U.S. patent application number 17/395968 was filed with the patent office on 2021-12-02 for malware classification and attribution through server fingerprinting using server certificate data.
This patent application is currently assigned to Cisco Technology, Inc.. The applicant listed for this patent is Cisco Technology, Inc.. Invention is credited to Blake Harrell Anderson, Martin Grill, David McGrew, Ivan Nikolaev, Subharthi Paul.
Application Number | 20210377283 17/395968 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 1000005767945 |
Filed Date | 2021-12-02 |
United States Patent
Application |
20210377283 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Anderson; Blake Harrell ; et
al. |
December 2, 2021 |
MALWARE CLASSIFICATION AND ATTRIBUTION THROUGH SERVER
FINGERPRINTING USING SERVER CERTIFICATE DATA
Abstract
In one embodiment, a device in a network receives certificate
data for an encrypted traffic flow associated with a client node in
the network. The device determines one or more data features from
the certificate data. The device determines one or more flow
characteristics of the encrypted traffic flow. The device performs
a classification of an application executed by the client node and
associated with the encrypted traffic flow by using a machine
learning-based classifier to assess the one or more data features
from the certificate data and the one or more flow characteristics
of the traffic flow. The device causes performance of a network
action based on a result of the classification of the
application.
Inventors: |
Anderson; Blake Harrell;
(Chapel Hill, NC) ; McGrew; David; (Poolesville,
MD) ; Paul; Subharthi; (San Jose, CA) ;
Nikolaev; Ivan; (Prague, CZ) ; Grill; Martin;
(Prague 9, CZ) |
|
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
Cisco Technology, Inc. |
San Jose |
CA |
US |
|
|
Assignee: |
Cisco Technology, Inc.
|
Family ID: |
1000005767945 |
Appl. No.: |
17/395968 |
Filed: |
August 6, 2021 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
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16869726 |
May 8, 2020 |
11108810 |
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17395968 |
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15353160 |
Nov 16, 2016 |
10686831 |
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16869726 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
1/1 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G06N 20/00 20190101;
H04L 63/1408 20130101; H04L 63/145 20130101; H04L 63/0428
20130101 |
International
Class: |
H04L 29/06 20060101
H04L029/06 |
Claims
1. A method comprising: obtaining, by a device in a network,
certificate data of an encrypted traffic flow sent from a client
node in the network to a remote server, wherein the certificate
data of the encrypted traffic flow is passively intercepted by an
intermediary device between the client node and the remote server
without a man-in-the-middle; determining, by the device, one or
more data features from the certificate data of the encrypted
traffic flow; determining, by the device, one or more flow
characteristics of the encrypted traffic flow; performing, by the
device, a classification of an application executed by the client
node and associated with the encrypted traffic flow by using a
machine learning-based classifier to assess the one or more data
features from the certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow
and the one or more flow characteristics of the encrypted traffic
flow, wherein the machine learning-based classifier assesses the
certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow without decrypting
the encrypted traffic flow; and causing, by the device, performance
of a network action based on a result of the classification of the
application.
2. The method as in claim 1, wherein the classification indicates
that the application is malware.
3. The method as in claim 1, wherein the network action comprises
at least one of: blocking the encrypted traffic flow or sending a
notification in the network regarding the classification.
4. The method as in claim 1, wherein the one or more flow
characteristics comprise one or more of: sequence of packet lengths
and time (SPLT) data regarding the encrypted traffic flow, sequence
of application lengths and time (SALT) data regarding the encrypted
traffic flow, byte distribution (BD) data regarding the encrypted
traffic flow, a ciphersuite, or a Transport Layer Security (TLS)
extension.
5. The method as in claim 1, wherein the one or more data features
from the certificate data comprise one or more of: a subjectAltName
entry, a certificate validity time period, or a subject common name
identifier.
6. The method as in claim 1, wherein the machine learning-based
classifier is configured to assess one or more of: a length of a
subject common name identifier, a character frequency of the
subject common name identifier, a certificate validity time period,
or a number of subjectAltName entries.
7. The method as in claim 1, further comprising: performing, by the
device, the classification of the application based in part on an
assessment of the one or more data features from the certificate
data by a rule-based analyzer.
8. The method as in claim 1, further comprising: using, by the
device, a training set of one or more data features of a plurality
of certificates to train the machine learning-based classifier.
9. The method as in claim 1, wherein obtaining the certificate data
of the encrypted traffic flow comprises: receiving, by the device,
the certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow from the
intermediary device that passively intercepts the certificate data
of the encrypted traffic flow.
10. An apparatus, comprising: one or more network interfaces to
communicate with a network; a processor coupled to the one or more
network interfaces and configured to execute one or more processes;
and a memory configured to store a process that is executable by
the processor, the process when executed operable to: obtain
certificate data of an encrypted traffic flow sent from a client
node in the network to a remote server, wherein the certificate
data of the encrypted traffic flow is passively intercepted by an
intermediary device between the client node and the remote server
without a man-in-the-middle; determine one or more data features
from the certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow; determine
one or more flow characteristics of the encrypted traffic flow;
perform a classification of an application executed by the client
node and associated with the encrypted traffic flow by using a
machine learning-based classifier to assess the one or more data
features from the certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow
and the one or more flow characteristics of the encrypted traffic
flow, wherein the machine learning-based classifier assesses the
certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow without decrypting
the encrypted traffic flow; and cause performance of a network
action based on a result of the classification of the
application.
11. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the classification
indicates that the application is malware.
12. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the network action
comprises at least one of: blocking the encrypted traffic flow or
sending a notification in the network regarding the
classification.
13. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the one or more flow
characteristics comprise one or more of: sequence of packet lengths
and time (SPLT) data regarding the encrypted traffic flow, sequence
of application lengths and time (SALT) data regarding the encrypted
traffic flow, byte distribution (BD) data regarding the encrypted
traffic flow, a ciphersuite, or a Transport Layer Security (TLS)
extension.
14. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the one or more data
features from the certificate data comprise one or more of: a
subjectAltName entry, a certificate validity time period, or a
subject common name identifier.
15. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the machine
learning-based classifier is configured to assess one or more of: a
length of a subject common name identifier, a character frequency
of the subject common name identifier, a certificate validity time
period, or a number of subjectAltName entries.
16. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the process when executed
is further operable to: perform the classification of the
application based in part on an assessment of the one or more data
features from the certificate data by a rule-based analyzer.
17. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the process when executed
is further operable to: use a training set of one or more data
features of a plurality of certificates to train the machine
learning-based classifier.
18. The apparatus as in claim 10, wherein the apparatus obtains the
certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow by receiving the
certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow from the
intermediary device that passively intercepts the certificate data
of the encrypted traffic flow.
19. A tangible, non-transitory, computer-readable medium that
stores program instructions that cause a device in a network to
execute a process comprising: obtaining, by the device, certificate
data of an encrypted traffic flow sent from a client node in the
network to a remote server, wherein the certificate data of the
encrypted traffic flow is passively intercepted by an intermediary
device between the client node and the remote server without a
man-in-the-middle; determining, by the device, one or more data
features from the certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow;
determining, by the device, one or more flow characteristics of the
encrypted traffic flow; performing, by the device, a classification
of an application executed by the client node and associated with
the encrypted traffic flow by using a machine learning-based
classifier to assess the one or more data features from the
certificate data of the encrypted traffic flow and the one or more
flow characteristics of the encrypted traffic flow, wherein the
machine learning-based classifier assesses the certificate data of
the encrypted traffic flow without decrypting the encrypted traffic
flow; and causing, by the device, performance of a network action
based on a result of the classification of the application.
20. The tangible, non-transitory, computer-readable medium as in
claim 19, wherein: the one or more data features from the
certificate data comprises one or more of: a subjectAltName entry,
a certificate validity time period, or a subject common name
identifier, and the one or more flow characteristics comprise one
or more of: sequence of packet lengths and time (SPLT) data
regarding the encrypted traffic flow, sequence of application
lengths and time (SALT) data regarding the encrypted traffic flow,
byte distribution (BD) data regarding the encrypted traffic flow, a
ciphersuite, or a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension.
Description
CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0001] This application is a Continuation Application of U.S.
patent application Ser. No. 16/869,726, filed on May 8, 2020,
entitled MALWARE CLASSIFICATION AND ATTRIBUTION THROUGH SERVER
FINGERPRINTING USING SERVER CERTIFICATE DATA, by Blake Harrell
Anderson, et al., and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/353,160,
filed on Nov. 16, 2016, entitled MALWARE CLASSIFICATION AND
ATTRIBUTION THROUGH SERVER FINGERPRINTING USING SERVER CERTIFICATE
DATA, by Blake Harrell Anderson, et al., the contents of which are
incorporated herein by reference.
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0002] The present disclosure relates generally to computer
networks, and, more particularly, to malware classification and
attribution in a network through server fingerprinting using server
certificate data.
BACKGROUND
[0003] Malicious network traffic can take many different forms. For
example, some traffic may seek to overwhelm a service by sending a
large number of requests to the service. Such attacks are also
sometimes known as denial of service (DoS) attacks. Other forms of
malicious traffic may seek to exfiltrate sensitive information from
a network, such as credit card numbers, trade secrets, and the
like. Typically, such traffic is generated by a client that has
been infected with malware. Thus, a further type of malicious
network traffic includes network traffic that propagates the
malware itself.
[0004] Intrusion protection systems (IPS), firewalls, and flow
monitoring systems generally attempt to detect and block malicious
traffic, whenever possible. However, in recent years, the amount of
encrypted network traffic has increased considerably. Notably, with
the advent of transport layer security (TLS) and other security
mechanisms, many websites are now encrypting even traditional
webpage data. This presents certain challenges to security systems
as the contents of the traffic may not be available for analysis
and pattern matching is generally inapplicable to encrypted
traffic.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0005] The embodiments herein may be better understood by referring
to the following description in conjunction with the accompanying
drawings in which like reference numerals indicate identically or
functionally similar elements, of which:
[0006] FIGS. 1A-1B illustrate an example communication network;
[0007] FIG. 2 illustrates an example network device/node; and
[0008] FIG. 3 illustrates an example of a network device capturing
traffic data;
[0009] FIGS. 4A-4B illustrate example plots of certificate data
features for benign and malware-generated traffic; and
[0010] FIG. 5 illustrates an example simplified procedure for using
certificate data to classify an application.
DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS
Overview
[0011] According to one or more embodiments of the disclosure, a
device in a network receives certificate data for an encrypted
traffic flow associated with a client node in the network. The
device determines one or more data features from the certificate
data. The device determines one or more flow characteristics of the
encrypted traffic flow. The device performs a classification of an
application executed by the client node and associated with the
encrypted traffic flow by using a machine learning-based classifier
to assess the one or more data features from the certificate data
and the one or more flow characteristics of the traffic flow. The
device causes performance of a network action based on a result of
the classification of the application.
DESCRIPTION
[0012] A computer network is a geographically distributed
collection of nodes interconnected by communication links and
segments for transporting data between end nodes, such as personal
computers and workstations, or other devices, such as sensors, etc.
Many types of networks are available, with the types ranging from
local area networks (LANs) to wide area networks (WANs). LANs
typically connect the nodes over dedicated private communications
links located in the same general physical location, such as a
building or campus. WANs, on the other hand, typically connect
geographically dispersed nodes over long-distance communications
links, such as common carrier telephone lines, optical lightpaths,
synchronous optical networks (SONET), or synchronous digital
hierarchy (SDH) links, or Powerline Communications (PLC) such as
IEEE 61334, IEEE P1901.2, and others. The Internet is an example of
a WAN that connects disparate networks throughout the world,
providing global communication between nodes on various networks.
The nodes typically communicate over the network by exchanging
discrete frames or packets of data according to predefined
protocols, such as the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP). In this context, a protocol consists of a set of
rules defining how the nodes interact with each other. Computer
networks may further be interconnected by an intermediate net81work
node, such as a router, to extend the effective "size" of each
network.
[0013] Smart object networks, such as sensor networks, in
particular, are a specific type of network having spatially
distributed autonomous devices such as sensors, actuators, etc.,
that cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions at
different locations, such as, e.g., energy/power consumption,
resource consumption (e.g., water/gas/etc. for advanced metering
infrastructure or "AMI" applications) temperature, pressure,
vibration, sound, radiation, motion, pollutants, etc. Other types
of smart objects include actuators, e.g., responsible for turning
on/off an engine or perform any other actions. Sensor networks, a
type of smart object network, are typically shared-media networks,
such as wireless networks. That is, in addition to one or more
sensors, each sensor device (node) in a sensor network may
generally be equipped with a radio transceiver or other
communication port, a microcontroller, and an energy source, such
as a battery. Often, smart object networks are considered field
area networks (FANs), neighborhood area networks (NANs), personal
area networks (PANs), etc. Generally, size and cost constraints on
smart object nodes (e.g., sensors) result in corresponding
constraints on resources such as energy, memory, computational
speed and bandwidth.
[0014] FIG. 1A is a schematic block diagram of an example computer
network 100 illustratively comprising nodes/devices, such as a
plurality of routers/devices interconnected by links or networks,
as shown. For example, customer edge (CE) routers 110 may be
interconnected with provider edge (PE) routers 120 (e.g., PE-1,
PE-2, and PE-3) in order to communicate across a core network, such
as an illustrative network backbone 130. For example, routers 110,
120 may be interconnected by the public Internet, a multiprotocol
label switching (MPLS) virtual private network (VPN), or the like.
Data packets 140 (e.g., traffic/messages) may be exchanged among
the nodes/devices of the computer network 100 over links using
predefined network communication protocols such as the Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), User Datagram Protocol
(UDP), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) protocol, Frame Relay
protocol, or any other suitable protocol. Those skilled in the art
will understand that any number of nodes, devices, links, etc. may
be used in the computer network, and that the view shown herein is
for simplicity.
[0015] In some implementations, a router or a set of routers may be
connected to a private network (e.g., dedicated leased lines, an
optical network, etc.) or a virtual private network (VPN), such as
an MPLS VPN, thanks to a carrier network, via one or more links
exhibiting very different network and service level agreement
characteristics. For the sake of illustration, a given customer
site may fall under any of the following categories:
[0016] 1.) Site Type A: a site connected to the network (e.g., via
a private or VPN link) using a single CE router and a single link,
with potentially a backup link (e.g., a 3G/4G/LTE backup
connection). For example, a particular CE router 110 shown in
network 100 may support a given customer site, potentially also
with a backup link, such as a wireless connection.
[0017] 2.) Site Type B: a site connected to the network using two
MPLS VPN links (e.g., from different service providers), with
potentially a backup link (e.g., a 3G/4G/LTE connection). A site of
type B may itself be of different types:
[0018] 2a.) Site Type B1: a site connected to the network using two
MPLS VPN links (e.g., from different service providers), with
potentially a backup link (e.g., a 3G/4G/LTE connection).
[0019] 2b.) Site Type B2: a site connected to the network using one
MPLS VPN link and one link connected to the public Internet, with
potentially a backup link (e.g., a 3G/4G/LTE connection). For
example, a particular customer site may be connected to network 100
via PE-3 and via a separate Internet connection, potentially also
with a wireless backup link.
[0020] 2c.) Site Type B3: a site connected to the network using two
links connected to the public Internet, with potentially a backup
link (e.g., a 3G/4G/LTE connection).
[0021] Notably, MPLS VPN links are usually tied to a committed
service level agreement, whereas Internet links may either have no
service level agreement at all or a loose service level agreement
(e.g., a "Gold Package" Internet service connection that guarantees
a certain level of performance to a customer site).
[0022] 3.) Site Type C: a site of type B (e.g., types B1, B2 or B3)
but with more than one CE router (e.g., a first CE router connected
to one link while a second CE router is connected to the other
link), and potentially a backup link (e.g., a wireless 3G/4G/LTE
backup link). For example, a particular customer site may include a
first CE router 110 connected to PE-2 and a second CE router 110
connected to PE-3.
[0023] FIG. 1B illustrates an example of network 100 in greater
detail, according to various embodiments. As shown, network
backbone 130 may provide connectivity between devices located in
different geographical areas and/or different types of local
networks. For example, network 100 may comprise local networks 160,
162 that include devices/nodes 10-16 and devices/nodes 18-20,
respectively, as well as a data center/cloud environment 150 that
includes servers 152-154. Notably, local networks 160-162 and data
center/cloud environment 150 may be located in different geographic
locations.
[0024] Servers 152-154 may include, in various embodiments, a
network management server (NMS), a dynamic host configuration
protocol (DHCP) server, a constrained application protocol (CoAP)
server, an outage management system (OMS), an application policy
infrastructure controller (APIC), an application server, etc. As
would be appreciated, network 100 may include any number of local
networks, data centers, cloud environments, devices/nodes, servers,
etc.
[0025] The techniques herein may also be applied to other network
topologies and configurations. For example, the techniques herein
may be applied to peering points with high-speed links, data
centers, etc. Further, in various embodiments, network 100 may
include one or more mesh networks, such as an Internet of Things
network. Loosely, the term "Internet of Things" or "IoT" refers to
uniquely identifiable objects/things and their virtual
representations in a network-based architecture. In particular, the
next frontier in the evolution of the Internet is the ability to
connect more than just computers and communications devices, but
rather the ability to connect "objects" in general, such as lights,
appliances, vehicles, heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning
(HVAC), windows and window shades and blinds, doors, locks, etc.
The "Internet of Things" thus generally refers to the
interconnection of objects (e.g., smart objects), such as sensors
and actuators, over a computer network (e.g., via IP), which may be
the public Internet or a private network.
[0026] Notably, shared-media mesh networks, such as wireless
networks, etc., are often on what is referred to as Low-Power and
Lossy Networks (LLNs), which are a class of network in which both
the routers and their interconnect are constrained. In particular,
LLN routers typically operate with highly constrained resources,
e.g., processing power, memory, and/or energy (battery), and their
interconnections are characterized by, illustratively, high loss
rates, low data rates, and/or instability. LLNs are comprised of
anything from a few dozen to thousands or even millions of LLN
routers, and support point-to-point traffic (e.g., between devices
inside the LLN), point-to-multipoint traffic (e.g., from a central
control point such at the root node to a subset of devices inside
the LLN), and multipoint-to-point traffic (e.g., from devices
inside the LLN towards a central control point). Often, an IoT
network is implemented with an LLN-like architecture. For example,
as shown, local network 160 may be an LLN in which CE-2 operates as
a root node for nodes/devices 10-16 in the local mesh, in some
embodiments.
[0027] FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of an example
node/device 200 that may be used with one or more embodiments
described herein, e.g., as any of the computing devices shown in
FIGS. 1A-1B, particularly the PE routers 120, CE routers 110,
nodes/device 10-20, servers 152-154 (e.g., a network controller
located in a data center, etc.), any other computing device that
supports the operations of network 100 (e.g., switches, etc.), or
any of the other devices referenced below. The device 200 may also
be any other suitable type of device depending upon the type of
network architecture in place, such as IoT nodes, etc. Device 200
comprises one or more network interfaces 210, one or more
processors 220, and a memory 240 interconnected by a system bus
250, and is powered by a power supply 260.
[0028] The network interfaces 210 include the mechanical,
electrical, and signaling circuitry for communicating data over
physical links coupled to the network 100. The network interfaces
may be configured to transmit and/or receive data using a variety
of different communication protocols. Notably, a physical network
interface 210 may also be used to implement one or more virtual
network interfaces, such as for virtual private network (VPN)
access, known to those skilled in the art.
[0029] The memory 240 comprises a plurality of storage locations
that are addressable by the processor(s) 220 and the network
interfaces 210 for storing software programs and data structures
associated with the embodiments described herein. The processor 220
may comprise necessary elements or logic adapted to execute the
software programs and manipulate the data structures 245. An
operating system 242 (e.g., the Internetworking Operating System,
or IOS.RTM., of Cisco Systems, Inc., another operating system,
etc.), portions of which are typically resident in memory 240 and
executed by the processor(s), functionally organizes the node by,
inter alia, invoking network operations in support of software
processors and/or services executing on the device. These software
processors and/or services may comprise a certificate analysis
process 244 and/or a flow classifier process 248.
[0030] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that other
processor and memory types, including various computer-readable
media, may be used to store and execute program instructions
pertaining to the techniques described herein. Also, while the
description illustrates various processes, it is expressly
contemplated that various processes may be embodied as modules
configured to operate in accordance with the techniques herein
(e.g., according to the functionality of a similar process).
Further, while processes may be shown and/or described separately,
those skilled in the art will appreciate that processes may be
routines or modules within other processes.
[0031] In various embodiments, certificate analysis process 244 may
be configured to capture and/or analyze certificate data associated
with an encrypted traffic flow. Such a flow may be, for example, a
Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL) traffic
flow that uses X.509 certificates or the like. In turn, certificate
analysis process 244 may provide the extracted data feature(s) of
the certificate to classifier process 248 for analysis.
[0032] In general, classifier process 248 may execute one or more
machine learning-based classifiers to classify encrypted traffic in
the network (and its originating application) for any number of
purposes. In one embodiment, classifier process 248 may assess
captured traffic data to determine whether a given traffic flow or
set of flows are caused by malware in the network, such as a
particular family of malware applications. Example forms of traffic
that can be caused by malware may include, but are not limited to,
traffic flows reporting exfiltrated data to a remote entity,
spyware or ransomware-related flows, command and control (C2)
traffic that oversees the operation of the deployed malware,
traffic that is part of a network attack, such as a zero day attack
or denial of service (DoS) attack, combinations thereof, or the
like. In further embodiments, classifier process 248 may classify
the gathered traffic data to detect other anomalous behaviors
(e.g., malfunctioning devices, misconfigured devices, etc.),
traffic pattern changes (e.g., a group of hosts begin sending
significantly more or less traffic), or the like.
[0033] Classifier process 248 may employ any number of machine
learning techniques, to classify the gathered traffic data. In
general, machine learning is concerned with the design and the
development of techniques that receive empirical data as input
(e.g., traffic data regarding traffic in the network) and recognize
complex patterns in the input data. For example, some machine
learning techniques use an underlying model M, whose parameters are
optimized for minimizing the cost function associated to M, given
the input data. For instance, in the context of classification, the
model M may be a straight line that separates the data into two
classes (e.g., labels) such that M=a*x+b*y+c and the cost function
is a function of the number of misclassified points. The learning
process then operates by adjusting the parameters a,b,c such that
the number of misclassified points is minimal. After this
optimization/learning phase, classifier process 244 can use the
model M to classify new data points, such as information regarding
new traffic flows in the network. Often, M is a statistical model,
and the cost function is inversely proportional to the likelihood
of M, given the input data.
[0034] In various embodiments, classifier process 248 may employ
one or more supervised, unsupervised, or semi-supervised machine
learning models. Generally, supervised learning entails the use of
a training set of data, as noted above, that is used to train the
model to apply labels to the input data. For example, the training
data may include sample traffic data that is "normal," or
"malware-generated." On the other end of the spectrum are
unsupervised techniques that do not require a training set of
labels. Notably, while a supervised learning model may look for
previously seen attack patterns that have been labeled as such, an
unsupervised model may instead look to whether there are sudden
changes in the behavior of the network traffic. Semi-supervised
learning models take a middle ground approach that uses a greatly
reduced set of labeled training data.
[0035] Example machine learning techniques that classifier process
248 can employ may include, but are not limited to, nearest
neighbor (NN) techniques (e.g., k-NN models, replicator NN models,
etc.), statistical techniques (e.g., Bayesian networks, etc.),
clustering techniques (e.g., k-means, mean-shift, etc.), neural
networks (e.g., reservoir networks, artificial neural networks,
etc.), support vector machines (SVMs), logistic or other
regression, Markov models or chains, principal component analysis
(PCA) (e.g., for linear models), multi-layer perceptron (MLP) ANNs
(e.g., for non-linear models), replicating reservoir networks
(e.g., for non-linear models, typically for time series), random
forest classification, or the like.
[0036] The performance of a machine learning model can be evaluated
in a number of ways based on the number of true positives, false
positives, true negatives, and/or false negatives of the model. For
example, the false positives of the model may refer to the number
of traffic flows that are incorrectly classified as
malware-generated, anomalous, etc. Conversely, the false negatives
of the model may refer to the number of traffic flows that the
model incorrectly classifies as normal, when actually
malware-generated, anomalous, etc. True negatives and positives may
refer to the number of traffic flows that the model correctly
classifies as normal or malware-generated, etc., respectively.
Related to these measurements are the concepts of recall and
precision. Generally, recall refers to the ratio of true positives
to the sum of true positives and false negatives, which quantifies
the sensitivity of the model. Similarly, precision refers to the
ratio of true positives the sum of true and false positives.
[0037] In some cases, classifier process 248 may assess the
captured traffic data on a per-flow basis. In other embodiments,
classifier process 248 may assess traffic data for a plurality of
traffic flows based on any number of different conditions. For
example, traffic flows may be grouped based on their sources,
destinations, temporal characteristics (e.g., flows that occur
around the same time, etc.), combinations thereof, or based on any
other set of flow characteristics.
[0038] As shown in FIG. 3, various mechanisms can be leveraged to
capture information about traffic in a network. For example,
consider the case in which client node 10 initiates a traffic flow
with remote server 154 that includes any number of packets 302. Any
number of networking devices along the path of the flow may analyze
and assess packet 302, to capture traffic data regarding the
traffic flow. For example, as shown, consider the case of edge
router CE-2 through which the traffic between node 10 and server
154 flows.
[0039] In some embodiments, a networking device may analyze packet
headers, to capture information about the traffic flow. For
example, router CE-2 may capture the source address and/or port of
host node 10, the destination address and/or port of server 154,
the protocol(s) used by packet 302, or other header information by
analyzing the header of a packet 302. In further embodiments, the
device may also assess the payload of the packet to capture
information about the traffic flow. For example, router CE-2 or
another device may perform deep packet inspection (DPI) on one or
more of packets 302, to assess the contents of the packet. Doing so
may, for example, yield additional information that can be used to
determine the application associated with the traffic flow (e.g.,
packets 302 were sent by a web browser of node 10, packets 302 were
sent by a videoconferencing application, etc.).
[0040] The networking device that captures the traffic data may
also compute any number of statistics or metrics regarding the
traffic flow. For example, CE-2 may determine the start time, end
time, duration, packet size(s), the distribution of bytes within a
flow, etc., associated with the traffic flow by observing packets
302.
[0041] As noted above, encryption in network traffic, and in data
such as files that transit networks, is rapidly increasing.
Notably, a recent test of malware indicated that approximately 10%
now use TLS. This poses major challenges with respect to visibility
and threat detection because certain technologies, such as deep
packet inspection (DPI), cannot be applied to encrypted traffic. In
terms of visibility, being able to detect encrypted traffic over
unconventional ports, such as DNS, could indicate out-of-policy
tunnels or data exfiltration. More specifically, the detection of
cryptographic protocols independent of the ports being utilized
gives valuable knowledge to network administrators. In terms of
threat detection, characterizing encrypted traffic as malicious has
numerous benefits and would allow network administrators to
identify when encrypted files transit the network using
non-encrypted protocols such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP), which is another data exfiltration method.
[0042] It may be possible to use a man-in-the-middle approach to
decrypt and inspect encrypted network traffic. For example, a proxy
between a client device and a server may act as an intermediary to
obtain the cryptographic information needed to decrypt the traffic.
However, such approaches are often cumbersome, raise a number of
privacy concerns, and may even be prohibited by law in some
jurisdictions.
[0043] Malware Classification and Attribution Through Server
Fingerprinting Using Server Certificate Data
[0044] The techniques herein allow for the detection of malware
through the analysis of data elements extracted from server or
client certificates associated with encrypted traffic flows (e.g.,
by a passive network monitoring device, etc.). In some aspects, the
extracted data elements can be used to determine data features for
input to a machine learning-based classifier or, alternatively, a
rule or signature-based system. Particularly, a TLS server
certificate often has a unique view of a TLS connection and the
techniques herein may leverage this information for improved threat
detection and threat attribution.
[0045] Specifically, according to one or more embodiments of the
disclosure as described in detail below, a device in a network
receives certificate data for an encrypted traffic flow associated
with a client node in the network. The device determines one or
more data features from the certificate data. The device determines
one or more flow characteristics of the encrypted traffic flow. The
device performs a classification of an application executed by the
client node and associated with the encrypted traffic flow by using
a machine learning-based classifier to assess the one or more data
features from the certificate data and the one or more flow
characteristics of the traffic flow. The device causes performance
of a network action based on a result of the classification of the
application.
[0046] Illustratively, the techniques described herein may be
performed by hardware, software, and/or firmware, such as in
accordance with flow classifier process 248, which may include
computer executable instructions executed by the processor 220 to
perform functions relating to the techniques described herein,
e.g., in conjunction with certificate analysis process 244.
[0047] Operationally, the executing device may extract data
elements from the X.509 certificate(s) from a TLS/SSL session, such
as the subjectAltNames, the common name, the validity period of the
certificate, or any other data available from the certificate(s).
For example, CE-2 shown in FIG. 3 or another passive network
monitoring device located between client node 10 and a remote
server 154 may passively intercept packets 302 of the encrypted
traffic flow, to capture data regarding the certificate(s)
themselves and potentially the flow, as well. In turn, the captured
certificate data can be used to form any number of data features
for input to a machine learning-based classifier or rule-based
system. In further embodiments, the certificate features can also
be combined with other flow characteristics related to the TLS
session (e.g., metrics regarding the traffic flow, the ciphersuite
in use or offered, TLS extensions, etc.), to determine whether the
application executed by the client and associated with the traffic
flow is malware. If so, the classifier may also be configured to
identify the malware family to which the application belongs.
[0048] A preliminary study was performed to assess the effects of
analyzing certificate data for purposes of malware detection and
attribution. In the study, server certificates from a large malware
dataset were contrasted with other, live traffic data in
production. A listing of the malware families, number of samples,
and resulting encrypted flows that successfully negotiated a TLS
handshake and sent application data is shown below:
TABLE-US-00001 TABLE 1 Malware Family Unique Samples Encrypted
Flows Bergat 192 332 Deshacop 69 129 Dridex 38 103 Dynamer 118 372
Kazy 228 1,152 Parite 111 275 Razy 117 564 Sality 612 1,200 Skeeyah
81 218 Symmi 494 2,618 Tescrypt 137 205 Toga 156 404 Upatre 377 891
Virlock 1,208 12,847 Virtob 115 511 Yakes 100 337 Zbot 1,291 2,902
Zusy 179 733 TOTAL 5,623 25,793
[0049] This resulted in the following observations regarding the
certificates used:
TABLE-US-00002 TABLE 2 Number of Malware Number Unique Server
Self-Signed Certificate Family of Flows IPs Certs Subject Bergat
332 12 0 www.dropbox.com Deshacop 129 38 0 *.onion.to Dridex 103 10
89 amthonoup.cy Dynamer 372 155 3 www.dropbox.com Kazy 1,152 225 52
*.onestore.ms Parite 275 128 0 *.google.com Razy 564 118 16
baidu.com Sality 1,200 323 4 vastusdomains.com Skeeyah 218 90 0
www.dropbox.com Symmi 2,618 700 22 *.criteo.com Tescrypt 205 26 0
*.onion.to Toga 404 138 8 www.dropbox.com Upatre 891 37 155
*.b7websites.net Virlock 12,847 1 0 block.io Virtob 511 120 0
*.g.doubleclick.net Yakes 337 51 0 baidu.com Zbot 2,902 269 507
tridayacipta.com Zusy 733 145 14 *.criteo.com
[0050] With reference to Table 2 above, the certificate subject
typically has a very long tail, with only the most frequent
subjects reported. Notably, these certificates were mostly (i.e.,
slightly more than 50%) comprised of subjects that had domain
generation algorithm (DGA)-like characteristics (e.g.,
www.33mhwt2j.net, etc.). The following certificate subjects were
the most frequent for TLS flows initiated by the observed malware:
[0051] block.io [0052] *.wpengine.com [0053] *.criteo.com [0054]
baidu.com [0055] *.google.com
[0056] Because the DGA-like certificate subjects are counted as
unique, they do not show up in this list.
[0057] Actual enterprise data was also assessed during testing, to
provide a comparison with the malware-associated TLS flows
described above. From this, the certificate subjects of the servers
to which the enterprise traffic most frequently involved were
observed as follows: [0058] *.google.com [0059] api.twitter.com
[0060] *.icloud.com [0061] *.g.doubleclick.net [0062]
*.facebook.com
[0063] Thus, while the malware mostly communicated with servers
that had suspicious certificate subjects (e.g., DGA-like
certificate subjects), it is also clear that malware communicates
with many inherently benign servers, as well. For example, the
certificate subject *.google.com appears as one of the most
frequently observed for both the malware-related traffic and the
benign enterprise traffic.
[0064] Several additional features of the certificate data were
also observed to exhibit differences with that of benign traffic,
example plots of which are shown in FIGS. 4A-4B, according to
various embodiments. In particular, the validity of the certificate
(e.g., in days, weeks, etc.) and the number of subjectAltName
entries also demonstrated a difference between malware-related and
benign encrypted traffic.
[0065] As shown in FIG. 4A, plot 400 illustrates the observed
percentage of flows for both the benign and malware-related traffic
as a function of the certificate validity in days. In FIG. 4B, plot
410 illustrates the observed number of subjectAltName (SAN) entries
from the certificates of both the benign and malware-related
traffic. Interestingly, the high prevalence of connections to
block.io, a Bitcoin wallet, heavily skewed the validity (375 days)
and number of subjectAltName entries (3) for the certificates of
servers to which the malware connected.
[0066] According to various embodiments herein, one or more
features extracted from certificate data can be used to train a
machine learning-based classifier. For example, any or all of the
following features may be used to train the classifier: [0067]
Number of SAN entries [0068] Validity of the certificate in days
[0069] Length of the certificate's subject common name identifier
[0070] Character frequency histogram of the certificate's subject
common name identifier
[0071] These features are not meant to be exhaustive, but simply
illustrative. Other embodiments provide for the construction of a
classifier that is trained to assess other certificate data
features, as well. Such a classifier may, based on the certificate
data features of an encrypted flow of interest, classify the
application associated with the TLS session. For example, using the
above approach, the classifier may identify the application as
belonging to a particular malware family. In further embodiments,
the techniques herein can also be used more generally to identify
the application itself, regardless of whether or not the
application is malicious.
[0072] Further embodiments also provide for the classifier, which
may be an ensemble classifier, to also assess characteristics of
the traffic flow itself. For example, assessed flow characteristics
may include, but are not limited to, sequence of packet lengths and
time (SPLT) data regarding the traffic flow, sequence of
application lengths and time (SALT) data regarding the traffic
flow, or byte distribution (BD) data regarding the traffic flow.
Further flow characteristics may include TLS context data such as
the ciphersuite offered, user agent, TLS extensions, or the
like.
[0073] Based on the classification of the application and traffic
flow, the classifying device may cause the performance of one or
more network actions. For example, in the case of the network
monitoring device (e.g., CE-2 in FIG. 3, another intermediary
networking device, etc.), the device may cause the traffic flow to
be blocked, rerouted, or receive a lower priority. In another
example, the device may send out one or more notifications based on
the classification, such as an alert to a network administrator
when malware is detected. Since the classification itself is
performed within the flow monitoring framework, this differs
considerably from post-processing, forensic approaches, and allows
for any number of network actions to be performed in response to
the classification. In further cases, if the classifier is
configured to simply identify the application associated with the
encrypted traffic flow, the device may cause any number of
appropriate quality of service (QoS) parameters to be set in the
network regarding the flow.
[0074] A prototype was constructed using the techniques herein to
distinguish between malicious encrypted flows and benign,
enterprise encrypted flows. Notably, a 11-logistic regression
classifier was first constructed to assess flows without taking
into consideration the associated certificate data, which
demonstrated a 1-in-10 k false discovery rate (FDR) accuracy of
70.5%. By reformulating the classifier to also consider the TLS
certificate features, this accuracy increased to 86.1%. Even
further improvements were noted by using a classifier that also
assesses TLS metadata, SPLT, BD, TLS, and self-signed certificate
features, with an improvement of approximately 1.5% at a 1-in-10 k
FDR.
[0075] Unsurprisingly, the certificate data features proposed
herein also significantly helped to attribute encrypted flows to a
particular malware family during family. In other words,
certificate data features can be used to differentiate between two
otherwise identical malware families. For instance, Zusy and Zbot
were often classified as each other, since they have similar TLS
clients and use similar cryptographic parameters. However, it was
also found that these two families connect to very different types
of servers (e.g., Zusy connects to ad services and Zbot connects to
unpopular compromised domains). Thus, leveraging the information in
the server certificate makes family attribution much more reliable.
Testing has shown that by also assessing the certificate data
features, classification of a single encrypted flow to the correct
family increased to 94.1% of the time from 90.3% of the time
without these features.
[0076] FIG. 5 illustrates an example simplified procedure for using
certificate data to classify an application in a network, in
accordance with one or more embodiments described herein. For
example, a non-generic, specifically configured device (e.g.,
device 200) may perform procedure 500 by executing stored
instructions (e.g., process(es) 244, 248). The procedure 500 may
start at step 505, and continues to step 510, where, as described
in greater detail above, the device may receive certificate data
for an encrypted traffic flow associated with a client node in the
network. For example, in some cases, the device may be a flow
monitoring networking device, such as a router, switch, or other
flow monitoring device (e.g., the device may intercept the flow
during forwarding to capture the certificate data). In other cases,
the device may receive the certificate data from such a flow
monitoring device.
[0077] At step 515, as detailed above, the device may determine one
or more data features from the certificate data. For example, the
device may extract from the certificate data a subjectAltName
entry, a certificate validity time period, a subject common name
identifier, or any other information that can be extracted from the
certificate data.
[0078] At step 520, the device may also determine one or more flow
characteristics of the encrypted flow, as described in greater
detail above. For example, the device may determine sequence of
packet lengths and time (SPLT) data regarding the traffic flow,
sequence of application lengths and time (SALT) data regarding the
traffic flow, or byte distribution (BD) data regarding the traffic
flow. Additional features regarding the flow may also include TLS
metadata (e.g., the ciphersuite, etc.) or any other information
that can be garnered about the encrypted traffic flow without
resorting to a man-in-the-middle interception approach.
[0079] At step 525, as detailed above, the device may perform a
classification of an application executed by the client node and
associated with the encrypted traffic. Typically, such a
classification may be to determine whether the application is
malware and, if so, potentially the malware family to which the
application belongs. However, in further cases, the classification
may be to simply identify the application as being one of a
plurality of benign applications, as well. In various embodiments,
the device may use a machine learning-based classifier to assess
the certificate data features and the traffic flow characteristics
and classify the application. For example, the device may use a
logistic regression classifier, to determine the classification of
the application. In further cases, the device may use the
certificate data features as input to a rule-based analyzer that
uses predefined rules to make a classification.
[0080] At step 530, the device may cause the performance of one or
more network actions based on the classification, as described in
greater detail above. For example, if the application/traffic flow
are determined to be malware-related, the device may send a
notification to an administrator and/or adjust how the network
handles the traffic flow (e.g., by causing the traffic to be
blocked, rerouted, etc.). Similarly, even if the application is
found to be benign, the device may effect any number adjustments
based on the application type from the classification. Procedure
500 then ends at step 535.
[0081] It should be noted that while certain steps within procedure
500 may be optional as described above, the steps shown in FIG. 5
are merely examples for illustration, and certain other steps may
be included or excluded as desired. Further, while a particular
order of the steps is shown, this ordering is merely illustrative,
and any suitable arrangement of the steps may be utilized without
departing from the scope of the embodiments herein.
[0082] The techniques described herein, therefore, leverage TLS
client and/or server features to better understand TLS
communications initiated by malicious programs. In some cases, the
TLS server features can be used to improve the performance of a
machine learning-based malware classifier by a statistically
significant margin. Further, the TLS server certificate data
features allow for more accurate threat attribution and provide an
intuitive view into the malware's behavior, e.g., malware
connecting to block.io most likely will have Bitcoin motivations.
Additionally, the collection of the server certificate data can be
performed passively and in an lightweight manner. Furthermore, it
is an orthogonal method to infer domain names, which is important
because DNS is not always available.
[0083] While there have been shown and described illustrative
embodiments that provide for the detection and classification of
malware and application types, it is to be understood that various
other adaptations and modifications may be made within the spirit
and scope of the embodiments herein. For example, while certain
embodiments are described herein with respect to using certain
models for purposes of classification and analysis, the models are
not limited as such and may be used for other functions, in other
embodiments. In addition, while certain protocols are shown, other
suitable protocols may be used, accordingly.
[0084] The foregoing description has been directed to specific
embodiments. It will be apparent, however, that other variations
and modifications may be made to the described embodiments, with
the attainment of some or all of their advantages. For instance, it
is expressly contemplated that the components and/or elements
described herein can be implemented as software being stored on a
tangible (non-transitory) computer-readable medium (e.g.,
disks/CDs/RAM/EEPROM/etc.) having program instructions executing on
a computer, hardware, firmware, or a combination thereof.
Accordingly this description to be taken only by way of example and
not to otherwise limit the scope of the embodiments herein.
Therefore, it is the object of the appended claims to cover all
such variations and modifications as come within the true spirit
and scope of the embodiments herein.
* * * * *
References