
of TRAC and equipment readiness.
(2) FAA Air Traffic Rules and Procedures Service (To be programmed
as needed in TRAC software.)
ATS (1) Autothrottle System (TRAC Access and Control)
(2) Air Traffic Services (Connectable as needed)
(3) Air Turbine Starter (TRAC connected)
ATSC Air Traffic Services Communication (DATA Connected TRAC)
ATCSS Air Traffic Control Signaling System. A system to provide
information between the pilot and air traffic control using the VHF
communications transceiver in conjunction with data link equipment
(Direct interface with TRAC).
ATSU ATS Unit (Interfaced)
ATT Attitude
AUX Auxiliary
AVIC Aviation Industries of China All foreign powers to develop
their own security codes and encryption for FACT in their
geographic area determined by the location equipment interfaced
with the TRAC/FACT processor onboard the aircraft.
AVLAN Avionics Local Area Network (Interfaced w/TRAC)
AVPAC Aviation VHF Packet Communications (Interfaced w/TRAC)
AVR FAA Regulation & Certification (For TRAC)
AWOS Automated Weather Observation System. A system that gathers
surface weather information and transmits the information this
system to be interfaced with TRAC system and used for aircraft in
known FACT flights for computer algorithms to process in the
robotics flight of the aircraft.
AVM Airborne Vibration Monitor all such data sent as an electrical
signal to the FACT process or TRAC/FACT processor to determine its
relevance.
AVOL Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level
AVPAC Aviation VHF Packet Communications SUC to the TRAC/FACT
system with data used for preprogrammed robotics, and RC
flight.
AVR FAA Regulation & Certification for PFN/TRAC/FACT technology
as well as develop and implement all regulations.
AVSAT Collins Satellite-Based Avionics interfaced with FACT with
FACT operating at the highest most secure interface level.
Question: How capable is Collins language for this task with
DES/DET and how much has to be developed with new code written and
encryption technology? TRAC/FACT is a progressive interface system
structured from COTS and improved. What are the possible software
packages that can be incorporated immediately?
AWO All Weather Operations will be interfaced with TRAC/FACT system
technology
AWOP All Weather Operations Panel videoed and interfaced with
TRAC/FACT technology
AWOS Automated Weather Observation System. A system that gathers
surface weather information and transmits the information to the
pilot via VOR, Comm Freq, or telephone lines. TRAC/FACT connected
and used in flight augmentation of robotics flight
AWPG All Weather Planning Group To help set up the protocols and
interfacing with FACT systems around the globe.
B
B717 Boeing Model 717 Aircraft (formerly the MD-95)(TRAC/FACT IN)
60 days FACT gen 1
B737 Boeing Model 737 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT gen 1
B747 Boeing Model 747 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT gen 1
B767 Boeing Model 767 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT gen 1
B767ER Boeing Model 767 Extended Range Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60
days FACT gen 1
B777 Boeing Model 777 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT gen 1
B7x7 Boeing Model 7x7 Aircraft TRAC/FACT IN) 60 days FACT gen 1
BA British Airways TRAC IN or part of) FACT & TRAC for any
flying Domestically)
BAP Bank Angle Protection--over speed (sensed by TRAC processor or
subsystems controlled by TRAC for programmed flights to safe
base
Baro--Corrected Pressure altitude-corrected local barometric
pressure. Altitude (Data & connection acquired & protected
from any subsystem as needed By TRAC processor SUC)
BGI Bus Grant Inhibit. A term used in CAPS transfer bus processing.
(Utilized as needed to complete TRAC SUC system and protocols.)
BIST Built-in Self Test For TRAC to determine system failures and
to be standardized and approved as a TRUSTED system for remote and
automated flight controls.
BITE-Equipment
BPCU Bus Power Control Unit (Access to operate and maintain TRAC
power requirements sustain TRAC emergency power pack readiness and
energize all essential TRAC peripherals in a TRAC event.)
C
CAA Civil Aviation Authority. A regulatory agency in the United
Kingdom. (Test and approve TRAC and develop national FACT command
codes) All commercial aircraft will have geographic location
sensitive FACT key codes and identification communication protocols
activated by TRAC processed I/O data for the sovereign
airspace.
CAAC Civil Aviation Administration of China (situational
determination of FACT protocols and use will be determined by the
owned and operating country of the aircraft.)
CAASD Center for Advanced Aviation System (to play an appropriate
role in TRAC System Development) Development (The Mitre Corp.)
C/A Code (1) GPS Course Acquisition Code
(2) Course-Acquisition Code SUC system to TRAC and used jointly
with other navigational data to determine air space and operate the
aircraft.
CAC Caution Advisory Computer (Tied into TRAC computer and running
FACT command software communications.
CACP Cabin Area Control Panel (electrically monitored and video
recorded and reported by TRAC locally and to ground support
regional IP buffers and FAA, NTSB mass data storage unit or any
other agency determined as necessary.)
CAE Component Application Engineer to address TRAC & FACT
System protocol configuration, interfacing, and deployment with
forward and backward engineering concerns.
CAGE Commercial Avionics GPS Engine (on board TRAC system
responsive)
CAH Cabin Attendant Handsets all audio and video in the cabin and
in the cockpit and storage compartments--as well as all sensed
data--is recorded and reported in real-time both locally and to the
ground via stream data or packetized data with reception
confirmation. Some data acquisition is determined as continual
monitoring and event programming dictates data handling. Protection
for all such systems is to be application-specific for aircraft
with special consideration to seclusion and limited access.
CAMI FAA Civil Aero medical Institute along with the Center for
Disease Control is to be an intricate part of the WoJack (War OPS)
protocol, a FACT protocol for compromised flights that have to land
at safe bases due to biological or chemical contamination.
CAPT Captain TRAC identification and monitor for Competency
Assessment system software algorithm (Eye evaluation) HMI over
control reaction as a symptom of fatigue or diminished
consciousness, head tilt, and atmospheric changes in the cabin
sensed by spectral analysis (or the nose) fight crew outfitted with
bio-telemetry transmitted to the TRAC processor monitoring flight
crew and critically ill passengers wearing PFN/TRAC personal units.
(telemetry accomplished either wirelessly or connected.)
CAS (1) Computed Airspeed (interfaced with TRAC programming)
(2) Collision Avoidance System SUC Interfaced system with TRAC)
CAT III c Operational performance Category III c. An ILS facility
providing operation with no decision height limit to and along the
surface of the runway and taxiways without reliance on external
visual reference. An absolute minimum for SAFE BASE field
technology along with a ground based virtual RC pilot in a
converted flight simulator with actual troubled aircraft flight
data telemetry and video imaging for the RC pilot to flight the
pilot-less aircraft to a safe landing.
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis (Always TRAC)
C-BAND The frequency range between 4000 and 8000 MHz. TRAC
interfaced
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee types of
communications/frequencies and emergency cross translation protocol
approved by the committee
CCITT International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative TRAC
approval
CDI Course Deviation Indicator SUC TRAC interface and an initial
flag for the Wo Jack Protocol to sense the change of control of the
aircraft or determine the plane is being used in an unauthorized
manner
CDR Critical Design Review should incorporate all effected agencies
and industry organizations and safety stands for all technologies
interfaced in the RC program or robotics programming for the
PFN/TRAC System.TM.
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information captured on video for
TRAC system automated flying use and record.
CDU Control Display Unit directly interfaced with TRAC
Processor.
CEPT Conference Europeene des Postes et Telecommunications To
approve communication interface protocols with (TRAC).
CF Change Field SUC as determined necessary.
CFDIU Central Fault Display Interface Unit direct connect with TRAC
processor
CFDS Centralized Fault Display System Video and audio recorded with
all possible data transmitted to the surface for as long as the
event is occurring via any and all communications available to
include passenger cellular phones wirelessly interfaced to the TRAC
processor (like bluetooth) and transmitted to a preprogrammed phone
address and computer modem set-up as part of emergency protocol for
cellular and wireless telephony with IP connections to FAA and
government real-time emergency air emergency response computers
involved.
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain (As part of TRAC)
CHI Computer Human Interface (As part of TRAC)
CHOL Collins High Order Language (if acceptable to be used in FACT
programming)
CI (1) Configuration Item
(2) Cabin Interphone is recorded with voce recognition technology
and identity algorithm.
CIDIN Common ICAO Data Interchange Network TRAC interfaced.
CIDS Cabin Interphone Distribution System (quarried for flags in
TRAC boot up and monitored.
CIE Commission Internationale de I Eclairag Approval for TRAC
CMS Cabin Management System SUC by TRAC
CMU Communications Management Unit is a subservient SUC to TRAC
with redundant connectables physical or wireless links between the
systems if they are distributed.
CNDB Customized Navigation Database interfaced with TRAC.
CNS/A Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Airborne
interfaced with TRAC.
Coasted a track that is continued based on previous track.
Track characteristics in the absence of surveillance data reports
(TCAS). Plus Surface track data up-loads through the TRAC
system.
CODEC Coder/Decoder Redundant in TRAC
COMAC ICAO's Communications Advisory Committee (To approve
communications and interface protocols used and routed through
TRAC.)
COMM Communications
Compass A low-powered radio beacon, used in conjunction Data
queried by TRAC to confirm event activation protocols.
Locator with ILS. A compass locator has a two-letter identification
and a range of at least 15 miles. Also monitored by TRAC and used
in determining event protocol and robotics flying via software
algorithm running in the processor as well as data reported to RC
Pilot for final approach and landing.
COMP Compressor TRAC will monitor and control the compressor for
cabin air pressure and be capable of stopping it as a SUC if
determined necessary under any WoJack or FACT protocol.
CPC (1) Cabin Pressure Controller TRAC will have SUC here as
well.
(2) Cursor Position Control
CPCI Computer Program Configuration Item. A CPCI number identifies
the configuration of a computer software program. All such
TRAC/FACT Config and module software numbers will be created with
the strictest of security and individuals will be aware strictly on
a need-to-know basis. Sovereign nations should write their own code
and SN them in a proprietary manner, unless it is determined that
allied security is acceptable.
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications This is an obvious
data link for the TRAC Flight system for robotics or remote control
flying and will provide data to the local TRAC unit on board and
down to the RC station for final robotics hand-off RC landing.
First generation, two-step remote and auto-control protocols
(Proprietary to this PFN/TRAC System)
CPI Continuous Process Improvement TRAC evolution
CPM Core Processor Module if not with in the TRAC protected system
must be subservient to TRAC processor and have redundant option to
TRAC if deemed essential in TRAC protocol.
CPS Cabin Pressure Sensor SUC interfaced under TRAC.
CPU Central Processing Unit Existing systems, if capable, can be
set up to perform first generation TRAC protocols as rapidly as
possible with systems becoming more consolidated.
CR (1) Change Request All CRs to the TRAC system require special
accountable security clearance and identity checks before the
system will allow access.
(2) Contrast Ratio
CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreement this is an
absolute necessity for TRAC technology to be put in place.
CRES Corrosion Resistant Steel An obvious component construct for
protective cans packaging essential TRAC components.
CRC (1) Cyclic Redundancy Code
(2) Cyclic Redundancy Check Both CRCs are to be employed to insure
security and reliable service in the TRAC system.
CRPA Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna As necessary TRAC
CRS CourseTrac monitor
CRZ Cruise
CSC Cargo System Controller Nose senses explosives, Biohazard,
radiation, video audio weight TRAC monitored and warning Flag
software pre-flight during and post-flight residuals.
CSCP Cabin System Control Panel interfaced or SUC to TRAC
CSDB Commercial Standard Data Bus Connected to TRAC with multiple
or redundant ACCESS FOR TRAC AND TRAC PROTOCOLS.
CSDS Cargo Smoke Detector System monitored by TRAC recoded and
reported event.
CSEU Control Systems Electronics Unit SUC by TRAC
CSMM Crash Survivable Memory Modules Redundant in TRAC and event
reported to the surface.
CSMU Cabin System Management Unit Subservient and event SUC to
TRAC.
CU Control Unit Either TRAC or subservient to TRAC processor and
protocols
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder Redundant in TRAC and REPORT via
versatile high-speed communication options of TRAC Routing
C & W Control and Warning TRAC providing as to event TRAC/FACT
protocols and Monitoring and responding to as to TRAC/FACY
protocols
CWP (1) Controlled Working Position if necessary TRAC monitored
(2) Controller Working Position (TRAC interfaced)
CWS Control Wheel Steering SUC TRAC
D
DARC Direct Access Radar Channel. An independent backup to main ATC
computers. TRAC system Access
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency TRAC developed by
and with this agency support and management
Data Link A system that allows exchange of digital data over an RF
link. ATCSS is a data link system used by the air traffic control
system. ACARS is a data link system used by airline command,
control and management system, using vhf communication frequencies.
TRAC directly connected and interfaced, to provide real-time
accountable emergency control of unauthorized aircraft use.
D-ATIS Digital Automatic Terminal Information System TRAC connected
TRAC event master.
DBU Data Base Unit TRAC connected any system in place presently in
any part of the PFN/TRAC system can be incorporated to complete the
more secure and remote control system.
DC10 Douglas Model DC-10 Aircraft TRAC outfitted aircraft systems
interfaced and subservient to TRAC
DCE Data Communications Equipment interfaced and SUC to TRAC
DCGF Data Conversion Gateway Function any present system performing
communication translation between protocols (wireless or connected)
to handle data or process commands can be incorporated in the TRAC
protocol of a specific aircraft, made redundant by TRAC if deemed
appropriate, or inexpensively duplicated across the industry if
deemed practical, and expedient to complete TRAC PFN Routing
functions.
DCMF Data Communication Management Function (obvious TRAC/FACT
interface and Protocol application.
DCMS Data Communication Management System (TRAC operation and
Protocols locally and systemically)
DCN (1) Drawing Change Notice
(2) Design Change Notice
(3) Document Change Notice all 3 of the above DCNs are to have an
efficient but secure review and handling on a need-to-know basis
when pertaining to TRAC components and interfacing--(reasonable to
service needs but all identity clearance for access and change
orders) (Secret clearances with respect to national security)
(depcon rating)
DCP Display Control Panel video and audio recorded and reported to
surface in real time and per TRAC/FAACT event of deemed necessary
protocol 30 second loop to surface buffers for data dumping if
deemed unessential.
DCPC Direct Controller Pilot Communication DCS is additionally
connected to TRAC and management and use to be determined for TRAC
protocols.
DCU Data Concentration Unit TRAC system can utilize any DATA
compression or storage system in place both in the air and on the
ground if determined adequate for TRAC/FACT.
DCV Directional Control Valve (possible SUC)
DDA Digital Differential Analyzer (utilized by TRAC)
DDD Dual Disk Drive Redundant systems in place can be used and with
TRAC/FACT protocol.
DDM Difference in Depth of Modulation TRAC use to be determined
DDP Declarations of Design and Performance. A control document
required by the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) for
certification of avionics equipment. A must for TRAC to be Trusted
in the United Kingdom for commercial use.
DDS Direct Digital Synthesizer SUC for TRAC or SOC or hybrid
substrate for any necessary Data recovery from disparate protocols
to TRAC system
DDT Downlink Data Transfer (to TRAC surface controls and storage
facilities)
DECCA A navigation system widely used by shipping in Europe. The
ground facilities consist of a master station and several
subservient stations interface hybrid substrate to TRAC processor
or comparable technical solution for position confirmation
protocols to TRAC/FACT/WoJack I/O processor for robotics flight or
remote control for location and timing information Dedicated as
determined by the proper authorities for standard TRAC routes of
communication and an emergency ded response for any communication
protocol and frequency used by TRAC/FACT processor in a flagged
emergency event to include a specialized cross communication
emergency translating software algorithm to make more universal and
extensive essential messaging.
DEFDARS Digital Expandable Flight Data Acquisition And Recording
System This system when present employed in or by TRAC, with
real-time reporting capability and event storage at the surface via
TRAC directed and interfaced communication systems.
Demand Mode AN ACARS mode of operation in which communications may
be initiated by the ground processor or the airborne system. Used
imperatively by TRAC system DES and FACT with present security for
first generation and higher language and code developed by defense
contractors and DOD (Omaha div)
DEST Destination (any deviation from flight plan throws a software
flag in TRAC/FACT WoJack Programming
DEV Deviation TRAC Software Flag for any flight plan DEV
DFA Direction Finding Antenna Date supplied to TRAC system for
processing
DFCS Digital Flight Control System as a consolidated part of future
TRAC systems or interface as available.
DFDAF Digital Flight Data Acquisition Function Continual monitoring
process for TRAC processor and this SUC will be used in robotics or
remote control flying scenario if it can be reasonably protected
from tampering to satisfy TRAC/FACT security requirements.
DFDAU Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit. The DFDAU samples,
conditions and digitizes the flight data. (protected and used in
TRAC systems)
DFDR Digital Flight Data Recorder
DFDU Digital Flight Data Unit
DGNSS Differential Global Navigation Satellite System
DGPS Differential Global Positioning System
DGSS Data-link Ground System Standard
DH (1) Decision Height--all five of the above in BOLD lettering are
all SUC to TRAC for robotics and remote control flying and supply
the necessary data to flag a FACT Wo Jack response.
(2) Data flash Header on all FACT transmissions for accountability
and encoded for security.
DI Data Interrupt A TRAC control Function if output and flag in
data input for on board preprogrammed TRAC robotics for any
affected sub-system or SUC
DIAS DGPS Instrument Approach System all instrument data essential
to robotics or remote control flying is provided to and from TRAC
processor and PFN TRAC system as Master in a flagged event
DID Data Item Description part of TRAC accountability (encrypted
for FACT headers)
DIP (1) Dual In line Package. The most common package configuration
for integrated circuits. And used in TRAC system or created by the
necessary components to meet/TRAC redundancy requirements
determined by developed protocols component engineers.
(2) Data Interrupt Program to be a TRAC monitored and managed
function
Directed A DME operating mode that allows an FMCS to select
Mode one to five DME stations for interrogation. Data employed by
TRAC system and protection of this system a requirement of TRAC
DITS Data Information Transfer System used where present or
performed by TRAC as an up grade or second generation
DL Data Link for all essential SUC to the TRAC processor
DLC Data Link Control Display Unit video and audio recorded and
reported per TRAC event.
DLGF Data Load Gateway Function either performed by TRAC (hybrid
substrates or soc interfaces or SUC in present and legacy
aircraft)
DLM Data Link Management Unit a part of or interfaced with TRAC
DLODS Duct Leak and Overheat Detection monitored by TRAC
DLP Data Link Processor a part of TRAC physically protected or
interfaced with first generation.
DLS Data Load System interfaced with TRAC
DLU Download Unit protected and connected to TRAC communication
routing system, when appropriate.
DMA Direct Memory Access but accountable and recorded TRAC/FACT DES
Collins protocols as determined.
DME Distance Measuring Equipment. A system that provides distance
information from a ground station to an aircraft. Interface for
FACT WoJack programming flagged events and for robotics flight and
remote control flying via TRAC.
DME/N Abbreviation for a DME normal system.
DME/P Abbreviation for a DME precision system. Both quarried for
essential data to TRAC operations
DMM (1) Digital Multimeter
(2) Data Memory Module redundant in TRAC system
DMS Debris Monitoring Sensor monitored recoded and reported by TRAC
if needed.
DMU Data Management Unit (a TRAC protected function)
Doppler The change in frequency observed at the receiver
Effect when the transmitter and receiver are in motion relative to
each other. Data used by TRAC system
DOTS Dynamic Ocean Tracking System Additionally, used and
interfaced data when applicable and present to a TRAC system
Downlink The radio transmission path downward from the aircraft to
the earth. This is in multitude through TRAC communication routing
especially in second-generation units.
DPR Dual Port RAM (special to TRAC/FACT and Wo jack programming
DPSK Differential Phase Shift Keying reg electronics and present in
TRAC system.
DRER Designated Radio Engineering Representative (FAA) to have high
security clearance and part of the design review used for TRAC/FACT
and Wojack in aircraft.
Drift Angle The angle between heading and track. It is due to the
effect of wind currents. Sometimes called the crab angle. Computed
data for remote control landing and robotics flight with TRAC.
DSARC Defense System Acquisition Review Cycle a necessary process
to update TRAC FACT and wojack from time to time.
DSB Double Side Band. An AM signal with the carrier removed.
Requires the same bandwidth as the AM signal. Incorporated for
location and communication as needed by TRAC system.
DSDU Data Signal Display Unit video and audio recorded and reported
in real-time flagged event stored.
DSF Display System Function--monitored by TRAC
DSNS Differential Satellite Navigation System Data incorporated in
TRAC programs
DTD (1) Data Terminal Display TRAC video
DTE Data Terminal Equipment interfaced and represented as need be
for TRAC
DTU Data Transfer Unit will connect or be able to down load TRAC
with proper security protocols
Dual Mode An airborne DME rt capable of processing DME/N reg. To
TRAC ops
DME and DME/P ground station signals. Operation is in the
L-band frequency range. Monitored data recovered for TRAC Ops
DUATS Direct User Access Terminal System has accountable access
recorded in TRAC/FACT security for accountability and management
control-identity check TRAC.
Duplex A communication operation that uses the simultaneous
operation, to transmit and receive equipment at two locations. TRAC
employed real-time data transfer for RC.
Dynamic RAM constructed of capacitor elements. Memory (TRAC
employed, as standards require
Dynamic RAM constructed of capacitor elements. Memory (TRAC
employed, as standards require
RAM cells must be periodically refreshed to keep capacitors from
discharging and losing data (see "Static RAM"). TRAC employed
application specific or in sub systems
EADI Electronic Attitude Director Indicator TRAC robotics uses DATA
recovered to fly
EANPG European Air Navigation Planning Group consulted and approval
for TRAC
EAP Engine Alert Processor monitored in the subsystems by TRAC
EAROM Electrically Alterable ROM--possible technology for FACT
flight plans if can be secured from tampering.
EARTS En route Automated Radar Tracking System TRAC continual
communication to surface.
EASIE Enhanced ATM and Mode S Implementation in Europe All air
traffic management will be SUC to PFN/TRAC/FAC command centers in
every country. They may very well be created out of existing ATM as
the highest level of ded. Dedicated control. However it is
suggested that they can be isolated during an event and securely
staffed at all time 24/7, both on any region and national or
international level and including final approach Safe Bases and
control handoffs if indifferent locations.
EATCHIP European ATC Harmonization and Integration Program could
possibly be integrated and interfaced with TRAC/FACT technology and
protocols in the most logical way for this area. ATM & ATC is
well established and all the organizations, countries and
professional and commercial associations are well represented in
European politics and governance (European Union). The inventor is
in no way attempting to tell any group of people how best to set up
TRAC/FACT in their homelands, only mentioning logical established
system components that are already in place that may help implement
the FACT program in an efficient manner.
To help implement TRAC/FACT integration through existing hardware
and software in aircraft and in surface systems in Europe--how ever
FACT codes would have to be set up per geographic for command
robotics and RC scenarios. These are all European questions best
answered by Europeans.
EATMS European Air Traffic Management System to be incorporated and
set up with TRAC/FACT system technology.
EC Event Criterion For FACT events and wojack have to be determined
and that EC has to be written in code to be able to utilize all the
(1) electronic signals supplied any TRAC process or TRAC ASIC.
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference the five above will be used
in all TRAC/FACT systems and protocols in Europe.
ECAM Electronic Caution Alert Module will be monitored by TRAC and
signaled to surface for remote flight and surface response.
ECEF Earth-Centered, Earth-Fixed TRAC interfaced guidance
ECP EICAS Control Panel SUC to TRAC
ECS (1) Engineering Compiler System. An automated data storage
system. Used for TRAC accountability function.
(2) Environmental Control System TRAC SUC as needed to manage the
planes occupants and public safety.
(3) Event Criterion Subfield Coordinated or altered for preferred
TRAC/FACT protocols.
ECSL Left Environmental Control System Card TRAC sub system SUC
ECSMC ECS Miscellaneous Card TRAC interfaced as applicable
ECSR Right Environmental Control System Card TRAC sub system
ED EICAS Display monitored.
EDA Electronic Design Automation a major renovation activity to
create the automated remote control and robotics flight in all
commercial aircraft and data routing.
EDAC Error Detection and Correction (used interchangeably with EDC)
Subsystem SUC to TRAC-TRAC governance.
EDC Error Detection and Correction TRAC highest level
processing.
EDCT Expected Departure Clearance Time all scheduled time will be
augmented by the monitoring TRAC/FACT system that downloads current
cleared data to less secure systems like air line display
systems--there is a more secure information level for every
airline, but all data is monitored managed and transmitted via the
TRAC/FACT system net work of interrelated integrated and interfaced
nodes of wireless gateways and NENA numbers.
EDI Engine Data Interface to be SUC to TRAC/FACT robotics Flight
and landings.
EDIF Engine Data Interface Function to be SUC to TRAC/FACT robotics
Flight and landings.
EDIU Engine Data Interface Unit to be SUC to TRAC/FACT robotics
Flight and landings.
EDMS Electronic Data Management System is directly interfaced as
part of the TRAC system in the first generation and ultimately
dispersed to redundant differently located TRAC ASICS in any
applicable aircraft. For the source system of mass data management
and storage the system will have En route buffers at communication
ink markers for all preprogrammed flights either regular routes or
the safe base flights that will have data repositories and
broadband wireless communication links frequency to be determined
by the appropriate FCC/FAA authorities. These repositories will be
linked by land lines, satellite, microwave fiber optics as part of
an isolated but fastest intranet to FACT central command and all
other FACT response units necessary SBs. The data is available in
real time to all locations with specialized station monitors at
each location for a FACT flight and it is recorded locally in the
aircraft directly below in the position marker repository and in
each FACT system hard drive (TIME/DATED with command strings and
headers. If no FACT event occurs the data is erased to open for new
space (length and time data is kept to be determined by the
appropriate standards group and authorities.
EDP (1) Electronic Data Processing the 6 above data generating and
handling functions will be interfaced in the appropriate manned for
efficiency and rapid application to TRAC.
(2) Engine Driven Pump
(3) Engineering Development Pallet to be drawn for each TRAC/FACT
system and PFN configuration for legacy aircraft and for new
aircraft design.
EDU Electronic Display Unit videoed and signals sent to TRAC
system.
EEC Electronic Engine Control SUC to TRAC.
EEPROM Electrical Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory SUC to,
responsive to and protected as part of TRAC/FACT essential flight
controls for uninterrupted flight FACT flights and landings in the
aircraft.
EEU ELMS Electronics Unit monitored for tampering and any TRAC/FACT
system must be completely operable without the normal aircraft
power to energize it or it's essential actuators. Additionally all
power in service to charge the TRAC system FACT programs must be
protected from power surge deliberate or incidental and/or any
shorting of terminals. Sensing circuits for completed operations
and programs to detect ineffective commands are to be an integrated
part of the TRAC processors capability in robotics as soon as it
can be provided.
EFD Electronic Flight Display Videoed and the electronic signals
recorded and reported if from a FACT flight in progress. All ground
systems for TRAC/FACT should be recorded 9with delete times and
memory storage size determined and standardized.
EFIP Electronic Flight Instrument Processor SUC to TRAC/FACT flight
process either incorporated and protected from local control and/or
a sub system over ride by a ASIC TRAC/FACT processor that controls
all the essential flight controls and receives all sensed data for
completed operations in robotics and RC commands.
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System SUC or sub system to
TRAC/FACT management monitoring and control.
EFIS CP EFIS Control Panel the eight above will be utilized or
interfaced with TRAC as appropriate for TRAC/FACT
effectiveness.
EGNOS European Geostationary Overlay System interfaced for flight
deviation detection in Europe TRAC/FACT Systems.
EGT Exhaust Gas Temperature sensed data reported as relevant to
TRAC process and the ground to detect fuel contamination etc. Also,
Fuel sensing in the aircraft tanks, airport storage facilities and
ground support trans port vehicles to detect reactants via
equipment and free standing PFN/TRAC application specific fuel
sentry units to guard against chemical agents that when heated in a
jet burn could cause tainted or contaminated atmosphere in a
significant area of the jet s operation to cause sick ness or death
on the surface. Especially in takeoff and landings.
EHSI Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator TRAC used with SUC
systems for automated flight.
EHV Electro-Hydraulic Valve SUC to TRAC/FACT systems and programs
and utilized to isolate local human control and effect automated
flying in hydraulically controlled aircraft.
EIA Electronic Industries Association to help in standardized
electronics to help universal ASICS to lessen cost for each
sophisticated application.
EICAS Engine Indication and Crew Alert System Videoed and sub
system to TRAC/FACT systems. FACT can be used to help the
legitimate flight crew handle a problem for as long as they are
able and take over the control of the flight as they are
incapacitated. Thus, the plane to the surface safely as rapidly as
possible--For normal flight emergencies--a controlled smoke black
out could be allowed to occur with all crew and passengers on O2
masks with eyes closed and the aircraft landed safely using the
thick smoke to suffocate the fire but not the people on board.
EIS Engine Indication System videoed and essential electrical
signals for flight SUC to TRAC/FACT control.
EISA Extended Industry Standard Architecture TRAC/FACT is to be
EISA. The PFN/TRAC system is created to be the standard in
accountable robust robotics and RC avionics control of an aircraft
for the present and long into the future. The PFN/TRAC System is
meant to provide an accountable machine messaging matrix of
equipment platform specific intranets as part of a massive human
machine management interface for societies to better control
equipment use in harmony with the earths environment and societies
infrastructures to preserve human life and maintain it's quality in
a free society. Many standard efforts will define the specifics in
hard ware soft ware and procedures, protocols, codes, rules,
regulations and law to be applied to the use of any PFN/TRAC unit
or system application. EISA is an ongoing process designed into the
inventions purpose and architecture to be progressive to meet
humanities needs.
EIU EFIS/EICAS Interface Unit this interface as well as many other
industry standard interfaces will be employed as needed.
ELAN Ethernet Local Area Network will be use as needed to set up
internal aircraft interfaced and used for in house computer
connections in surface stations for TRAC/FACT systems.
ELC Emitter Coupled Logic used and all protocols discernable or
translated via hybrid substrates, chipsets or ASIC or SOC
architecture for the TRAC/FACT process or application specific
processors.
ELEC Electrical
ELM Extended Length Message ELM used as data require for complete
transmission in TRAC/FACT service.
ELMS Electrical Load Management System monitored by TRAC/FACT
system and FACT to control for flight as protect-able or to replace
this energy source.
ELS Electronic Library System a special ELS will be started for 5
initial TRAC/FACT robotics flight and landings at designated Safe
Bases as first library on board everything and application specific
to any aircraft in US airspace. Additionally ELS robotics flight
for all air craft to robotically land at all airports will be an on
going proprietary product and technology of the TRAC/FACT system
and related patent and protected technology. It will be possible to
up load robotics and/or RC command from anywhere to a troubled
aircraft due to a compromised pilot and safely land the plane at
the desired airport or help the deficient pilot where they are
inept provided it is not a FACT event, e.g. Wojack--these flight
are automatically going to safe air space and contained and secured
SB landings, unless otherwise routed due to TRAC/FACT programming
and protocols form Command center.
ELT Emergency Locator Transmitter will be augmented with a GPS
packetized location signal NEMA etc. modulated on there emergency
beacon to be picked up by any surface or seaworthy PFN/TRAC unit
and translate the emergency signal to the best wireless gateway and
NENA data link number for the area TRAC/FACT avionics system for
accurate location coordinates. As part of the data stream for a
troubled aircraft, data will be transmitted during a crash event
for 5 sec until impact and at battery saving intervals if the hot
GPS reading is functioning. Additionally all the other wireless
cellular phones and navigational aids will be quarried by the
protected TRAC processor unit to record and report back all
functioning wireless devices for debris field recognition, and to
contact any survivors to aid emergency response workers.
EMC (1) Entertainment Multiplexer Controller interfaced and used as
needed as applicable in any specific aircraft avionic component for
the initial TRAC/FACT process and protected accordingly, but
ultimately part of the TRAC/FACT--ASIC.
(2) Electro Magnetic Capability TRAC processing protected from
EMFs
EMER Emergency
EMI Electro-Magnetic Interference TRAC protected from
EMS Engine Management System Sub system SUC to TRAC
EP (1) External Power--Charge TRAC systems--FACT protocol isolated
from TRAC system
EPCS Engine Propulsion Control System Sub system to
Autopilot/Flight computer/interfaced with TRAC via higher software
application or direct connect to TRAC processor as per security
needs and aircraft architecture.
ENQ Enquire
EOT End-Of-Text
EP (1) External Power TRAC system has internal power for FACT
protocol and normally operates on external power--however TRAC is
to be protected from external power tampering to disable TRAC.
(2) Engineering Project PFN/TRAC System implementation in to
aircraft into ground system and into secure transportation matrix
or network, EPC External Power Contractor Secured and Protected to
TRAC integrated System.
EPCS Engine Propulsion Control System SUC sub system configured for
essential control functions (secured and protected as
applicable).
E-Plane The E-Plane is the plane of an antenna that contains the
electric field. The principal E-Plane also contains the direction
of maximum radiation. All forward looking radar and aircraft
location data deliverable to the TRAC System or interfaced
subsystems will be used at a higher level by the TRAC processor via
FACT software running final function flight robotics or remote
control.
EPLD Electrically Programmable Logic Device
EPROM Erasable Programmable ROM The 2 above hardware components
implored in subsystems and interfaced as needed to customize
present disparate human dominant controls to a more secure
automated system for TRAC management protocols.
Equivalent Airspeed is a direct measure of Airspeed the
incompressible free stream of dynamic (EAS) pressure. It is CAS
corrected for compressibility effects. The two above data supplied
to the robotics FACT program running and the ground support TRAC
system for robotics flight and RC landing (I) DATA.
ERP Eye Reference Point
ERSDS En Route Software and Development Support TRAC Data for
Robotics flight and interfaced with surface monitoring system.
ERU Engine Relay Unit Sub system SUC to TRAC as practical and
necessary
ESA European Space Agency needed approval for TRAC in Europe and
necessary in the development of the technical changes protocols,
standards and regulations, as well as helping to supply the
necessary satellite tracking and communication technology for the
most responsive real-time remote and robotics control over the
European continent.
ESAS (1) Enhanced Situational Awareness System
(2) Electronic Situation Awareness System to be more enhanced and
incorporated and interfaced with the TRAC system FACT protocol of
Homeland Secure Transportation via accountable
monitoring/management aggressive remote and robotics control in
emergency situations.
E-Scan Electronic Scanning
ESD Electrostatic Discharge TRAC electronics must be especially
protected form this event with surge protection on any ASIC or
crucial IC circuit that is a sub system or essential SUC to TRAC
Systems automated control of aircraft functions.
ESDS Electrostatic Sensitive Devices. Also known as ESSD. Protected
for all TRAC/FACT functions and protocols.
ESID Engine and System Indication Display Usable electronic signal
provided as necessary to TRAC controller and FACT programming
locally and to any ground support virtual flight crew assisting and
of course the RC pilot.
ESIS Engine and System Indication System all electronic data
provided the local robotics and remote flight crew. Additionally to
improve and increase the distance of Remote control Flying accuracy
a special software algorithm both in the aircraft and in the
surface RC flight station need to be developed to use the forward
looking weather radar or any pre flight path sensing equipment data
or external surface or satellite data and adjust the RC fight
stations experience to portrait real-time conditions in the distant
aircraft. Future project for long distant remote control with
optimum flight control insured by robotics backup monitoring
real-time condition.
ESR Energy Storage/Control monitored SUC and used as safely
available to the PFN/TRAC System
ESS (1) Electronic Switching System any essential controls TRAC
interfaced.
(2) Environmental Stress Screening All TRAC systems must comply
with the necessary requirements for impact and environmental
packaging, however
ESSD Electro Static Sensitive Devices (see ESDS)
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival monitored and adjusted by TRAC/FACT
involvement.
ETD Estimated Time of Departure monitored by TRAC System for FACT
events or flags.
ETI Elapsed Time Indicator
ETM Elapsed Time Measurement all timing data monitored by TRAC for
FACT alert flag and to prompt automated quarries of system and
personnel.
ETMS Enhanced Traffic Management System a major purpose for
TRAC/FACT management as well as coordination with other
TRANSPORTATION. Another purpose enhanced public safety.
ETOP Extended Twin Engine Operations to be monitored by TRAC/FACT
systems and coordinated with air speed head winds and other sensed
and RF supplied data for the automated robotics flights to safe
bases by TRAC/FACT process or ASIC processors.
ETRC Expected Taxi Ramp Clearances FACT monitored for an early
ACARS OOOI event FACT flag and then controlled by TRAC/FACT command
control both locally and centrally depending on the nature of the
FACT event--(handled locally in designated isolated area of the end
of a runway or cleared to fly out to a safe base for handling with
specially trained FACT personnel.
ETX End-of-transmission EXT will have a FACT encrypted secure
signature to designate to all TRAC/FACT units a legitimate signal.
(The exact technique and implementation of these unique signatures
is to remain a trade secret to be disclosed to the proper security
personnel at the time they construct there own secret code writing
for operational FACT commands for their air space
EUR European
Eurocae European Organization for Civil Aviation Electronics. A
regulatory agency for avionics certification in Europe This agency
will most definitely determine the TRAC integration process of
existing avionics in legacy aircraft and help design and approve
the ASICs and support computer and wireless systems needed for
TRAC/FACT to operate in European air space.
EURO--European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation.
CONTROL Operations Obviously EURO-CONTROL will be directly involved
with determining the safe airways over Europe to Safe TRAC/FACT
Bases.
EVS Enhanced Vision Systems are to be interfaced with recognition
software to transduce the image to a signal for good (I-data) to
any TRAC/FACT processor to use if this proves beneficial to
robotics flight and landing. Using a similar technology to video
lane maintenance in collision avoidance systems in surface
applications and judging distance by size of an object in a
calibrated field via a software algorithm running in the real-time
flight processor) (possible taken form a calibrated Screen
presented for enhanced pilot vision) whether for normal light or
night vision enhanced applications.
Event recording device note for any data for voice/audio/video or
transmitted communications all elements required for accountable
memory storage must have RF beacon (FAA standard and DSRC like
Bluetooth to activate any hand held telephony in an event (crash or
impact) to narrow the search area and help determine debris field
prior to search, rescue, and recovery operations to generate
accurate maps in Real-Time. Additionally memory units will be
outfitted with a GPS receive with protected patch antenna to give
one hot reading of an initial stationary detected state, if another
movement is detected from this resting state-battery saving GPS
readings are delivered via any beacon or transmitting function if
not terminated by the appropriate authorized parties--Also the unit
will be capable of repeating emergency communications to any other
local PFNs and/or dial out to NENA-FAA and security group with GPS
coordinates-personal PFN technology minimal Processor IC custom
Hybrid substrate in a can or simple IC micro computers like
stap--Standards to determine configuration and use protocol.
F
FAA (1) Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.)
(2) Federal Aviation Authority to approve and implement the
PFN/TRAC System in the United States for air travel.
FAC Flight Augmentation Computer SUC or sub system interfaced and
used as available or needed to affect safe superior and secure
control or the aircraft.
FADEC Full Authority Digital Electronic Control a base technology
of PFN/TRAC System hardware constructions and used and interfaced
with as well as analog systems complete the secure control
technology to perform accountable robust robotic & remote
control.
FAF Final Approach Fix at this point or some where close the first
generation TRAC landing for troubled aircraft performing under FACT
robotics software will be contacted to release controls to the
ground RC flight crew for the final approach and landing--Robotics
programs will run a guardian copilot soft ware use and protocol to
be determined (quickly).
2nd generation will provide robotics software to help inexperienced
pilot with on-board, automated equipment to reach this landing
point and beyond to the pilot feel sure the can make a safe
landing-programs to be up linked as well as RC pilot help as it
becomes avail able locally or virtually.
FAI First Article Inspection. PFN TRAC will run it's own preflight
inspection to check all systems interfaced and during the flight
monitor system. Pilot must clear ID check and log in the system
highest technical identity as well as his filed preflight report is
required--FAA-override and clear.
FAATC FAA Technical Center--to approve all TRAC applications and
interfaces as well as all systems interfaced with TRAC--this center
has to provide the SECRET and security cleared personnel to access
any aviation PFN/TRAC unit in the aircraft and on the ground.
Security clearance and qualification is checked on a regular and
intermittent basis as a condition of this job--Homeland and the
appropriate security agencies to assist on he standards and be in
direct communication with these technical inspectors with the
latest security information as to threats to compromise the
PFN/TRAC system for aviation.
FADE FAA-Airline Data Exchange Monitored/managed or SUC a SUB
system to the surface FAA-Homeland Security PFN/TRAC System
architecture in the Transportation intranet for aviation. This
intranet operated as part of the Internet will have a higher level
of access and control during FACT conditions. During a FACT event
limited access to view or acquire data in a particular
transportation intranet will be evoked with only security DET/DES
or FACT Homeland Security/agency cleared and specific to have
access to these involved data bases. Separate interactive DOT
intranets will monitor surface vehicles for land roadway, rail and
seaways. The PFN/TRAC System ties all these systems together.
FADEC Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (TRAC Protocol
Master Control)
FANS Future Air Navigation System with more Direct GPS supported
flights rather than the traditional hub flying should have special
designed safe air space flight plans to the safe bases that protect
surface public safety, with an emergency response air cavalry
dispatched to intercept and escort a FACT/WoJack event with the air
escort RC pilot. This team will follow and assist the troubled
flight if it is forced don or crashes prior to SB landing and
terminate the flight if this action is warranted.
Fan Marker A marker beacon used to provide identification of
positions along airways. Standard fan marker produces an
elliptical-shaped pattern. A second type produces a dumbbell-shaped
pattern. TRAC/FACT robotics will use this position information data
either in existing autopilot or flight computer systems as a SUC
system to TRAC or they will use the data through direct Flight
controls in the case of second generation self contained and
protected TRAC/FACT System.
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation will be responsible for helping to
develop FACT ESNs for aircraft and components interfaced and
inventoried by TRAC locally--which will flag the PFN/TRAC System in
real-time of any change both in the aircraft and in ground control.
Authorized Technicians will have direct personal PFN connect to
answer any FAA or homeland security questions and meet any security
check in real time.
FAST Final Approach Spacing Tool this system will be employed in
later PFN/TRAC Systems as a general rule--first generation
TRAC/FACT systems will be sent automatically to the Safe Bases. As
flight and landing software libraries are forth coming regular
troubled flight emergencies where flight skill is the only concern
will be spaced automatically by the Robotics system in TRAC and
connected to FACT ground support as needed to affect a safe landing
or help a JFK Jr. type pilot land his aircraft in overpowering
conditions for their skill level. By using the automated onboard
systems to assist them where they are most deficient--store the
corrected errors and provide to a simulator experience for the
pilot to practice his skills for future flying.
FBL Fly By Light This system can be used for TRAC robotics to
control the landing in conjunction with the RC pilot so that data
is being shared between the TRAC system in the plane and the
TRAC/FACT RC simulator station--protocol for master controls to be
determined. Some of this decision may be done by policy and some by
the technologies in use at the time of any given event.
FBW Fly By Wire These systems will prove far easer to eliminate
local control and divert it to the PFN/TRAC unit for FACT protocols
and of course all Flyby wire controls and their redundant systems
will be SUC to the TRAC/FACT program in an event like a WoJack
Scenario.
FCAF Flight Data Acquisition is an ongoing process for the TRAC
system with the FACT software searching for an event, if an event
is detected robotics flight is initiated away from all other air
traffic--onboard sensor systems are further quarried through TRAC
processor via data communications and acquisitions in a real-time
with memory storage active, the personnel are quarried and so is
the surface support to decide if the criterion is met to continue a
robotics flight to the safe base or return the flight to local
pilot control and the adjusted flight path and new approved flight
plan.
FCC (1) Federal Communications Commission will assign ded or
Dedicated frequencies as well as DSRC frequencies to manage all
carryon devices via TRAC system for FACT protocol. Additionally,
FCC will sanction and help develop with other security agencies a
universal high application software that can translate emergency
messages through any wireless protocol for chipsets, hybrid
substrates or SOC technology for the PFN/TRAC unit to scan for
emergency communications process and retransmit to the appropriate
emergency response intranet and services via other TRAC interfaced
communication protocols to act as a local wireless router in a
large flexible matrix or web for networking better
communications.
(2) Flight Control Computer will be part of the COTS TRAC first
generation and must be altered to have flight control uninterrupted
locally to meet TRAC/FACT specifications--and must activate as a
SUC system to perform robotics flight. These advanced Flight
systems may evolve as the central processing component of many
PFN/TRAC systems in specific aircraft. This is the call of industry
standards government and for system and component engineers. These
are workshop adjustments to better construct the TRAC/FACT
component from existing technology. The goals are clearly stated
and the base modality for every step is to increase public safety
and national security while consolidating and protecting the system
for isolated control and confirmed and approved access.
FCDC Flight Critical dc These power bus systems should be protected
as part of the flight control system SUC under FACT protocol and
where ever possible energized by TRAC/FACT system PFNs to complete
any robotic or remote control commands to include DSRC wireless or
wireless Ethernet interfacing for cost effective redundancy. CODEC
in these PFNs to be additionally encrypted with FACT communication
Software to thwart any undesirable command communication attempts.
Additionally, disregard and report any non-inventoried ESN
transmission from known onboard interfaced equipment. All new
interfacing must be accomplished through FACT surface security
protocols FAA and whatever homeland security protocols deemed
necessary.
FCP Flight Control Panel Video and audio monitored and control
functions neutralized in a FACT event e.g. WoJack incident as soon
as detected with all these controls turned over to TRAC/FACT
control of robotics and remote control. If the panel contains vital
components Flight computer autopilot processors or control modules
that can influence flight or critical flight systems they must be
protected and unusable to local human control.
FD (1) Flight Director During an event-FAA position with Home land
security team) Termination of flight decided at the highest level
as possible for the best real-time response needed--decision tree
needed.
(2) Final Data
FDAF Flight Data Acquisition Function a continual process during a
TRAC/FACT event.
FDAU Flight Data Acquisition Unit part of TRAC system and protected
as needed to provide uninterrupted service to any FACT program
running.
FDB Flight Plan Data Bank a unit that could store the 5 safe base
flights and landings subsystem of or SUC to TRAC/FACT.
FDDI Fiber Distributed Data Interface All data communications, be
they wire wireless or light communications are interfaced through
the TRAC system and managed as needed.
FDE Fault Detection and Exclusion
FDEP Flight Data Entry Panel All access must be accompanied by the
highest personal Identity check feasible a TRAC protocol.
FDH Flight Deck Handset Same security ID required Finger thaw pulse
and thermal sensor or Iris read to activate with personal smart
card swipe or individually issued to flight crew.
FDI Fault Detection and Isolation SUC to FACT program analysis.
FDM Frequency Division Multiplex is a system where the messages are
transmitted over a common path by employing a different frequency
band for each signal. This technology can be used for the final
approach or local remote control encrypted signals to fly the plane
separate channels for critical controls.
FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access Could be a SUC system used
by TRAC in a FACT protocol if the Access to the transmission can be
controlled and secured.
FDR Flight Data Recorder and an intricate part of the PFN/TRAC
system. Presently we have the highest protection for the recordings
of a flight. PFN TRAC protocols call for this level of secure
protection or greater for communication routing and computer
controls necessary to fly and land an air craft--This is a major
proprietary difference between what is and what this technology
brings to the world of flying--Accountable automated flying and
advanced and enhanced Human Machine Interfacing.
FDRS Flight Data Recorder System Sub system to TRAC/FACT protocols
or a redundant technology SUC to TRAC's function to deliver same
stored data to surface repositories or mass data buffers
transmitted to while flight is in route and cleared if non event
related or stored with FAA mass data and any manufacturer data
base.
FEATS Future European Air Traffic Management System PFN/TRAC
constructed with the appropriate communication frequencies and the
proper FACT encrypted software. FACT software is activated by
sovereign airspace determined by position location technology on
board and confirmed in many redundant software passes--exact
protocols for emergency TRAC/FACT scenarios like a WoJack
event--involving numerous airspace restrictions must be pre approve
for the robotics flights prior and coordinated with all appropriate
governments.
FEC Forward Error Correction SUC for TRAC robotics flight
FF (1) Free Flight
(2) Flitefone (TRAC monitored
FGC Flight Guidance Computer Can be an integrated part of TRAC or
SUC to TRAC or finally an element of a 2nd generation TRAC
system.
FHA Fault Hazard Analysis Interfaced process SUC to TRAC
FLT CTRL Flight Control PFN/TRAC System TRAC interface and
emergency control.
FLT INST Flight Instrument
FLW Forward Looking Wind shear Radar data interfaced into FACT SB
Flight and landing robotics programs as well as reported to any RC
pilot controls and any real-time fuzzy logic algorithm to fly the
plane more responsive to actual conditions where communication lag
may hinder real-time flight.
FM Frequency Modulation
FMA Flight Mode Annunciator Application to be determined for FACT
programmed flights.
FPA Flight Path Angle data to be processed by TRAC for coordinating
real-time surface safety information and to control aircraft via
robotics and remote controlled flight and landings.
FPAC Flight Path Acceleration Monitored and governed by TRAC/FACT
as need be FPC Flight Profile Comparator a program and protected
function SUC to TRAC/FACT programming either as an integrated
function or interfaced.
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array A processor configuration that
TRAC may use in application specific aircraft needs, also a custom
gate array, and the following TRAC Processors cover a wide variety
of hard ware configurations for the correct ASIC in the patent and
protected technology. The following out of alphabetical order.
COTS Based list is seven such possible architectures
PC, Programmable Controller
Custom
Logic Sequencer
mP (Micro processor)
FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array)
Custom Gate Array
Systems On a Chip (SOC)
FPV Flight Path Vector interfaced and protected data to the
TRAC/FACT program.
FQIS Fuel Quantity Indicating System
FQPU Fuel Quantity Processor Unit SUC in TRAC system
Frequency (1) Function in 860E-5 (-005/-006) to allow tuning 2
Agile by-5 inputs from on-board FMCS/PNCS systems. Channeling may
be as often as every 5 seconds. The 6-wire output data is modified
for input to an FMCS or PNCS.
FRP Federal Radio navigation Plan
FSE Field Service Engineer Secret and security qualified and
approved for TRAC/FACT access.
FSEU Flap Slat Electronics Unit and sub systems autopilot, flight
computer SUC to TRAC/FACT protected control
FSIC ATA Flight Systems Integration Committee To help configure the
various interfaces and configurations of TRAC generational
employment, by setting standards and regulations.
FW Failure Warning interfaced to TRAC via sub systems initially and
ultimately a TRAC protected function.
FWS Flight Warning System SUC to TRAC with application specific
TRAC response programming.
FWC Flight Warning Computer Sub system and SUC to TRAC ultimately
to be a protected function of TRAC processing ASAP.
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association to assist standards
efforts to determine progression of TRAC/FACT protocols into each
aircraft.
GANS Government Air Navigation System a crucial element of the
ground TRAC/FACT system with GBSTs to determine aircraft deviation
either generated from the Aircraft checks or ground generated--also
monitor and tracking.
GBST Ground Based Software Tool used in monitoring all flights and
aiding in robotics and remote control landings.
GCA Ground--Controlled Approach. A system that uses a ground-based
controller to control the approach of an aircraft by transmitting
instructions to the pilot This system will be converted to
communicating directly with the TRAC processor in a FACT protocol
and deliver data rather than voice.
GCAS Ground Collision Avoidance System used as needed and developed
for Robotics and RC landings.
GCB Generator Circuit Breaker
GCS Ground Clutter Suppression
GCU Generator Control Unit TRAC monitor
GDLP Ground Data Link Processor interfaced or integrated with TRAC
processor GDOP Geometric Dilution Of Precision. A term referring to
error introduced in a GPS calculation due to the positioning of the
satellites and the receiver. This algorithm employed to provide the
most accurate position data to TRAC.
GDP Ground Delay Program
GECAS General Electric Capital Aviation Services to help construct
TRAC
GEN Generator
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit
GEOS Geostationary Earth Orbit Satellite To provide location and
communication Links for greater RC at a distance nearer real-time
responsiveness.
GES Ground Earth Station to provide correction GPS signal and
possibly be used to retrieve data downloads from TRAC flights.
GG Graphics Generator employed in simulator RC station and ground
support PFN/TRAC System.
GH Ground Handling and Robotics the priority system in a FACT
event
GHz Gigahertz minimum speed for TRAC processing
GIB GNSS Integrity Broadcast
GIC GPS Integrity Channel
GICB Ground-Initiated Comm-B
GIGO Garbage-In Garbage-Out
GIS Geodetric Information System
Glide path The approach path used by an aircraft during an
instrument landing or the portion of the glide slope that
intersects the localizer. The glide path does not provide guidance
completely to a touchdown point on the runway. TRAC Used as
applicable to landing by robotic and remote control, also a point
for a handoff from robotics WLS to RC final touch down or an assist
protocols for the JFK, Jr. scenario.
Glide slope The vertical guidance portion of an ILS system. TRAC
ILS approach use for SB landing prior to RC handoff
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Russian) Used in the
Soviet Union for TRC navigation.
GLS GPS Landing System used in the TRAC/FACT programming
GLU GPS Landing Unit used in TRAC Processing
GM Guidance Material
GMC Ground Movement Control
GMPLS Global Multimode Precision Landing, System used where
available for robotics and remote controlled landing TRAC
processing.
GMT Greenwich Mean Time. GMT is a universal time scale based upon
the mean angle of rotation of the earth about its axis in relation
to the sun. It is referenced to the prime meridian that passes
through Greenwich, England.
GND Ground
GNE Gross Navigational Error
GNLU GNSS-based Navigation and Landing Unit data used and
interfaced with TRAC robotics and Remote control where available
Europe and 2nd generation.
GNR Global Navigation Receiver SUC system to TRAC
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System Data used applicable to
aircraft TRAC
GNSSP ICAO Global Navigation Satellite System Panel
GNSSU GNSS Unit SUC to TRAC system when present
Goniometer A device that combines the two signals from two loop
antennas. The goniometer (or resolver) contains two fixed coils and
one rotating coil. The rotating coil is connected to the ADF
bearing indicator needle to indicate the relative bearing from the
aircraft to the NDB station. The mechanical position of the rotor
represents the bearing of the station, and the position is
electrically transmitted to the RMI. Used with hub flying position
this data will be SUC to TRAC and compared with GPS and other
position equipment on board.
GOS Grade of Service
GPADIRS Global Positioning, Air Data, Inertial Reference System
data processed in TRAC system to check other systems readings for
error. All position and velocity data to be checked by TRAC systems
to determine if the flight plan is deviated from and if there is a
FACT event.
GPIB General Purpose Instrument Bus Possible connecting point for
the Primary Focal Node Trusted Remote Activity Controller to be
attached if it can be properly protected.
GPNS Ground Proximity Warning System sub system to TRAC and
delivering data to any robotics or RC flight program running in the
air or on the surface.
GPS (1) Global Positioning System (see NAVSTAR)
(2) Global Positioning Satellite
GPSSU Global Positioning System Sensor Unit all of the 3 above to
deliver data to the TRAC processor and FACT program when available
and needed.
GPU Ground Power Unit
GPWC Ground Proximity Warning Computer
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System The 2 above subsystems
delivering data to the TRAC processor during a FACT programmed
flight.
Gradient The rate at which a variable quantity increases or
decreases.
Gray Code Special binary code used to transmit altitude data
between framing pulses of a transponder reply. A cyclic code having
only one digit change at a time.
Used in Mode C to transmit aircraft barometric altitude. Also known
as Gilham code. For all special code and protocols chip sets hybrid
substrates or a running program in the TRAC processor will decode
the necessary data for the TRC system to use this data as available
and needed for the best flight performance.
Ground Wave A radio wave that travels along the earth's
surface.
GRP Geographic Reference Point
GS (1) Glideslope an important element to a robotics and remote
control landing.
(2) Ground Speed read, determined used or generated as necessary
for the TRAC system to perform with the RC ground support pilot to
land and stop the troubled aircraft.
GSE Ground Support Equipment Special access tools and procedures ID
protocols to the Primary Focal Node with the Trusted Remote
Activity Controller.
GSP Glare Shield Panel
GSV Gray Scale Voltage(s) Readable binary code for altitude and
barometric pressure as needed by the TRAC processor for robotics
and RC flight.
GT Greater Than
GTA General Terms Agreement
GTC Data Link Ground Terminal Computer TRAC/FACT download to a
FACT/DES/DET or similar database protected for mass data--special
authorization to perform the process and special access and
accountable access protection whether it is a physical connection
or special wireless encrypted process.
GTR General Technical Requirements For TRAC are spelled out in this
alphabetical list of avionic terms.
GUI Graphic/User Interface
GVE Graphics Vector Engine
GWS Graphical Weather Services same data (via
electronic/digital/analog signal provided the TRAC processor for
all three of the above.
Gyroscope A rotating device that will maintain its original plane
of rotation, no matter which direction the gyroscope mount is
turned. Data transduced if necessary to an electrical signal when
not present and provided to the TRAC processor for the Robotics
flight to determine horizon and level flight reference.
H
HDBK Handbook Written to detail out the TRAC/FACT protocol in the
specific aircraft.
HDG Heading Data delivered to the TRAC processor for flight
deviation recognition function.
HDLC High Level Data Link Control A major function of TRAC
HDOP Horizontal Dilution Of Precision
HDP Hardware Development Plan For TRAC--is to start with existing
air craft architecture and interface and protect any existing
hardware that can support TRAC/FACT robotics and remote control
flight and landing, additionally augment these systems with the
necessary ASIC and local HMI lockouts to complete these first
generation and aftermarket changes. 2nd generation HDP Forth
coming. For surface systems utilize all the computer hardware
systems in the agencies either existing or augmented in DOT, FAA,
NHTSA, NTSB, DOD Homeland Security link w? DOJ/FBI, CIA, NSC via
FACT communication and software protocols to create an entire
secure transportation management system.
Heading The direction of an aircraft path with respect to magnetic
or true north. All location equipment to determine true heading on
the aircraft is to be quarried by TRAC/FACT to insure the FACT
program triggers on proper event flags in the program to take
robotic control and fly the plane correctly.
HF High Frequency. The portion of the radio spectrum from 3 to 30
MHz. HF communication systems operates in the 2 to 30 MHz portion
of the spectrum.
HFDL High-Frequency Data Link All communication is SUC to TRAC as
needed with redundancy as needed for reliability, ded frequencies
have to be determined for the RC flight and encrypted communication
links, the bandwidths have to accommodate the best handling of the
determined essential data for each fact function and be translated
by TRAC for redundant messaging when one communication link is
compromised.
HFS High-Frequency System
HGA High Gain Antenna
HHLD Heading Hold Any change of the heading in a flight plan is to
be recovered by video and all information is to be considered
TRAC/FACT event record and report flag status.
HIL Horizontal Integrity Limit any real-time flight data sensed or
generated is delivered to the TRAC Processor or protected sub
system SUC to the TRAC processor running any FACT preprogrammed
robotics or for RC downloads.
HIRF High Intensity Radiated Field TRAC protected from with a mesh
composite in the physical protection if needed to protect against
EMWs--Protection to be determined by standards effort
HLCS High Lift Control System SUC to FACT robotics flight programs
either protected distributed TRAC node--autopilot or flight
computer or a consolidated second-generation PFN/TRAC system.
HLE Higher Layer Entity TRAC processor and programming
HLL High Level Language FACT code
HMI Human Machine Interface Enhanced by TRAC with accountable
shared control scenarios.
HMOS High Density Metal Oxide Semiconductor All electronic
component technology used in TRAC construction.
HOW Hand-Over Word cock pit and cabin video for TRAC recording and
RC communications and for gesture recognition program in TRAC also
voice command recognition software in TRAC.
HP High Pressure
HPA High Power Amplifier
hPa hecto Pascal
HPC High Pressure Compressor
H-Plane The H-Plane is the plane in which the magnetic field of the
antenna lies. The H-Plane is perpendicular to the E-Plane.
HPR High Power Relay SUC to TRAC
HPSOV High Pressure Shutoff Valve SUC to TRAC
HPT High Pressure Turbine
HSI Horizontal Situation Indicator. An indicator that displays
bearing, glide slope, distance, radio source, course and heading
information. Video and Data lined appropriately as to TRAC.
HSL Heading Select Video and data linked to TRAC
HSR High Stability Reference Interfaced as needed
HUD Heads Up Display TRAC connected
HVPS High Voltage Power Supply SUC to TRAC
HW Hardware
HX Heat Exchanger
HYD Hydraulic
HYDIM Hydraulic Interface Module sub system and SUC to TRAC
Hz Hertz (cycles per second)
I
IACSP International Aeronautical Communications Service
Provider
IAF Initial Approach Fix Data to TRAC/FACT programs
IAOPA International Council of Aircraft Owners and Pilots A group
to help determine and set Standards codes regulations and use of
TRAC/FACT with government.
IAP Instrument Approach Procedure to include complete protocol for
RC and robotics landing via TRAC/FACT programming at the 5 SBs for
FACT events. Second and future generations of PFN/TRAC to complete
robotics and RC landings at traditional airports of all WLS
approaches.
IAPS Integrated Avionics Processing System incorporated as TRAC in
first generation where applicable--further protected and managed
via FACT software.
IAS Indicated Air Speed all data delivered to TRAC
IATA International Air Transport Association to take part in the
forming and implementation of standards rules regulation and law
incorporated in TRAC/FACT protocols.
IC (1) Intercabinet used as applicable to TRAC/protocol for
security
(2) Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization (Montreal) another
group to be incorporated in determining the procedures and rules
standards, regulation codes laws that TRAC will be applied by and
FACT programming will be coded and written for ICC IAPS Card Cage
to be constructed to meet the TRAC/FACT protection requirement for
any essential processing system to perform the FACT protocols
un-abated.
ICD (1) Installation Control Drawing for each TRAC/FACT flight
system for each aircraft.
(2) Interface Control Drawing TRAC/FACT for each aircraft
(3) Interactive Design Center used to develop the proper TRAC/FACT
configurations for each aircraft type from what is COTS and what
has to be interfaced and augmented to be certified TRAC/FACT
ready.
ICNIA Integrated Communications, Navigation and Identification
Avionics an essential automation to all flying platforms for
TRAC/FACT certifications, additionally this is to be a protected
avionics package with an onboard inventory program for an avionics
FACT package deliverable by wireless and recorded in protected
memory. This ICNIA package when present will provide data to the
TRAC process and/or computer running FACT robotics flight and
landing programming.
ICU Instrument Comparator Unit to be monitored by TRAC for any
flagged instrument failures or possible tampering event flag for
FACT.
IDC Indicator Display/Control videoed combined with data streams
sent to surface system to evaluate.
Ident The action of the transponder transmitting an extra pulse
along with its identification code (at the request of a
controller). Used for essential TRAC communication link, and this
Ident modality to be used by TRAC components dispersed by an
accident to communicate location data between existing operating
PFN/TRAC components and rescuers establish-most accurate debris
field for best rescue and recovery.
IDG Integrated Drive Generator
IDS (1) Ice Detection System
(2) Integrated Display System
IEC IAPS Environmental Control Module TRAC connected and
interfaced
IED Insertion Extraction Device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers to take part
in the standards efforts for all TRAC hardware.
IF (if) Intermediate Frequency. A frequency to which a signal is
shifted as an in-between step in the reception or transmission of a
signal. TRAC is a communication router and therefore this function
is part of the TRAC scan processor for all communications
interfaced with a FACT priority scan recognition algorithm. Any
wireless system also on board would be a sub system or SUC to
TRAC.
IFALPA International Federation of Airline Pilots Association an
organization to take part in the standards, codes and rules
regulations and laws pertaining to the implementation of TRAC/FACT
System and protocols.
IFATCA International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers O
Associations This organization will also take part in the
construction of protocols for TRAC/FACT software action for the
robotics flight plan and the surface RC pilots handling the final
approach.
IFPS Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing System This system
will be access able in real-time and be part of a software program
comparing the flight in progress and trip both surface and air
systems upon a deviation as a FACT flagged event.
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IGES Standardized Graphics Exchange File
IGV Inlet Guide Vane
ILM Independent Landing Monitor Data interfaced as needed to TRAC
system
ILS Instrument Landing System. The system provides lateral, along
course and vertical guidance to aircraft attempting a landing. Data
provided the robotics and remote controlled landing program for
FACT.
INA Integrated Modular Avionics How TRAC software will be
configured and consolidated.
INC Instrument Meteorological Conditions data supplied as available
and needed by FACT flight programming.
IMPATT Impact Avalanche and Transmit Time. This type of Diode, when
mounted in an appropriate cavity, produces microwave oscillations
and amplification.
IMTEG ICAO ILS/MLS Transition Group Europe to take part in the
standards on how TRAC/FACT will be configured and implemented in
Europe.
IND Indicator all indicators will be videoed and their electrical
signal will be transmitted to the TRAC Processor.
INU Inertial Navigation Unit will provide data to TRAC for FACT
programming.
IAS Indicated Airspeed is the speed indicated by a differential
pressure airspeed indicator which measures the actual pressure
differential in the pilot-static head. It is the actual instrument
indication for a given flight condition. This electrical signal
will be provided to the TRAC processor. All such reported data
during a FACT event is recorded locally and transmitted to the
surface for redundant storage and use in RC piloting.
Indicated The altitude above mean sea level (uncorrected for
Altitude temperature). Used data as relevant to flight operations
in FACT robotics and RC piloting.
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization to be
instrumental in ded dedicated frequencies procedures and protocols
in using satellite communications for accurate positioning of
aircraft in 3 dimensions and communicating long distant for
real-time or near real-time RC or robotics augmentation on board a
troubled aircraft.
I/O Input/Output. Refers to bidirectional data ports. As many as
necessary to handle the data streams to fly the air craft and
communicate with the surface Processors will range to meet
application specific needs of the aircraft originally with future
configurations more standardized and consolidated, however more
redundant and more difficult to defeat system integrity.
INPH Interphone All communications are monitored by the TRAC system
and voice recognition command identity capability will exist
locally, however the ultimate control over TRAC can rest at the
surface via encrypted FACT commands if deemed appropriate and
wise.
INS Inertial Navigation System. A self-contained, dead reckoning
system that senses the acceleration along the three axes of the
aircraft and calculates the distance traveled from a reference
point. Accuracy of the system decreases with respect to time. Never
the less this systems electronic signals and data will be provided
to the TRAC processor running FACT software running an appropriate
algorithm for error to use and confirm FACT program choices and to
correctly navigate the plane and/or check flight progress on the
pre register flight plan.
INST Instrument All essential data provided to TRAC with
instrumentation videoed.
Intruder An altitude reporting aircraft that is being considered as
a potential threat and that is being processed by the threat
detection logic (TCAS). Any TCAS protocols and tracking system as
well as scramble fighter response to protect airspace will be
incorporated into a troubled FACT event like WoJack protocol,
Additionally, the FACT event on the troubled air craft will
initiate a TCAS response with special new protocols to include an
RC pilot in an assist escort fighter.
IOC Initial Operational Capability first TRAC/FACT systems in 120
days with 100% cooperation of government agencies/military and
commercial contractors.
ION Institute of Navigation
IOR Indian Ocean Region
IOT & E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 90-120 days for
TRAC/FACT deployment.
IP Intermediate Pressure
IPB Illustrated Parts Breakdown
IPC (1) Intermediate Pressure Compressor
(2) Illustrated Parts Catalog
IPD Industrial Products Division to participate and approve the
configurations and help create standards rules code.
IPL Illustrated Parts List
IPT (1) Intermediate Pressure Turbine
(2) Integrated Product Team (FAA) for TRAC/FACT system and
responsible for setting the progressive steps for specific aircraft
as per there application and risk to meet FACT protocols.
IRP Integrated Refuel Panel all flight data provided to the Flight
system of TRAC/FACT or any protected sub system performing FACT
flying
IRS Inertial Reference System data provided TRAC/FACT system as
available or needed.
IRU Inertial Reference Unit data provided the FACT program in use
and data supplied to surface management systems.
ISA (1) Industry Standard Architecture
(2) International Standard Atmosphere the 2 above are a conditions
of TRAC/FACT System.
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network to be interfaced or
assimilated/made a part of the PFN/TRAC System and further
encrypted as appropriate with FACT software
ISDOS Information System Design and Optimization System
ISLN Isolation The TRAC processor and FACT program must be isolated
from any air born contact.
ISO (1) International Organization for Standardization
(2) International Standards Organization these two above are
absolutes for TRAC/FACT system as inherent in the architecture of
TRAC.
Iso-Contour Refer to contour
ISPA International Symposium on Precision Approach and Instrument
Landing in the future to review TRAC/FACT robotics and RC landing
with WLS data links are fed to the TRAC system and surface RC
station with a count down for touch down estimate verbally for
ground response team readiness throughout the base handling a FACT
event. For all teams medical/CDC, law enforcement/military
readiness-additionally the ILS data is fed to the TRAC processor or
Flight controller or adapted autopilot handling robotics flight for
glide path or final approach application specific per aircraft
equipment.
ISPACG Informal South Pacific ATC Coordinating Group all groups
agencies governments and/organizations to participate in the FACT
structure and protocol development for their geographic area and
any general applications that effect all.
ISSS Initial Sector Suite System. All tracking or position
placement systems or data to be feed to the surface system and
transmitted to an airborne TRAC system querying accurate location
for confirmation is to be available to TRAC/FACT.
ISU Initial Signal Unit All transmitted data to be feed to
TRAC/FACT system for robotics flight/glide path and landing,
additionally provided surface RC station and ground support
team.
ITM Information Technology Management is the ground-based portion
of an ADMS (see also EDMS). Immediately used to run FACT
programming and protocols.
ITO Indium-Tin Oxide
ITS Integrated Test System internal testing of all systems
interfaced to or as a part of a TRAC System processor must run a
self-test and component check on boot up and periodically as part
of any operational algorithm. As well as be able to determine new
interfaces and include reject, record and report their connection,
ESN/FACT ID and/or removal locally if appropriate and to the
surface ITM, ADMS, EDMS via wireless and IP connections. One
important part of being TRUSTED is that the TRAC/FACT system in
place at any given time can report to the proper people a system
failure, real-time reporting to authorized people and locations in
the air and on the surface to be defined by proper standards codes
rules regulation and governing agencies.
ITT (1) Interstage Turbine Temperature
(2) Inter-Turbine Temperature
ITU International Telecommunications Union an organization to help
determine the use of wireless systems by TRAC/FACT and help set up
the matrix of communication options for the TRAC/FACT system per
geographic area with the appropriate sovereign powers and
commercial interests.
IV Isolation Valve This device will be an electrically controlled
solenoid valve on hydraulic assist and complete hydraulic systems
to lock out local control. Full hydraulic control systems will have
their delivery lines primary and redundant from the pilot controls
to their actuators blocked or diverted to an absorbs ion bladder or
accumulator cushioned with nitrogen to control pressure. This
diversion must take place in an unobtainable area in the aircraft
during flight and the access and service must require FACT system
avionics/hydraulics certification on the ground.
ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System FACT RC Station connected
and data transmitted to TRAC processor or adaptive autopilot for
automated landing to receive crosswind surface data, Doppler
radar/down bursts etc.
J
JAA European Joint Airworthiness Authority to approve and help
create the appropriate TRAC/FACT operation and use for European
airspace and the sovereign powers and publics affected.
JAL Japan Air Lines All airlines will work with their host
country's government and any foreign government they fly into to
provide the correct TRAC FACT programming as per confirmed air
space they are in. TRAC processors through various communication
systems and locating technologies will activate the appropriate
program codes and international flight and coordination must be
determined via the proper named organizations and government
agencies-working together for the safest most optimum public safety
and security for all in the air and on the surface.
JAR Joint Airworthiness Requirement TRAC/FACT self test and FACT
inspections should be a FAA/homeland security regulation and part
of any airworthiness requirement to fly air aircraft per airspace.
Certification transmitted or IP connected prior entering new
airspace another r requirement with all sovereign air space
approval and ultimate control.
JAR-AWO Joint Airworthiness Requirements--All Weather
Operations TRAC/FACT approved and part of, as well as interfaced
with, all necessary equipment in an air worthy and protected state
to perform robotics flight and RC flights.
JFET Junction Field Effect Transistor, any electronics components
can be used either directly or as part of a subsystem in the
construct of a TRAC system and/or FACT protocol.
JPO Joint Program Office all agencies and any essential flight or
air travel organizational offices will be linked DET/FACT software
and other unsecured IP links will be provided generic messages from
the fact system to be determined as appropriate for the
circumstance to provide information in a less secure environment to
the public during a FACT event.
J/S Jammer to Signal Ratio
JTAG Joint Test Action Group
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System To be
connected with by and for FACT protocols.
K
KAL Korean Air Lines All airline will work with their host
country's government and any foreign government they fly into to
provide the correct TRAC FACT programming as per confirmed air
space they are in. TRAC processors through various communication
systems and locating technologies will activate the appropriate
program codes and international flight and coordination must be
determined via the proper named organizations and government
agencies--working together for the safest most optimum public
safety and security for all in the air and on the surface.
Key A hand-operated switching device or the act of operating such a
device. A special key stroke for FACT communications that are dated
and coded to communicate with FACT/Homeland security to alert of
FACT event and transmit essential data to be set up and determined
and to determine who should know such communication Links--key pads
on handheld flight communicators or personal PFNS as well as DETs
on the flight stations and instrument panels.
KGLS Kinematic GPS Landing System used for the FACT/RC robotics
landing
KHz Kilohertz (1000 cycles per second)
kb/s Kilobits Per Second The fastest communications and processing
is to apply to the necessary Real-time flight and landing controls
with all other data transmitted in near real-time always with the
most critical FACT data being handled with the highest
priority.
KBU Keyboard Unit on all FACT/DETs throughout the system onboard
the aircraft and in the ground support system.
KPS Kilobytes Per Second, Real-time Flight controls to have the
highest data rates.
kts Knots. Landing knots due to inertia/size of the aircraft is a
FAA classification system and such classification system will be
used to apply FACT deployment through out the aircraft industry in
this paper a chart is presented of the aircraft classifications
here.
The FAA provides the following categorizations of aircraft.
Categorization by Stall Speed (which determines the basis of
landing or approach speed):
TABLE 1 Aircraft Approach Category 1.3 Times Maximum Speed Aircraft
the Stall (Circling Typical Aircraft Category Speed in Knots
Approaches) in This Category A less than 90 knots small single
engine 91 knots B 91 to 120 knots 120 knots small multi engine C
121 to 140 knots 140 knots airline jet D 141 to 165 knots 164 knots
large jet/military jet E above 166 knots special military (source:
FAA, 1976, United States standards for Terminal Instrument.
Additionally knots kts or aircraft speed will be provided via an
electrical signal to the TRAC processor performing FACT robotics
and RC flights and landing.
In the Chart above Categories C&D are focused on for the most
rapid deployment of FACT due to the high fuel and inertia
destructive value of these aircraft to surface targets when used by
hostile forces or terrorists. Basically, this patent allows for the
DOD & military to use FACT and apply it with DES/DET as they
see best and therefore security applications are left unstated.
These systems are of the highest security and their exact
implementation will not be detailed here in this international
forum. However, this inventor is willing to help the United States
of America expand on this technology in anyway possible or needed
at anytime to increase public safety, national security and
preserve freedom and democracy.
kVA Kilovolt-ampere
L
L Left
L1 Frequency on which GPS SPS signals are transmitted, will be
incorporated into the TRAC/FACT system.
L-Band carrier (1575.42 Mhz) Monitored and interfaced with the
TRACT communication router.
L1011 Lockheed Model 1011 Aircraft First generation TRAC/FACT ready
in 90 days--this is a C-D category aircraft.
L2 L-Band carrier (1227.6 MHz) interfaced with the TRAC scan and
router section ASAP otherwise TRANSCEIVER a sub system or SUC to
current to TRAC/FACT management.
LAAS Local Area Augmentation System
LAC Lineas Aereas Del Caribe (an airline) All airlines will work
with their host country's government and any foreign government
they fly into to provide the correct TRAC FACT programming as per
confirmed air space they are in. TRAC processors through various
communication systems and locating technologies will activate the
appropriate program codes and international flight and coordination
must be determined via the proper named organizations and
government agencies working together for the safest most optimum
public safety and security for all in the air and on the
surface.
LADGPS Local Area Differential GPS All of the most accurate systems
for GPS will be interfaced with the air and surface system under
TRAC/FACT control to safely determine FACT events and perform
robotics and RC flights and landings.
LAN Local Area Network all such net works are to be interfaced as
needed and SUC or protected sub systems to TRAC system and/or FACT
protocols which ever is present in any given system
LAT Latitude a coordinate important to determining flight deviation
and in flying and landing FACT controlled flights.
L-Band A radio frequency band from 390 to 1550 MHz. Interfaced and
used to perform FACT programming and monitored by TRAC RF routing
and scanning.
LCC Leadless Chip Carrier as a hardware socket employed as needed,
additionally any RF device is SUC to TRAC/FACT management and
control and interfaced with the system- and if any chip mount can
be used to precipitate TRAC/FACT interfacing with the least of
connectable effort any ware in the Aircraft to the control buss and
be done in a secure solo manner wired or wireless it is to be used
as much as necessary.
LCD Liquid Crystal Display on all components integrated with the
TRAC/FACT system with the displays covered to anyone other than
FACT cleared Technical teams.
LCP Lighting Control Panel TRAC can control all illumination in the
aircraft for FACT protocols to limit local control capability to
prevent unauthorized or unsafe use of an aircraft so compromised.
The FACT robotics and RC via TRAC can use infrared cameras and heat
sensing system during such an event to determine the proper
illumination for an event.
LCSTB Low Cost Simulation Test bed all test means to insure the
highest safety in TRAC/FACT design construction deployment and use
are to be employed in the most efficient manner with respect to the
need for TRAC/FACT per aircraft and support system.
LD Lower Data less important data will run at slower computing
speeds and communication protocols, however in a FACT event all
data can be important and local and surface software programs will
evaluate data importance sensed on board. Human controls on the
surface can prioritize this process (protocols to be
determined).
LDCC Leaded Chip Carrier All systems
LDGPS Local Area Differential Global Positioning Satellite used to
determine FACT event and to fly the FACT flight plans and
Landings.
LDU Lamp Driver Unit
LED Light Emitting Diode used as needed for TRAC error recognition
and general illumination in authorized servicing--work or utility
lighting used to recognize personnel determine their actions and to
alert others to unauthorized work as well as distract or hinder
unauthorized tampering by flashing/blinding or abstinence.
Leg The section of the flight between two waypoints. To be
TRAC/FACT monitored for flight plan deviations also the area of a
FACT flight over the least populated or sensitive Surface areas for
FACT flights to SB waypoint air space.
LF Low Frequency. The frequency range from 30 to 300 kHz. All
communication L frequencies to be set up for TRAC/FACT DATA
communication links and SCAN routing--actual frequency use to be
determined by RF component engineers and government agencies as per
physics characteristics and desired use.
LGA Low Gain Antenna all necessary antennas protected secluded FACT
inspected and TRAC/FACT tested on boot up and periodic auto testing
as part of TRUSTED system protocol.
LH Lufthansa
LHP Lightning HIRF Protection TRAC/FACT components protected for
lightning strikes and static and ground spiking to disable the
system.
LIB Left Inboard
LISN Line Impedance Stabilization Network SUC for TRAC
LLP Left Lower Plug. Identifies the plug on the rear connector of
an avionics unit. All connections including LLPs are to take place
in physically protected cans as well as have protected leads with
one-way power service regulated to restrict tampering and protect
against current overload.
LLWAS Low-Level Wind Shear Alert System This data provided to the
RAC flight station and the TRAC processor or Adaptive autopilot for
robotics flight adjustment and landing.
L/M List of Materials
LMM Locator Middle Marker. An NDB that is co-located at the same
site as the 75 MHz middle marker beacon.
LMP Left Middle Plug. Identifies the plug on the rear connector of
an avionics unit. All connectors and leads for essential energy or
communication Links are to be shielded or protected.
LMT Local Mean Time
LNA Low Noise Amplifier
LNAV Lateral Navigation is programmed in the flight plans for fact
and processed through the TRAC processor or the Adaptive auto
pilot/flight computer. Actual lateral position monitored throughout
he various onboard position-sensing systems.
LOB Left Outboard
LOC Localizer. The lateral guidance portion of an ILS system.
Incorporated into TRAC/FACT programmed and RC flights and
landings.
Lock-On The condition that exists when the DME receives reply
pulses to at least 50 percent of the interrogations. Valid distance
information is then available. A technology used to determine plane
position and used in the automated flying of the TRAC/FACT
programs.
LOM Locator Outer Marker. An NDB that is co-located at the same
site as the 75 MHz outer marker beacon. All markers used to line up
aircraft for landing will be used in the FACT final approaches for
robotics and RC coordinated landings.
LON Longitude
LORAN Long Range Navigation. A system using a ground facility
composed of a master station and a subservient station. The
airborne receiver computes the position of the aircraft by using
two or more received dominant-subservient.
pairs of signals. LORAN-A operates at 1850, 1900 and 1950 kHz.
LORAN-C operates at 100 kHz. LORAN A was replaced by LORAN C in
1980.
LORAN C Long Range Navigation System The loran system along with
GPS will be used in together for FACT to determine a deviation and
for FACT flying.
LOS Line Of Sight as part of the RC station one RC pilot will
maintain line of sight while another maintains an instrument
approach as part of the surface team landing a FACT flight.
Additionally, RC pilots in assist escort craft will maintain LOS
with the FACT flight for as long as possible. Ultimately, the FACT
flight can be safely landed robotically, remotely controlled with 3
skilled pilots as a coordinated team--protocols to be determined
and developed.
LPC Low Pressure Compressor
LPT Low Pressure Turbine
LRA (See RALT)
LRM Line Replaceable Module ultimately PFN/TRAC units will be
constructed as LRMs or LRUs and be placed in several areas along
the control bus.
LRRA (See RALT)
LRU Line Replaceable Unit ultimately PFN/TRAC units will be
constructed as LRMs or LRUs and be placed in several areas along
the control bus.
LSB (1) Lower Sideband. The lower sideband is the difference in
frequency between the AM carrier signal and the modulation signal.
All RF Communication On the aircraft will be routed through
PFN/TRAC system for total Communication access.
(2) Least Significant Bit
LSD Least Significant Digit
LSI Large Scale Integration PFN/TRAC and FACT programming is LSI
and will be in the form of an ASIC as time passes.
LSK Line Select Key
LTP Left Top Plug. Identifies the plug on the rear connector of an
avionics unit. All connectors and essential leads are protected,
for SUC or sub systems for TRAC System and FACT.
Lubber Line A fixed line placed on an indicator to indicate the
front-to-rear axis of the aircraft. Data electronic signal provided
FACT flight programs running in sub systems or in TRAC/FACT
system.
LV Lower Sideband Voice recorded and controlled by TRACor FACT
programming for FACT event.
LVDT Linear Voltage Differential Transducer (used with aircraft
control surface servos) monitored by TRAC/FACT and emergency power
provided by protected PFN/TRAC System.
LVLCH Level Change monitored and Managed by TRAC/FACT programs as
appropriate.
LVPS Low Voltage Power Supply avail able to TRAC operations and
also inherent in TRAC Systems.
M
m Meter
m/s Meter per Second All measurements that equate to movement of
the aircraft will be transduced into an electrical signal and
provided TRAC processor or the FACT sub system to be used in the
determination of a FACT event and how to fly and land the aircraft
via robotics and RC controls.
MAC Medium Access Controller all essential controllers will be
incorporated for the FACT protocols as subsystems or SUC to TRAC
and especially a good access point that must be protected with
restricted access or any translation processor that will allow for
a higher application software to control the system.
Mach Number Mach number is the ratio of the true airspeed to the
speed of sound at a particular flight condition. It is the chief
criterion of airflow pattern and is usually represented by the
free-stream steady-state value.
Mag Magnetic
Magnetic The bearing with respect to magnetic north.
Bearing
Magnetic North The direction north as determined by the earth's
magnetic field. The reference direction for measurement of magnetic
directions. The four above terms and definitions involving the
heading of the aircraft using the traditional compass will be
provided as an electrical signal indicative of the instrumentation
to the FACT algorithm to equate the true aircraft direction and
heading the pilot is reading on the instruments. This will be
determined by satellite and GPS, Lorands other RF and locating
devices on board and dead reckoning to determine true intent of
aircraft and controlling operators and to assist the local
real-time operators in maintaining the correct course for the
real-time circumstance and providing the proper air and surface
support for the troubled air craft to in sure better public safety
in the air and on the surface.
MAMS Military Airspace Management System will be connected directly
in a FACT event. And military bases will be chosen and outfitted
for FACT operations (to be determined as a National air guard/coast
guard response or regular military or all three of the above with
local law enforcement and emergency response air support assisting
immediately until relieved all coordinated by local FAA/FACT air
space controllers handling a FACT event.
MAR Managed Arrival Reservoir
Marker Beacon A transmitter operating at 75 MHz that provides
identification of a particular position along an airway or on the
approach to an instrument runway. The marker beacon is continuously
tone-modulated by a 400-Hz, a 1300-Hz or a 3000-Hz tone. Marker
beacons along an instrument runway provide along-course (range)
guidance and designate when an aircraft should be at a certain
altitude if the aircraft is following the glide path. An audio
algorithm will transduce this signal or a digital or electrical
analog signal with identifiable characteristics will be transmitted
to the troubled aircraft overhead at the appropriate position for
the Flight glide path algorithm to adjust the aircraft control
surfaces (Flaps etc.) to obtain the proper altitude and later al
position for the airport approach and landing. This data is also
provided the RC stations in the chase aircraft and in the surface
support. The system used to deliver this important data should be
universalized or multiple technologies have to be available on the
ground on these safe bases. Additionally these beacons have to have
the highest of surface protection with a vigilant monitor on any
near Safe Base wireless communications that could be misinterpreted
as a marker signal SB signal should have an encrypted code
recognized by on board TRAC/FACT programming.
MASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards any FACT
configuration that is to be used by aircraft flying must meet this
standard and that will probably require a special customized
inspection by the most skilled in aviation/avionics to determine
flight readiness. These first generation systems will not be easy,
simple or perfect, but they each have to improve air security and
public safety as much as possible in each step and continue to
improve until an entire safe PFN/TRAC System unit is obtained in
every aircraft.
MAT Maintenance Access Terminal have to have FACT approved
technicians and security surveillance over work performed with
workers wearing PFN/TRAC units with audio and video record/report
capability in real-time. Infrared/heat and human imaging sensing
and system software algorithms with ESN quarries of these personal
PFNS are to identify personnel with Identity check points
Sync/timed PIN codes, Iris reading finger print non invasive DNA,
face print recognition, voice recognition and finger print thaws on
the PFN identity belt that the worker is wearing is needed. (Proper
security is available at the installation and is rotated. Each
PFN/TRAC/FACT component with it's anti-tamper sensing and
electronic seals can communicate with security at any MAT and all
other FAA security checks and inspections are observed.
MAWP Missed Approached Waypoint this signal is provided air born
TRAC/FACT program and the RC pilot for any effort to land the
aircraft or retry or deal with the situation as best as
possible.
MB Marker Beacon all signals provided electronically to the FACT
program and the RC surface support.
MBE Multiple Bit Error Algorithm in FACT programming will always be
running parallel queries of multiple redundant systems to determine
the most accurate data to use. Additionally, the surface flight
crew is monitoring all the same data and communicating with the
chase RC pilot at the long distance and the surface RC pilot for
close in landing.
MC Master Change any change in avionics to FACT performance must be
approved recorded/logged in with all persons involved S/N etc. and
inspected for proper working order by FACT inspectors prior to any
flight an FAA structured security.
MCB Microwave Circuit Board all radar or FACT operated systems have
to be serviced by FACT cleared security and calibration and
performance of these subsystem components have to be checked for
proper FACT working order.
MCC Maintenance Control Computer has a special encrypted area for
FACT service.
MCDP Maintenance Control Display Panel video and electronic signals
generated are recorded and reported as determined to be a flag for
a FACT System security Flag.
MCDU Multifunctional Control Display Unit videoed and signals
recorded/reported as needed.
MCN Manufacturing Control Number registered in every PFN/TRAC unit
and component memory on board and traceable in the system or any
other system components are interfaced with or exchanged. FACT
registration protocol for S/N ESN and OEM product and component
numbers or ID/lot Nos.
MCP (1) Maintenance Control Panel FACT protocols to be determined
and FACT qualified person monitoring the panel.
(2) Mode Control Panel
MCT Max Continuous Thrust
MCU (1) Modular Concept Unit (approximately 1/8-ATR,
Airline Transport Rack)
(2) Multifunction Concept Unit
MD11 Boeing Model 11 Aircraft (formerly McDonnell Douglas)
MD90 Boeing Model 90 Aircraft (formerly McDonnell Douglas) The
above 2 aircraft to be FACT fitted with first the first generation
with in 90 days.
MDA Minimum Descent Altitude As a general rule the Descent in any
FACT landing will take place at minimum levels needed for a gradual
long slow glide path.
MDC Maintenance Diagnostic Computer will record and report all
alerts and conditional data to the TRAC/FACT system if on board the
Aircraft and to the surface. If part of a surface maintenance check
the system will report all data to the TRAC/FACT system for on
board records and the surface FACT mass data Base for future
reference attention and clearance as determined necessary and
prudent.
MDCRS Meteorological Data collection and Reporting System on the
surface will provide all flight stations air born and on the
surface with weather conditions applicable to flight and landing.
Additionally this information is provided to medical or HAZMAT
teams and law enforcement to ready response for the incoming
troubled aircraft application specific to the public safety
response and current weather conditions that can aggravate the
situation.
MDS Minimum Discernible Signal. The MDS is the lowest RF signal
level that can be detected as a valid signal. Has to be absolutely
identified for the most radical of commands to be carried out in
FACT programming. A protocol of equations for public safety and
national security are to be developed in the event all
communications are disabled. For this reason the TRAC scan and blue
tooth wireless communication link with all forms of wireless
communication is stressed for TRAC/FACT System to access NENA
numbers and FACT/homeland FAA master control to communicate the
appropriate codes to the central control station to intercede FACT
termination programs or other radical defense programming.
MDT Maintenance Display Terminal videoed and recorded reviewed
prior to final flight clearance.
MEA Minimum En route Altitude There is to be a high MEA for all
FACT Safe Base flights as general programming.
MEC Main Equipment Center
MEDLL Multi-ath Estimating Delay Lock Loop any automated flight
programming is to be interfaced directly with FACT programming and
may be interrupted or secured and used as part of the TRAC/FACT
system--1st generation.
MEL Minimum Equipment List. The list of equipment that the FCC
requires to be aboard an aircraft before flying. The automated TRAC
Communication scanner and router with wireless communication link
DSRC should become a FCC/FAA/homeland security necessity for all
aircraft as soon as possible to increase communication links with
emergency inessaging protocols to be developed for FACT in 90
days.
MES Main Engine Start this electrical signal should run a FACT
system check for immediate shutdown for an non-cleared TRAC/FACT
system with an alert sent to control tower, company monitoring
system and surface security with aircraft location ESN and audio
and video on in the aircraft--engine should have FACT sensor and
lead or wireless protected to TRAC/FACT System monitoring.
MF Medium Frequency. The portion of the radio spectrum from 300 kHz
to 3 MHz. All communication links scanned by TRAC/FACT and used as
determined appropriate.
MFCP Multifunction Control Display Panel videoed and recorded and
reported as appropriate for function related to TRAC/FACT
protocols.
MFD Multifunction Display Same as above with electrical signal
monitored.
MFDS Multifunction Display System Same as above with electrical
signal monitored
MDFU Multifunction Display Unit Same as above with electrical
signal monitored.
MFM Maintenance Fault Memory made part of TRAC/FACT system and
dealt with accordingly.
MGSCU Main Gear Steering Control Unit SUC with any servo motor
control to TRAC or FACT management for the surface collision
avoidance or TRAC/FACT robotics or RC surface taxing.
MHD Magnetic Hard Drive used in TRAC and fully protected in any
avionics as a FACT protocol.
MHz Megahertz (1,000,000 cycles per second)
MIC Microphone. Also refers to the output signal of the Microphone.
To be recorded and used with voice recognition technology in
TRAC/FACT systems. Reported to the surface during FACT event. For
entire flight after event flagged.
Micro-EARTS Microprocessor En route Automated Radar Tracking
employed in FACT determining software and to fly to safe Bases.
MIDU Multi-purpose Interactive Display Unit video captured with
electronic signal recorded and reported for TRAC/FACT System.
MIL Military used for a fact event as determined appropriate by
FAA/DOT/DOD/homeland security.
MIPS Million Instructions Per Second Data delivered to Fact for the
surface
MLS Microwave Landing System employed by TRA/FACT automated flights
and landings.
MLW Maximum Landing Weight--always the question to dump fuel and
cargo will be part of FACT scenario with special restricted area
provided with automated signals and automated dumping actuators on
tanks and storage areas that release transponders to mark the
debris dropped for immediate hazmat procedures.
MM Mass Memory a PFN/TRAC/system intra net for aviation FACT mass
database
MMI Man-Machine Interface TRAC/FACT enhanced with accountable
shared controls of aircraft.
MMIC Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit all Tracking and
positioning technology for aircraft to be protected and controlled
according to FACT protocols.
Mmo The maximum Mach number at which an aircraft has been certified
to operate. Incorporated in the FACT programmed flights MMR
Multi-Mode Receiver incorporated in to TRAC/FACT scanning functions
and used as part of any application specific communication link for
any applicable aircraft.
MNPS Minimum Navigation Performance Specification There will be a
TRAC/FACT MNPS for every progressive step of the technology to be
cleared to fly as time goes on and the system becomes more
sophisticated and unified.
MNT Mach Number Technique
MO Magneto-Optical-FAA to determine inspection for FACT readiness
and performance.
MOA Military Operation Area the safe bases will have a great
military presence and the bases will have the highest
security-whether it is all military DES/DET and physically
protected is to be determined by homeland security DOD, DOT, FAA
and any level of threat.
MOCA Minimum Obstacle Clearance Altitude will be on the floor for a
good deal of the area up to the landing strip of a SB. As time goes
on other airports may be rated to handle certain FACT protocols and
have special area teams with law enforcement, hazmat and medical
teams available and the MOCA in those programs might be more
sensitive to elevation requirements in glide paths and final
approaches.
MOD (1) Modulator with encoding and encryption for FACT
(2) Modification is a continual state with TRAC/FACT system
deployment.
(3) Magneto-Optical Drive
Mode A The pulse format for an identification code interrogation of
an ATCRBS transponder.
Mode B An optional mode for transponder interrogation.
Mode C The pulse format for an altitude information interrogation
of an ATCRBS transponder.
Mode D An unassigned, optional transponder mode.
Mode S (1) Mode Select (A transponder format to allow discrete
interrogation and data link capability).
(2) Selective interrogation mode of SSR-FACT communication to
utilize and recognize all pulse codes for each mode with
programming written. Additionally the FACT protocol will supply
headers of equipment interfaced and inventoried to provide the most
update list of equipment as part of any compromised flight either
via the aircraft trans ponder or the communication link to 2 way
transponders or transceivers to store in local data repositories or
buffers on the flight path or a FACT flight.
MODEM Modulator/Demodulator able to handle FACT encryption and SUC
to TRAC/FACT
MOPR Minimum Operational Performance Requirements
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards the above two to be
determined for any given TRAC/FACT systems.
MORA Minimum Off-Route Altitude set by research for public safety
routes and programmed in the FACT plight processors either TRAC or
adaptive autopilot or Flight computer systems that are
protected.
MOS Metal Oxide Semiconductor
MOSFET Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transmitter
MOU Memorandum Of Understanding
MP (1) Middle Plug. Identifies the plug position on the rear
connector of an avionics unit. To be protected as well as the lead
for any avionics system crucial to the FACT performance.
(2) Main Processor
MPEL Maximum Permissible Exposure Level MPEL for toxins bacteria or
decease and radiation will be determined sensed by on board systems
and programmed and given protocols for the SB FACT flights and
landings, and MPEL rating will be determined for each approved
TRAC/FACT System approved for operation on any aircraft.
MROSE Multiple-tasking Real-time Operating System
Executive
MRR Manufacturing Revision Request continually put out on all
aircraft for an avionics update with TRAC/FACT protocols.
MS Millisecond
MSB Most Significant Bit
MSCP Mobile Satellite Service Provider will be communication linked
to the FAA/FACT intranet with emergency translation messaging at
the highest application level for wireless and GPS communication
and TRAC.backslash.king.
MSD (1) Most Significant Digit
Suggested FACT mass data controls
(2) Mass Storage Device is set up as part of all governing agencies
with a sharing of the data. These agencies will have their own
access codes and FACT security and read only access as a rule--all
access is recorded and placed in the header of the file that is the
same across all agencies. The highest level of security can
maintain the file for special eyes. Agencies with linked MSD for
FACT in transportation DOD/DOT/Homeland Security/FAA/FBI/CIA/NSC.
FAA will have buffers a cross the nation that will have wireless
gateways and land line connections to receive real time Data from
aircraft and enter that data into the system. Additional gateways
and buffers will be there for surface transportation and this
intranet is linked at the highest level for all the agencies to
monitor at the highest FACT level for public safety and national
security. FACT is a fully accountable access technology that
carries the strictest penalties for unprofessional or corrupted use
of the system and technologies no matter who the perpetrator. FACT
codes allow for the immediate access to any computer storage system
and accompany a review process with all involved parties and their
legal representatives in a proper agreed upon forum. Protocols and
use must be constitutionally based to provide and preserve freedom
and respect for individual privacy, but provide latitude in use for
public safety and national security protection. The system will not
be used or compromised for misdemeanor or simple crime prosecution
and FACT trained professionals do all data released and destroyed.
With out proper certification encrypted on the file it is the
highest security breech and subject to high fines and imprisonment.
Every citizen has a right to request if information is held on them
and to view that data via a proper ID protocol and under the
correct circumstances. All access to their file has to be decoded
for there viewing and they have the right to request information on
any data, collection process and use. The citizen can also request
the file be destroyed and it is to be reviewed by FACT for this
purpose. No file should be maintained for photo ID or any ID
technology data DNA fingerprint for any regular citizen with no
significant criminal past (violent). Non-citizens are to be
followed through out the computer matrix as necessary by the
sovereign powers. However the proper respect for each individual
maintained. Obviously, these are suggestions in setting up the
proper protocols for the use of FACT in the PFN/TRAC System. The
inventor would like to say that it is the Freedom of the United
States we want to protect for each individual citizen. This can
only come from the greatest respect for every individual and their
private life. Personal activities should always be monitored for a
need to know basis only in public safety and national security and
not be used or applied as a policing tool. In many cases the
monitoring and use should be automated with the 3 laws of robotics
applied. The use and access of all FACT access data should be
quarried for personal ID, application and pertain to FACT protocols
on a need to know basis. Otherwise all mass data should be FACT
accessible for real-time use accompanied by a review of procedure
for a FACT event with enough FACT officials available for case
loads and review of use procedures. Additionally personal data used
in any mass data system including credit and commercial streams
should have to be approved by the individual. Intrusions of privacy
of this commercial practice should also be stopped and have strict
civil penalties--some automatic and others applied through tort
laws. This is necessary for the citizen to trust FACT and mass data
storage of a personal nature. This kind of data must receive the
greatest protection and have the highest respect. All such data
bases should have FACT access and run in a FACT approved mode--with
a special FACT review of such data bases for the citizen with the
ability to have data sponged from these data bases and prosecute
those systems that continue to violate privacy laws.
MSG Message
MSI Medium Scale Integration The PFN/TRAC System progressive
integration will encompass all subsystems and interface ultimately
as LSI
MSL Mean Sea Level
MSP Mode S Specific Protocol to be developed and programmed for
FACT
MSSS Mode S Specific Services TRAC/FACT
MSU Mode Select Unit
MT Minimum Time
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures. A performance figure calculated by
dividing the total unit flying hours (airborne) accrued in a period
of time by the number of unit failures that occurred during the
same time. Where total unit hours are available, this may be used
in lieu of total unit flying hours. A FACT file with MTBF data
specific to equipment on board will be maintained with also a
scheduled service file and response.
MTBR (1) Mean Time Between Removal
(2) Mean Time Between Repairs. A performance figure calculated by
dividing the total unit flying hours accrued in a period by the
number of unit removals (scheduled plus unscheduled) that occurred
during the same period. Same TRAC/FACT procedure as above.
MTBUR (1) Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removal
(2) Mean Time Between Unit Replacements. A performance figure
calculated by dividing the total unit flying hours (airborne)
accrued in a period by the number of unscheduled unit removals that
occurred during the same period. Same TRAC FACT components as
above.
MTC Maintenance Terminal Cabinet
MTD Maintenance Terminal Display
MTF Maintenance Terminal Function The 3 above will have TRAC/FACT
protocols to be followed as to the protection and service of all
essential connectables and testing for FACT components.
MTI Moving Target Indicator. This type of radar display will show
only moving targets. This system's data will be used in robotics
flying and RC landing.
MTM Module Test and Maintenance for all TRAC/FACT hard ware &
software there will be certified FACT inspectors and technicians to
test any essential modules.
MTMIU Module Test and Maintenance Bus Interface Unit will be
afforded guarded access and be used as a possible PFN/TRAC
processor connecting point to access the control bus for vital FACT
operations in first generations to retrofit legacy aircraft. If
this proves doable this connection will be protected and require
FACT certification to enter the area and perform testing or FACT
augmentations.
MTTDA Mean Time To Dispatch Alert
MTTF Mean Time To Failure. A performance figure calculated by
dividing the summation of times to failure for a sample of failed
items by the number of failed items in the sample. The same item
failing N times constitutes N failed items in the sample. This is
different from mean time between failures since no allowance is
given to items that have not failed.
MTTM Mean Time To Maintenance. The arithmetic mean of the time
intervals between maintenance actions.
MTTMA Mean Time To Maintenance Alert
MTTR Mean Time To Repair. A performance figure calculated by
dividing the sum of the active repair elapsed times accrued in a
period on a number of designated items by the number of these items
repaired in the same period.
MTTUR Mean Time To Unscheduled Removal. A performance figure
calculated by dividing the summation of times to unscheduled
removal for a sample of removed items by the number of removed
items in the sample. This is different from MTBUR since no
allowance is given to items that have not been removed. For the
above 6 mean measurements--the TRAC/FACT protocol will establish a
minimum time for these timed maintenance procedures to insure
adequate service and optimum reliability. During all these
maintenance procedures the strictest security with certified
TRAC/FACT personnel is a standard requirement and the specifics
will be determined in standards efforts and FAA/homeland security
regulations. This may be flexible as intelligence determines threat
to a free society regardless of cost.
MU ACARS Management Unit integrated SUC to TRAC and part of
FACT
MULT Multiplier
MUS Minimum Use Specification. A generic description by parameter
and characteristics of the test equipment and resources required
for testing a unit or system. A protocol developed for FACT
interfaced components and self tested during boot up and periodic
auto tests to be a trusted system by recognizing failure a TRAC
characteristic.
MUX Multiplexer FACT utilized in subsystems SUC and a crucial
function in the TRAC ASCIC.
N
N1 Fan speed
N2 Intermediate compressor speed
N3 High speed compressor the 3 above monitored as needed by
TRAC/FACT and SUCs.
NACA National Air Carriers Association to take part in TRAC/FACT
standards rules regulations discussions but not to control policy
procedures protocols or requirements--homeland security to make all
final decisions via it's interagency matrix. (To restrict lobbing (
)--additionally government to aid in costly security conversions
with a special committee to oversee cost and network technologies
to reduce duplication and to much specificity--stop creating
disparate systems--more universal application with less proprietary
and better security.
NADIN National Airspace Data Interchange Network
NAS National Airspace System
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration The 3 terms
above--to be interfaced with home land security and the FAA direct
FACT control flights with FACT security.
NASPALS NAS Precision Approach and Landing System interfaced with
the FACT/TRAC system for the FACT landings.
NAS/TRB National Academy of Science, Transportation Research.
Board to provide development of the different PFN/TRAC System
components and FACT protocols.
NAT North Atlantic Region
NAT SPG North Atlantic Systems Planning Group this group will help
determine the regional application of FACT and determine the areas
for SBs and safe En route flight plans to the safe zones.
NATCA National Association of Air Traffic Controllers will be
helping to develop proper handling procedures for FACT flights and
be an essential part of FACT implementation at the SBs.
NATRSSIG ICAO North Atlantic Reduced Separation Standard.
Implementation Group involved in approving TRAC/FACT
implementation.
NATS (1) North Atlantic Track System involved in approving
TRAC/FACT implementation.
(2) UK National Air Traffic Services involved in approving and
developing TRAC/FACT implementation.
NAV Navigation
NAVAID Navigational Aid all onboard NAV aids will be quarried to
report to the FACT program and the RC stations to be checked for
FACT robotics and RC.
Navigation A medium holding the customized navigation.
Datacard database. This technology will be used as well as ASIC SOC
and hybrid substrates as application specific to each aircraft.
NAVSTAR The NAVSTAR global positioning system (GPS) is a system
using 24 satellites, all reporting precise time signals, along with
location keys. Eight satellites are in each of three 63-degree
inclined plane circular orbits at 1,000 nmi in altitude. The system
is used for navigation and determining exact position. All
navigation systems will be used and most especially NAVSTAR for
FACT robotics and RC.
Nautical Mile Equivalent to 6,076.1 feet, or approximately
1.15(nmi) statute miles.
NBAA National Business Aircraft Association will have to have the
fleet of business aircraft better protected as relevant to their
threat. And the FAA and homeland security has to set up proper
schedule for these various aircraft to be fully FACT ready and
protected.
NC Numerical Control Flights and landing s at the Safe Bases will
be handled by priority of emergency to the greatest public safety
hazard presented. One person should function as a real-time NCA
over these decisions in the governing agency or intranet for
FAA/homeland security over air travel. There needs to be a study to
determine all imaginable emergency flight scenarios and still the
designated NCA at any given time will have to make the case of
priority for each troubled flight. With time permitting the
President of the US should be the final NCA for any decision to
terminate a flight. However, there has to be a response decision
tree for situations not allowing the time for any such decision. It
is important to remember that TRAC/FACT protocols will make it next
to impossible for a Hijacking there always is the possibility any
security can be defeated if there is a will to do so. For this
reason there will always be the need to handle the worst of
decisions a caring humanity has to make to preservers the greatest
number at risk at a given time of emergency. For this reason the
decisions should be understood prior to any possible need for
them.
N/C New installation Concept All tools to virtually experience
TRAC/FACT system performance or FACT protocol Scenarios should be
utilized in development and for the projected combination of
present separate and disparate systems to construct the diverse
levels of FACT development across the spectrum of Air craft prior
to the actual construction or installation. There are design tools
that can be used to calculate the assets and difficulties of many
hardware combinations to determine how best to interface them for
automated flight and landing.
NCA National Command Authority Set up with specific WoJack rules as
to the Threat of life for the passengers and crew, and the threat
to people on the surface. Every possible scenario should be
considered with safe time decision markers put in place. A protocol
has to be developed and practiced to insure the best decision is
made and carried out in the proper time frames with the proper
prudence and lack of hesitation to insure the greatest public
safety under such extreme circumstances. The NCA should be an FAA
or air command specialist 24/7. A team of such NCA executives at
each SB and for all the En route WoJack or FACT event flights in
constant monitoring and flight management. TRAC with FACT protocols
is designed to give the NCA executive officer all the possibilities
imaginable on any given aircraft to foil a FACT event and land the
aircraft at a Safe Base for maximum public safety on board the
aircraft and on the surface. As stated earlier and time permitting
any doomed flight or one that must be terminated the president of
the US in the US should become the acting NCA and additionally
explain the NCA's decision to the nation if any such action must be
taken along this command chain. However, as stated above, there has
to be a response decision tree for situations not allowing the time
for any such president involvement. It is important to remember
that even though TRAC/FACT protocols will make it next to
impossible for a Hijacking there always is the possibility any
security can be defeated--if there is a will to do so. For this
reason there will always be the need to handle the worst of
decisions a caring humanity has to make to preserve the greatest
number at risk at a given time. In this case the decisions should
be understood prior to any possible need for them and the
procedures well understood by those that might have to perform
them. Of course, the NCA is an integrated part of the PFN/TRAC
System FACT/WoJack protocols for air travel/transport intranet
management.
NCD No Computed Data TRAC scanning function during no event has a
NCA command function to allow the energizing of any phone via
wireless interface to quarry passengers and crew on board GPS or
locating systems if a FACT event is a real concern and there is no
NCD to confirm an ongoing FACT event. All such connections are
recorded and require accountable reports for their use and
action.
NCR National Cash Register TRAC systems in surface transportation
run wireless payment industry encrypted software and the aircraft
PFN will have this capability as well with card swipe systems to
handle regular cards and smart cards as well as other forms and
mediums of credit payment personal ID/iris or DNA.
NCS Network Coordination Station PFN/TRAC/FACT System is the
primary NCS while any FACT event aircraft is passing through or
near any regular flight patterns until the aircraft is with Safe
escort and in safe En route flight plan to SB. This is coordinated
handoff with standard FAA flight controls. However immediately the
troubled flight is given a RC and escort flight crew to in clued a
surface NCA commander flight assist RC pilot with flight
termination capability by either of the escort aircraft a safe base
surface crew with RC flight crew for landing and the appropriate
force assembling to handle the specific emergency. At the point of
hand off the FAA flights are monitored by all SBs and there is an
NCA overseeing all commercial and private aircraft activity in US
air space the Military are put on alert and intercept and assist
pilots are pre scrambled to aircraft on the tarmac. A
FAA/DOD/homeland security NCA makes the call to ground all aircraft
or pursue any FACT events due to flight deviation or sensed
problems.
ND Navigation Display. An EFIS presentation substituting for the
horizontal situation indicator (HSI). These instruments will be
videoed and any electrical signal they generate will be used for to
assist in or confirm robotics flight and landings. There use for
such functions depend on how accurate there data and how protected
they can be made for uninterrupted service during a FACT event.
NDB (1) Non-Directional Radio Beacon. A ground station designed
specifically for ADF use that operates in the 190-to-550-kHz range.
Transmits a continuous carrier.
with either 400-or-1020 Hz modulation (keyed) to provide
identification. The FACT program will use all such transmissions
and all communications are to be scanned and used as applicable to
robotics flight and landings and confirming the identity of an
aircraft and it's location and altitude during a FACT event.
(2) Navigation Data Base (as stored in FMC memory) If capable and
secure protection possible the FMC NDB will be used in applicable
air craft to RAM store and monitor the 5 SB flight plans via
adaptive autopilots or flight computers for the first generation
TRAC FACT robotics system flights.
NDI Non-Developmental Item
NEG Negative
NERC UK New En Route Center This center may well serve as England's
coordination center and FACT event command center for air
travel/transport. This inventor is not trying to suggest how any
other foreign nations should TRAC/FACT protect their air space and
public safety in the air or on the surface. This requires these
countries to make the same tough decisions on how best to receive
and handoff flights into their airspace and also how to deal with a
FACT event when it occurs, as well as handle those flights to
possibly international Safe Bases. Europe has so may sovereign air
spaces so close together that their coordination and assistance to
air and for surface protection and support will have to be
determined via organizations like the European Union and NATO and
each country's National Security Agencies/military. Obviously,
there are national and international aviation agencies
and/organizations that will all take part in the standards, rules,
regulations, code and law making for these geographic areas and
events. TRAC systems will provide for accurate position of aircraft
over air space during a FACT event, but coordination and
preprogramming and planning is essential for the optimum system use
and public safety.
NH High Pressure Gas Generator RPM
NHE Notes and Helps Editor Used in user-friendly TRAC/FACT
programming with assistant if determined safe and useful.
NIC AEEC New Installation Concepts Subcommittee will be review
PFN/TRAC/FACT System and determine implementation of the
progressive and flexible architecture across the diverse aircraft
platforms.
NIS Not-In-Service is a FACT program state. The FACT program can
determine as a TRUSTED system (TRAC) and automatically lock the
aircraft down for service through auto checks or RC and the proper
systems must be checked or in perfect working order before the
aircraft can be used. This includes a progressive programming to
stop the unauthorized use or unsafe use of aircraft as per the
operational state of the aircraft. Either to stop a take off and
taxi back with a seal and lock down mode to a special security
section of the air port--ideally at the end of the take off runway
just to the side of the run way path--a security compound with a
diverse emergency response team. If airborne FACT event protocols
apply to safe base decision tree for types of emergencies must be
worked out and remain secret in some cases. (This may be the best
way to keep perpetrators from defeating them).
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology will fund and
help develop and coordinate efforts in the United States and around
the world.
N-Layer N is set for any layer name (such as link, network, etc.)
or for the initial (e.g.-SDU mean LSDU at the link layer). OSI
model definition. TRAC will have N-Scann/hybrid substrate/for
communication links and E/E bus interfaces as IC components.
NL Low Pressure Gas Generator RPM
NLR Netherlands National Aerospace Laboratory to help develop
TRAC/FACT systems for all aircraft it is designing, testing or
developing.
NLT Not Less Than There will be an NTL point for TRAC/FACT system
goes for any flight.
nm Nautical Mile
NMI Nautical Mile
NMOS N-type Metal Oxide Semiconductor
NMT Not More Than there will also be NMT for a certain amount of
deficiencies in the system as well--to be determined for all
aircraft and aircraft specific as well.
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will supply
data and take part in the Safe flight and Base locations.
NOC Notice Of Change--a special NOC will be issued for all
TRAC/FACT work with the highest of security and accountability in
the planning and carrying out of any change orders.
NO COM No Communication. A NO COM annunciation indicates that a
downlink message has not been acknowledged in an ACARS system. NO
COMM is a FACT event automatically and RC surface commands are sent
out to TRAC via all TRAC interfaced communication Links and the
downloaded carryon personal wireless systems are automatically
dialed for the ground support to establish contact with the air
craft via passengers and crew to determine state of the flight if
still air born--Command scenarios to be determined if this is a
deliberate act to commandeer the air craft and use it in an
unauthorized or unsafe fashion. Other wise TRAC is to continually
supply communication links in triplicate for the coordination of
air surface response to the safest landing of the aircraft. Due to
the wireless link of TRAC to all carryon phones the TRAC scan
processor will be able to deliver the communication via the pilots
head sets or cabin communication Link system.
Noise Undesired random electromagnetic disturbances or spurious
signals which are not part of the transmitted or received signal.
In the construction of TRAC/FACT protection of a PFN or sub system
SUC to FACT the construction should provide for the protection
against undesired emfs.
NOTAM Notice to Airmen NOTAM to all the assist and RC crews are
given at a FACT event automatically to a scramble state to man
their posts--At this point the system has determined what safe base
and an initial protocol response for the SB chosen. Further action
is based on in flight developments and data received in the SB
command center.
NPA Non-Precision Approach In the first generation a wide variety
of disparate systems will create the possibility of NPAs in the
early TRAC/FACT systems. When a aircraft is determined to be a FACT
event it will fly to a SB safe fly zone and the best effort to RC
it to the ground will be made as one better option than allowing
for unauthorized and unsafe control. This is not perfect however
necessary. As systems are refined for robotics landings and better
suited for more accurate RC landings this NPA will be greatly
reduced as a FACT event. Ultimately, there will be safe landings
and skilled RC pilots for all troubled aircraft at the SBs and for
may regular airport facilities to help the unskilled or compromised
pilot handle their aircraft properly.
NPDU Network Protocol Data Unit Will be programmed with TRAC/FACT
protocols.
NPRM Notice of Public Rule Making All PFN/TRAC/FACT notices will be
reviewed for what information can be publicly disseminated for the
optimum public safety and not to compromise the purpose of the
system.
NRP National Route Program will be augmented as needed to provide
for the SB en route flights and be altered by the FACT command
structure to insure uninterrupted activities during a FACT
event.
NRZ Non-Return to Zero all instrumentation will be videoed and the
electronic signal reported to TRAC/FACT programming for comparison
algorithm and additional fault detection.
NSEU Neutron Single Event Upset
NSSL National Severe Storms Laboratory To determine with storm
simulation software the effects of weather conditions on various
aircraft on a glide path in to SBs and sensing systems which will
aid in real time flying.
NTF No Trouble Found (referring to testing or checkout of
unit/module) NTFs NFT state must be found throughout the TRAC/FACT
program both on boot up and any periodic system check.
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board will play a continuing
role in reviewing the procedures and protocols for each aircraft
for TRAC/FACT and the SB procedures to seek and fund better safer
utilization of TRAC/FACT.
NVM Non-Volatile Memory will be used in event recording an RAM for
TRAC/FACT with special physical protection for both.
NWA Northwest Airlines all airlines must perform appropriately to
sovereign power rules regulations and laws in a particular
established geographic area and air space and to their host
countries law and rules in the proper use of TRAC/FACT System
technology.
NWS National Weather Service. The NWS provides a ground-based
weather radar network throughout the United States. The radar
network operates continuously and transmits the data to the
National Meteorological Center, where it correlates with other
weather observations. NWS will be coordinated in a IP traditional
PFN/TRAC System interface in the FAA/aviation intranet to provide
the data electronically and visually to the FACT command center and
the robotics and RC pilot stations as needed to flight the air
craft and land it in the safest manner.
O
OAC Oceanic Area Control Center will be IP and wirelessly linked to
the PFN/TRAC/FACT system to monitor and help manage aircraft over
the far reaches of the planet covered in water. These flights will
have robotics flights and all flights will have robotic options ara
form any severe storms at sea and over land. Support seaworthy
surface craft will be dispatched as well as air support and air
fueling for troubled aircraft over the ocean. Tracking, support and
emergency downing of aircraft will have options at sea including
isolated island bases for troubled aircraft as a traditional
SB.
OAG Official Airline Guide will have a section devoted to standard
operating procedures for TRAC/FACT incidents--still to be
determined on how it will be presented to the public and skilled
professionals.
OAT (1) Optional Auxiliary Terminal. The OAT may be in the form of
a CRT/Keyboard device capable of interfacing with other sources of
data on the aircraft and supplying data to a hard copy printer.
(Used in an ACARS system.) OAT and regular interface terminals are
provided to TRAC and needed for humans to respond to FACT and other
TRAC programming, however for them to be used with TRAC there human
access points have to present no threat of disrupting TRAC/FACT
programming by unauthorized and/or unsafe commands. The HMI
terminal interface cannot be shorted or electronically disrupt the
system even if the terminal is destroyed. All terminals have to
have photo recognition and internal software locally to clear
access demand the most stringent of security for any program change
order has to be applied with total accountability.
(2) Outside Air Temperature. The uncorrected reading of the outside
temperature gauge. Different types of gauges require different
correction factors to obtain static air temperature. Corrected and
valid external air temperature provided to the robotics TRAC/FACT
control and reported to RC pilots on the ground.
OBS (1) Omnibearing Selector. A panel instrument that contains the
controls and circuits to select an omni-bearing and determine the
TO-FROM indication. All instrumentation that is used to hold a
heading or data that can be used to recognize a flight deviation
must be interfaced with the TRAC/FACT system to determine a FACT
event and if the correct path is being followed.
(2) Optical Bypass Switch
Octal Base-8 counting system. Numbers include
0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8.
ODAP Oceanic Display And Planning system. Will present oceanic
flight data to controllers in a display that will enable better
route and altitude assignments. This system is SUC to TRAC/FACT
systems and protocols if it is automated with data delivered to the
aircraft in real-time or as part of the overall surface control
system.
ODID Operational Display and Input Development
ODL (1) Optical Data Link
(2) Oceanic Display and Planning System
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer Will review this patent and
white paper for applicable equipment on their aircraft and
interface the systems and equipment use to meet the highest level
of protected automation they can to perform FACT functions. They
will advise all owners of suggested upgrades and changes for their
aircraft (to include component manufacturers as well, and help
arrange to do the necessary augmentations under the proper
FAA/homeland security FACT procedure as possible--Government will
subsidize as much as possible the upgrades and so should insurance
companies private owners clubs and/organizations for the individual
aircraft up dates. Additionally all aircraft owners should be
allowed tax saving incentives for the TRAC/FACT upgrades.
OEU Overhead Electronics Units
Off-Block Time The time that the aircraft leaves the gate.
OFP Operational Flight Program are on file and electronic in medium
for an automated tracking of every flight in the FAA command center
and Homeland security, nay deviation initiates FACT interrogatories
of the on board TRAC/FACT flight and authorized pilot in dialog. If
the interrogatories in the command center are questionable the
Center can flag a FACT event from RC. Additionally robotics
programming can flag a FACT event and the plane is on it's way to a
safe base via a safe route with communication open and the aircraft
being analyzed--with proper justification and reason a new flight
plan is approved and the aircraft is allowed to go on to it's
destination or other approved airport.
OID Outline Installation Drawing
OIU Orientation/Introduction Unit
OLAN Onboard Local Area Network all LAN that are responsible for
essential flight controls are to be interfaced in a protected
fashion to isolate protected robotics and RC controls of the
TRAC/FACT system on board.
OM Outer Marker like all markers will provide their position data
to the TRAC/FACT processor or linked processors (earlier
generations interfaced adaptive auto-pilot or flight computer
systems protected and running FACT programs) on board for the FACT
flight and landing programs to robotically control the air craft;
or be used by the RC pilots either in the pursuit assist aircraft
or the RC flight station at the SB (Converted flight simulator to
land the aircraft with the must current real-time data of the air
craft s position and glide path.
OMEGA A navigation system that uses two high-powered transmitter
ground stations to broadcast a continuous wave signal. The receiver
measures the range difference between the two stations to determine
position. These inherent air navigation systems will be used with
automated triangulation the position markers and beacon, lorands
and GPS as well as other satellite tracking, Dead reckoning in a
combined fashion to confirm flight plans programmed into the
automated flight systems on board and registered in the national
flight control command center FACT/FAA/homeland security regionally
tracking aircraft movement and nationally. A local flag in the Fact
software may question an aircraft with a diverted flight path or
one recognized diversion from surface tracking. Either will cause
an immediate robotics SB flight and real-time
investigation/scramble of assist aircraft and SB readiness as well
as a national alert throughout all of FAA/homeland security.
Omni bearing The bearing indicated by a navigational receiver on
transmissions from an omni directional radio range (VOR). A
standard in air avionic and navigation will be incorporated into
FACT flights as well as GPS and the above-mentioned positioning
technology for robotics flight RC flight and landings and to detect
FACT events. These actual used systems will depend on the aircraft
and FAA/homeland security standards for each country.
OMS (1) Onboard Maintenance System--if automated will be part of
TRAC/FACT or FACT will run an auto check for maintenance.
(2) Order Management System TRAC/FACT is the master operation
system or management system.
OOOI OUT-OFF-ON-IN. An OOOI event is recorded as part of the ACARS
operation. The OUT event is recorded when the aircraft is clear of
the gate and ready to taxi. The OFF event occurs when the aircraft
has lifted off the runway. The ON event occurs when the aircraft
has landed. The IN event occurs when the aircraft has taxied to the
ramp area. OOOI is also sequence keys in the FACT program providing
for options in robotics and remote control.
The inventor can list here possible FACT flags for robotics and RC
aircraft control--for all the ACARS events however, understanding
each aircrafts capability for the current FACT response to be
applied is best determined and specified by the TRAC/FACT system of
authorities to include government, professional organizations and
public safety watchdog groups. However the final secure protocol
actions may be kept a secrete from the general public for better
effectiveness in public safety--for this reason the inventor will
not detail out here all the possibilities he envisions but is
willing to share them in the proper setting and the proper
time.
On-Block Time The time that the aircraft arrives at the gate. All
timed data is to be monitored for FACT events.
OPAS Overhead Panel ARINC 629 System
OPBC Overhead Panel Bus Controller the 2 above lines have to be
protected if they can be used to alter flight performance
locally.
OPR Once Per Revolution
OPS Operations Per Second All essential data sensed for flight
operations is SUC to TRAC/FACT processing.
OPU Over speed Protection Unit is to be directly tied to the
robotics flight system and protected as the TRAC/FACT system if
there is not a protected PFN/TRAC/FACT ASIC processor on board. If
there is the robotics flights will have over speed protection and
stable flight plans. Basically robotic flight and local flight
control lock out all happen at once triggered by a deviated flight
plan to include safe airspeed limit flags in FACT robotics flight
programs monitoring any OPU or other velocity systems will flag a
robotics FACT event and communication with the aircraft from FACT
control central.
OR Operational Requirements for TRAC/FACT systems will vary per
aircraft, and national state of security via a Public safety
equation yet to be determined. Aircraft will be allowed to fly
absent of all the TRAC/FACT systems so long as there threat can be
neutralized via other security means. And partial TRAC/FACT systems
not fully safe for on board air travelers will be allowed to fly
absent added human security if the aircraft can be controlled to a
safe crash zone at least. Of course acceptability of these limited
operational requirements starts with the air travelers willingness
to fly under these conditions and ends with FAA/FACT/Homeland
security approving any such limited FACT flights.
OSC Order Status Report
OSI (1) Open Systems Interconnection
(2) Open System Interface used to connect with TRAC/FACT system
monitoring but not to receive crucial security FACT data.
OTH Over The Horizon
OTS Organized Track System to incorporate as a TRAC/FACT IP
component or be incorporated in the TRAC/FACT control system to
handle all the telemetry which is to be divided up into flight
station monitors on the surface both centrally and locally at the
SB.
OVRD Override Surface FACT control center will always have full
OVRD, Because the TRAC/FACT system will have so many routes of
communication the total command and control over the flight will
reside on the ground with special encoded communications that both
surface and air systems recognize.
oxy Oxygen supplied as needed to sustain human life during a FACT
event along with other atmospheric elements and compounds to
control the passengers, occupants, and crew.
P
PA (1) Passenger Address recorded and processed by the TRAC/FACT
processor voice recognition software for a FACT event announcement
by hijackers or crew (and reported to a voice ID software algorithm
in FACT control central) with a language translator function
(local) for Keywords in every language. This will trigger a FACT
flight robotics response to the Safe base and an automatic lock
down of all local flight controls. The surface is alerted and cabin
and cockpit video and audio activated for FACT surface response
teams to monitor and manage the compromised aircraft, Additionally
the passengers are alerted in their language to the event in
progress. They can be given direction from the surface over the PA
and are also give permission and freedom to beat the living crap
out of any perpetrator and aid the crew or sky marshal in gaining
control of the aircraft and subduing the ignorant son of a gun. If
the PA is not an optimal mode the ground support team can activate
passenger identified cellular phones on board and help direct a
concerted effort via the camera surveillance as long as the cameras
are operating or presenting visible data. When the video are
disabled the phone contacts keeps the surface FACT support team in
contact with the Processor via Blue tooth wireless if need be and
can still provide voice communication with passengers to ascertain
the nature of the threat in the troubled aircraft. Obviously cabin
and cockpit surveillance audio and video equipment should be
installed by FACT personnel in redundancy in secret locations and
operated in the most professional manner at all times.
(2) Power Amplifier used as needed for TRAC/FACT equipment
operations and protected in use and from tampering.
PAC Path Attenuation Compensation these automated flight algorithms
will be used in robotics if not present in normal instrumentation
for a TRAC/FACT system to perform a robotics flight and RC
landing.
PA/CI Passenger Address/Cabin Interphone connected to the TRAC
processor for FACT programming to determine a FACT event on the air
craft and to recorded locally and reported to the surface control
center and position marker data repositories so that all
questionable dialog can be further analyzed and identified at the
surface.
PACIS Passenger Address and Communication Interphone
System The same as above for TRAC monitoring
Paired Channels DME channels are paired with a VORTAC or WLS
frequency and are automatically selected when the VORTAC or ILS
frequency is selected. Most navigation controls have this feature.
These systems of course will be incorporated into FACT flight,
glide path and landing and be operated with special encrypted
communication Protocols. Additionally they will be augmented to
precipitate total robotics as available for all aircraft to return
safely to the ground at SBs and ultimately as a pilot aid for the
deficient pilot. They will be covered and copiloted from surface
controls as determined advisable and optimal. Once again the
TRAC/FACT invention uses all COTS and progresses to more
sophisticated, integrated, consolidated and specialized systems to
cover forward and backward engineering concerns for all flying
aircraft.
PAL Programmable Array Logic this process and processors where
available and involved in critical flight systems will be
interfaced as the TRAC/FACT system as well as programmable field
arrays, custom gate arrays, microprocessors and any other
processing unit. The use replacement the augmentation and the
custom interfacing of all these different control technologies will
be determined by the manufacturers system and component engineers
for each air craft. The goals will be the same--Locked out local
flight controls--Protected Robotic flight systems to safe crash
zones and/or SAFE BASE Landing Areas--robotics landings at the safe
base areas--or RC landings at the SBs--ASAP--audio and video of the
aircraft interior to the surface support and protected Recording
systems--DSRC to all wireless system carried on board a ded
Dedicated ASIC for TRAC/FACT processing protected and redundant.
This is the progression. Much of the automation to fly the aircraft
and land it is COTS and exists now, however not on all
aircraft.
PAM Pulse Amplitude Modulation to be used in TRAC/FACT electronics
as needed.
PAR Precision Approach Radar. An X-band radar, which scans a
limited area and is part of the ground-controlled approach system.
This system to be directly interfaced into TRAC/FACT controls on
the surface at SBs and transmit essential data to FACT robotics
landing the plane or utilized in the virtual flight image of the
real-time flight simulation station for the RC pilot to fly the
landing safely.
PATA Polish Air Traffic Agency will aid in determining safe fly
zones and flight patterns as well as SBs and be trained to
recognize a FACT flight. They might well have the FACT control
canter in their center. These are for the sovereign powers of the
airspace to determine how and who shall implement TRAC/FACT for
them. Understandably PATA will play an essential role in this for
Polish airspace.
PAU Passenger Address Unit PA monitored by TRAC FACT programming
for voice recognition and ID as well as to aid coordinated efforts
between the aircraft occupants and surface control--as explained
earlier.
PAX Passenger
PBID Post Burn-In Data TRAC/FACT System will use this kind of
firmware as it can be protected from alteration and FACT purpose to
safely and securely control the aircraft by the proper authorities
on the surface. This technology allows for easier interfacing of
presently disparate systems in the inevitable menagerie of first
generation TRAC/FACT systems, but must meet security protocols for
it to be effective as part of any FACT system. And not more of a
use as a remote control weapon in the wrong hands. Of course access
in servicing and security in programming (encryption as well as
physical and electrical protection are the critical issues
governing any technology employed in the TRAC/FACT process and
ultimate protected redundant community of ASICS scattered along and
integrated with the E/E bus systems by wire and wireless to perform
accountable reliable robotics and RC Flight control coordinated
with the appropriate and authorized desires of those in control on
the surface.
PBX Private Branch Exchange
PC (1) Personal Computer all computers and systems interfaced to
TRAC/FACT anywhere is to have a running security program to be
determined if security protocols in any locale or in any IP
protocol has been breeched. Total accountability for all interfaced
components and ID for all users at the highest level of ID
assurance available. Continual system integrity checks for new
interfacing or hacking, with a special response team to localize
and apprehend and detain any person or persons causing a system
tampering alert for full investigation of their activities and
system compromised. Automatically an--isolate and redundant system
takes over if a tamper event is detected. To handle any real-time
FACT event occurring.
(2) Printed Circuit used in TRAC/FACT components or sub systems
interfaced as needed.
P-Code The GPS precision code the most accurate of GPS signal will
be employed for the TRAC/FACT system, but the FACT program will run
an error correcting program and ground signal correction as well as
a fuzzy logic program to quarry any other on board GPS receivers
carried on and picking up hot GPS signals to confirm all FACT
robotics commands and aircraft position analysis data. This data
will be recorded locally but also reported to surface control for
processing and deliberation and final decision regarding all FACT
flight options.
PCB Printed Circuit Board used as needed for TRAC/FACT systems.
PCC Pilot Controller Communication interfaced with TRAC/FACT
process/processor and running voice recognition and translation
software to detect a FACT event on board the aircraft. The
communication will be recorded locally as usual and made part of
the TRAC/FACT protocol with real-time reporting and the voice
recorder unit must be protected and un-accessible physically while
the aircraft is in flight--all hand held communicators and personal
PFNs as well as wireless mics should be recorded in simultaneously
on separate digital tracks and time synchronized and presented to a
specialist at a visual and audio monitor in the FACT control
center. A number of specialist may be used to analyze to audible
transmissions to determine Identity mental state of all involved
and best course of action in the air and when boarding on the
ground. There are obvious types of people for this team however
this inventor prefers to leave this development and personnel
determination to the appropriate government agencies
and/organizations already skilled in dealing with extreme human
behavioral conditions. The inventor does feel however this should
be an odd number team that works well together and is trained and
practices all types of scenarios imaginable. All real incidents
recorded should be analyzed and used for preparation and as much as
possible an automated software developed to shadow a situation and
provide viable options to the team. The electronic library can be
used for training simulations and real-time responses.
PCI Protocol Control Information. The N-PCI is exchanged between
peer network members (OSI Model) to coordinate joint information.
This may well serve as a basis of initial secure communication
protocols for the TRAC/FACT system in air travel. It might use
DES/DET for the interface with the military. However, this inventor
feels these system have to interface but be kept separate for
security reasons the FACT software protocols were designed for
federal agencies including the military to set up their accountable
access to the FACT system and control in real-time what they had to
for public safety and National security. This is reflective of how
the government is set up now with real-time selective and isolated
marshal law imposed on all transportation via the TRAC/FACT machine
messaging matrix. It allows for immediate agency coordination and
cooperation for real-time FACT events yet provides freedom of
movement and operations individually for government agencies and
citizens. To develop the fact construct or operational software
program it will require every agency to provide a secure FACT
person or team to develop there secure code ID with the US Military
Omaha and secret clearance contractors. This will be basis for the
matrix of intranets to create the national PFN/TRAC system.
PCIP Precipitation Baby the rain must fall--and TRAC/FACT systems
must be protected from it and the natural element including contact
with earth wind and fire. The system must also tie all
meteorological systems and automated systems as well as provide
freestanding PFN/TRAC units to report and perform robotics and RC
control functions due to meteorological events to insure the best
system performance for the TRAC system to return a FACT flight
safely to the surface.
PCM Pulse Code Modulation will be used as a digital transmission as
needed in TRAC/FACT interfaced avionics.
PCU (1) Passenger Control Unit This will be expanded to mean the
handling of technology that can help control behavior in flight
like the administering of a sleep agent or tranquilizer to allow
for uninterrupted surface control of the aircraft.
(2) Power Control Unit will be SUC to TRAC/FACT systems and the
TRAC/FACT process or processor will be protected from tampering
with the power control unit. If this system is a critical TRAC/FACT
component it hast be protected and have protected redundant power
and control capability or as part of any TRAC system a separate
power controlled by a protected TRAC ASIC processor has to in
place.
PDC Pre-Departure Clearance requires ACARS OOI FACT examination
readiness meaning all inventoried systems are checked out and
downloaded to the FACT control center. The inventory is a stand
record of readiness for this aircrafts avionics critical services
tires, brakes, carryon wireless electronics, navigational aids,
personal PCs, palm pilots, and all E/E systems. TRAC FACT readiness
to include crew and passenger ID checklist of known public threats
to society--photo recognition technology fingerprint and DNA if
Civil defense security alert high enough. Obviously these systems
will be interfaced with FACT control centers and the terminal
security checks also PFN/TRAC units and system provided.
Accomplished by using COTS and enhancing them to PFN/TRAC system
level of performance.
PDCU Panel Data Concentrator Unit the electronic signals provided
the TRAC/FACT process as applicable.
PDDI Product Definition Data Interface. Standardizes digital
descriptions of part configurations and properties needed for
manufacturing. Used extensively to utilize cross-environmental
technologies to interface with existing COTS technology to create
the TRAC/FACT system.
PDF Primary Display Function
P-DME Precision Distance Measuring Equipment used for all robotics
and RC flight sim programs to be processed for FACT flights landing
and taxiing.
PDN Public Data Network Data to be supplied and approved by
TRAC/FACT IP interface and appear on the internet as an informative
transportation portion or web page for the public to view--this
function is well defined in the extensive previous 7 patents and
protected patent filings.
PDOP Position Dilution Of Precision. A GPS term for error
introduced into the GPS calculations. This military skew to be
eliminated or compensated for but FACT encrypted when used in FACT
systems--the most accurate data a necessity for this
application--equally the military have to feel sure it is used with
national security in tact to include the termination of a fact
flight using this guidance for unauthorized and as a guided bomb
run--however the military has the ability to turn off the GPS in a
grid fashion if this is deemed a better option.
PDOS Powered Door Opening System all to be SUC to TRAC/FACT to
allow for the boarding of a FACT flight at a SB with a FACT
command.
PDR Preliminary Design Review for every TRAC/FACT system
deployment.
PDS Primary Display System videoed and signals recorded and
interfaced as needed for TRAC/FACT operations.
PDU (1) Protocol Data Unit. The N-PDU is a combination of the N-PCI
and the N-UD or N-SDU. The N-PDU is the total information that is
transferred between peer network members (OSI Model) as a unit. The
PDU is a forerunner to TRAC communication protocol translation and
message routing and as such is to be protected and interfaced as a
integrated TRAC/FACT component.
(2) Power Drive Unit--if this is a servomotor for flight control
surfaces or critical in-flight controls it is to be protected and
it's power leads are to be protected.
Performance Index A relative number used to compare the performance
of different radar systems. It is calculated from transmitter peak
power, antenna gain, pulse width, prf, antenna beam width, and the
receiver noise figure. Any automated systems or algorithms to
provide the best radar data for FACT flight and landings should be
protected and utilized.
PED Portable Electronic Devices all having transmission receiving
capability are to interface with the TRAC/FACT processor and be SUC
to FACT commands deliverable in the PED protocol. Additionally the
PFN/TRAC TRANSCEIVER should be equipped with a frequency scanner
and locate and report any unknown RF oscillation. This also should
be a standard PFN/TRAC free standing function throughout the
airfields constantly canvassing transmissions and triangulating on
their location via the matrix of receivers. FACT FAA command
control center locally in the Tower should be monitoring these
signals with an algorithm that identifies known signals and flags
suspicious ones. Mobil PFN/TRAC RF sensors will also have GPS to
tag exact location when they pick up an odd ball.
Any such in-flight new signal will trigger a FACT event status with
aircraft flow to safe route zone and towards SB until the nature of
the transmission can be identified.
PET Pacific Engineering Trials as needed for TRAC/FACT
approval.
PF Power Factor
PFC Primary Flight Computer is immediately part of the first
generation of TRAC/FACT and must be protected and interfaced
accordingly. Additionally these units and autopilots will be
adapted and programmed to handle the robotics flights.
PFCS Primary Flight Control System TRAC/FACT is the PFCS in a FACT
event both in the aircraft and through the FAA/FACT command control
Center.
PFD (1) Primary Flight Display. An EFIS presentation substituting
for the ADI.
(2) Primary Flight Director.
PFE Path Following Error
PFR Pulse Repetition Frequency. The rate at which pulses are
transmitted.
PGA Pin Grid Array
PHY Physical Interface Device
Phase A signal in which the phase varies (with respect to
Modulation the original signal) with the amplitude of the
modulatory signal, while the amplitude of the carrier wave remains
constant. Similar to a modified frequency modulated signal.
PIO Processor Input/Output the 5 lines above defines elements of
avionics and TRAC/FACT will incorporate them as needed
PIREP Pilot Report an automated Pilot report will be filed
electronically and in the written form printed out for each fact
event from the onboard FACT robotics system and the Surface system
and RC crew.
Pitot Pressure The sum of the static and dynamic pressures and is
the total force per unit area exerted by the air on the surface of
a body in motion.
Pitot Tube A forward facing probe attached to the outside of the
aircraft to sense the relative pressure of the aircraft moving
through the atmosphere. Named for Henri Pitot who first used this
method of measuring fluid flow pressure. Transduced for forward
speed into a electronic signal and inputted to the TRAC processor
or TRAC process for FACT robotics flight.
PLA Power Level Angle TRAC controlled in FACT program
PLL Phase Locked Loop
PM Phase Modulation
PMA (1) Permanent Magnet Alternator 3 above avionics interfaced and
monitored by TRAC as necessary.
(2) Parts Manufacturing Approval a standard process for all
TRAC/FACT components and their interfaces.
PMAT Portable Maintenance Access Terminal a possible interface
location for TRAC processor to E/E bus systems if protected in
flight and secured for service for FACT protocols.
PMC Provisional Memory Cover must meet TRAC/FACT protocols
PMG Permanent Magnet Generator
PMOS P-Type Metal Oxide Semiconductor
PN Pseudo Noise
PNCS Performance Navigation Computer System directly interfaced
with TRAC process in first generation.
PNEU Pneumatic
POC (1) Proof Of Concept for all TRAC/FACT modalities, components
and interfaces are all ready in existence in COTS segments.
(2) Point of Contact
Polled Mode An ACARS mode of operation in which the airborne system
transmits only in response to received uplink messages (polls).
TRAC/FACT systems will have this function from the surface command
control center and regional En route markers for FACT
downloads.
POR Pacific Ocean Region will be set up for FACT TRAC handoff to
the countries geographically in control of airspace.
POS Position
POS/NAV Positioning/Navigation the 2 above will be a constant
monitor program to determine flight plan deviation and to control
robotics flight for the TRAC processor and FACT program.
POT Potentiometer
PPI Planned Position Indicator. A type of radar display that shows
aircraft positions and airways chart on the same display. Used in
the command center and the electronic signal provided to the FACT
program running in the TRAC processor on board the aircraft AND
RECORDED IN BOTH LOCATIONS.
PPM (1) Pulse Position Modulation when available configuration
algorithm in FACT software for position confirmation.
(2) Parts Per Million a reading transduced to an electronic signal
indicative of the level and identity for a contamination in the
cabin atmosphere.
PPS Precise Positioning Service
P/RAT Prediction/Resolution Advisory Tool an evaluation program to
adjust operational parameters and will be used as applicable to
accurately adjust automated systems to operate the aircraft safely
via robotics and RC in the TRAC/FACT System.
PRAM Prerecorded Announcement Machine the robotics system will have
prerecorded announcements in the TRAC/FACT programs.
PRAIM Predictive Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring standard
process in the TRAC/FACT system.
PRELIM Preliminary Data
PRESS Pressure
Pressure The altitude measured above standard pressure level.
Altitude Based on the relationship of pressure and altitude with
respect to a standard atmosphere. Physical measurements transduced
to an electrical signal for the TRAC processor and FACT programs to
factor in their programming.
Preventive A resolution advisory that instructs the pilot to avoid
advisory certain deviations from current vertical rate (TCAS).
Transmitted to TRAC/FACT system as an electrical signal encrypted
for the FACT program to factor in for robotics flight.
PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency used as needed for TRAAC
avionics.
PRI Primary
PRM Precision Runway Monitoring part of the surface TRAC/FACT
command control system and linked to aircraft performance on the
surface as well as utilized by taxi programs and RC control
stations.
PRN Pseudo Random Noise factored out in the ground RF monitoring
via software program.
PROM Programmable ROM used as needed in TRA/FACT systems.
Protocol A set of rules for the format and content of messages
between communicating processes. TRAC/FACT will set up a higher
level software interface that crosses over communication protocols
to transfer emergency messages universally encrypted as FACT
messages via the TRAC processor interfaced with a divers number of
communication chipset of different communication link protocols.
This will create a large flexible machine-messaging matrix to
include voice communication as well.
PROX Proximity is a continual set of functions always being
performed by a number of software algorithms in communications and
navigation programs running as a basic characteristic of the TRAC
system. TRAC processors always provide location data via GPS
systems or other location systems or data to determine the location
of another transmission by identifying the transmission between two
or more receiving PFNs of known location and running an automated
triangulation algorithm to find the location of the transmission.
This is factored locally and systemically and reported and recorded
for accuracy and accountability.
PRSOV Pressure Regulating and Shutoff Valve used and monitored by
TRAC/FACT systems for hydraulic diversions to lock out local
controls or energize certain control surface actuators or control
fuel flow or sleeping agent flows or 02 level or atmospheric
pressure in the cabin.
P/RST Press To Reset
PRTR Printer there will be a printer connected to the TRAC/FACT
system to provide printouts on systems status to authorized
requesters.
PS Power Supply for TRAC/FACT systems will be protected and
available and regulated and externally rechargeable, but not
drainable or interruptible, during a FACT event and capable of
energizing all necessary components and accessories to robotically
fly the aircraft or receive RC commands from the surface and
deliver data to fly and land the aircraft via the TRAC/FACT
system.
PSA Power Supply Assembly protected if a TRACFACT main emergency
system and/or SUC to TRAC/FACT system if another avionics system on
board.
PSDN Packet Switched Data Network incorporated and interfaced as
TRAC/FACT process or ASIC processor and Communication Link if
essential to secure safe flight and landing capability with the
system protected.
PSEU Proximity Sensor Electronic Unit data supplied to TRAC
processor and used as a tamper detection sensor to quarry human
activity around a TRAC sensitive component.
PSL/PSA Problem Statement Language/Problem Statement.
Analyzer used to test software interfacing for TRAC/FACT systems
with OEM and COTS avionics.
PSPL Preferred Standard Parts List each aircraft manufacturer will
be expected to generate PSPLs for the generations of TRAC/FACT
systems to update their aircraft with TRAC/FACT technology.
PSR Primary Surveillance Radar. The part of the ATC system that
determines the range and azimuth of an aircraft in a controlled air
space. PSR will be employed at all SBs and be used for the robotics
glide path by up loading data to the incoming troubled aircraft and
providing glide path telemetry to the RC simulator to RC land the
aircraft.
PSS Proximity Sensor System used for all movement applications from
the micro to the macro in distance and size of object to supply
relevant data to TRAC processors running vehicle operation
algorithms e.g. collision avoidance in the air, with the ground, on
the ground and anti tampering software programs.
PSU Passenger Service Unit.
PTR Production Test Requirements applied to all TRAC/FACT systems
for the design state and aftermarket use, however some
circumstances may warrant prior application and use to full and
complete production approval to be determined by national
security/public safety and risk management officials.
PTSD Production Test Specification Document provided for all
TRAC/FACT systems and protocols.
PTT (1) Post, Telephone and Telegraph communication Links via
TRAC/FACT routing.
(2) Push To Talk. Also refers to the switching signal that enables
the transmitter VOX operated in the TRAC/FACT system and keyed up
electronically and manually.
PTU Power Transfer Unit interfaced monitored and controlled as
needed to the TRAC/FACT system.
PVT Position, Velocity, Time an absolute data feed to the TRAC
system process of interfaced COTS avionics or TRAC/FACT/ASIC input
of data for flight deviation recognition to trigger a FACT event
and also to FACT fly and land the aircraft, via the 5 preprogrammed
FACT flights and RC landings.
PWM Pulse-Width Modulation to be determined for FACT software and
communication link protocols if different.
PWR Power
PwxA Pilot Weather Advisory transduced to an electrical signal for
TRAC/FACT management and operation programs to factor for robotics
flight and RC.
Q
QAR Quick Access Recorder all recorders to be protected and require
FACT access personnel to access and recover.
QC Quality Control a paramount importance for any and all TRAC/FACT
components their interfaces and connectables as well as security
clearance in all major programming and flight readiness.
QEC Quadrantral Error Corrector for position to be used in flight
tracking and data provided to the TRAC/FACT system.
QFE A method of setting the altimeter to compensate for changes in
barometric pressure and runway elevation. Pilot receives
information from airfield and adjusts his altimeter accordingly and
it will read zero altitude at touchdown on the runway. Atmosphere
datum -29.92 inches of mercury (1,013.25 mb). This setting is used
in the United States airspace by all aircraft above FL180.
QNH The more common method of setting the altimeter to compensate
for changes in barometric pressure. Pilot receives information from
airfield, adjusts his altimeter accordingly and the altimeter will
read airfield elevation, at touchdown. For the above 2, the
information to be sent as an electrical signal to the TRAC
processor reading barometric transduced data to run an adjustment
algorithm for the TRAC process to read Barometric Zero on a robotic
touch down with real-time aircraft data supplied to RC SB station
helping to land the Troubled aircraft.
QNE The method of setting the altimeter to the standard and a
standard for setting the Altimeter reading in the TRAC/FACT program
can be termed QNET.
QOP Quality Operating Procedures to be determined for TRAC/FACT
procedures and protocols.
QOS Quality of Service must be of a consistent high caliber for
TRAC/FACT systems.
QRH Quick Reference Handbook for each area of TRAC technology.
Quadrantral Error in the relative bearing caused by the distortion
of the received radio signal (rf fields) by the structure of the
aircraft. To be compensated in existing COTS sub systems or
programmed into the chipsets, hybrid substrate, or ASIC SOC for
future TRAC/FACT processors for RF protocols.
R
R Right
RA (1) Resolution Advisory (generated by TCAS) all pilot waning
advisories given for collision are to be provided to the robotics
program running in the TRAC/FACT process/processor for robotics
flight augmentation to avoid a collision.
(2) Radio Altimeter all altitude data generated is to be provided
in the form of a recognizable electrical signal to the on board
flight responsive TRAC/FACT system during a FACT event or to be
used for FACT monitoring. In tern the data is transmitted to the
surface FAA/FACT command control and assigned RC stations both at
the SB and in any pursuit assist aircraft. If the signal is
generated from a surface system the data is provided to the in
flight TRAC/FACT unit and surface monitoring and management system
for robotics flight program flight an RC flight coordination and
control.
Rabbit Tracks Rabbit Tracks, or running rabbits, refer to the
distinctive display produced by another (alien radar) radar system
transmission. Military tracking and targeting systems to detect
foreign military threats need to be evaluated to determine the need
for recognition of rabbit tracks and their use in a FACT scenario.
To the inventor, it is obvious if the aircraft detects rabbit
tracks or the pursuit assist aircraft detects rabbit tracks within
or near to the US boarders; FACT command center, en route
controller and surface cabin analysis team have to determine if the
rabbit tracks are related and part of an attempt to control the
aircraft. If the radar can tot be recognized and determined
friendly and the FACT aircraft is not controlled by FACT robotics
and surface RC, 1. Time permitting pinpoint rabbit track location
and track if a moving target and dispatch surface security force to
apprehend persons and equipment and interrogate and report to FACT
control center 1a. Do a TRAC/FACT scan communication sweep from all
close to the rabbit tracks PFN/TRAC units and along the projected
flight path to pick up suspicious RF signals--initiate same sweep
for in the aircraft TRAC units and run a correlation algorithm to
detect same alien frequency and jam at both ends. Determine
locations of transmission and dispatch interdiction/interrogation
force 1b. Simultaneously TRAC/FACT communication Scan for secure
communication link to FACT command control center from troubled
aircraft. FACT 2. Response (no time scenario) air to surface
tracking missile from pursuit aircraft fired on rabbit track
location. And ready to take out the troubled aircraft. Either from
the control command center or from the pursuit aircraft (training,
preplanning and a guardian TRAC/FACT program of options should
always be running for the real-time FACT crew to try and help make
the hard decisions).
Radar Radio Detecting And Ranging. A system that measures distance
and bearing to an object. To be used as available on each air craft
to provide data to the FACT robotics and RC operations via the TRAC
system to the FACT components in the aircraft and on the
surface.
Radar Mile The time interval (approximately 12.359 microseconds)
required for radio waves to travel one nautical mile and return
(total of 2 nmi). This physical fact of RF speed will be used to
determine speed and positions as possible by sub systems and any
primary focal node TRAC ASIC performing FACT software quarrying
sensed data if this development of position and speed data in this
manner is required either as an essential modality or as a backup
data source for the FACT tracking and guidance algorithm to
factor.
Radial A line of direction going out from a VOR station measured as
a bearing with respect to magnetic north. All directional data
provided like VOR technology in equipment on board any particular
aircraft should be evaluated as a sub system to be interfaced for
TRAC/FACT programming. Fact programming should be versatile enough
either through application specific software version or if possible
as a general operating system to run the protocols and software
needed to utilize data from various positioning and locating
technologies. This will require cooperation in the code writing and
engineers responsible for existing embedded systems to determine
the most proficient modalities to interface these disparate systems
into one operating system or most appropriate configuration for any
particular avionics available.
Radome The radome is the protective cover on the aircraft nose that
fits over the weather radar system antenna. The radome is
transparent at radar frequencies. This radar will be used to
provide data for FACT to determine the smoothest flight pattern via
robotics to SBs and report all such flight augmentations and data
gathered. However, additionally a camera or video system of the
highest caliber as well as night vision system should be mounted in
the nose and sending data back to TRAC/FACT robotics and surface/
(air assist if needed) RC control pilots for robotics flight and RC
landing as well as taxiing.
RAI Radio Altimeter Indicator videoed with data provided TRAC/FACT
system by electrical signal.
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring TRAC/FACT auto check
of essential communications to incorporate RAIM in sub systems and
direct integrated systems.
RALT Radio Altimeter (also RA, RADALT, LRA, LRRA) used as detailed
above for TRAC/FACT applications.
RAM Random Access Memory. Generally used to describe, read, write
integrated circuit memory. Used as a general electronics modality.
RAM back up for 5 FACT flights will exist in redundancy and be
reloaded in to any sub system flight controls responsible for FACT
flights in a redundant fashion for a sensed FACT event.
RAPPS Remote Area Precision Positioning System the FAA/FACT command
& control center will be able to be set up on Whitehouse
multi-screen representation or Air force 1 as a RAPPS and with more
telemetry and remote control during a FACT event or as desired by
the President and command staff he wishes present. RAPPS and
FAA/FACT command and control will be local and National and RAPPS
as desired can additionally be provided commercial carriers and
other relevant viewers.
RAS Row Address Strobe will be videoed in landing and used to
position glide path by a video algorithm if it proves feasible and
worthwhile.
RAT RAM Air Temperature is the temperature of the air entering an
air scoop inlet. It is a factor in engine performance. This data
will be processed and available via TRA/FACT processing to be used
as needed for proper flight performance and for the surface crew to
evaluate aircraft environment and total parameter of threat to and
from the environment as to the particular circumstances of the FACT
event.
RBS Ration by Schedule
R-C Resistor-Capacitor network used as applicable for TRAC/FACT
process and construction.
RCC Remote Charge Converter TRAC/FACT systems are to be capable of
inverting and converting current to meet any DC & AC
requirements for essential subsystems and/or accessories via a
protected emergency energy system.
RCP Radio Control Panel audio/video record/report and to be
directly interfaced with TRAC and protected during a FACT event for
uninterrupted secure surface access and control.
RCVR Receiver interfaced with and monitored by TRAC as much as
possible either physically or by wireless means.
Rd R-Channel used for data TRAC/FACT major Surface to air
communication link to carry special encrypted data for FACT
event.
R & D Research and Development to go in to High gear in all
commercial and government labs to develop interfaces and
connections for TRAC/FACT processing in surface application and for
avionics past, present and future modalities for the PFN/TRAC/FACT
technology.
RDMI Radio Distance Magnetic Indicator transduced signal--used and
interfaced as much as possible for TRAC/FACT flight deviation
monitoring and robotics flight.
RDR Radar a major tool to determine aircraft position and flight
the aircraft to the SB and land it safely for TRAC/FACT protocols,
Systems to be developed and integrated for traditional flight
routes, SB routes and new more direct GPS route. Additionally
aircraft collision avoidance RDR to be made more usable for
robotics flight.
RDSS Radio Determination Satellite Service used in the positioning
of aircraft as appropriate and doable.
RE&D Research, Engineering and Development for the construction
of the TRAC/FACT system in hardware/software and interfaces to
construct minimum flight requirement systems in everything flying
in the US in the next 180 days.
RECAP Reliability Evaluation and Corrective Action Program a
continual process for every TRAC/FACT system/generation.
REFL Reflection--not for light but for the TRAC/FACT System.
Reflection on how it is being used what make it safer and what is
the proper application for a free society and one under attack or
in some sort of danger that is alleviated via FACT
applications.
Reflectivity Factor (Z) This is a measurement of the ability of a
target to reflect the energy from a radar beam.
Relative Bearing The bearing of a ground station relative to the
direction the aircraft nose points, or the direction of an aircraft
to or from an NDB. To be used as applicable in controlling
TRAC/FACT flights.
REL Relative
Resolution Advisory A display indication given to the pilot
recommending a maneuver to increase vertical separation relative to
an intruding aircraft. A resolution advisory is also classified as
corrective or preventive. This data to be provided to TRAC system
running FACT robotics flight to alter the aircrafts flight path for
the safest un interrupted flight to the safe fly zone and SB
landing zone--all such maneuvers and data causing course and
altitude change relayed to SB RC simulator and monitoring stations
on the surface with data recorded and reported in both locations
for accountability.
RET (1) Rapid Exit Taxiway used for a FACT emergency to the local
control and containment area or provide as a take off or landing
parallel standard runway and taxi lane for immediate FACT flight,
landing or local dealing--these exist on safe bases for sure and
should be built with this consideration, however construction at
standard FAA airports should be constructed or augmented in the
future with this capability.
(2) Reliability Evaluation Test TRAC FACT systems self perform on
boot up and periodically and qualified approved personnel perform
physically.
REU Remote Electronics Unit
RF Radio Frequency. A general term for the range of frequencies
above 150 kHz, to the infrared region (1012 Hertz).
RFI Radio Frequency Interference The above two to be monitored and
manage by the TRAC/FACT scan and routing.
RFP Request For Proposal
RFTP Request For Technical Proposal RFTP need to be written from
each area of the PFN/TRA/FACT technical area for OEMs of aircraft
and avionics to prose constructing the components of the
system.
RFU Radio Frequency Unit
RGCSP Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel
RIB Right Inboard
RIN UK Royal Institute of Navigation to help set up the NAV systems
used for TRAC/FACT in Europe and England.
RLS (1) Remote Light Sensor used for security and other TRAC
automation
(2) Reliable Link Source
RLY Relay used in the TRA/FACT system for remote switching.
R & M Reliability and Maintainability are always important
element for any system and paramount for public safety and National
security in TRAC/FACT.
RMI Radio Magnetic Indicator signal converted to electrical signal
and used as needed for TRAC/FACT system.
RMP Remote Maintenance Panel
RMS Root Mean Square
RNAV Random Navigation/Area Navigation
RNG Range
RNGA Range Arc
RNP Required Navigation Performance the above 5 lines are important
radar and navigational aids to aircraft tracking and each such
locating system will be used as needed in the TRQAC/FACT system
applicable by aircraft.
RO Roll Out
ROB Right Outboard
ROC Rate Of Climb
ROD Rate of Descent will be tracked and controlled by TRAC/FACT
robotics flight during a FACT event.
ROI Return On Investment always good business and should be good
for TRAC/FACT implementation from government funding Insurance
rebates, the airline industry.
ROM Read Only Memory used in TRAC/FACT systems as needed possibly
for the safe flight boot ups.
ROTHR Re-locatable Over-The-Horizon Radar used for the control of
robotics and RC flights.
RPM Revolutions Per Minute
RSP Reversion Select Panel
RT Receiver-Transmitter (rt). Also referred to as a transceiver
(see T/R). An interfaced portion of the TRAC/FACT scanner
system.
RTA (1) Receiver Transmitter Antenna protected but efficient for
TRAC/FACT communication link
(2) Required Time of Arrival to be monitored and updated by
TRAC/FACT system.
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics to take part in
determining the essential RF systems and scan functions for
TRAC/FACT.
RTF Radiotelephony to be interfaced and controlled by TRAC/FACT
processor and DSRC.
RTI Real-Time Interrogate all the I/O and for the proper personnel
security responses and sensed data check as part of standard
operational program for TRAC/FACT system.
RTP Reliability Test Plan to be determined for each TRAC/FACT
system partially determined by OEMs and government agencies.
RTO Rejected Takeoff there will be a v point or take off abort
electrical signal marker to Fact program to know to kill the flight
and go to slow, stop, secure program on the ground and taxi to the
secure holding area.
RTP Radio Tuning Panel to be locked down and protected from local
access and available and interfaced with the TRAC/FACT system.
RTS Request To Send this communication command will be controlled
by TRAC/FACT interfacing.
RTU Radio Tuning Unit SUC to TRAC/FACT operation.
Runway The act of inadvertently crossing the runway holding.
Incursion point without ATC clearance--limited or eliminated by
FACT collision guardian program running in the TRAC unit and in the
ground FACT control center both giving pilot notification and
controlling the traffic pattern along the taxi ways and
runways.
RVDT Rotary Voltage Differential Transducer interfaced and
monitored by TRAC/FACT system
RVR Runway Visual Range enhanced by Radar and night vision
interfaced into TRAC/FACT systems.
RVSM Required Vertical Separation Minimums to be programmed in the
Fact robotics programs.
RWM Read-Write Memory. A memory in which each cell is selected by
applying appropriate electrical input signals, and the stored data
may be either sensed at the appropriate output terminal or changes
in response to other electrical input signals. RWM memory storage
will be employed as determined by stand by applications in the
TRAC/FACT technology.
RWY Runway
RZ Return to Zero the term used for setting gauges--however all
FACT programs will run data check programs to constants to
recalibrate their electronic programs for the signal they are
receiving and processing. In the TRAC/FACT system.
S
SA Selective Availability the TRAC/FACT program will be written
with as much SA code as possible to allow for similar processors to
use different location and communication and actuator control
mechanism.
SAA Service Access Area
SAARU Secondary Attitude Air Data Reference Unit
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers to take part in the interfacing
of surface transportation intranets like On star, Wing Cast and
Tele-aid with the aviation intranet for high security applications
and public information and better traffic management as all part of
a large machine messaging matrix--the PFN/TRAC System.
SAI AEEC Systems Architecture and Interfaces.
Subcommittee to help determine standards rules regulations codes
and law for TRAC/FACT.
SAMS Special Use Airspace Management System SAMS may well be a
System to start developing the FACT SB flights zones and bases. The
inventor is going to quarry government agencies and the military to
locate property and existing bases that are capable of quick
conversion for SBs.
SAR Search And Rescue will be changed to have a FACT response
officer and crew to respond from FAA/FACT homeland security. Every
agency like the FBI, NTSB, Coast Guard/Military etc, area law
enforcement will have FACT training and be directly responsive to
FACT command control center until released by FACT Homeland
Security/the President of The United States or the Homeland
Security Cabinet Member. When no threat to public safety and
Homeland Security is satisfied a normal accident investigation team
or activity continues the work on the lookout and monitored by a
FACT representative and all information transmitted back to FACT
center either the individual law enforcement agencies or the joint
agency FACT center. Otherwise, SAR is handled the same only with a
chain of command, a FACT trained commander in the field who is
trained in FACT procedures and protocols from SAR as well and makes
the call that it is safe enough for normal SAR personnel to proceed
or whether there is a greater risk-more Terrorist activities etc.
The air pursuit assist teams will have air cav helicopter teams
with EMTs SWAT assault teams and CDC and HAZMAT skilled teams
regionally scrambled by FACT control center. These personnel are
recruited from the best in their specific areas and trained in FACT
procedures and protocols. To start the program Air National guard
in all the respective services can set up the aircraft teams. SWAT
teams should have Police and, Military skill with trained
psychiatrists and emergency medical people. Each regional area
should have in triplicate people speaking every language known to
man on pagers for a second wave helicopter to transport a FACT
trained translator to tem up with the specialists. If people are
not available translation programs on palmtops and lap tops with
voice recognition technology should be available and this
automation should be available a soon as possible.
SARPS Standards And Recommended Practices will be set up for
TRAC/FACT technology and it's use. Much of the basics are covered
in this patent white paper filing. TRAC the machine-messaging
matrix is well documented through out the writings and skilled
personnel can finalize applications of the technology to best suit
the incident and their understanding of the job they perform.
Additionally bomb squad robots and other robotics devices can be
FACT approved or configured and interfaced to be part of any early
SAR response entering high heat/high risk and dangerous
environments and performing robotics rescue. Along with K-9 teams
special personal PFN/TRAC units can be out fitted with the Nose, a
sensor that sniffs at 2000 times that of a human being and is able
to detect molecular structure. Equipped with an electronic library
of odors this sensor on all SAR FACT people personal PFNS can
record orders matched to accurate GPS coordinates at the event site
all the time they are working and supply these detailed telemetries
back to the FACT center on a calibrated map of the debris field or
landing zone for analysis. Additionally the software running in the
personnel PFNS can be set to FLAG dangerous odors or odors to help
locate passengers or crews.
Finally as a standard recommended action from the inventor is that
all second response teams to a second FACT incident should be
listening to FACT central and their regional center where assigned
staff is monitoring the first FACT event and issuing hazard
bulletins in real-time to counter for any planned multiple attack
like 9/11, or future event out of a present attack-like a secondary
explosive device. The FAA did well to halt all flights with the
management technology available 911. Hopefully, with a more
responsive technology like TRAC in place to perform accountable
real-time robotics and remote control we can continue to have the
best response possible to save as many lives in the aircraft and on
the surface for such future heinous acts. Emergency bulletins from
FACT central of this nature should interrupted communication links
with a real-time buffer in each personal PFN receiving all local
communications and continuing local communications immediately
after the critical central announcements. These announcements
should be as short as possible--basically clear the area
commands.
The many organizations and agencies and the general public in each
society will help create the SARPS standards and roles everyone
will be involved in for a FACT event and to use the PFN/TRAC
System. This document is to detail this technology's architecture
as a machine-messaging matrix of accountable robotics and remote
control. TRAC is created to help humanity provide a safer
existence, through the intelligent and authorized use of equipment
vehicles and machines. It is designed for the long social learning
curve and short life span we humans have on this wonderful spinning
hydrosphere. Hopefully, for all us trying, we can travel, live and
learn with each other peacefully and respectfully for a full 100
yrs each. It will require Peace, tranquility and accommodation for
our differences as well as the intelligent use of our technology
and the world's resources. TRAC addresses these important issues
and helps organizes them respectfully for our learning humanity on
a global scale with the least amount of individual anxiety and
social and cultural turmoil. It manages humanities different needs,
time and communication as a critically conscious part in all of
humanity's technology.
SAS Situational Awareness for Safety SAS will be written and
structured for FACT.
SAT Static Air Temperature is the total air temperature corrected
for the Mach effect. Increases in airspeed cause probe temperature
to rise, presenting erroneous information. SAT is the outside air
temperature if the aircraft could be brought to a stop before
measuring temperatures. SAT algorithms will be used in the
subsystems for measuring air temperature or run in the TRAC/FACT
ASIC receiving direct input data from a sensor experiencing MACH
air resistance.
SATCOM Satellite Communication System will be integrated for TRAC
communication and location of FACT flights globally.
SB Service Bulletin for TRAC/FACT require specific encoding
encrypted that has to be scanned and handled by FACT equipment and
personnel with proper repair security team dispatched for any
physical repairs.
SBE Single Bit Error--a certain amount of fuzzy logic or error
correction will be in the FACT software, however the error in
encrypted commands will not allow for any error of the slightest
and is to be worked out and tested extensively before approved and
placed in service.
SC-186 RTCA Special Committee 186 (Responsible for ADS-B technical
standards) all surveillance systems radio and radar standards to be
applied and augment for FACT application by any standards effort
operating or effected commercial interests and government agencies
to FAA/FACT homeland Security.
SCAT Special Category in first generation systems there will be a
lot of SCAT and I mean literally as well as special category
TRAC/FACT configurations. The SCAT trail to TRAC/FACT ready
aircraft will need some cleaning up as time goes on with universal
consolidation and integration in future aircraft automation and
avionics and further retrofitting. But anything that flies has to
be approved into a FACT category so that the FAA/FACT command
control system has the most control of the aircraft possible during
a FACT event. I imagine the SCAT trail to be loaded in these early
days with the scramble to interface disparate systems, so I suggest
an on going alphabetical FAA/FACT access web site with a firewall
and secure registration to include individual ID level to access a
share ware program of hardware and soft ware with open lines of
contact communications between manufacturers to upgrade legacy
aircraft with what ever it takes to FACT ready planes in the US
Skies. Government should fund and industry compensated reasonably
for this collaborative effort with respect to cast loss and profit
for any such system update. For this to happen it requires all to
give a little but not to get hurt even profit in the expanding
economy.
SCAT 1 Special Category 1 (approach)
SCD Specification Control Drawing
SCDU Satellite Control Data Unit
SCID Software Configuration Index Drawing The 4 above lines are all
SCAT activities and must meet final FACT approval. OEMs avionics
manufacturers can take any approach they feel will work for
them--there should be a FAA/FACT assist board but not one to
approve every step. The manufacturers must build it to be TRAC/FACT
ready, and not just by this document but what is determined to be
the FACT standard, which might well change from time to time.
Additionally the 4 above lines are part of an ongoing process of
development and deployment of TRAC/FAC technology but the crucial
steps are the initial ones everyone will know the process for FACT
approved components and systems when the organizational structure
is in place.
SCIU Radio Altimeter Indicator Data transduced and SUC to TRACFACT
management system.
SCMU Special Communications Management Unit will be exactly what
each PFN/TRAC system will be and especially when operating FACT
Event Software. However any electronic control units should be
appraised for the their conversion to be a PFN/TRAC/FACT unit and
augmented and upgraded to be interfaced as COTS into the
system.
SCPC Single Carrier Per Channel all radio modalities will be
approved for TRAC/FACT protocols and be SUC to TRAC/FACT.
SCS Single Channel Simplex. A communication system that uses
simplex. All radio modalities will be approved for TRAC/FACT
protocols and be SUC to TRAC/FACT--in this case with a simplex
interface.
SCSI Small Computer System Interface SCSI will be security
protected for interface at the secure levels of FACT data and
tracked in a standard IP modality for general new access not just
stored on local hard drives but sent as system reported inventory
to FACT buffers or mass data handling and storage with time and
date ESN or any other S/N and personal ID at the time of interface
and/or access and use. There may be DES/DET configurations or other
FACT security protocols used with SCSI interfaces, serial, parallel
or USB or fire wire interfaces or protocols. The most important is
the security and the firewall to sensitive TRAC/FACT data systems
the hardware and software can start with present COTS systems as
much as possible and be made more universal consolidated and
integrated.
SCU Signal Conditioning Unit
SD (1) Side Display
(2) Storm Detection. It is the designation for the hourly
transmitter radar observations from the NWS and ARTCC radars.
Individual SDOs are combined and transmitted once an hour as
collectives (SDUOs) over the aviation Teletype circuits. All data
related to flying conditions to be provided for robotics FACT
controllers and RC landing stations in electronic format.
SDD Standard Disk Drive
SDI Source Destination Identifier on all transmissions for
TRAC/FACT transmission and command codes as part of the software
command structure.
SDM Speaker Drive Module SUC to TRAC/FACT systems.
SDRL Supplier Data Requirements List to be determined for TRAC/FACT
components and system as a result of evaluating goals and this
list.
SDU Satellite Data Unit
Search In this mode, the DMS scans from 0 mile to the outer range
for a reply pulse pair after transmitting an interrogation pulse
pair. TRAC/FACT System will provide any recovery and rescue vehicle
or aircraft a calibrated GPS/Rf triangulation calibrated map
pinpointing last known and/or most recent transmissions on a
monitor to lay in the debris monitoring sensors reply pulse and
conversely this image is to be transmitted to FACT control central.
Sensors for toxic substances, radiation, poison bio toxins HAZMAT
are to identify objects and be marked on rescuers maps and central
command monitors.
SEC Secondary
SED Secondary EICAS Display videoed and recorded and reported by
TRAC/FACT system with possible course of actions from monitoring
and management program.
SEI Standby Engineer Indicator
SEL Select
SELCAL Selective Calling System. A system used in conjunction with
HF and VHF communication systems that allow a ground-based radio
operator to call a single aircraft or group of aircraft without the
aircraft personnel monitoring the ground station radio
frequency.
Sensitivity Level Command An instruction given to the TCAS
equipment for control of its threat volume. All such above
communication links for coordinated ground movement must have a
recording in the aircraft TRAC unit and in the surface control
system and during a FACT event data delivered in electronic medium
for the TRAC/FACT processor to control the aircraft--additionally
and as soon as possible any voice transmission should be run
through voice recognition technology for the TRAC/FACT unit to
evaluate and respond as appropriate and confirmable to detect a
FACT event and to perform robotics control.
SEPC Secondary Electrical Power Contactor monitor and manage by
TRAC/FACT systems as determined appropriate.
SEPP Stress Evaluation Prediction Program For TRAC/FACT components
to be determined and implemented--and for people performing FACT
operations. There is to be software algorithms to read voice and
sense other indications for all types of physical states that might
less or be indicative of a FACT event or unsafe operating
performance for all jobs.
SERNO Serial Number to accompany all transmissions for the aircraft
and a header of equipment serno inventoried as safely possible for
data handling of crucial commands.
SEU (1) Single Event Upset Flag for TRAC.FACT program
(2) Seat Electronics Unit
SFE Supplier Furnished Equipment
SG Signal Generator SUC to FACT
SGPNS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System used in robotics
Taxiing by FACT.
SI (1) Standby Instruments
(2) Supporting Interrogator
SICAS Secondary Surveillance Radar Improvements and Collision
Avoidance System
SICASP Secondary Surveillance Radar Improvements and Collision
Avoidance System Panel the three radar components to deliver flight
data to TRA/FACT processor for robotics flight and RC stations.
SID Standard Instrument Departure to be used as applicable for
future robotics for TRAC flying.
Sidetone The reproduction of sounds in a headset (or speaker) from
the transmitter of the same communication set. This allows a person
to hear his/her own voice when transmitting.
SIF Standard Interchange Format used as applicable and not
demeaning FACT security.
SIGMETS Significant Meteorological Observations to be transduced in
real-time for TRAC robotics flights and landings.
SIL (1) Systems Integration Lab to determine the beset sub system
integration for COTS to create FACT and consolidate it to a ASIC or
SOC on a chip.
(2) Service Information Letter special handling for TRAC/FACT
service paper work.
Simplex A communication operation that uses only a single channel
for transmit and receive operations. Communications can take place
in only one direction at a time. No matter how limited a RF system
appears it is to be evaluated for TRAC/FACT monitoring interfacing
and management via universal PFN/TRAC units and their Radio scanner
process. As for aviation the simplex communication links for
markers and beacons should be augmented with more comprehensive
PFN/TRAC units able to receive ded return broad cast from overhead
aircraft of packetized data and store the data in local buffers and
retransmit them to a IP gateway or connect to land lines and
transmit the data back to FAA/FACT command control center.
SIP Single In-line Package used as needed.
SITA Societe Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautiques
This organization to be involved in setting up the area TRAC/FACT
systems and developing standards in it's region.
SIU Skywave Satellite Interface Unit employed as needed. A radio
wave that is reflected by the ionosphere. Depending upon the state
of the ionosphere, the reflected radio wave may propagate along the
layer of the ionosphere or be reflected at some angle. It is also
known as ionospheric or indirect wave. SW/sky wave will be
monitored and utilized as needed and as relevant to maintaining
communication with FACT aircraft.
SL Sensitivity Level
S/L Sub-Level
Slant Range The line-of-sight distance from the aircraft to a DME
ground station. Data linked to TRAC/FACT robotics and RC
f&l.
SLEP Service Life Extension Program
SLM Standard Length Message packaged for best speed and accuracy on
the most favorable frequencies for RC in the ded RF for TRAC/FACT
RF system.
SLS Side-Lobe Suppression. A system that prevents a transponder
from replying to the side-lobe interrogations of the SSR. Replying
to side-lobe interrogations would supply false replies to the ATC
ground station and obscure the aircraft location SLS employed in
TRAC/FACT for the most accurate Tracking signal the aircraft can
provide to the surface system, additional back up via other
tracking provided to the surface FAA/FACT command control center
and additionally all beacons must be TRAC/FACT protected from in
flight deactivation.
SLV Sync Lock Valve
SMC System Management and Communication SMC is the PFN/TRAC
system.
SMD Surface Mount Device used as needed.
SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems For ground
robotics and collision avoidance and coordination with aircraft
landing in a controlled fashion and uncontrolled fashion--all
telemetry entered in to the TRAC/FACT system and presented in a
usable form for humans and machines to coordinate the best
interaction for public safety and smooth operation in general
movement.
SMI Standard Message Identifiers and FACT encrypted Identifiers
SMR Surface Movement Radar interfaced with the TRAC/FACT process or
processor as available.
SMSO Space and Missile Systems Organization to review FACT
protocols to terminate a FACT flight by air-to-air and surface to
air and satellite to air missile attack. Additionally, to research
the strategic capability to partially disable an aircraft and semi
control a crash landing in a safe zone. And finally to plant with
an adhesive or puncture clamp device a wireless PFN/TRAC unit to
reestablish FACT surface control where original wireless units
interfaced have been damaged or compromised.
SMT (1) Aileron/Rudder Servo Mount
(2) Elevator Servo Mount
(3) Servo Mount
(4) Stabilizer Trim Servo Mount The 4 above lines for servo
controls and their mounts are to be protected for TRAC/FACT
operations and inspected by FACT approved tech teams.
(5) Station Management--will be determined for a TAC/FACT FAA/FACT
control center with a chain of command and an odd number of people
in any decision tree. Decisions will be pre conditioned and timed
for efficiency--each local station will have a similar structure.
For RF station management SMT the TRAC/FACT processor will control
all sub systems in the first generation and always manage all
communications on board.
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio will be a determining factor for the RF
options carried out by the sophisticated scan function of the TRAC
processor or first generation drafted RF automated tuning equipment
from existing COTS in aircraft. Normally there will be a number of
dedicated FACT frequencies for the system to robotically and RC fly
and land the aircraft. However the TRAC FACT protocol calls for the
complete control over wireless communications at all time on board
the aircraft with the capability to FACT contact the surface
FAA/FACT center via any usable frequency and protocol for all
devices on board. Understandably this requirement may be 6 months
to a year in the construction and 24-30 months before all carryon
devices are interfaced. It should and will be done for regular
flight safety with normal wireless communication management
concerns and an absolute must if we are prepared to smoke an
aircraft carry our fellow citizens to protect others on the
surface. This wireless interfacing exists for surface
transportation to control driver distraction and to operate
collision avoidance systems as an operational aid to the driver for
PFN/TRAC technology in cars. So if the phones are to have a
wireless connection to our operational programs in our cars the
PFNTRAC units in the planes should also control them.
SOIT Satellite Operational Implementation Team should have FACT
security checks.
SOP Standard Operating Procedure There will be standard operational
procedures and they should start with security as the first step of
implementation to any Operating procedure for FACT.
SOS Silicon On Sapphire
SPATE Special Purpose Automatic Test Equipment all FACT TEST
equipment will be SPATE an have to be logged in and out and keep a
record of it's use and handling locally and be capable of reporting
this and it's data directly to TRAC/FACT mass data handling and
storage. As part of FACT secure handling the system will quarry the
ID's of the tech handler and the ESN of the unit and have a special
a special self test for integrity check with FACT
encryption--Inventor to provide an additional security element to
the encryption security as a trade secrete when the proper time
comes.
SPC Statistical Process Control--in every local command and control
center a guardian FACT software program will run parallel at a
manned station based on all the technical data recovered in real
time. It will be running software scenarios and providing
probabilities and tradeoffs as well as decision trees with count
down markers for decisions and new scenarios until the event is
concluded. This is from all levels ACARS--Air born--landing and
ground response for as long as it takes. It might be decided that
there should be an Air Commander a different surface commander or
there might be a need to change personnel due to fatigue or some
other reason.
Additionally all real-time recorded data will be processed for
statistics and to create an electrical library for better options
from past experience and to create virtual FACT events for practice
and guardian programs.
SPD Speed always monitored and factored by TRAC/FACT for danger and
deviation.
SPE Seller Purchased Equipment As part of the FACT program in the
PFN/TRAC System there will be a national registry in which all
manufacturers register their products and provide a hardware or
software component that provides a ESN and lot No or Vin when
interfaced with the TRAC processor. An inventory program on system
boot up or as a periodic procedure--still to be determined for
aircraft--probably every pre-take off check) quarries all
interfaced E/E systems to include passenger carryon devices
equipped with DSRC (blue tooth etc). Equipment removed is time and
dated by the system and it s recorded and reported to FACT central
registry. When any thing is added the same process takes place.
This allows for the immediate recognition of stolen equipment and
illegal use of that property in another aircraft, vehicle or
equipment. It was designed to stop parts theft in automobiles and
vehicle thefts as well. Also with sensors on removable mechanical
parts the system asks for the service personnel's ID and the LOT
and S/N for the new part in stalled. If there is a crash the entire
equipment inventory is down loaded to FAA/FACT control center (with
NTSB/FBI and all other proper homeland security having the data in
real-time) the statistical algorithms is going to kick out hi
probability commonalities with all the current data concentrated in
the appropriate agencies and manufactures immediately.
Equally important is the FACT registry was designed for national
security. It tracks all electrical components and provides for a
nations security forces to implant their legitimate code
identifiers to thwart the possibility of any wireless device being
used in remote control sabotage of a piece of equipment. This
system and process is discussed in surface transportation systems
in earlier filings. Some of the crucial implementations are
deliberately kept as a trade secret at this point.
Speed of Represented by the symbol c and has a value of Light
2.9979250.times.10 meters/second or 983,571,194 feet/second.
SPI Special Position Identification will be issued for each FACT
triggered event in FAA/FACT command center on a calibrated map with
the immediate download of flight telemetry data and robotics flight
and local control lock out. Stations monitored, like a NASSA
control with trained FACT mission staff, are scrambled from their
recreational ready room next to the command center.
SPIP Designation for a transponder ident pulse.
SPKR Speaker
SPM (1) Surface Position Monitor reported to FACT control center
with all critical signal data in a useable format for the TRAC
processor for FACT robotics programming to factor.
(2) Stabilizer Position Modules protected and interfaced with
TRAC/FACT system for robotics flight and RC landings.
Spoking Spoking refers to a display presentation that radiates
outward from the display origin like the spokes on a wagon wheel.
All displays to be videoed in the FACT control centers and in the
FACT event aircraft with their data in an electrical digital form
for the FACT software programs to process. Data to be recorded in
both locations as it is transmitted and received and as it is
reconfigured (error corrected and consistent).
SPR Sync Phase Reversal (term used in Mode S transponders) This
transponder may be capable of the DATA link and FACT upload
telemetry. If SPR can help protect critical flight data exchange
for robotics augmentation in flight via small packetized commands
or as a confirm signal given over other dedicated frequencies it
should be set up with the proper encryption and special recognition
technology to function for these applications.
SPS Standard Positioning Service all such data generated to be
incorporated in the TRAC/FACT system.
SQ or Sql Squelch auto squelch and RF signal fix control and
monitor and management to be performed SUC to TRAC/FACT
operation.
Squall Line A squall line is a line of thunderstorms and developing
thunderstorms. Read by forward searching radar, Doppler, ground and
satellite systems and data provided in a concise confirmed format
for robotics flight and RC landing by TRAC and FACT
programming.
Squawk Reply to interrogation signal (XPD). Prepared in a protocols
usable by TRAC/FACT programming and recorded and timed on location
for FACT record
Squelch A control and/or circuit that reduces the gain in response
of a receiver. The squelch is used to eliminate the output noise of
the receiver when a signal is not being received. Auto controlled
by TRAC management or interfaced sub-system.
Squitter (1) The random pulse pairs generated by the ground station
as a filler signal.
(2) The transmission of a specified reply format at a minimum rate
without the need to be interrogated (filler pulses transmitted
between interrogations).
[XPD]. Used as needed in any system to maintain the optimal
tracking of the aircraft during the FACT event
(3) Spontaneous Transmission generated once per second by
transponders.
SR SwissAir to set up their TRAC/FACT System as applicable if they
return.
SRADD Software Requirements And Design Description to be
constructed form this paper for the TRAC System and FACT
protocols.
SRAM Static Random Access Memory used as needed to construct
TRAC/FACT system for each application as per COTS available.
SRD Systems Requirements Document to be generated individually for
model and series of aircraft and for custom and home built
aircraft. First SRD submitted by OEM manufacturers for all
commercial production aircraft to develop their own automated local
control locks out and summit SRD to FAA/FACT homeland security for
review. The second SRD submitted is for a processor system either
from adaptive autopilot or flight controller or flight computer
units with automated controls to control the flight surfaces
un-interrupted locally. The controller must use onboard location
sensing and guidance equipment that is protected locally from in
flight tampering and factor the positioning data via one of five
robotics or preprogrammed flight plans running in the protected
controller. The flight plans conduct the aircraft along FAA/FACT
determined safe traceable routes to 5 Safe Bases/controlled crash
Zones for the proper surface response and most complete possible
response.
The system information and design via FAA/FACT secure handling is
to be properly made available and priced feasibly for all legally
registered aircraft to be equipped properly and cleared to fly in
US airspace under TRAC/FACT conditions. The first TRAC/FACT
condition that must be met by all aircraft is:
Deviation=complete robotics SB/Z flights without local control
If the aircraft can via proper communications and data recovered
from the FACT event aircraft and TRAC/FACT tracking systems via
communications to surface convince FAA/FACT command and control
there is good reason for the deviation. Then the controls of the
aircraft should be returned with flight instructions given to
return to original heading or alternate approved course to the
registered destination or approved new destination if FAA/FACT
acceptable.
With communications established with the troubled FACT Event
aircraft and suspicion still high pursuit assist fighters ASAP
along the robotics flight path will escort the aircraft. The
fighters as determined appropriate can place the suspect aircraft
on a missile laser lock and the same is done from the ground with
missiles or phalanx machine cannon with discernable different
audible sounds provided to the FACT event Pilot via TRAC/FACT
communications with the air craft communication signal broadcasted
from a functional antenna location away from bunker protected
surface personnel at the SB. Any hostile action from the aircraft
can result in the immediate wasting of the FACT event aircraft or
some real-time disable measure discussed through out the technology
filings. One such system employs laser light (possibly when locked
on the FACT target) can transmit RC control signals to the FACT
vehicle or in this case air craft and shut down motors off or cut
their power settings or perform other RC flight controls if radio
controls are non functional.
With this FACT command control capability in place when over the
Safe Base/crash zone in as much as a glide path to land the
robotics, preprogrammed or RC FACT Event aircraft A FACT command
can return the flight controls (so long as they can be re locked to
the FACT Event pilot to land on the extra-extra long and large
runway if this proves to be advantageous, feasible and prudent for
a minimal robotics/RC controllable FACT flight--SB airfields fully
fire and EMT equipped will additionally a have protected access
tunnel way with sealed accessible ceiling for SWAT and EMT teams to
approach the FACT flight when on the surface--The tunnel to have
blinking light and audio tone at the closest tunnel access to the
plane--video monitors in the tunnel with images from video cameras
from PFN/TRAC/FACT units along the runway. FACT control center has
all the images and the images most relevant to first board or
deployed surface support.--Robtics Tillies or hi lifts to bag the
air craft if contaminated and protected atmosphere systems for the
bag and direct connect to aircraft cabin atmosphere with sensor
system and compressed contaminant for atmosphere extracted from the
aircraft. Additionally, protective gear for any first board
individuals. Full complement of weapons and training for the first
team in.
Note: this is a minimal system that can be accomplished by
protection and programming of present aircraft relatively fast
considering the nature of the threat and enormity of the change in
aircraft control and TRUST in flight management from human to
machine.
As stated by the inventor for PFN/TRAC car jack security systems;
there are no real good options to very bad acts that misguided
people want to do. However, the first goal is to limit the time and
space the intentionally deviant event takes place. This is hard, to
do with people in a free society. More possible for the immediate
future is to better manage our machines and technology. These first
robotics and local control lock outs save more lives on the ground
during a suicide hijacking and provide more time, better places to
land/control a crash with generally more options for the people in
the aircraft. Perfect solutions for imperfect behaviors are tough,
and even tougher to do rapidly. The TRAC/FACT System/process is a
good progression to grow accountable Machine/Human management of
our technology during these extremely dangerous human
situations.
Obviously SRDs will continue to be issued for new systems and
technology updates for legacy aircraft in an ongoing process to
provide fully controlled robotics and RC landings for every
aircraft. And not just at SBs, but also at any airport a pilot is
experiencing difficulty in landing their aircraft. The point here
being--you have to get the system and process in place and the
PFN/TRAC/FACT System is architecture to organize and progressively
accomplish that. And not just in aviation but also in all of
transportation and machine use via The PFN/TRAC System machine
messaging matrix.
SR Service Request Special security protocol for TRAC/FACT System
and components.
SRU Shop Replaceable Unit much modular and component repairs
tracked electronically through the TRAC/FACT system of registries
will be done.
SSB Single Sideband. An AM signal that has a reduced carrier, with
the power applied to a single sideband. Since the bandwidth of the
information-carrying signal is reduced, a better signal-to-noise
ratio is obtained at the receiver. This physical characteristic
will be appraised for the application of data or communication
desired in a TRAC/FACT communication link application by FAA/FCC
security agencies and standards efforts to determine ded regular
communications. Additionally the multi-translation protocol ASIC in
the TRAC system will pre pare data in appropriate data packets for
the physical characteristic of any frequency and receiver system it
is transmitting to via FACT communication software.
SSCVR Solid State Cockpit Voice Recorder to be interfaced with the
TRAC/FACT System and time and date synchronized.
SSEC Static Source Error Correction data to be factored by
TRAC/FACT when available.
SSFDR Solid State Flight Data Recorder incorporated and interfaced
with the TRAC/FACT system.
SSM Sign Status Matrix
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar. A radar-type system that requires
a transponder to transmit a reply signal. Used as needed by
TRAC/FACT robotics and RC flight programs.
SSSC Single Sideband Suppressed Carrier. A SSSC signal is a band of
audio intelligence frequencies that have been translated to a band
of radio frequencies without distortion of the intelligence signal.
Used as beneficial to the TRAC/FACT system communication link.
SSU Subsequent Signal Unit
STA Station the 2 lines above to be used as needed to complete the
development interfacing and implementation for the TRAC/FACT
system.
STAB Stabilizer automated for TRAC/FACT
Standard Atmosphere Represents the mean or average properties of
the atmosphere. At sea level static pressure is 29.92 InHg and
temperature is +15.degree. C.
Standby Mode A DME mode that applies power to the DME RT but the
unit does not transmit.
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Routes
STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
Static Ports Flush-mounted openings in the skin of the aircraft
fuselage used to sense static pressure.
Static Ambient atmospheric pressure or static pressure is pressure
the force per unit area exerted by the air on the surface of a body
at rest relative to the air. The 2 above terms--data recovered for
external air pressure via sensing to be used by the TRAC/FACT
processor as needed.
Static Ram constructed of bi-stable transistor elements.
Memory cells do not require refreshing (see "Dynamic RAM").
Static Source Error (SSEC) A correction applied to static source
pressure measurements to partly or completely correct for pressure
errors, which are caused by airflow changes. It is computed as a
function of Mach and altitude based on measured errors for a
particular static system, a software algorithm in TRAC/FACT
processor to account for this.
STBY Standby
STC (1) Sensitivity Time Control. A control circuit used in radar
applications to control receiver gain with respect to time. SUC or
sub system to supply data to TRAC/FACT system.
(2) Supplemental Type Certificate
STCA Short Term conflict Alert all alert or collision avoidance
data is to be provided in useable input data to the TRAC/FACT
robotics and RC flights programs and control stations.
STCM Stabilizer Trim Control Module to be SUC to TRAC/FACT
control
STD Standard
STP Standard Temperature and Pressure
STS Stable Time Subfield
STVS Small Tower Voice Switch
SUA Special Use Airspace there is to be declared SUA routes and
zones to and around safe bases for TRAC/FACT operations.
SUL Yaw Damper Actuator SUC and responsive in FACT robotics
flights.
SUO (1) Aileron/Elevator/Rudder Servo
(2) Servo Actuator the above 2 lines to be made an intricate part
of the Robotics control of an aircraft during a FACT event with the
controls and components protected.
Super-heterodyne Receiver A receiver in which the incoming RF
signal is mixed to produce a lower intermediate frequency, to be
used as applicable to provide enough frequency for the data
transfer by isolated channels in a TRAC/FACT application.
Suppressor A pulse used to disable L-band avionics during the pulse
transmitting period of another piece of L-band airborne equipment.
It prevents the other avionics aboard the aircraft from being
damaged or interfered with by the transmission and any noise
associated with that transmission the coordination of conflicting
transmission equipment on board the aircraft alleviated by having
and automated preprogrammed component in TRAC/FACT that quarries
for other L-band airborne equipment. And provides a suppressor
pulse or times equipment use.
SUT (1) Auto throttle Servo a component protected for FACT control
robotics flying and RC landing when available and installed when
not.
(2) Stabilizer Trim Servo same as above protected and SUC for
TRAC/FACT.
SV Space Vehicle to have PFN/TRAC units.
SVC Service special security protocols for TRAC/FACT systems and
components.
SVO Servo protected and SUC to TRAC processor and FACT
protocols
SVT Servo Throttle used in the FACT robotics flights and
landings
SVU Satellite Voice Unit
S/W Software
SYS System the 3 lines above applicable to TRAC/FACT technology and
detailed though out the filings.
T
TA Traffic Advisory issued by TRAC/FACT system and each unit will
be able to compare geographic position and elevation to be
responsive in real-time to relevant TA information.
TAC (1) Test Access Control the test port on all TRAC/FACT
equipment are ID access sensitive and protected against tampering
or disturbing crucial connected TRAC/FACT components.
(2) Thrust Asymmetry Compensation SUC to FACT robotics flights.
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation System Provides azimuth and distance
information to an aircraft from a fixed ground station (as opposed
to DME providing only distance information). This data to be used
by TRAC/FACT programming in robotics flight and landing and
software code written to use the data in concert with other
location and position and speed data source systems.
Tach Tachometer
TACIU Test Access Control Interface Unit a special connection and
ID access process must be provided for any TACIU to be used and
recognized by TRAC/FACT units and components as part of the
security protocol in place in FACT protected avionics.
TAG AEEC Technical Advisory Group to aid in the development and use
of TRAC/FACT technology and Protocols.
TAI Thermal Anti-Icing data sensed conditions data provided in
usable form for FACT robotics flight programming to deploy proper
counter measures.
Target An aircraft within the surveillance range of TCAS reported
to TRAC/FACT command control and the TRAC/FACT unit on board with
robotics being SUC to surface RC station controls--control to be
determined by individual aircraft and conditions.
TAS True Airspeed always converted for accuracy and compared with
surface calculations via GPS and any or all speed sensing
technology available on the aircraft and on the surface.
TAT (1) Total Air Temperature. The air temperature, including heat,
rise due to compressibility. To be equated and compensated for via
surface upload data and recalibration software algorithm in the
TRAC/FACT processor or sub-systems integrated in the earlier
generations.
(2) True Air Temperature determined as above in the same manner
recalibration software and protected temperature sensors.
TATCA Terminal Air Traffic Control Automation to be SUC to
TRAC/FACT command and control during FACT event and interfaced with
TRAC/FACT monitoring system to search for FACT Event flags.
TAU TAU is the minimum time a flight crew needs to discern a
collision threat and take evasive action. It represents the
performance envelope (speed and path of aircraft) divided by the
closure rate of any intruder aircraft (TCAS). TAU greatly reduced
with direct data fed to both aircraft TRAC/FACT systems and
aircraft diverted from each other in plenty of time as they are in
continual contact and electronically aware of their relative
positions robotics flight can control or shared coordinated
controls with dual human and machine control either airborne or
from the surface.
TBB Transfer Bus Breaker
TBD To Be Determined a great deal of TRAC/FACT system
configurations and protocols by OEMS avionics Manufacturers
standards groups, Nations government agencies and the public.
TBS To Be Supplied
TC Type Certificate
TCA Terminal Control Area there is to be a special Control area to
be set up a way from the Terminal with high security protocols and
personnel to physically handle TRAC events not yet air borne
TCAS Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System interfaced into the
TRAC/FACT system.
TCAS I A baseline system that provides a warning (TA) to the flight
crew of the presence of another aircraft (potential collision
threat) within the surveillance area. No avoidance maneuver is
suggested. interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TCAS II A collision avoidance system providing traffic information
(within approximately 30 nmi of the aircraft) to the flight crew,
in addition to the resolution advisories (RA) (for vertical
maneuvers only). A TCAS II equipped aircraft will coordinate with
TCAS II equipped intruder aircraft to provide complementary
maneuvers. interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TCC Turbine Case Cooling
TCCC Tower Control Computer Complex interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TCM Technical Coordination Meeting
TCS Touch Control Steering interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system
with local control eliminated.
TCXO Temperature Controlled Crystal Oscillator
TDLS Tower Data Link System interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TDM In the Time Division Multiplex Systems a common carrier is
shared to transmit multiple messages (to multiple receivers) by
time-sharing the carrier between the message sources. interfaced
into the TRAC/FACT system.
TDMA Time Division Multiplex Access. When multiple transmitters are
using a single carrier to transmit to a single receiver, the
carrier is time shared between each of the transmitters, so the
multiple messages are not garbled at the receiver. interfaced into
the TRAC/FACT system.
TDOP Time Dilution of Precision. A term used to describe the error
introduced by variances in the calculated time.
TDR Transponder interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system
TEC Thermo-Electric Cooler
TEI Text Element Identifiers interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TEMP Temperature
Temperature A sensor protruding into the air stream to sense
air.
Probe temperature. Requires correction to get static air
temperature. interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TERPS Terminal Instrument Procedures interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TF1 RTCA Task Force One, GNSS Transition and Implementation
Strategy interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TF2 RTCA Task Force Two, Transition to Digital Communications
TF3 RTCA Task Force Three, Free Flight Implementation interfaced
into the TRAC/FACT system.
TFM Traffic Flow Management interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TFM-ART TFM Architecture and Requirements Team interfaced into the
TRAC/FACT system.
TFT Thin Film Transistor
TG Transmission Gate
TGC Turbulence Gain Control interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
Threat A target that has satisfied the threat detection logic and
thus requires a traffic or resolution advisor y interfaced into the
TRAC/FACT system (TCAS).
TIS Traffic Information Service interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TK Track Angle interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TKE Track Angle Error
T/L Top-Level
TLA Thrust Lever Angle interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TLM Telemetry Word interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TLS Target Level of Safety interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TMA Terminal Airspace For SBs TRAC/FACT protected.
TMAC TFM Modeling and Analysis Capability.
TMC (1) Thrust Management Computer TRAC/FACT interfaced.
(2) RTCA Technical Management Committee For TRAC/FACT
implementation in every commercial company and government
agency.
TMCF Thrust Management Computer Function FACT programmed.
TMCS Thrust Management Computer System interfaced into the
TRAC/FACT system.
TMS Thrust Management System interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TMU Traffic Management Unit interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TO Take Off
TOC (1) Top of Climb
(2) Traffic Operations Center interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
(3) Transfer of Communication interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TOD Top Of Descent
TO/FROM Indicates whether the omni bearing selected is the
Indicator course to or from the VOR ground station.
TOGA Take-Off, Go-Around. Also seen as TO/GA. interfaced into the
TRAC/FACT system.
TOR Terms of Reference
Touchdown The point at which the predetermined glide path
interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system intercepts the runway.
TOW Time Of Week
TP Telecommunications Processor interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TPMU Tire Pressure Monitor Unit
TPR Transponder interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
TR Temporary Revision. A document printed on yellow paper that
temporarily amends a page or pages of a component maintenance
manual.
T/R (1) Thrust Reversers interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system.
(2) Transceiver (see RT)
(3) Receiver-Transmitter
TRA Temporary Reserved Airspace interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
TRAC Terminal Radar Approach Control interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
Track (1) The actual path, over the ground, traveled by an aircraft
(navigation).
(2) In this mode the DME transmits a reduced pulse pair rate after
acquiring lock-on (DME).
(3) Estimated position and velocity of a single aircraft based on
correlated surveillance data reports (TCAS). interfaced into the
TRAC/FACT system.
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control
Proprietary Name for PFN/TRAC System.TM. processor
TRAC Trusted Remote Activity Controller is the primary protected
communication and machine-messaging node in an aircraft.
Ultimately, a protected ASIC that performs accountable Robotics
flight/landing and interfaces Remote Control commands from a
TRAC/FACT command center. The PFN/TRAC unit in the aircraft also
interfaces with all wireless communications and can route
communications and data from the E/E system of the aircraft via any
interfaced RF protocol by a higher level software interface for
emergency communication via a Translator scan program running as
FACT software in the TRAC processor.
Return to avionics terms
TRACS Test and Repair Control System. An automated data retrieval
system. TRACS functions include: 1) provide the location of any
given unit at any time; 2) provide an efficient flow of work to and
from test stations; 3) provide quick access to quality information
generated by the actual testing process (performed by the
technician); (4) provide statistical and historical data regarding
throughput time for products, failure, yield rates, WIP, etc. TRACS
is an excellent system that should be incorporated and augmented to
provide FACT security protocols and testing wherever it is in use
for all the avionics sub systems interfaced in a TRAC/FACT
system.
Traffic Advisory Information given to the pilot pertaining to the
position of another aircraft in the immediate vicinity. The
information contains no suggested maneuvers. (Traffic advisory
airspace is 1200 feet above and below the aircraft and
approximately 45 seconds distant with respect to closure speed of
the aircraft).
[TCAS] This data provided these systems will be SUC to the
TRAC/FACT robotics running in the aircraft and should be used to
avoid collision in any robotics flight or RC scenario.
Traffic Density The number of transponder-equipped aircraft within
R nautical miles (nmi) of own aircraft, divided by p.times.(R
nmi)1/2. Transponder-equipped aircraft include Mode-S and ATCRBS
Mode A and Mode C, and excludes own aircraft (TCAS). Density air
traffic for any SB route crash zone or SB will be determined by
these different digital address transponders of area aircraft and
TRAC/FACT command and control will clear with standard FAA flight
control all unessential aircraft during a FACT event immediately
upon an alert.
Transceiver A receiver and transmitter combined in a single
unit.
Same as RT. To be SUC to TRAC/FACT unit
Transponder Avionics equipment that returns an identifying coded
signal. To be linked with TRAC/FACT system and the TRAC ASIC or sub
system interfaced capable of returning coded FACT signal back by
other wireless systems interfaced to TRAC/FACT command and control
centers on the surface.
TRK Track a major function of the TRAC/FACT monitoring system for
flight deviation.
TRP (1) Mode S Transponder all data link capability via
transponders or RF/wireless equipment will be interface with the
TRAC/FACT processor and scan communication router and be capable to
receive packetized data in a protocol they can handle.
(2) ARPA Technology Reinvestment Program
TRR Test Rejection and Repair
TRSB Time Reference Scanning Beam. The international standard for
MLS installations. This microwave landing beam should be evaluated
for landing applicably equipped aircraft for the guidance on the
glide path to the final approach and used in conjunction with the
TRAC/FACT robotics software and RC preprogrammed systems to land
the FACT event flight absent of local cockpit controls.
TRU Transformer Rectifier Unit uses as needed.
True Airspeed The true velocity of the aircraft through the
surrounding air mass. Data provided to the TRAC/FACT processor or
the sub systems accurately or for sub routine algorithms to factor
for accurate data for the robotics and RC programming.
True Altitude The exact distance above mean sea level (corrected
for temperature). Data provided to the TRAC/FACT processor or the
sub systems accurately or for sub routine algorithms to factor for
accurate data for the robotics and RC programming.
True Bearing The bearing of a ground station with respect to true
north. Data provided to the TRAC/FACT processor or the sub systems
accurately or for sub routine algorithms to factor for accurate
data for the robotics and RC programming.
True North The direction of the North Pole from the observer.
TSA Tail Strike Assembly
TSE Total System Error The TRAC/FACT integrity self test system
will provide any system failure/error/or incongruity to be
discovered--it will check for backup systems and the entire system
is to have redundancy in all critical flight functions with
designated compromised system states to Flag the TRAC/FACT system
as down with the TRAC unit securing all flight controls. Because of
the diversity of equipment these standards of certification will be
somewhat flexible. However, no aircraft should fly with out
ultimate control from the surface and control locks and
communications and controls in working order prior take off.
TSM Autothrottle Servo Mount (without Clutch) this system to be
controlled with the TRAC/FACT processor or sub systems SUC to FACT
for at least flight and landing.
TSO Technical Standard Order. Every unit built with a TSO nameplate
must meet TSO requirements. TSO operating temperature extremes are
not the same as the manufacturing burn-in limits. All data is to be
recorded and dated in the TRA/FACT processor as critical inventory
data as well as any inspections for defects or standard
maintenances--this data downloaded to buffers in the TRAC/FACT
command and control center to be factored in any event pertaining
to the host aircraft.
TTFF Time To First Fix calculated on board unit and reported to
FAA/FACT command control/owner/airline and matter of public web
presentation as appropriately determined information for
monitoring.
TTL Transistor--Transistor Logic all electronics used as
applicable.
TTR TCAS II Receiver/Transmitter Interfaced with TRAC/FACT
TTS Time To Station, an indication that displays the amount of time
for an aircraft to reach a selected DME ground station while
traveling at a constant speed. Obviously this system must be
capable of providing data in a usable format for the TRAC/FACT
processor or the sub systems SUC to TRAC would process the data for
FACT robotics. Probably a system like TTS would be along the FACT
safe flights corridors to confirm and control the robotics flight.
The exact equipment requirements for the robotics flight might well
be a series of ground stations encompassing position data ground to
space weather conditions and down loading and up loading to the
aircraft from these local markers and the FAA/FACT command control
center running a parallel software program to the FACT flight Event
underway in the protected adapted auto pilot or PFN/TRAC/FACT
processor. Additionally same data to escort assist aircraft and the
flight station simulator at the safe base. It becomes a complete
team effort with the best real-time control commanding the flight.
A combination of preprogrammed flying experience interfaced with
real human skill and a speed of transmission algorithm software
interface program to make the best real-time flight controls. As
the aircraft nears the final SB the flight controls will be at the
highest real-time responsiveness and may prove to be the best way
to land legacy aircraft with limited avionics other that the
mandatory flight controls.
TTY Teletypewriter recorded and interfaced as available for the
ultimate communications via the TRAC/FACT system. The software
program protocol send an electronic signal to type for TTY must be
SUC to FACT programming either if it is running in the TRAC
processor or some interface unit or as a sub system already in
existence.
TURB Turbulence
Turbulence The US National Weather Service defines light turbulence
as areas where wind velocity shifts are 0 to 19 feet per second (0
to 5.79 meters per second) and moderate turbulence as wind velocity
shifts of 19 to 35 feet per second (5.79 to 10.67 meters per
second). The above two terms. Sensing for turbulence in critical
areas for a FACT robotics Flight should have the appropriate
sensors in location and the national weather forecasters and
FAA/FACT system connected with the all weather reporting
satellites. Doppler and radar in and on the surface all should be
reporting in route atmospheric conditions as close to the elevation
that the FACT flight will be encountering prior to it happening for
real-time flight adjustments.
TVBC Turbine Vane and Blade Cooling
TVC Turbine Vane Cooling
TWDL Two Way Data Link to be interfaced as much as possible to the
on board TRAC/FACT system and SUC as much as possible to TRAC/FACT
processing.
TWIP Terminal Weather Information for Pilots Data available
electronically to the TRAC/FACT system to factor best robotics FACT
flight from the instant the plane is airborne, this is an on going
condition during flight until the aircraft in landed. The terminal
pilot data translated to an electrical data stream allow for the
aircraft to hot read GPS and other location technology on board and
plot the best course with known and projected flying conditions in
each individual aircraft. These FACT flights will be immediately
cleared by FAA flight control and handed off to FAA/FACT command
control with all the proper encoded signals for surface evaluation
and concurrence. Basically the TRAC/FACT flight computer is ready
to fly the plane in a nanosecond of a FACT event and knows exactly
what is around it and what has to do to go to the safe zone as fast
as possible.
TWP Technical Work Program Special for all TRAC/FACT components
TWT Traveling Wave Tube
TX Transmit (see XMIT) Fact monitored and controlled.
U
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter used and SUC to
TRAC/FACT system.
UAL United Airlines to be equipped with TRAC/FACT ASAP
UB Utility Bus Interfaced with the TRAC/FACT System, but the
TRAC/FACT system has to be able to energize the essential flight
and landing control component if the utility bus is compromised.
And the processor running FACT robotics has to be protected from
the utility bus being tampered with to disable the TRAC program.
The processor component if not a PFN/TRAC system unit must have
it's own emergency power source to operate the FACT programming and
necessary accessories.
UBI Uplink Block Identifier to be encrypted special for FACT
protocols.
UCS Uniform Chromaticity Scale
UD User Data. The N-User data may also be transferred between peer
network members (OSI Model) as required. The OSI and all interface
gateways to be evaluated by system and application for the FACT
data transfer for all IP and wireless connections and gateways. A
basic security evaluation may be in order and would make all
parties more comfortable. However FAA/FACT homeland security cannot
be compromised what so ever. For this reason as part of the
Homeland security teams affected agency representatives have to be
provided with full and complete security clearance over sensitive
agency data.
UFDR Universal Flight Data Recorder to be incorporated in to the
TRAC/FACT system and/or replaced.
UHF Ultra-High Frequency. The portion of the radio spectrum from
300 MHz to 3 GHz. Interfaced and used as needed with transmission
formatted in an encrypted FACT code as used.
ULB Underwater Locator Beacon
ULD Unit Load Device For software or programming to be done by
special FACT equipment and/or wirelessly by special FACT
transmission. Additionally, special tools and learns as unit load
devices to install and access the PFN/TRA/FACT unit and system.
Same install and uninstall special modules for software
applications.
UMT Universal Mount as much as possible but to be as secure and
tamper proof as possible for any TRAC/FACT component, unit or
interface.
Unpaired A DME channel without a corresponding VOR or ILS Channel
frequency.
Uplink The radio transmission path upward from the earth to the
aircraft. To be used in the precision FACT landing with data
presented to the program via sub systems in a format useable for
the program to factor and send commands to the appropriate
actuators to affect a proper landing. This includes activating
landing gear servomotors or solenoids on hydraulic systems at the
appropriate time for landing.
UPS Uninterruptible Power System all PFN/TRAC Systems units have
this quality as a standard component to be a PFN/TRAC unit. However
any first generation subsystems interfaced and carrying out FACT
programming must have redundant and protected power systems. They
are not to be interrupted locally by any means.
USAF United States Air Force or air national guard to deploy
members of the crew with pursuit aircraft to be a part of the
FAA/FACT command and control process. They will be both the strong
arm and the helping hand in the air. They will be scrambled from
strategic location and scattered to reach a trouble FACT flight
within 12 minutes--7 if a known high security risk and air cover is
being flown they will fly escort with an assist RC pilot and they
will have full capability to take the FACT EVENT aircraft out if
this un thinkable option is the only solution for the maximum of
public safety and/or national security. Additionally, as part of
the unthinkable, strategically place will SAMS under the FAA/FACT
command structure but manned by military (to be DOD determined). A
FACT event triggers a ground response from these SAMS/Patriot to
track/monitor and lock on. If the FACT flight is on the safe base
flight plan they just monitor the flight through their effective
range area and this is a continual process to the SB Landing. FACT
command has the trigger. The inventor is not trying to state the
type of ordinance to be use automated machine cannon or automated
anti-aircraft weapons (determined by DOD) Chase assist aircraft to
have a transponder recognized by the target selection process in
the weapon system to differentiate them from the troubled target
FACT Event aircraft.
If appropriate the Air force and military will be participating in
the safe flight and landing of the troubled aircraft and in the
construction maintenance and operation of the Safe Bases and safe
crash zones protected around the Safe Bases. They will also supply
much of the personnel to handle special opps in boarding the
aircraft as well as the best in police hostage and SWAT
teamwork--(to be determined by the best in these areas). Military
to also provide expertise in weapon disarming from explosives to
people.
The inventor retains a detailed set of writings and figures of the
US--showing areas that could be used for safe fly zones and as safe
bases to land at--they are not detailed in this paper for a number
of reasons. The inventor feels it is not his place to make those
statements in a possible public forum--he is willing at the
appropriate time to elaborate on his thoughts to the appropriate
authorities responsible for public safety and national
security.
USB Upper Sideband is the information-carrying band and is the
frequency produced by adding the carrier frequency and the
modulating frequency. USB RF will be used and formatted with FACT
protocols to handle data and ded dedicated as needed.
USGIC U.S.GPS Industry Council will be consulted and take part in
determining how to construct there equipment for direct Avionics
applications for TRAC/FACT procedures and protocols and to have
their locating receivers owned as personal products be interfaced
with the on board TRAC/FACT unit via DSRC and any other wireless to
be managed while on board an aircraft and used to provide
confirming location data. Additionally USGIC to aid in the FACT
flight path redundant markers to certify in real-time the validity
of a marker that is suppose to have a stationary address as a
tamper resistant measure.
USTB Unstabilized to be sensed by TRAC/FACT programming for FACT
event recorded and reported with all operating systems reporting
for analysis.
UTC Universal Coordinated Time to be used for TRAC/FACT operations
and stored on board and in FACT command and control centers as
usual.
UUT Unit Under Test will show in a display to qualified and
identified FACT team attendants at the units and any station
terminal or control panel. System video cameras and infrared
sensors and ID programming to quarry the persons present for
TRAC/FACT clearance before displaying data. Any tampering will be
recorded as needed for tampering snap shot to full video recorded
locally and reported to the FACT command and control center for
response.
UV Upper Sideband Voice all radio systems evaluated formatted and
SUC to FACT management.
UW Unique Word the use of encrypted commands and formatting special
and secure for FACT commands in each interfacing program.
V
V1 Critical engine failure velocity safe operational limits
preprogrammed into TRAC/FACT program and engine performance sensed
locally.
V2 Takeoff climb velocity preprogrammed in to flight robotics in
the future for future robotics flight. Safe operational parameters
for V2 for FACT monitoring for FACT event flags.
VA Volt-Amperes monitored for operational alerts by TRAC/FACT
system and for switching to TRAC/FACT power system.
VAC Volts AC Monitored
VAP Visual Aids Panel videoed and electronic format recorded and
reported for redundant storage.
VAPS (1) Virtual Avionics Prototyping System
(2) Virtual Applications Prototyping System these two to be used in
the development of the TRAC/FACT system and components and
incorporated in a proof tested form as a virtual RC simulation
pilot station operation and for total system practice to simulate a
FACT event for crew drills.
VAU Voltage Averaging Unit to be monitored by the TRAC/FACT system
and a final regulator and fuse able link protection to critical
TRAC/FACT components.
VBV Variable Bypass Valve controlled and monitored as deemed
critical to TRAC/FACT system of management.
VCCS Voice Communication Council System electronic translation
programs and voice recognition to run in TRAC/FACT aircraft with
universal (Eng) language. Additionally electronic data
communication link timed with voice communication to shadow and
verify message accuracy in the aircraft and on the surface This
message protocol should be part of an emergency message protocol
developed for cross communication via different wireless protocols
interfaced and processed in the TRAC translation scan portion of
the PFN/TRAC/FACT unit. It can be further encrypted for FACT
command controls.
VCD (1) Voltage Controlled Device
(2) Variable Capacitance Diode
VCO Variable Controlled Oscillator
VDC Volts Direct Current the 4 electrical component lines above
will be SUC to TRAC/FACT systems as their application is critical
to flight control and accountability in real-time. Either, directly
connected or by interfacing with controllers, sub-systems or
electrical bus in the appropriate FACT manner to insure
uninterrupted service during a FACT event.
VDL VHF Data Link will be used to handle audio/video and large
quantity of compressed digital telemetry data in to short packets
from aircraft to surface gateway & data repositories for
TRAC/FACT control command centers. Priority screening for data
transmitted progression will be controlled in real-time by the FACT
event software able to quarry the appropriate systems and/organize
the transmission. This is done in both directions and timed
universally by constant satellite timing. Actual frequencies will
be determined by industry standard efforts and FAA and FCC approval
and dedication.
VDOP Vertical Dilution of Precision monitored and compensated by
appropriate sub-systems with alert flags for out of acceptable
parameters possible FACT trigger.
VDR VHF Data Radio
Vertical Speed The rate of change of pressure altitude, usually
calibrated in hundreds of feet per minute. Transduced to a format
for the TRAC/FACT program to monitor rate of clime for FACT event
flags.
VFO Variable Frequency Oscillator FACT implementations to be
determined by application and system placement.
VFOP Visual Flight Rules Operations Panel Videoed and electronic
signal stored.
VFR Visual Flight Rules To be equated as an electronic signal on
board the aircraft via flight cams/night vision/radar equivalents
factored by a software algorithm and configured as per visual
flight rule requirements to be used in human machine interface
applications to create virtual flight for real-time FACT event
aircraft in simulator and monitoring screens. Also possible use for
local pilot help if trusted Pilot determined. And additionally
employed for Robotics via data formatted for FACT program to manage
the Flight controls more responsive to real-time obstacles in the
flight path.
REMINDER NOTE: On addressing terms. Bold face comments are made to
define and teach the PFN/TRAC/FACT system not to further any base
understanding of terms and acronyms listed and defined in small
print. They are used to stimulate dialog and understanding to how
this machine-messaging network interfaces all machinery equipment
and vehicles for aviation with surface management and
transportation.
Understandably VFR rules refer to flight conditions and not
normally used by automated landing systems. They refer to pilots
rather than an ILS landing. However as time goes on the robotics
and RC assist systems will be better able to assist compromised
pilots or limited skilled pilots (possible JFK Jr. scenario) if
this proper software has been developed for even good and clear
flying conditions. Obviously, it is needed for FACT event flight
and landings at SB ASAP. This paper is dedicated to employing all
the elements that make up aviation flying and conditions for FACT
rather than local pilot to control and deal with in a real-time
instant.
VHF Very High Frequency. The portion of the radio spectrum from 30
to 300 MHz. To be used as detailed and needed for TRAC/FACT
applications with local control managed by FACT protocols.
VHS Very High Speed
VHSIC-2 Very High Speed Integrated Circuits--phase 2 These 2 above
will be employed as much as possible and be an ongoing work in
progress and better speeds are available. Always the fastest data
speeds are given to real-time flight controls in processing and
communications.
VIGV Variable Integral Guide Vane
VISTA Virtual Integrated Software Test bed for Avionics to be used
to test interfaces and sub system integration and design for new
ASICs to be TRAC/FACT units in avionics.
VIU Video Interface Unit will be expanded with dedicated circuitry
and data handling for critical FACT event data. Special for cockpit
applications, cabin surveillance and TRAC/FACT systems security and
aircraft integrity. Separate but equally secure Flight Cams. With
less secure multi-media systems for passenger entertainment.
However all systems to be useable by FACT robotics and FAA/FACT
homeland security. Possibly hardware Protocols like DES and FACT
software.
V/L VOR/Localizer used as detailed for FACT flights and
landing.
VLSI Very Large Scale Integration a TRAC FACT constant.
VLV Valve
V/M Voltmeter
Vmo The maximum airspeed at which an aircraft is certified to
operate. This can be a fixed number or a function of configuration
(gear, flaps, etc.) or altitude, or both. Vmo to be factored in to
FACT program and used as a FACT event flag if appropriate.
VNAV Vertical Navigation monitored and Managed by FACT programming
as needed.
VNR VHF Navigation Receiver used as needed and data factored into
the robotics FACT flight and landing programs.
Voispond A causal function that would automatically identify an
aircraft by a voice recording. Voispond is not yet implemented. To
be used as detailed in this paper as a FACT identity protocol.
VOR VHF Omni-directional Radio Range. A system that provides
bearing information to an aircraft.
VOR/DME A system in which a VOR and DME station are co-located.
VOR/MB VOR/marker beacon.
VORTAC A system in which a VOR and a TACAN station are co located.
The 4 terms above are all to be used by FACT programming as needed
to best out fit each avionics system per each aircraft. Ideally the
best systems will be universally made more available for legacy
aircraft.
VOS Velocity Of Sound
VOX Voice Transmission Recorded and reported on the surface and
throughout the aircraft.
VPN Vendor Part Number to be recorded and reported in the FACT
registry for each aircraft that it is interfaced with.
VR Takeoff Rotation Velocity monitored and recorded.
VRAM Video Random Access Memory all necessary application software
and drivers to be redundant in the TRAC/FACT system in isolate
RAM.
VS Vertical Speed monitored and Factored by FACT for event robotics
implementation.
VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal.
VSCF Variable Speed Constant Frequency to be determined by
application for FACT transmissions.
VSCS Voice Switching and Control System managed by TRAC/FACT event
programming and the surface control.
VSI Vertical Speed Indicator data formatted for the Fact program
and TRAC process and recorded and reported to surface FACT
system.
VSL Advisory Vertical Speed Limit advisory may be preventive or
corrective (TCAS). All such conditions and over speed scenarios to
have preventative parameters stored in the FACT software and the
system to monitor and factor for FACT response.
VSM Vertical Separation Minimum for rotor wing aircraft and for all
aircraft safe position parameters for operation to be programmed in
to the Fact program for flight assistance as robotics flight
becomes most reliable. Presently, for normal FACT flight
exaggerated minimums.
VSV Variable Station Vane.
VSWR Voltage-Standing Wave Ratio. The ratio of the amplitude of the
voltage (or electric field) at a voltage maximum to that of an
adjacent voltage minimum. Vswr is a measurement of the mismatch
between the load and the transmission line. To provide trouble
alerts to FACT system with software diagnosing problematic cause
e.g. tampering or service failure prompting proper response
real-time automated augmentation to include substitution if needed
and personnel dispatched to further remedy the difficulty.
VTO Volumetric Top-Off.
VTOL Vertical Takeoff and Landing monitored and managed as
application specific for helicopters, pogos of old and ospreys if
the military implement with DED and DET most likely.
W
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System (Method of Differential GPS) to
be used in the location and tracking of a FACT event access via the
communication link established from the airborne TRAC/FACT unit and
transponders.
WADGNSS Wide Area Differential Global Navigation Satellite
System.
WADGPS Wide Area DGPS o be used in the location and tracking of a
FACT event access via the communication link established from the
airborne TRAC/FACT unit and transponders.
WADGNSS Wide Area Differential Global Navigation Satellite be used
in the location and tracking of a FACT event access via the
communication link established from the airborne TRAC/FACT unit and
transponders.
WAFS World Area Forecast System interfaced with TRAC/FACT system
and data available formatted for immediate application with the
TRAC/FACT system command and control and regionally relevant
provided to the TRAC/FACT unit performing FACT flight.
WAI Wing Anti-Ice SUC to TRAC/FACT--with FACT having sensor data
for wing ice condition and deployed as needed in the TRAC FACT
flight.
WARC-92 World Administrative Radio Conference (1992).
WARC-MOB World Administrative Radio Conference for the Mobile.
Service the 2 above to take part in as much as they are active in
the determination of standard frequency and RF protocols.
Waypoint A position along a route of flight. Will be used as stated
earlier in the robotics FACT flight via these transmissions
especially formatted for processing for this purpose both in the
aircraft and via the surface matrix.
WCP WXR Control Panels videoed and recorded and reported.
WD Wind Direction always sensed, recorded, reported, and used in
the Flight maintenance.
WES Warning Electronic System interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
WEU Warning Electronic Unit interfaced into the TRAC/FACT
system.
WFA WXR Flat Plate Antenna
WGS World Geodetic System
WGS-72 World Geodetic Survey of 1972
WGS-84 World Geodetic System 1984 The 3 above used as relevant for
robotics flights and to determine safe flight paths to the SBs.
Whisper--Shout A sequence of ATCRBS interrogations and suppressions
of varying power levels transmitted by TCAS equipment to reduce
severity of synchronous interference and multi-path problems. To be
used in the current applications but the data formatted for the
TRAC/FACT system.
WIP Work In Progress PFN/TRAC/FACT System
WMA WXR Antenna Pedestal & WXR Wave guide Adapter
WMI WXR Indicator Mount
WMS Wide-area Master Station will be employed in the navigation
programs and communications for FACT monitoring and management as
need be.
WMT WXR Mount
WN Week Number
WORD Grouping of bits. Size of group varies from microprocessor to
microprocessor. Will be used as appropriate in the TRAC
processor/FACT programs the interface software to all necessary sub
system microprocessors or controllers
WOW Weight On Wheels as sensed in the aircraft to be transmitted to
the TRAC/FACT processor on board and to the TRAC/FACT surface
computers to check for abnormalities. A section of the taxiway to
be set with a scale mechanism weighing those aircraft not having
weight sensor and software algorithm to determine total aircraft
weight. These records are stored on board the aircraft and in the
FACT Mass data storage and factored by FACT programs for a FACT
flag event (criterion to be determined and application to be
determined as meaningful or discernable data per aircraft
type).
Additionally, fuel and ship, store weights, Baggage plus shipping
weights and people carry on weights could be measured and added to
TAR weight value of the aircraft each receiving inspection weighed
in and entered electronically into the FACT system. This record
used to create traveling weight profiles for aircraft type, route
weights all sensitive to time of year activities which may be used
to project wear and tear on aircraft with flight conditions
recorded during all flights for early safety checks on structural
components and for transportation management through out the air
and surface systems.
WP Working Paper to be a continual process, however this procedure
needs to be put in place for the use of TRA/FACT documentation even
in the earliest form. This final development of the specific
systems in an aircraft to be FACT worthy may need to be handled
with certain security measures in place. A FAA/FACT homeland
security group on Technology security should determine this.
Obviously, all specific code writing (encrypted) software needs the
highest security, but even for how existing COTS are used needs
some security.
WPT Waypoint used in TRAC/FACT flights to monitor for an event and
to manage any SB point. The type of technology used may vary at
first but the tracking function must be redundant both in the
TRAC/FACT system in the aircraft and on the surface. As time passes
the best combination or best technology that can be
secured/protected and provide consistent redundant and reliable
service may be consolidated and integrated as an ASIC-SOC for a
PFN/TRAC/FACT set of markers. Ideally, universal use and
interfacing improves efficiency and cost effectiveness. However,
any and all operating systems performing way point location
functions or aircraft tracking must be configure to interface with
FACT or FACT will run a sub routine to use their formatted data.
Hopefully all technologies and commercial interest will want to
interface with the TRAC/FACT System the way FAA/FACT home land
security determines best for safe secure control in the system data
management.
WRC World Radio communication Conference--Conferences organization
will meet to determine area standards and global standards in
frequency and for procedures to be incorporated in to computer and
automated protocols for real-time application with some uniform
consistency. At least this should be the goal. As much as possible
the use of TRAC should be uniform around the world and respectful
of individual rights with greater public safety in transportation.
Due to national cultural/religious differences the implementation
of TRAC/FACT will vary to some degree. It would be possible for
automated stored FACT programs to monitor for different maybe
unfair FACT Events and to use different ded dedicated frequencies
for conducting FACT procedures and protocols in an airspace over a
particular area. The inventor hopes through WRC and other industry
organizations and national government agencies cooperating that the
same frequencies will be used around the world generally and that
FACT procedures and protocols to determine an event and any course
of action become universal with good respect for human rights as
mentioned above.
WRS Wide-area Reference Station all systems used for tracking
aircraft will be used as needed in the TRAC/FACT system by first
formatting data to be synthesized and factored by running programs
and sub routines in the FACT operation.
WRT WXR Receiver/Transmitter all such devices are to be interfaced
with the TRAC/FACT system with identifiers.
WWW Internet World Wide Web IP connections and WWW communication
link in flight is part of the in flight systems connected to the
TRAC/FACT management system on board. This is a recent area of
commercial infringement on TRAC proprietary technology that should
be interfaced with FACT event control during a WoJack event or any
FACT event. It is also another system that must be a sub system to
the TRAC process. Additionally all data on aircraft location,
performance and impact on the environment should be handled by FACT
and presented on public web pages on the WWW. This is another
proprietary function of the PFN/TRAC system.
WX Weather
WXI WXR Indicator
WXP Weather Radar Panel
WXR Weather Radar System the 2 above all crucial weather data timed
and positioned is to be delivered via useable data streams to the
FACT program and the FAA/FACT command control center for monitoring
and mid flight course corrections as well as RC landings.
WYPT Waypoint Altitude all way points should be monitored by
TRAC/FACT for deviation and FACT event flag (altitude) but used as
crucial sensed events in the robotics flight of the aircraft.
X
X-BAND Channel The frequency range between 8000 and 12500 MHzX-A
DME channel. There are 126 X-Channels for DME operation. For the
first 63 channels, the ground-to-air frequency is 63 MHz below the
air-to-ground frequency. For the second 63 X-channels the
ground-to-air frequency is 63 MHz above the air-to-ground
frequency. These above communications have to be completely
controlled from FACT command control central handling a FACT event
on board the compromised aircraft. The TRAC processor also can use
all the frequencies available in its automated contact to the
surface. However, all local communication switching must be locked
out from local control. And the aircraft monitored for any
unauthorized transmissions.
X.25 Packet Switched Data Network X.25 to be used for TRAC/FACT
data and Communication Link for robotics and remote control.
XCVR Transceiver interfaced into the TRAC/FACT system on board and
on the surface.
XFR Transfer
XLTR Translator XLTR unit will be part of the TRAC process to scan
different communication protocols and transfer emergency messages
via any communication link interfaced with a TRAC system.
XM External Master
XMIT Transmit
XMTR Transmitter on board all interfaced, surrounding area
monitored by TRAC/FACT RF scan system.
XPD ATC Transponder (also XPDR, XPNDR, TPR) data interfaced into
the TRAC/FACT system in helping to monitor flights for FACT events
and to fly and land them via FACT robotics programs and RC flight
commands.
XPDR Transponder to be protected from in flight tampering and RF
incorporated in creating the PFN/TRAC unit in aircraft.
Y
Yagi Antenna An antenna with its maximum radiation parallel to the
long axis of its array, consisting of a driven dipole, a parasitic
dipole reflector, and one parasitic dipole director or more.
YSAS Yaw Stability Augmentation System sub-system to TRAC/FACT.
YD Yaw Damper automated for TRAC/FACT flight SUC to FACT.
Z
Z Refer to reflectivity factor.
ZFW Zero Fuel Weight. TRAC/FACT on board system will have the
capability to dump fuel in the Hi Jack event as part of the first
line of TRAC/FACT defense options, and to dump it along a Safe fly
crash zone where hazmat surface teams are activated to evacuate,
initiate preplanned protective measures and deal appropriately with
such an in flight fuel dump if over land (SEA response?).
Additionally, a compressed flame retardant possibly CO2 should be
released in the evacuated areas of the fuel tanks to suppress
remaining fuel ignitions--(possibly some expandable flame retardant
gel or O2 absorbent foam as another possible tank filler or a
solvent solution that reduces fuel to be flammable) Final Approach
to SB controlled crash/landing zone with all flame suppression
measures employed on the ground. NOTE: Absolute Emergency Fuel dump
requires tanks to be empted in 30 sec while simultaneously filled
with anti inflame ant. Triggered by a confirmed collision
(robotically determined by PFN/TRAC/FACT matrix or FAA/FACT command
surface control center. This is a definite collision response and
the fuel dump insures flight termination with the least incendiary
contribution to accident fires. Not a good option, hopefully not a
necessary one.
Z-Marker A marker beacon, sometimes referred to as a station
locator that provides positive identification to the pilot when the
aircraft is passing directly over a low frequency navigation aid.
Z-Markers will be used on a ded TRAC/FACT frequency. However the
protected FACT program must be capable of out thinking the bad guy.
This means that all location data is used by TRAC/FACT programming
and all forms of communication. Code and sub programs have to be as
deeply written, as there are accessory options on any specific
aircraft. For example the FACT program must be capable of
processing GPS, dead reckoning, all the marker frequencies,
Lorands, automated RF triangulation, use any location data from
cellular phone protocols and contact TRAC/FACT command and control
center via all RF equipment interfaced via wireless gate ways to IP
internet/intranet direct connect confirm and coordinate all data
available. The objective is to develop a mindful machine in the
aircraft that moves at the speed of electricity or light from local
computer generated decisions to surface override commands. It is
suggested as an ultimate security measure that FACT code and
encryption always be subject to the Chief Executive's order, the
president of the US for the US must have total override and have
the same security procedure as those held for nuclear weapons along
with the same backup procedures.
Special Z-Markers will be along the SB routes to SBs with physical
security and electronic integrity checks through the system.
(Frequency to be determined and encrypted coordinates as well as an
integrated local GPS sealed back up to sense any unauthorized
movement of the RF unit. Ultimately this should be an application
specific PFN/TRAC Z-marker unit. Additionally, system integrity
checks between Marker and FACT command control and security/service
check schedule.
Summary
The PFN/TRAC technology provides the capacity to organize, record,
report, relay and control data and equipment through a large
machine messaging matrix, by either sharing or replacing local and
standard Human Machine Interfacing HMI with accountable robotics
and/or remote control. This patent filing deals with transportation
and specifically avionics and air travel.
The following are basic terms and definitions used for this
invention: The PFN is a Protected Primary Focal Node (an
accountable telematics interface unit and communication router. The
PFN contains TRAC a Trusted Remote Activity Controller to perform
accountable & reliable robotics and remote control. FACT stands
for Federal Access and Control Technology. RC=Remote Control,
WoJack=War ops and Jack is taken from hi jacking. TRUSTED for this
invention means; reliable, accountable, and Acceptable to all the
public (the citizens, government, and commerce).
Of particular value right now, TRAC technology can be embedded into
aircraft (at the design stage or after-market) and perform
accountable functions for the purpose of gaining control and
stopping the unauthorized or unsafe use of an aircraft. Known as
the PFN/TRAC SysteMTM, the architecture utilizes existing
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) aircraft technology to create the
automated controls for robotics flight and remote controlled
landings absent any human (local) to pilot the aircraft.
However, in a hijacking the lack of flying skill is not the only
concern. The aircraft might well be commandeered and deliberately
used and guided for it's destructive potential (e.g. a human guided
missile into the WTC). In this scenario it is necessary to restrict
the local flying controls immediately. For fly by wire controls the
conversion to exclude a local pilot on board the aircraft can be
achieved far faster than those aircraft still using physical links.
Total hydraulic systems and hydraulic assist systems can be
converted to exclude local controls easer than physical link
systems, but still more difficult than fly by wire systems. Systems
and modalities for physical lockouts on human controls and the
automation of those controls is taught in prior related filings so
that anyone skilled in the art (engineers) can shop up the
necessary devices to construct a protect an RC capable or robotics
flight aircraft.
The initial goal after eliminating local control is to stabilize
the planes flight path. This second objective is accomplished via
robotics (for better real-time responsiveness) in flying the plane
to a Safe Base This control protocol PFN/TRAC System is secured and
secluded onboard with preprogrammed software (5 preprogrammed
flight plans available to TRAC processor) The TRAC processor is
interfaced with the essential E/E system bus to operate the planes
flight control surfaces to guide it to the best location emergency
response specific safe base. All available location systems and
communication systems are interfaced with the TRAC processor.
Additional controls interfaced with PFN/TRAC are to be the cabin
and cockpit air pressure controller to restrict any air exhausted
from the aircraft by either routing the air through carbon dioxide
scrubbers/converters, as well as adding fresh air. The removed and
compressed atmosphere is canned. This un-recyclable air or waste
air is then presented to a sensor array to detect biohazards and
toxins. Once transducers have converted any molecular substance to
an electrical signature, the signal is analyzed for recognition by
the TRAC system software library, recorded and reported to the
surface by any secure on board TRAC unit for the surface Safe Base
system to prescribe the appropriate safe base response to the
troubled landing craft. Informed decisions to determine whether to
terminate it bag it, sterilize it or how to unseal it on the
ground). Also, connected to the ventilation system the TRAC
processor controls a valve with debilitating gas (sleep gas or
chloroform) that can be activated from the ground or robotically
for what is termed a WoJack scenario or FACT protocol.
During the final approach to the designated safe base landing zone
the robotics flight and glide path control does a hand off to a
Remote Control RC pilot in a surfaced based converted flight
simulator receiving secure and redundant essential data streams via
a protected communication system with the greatest real-time
responsiveness of the aircraft heightened by a guardian software
algorithm. The result is an intelligent airplane with an
accountable autopilot and a Remote Control RC pilot.
Abhorrent RC Accessory Options
TRAC will have the ability to dump any fuel from a remote location
or as a robotics function another option that must be reviewed, but
can be available. Obviously, the PFN/TRAC system could perform all
these undesirable functions as well; including the ultimate
destruction of the aircraft. The proper Decision Tree protocol has
to be determined ahead a time by all the public for these emergency
FACT scenarios. PFN/TRAC was created to improve public safety; the
quality of human life and to save lives in transportation, e.g. A
detected FACT/WoJack flagged event with no ground or robotics
control may well result in a forced destruction of the FACT event
aircraft. But at least we are progressing options to save more
lives through technical advancement, both through better management
of our equipment and through an increase communication with each
other and our machines.
* * * * *