U.S. patent number 10,747,905 [Application Number 15/632,247] was granted by the patent office on 2020-08-18 for enclave ring and pair topologies.
This patent grant is currently assigned to Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. The grantee listed for this patent is Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. Invention is credited to John Marley Gray.
United States Patent |
10,747,905 |
Gray |
August 18, 2020 |
Enclave ring and pair topologies
Abstract
In one example, a first enclave for use by a first counterparty
to a smart contract is identified. A second enclave for use by a
second counterparty to the smart contract may be identified.
Secrets associated with the first counterparty to the first enclave
may be caused to be securely provided. Secrets associated with the
second counterparty to the second enclave may be caused to be
securely provided. A cryptlet is caused to be provided to the first
enclave. The cryptlet may be caused to be provided to the second
enclave. A payload is received from the first enclave. A payload
may be received from the second enclave. Validation may be caused
to be performed for a plurality of payloads. The plurality of
payloads may include the payload from the first enclave and the
payload from the second enclave.
Inventors: |
Gray; John Marley (Snoqualmie,
WA) |
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC |
Redmond |
WA |
US |
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Assignee: |
Microsoft Technology Licensing,
LLC (Redmond, WA)
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Family
ID: |
64097322 |
Appl.
No.: |
15/632,247 |
Filed: |
June 23, 2017 |
Prior Publication Data
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Document
Identifier |
Publication Date |
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US 20180330125 A1 |
Nov 15, 2018 |
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Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
Issue Date |
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62505038 |
May 11, 2017 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
1/1 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L
9/14 (20130101); H04L 9/3236 (20130101); H04L
9/32 (20130101); G06Q 20/065 (20130101); G06F
21/53 (20130101); G06F 21/72 (20130101); H04L
9/085 (20130101); H04L 9/3255 (20130101); G06F
21/602 (20130101); G06F 21/74 (20130101); H04L
63/12 (20130101); G06F 21/51 (20130101); H04L
9/3221 (20130101); H04L 9/0894 (20130101); H04L
2209/38 (20130101); H04L 2209/56 (20130101) |
Current International
Class: |
G06F
21/72 (20130101); H04L 9/32 (20060101); H04L
29/06 (20060101); G06F 21/74 (20130101); G06Q
20/06 (20120101); G06F 21/51 (20130101); G06F
21/53 (20130101); H04L 9/14 (20060101); G06F
21/60 (20130101); H04L 9/08 (20060101) |
References Cited
[Referenced By]
U.S. Patent Documents
Foreign Patent Documents
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2008113425 |
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Sep 2008 |
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WO |
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2013011263 |
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Jan 2013 |
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WO |
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2014105914 |
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Jul 2014 |
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WO |
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2016020465 |
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Feb 2016 |
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WO |
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2017007725 |
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Jan 2017 |
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WO |
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2018090012 |
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May 2018 |
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WO |
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Primary Examiner: Khan; Sher A
Attorney, Agent or Firm: Chin; David Chin IP, PLLC
Parent Case Text
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION(S)
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application
No. 62/505,038, filed May 11, 2017. The entirety of this
aforementioned application is incorporated herein by reference.
Claims
I claim:
1. An apparatus, comprising: a device including at least one memory
adapted to store run-time data for the device, and at least one
processor that is adapted to execute processor-executable code
that, in response to execution, enables the device to perform
actions, including: identifying a first enclave for use by a first
counterparty to a smart contract; identifying a second enclave for
use by a second counterparty to the smart contract; causing secrets
associated with the first counterparty to be securely provided to
the first enclave; causing secrets associated with the second
counterparty to be securely provided to the second enclave; causing
a cryptlet to be provided to the first enclave; causing the
cryptlet to be provided to the second enclave; receiving a payload
from the first enclave; receiving a payload from the second
enclave; and causing validation to be performed for a plurality of
payloads, wherein the plurality of payloads includes the payload
from the first enclave and the payload from the second enclave.
2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the validation for the
plurality of payloads further includes performing a consensus
process.
3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the secrets associated with
the first counterparty include a private user key for the first
counterparty, and wherein the secrets associated with the second
counterparty include a private user key for the second
counterparty.
4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the secrets associated with
the first counterparty include at least one contract term.
5. The apparatus of claim 1, the actions further including: if the
validation of the plurality of payloads is unsuccessful, issuing a
re-compute command to each enclave for which the payload of the
enclave did not validate.
6. The apparatus of claim 1, the actions further including:
identifying a third enclave for use by a third counterparty to a
smart contract; causing secrets associated with the third
counterparty to be securely provided to the third enclave; causing
the cryptlet to be provided to the third enclave; and receiving a
payload from the third enclave, wherein the plurality of payloads
further includes the payload from the third enclave.
7. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein each payload of the plurality
of payloads is encrypted with a ring signature.
8. The apparatus of claim 6, the actions further including:
fetching a cryptlet binding for the first enclave, wherein the
cryptlet binding is configured for a ring topology of enclaves;
fetching a cryptlet binding for the second enclave, wherein the
cryptlet binding is configured for a ring topology of enclaves; and
fetching a cryptlet binding for the third enclave, wherein the
cryptlet binding is configured for a ring topology of enclaves.
9. A method, comprising: causing secrets associated with a first
counterparty to a smart contract to be securely sent to a first
enclave; causing secrets associated with a second counterparty to
the smart contract to be securely sent to a second enclave; causing
a cryptlet to be provided to the first enclave; causing the
cryptlet to be provided to the second enclave; and causing
validation to be performed for a plurality of payloads, wherein the
plurality of payloads includes a payload provided by a first
enclave and a payload provided by a second enclave.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the validation for the plurality
of payloads further includes performing a consensus process.
11. The method of claim 9, wherein the secrets associated with the
first counterparty include a private user key for the first
counterparty, and wherein the secrets associated with the second
counterparty include a private user key for the second
counterparty.
12. The method of claim 9, further comprising: causing secrets
associated with the third counterparty to be securely sent to a
third enclave; and causing the cryptlet to be provided to the third
enclave, wherein the plurality of payloads further includes the
payload from the third enclave.
13. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein each payload of the
plurality of payloads is encrypted with a ring signature.
14. The method of claim 12, further comprising: fetching a cryptlet
binding for the first enclave, wherein the cryptlet binding is
configured for a ring topology of enclaves; fetching a cryptlet
binding for the second enclave, wherein the cryptlet binding is
configured for a ring topology of enclaves; and fetching a cryptlet
binding for the third enclave, wherein the cryptlet binding is
configured for a ring topology of enclaves.
15. A processor-readable storage medium, having stored thereon
processor-executable code that, upon execution by at least one
processor, enables actions, comprising: causing secret information
associated with a first counterparty to be securely provided to a
first enclave; causing secret information associated with a second
counterparty to be securely provided to a second enclave; causing a
cryptlet to be sent to the first enclave; causing the cryptlet to
be sent to the second enclave such that execution logic performed
by the first enclave is identical to execution logic performed by
the second enclave; and causing validation to be performed for a
plurality of payloads, wherein the plurality of payloads includes a
payload provided by a first enclave and a payload provided by a
second enclave.
16. The processor-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the
validation for the plurality of payloads further includes
performing a consensus process.
17. The processor-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the
secret information associated with the first counterparty includes
a private user key for the first counterparty, and wherein the
secret information associated with the second counterparty includes
a private user key for the second counterparty.
18. The processor-readable storage medium of claim 15, the actions
further comprising: causing secret information associated with the
third counterparty to be securely provided to the third enclave;
causing the cryptlet to be provided to the third enclave, wherein
the plurality of payloads further includes the payload from the
third enclave.
19. The processor-readable storage medium of claim 18, wherein each
payload of the plurality of payloads is encrypted with a ring
signature.
20. The processor-readable storage medium of claim 18, the actions
further comprising: fetching a cryptlet binding for the first
enclave, wherein the cryptlet binding is configured for a ring
topology of enclaves; fetching a cryptlet binding for the second
enclave, wherein the cryptlet binding is configured for a ring
topology of enclaves; and fetching a cryptlet binding for the third
enclave, wherein the cryptlet binding is configured for a ring
topology of enclaves.
Description
BACKGROUND
Blockchain systems have been proposed for a variety of application
scenarios, including applications in the financial industry, health
care, IoT, and so forth. For example, the Bitcoin system was
developed to allow electronic cash to be transferred directly from
one party to another without going through a financial institution.
A bitcoin (e.g., an electronic coin) is represented by a chain of
transactions that transfers ownership from one party to another
party. To transfer ownership of a bitcoin, a new transaction may be
generated and added to a stack of transactions in a block. The new
transaction, which includes the public key of the new owner, may be
digitally signed by the owner with the owner's private key to
transfer ownership to the new owner as represented by the new owner
public key.
Once the block is full, the block may be "capped" with a block
header that is a hash digest of all the transaction identifiers
within the block. The block header may be recorded as the first
transaction in the next block in the chain, creating a mathematical
hierarchy called a "blockchain." To verify the current owner, the
blockchain of transactions can be followed to verify each
transaction from the first transaction to the last transaction. The
new owner need only have the private key that matches the public
key of the transaction that transferred the bitcoin. The blockchain
may create a mathematical proof of ownership in an entity
represented by a security identity (e.g., a public key), which in
the case of the bitcoin system is pseudo-anonymous.
SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE
This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a
simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed
Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features
or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it
intended to be used to limit the scope of the claimed subject
matter.
Briefly stated, the disclosed technology is generally directed to
secure transactions. In one example of the technology, a first
enclave for use by a first counterparty to a smart contract is
identified. A second enclave for use by a second counterparty to
the smart contract may be identified. Secrets associated with the
first counterparty to the first enclave may be caused to be
securely provided. Secrets associated with the second counterparty
to the second enclave may be caused to be securely provided. A
cryptlet is caused to be provided to the first enclave. The
cryptlet may be caused to be provided to the second enclave. A
payload is received from the first enclave. A payload may be
received from the second enclave. Validation may be caused to be
performed for a plurality of payloads. The plurality of payloads
may include the payload from the first enclave and the payload from
the second enclave.
Cryptlets may be installed and registered by the cryptlet fabric.
Cryptlets may perform advanced, proprietary, private execution with
secrets kept from counterparties, such as private keys or different
variable values for counterparties that should not be shared, e.g.,
terms and prices. In this case, more than one instance of a
cryptlet may be used in order to keep secrets (keys, terms) in
separate secure address spaces, to provide isolation, and for
privacy encryption schemes like ring or threshold encryption
schemes for storing shared secrets on the blockchain. In some
examples, cryptlets each running the same logic in a separate
enclave that are hosting secrets for a single counterparty in a
multi-counterparty smart contract runs in a pair for two
counterparties or a ring with more than two counterparties. In some
examples, the cryptlets running in a pair or a ring perform the
same execution logic, with different cryptographic keys for signing
or secret parameters not shared with others.
Other aspects of and applications for the disclosed technology will
be appreciated upon reading and understanding the attached figures
and description.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Non-limiting and non-exhaustive examples of the present disclosure
are described with reference to the following drawings. In the
drawings, like reference numerals refer to like parts throughout
the various figures unless otherwise specified. These drawings are
not necessarily drawn to scale.
For a better understanding of the present disclosure, reference
will be made to the following Detailed Description, which is to be
read in association with the accompanying drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a suitable
environment in which aspects of the technology may be employed;
FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a suitable
computing device according to aspects of the disclosed
technology;
FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a system;
FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating an example of the system of
FIG. 3; and
FIGS. 5A-5B are an example dataflow for a process, in accordance
with aspects of the present disclosure.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The following description provides specific details for a thorough
understanding of, and enabling description for, various examples of
the technology. One skilled in the art will understand that the
technology may be practiced without many of these details. In some
instances, well-known structures and functions have not been shown
or described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the
description of examples of the technology. It is intended that the
terminology used in this disclosure be interpreted in its broadest
reasonable manner, even though it is being used in conjunction with
a detailed description of certain examples of the technology.
Although certain terms may be emphasized below, any terminology
intended to be interpreted in any restricted manner will be overtly
and specifically defined as such in this Detailed Description
section. Throughout the specification and claims, the following
terms take at least the meanings explicitly associated herein,
unless the context dictates otherwise. The meanings identified
below do not necessarily limit the terms, but merely provide
illustrative examples for the terms. For example, each of the terms
"based on" and "based upon" is not exclusive, and is equivalent to
the term "based, at least in part, on", and includes the option of
being based on additional factors, some of which may not be
described herein. As another example, the term "via" is not
exclusive, and is equivalent to the term "via, at least in part",
and includes the option of being via additional factors, some of
which may not be described herein. The meaning of "in" includes
"in" and "on." The phrase "in one embodiment," or "in one example,"
as used herein does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or
example, although it may. Use of particular textual numeric
designators does not imply the existence of lesser-valued numerical
designators. For example, reciting "a widget selected from the
group consisting of a third foo and a fourth bar" would not itself
imply that there are at least three foo, nor that there are at
least four bar, elements. References in the singular are made
merely for clarity of reading and include plural references unless
plural references are specifically excluded. The term "or" is an
inclusive "or" operator unless specifically indicated otherwise.
For example, the phrases "A or B" means "A, B, or A and B." As used
herein, the terms "component" and "system" are intended to
encompass hardware, software, or various combinations of hardware
and software. Thus, for example, a system or component may be a
process, a process executing on a computing device, the computing
device, or a portion thereof.
Briefly stated, the disclosed technology is generally directed to
secure transactions. In one example of the technology, a first
enclave for use by a first counterparty to a smart contract is
identified. A second enclave for use by a second counterparty to
the smart contract is identified. Secrets associated with the first
counterparty to the first enclave are caused to be securely
provided. Secrets associated with the second counterparty to the
second enclave are caused to be securely provided. A cryptlet is
caused to be provided to the first enclave. The cryptlet is caused
to be provided to the second enclave. A payload is received from
the first enclave. A payload is received from the second enclave.
Validation is caused to be performed for a plurality of payloads.
The plurality of payloads includes the payload from the first
enclave and the payload from the second enclave.
In some examples, a cryptlet is a code component that can execute
in a secure environment and be communicated with using secure
channels. One application for cryptlets is smart contracts. In some
examples, a smart contract is computer code that partially or fully
executes and partially or fully enforces an agreement or
transaction, such as an exchange of money and/or property, and
which may make use of blockchain technology. Rather than running
the logic of a smart contract in the blockchain itself, in some
examples, the logic may instead be done by cryptlets executing off
of the blockchain. In some examples, the blockchain may still be
involved in some manner, such as in tracking the state, and
receiving the output of the cryptlet.
Some or all of the cryptlet code may be associated with a
constraint to execute in a secure environment. Accordingly, some of
the cryptlet code may be run in an enclave. In some examples, an
enclave is an execution environment, provided by hardware or
software, that is private, tamper resistant, and secure from
external interference. In some examples, outputs from the cryptlet
code are signed by at least the host enclave's private enclave key
of an enclave key pair stored by the host enclave.
Cryptlets may be installed and registered by the cryptlet fabric.
Cryptlets may perform advanced, proprietary, private execution with
secrets kept from counterparties, such as private keys or different
variable values for counterparties that should not be shared, e.g.,
terms and prices. In this case, more than one instance of a
cryptlet may be used in order to keep secrets (keys, terms) in
separate secure address spaces, to provide isolation, and for
privacy encryption schemes like ring or threshold encryption
schemes for storing shared secrets on the blockchain.
In some examples, cryptlets each running the same logic in a
separate enclave that are hosting secrets for a single counterparty
in a multi-counterparty smart contract runs in a pair for two
counterparties or a ring with more than two counterparties. In some
examples, the cryptlets running in a pair or a ring perform the
same execution logic, with different cryptographic keys for signing
or secret parameters not shared with others.
In some examples, cryptlets in one of these configurations
participate in simple consensus processes with a witness providing
validation, such as Paxos, a simple 100% match between pairs,
and/or the like.
Illustrative Devices/Operating Environments
FIG. 1 is a diagram of environment 100 in which aspects of the
technology may be practiced. As shown, environment 100 includes
computing devices 110, as well as network nodes 120, connected via
network 130. Even though particular components of environment 100
are shown in FIG. 1, in other examples, environment 100 can also
include additional and/or different components. For example, in
certain examples, the environment 100 can also include network
storage devices, maintenance managers, and/or other suitable
components (not shown). Computing devices no shown in FIG. 1 may be
in various locations, including on premise, in the cloud, or the
like. For example, computer devices no may be on the client side,
on the server side, or the like.
As shown in FIG. 1, network 130 can include one or more network
nodes 120 that interconnect multiple computing devices 110, and
connect computing devices no to external network 140, e.g., the
Internet or an intranet. For example, network nodes 120 may include
switches, routers, hubs, network controllers, or other network
elements. In certain examples, computing devices no can be
organized into racks, action zones, groups, sets, or other suitable
divisions. For example, in the illustrated example, computing
devices no are grouped into three host sets identified individually
as first, second, and third host sets 112a-112c. In the illustrated
example, each of host sets 112a-112c is operatively coupled to a
corresponding network node 120a-120c, respectively, which are
commonly referred to as "top-of-rack" or "TOR" network nodes. TOR
network nodes 120a-120C can then be operatively coupled to
additional network nodes 120 to form a computer network in a
hierarchical, flat, mesh, or other suitable types of topology that
allows communications between computing devices 110 and external
network 140. In other examples, multiple host sets 112a-112C may
share a single network node 120. Computing devices no may be
virtually any type of general- or specific-purpose computing
device. For example, these computing devices may be user devices
such as desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers,
display devices, cameras, printers, or smartphones. However, in a
data center environment, these computing devices may be server
devices such as application server computers, virtual computing
host computers, or file server computers. Moreover, computing
devices 110 may be individually configured to provide computing,
storage, and/or other suitable computing services.
In some examples, one or more of the computing devices 110 is an
IoT device, a device that comprises part or all of an IoT support
service, a device comprising part or all of an application
back-end, or the like, as discussed in greater detail below.
Illustrative Computing Device
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating one example of computing device
200 in which aspects of the technology may be practiced. Computing
device 200 may be virtually any type of general- or
specific-purpose computing device. For example, computing device
200 may be a user device such as a desktop computer, a laptop
computer, a tablet computer, a display device, a camera, a printer,
or a smartphone. Likewise, computing device 200 may also be server
device such as an application server computer, a virtual computing
host computer, or a file server computer, e.g., computing device
200 may be an example of computing device 110 or network node 120
of FIG. 1. Computing device 200 may also be an IoT device that
connects to a network to receive IoT services. Likewise, computer
device 200 may be an example any of the devices illustrated in or
referred to in FIGS. 3-5, as discussed in greater detail below. As
illustrated in FIG. 2, computing device 200 includes processing
circuit 210, operating memory 220, memory controller 230, data
storage memory 250, input interface 260, output interface 270, and
network adapter 280. Each of these afore-listed components of
computing device 200 includes at least one hardware element.
Computing device 200 includes at least one processing circuit 210
configured to execute instructions, such as instructions for
implementing the herein-described workloads, processes, or
technology. Processing circuit 210 may include a microprocessor, a
microcontroller, a graphics processor, a coprocessor, a
field-programmable gate array, a programmable logic device, a
signal processor, or any other circuit suitable for processing
data. Processing circuit 210 is an example of a core. The
aforementioned instructions, along with other data (e.g., datasets,
metadata, operating system instructions, etc.), may be stored in
operating memory 220 during run-time of computing device 200.
Operating memory 220 may also include any of a variety of data
storage devices/components, such as volatile memories,
semi-volatile memories, random access memories, static memories,
caches, buffers, or other media used to store run-time information.
In one example, operating memory 220 does not retain information
when computing device 200 is powered off. Rather, computing device
200 may be configured to transfer instructions from a non-volatile
data storage component (e.g., data storage component 250) to
operating memory 220 as part of a booting or other loading
process.
Operating memory 220 may include 4th generation double data rate
(DDR4) memory, 3rd generation double data rate (DDR3) memory, other
dynamic random access memory (DRAM), High Bandwidth Memory (HBM),
Hybrid Memory Cube memory, 3D-stacked memory, static random access
memory (SRAM), or other memory, and such memory may comprise one or
more memory circuits integrated onto a DIMM, SIMM, SODIMM, or other
packaging. Such operating memory modules or devices may be
organized according to channels, ranks, and banks. For example,
operating memory devices may be coupled to processing circuit 210
via memory controller 230 in channels. One example of computing
device 200 may include one or two DIMMs per channel, with one or
two ranks per channel. Operating memory within a rank may operate
with a shared clock, and shared address and command bus. Also, an
operating memory device may be organized into several banks where a
bank can be thought of as an array addressed by row and column.
Based on such an organization of operating memory, physical
addresses within the operating memory may be referred to by a tuple
of channel, rank, bank, row, and column.
Despite the above-discussion, operating memory 220 specifically
does not include or encompass communications media, any
communications medium, or any signals per se.
Memory controller 230 is configured to interface processing circuit
210 to operating memory 220. For example, memory controller 230 may
be configured to interface commands, addresses, and data between
operating memory 220 and processing circuit 210. Memory controller
230 may also be configured to abstract or otherwise manage certain
aspects of memory management from or for processing circuit 210.
Although memory controller 230 is illustrated as single memory
controller separate from processing circuit 210, in other examples,
multiple memory controllers may be employed, memory controller(s)
may be integrated with operating memory 220, or the like. Further,
memory controller(s) may be integrated into processing circuit 210.
These and other variations are possible.
In computing device 200, data storage memory 250, input interface
260, output interface 270, and network adapter 280 are interfaced
to processing circuit 210 by bus 240. Although, FIG. 2 illustrates
bus 240 as a single passive bus, other configurations, such as a
collection of buses, a collection of point to point links, an
input/output controller, a bridge, other interface circuitry, or
any collection thereof may also be suitably employed for
interfacing data storage memory 250, input interface 260, output
interface 270, or network adapter 280 to processing circuit
210.
In computing device 200, data storage memory 250 is employed for
long-term non-volatile data storage. Data storage memory 250 may
include any of a variety of non-volatile data storage
devices/components, such as non-volatile memories, disks, disk
drives, hard drives, solid-state drives, or any other media that
can be used for the non-volatile storage of information. However,
data storage memory 250 specifically does not include or encompass
communications media, any communications medium, or any signals per
se. In contrast to operating memory 220, data storage memory 250 is
employed by computing device 200 for non-volatile long-term data
storage, instead of for run-time data storage.
Also, computing device 200 may include or be coupled to any type of
processor-readable media such as processor-readable storage media
(e.g., operating memory 220 and data storage memory 250) and
communication media (e.g., communication signals and radio waves).
While the term processor-readable storage media includes operating
memory 220 and data storage memory 250, the term
"processor-readable storage media," throughout the specification
and the claims whether used in the singular or the plural, is
defined herein so that the term "processor-readable storage media"
specifically excludes and does not encompass communications media,
any communications medium, or any signals per se. However, the term
"processor-readable storage media" does encompass processor cache,
Random Access Memory (RAM), register memory, and/or the like.
Computing device 200 also includes input interface 260, which may
be configured to enable computing device 200 to receive input from
users or from other devices. In addition, computing device 200
includes output interface 270, which may be configured to provide
output from computing device 200. In one example, output interface
270 includes a frame buffer, graphics processor, graphics processor
or accelerator, and is configured to render displays for
presentation on a separate visual display device (such as a
monitor, projector, virtual computing client computer, etc.). In
another example, output interface 270 includes a visual display
device and is configured to render and present displays for
viewing. In yet another example, input interface 260 and/or output
interface 270 may include a universal asynchronous
receiver/transmitter ("UART"), a Serial Peripheral Interface
("SPI"), Inter-Integrated Circuit ("I2C"), a General-purpose
input/output (GPIO), and/or the like. Moreover, input interface 260
and/or output interface 270 may include or be interfaced to any
number or type of peripherals.
In the illustrated example, computing device 200 is configured to
communicate with other computing devices or entities via network
adapter 280. Network adapter 280 may include a wired network
adapter, e.g., an Ethernet adapter, a Token Ring adapter, or a
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) adapter. Network adapter 280 may also
include a wireless network adapter, for example, a Wi-Fi adapter, a
Bluetooth adapter, a ZigBee adapter, a Long Term Evolution (LTE)
adapter, or a 5G adapter.
Although computing device 200 is illustrated with certain
components configured in a particular arrangement, these components
and arrangement are merely one example of a computing device in
which the technology may be employed. In other examples, data
storage memory 250, input interface 260, output interface 270, or
network adapter 280 may be directly coupled to processing circuit
210, or be coupled to processing circuit 210 via an input/output
controller, a bridge, or other interface circuitry. Other
variations of the technology are possible.
Some examples of computing device 200 include at least one memory
(e.g., operating memory 220) adapted to store run-time data and at
least one processor (e.g., processing unit 210) that is adapted to
execute processor-executable code that, in response to execution,
enables computing device 200 to perform actions.
Illustrative Systems
FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a system
(300). System 300 may include network 330, as well as participant
devices 311 and 312, member devices 341 and 342, counterparty
devices 316 and 317, validation nodes (VNs) 351 and 352, enclaves
371 and 372, cryptlet fabric devices 361 and 362, and key vault
365, which all may connect to network 330.
Each of the participant devices 311 and 312, counterparty devices
316 and 317, member devices 341 and 342, VNs 351 and 352, cryptlet
fabric devices 361 and 362, and/or key vault 365 may include
examples of computing device 200 of FIG. 2. FIG. 3 and the
corresponding description of FIG. 3 in the specification
illustrates an example system for illustrative purposes that does
not limit the scope of the disclosure.
Network 330 may include one or more computer networks, including
wired and/or wireless networks, where each network may be, for
example, a wireless network, local area network (LAN), a wide-area
network (WAN), and/or a global network such as the Internet. On an
interconnected set of LANs, including those based on differing
architectures and protocols, a router acts as a link between LANs,
enabling messages to be sent from one to another. Also,
communication links within LANs typically include twisted wire pair
or coaxial cable, while communication links between networks may
utilize analog telephone lines, full or fractional dedicated
digital lines including T1, T2, T3, and T4, Integrated Services
Digital Networks (ISDNs), Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), wireless
links including satellite links, or other communications links
known to those skilled in the art. Furthermore, remote computers
and other related electronic devices could be remotely connected to
either LANs or WANs via a modem and temporary telephone link.
Network 330 may include various other networks such as one or more
networks using local network protocols such as 6LoWPAN, ZigBee, or
the like. Some IoT devices may be connected to a user device via a
different network in network 330 than other IoT devices. In
essence, network 330 includes any communication technology by which
information may travel between participant devices 311 and 312,
counterparty devices 316 and 317, member devices 341 and 342, VNs
351 and 352, cryptlet fabric devices 361 and 362, enclaves 371 and
372, and/or key vault 365. Although each device or service is shown
connected as connected to network 330, that does not mean that each
device communicates with each other device shown. In some examples,
some devices/services shown only communicate with some other
devices/services shown via one or more intermediary devices. Also,
although network 330 is illustrated as one network, in some
examples, network 330 may instead include multiple networks that
may or may not be connected with each other, with some of the
devices shown communicating with each other through one network of
the multiple networks and other of the devices shown communicating
with each other with a different network of the multiple
networks.
In some examples, VNs 351 and VN 352 are part of a blockchain
network. In some examples, VNs 351 and 352 are devices that, during
normal operation, validate and process submitted blockchain
transactions, and execute chaincode. In some examples, member
devices 341 and 342 are devices used by members to communicate over
network 330, such as for communication between a member and its
corresponding VN, for example to endorse a VN. In some examples,
participant devices 311 and 312 are devices used by participants to
communicate over network 330, such as to request a transaction.
In some examples, counterparty devices 316 and 317 are devices used
by counterparties or as counterparties to a smart contract that
makes use of a contract cryptlet via the cryptlet fabric (where the
cryptlet fabric includes, e.g., cryptlet fabric device 361 and
cryptlet fabric device 362). Counterparty devices 316 and 317 may
each be, represent, and/or act on behalf of a person, company, IoT
device, smart contract, and/or the like.
An example arrangement of system 300 may be described as follows.
In some examples, enclaves 371 and 372 are execution environments,
provided by hardware or software, that are private, tamper
resistant, and secure from external interference. Outputs from an
enclave are digitally signed by the enclave. Cryptlet fabric
devices 361 and 362 are part of a cryptlet fabric that provides
runtime and other functionality for cryptlets, as discussed in
greater detail below. Key vault 365 may be used to provide secure
persistent storage for keys used by cryptlets for identity, digital
signature, and encryption services.
System 300 may include more or less devices than illustrated in
FIG. 3, which is shown by way of example only.
Illustrative Device
FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating an example of system 400,
which may be employed as an example of system 300 of FIG. 3. System
400 may include participant devices 411 and 412, counterparty
devices 416 and 417, member devices 441 and 442, blockchain network
450, cryptlet fabric 460, enclaves 470, and key vault 465.
In some examples, during normal operation, blockchain network 450
may validate and process submitted blockchain transactions. In some
examples, member devices 441 and 442 are devices used by members to
communicate with blockchain network 450. In some examples,
participant devices 411 and 412 are devices used by participants to
communicate with blockchain network 450, such as to request a
transaction. In some examples, enclaves 470 are execution
environments, provided by hardware or software, that are private,
tamper resistant, and secure from external interference. In some
examples, outputs from an enclave are digitally signed by the
enclave. Key vault 465 may be used to provide secure persistent
storage for keys used by cryptlets for identity, digital signature,
and encryption services.
In some examples, counterparty devices 416 and 417 are devices used
by counterparties or as counterparties to a smart contract that
makes use of a contract cryptlet via cryptlet fabric 460.
Counterparty devices 416 and 417 may each be, represent, and/or act
on behalf of a person, company, IoT device, smart contract, and/or
the like, as discussed in greater detail below.
Blockchain network 450 may include a number of VNs. In some
examples, each member of blockchain network 450 may, via a member
device (e.g., 441 or 442), maintain one or more VNs in blockchain
network 450. Participants may request, via participant devices
(e.g., 411 or 412) for transactions to be performed by blockchain
network 450. During normal operation, VNs in blockchain network 450
validate and process submitted transactions, and execute logic
code.
Transactions performed by the blockchain network 450 may be stored
in blockchains. In some examples, blockchains are decentralized
ledgers that record transactions performed by the blockchain in a
verifiable manner. Multiple transactions may be stored in a block.
Once a block is full, the block may be capped with a block header
that is a hash digest of all of the transaction identifiers within
a block. The block header may be recorded as the first transaction
in the next block in the chain, thus creating a blockchain.
A blockchain network may also be used for the processing of smart
contracts. In some examples, a smart contract is computer code that
partially or fully executes and partially or fully enforces an
agreement or transaction, such as an exchange of money and/or
property, and which may make use of blockchain technology. Rather
than running the logic of a smart contract in the blockchain
itself, the logic may instead, with assistance from cryptlet fabric
460, be done by cryptlets executing off of the blockchain network
450. In some examples, a cryptlet is a code component that can
execute in a secure environment and be communicated with using
secure channels. In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 is
configured to provide runtime and other functionality for
cryptlets.
In some examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 a server-less cloud platform
that provides core infrastructure for middleware that enables
blockchain-based applications with increased functionality. In some
examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 is comprised of several components
providing the functionality for an enhanced security envelop of
blockchain application into the cloud as well as a common
application program interface (API) that abstracts the underlying
blockchain and its nuance from developers.
In some examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 manages scale, failover,
caching, monitoring, and/or management of cryptlets, as well as a
run time secure key platform for cryptlets that allows for the
creation, persistence, and hydration of private keys at scale.
("Hydration" refers to the activation and orchestration in memory
from persistent storage.) This allows cryptlets to create, store
and use key pairs in a secure execution environment to perform a
variety of functions including, for example, digital signatures,
ring signatures, zero knowledge proofs, threshold, and homomorphic
encryption.
In some examples, a cryptlet may be a software component that
inherits from base classes and implements interfaces that provide
cryptographic primitives and integrations for distributed trust
applications. In some examples, it is sufficient for developers to
know the base classes and how to implement required and optional
interfaces for cryptlets to develop on the platform. Established
software development frameworks, patterns, and designs can be used
for user interfaces and integration into existing systems.
Types of cryptlets may include utility cryptlets and contract
cryptlets. Utility cryptlets usually perform external data
integration via events internal or external, provide data access or
reusable logic to blockchain smart contracts, but can also provide
service level APIs for other systems to work with blockchains.
Utility cryptlets whose primary purpose is to inject attested data
into blockchains may be called "oracle" cryptlets. In some
examples, contract cryptlets contain smart contract specific logic
that counter-parties signing the contract agree to. Both types of
cryptlets may provide a blockchain facing API and a Surface level
API.
Regardless of how a smart contract is implemented, utility
cryptlets may be used to provide information and additional
computation for smart contracts in reusable libraries. These
libraries may be used to create a framework for building
distributed applications and exposed in a common way via the
Cryptlet Fabric 460 in both public and private cloud, and in
blockchain environments.
Contract cryptlets may redefine the implementation of the logic
that a smart contract executes. In some examples, these cryptlets
prescribe that any logic be run off-chain, using the underlying
blockchain as a database.
Utility cryptlets may provide discrete functionality like providing
external information, e.g., market prices, external data from other
systems, or proprietary formulas. These may be called "blockchain
oracles" in that they can watch and inject "real world" events and
data into blockchain systems. Smart contracts may interact with
these using a Publish/Subscribe pattern where the utility cryptlet
publishes an event for subscribing smart contracts. The event
triggers may be external to the blockchain (e.g., a price change)
or internal to the blockchain (e.g., a data signal) within a smart
contract or operation code.
In some examples, these cryptlets can also be called directly by
other cryptlets within the fabric and expose an external or surface
level API that other systems can call. For example, an enterprise
Customer relationship management (CRM) system may publish an event
to a subscribing cryptlet that in turn publishes information to a
blockchain in blockchain network 450 based on that information.
Bi-directional integration may be provided to smart contracts and
blockchains through Cryptlet Fabric 460 in this way.
Contract or control cryptlets may represent the entire logic or
state in a contractual agreement between counter parties. In some
examples, contract cryptlets used in smart contract-based systems
can use the blockchain ledger to authentically store a contract's
data using smart contract logic for data validity, but surrogate
logic to a contract cryptlet providing "separation of concerns"
within an application's design. The relationship between an
on-chain smart contract and a contract cryptlet may be called a
trust relationship.
For non-smart contract based systems, in some examples, contract
cryptlets perform logic and write their data to the blockchain
without the smart contract or well-defined schema on the
blockchain.
In essence, in some examples, contract cryptlets can run the logic
of a contractual agreement between counterparties at scale, in a
private secure environment, yet store its data in the underlying
blockchain regardless of type.
In some examples, a cryptlet has common properties regardless of
type:
Identity--For example, a key pair. The identity can be created by
the cryptlet itself or assigned. The public key is also known as
the cryptlet address in some examples. The private key may be used
to sign all transactions from the cryptlet. Private keys may be
stored in the KeyVault 465 or otherwise fetched via secure channel
when rehydrating or assigning identity to a cryptlet.
Name--A common name that is mapped to the address for a more
readable identity in some examples.
Code--code written in a language that's its Parent Container
supports in some examples.
CryptletBindings--a small list of bindings that represent the
client (e.g., blockchain contracts or accounts) addresses and
parameters for the binding in some examples.
Events--List of events published or watched by the cryptlet in some
examples. These event triggers can be watched blockchain data or
events or external in some examples.
API--A set of surface level APIs that non-blockchain systems or
other cryptlets can use as well as subscriber call back methods in
some examples.
Parent Container--A cryptlet container that the cryptlet runs in,
in some examples.
Manifest--simple JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) configuration
settings for a cryptlet that is used for deployment into the
fabric, in some examples.
A cryptlet container may provide a runtime for Cryptlets to execute
in. Cryptlet containers may provide abstractions for Cryptlets like
I/O, security, key management, and runtime optimization.
Cryptlet containers may provide secure key storage and retrieval
for cryptlets to use for identity, digital signatures and
encryption. Cryptlets may automatically store and fetch keys via
the cryptlet container which integrates with the key vault 465 via
a secure channel or CryptletTunnel.
A cryptlet may declare in the manifest its configuration,
enclaving, type, etc. In some examples, the cryptlet container
ensures that the dependencies the cryptlet needs are in place for
it to run.
Enclave requirements for a cryptlet may be set in the cryptlet
manifest or in policy. Enclave options and configuration are set in
the cryptlet container service, which is part of Cryptlet Fabric
460 in some examples.
In some examples, the cryptlet container service is the hub of the
Cryptlet Fabric 460. In some examples, the primary duties and
components of the cryptlet container service are: Cryptlet Fabric
Registry, which is the Registry and Database for configuration.
Cryptlets: Name and ID, Surface Level API, and Events they expose
to blockchain networks. Blockchains or other distributed ledgers:
Network Name, Type, Node List, metadata. Smart contracts: on-chain
smart contract addresses and application binary interfaces (ABIs)
or other interface definition that subscribe to or have trust
relationships with Cryptlets as well as the host blockchain
network. CryptletBindings, which is a collection of all bindings
the fabric serves. A CryptletBinding may map smart contracts to
cryptlets or cryptlets to cryptlets for validation and message
routing. A CryptletBinding may represent a single binding between a
smart contract and a cryptlet (or pair/ring). Details about the
binding like subscription parameter(s), interface parameter(s),
and/or smart contract address are used to route messages between
cryptlets, their clients, smart contracts, or other cryptlets.
Secure Compute Registry: is a registry of enclaves and their
attributes like capabilities, version, costs, and configuration.
Enclave pool definitions of clusters and additional cryptographic
services provided by Enclave Pools like key derivation, ring
signatures, and threshold encryption. Cryptlet Catalog, which may
be a REpresentational State Transfer (REST) API and/or Web Site for
developers to discover and enlist cryptlets into their applications
either for a smart contract binding or for use in building a user
interface or integration. API for abstracting blockchain
transaction formatting and Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation,
Durability (ACID) delivery append transactions and read queries
from cryptlets and any other system wanting "direct" access to the
underlying blockchain. This API can be exposed in various ways,
e.g., messaging via service bus, Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs),
and/or REST.
Cryptlets, blockchains and smart contracts may get registered with
the cryptlet fabric registry service. The cryptlet container
service may publish the Cryptlet Catalog for on-chain smart
contract, front end user interface (UI) and systems integration
developers discover and use cryptlets. Developers using the service
level APIs may interact with the blockchain via cryptlets and not
be concerned or even necessarily know they are working with
blockchain data. User Interfaces and Integrations to other systems
may interact with cryptlet surface level APIs to rapidly integrate
and build applications.
Enclaves may be hardware or software. For example, a software
enclave can be formed by running a hypervisor or Virtual Secure
Machine (VSM). An example of a hardware enclave is a secure
hardware enclave such as SGX from Intel. A hardware enclave may
have a set of keys that are burned/etched onto the silicon than can
be used to sign output from the enclave to serve as an attestation
to its secure execution. Usually, there is a 1-1 ratio of code and
the enclave it runs in. However, in the cloud, cryptlets may be
instantiated dynamically and may or may not get the same hardware
enclave.
In some examples, enclave resources are pooled together and
categorized based on their capabilities. For example, there may be
VSM enclaves and hardware enclaves which may have different
performance or memory enhancements over time. Cryptlets may be
configured to request any enclave or a specific type of enclave and
potentially a higher performance hardware enclave at runtime.
In some examples, enclaves are secure execution environments where
code can be run in an isolated, private environment and the results
of the secure execution can be attested to have been run unaltered
and in private. This means that secrets like private keys can be
created and used within an enclave to sign transactions and be
proved to third parties to have run within an enclave.
In some examples, to deliver cryptlets at scale, enclaves are
pooled by the Cryptlet Fabric 460 upon receiving an enclave pool
request. In some examples, an enclave pool acts as a resource
where, upon receiving an enclave request for a cryptlet, an enclave
can be fetched from the enclave pool by Cryptlet Fabric 460 and
allocated to a cryptlet at runtime based on the requirements of
that cryptlet.
For example, a policy can be set that all cryptlets running a smart
contract between counterparty A and B always requires an SGX V2
Enclave from Intel.
Alternatively, the enclave requirement may be left unspecified, so
that the least cost (e.g., in terms of money, time, already active,
etc.) enclave is provided.
Enclaves 470 are registered within the enclave pool. In some
examples, an enclave pool shared signature is generated for the
enclave pool, where the enclave pool shared signature is derived
from the private key of each enclave in the enclave pool. In some
examples, pool management uses just-in-time (JIT) instantiation of
enclaves to use them when active, but return them to the pool as
soon as the work is done. In some examples, a cryptlet that has an
asynchronous lifespan and that will not complete its work can
release its enclave at a checkpoint and be re-instantiated in a
different enclave. In some examples, switching enclaves produces
different attestations that can be validated by the enclave pool
shared signature.
In some examples, when a set of enclaves is registered with the
Cryptlet Fabric 460, each enclave public key is recorded in the
enclave pool registry. In some examples, the characteristics are
recorded upon registration and can be modified for pool categories
that are not inferred from the hardware. In some examples, once all
the enclaves are registered, the keys for all enclaves are used to
generate a key pair for the pool which is stored in the Key Vault
465.
At runtime, the CryptletContainerService may determine cryptlets
runtime environment dependencies based on its registration or
policy and request an enclave out of the enclave pool. The enclave
pool may activate an enclave and return its address to the
CryptletContainerService, which may then inject the appropriate
CryptletContainer. In some examples, the CryptletContainer is
provided the cryptlet ID and an active binding, which
CryptletContainer uses to fetch the cryptlet binary from secure
storage, and run a hash code signature check on the cryptlet, which
may be a part of the cryptlet's composite identifier. In some
examples, the CryptletContainer then fetches any keys required by
the cryptlet from the KeyVault 465 and passes them along with the
active cryptlet binding into the constructor of the cryptlet to
instantiate it within the enclave. In some examples, cryptlet code
executes in the enclave, and the payload is digitally signed by the
private key of the enclave.
Once a cryptlet is done with its synchronous work, it may call its
checkpoint method which may pass any new keys generated during its
session for the CryptletContainer to persist in the Key Vault 465
as well as release the cryptlet's enclave back to the pool. By
returning the enclave, the enclave then becomes available again to
be used by another cryptlet.
In some examples, if a Cryptlet requires an enclave that is not
available and will not be available within a defined call window,
an error is logged, and an exception is thrown.
New enclaves may be added to the enclave pool, which will generate
a new shared signature for the pool. In some examples, a shared
signature is used when a cryptlet's lifetime spans multiple
enclaves and continuity of attestation needs to be established. In
some examples, the shared signature is historical, so if a cryptlet
is attested across multiple enclaves, the shared signature is
checked, and if the current signature does not match, the previous
version of the signature is checked until a match is found. In
these examples, if no match is found, the attestation chain is not
valid.
In this way, in these examples, a rogue enclave cannot contribute
to a validated transaction. In these examples, if a rogue enclave
contributes to a transaction, the shared enclave signature would
not be made, and the attestation chain would not be valid.
In some examples, the cryptlet container service has a Blockchain
Router that provides the abstraction API for data operations
against blockchains. Each different type of blockchain may have a
Blockchain Message Provider or Connector that is plugged into the
blockchain router for proper message formatting for each
blockchain.
In some examples, blockchain connectors have a valid address on
each of the blockchains the blockchain connector serves and signs
transactions with the key for this address. In some examples,
blockchain connectors run within an enclave for transaction-signing
purposes.
The Blockchain router depends on CryptletBindings for routing
messages to the appropriate blockchain connector. The blockchain
connector uses the CryptletBinding information to format the
messages correctly and to ensure delivery to the targeted
recipient.
In some examples, the cryptlet binding is a data structure that
provides the abstraction between the cryptlet and underlying
blockchain, smart contracts, and accounts. The cryptlet binding may
or may not be secured itself, as it may only contain identifier(s)
of bound components (e.g., unique identifier(s)) that authorized
parties use to look up details from other services. In some
examples, used in routing messages, the binding provides the
cryptlet ID and the Smart Contract ID itself. In some examples, the
smart contract address is looked up and is bound to a specific
Blockchain ID that maps to a node address.
Data may be enveloped in multiple layers of digital attestations
(e.g., signatures) signed by the data producer or "on-behalf of" a
user or IOT device, cryptlet, its host enclave and, then the
blockchain connector. This layering may be referred to as a
signature onion.
The CryptoDelegate, which is a portion of cryptlet fabric 460 in
some examples, may provide an optimization point for verifying
these layered signatures before passing on to be validated by all
of the nodes, accordingly reducing redundant signature checks,
rejecting invalid attestation chains, and/or freeing compute
resources.
Key Vault 465 may provide secure persistent storage of keys used by
cryptlets for identity, digital signatures and encryption services.
Cryptlet containers may provide abstractions to cryptlets for
storing and fetching keys at runtime. In some examples, a secure
communication channel, called a CryptletTunnel, is established
between the KeyVault 465 and the enclave that is hosting the
CryptletContainer. In some examples, storage and retrieval of
private keys and secrets used by hosted cryptlets are provided
automatically and on demand by the CryptletContainer.
For instance, in some examples, when a cryptlet is instantiated
within its CryptletContainer host, if its identity is established
by a key pair in the key vault, the CryptletContainer will securely
fetch and provide the key pair to the cryptlet upon instantiation.
Or, if the cryptlet creates its own or a new key pair, these new
keys may be automatically stored by the CryptletContainer when the
Cryptlet deactivates. In some examples, the cryptlet can then use
the private key to sign transactions and messages for delivery. One
example of an assigned key is a cryptlet that signs transactions as
a specific counter party, corporation, user, or device, to a Smart
Contract with the counter party's private key.
In some examples, cryptlets can request keys or secrets from their
container for other cryptographic services like encryption,
decryption, and signing of messages. In some examples, keys used by
cryptlets, either for identity or other cryptographic purposes, are
looked up and located by the CryptletContainer using the
CryptletBinding that resolves to either a Cryptlet Instance ID or a
CounterpartyId and requesting or storing via the CryptletTunnel to
KeyVault 465. In some examples, a CryptletBinding Key Graph is used
to record key locations for resolving and locating keys for a
different counterparty in a separate Key Vault 465 instance that
may be controlled by that counterparty. Key derivation for multiple
Cryptlet Identities from a single counterparty may provide multiple
concurrence instances to be distinguished. Also, in example
scenarios for one-time use key derivation scenarios where Key Vault
465 issues or a cryptlet creates a derived key for cryptlet
signing, when the signing is done, the derived key is destroyed as
it was only in enclave memory. Key life cycle services such as key
expiration and reset may be provided as utilities.
Besides Key Vault 465, a cryptlet tunnel may be established between
an enclave and any suitable Hardware Security Module (HSM)--Key
Vault 465 is but one example of an HSM to which the enclave may
establish a cryptlet tunnel.
In some examples, a cryptlet tunnel is dynamically established
between a Hardware Security Module (e.g., Key Vault 465) and an
enclave for the purposes of securely transmitting private keys or
secrets that are stored in the HSM to the cryptlet running within
the enclave. This may also allow cryptlets to create new keys in an
enclave and store them to an HSM securely through the tunnel. In
some examples, secrets may be exchanged in both directions (enclave
to HSM and HSM to enclave). In some examples, the cryptlet tunnel
is created at runtime via the enclave and HSM securely sharing
session keys to construct a short-lived tunnel for the exchange of
these keys for the active cryptlet. In some examples, the keys that
are fetched into an enclave via the cryptlet tunnel are only in
enclave memory are destroyed when the cryptlet is closed or
faulted.
In some examples, an intermediary device may be used in the
cryptlet tunnel rather than directly connecting the HSM and the
enclave. For instance, in some examples, a host virtual machine of
the enclave is used as a broker, in which the host virtual machine
brokers the connection for the enclave, although the decryption is
still performed in the enclave itself.
In some examples, a user may have a user token that can be passed
and mapped to a key in Key Vault 465. When activities associated
with the user are performed in an enclave, the user's key may be
fetched from Key Vault 465 using a cryptlet tunnel, e.g., in order
to sign on behalf of the user using the user's key. Use of the
cryptlet tunnel may allow the key to be communicated securely
between the enclave and Key Vault 465.
In some examples, once the secure tunnel is in place, the enclave
request the cryptlet keychain. The cryptlet keychain may include
the key pair for the cryptlet that is used for signing and/or
executing the payloads created by the cryptlet. The cryptlet
keychain may also include a key pair for any counterparties (e.g.,
user, IoT device) that the cryptlet can "sign on behalf of"). The
cryptlet may also include any secrets defined in the contract
binding, such a shared secret between counterparties or a single
party such as contract terms that a party or parties do not want
visible on the blockchain.
Once the enclave keychain is obtained, the instance of the cryptlet
may be provided, and the cryptlet may be provided with the
cryptlet's keychain and binding in the constructor or
initialization. In some examples, the cryptlet executes the
cryptlet code and any output is/can be signed by the private keys
in the cryptlet keychain. In some examples, the payload is then
handed to the CryptletContainer for the enclave signature to be
created around that payload providing the enclave attestation. The
signatures may be part of a signature onion. For instance, in some
examples, the signature onion may include a signature by the
enclave key, a signature by the cryptlet key, a signature by a
blockchain-specific key, and a signature of another enclave,
resulting in a four-layer signature onion proving a chain of proof
with four layers of attestation in these examples.
As discussed above, a cryptlet's lifetime may span multiple
enclaves. In some examples, the secure cryptlet tunnel provides a
way of persisting secrets across multiple enclaves, in that each
enclave can communicate with an HSM that persistently stores the
secrets.
A secure tunnel between an HSM and an enclave is discussed in
detail above. Such secure tunnels can be established between an
enclave and another enclave in the same manner as discussed above
between an HSM and an enclave. A secure tunnel between an enclave
and another enclave may be used to allow cryptlets to exchange
secrets with each other at runtime. Among other applications, this
may be used for enclaves in ring and pair topologies for secure
communications between enclaves in the topology.
In some examples, developers can construct their smart contracts
using objects against their logic and simply persist their object
state into the blockchain ledger without having to write a smart
contract schema. In some examples, the reverse is also true, and an
object model can be built and mapped from an existing smart
contract schema. This environment may provide blockchain
portability and ease of development for blockchain solutions.
In some examples, the CryptoDelegate is a set of capabilities that
are delivered differently based on the underlying blockchain or
ledger. In some examples, the CryptoDelegate is part of Cryptlet
Fabric 460. In some examples, the CryptoDelegate functions, in
essence, as a client-side or node-side integration for the Cryptlet
Fabric 460. Among other things, the CryptoDelegate may perform
attestation checks on messages before delivery to the underlying
node platform, e.g., blocking invalid transactions before they get
propagated around blockchain network 450.
As discussed above, when an enclave pool is formed, the enclaves in
the pool may be registered with the enclave pool. In some examples,
when the enclaves are so registered with Cryptlet Fabric 460, each
enclave public key may be received by Cryptlet Fabric 460 and each
enclave public key may be recorded in the enclave pool registry.
Additionally, as part of the process that occurs when an enclave
pool is formed, an enclave pool shared key may be derived from the
public key of each enclave in the enclave pool by Cryptlet Fabric
460. A new enclave pool shared key may be generated by Cryptlet
Fabric 460 if the membership of the enclave pool changes.
A cryptlet can request an enclave from an associated enclave pool
in response to a need. The request may specify a particular size or
type of enclave. For example, some types of enclaves are more
secure than others, and may be associated with a greater cost, and
so an enclave having a particular level of security may be
requested according to the particular request. When the request is
made, a suitable enclave can be fetched by Cryptlet Fabric 460 from
the enclave pool and allocated to the cryptlet based on the
particular request.
Cryptlet code that is be executed in an enclave can then be
executed in the allocated enclave. As part of the execution of the
cryptlet code, the cryptlet code may generate a payload in the host
enclave. The payload of the host enclave can then be signed and/or
encrypted by the cryptlet private key as well as digitally signed
by the private enclave key of the host enclave. The host enclave
can then be deallocated from the first cryptlet, so that the
cryptlet is no longer running in the enclave, and the enclave is
available for other cryptlets. The payload can be attested to
out-of-band from the blockchain, e.g., with the public key of the
cryptlet and the public key of the enclave.
In some cases, the cryptlet code may also be run in another
enclave. For instance, in some examples, as discussed above, pool
management may use "just-in-time" (JIT) instantiation of enclaves,
but return them to the pool after the work is done. In some
examples, a cryptlet that has an asynchronous lifespan and that
will not complete its work can deallocate its enclave at a
checkpoint.
Accordingly, a different suitable enclave may be fetched from the
enclave pool by Cryptlet Fabric 460 and the cryptlet may be
re-instantiated in the new enclave. The cryptlet may then continue
to execute in the other host enclave (e.g., the new enclave). The
payload of the other host enclave can then be digitally signed by
the private enclave key of the other host enclave. The other host
enclave can then be deallocated so that the cryptlet is no longer
running in the enclave, and the other host enclave made available
for other cryptlets.
In some examples, the cryptlet may be executed by still more
enclaves, such as by at least a third enclave in a similar manner
as described above for the second enclave.
Because the cryptlet in this example is executed in more than one
enclave, the output of the cryptlet code may contain two or more
digital signatures which each originate from the private key of
different enclaves from the enclave pool, in addition to a digital
signature originating from the private cryptlet key, as well as
possibly other digital signatures as part of the signature onion.
In some examples, the digital signatures that originate from an
enclave key from an enclave that belongs to the enclave pool can
all be validated by comparing them against the shared enclave pool
key. In some examples, the verification of digital signatures may
be performed by the cryptlet fabric.
In some examples, cryptlet code is packaged as a cryptlet that has
its own identity that is a composite of multiple components. In
some examples, the cryptlet identity is the combination of the
binary hash of the compiled cryptlet, the cryptlet public key, and
the binding identifier.
In some examples, the cryptlet identity being composed of these
three components allows for a single binary to be compiled and
reused across many instances of that contract type.
For an example, for a cryptlet binary financial contract that is an
Interest Rate Swap, in one example, the Swap cryptlet would have a
hash+public key that uniquely represents that cryptlet binary in
the fabric. In this example, when a new Interest Rate Swap is
created, an instance of that contract is created represented by a
binding Id. In some examples, the binding represents the
properties/rules of the Swap instance, such as the identities of
the counter parties, where the cryptlet gets interest rate pricing
from and how often, and/or the like.
In this way, there may be numerous instances of an Interest Rate
swap with a single binary cryptlet executing each of these
contracts. The unique instance is the composite cryptlet identity
that represents the contract in this example.
Accordingly, in some examples, the combination of three components,
(1) Binary Hash, (2) Cryptlet Public Key, and (3) Binding Id, is
the instance identifier which is then represented as a hash digest
for contract that is recorded on the blockchain ledger representing
the version of logic controlling the smart contract. This cryptlet
identity may be used regardless of whether or not enclave pool is
used and regardless of whether or not the shared key is used. In
some examples, an instance of a cryptlet consists of the three
components (1) Binary Hash, (2) Cryptlet Public Key, and (3)
Binding Id, where a general cryptlet that has not been instantiated
consists of two components: (1) Binary Hash and (2) Cryptlet Public
Key, and where a particular instantiation of that cryptlet would
then add the binding Id of that instance of the cryptlet to
generate the cryptlet identity for that instance of the
cryptlet.
Cryptlets may be installed and registered in cryptlet fabric 460.
During the process of installing a cryptlet in fabric 460, cryptlet
fabric 460 fetches the cryptlet binary for the cryptlet being
installed, and generates a hash of the cryptlet binary. Cryptlet
fabric 460 may also request key vault 465 to create a key chain
that may include, among other things, a key pair for the cryptlet,
where the key pair includes a cryptlet private key and the cryptlet
public key, and request that the cryptlet public key be sent to
cryptlet fabric 460. Cryptlet fabric 460 may receive the public key
and creates a cryptlet identity for the cryptlet, where the
cryptlet identity consists of two components (1) the hash of the
binary and (2) the cryptlet public key, because the cryptlet is
uninstantiated. Cryptlet fabric 460 may register the cryptlet with
the cryptlet identity in a cryptlet registry in cryptlet fabric
460, in which the cryptlet identity is stored as an entry in the
cryptlet registry as part of the registration. In some examples,
the cryptlet registry may act as a kind of catalog from which
cryptlets can be selected.
In some examples, when a request for a particular cryptlet is made,
and the cryptlet has yet to be instantiated, cryptlet fabric 460
intercepts the request. If the cryptlet will need to execute in a
cryptlet, then regardless of whether or not enclave pooling is
used, cryptlet fabric 460 may then identify an enclave to be used
for executing the cryptlet. The cryptlet fabric 460 may send a
cryptlet container to the enclave to be executed in the enclave,
and the cryptlet container may fetch the cryptlet key pair for the
cryptlet. In some examples, as previously discussed, this is
accomplished via a secure channel between Key Vault 465 and the
cryptlet container executing in the enclave. Regardless of whether
the enclaves are pooled or not, cryptlet fabric 460 may also send
the cryptlet binary to the enclave and the cryptlet may begin
executing in the enclave.
The cryptlet fabric 460 may then generate the cryptlet binding for
the cryptlet and the binding identification associated with the
cryptlet binding for the cryptlet. The cryptlet executing in the
enclave may output a payload that may be digitally signed by at
least the private enclave key of the host enclave, and signed or
encrypted by the cryptlet private key. In some examples, cryptlet
fabric 460 receives the payload.
Cryptlet fabric 460 may also generate the cryptlet identity, as a
combination of the binary hash, the cryptlet public key, and the
binding Id. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then generate a hash digest of
the cryptlet identity, and cause the hash digest of the cryptlet
identity to be provided/communicated to the blockchain ledger in
blockchain network 450, where the hash digest may be recorded on
the blockchain ledger representing the version of logic controlling
the smart contract.
A check may be performed periodically to ensure that the cryptlet
identity version is correct, that the signature is correct, and the
like. In some examples, it is ensured that the cryptlet is not
changed unless all parties agree to the change. In some examples,
if all parties agree to a change in a smart contract, the cryptlet
identity changes accordingly to an updated version. In some
examples, the version of the cryptlet can be checked to ensure that
the cryptlet instance was not changed in a manner that was not
agreed to by all parties. In these examples, if the cryptlet
instance is changed without the change being agreed to by all
parties, the cryptlet instance will no longer function.
In some examples, a cryptlet smart contract includes a contract
cryptlet, the cryptlet binding of the contract cryptlet, and a
smart contract instance stored on a ledger, where the smart
contract ledger instance is also indicated in the cryptlet binding
of the contract cryptlet. The smart contract ledger instance may be
stored on a blockchain such as blockchain network 450, or, instead
of being stored on a blockchain, may be stored on another
datastore. In some examples, the smart contract ledger instance has
a unique public address identified such as
"ox9f37b1e1d82ebcoa163cd45f9fa5b384ea7313e8." The smart contract
ledger instance may include the state of the contract as well as
other relevant information about the contract, as well as the
digital signatures of the identities of the counterparties to the
contract. The smart contract ledger instance may include various
information from the lifetime of the contract, including
information such as payments made, and information such as whether
the contract is active, complete, awaiting counterparty signatures,
or terminated.
In some examples, a smart contract ledger instance in generated in
part from a schema. In some examples, a schema is a smart contract
ledger template, which is used to generate a smart contract ledger
instance in conjunction with basic information about the contract
that needs to be filled in in order to generate the smart contract
ledger instance from the template, which may include, for example,
the initial seed properties for the smart contract. For instance,
for an example smart contract that is a loan agreement, initial
seed properties may include, for example, who the lender is, how
much money is being borrowed, and/or the like. Subsequent terms of
the contract may be determined through later contract negotiation,
as discussed in greater detail below.
In some examples, while the smart contract ledger instance includes
the state of the smart contract, digital signatures, and other
relevant data concerning the smart contract, it is not the complete
smart contract because it does not include the smart contract
logic. The smart contract logic may be performed by a contract
cryptlet for which the cryptlet binding of the contract cryptlet
includes a binding that is a mapping to the unique address of the
corresponding smart contract ledger instance. In some examples, the
cryptlet binding also includes mappings to a set of counterparties
to the contract represented as public keys that may be tied to
other identity systems. These counterparties can represent two or
more people, companies, IoT devices, other smart contracts, and/or
the like. The cryptlet binding may also include external sources.
For example, the external sources may include one or more utility
cryptlets that provide external data that a contract needs for its
logic, such as an interest rate or a market price to calculate a
payment or fee. A utility cryptlet may be used to present, for
example, particular market data and to attest to the value of the
presented market data. The cryptlet binding may include data from
external sources to be received, as well as, for example, how
frequently the external information is to be received.
A cryptlet fabric 460 with installed contract cryptlets may receive
a message, e.g. from counterparty device 416 and/or 417, to make a
new smart contract.
In some examples, the contract cryptlet may require an enclave. If
so, the following may occur in some examples. Cryptlet fabric 460
identifies an enclave to be used for executing the contract
cryptlet. Cryptlet fabric 460 sends a cryptlet container to the
enclave to be executed in the enclave, and the cryptlet container
may fetch the cryptlet key pair for the cryptlet. This may be
accomplished via a secure channel between Key Vault 465 and the
cryptlet container executing in the enclave. Cryptlet fabric 460
may also send the cryptlet binary for the contract cryptlet to the
enclave and the contract cryptlet may begin executing in the
enclave.
In other examples, the contract cryptlet does not need an enclave,
or may need an enclave at a later time but not for the initial
execution of the contract cryptlet. For example, the contract
cryptlet may need to execute in an enclave during certain portions
of time and not others, the portions of time for which the cryptlet
needs to execute in an enclave might not include the initial
execution of the contract cryptlet, for instance. In this case,
cryptlet fabric 460 causes the contract cryptlet to begin
execution. Either way, at this point, in some examples, the
contract cryptlet begins execution, either in an enclave or not in
an enclave.
After the contract cryptlet begins execution, the contract cryptlet
may make a request for information, such as a request for the
initial seed properties of the contract. Cryptlet fabric 460 may
receive the request, and may send a request to the counterparties
(e.g., via counterparty device 416 and/or 417) for the information
requested by the contract cryptlet. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then
receive the response to the request. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then
fetch a schema associated with requested contract. In some
examples, cryptlet fabric 460 may already have a stored copy of the
schema in cryptlet fabric 460; in other examples, cryptlet fabric
460 requests and receives a copy of the schema from a source
external to cryptlet fabric 460.
Based on the information received from the response to the request
and the schema, cryptlet fabric 460 may create a smart contract,
and then cause a smart contract instance to be deployed on a
ledger. In some examples, the ledger is a ledger on blockchain
network 450. In other examples, the ledger is a ledger in a
datastore that is not part of a blockchain.
After the smart contract ledger is deployed, cryptlet fabric 460
may receive the unique address of the smart contract ledger, where
the address acts as the unique identification of the smart contract
ledger instance.
Cryptlet fabric 460 may also generate the cryptlet binding, which
includes bindings for the contract cryptlet. In some examples, each
of these bindings is a mapping between the contract cryptlet and
another cryptlet, a smart contract, or an identification of a
counterparty to the smart contract. The bindings may be used to
route messages between the cryptlet and the other cryptlet or smart
contract to which the cryptlet is mapped by the binding. The
cryptlet binding may represent the properties and/or rules of the
cryptlet. For instance, in an example of a cryptlet that is an
interest rate swap, the cryptlet binding may include the identities
(public key) of the counterparties to the interest rate swap, where
the cryptlet gets interest rate pricing, and how often the cryptlet
gets interest rate pricing.
The cryptlet binding may include a binding that is a mapping
between the contract cryptlet and the unique address of the smart
contract ledger instance, which serves as the unique identification
of the smart contract ledger instance. The cryptlet binding may
also include a binding for each counterparty that is represented as
a public key. The cryptlet binding may include mappings to external
sources of data, such as a mapping to a utility cryptlet that
provides and attests to market data needed by the logic of the
smart contract cryptlet.
Cryptlet fabric 460 may then communicate the cryptlet binding to
the contract cryptlet.
Cryptlet fabric 460 may communicate to the smart contract ledger
instance to update the smart contract ledger instance when
appropriate, such as when there is a state change, or the like.
Cryptlet fabric 460 may also instantiate resources for the contract
cryptlet and route messages through the system. The contract
cryptlet may control the negotiation process for the contract, with
terms being updated as they are agreed upon during the negotiation.
The communication for the negotiation may occur, for example,
between the contract cryptlet and one or more counterparty devices
(e.g., 416 and/or 417) via cryptlet fabric 460. In some examples,
the smart contract is finalized once all parties digitally sign the
smart contract. In some examples, once all parties have digitally
signed the smart contract, then the contract binding is completed,
and the contract cryptlet begins to run the actual contract
logic.
In some examples, after a smart contract is complete, the contract
cryptlet instance no longer exists, but the smart contract ledger
instance still exists, and it is possible afterwards for an
authorized party to review the ledger to obtain historical
information about the contract. In some examples, the contract
cryptlet does not persistently store its state or any other aspects
of the contract; rather, the contract cryptlet uses the smart
contract ledger instance to store the state of the contract
cryptlet and other smart contract data.
As a non-limiting example, an overview of a process that employs
use of a Cryptlet Smart Contract may include:
1. A request for a new contract being made to the cryptlet fabric,
which in some cases is made is to a contract cryptlet that is
executing in waiting or newly instantiated by the fabric to handle
the request to begin the contract creation process.
2. The contract cryptlet takes the new contract request, which
include initial seed information required for starting the contract
which can be as little or as much information needed for that
contract, e.g., contract name, description, first counterparty
(e.g., lender), etc.) The contract cryptlet may validate this
request and generate a contract constructor message that it sends
to the cryptlet fabric. This message may be signed with at least
the cryptlet and its enclave signatures. This message may also be
signed with the first counterparty's signature. This message may
also include the public address(es) in the message for the contract
cryptlet and/or any counterparty(-ies) in the constructor
message.
3. The cryptlet fabric may validate this request, determine the
destination blockchain type, format a blockchain specific
transaction, and route this message to the appropriate blockchain.
In this example, the transaction flows from the cryptlet fabric,
perhaps running in the public or a private cloud to a blockchain
node that can be running anywhere.
4. The blockchain node may validate this message, which in some
cases may first be validated by the CryptoDelegate that validates
the outer layers of the signature onion, e.g., to ensure this
transaction message originates from valid and secure source(s), via
the enclave and cryptlet signatures. The message may then be sent
to the blockchain node for execution. In some cases, a
CryptoDelegate is not available and only the blockchain specific
signature is checked before sending the message to the node for
execution.
5. The blockchain node upon receiving this request for a new
contract via a constructor message may then execute the code
creating the smart contract instance using the defined schema in
the constructor and embedded the public address(es) of the owning
cryptlet contract and any counterparty(-ies) in the appropriate
places within the schema, e.g., to ensure only the contract
cryptlet can update this instance of the contract, and establishes
any counterparty(-ies) in their roles within this contract. This
smart contract is given a unique identifier, usually a public key,
that serves as an address where future messages for interaction can
be sent on that blockchain. This address may be returned from the
constructor message and passed from the node back to the cryptlet
fabric.
6. The cryptlet fabric may receive this address and create a base
cryptlet contract binding. In some examples, the binding includes
references to the contract cryptlet, the smart contract instance
address and any counterparty(-ies) provided in the constructor
message.
7. The cryptlet fabric may then provide this binding to the
contract cryptlet for it to become active with a new composite
identifier, e.g., its binary hash, public address, and the binding
identifier. This contract cryptlet may now be bound to service only
the binding that it is associated with, and will only be allowed to
work with secrets, private keys, for those entities listed in its
binding.
8. In some cases, this binding ID is then passed back to the sender
of the original new contract request, for example a User
Application or perhaps another system. Additional messages sent to
the cryptlet fabric referencing this binding ID should be routed to
the Contract Cryptlet bound with that ID. In some cases, these
additional messages include additional contract details being or to
be added, like loan term, amount borrowed, and counterparty
agreement (e.g., to the terms of the contract). Each of these
messages may be handled by the contract cryptlet, validated,
signed, and delivered as state to the underlying smart contract
address.
9. In some cases, external data is required for a contract to
function, for example, a variable interest rate that can change
from month to month. In these cases, a cryptlet fabric may add a
utility cryptlet to the contract binding. In some examples, this
external data provider portion of the binding includes the
identification of the utility cryptlet providing this data, the
requirements for receiving this external data like an event: time
based, threshold or ad hoc/on demand from the contract cryptlet. In
some cases, these external data update rules are recorded in the
contract and agreed to by all the counterparties as data regarding
the source and circumstances for updates to be accepted. For
example, a rule may define that interest rates are to be determined
on the 5th day of every month a 4:00 PM EST using the 5 Year
Treasury rate+0.10 basis points from source with a name "interest
rate source" and a with a particular public key. Once agreed this
external data source may be added to the cryptlet binding of the
contract cryptlet, and a binding for the utility cryptlet may be
created and sent to the utility cryptlet. The utility cryptlet may
use its binding rules to trigger data updates to be sent to the
contract cryptlet. Any data updates may be signed by the utility
cryptlet and its host enclave, e.g., for validation. External data
updates provided by utility cryptlets to contract cryptlets may be
persisted to the smart contract address with the utility cryptlet
signatures along with calculation results from the contract
cryptlet with signatures, e.g., to provide proofs and attestations
of data validity
10. Once a Cryptlet Binding has a smart contract ledger address,
the counterparty signatures and optional external data source(s)
defined by it becomes fully operational and can usually execute
independently for the full term of the contract, e.g., interacting
via messages relevant to its binding. Such messages may be
associated with payments, receipts, notifications, etc.
Cryptlets may perform advanced, proprietary, private execution with
secrets kept from counterparties, such as private keys or different
variable values for counterparties that should not be shared, e.g.,
terms and prices. In this case, more than one instance of a
cryptlet may be used in order to keep secrets (e.g., keys, contract
terms) in separate secure address spaces, to provide isolation, and
for privacy encryption schemes like ring or threshold encryption
schemes for storing shared secrets on the blockchain. Among other
things, each counterparty may have its own private user key. In
some examples, one of more of the counterparties may have, as
secret, negotiating terms of their portion of the smart contract,
but the total smart contract can still be determined in aggregate
while keeping the negotiating terms of each counterparty
secret.
In some examples, cryptlets each running the same logic in a
separate enclave that are hosting secrets for a single counterparty
in a multi-counterparty smart contract run in a pair for two
counterparties or a ring with more than two counterparties. In some
examples, the cryptlets running in a pair or a ring perform the
same execution logic with different cryptographic keys for signing
and/or secret parameters not shared with others.
Many different types of smart contract execution logic can be
executed in various examples. Some example may include a financial
derivative that is active during market hours, which obtains market
data, calculates distributions, and moves balances dynamically.
In some examples, cryptlets in one of these configurations
participate in simple consensus processes with a witness providing
validation, such as Paxos, a simple 100% match between pairs,
and/or the like. In some examples, the witness also acts as a
notary. As discussed in greater detail below, in some examples, the
witness executes in a separate enclave.
A contract cryptlet typically involves multiple counterparties. In
some examples, cryptlet execution paths are used that follow a
single counterparty workflow where one counterparty executes a step
and signs, releases, and the next counterparty picks up the next
step and can use one instance of a cryptlet at a time with each
instance fetching the counterparty secrets during that step. This
may prevent counterparty secrets from being present in the same
enclave.
In some examples, cryptlets are run as shared code in multiple
enclaves with each enclave hosting a single counterparty's secrets
and signing the counterparty's cryptlet instances output with the
counterparty's private key and submitting it to the cryptlet
pair/ring witness for validation. In various examples, secrets are
not limited to keys for signing or encryption; some of the secrets
can be variables as well.
A ring or pair topology may be used in which counterparties execute
logic at the same time and synchronously agree on the collective
output before persisting the collective output to the underlying
database/blockchain. In some examples, a pair or ring will
instantiate a cryptlet for each counterparty to synchronously run
the shared logic of the cryptlet in the counterparty's own enclave
with only that counterparty's secrets. In some examples, the logic
is then run, and the output is signed/encrypted/computed with the
counterparty's secrets and provided to the witness. In some
examples, after the outputs are provided by the enclaves for the
counterparties, the counterparty results are validated, as
described in greater detail below.
As previously discussed, in a pair or ring topology,
enclave-to-enclave secure tunnels may be used to communicate
securely between enclaves in the ring or pair.
One example of a process for use with a pair or ring topology of
enclaves may proceed as follows. In some examples, prior to the
instantiation of any particular cryptlets, cryptlets and cryptlet
bindings may be generated for later use in particular
instantiations. In some examples, for cryptlets that are used in a
pair or ring, the corresponding cryptlet binding for the cryptlet
will be configured accordingly to that the cryptlet will properly
operates as part of the pair or ring.
In some examples, when a request for a particular cryptlet is made,
and the cryptlet has yet to be instantiated, cryptlet fabric 460
intercepts the request. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then fetch a
corresponding cryptlet binding for the cryptlet. In some examples,
if the cryptlet is to be run in a pair or ring toplogy, then a
cryptlet binding that is configured accordingly is fetched.
Cryptlet fabric 460 may then determine the requirements and
counterparties based on the cryptlet binding. In some examples,
cryptlet fabric 460 then identifies and fetches the enclaves--one
for each counterparty, and also one for the witness if the cryptlet
binding indicates that a witness it to be used. In some examples,
cryptlet fabric 460 then sends/injects a cryptlet container to each
of the fetched enclaves, and each enclave executes the cryptlet
container that was sent to the enclave.
In some examples, the cryptlet containers cause secure tunnels
between each enclave and Key Vault 465, and secure tunnels between
the enclaves. The cryptlet containers may each securely receive
keys and other secrets from Key Vault 465. By providing properly
configured cryptlet containers to the enclaves, cryptlet fabric 460
may cause secrets associated with each counterparty to be securely
provided to each corresponding enclave.
In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 provides to each of the
enclaves the cryptlet binding. In some examples, cryptlet fabric
460 may send cryptlet binaries to each of the cryptlets. In some
examples, each of the cryptlets then executes in the enclave. In
some examples, the cryptlet running for each enclave are identical
to each other and include identical execution logic, with the
difference being only in the secrets of each enclave. In some
examples, execution of cryptlets occurs in the manner described
above. In some examples, the execution logic is the same for the
enclave of each counterparty--the only difference is in secrets,
which may include keys. In some examples, the enclave for each
counterparty then should provide the same payload as the enclave
for each other counterparty, except that, for example, signatures
may be different. In some examples, after the enclave for each
party generates a payload, the counterparty results are validated.
In some examples, the validity of the payloads from each party are
validated such that some computed fields need to match or agree,
but others do not, such as the sum of some inputs, but the order of
the inputs may differ. In some examples, the signatures are also
different.
In some examples, the witness is also running in an enclave and
validates the counterparty results and determines if consensus is
achieved, and if consensus is achieved, the witness sends the
signed output to the Cryptlet Fabric 460 for delivery to the data
tier. In some examples, a Cryptlet Pair witness simply requires
output validation equality and issues re-compute commands to
cryptlet payloads that don't validate. In some examples, the
witness determines whether the payload of each cryptlet in the ring
or pair is the same as each of the other payloads. In some
examples, a Cryptlet Ring can use a consensus protocol such as
Paxos or the like to achieve consensus. After validation and/or
consensus, cryptlet fabric 460 may provide the collective output to
the data tier. In some examples, the collective output is then
persisted on blockchain network 450.
In some examples, the ring or pair topology allows secure
multi-party computing to be performed for blockchains or other
shared applications while allowing counterparties to have secrets
isolated from each other. In some examples, the counterparties each
execute logic at the same time, and synchronously agree on the
collective output in the manner described before persisting the
collective output to the blockchain.
In some examples, for a cryptlet that is to be used in a ring or a
pair topology, the cryptlet binding for the cryptlet is configured
accordingly. In some examples, the cryptlet binding for the
cryptlet to be used in a ring or pair topology indicates the
requirements and the counterparties.
In some examples, ring encryption may be used. In some examples in
which ring encryption is used, the private keys of each of the
counterparties may be loaded, and a ring signature generated. In
some examples, instead of using a witness, ring encryption may be
used and the payloads can all be broadcast and processed at
substantially the same time.
Examples herein have been given of enclave pair and ring topologies
used in conjunction with a blockchain network. However, enclave
pair and ring topologies may also be used for cryptlets in other
contexts, some of which involve a blockchain network and some of
which do not involve a blockchain network. That is, enclave pair
and ring topologies may be used in applications that do not involve
blockchain networks.
Illustrative Processes
For clarity, the processes described herein are described in terms
of operations performed in particular sequences by particular
devices or components of a system. However, it is noted that other
processes are not limited to the stated sequences, devices, or
components. For example, certain acts may be performed in different
sequences, in parallel, omitted, or may be supplemented by
additional acts or features, whether or not such sequences,
parallelisms, acts, or features are described herein. Likewise, any
of the technology described in this disclosure may be incorporated
into the described processes or other processes, whether or not
that technology is specifically described in conjunction with a
process. The disclosed processes may also be performed on or by
other devices, components, or systems, whether or not such devices,
components, or systems are described herein. These processes may
also be embodied in a variety of ways. For example, they may be
embodied on an article of manufacture, e.g., as processor-readable
instructions stored in a processor-readable storage medium or be
performed as a computer-implemented process. As an alternate
example, these processes may be encoded as processor-executable
instructions and transmitted via a communications medium.
FIGS. 5A-5B are an example dataflow for a process (580). In some
examples, process 580 is performed by a cryptlet fabric, e.g.,
cryptlet fabric 460 of FIG. 4.
In the illustrated example, step 581 occurs first. At step 581, in
some examples, a first enclave for use by a first counterparty to a
smart contract is identified. As shown, step 582 occurs next in
some examples. At step 582, in some examples, a second enclave for
use by a second counterparty to a smart contract is identified. As
shown, step 583 occurs next in some examples. At step 583, in some
examples, secrets associated with the first counterparty are caused
to be securely provided to the first enclave. As shown, step 584
occurs next in some examples. At step 584, in some examples,
secrets associated with the second counterparty are caused to be
securely provided to the second enclave.
As shown, step 585 occurs next in some examples. At step 585, in
some examples, a cryptlet is caused to be provided to the first
enclave. As shown, step 586 occurs next in some examples. At step
586, in some examples, the cryptlet is caused to be provided to the
second enclave. As shown, step 587 occurs next in some examples. At
step 587, in some examples, a payload is received from the first
enclave. As shown, step 588 occurs next in some examples. At step
588, in some examples, a payload is received from the second
enclave. As shown, step 589 occurs next in some examples. At step
589, in some examples, validation is caused to be performed for the
plurality of payloads. In some examples, the plurality of payloads
includes the payload from the first enclave and the payload from
the second enclave.
The process may then proceed to the return block, where other
processing is resumed.
CONCLUSION
While the above Detailed Description describes certain examples of
the technology, and describes the best mode contemplated, no matter
how detailed the above appears in text, the technology can be
practiced in many ways. Details may vary in implementation, while
still being encompassed by the technology described herein. As
noted above, particular terminology used when describing certain
features or aspects of the technology should not be taken to imply
that the terminology is being redefined herein to be restricted to
any specific characteristics, features, or aspects with which that
terminology is associated. In general, the terms used in the
following claims should not be construed to limit the technology to
the specific examples disclosed herein, unless the Detailed
Description explicitly defines such terms. Accordingly, the actual
scope of the technology encompasses not only the disclosed
examples, but also all equivalent ways of practicing or
implementing the technology.
* * * * *
References