U.S. patent application number 16/969363 was filed with the patent office on 2021-02-18 for integrity protection for user plane data in 5g network.
This patent application is currently assigned to NEC Corporation. The applicant listed for this patent is NEC Corporation. Invention is credited to Sivabalan ARUMUGAM, Sheeba Backia Mary BASKARAN, Hironori ITO, Sivakamy LAKSHMINARAYANAN, Anand Raghawa PRASAD, Takahito YOSHIZAWA.
Application Number | 20210051482 16/969363 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 1000005219954 |
Filed Date | 2021-02-18 |
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United States Patent
Application |
20210051482 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
ITO; Hironori ; et
al. |
February 18, 2021 |
INTEGRITY PROTECTION FOR USER PLANE DATA IN 5G NETWORK
Abstract
A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile
communication device or a core network entity according to a first
exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes configuring
settings and parameters for integrity protection for user data with
another party; receiving user plane data from the other party,
calculating Message Authentication Code for Integrity (MAC-I) for a
part of the data and checking integrity of the part of the
data.
Inventors: |
ITO; Hironori; (Tokyo,
JP) ; PRASAD; Anand Raghawa; (Tokyo, JP) ;
ARUMUGAM; Sivabalan; (Perungudi, Chennai, Tamil Nadu,
IN) ; YOSHIZAWA; Takahito; (Heidelberg, DE) ;
LAKSHMINARAYANAN; Sivakamy; (Perungudi, Chennai, Tamil Nadu,
IN) ; BASKARAN; Sheeba Backia Mary; (Perungudi,
Chennai, Tamil Nadu, IN) |
|
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
NEC Corporation |
Minato-ku, Tokyo |
|
JP |
|
|
Assignee: |
NEC Corporation
Minato-ku, Tokyo
JP
|
Family ID: |
1000005219954 |
Appl. No.: |
16/969363 |
Filed: |
February 6, 2019 |
PCT Filed: |
February 6, 2019 |
PCT NO: |
PCT/JP2019/004247 |
371 Date: |
August 12, 2020 |
Current U.S.
Class: |
1/1 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04W 12/106
20210101 |
International
Class: |
H04W 12/10 20060101
H04W012/10 |
Foreign Application Data
Date |
Code |
Application Number |
Feb 16, 2018 |
IN |
201841005966 |
Claims
1. A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile
communication device or a core network entity, the method
comprising: configuring settings and parameters for integrity
protection for user data with another party; receiving user plane
data from the other party; calculating Message Authentication Code
for Integrity (MAC-I) for a part of the user plane data; and
checking integrity of the part of the user plane data, wherein the
mobile communication device only checks integrity of the part of
the user plane data and the mobile communication device and the
core network entity use shorter MAC-I.
2. A method according to claim 1 further comprising: reading
information on size of the part of the user plane data for
integrity protection from the received user plane data.
3. A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile
communication device or a core network entity, the method
comprising: configuring settings and parameters on integrity
protection with the other party; receiving the data from the other
party; and deciding whether calculating MAC-I for the received data
or not.
4. A method according to claim 3 further comprising: calculating
data rate of the received data; and deciding whether calculating
MAC-I for the received data or not based on the data rate.
5. A method according to claim 3 further comprising: calculating
processing load; and deciding whether calculating MAC-I for the
received data or not based on the processing load.
6. A method according to claim 3 further comprising: calculating
processing load; and deciding whether calculating MAC-I for the
received data or not based on the importance of the received
data.
7. A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile
communication device or a core network entity, the method
comprising: configuring settings and parameters on integrity
protection with the other party; calculating MAC-I for a part of
data to be sent; and sending the data and the MAC-I to the other
party.
8. A method according to claim 7 further comprising: including
information on size of the part of the data in the data to be sent.
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] This invention provides a new method on integrity protection
of user plane data in 5G network, which resolves the problem with
overload of processing the integrity protection. The method can
reduce the processing load of the integrity protection and avoid
service disruption.
BACKGROUND ART
[0002] In 5G network, integrity protection is applied to U-plane
data for such as IoT applications, which is being discussed in
3GPP.
SUMMARY OF INVENTION
Technical Problem
[0003] When integrity protection is applied to the User Plane (UP)
data transferred between UE and 5G network, if the data rate is
high, UE cannot process the integrity protection check, or the
processing could cause high power consumption and/or transmission
delay, then the service cannot be sustained or the requirement of
the service cannot be met. In 3GPP, the maximum data rate to
support integrity protection is defined to avoid the problem,
however, it's highly probable that some services in 5G require
integrity protection with high data rate. Furthermore, no
procedures are defined if the data rate exceeds the limitation.
Solution to Problem
[0004] A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile
communication device or a core network entity according to a first
exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes configuring
settings and parameters for integrity protection for user data with
another party; receiving user plane data from the other party,
calculating Message Authentication Code for Integrity (MAC-I) for a
part of the data and checking integrity of the part of the
data.
[0005] A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile
communication device or a core network entity according to a second
exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes configuring
settings and parameters on integrity protection with the other
party, receiving the data from the other party; and deciding
whether calculating MAC-I for the received data or not.
[0006] A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile
communication device or a core network entity according to a second
exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes configuring
settings and parameters on integrity protection with the other
party, calculating MAC-I for a part of data to be sent and sending
the data and the MAC-I to the other party.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
[0007] FIG. 1 shows the UE and mobile networks.
[0008] FIG. 2 shows U-plane data with MAC-I.
[0009] FIG. 3 shows Calculation of MAC-I.
[0010] FIG. 4 shows a bock diagram of the method for embodiment
1.
[0011] FIG. 5 shows a partial integrity protection.
[0012] FIG. 6 shows a data format in PDCP.
[0013] FIG. 7 shows a block diagram of the method for embodiment
2.
[0014] FIG. 8 shows a block diagram of the method for embodiment
3.
DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS
Embodiment 1
[0015] As shown in FIG. 1, a UE (User equipment)101 or a mobile
terminal connects and communicates with 5G network including RAN
(Radio Access Network)102 and core network nodes such as AMF
(Access and Mobility management Function)103 and UPF (User Plane
Function)104. In 5G networks, RAN (Radio Access network)102 is also
called as NG (New Generation)-RAN or gNB (gNodeB), or other access
networks such as Wi-Fi may be used as non-3GPP access. Integrity
and confidentiality protection is usually applied to CP (Control
Plane) data transferred between UE101 and RAN102 or between UE101
and AMF103, while the protection is optionally applied to UP (User
Plane) data transferred between UE101 and RAN102 or between UE101
and UPF104. Configurations in terms of the integrity protection,
such as usage of integrity protection, algorithms, security keys
and any other settings on the integrity protection, are carried out
when the UE101 connects to the 5G network.
[0016] FIG. 2 shows the UP data with integrity protection which
consists of header, UP data and MAC-I (Message Authentication Code
for Integrity).
[0017] The MAC-I is usually calculated by inputting header and UP
data to hash function 301 as shown in FIG. 3. Some other values
such as algorithm identifier of the integrity protection and
parameters relating to the protection may be input to the hash
function.
[0018] The UP data is sent from UE101 to network (RAN102 or UPF104)
or vice versa.
[0019] FIG. 4 depicts a block diagram of the method to handle the
received UP data at receiver side in this invention, and all the
steps are executed in the receiver side. Firstly, the receiver
(UE101, RAN102 or UPF104) receives UP data (S401). The data rate is
calculated using the data including the ones received in the past,
e.g., 1 second or 3, 5, 10 seconds, etc (S402). It is checked
whether the data rate is higher than the limit value which is
preliminary configured, or not (S403). The data rate may be
monitored in order to decide an action for the received data. The
data rate may be provided by other layers such as physical layer of
wireless transmission, or application layers. If the data rate is
higher than the limit value, going to a step S404, otherwise S405.
The data is discarded without executing the integrity check (S404,
1-1). Another option is that the data including MAC-I is stored
(S404, 1-2) so that the integrity check can be executed later, then
going to a step S407. Integrity check is carried out (or executed)
by calculating the MAC-I using header and UP data in the same
manner as shown in FIG. 3, and comparing the MAC-I with the one in
the received data (S405). If the result of the integrity check is
fail, i.e., the values of both the MAC-Is don't match, going to a
step S407, otherwise going back to the first step S401 (S406). The
failure of the integrity is reported to the higher layer (S407). It
may be reported that the check hasn't been done as in S404 or the
result of the integrity check is fail in S405. The information may
be sent to the sender side depending on the requirements of the
application.
Embodiment 2
[0020] FIG. 7 depicts a block diagram of the method to handle the
received UP data at receiver side in this invention. The difference
from embodiment 1 is in only the steps S402 and S403 in the FIG. 4.
The load of processors such as CPU (Central Processing Unit) or DSP
(Digital Signal Processor) are monitored in order to decide the
action for the received data. The load of processors are usually
provided by the operation system. The value of the load is
calculated, e.g., as the average in the past one or several
seconds, corresponding to the reception of the UP data (S702). It
is checked whether the value of the load is higher than the limit
value which is preliminary configured, or not (S703). If it is
higher, going to a step S404, otherwise S405.
Embodiment 3
[0021] FIG. 8 depicts a block diagram of the method to handle the
received UP data at receiver side in this invention. The difference
from embodiment 1 is in only the steps S402 and S403 in the FIG. 4.
The importance of the received data is checked (or monitored) in
order to decide the action for the received data (S802). The
importance means how the integrity protection is important for the
data. For example, main information of the application or
information which could cause serious damage if it is forged are
important, while advertisement is less important. There are two
options on the decision of the importance. One is that the
importance is decided by the sender side, and the importance is
marked in the header of the data. The information may be binary
(important or not) or multiple levels. The receiver reads the
information in the header, and decides the importance of the data.
Another option is that the importance of the data is decided by the
receiver side. If the data is important, going to a step S405
(integrity check is carried out), otherwise S404 (integrity check
is not carried out) (S803).
Embodiment 4
[0022] An integrity for the part of the UP data, which has high
importance, is checked in order to reduce a processing cost of the
integrity check. When integrity for part of the data is
appropriately protected, falsification of the data is impossible by
modifying not protected data. Therefore, the processing cost can be
reduced efficiently by checking the part of the UP data with
maintaining the performance of integrity protection. When the UP
data is audio data, integrity only for header and important part of
the UP data with high sensitivity for audio quality such as the
bits for high amplitude of the audio signals is protected. For
video data, video header and intra frame or intra video packet,
which are referred from ones for prediction are important, and the
integrity for the data is protected. Such important data is usually
gathered and placed from the beginning the UP data, then integrity
protection for the part of the data is carried out, where MAC-I is
calculated using header and important part of the UP data as shown
in FIG. 5. There are two options to handle the size of the
protected part of the UP data at both sender and receiver sides.
One option is that the size is configured before starting the
transferring the UP data as well as other settings. Another option
is that the size is included in the header of the UP data by the
sender, and the receiver reads the size from the header in the
received data. This method can be combined with the embodiments 1
to 3 by replacing the step for calculating the MAC-I (S405) by the
method as described here.
Embodiment 5
[0023] The size of MAC-I is decided appropriately depending on the
importance of the data or the requirements of the applications in
order to reduce the processing cost and overhead of the transferred
data size, e.g., when the importance is higher, larger size of the
MAC-I is selected. There are two options to handle the size of the
MAC-I at both sender and receiver sides. One option is that the
size is configured before starting the transferring the UP data as
well as other settings. Another option is that the size is included
in the header of the UP data by the sender, and the receiver reads
the size from the header in the received data. This method can be
combined with the embodiments 1 to 3 by replacing the step for
calculating the MAC-I (S405) by the method as described here.
Embodiment 6
[0024] The methods described in embodiment 3 to 5 are realized with
PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol) defined in 3GPP TS 33.323
v15.0.0. FIG. 6 shows the format used with PDCP, where reserved
bits (R) are shown, which can be used to combine with the methods
in the invention.
[0025] For the method described in embodiment 3, the importance of
the data is shown using the reserved bits as follows:
[0026] R: important (1), not important (0)
[0027] Further, multiple bits of R are used to show the multiple
levels of the importance. For example, when there are four levels
of the importance, two bits of R are used as follows: [0028] RR:
lowest level (00), level 1 (01), level 2 (10), highest level
(11)
[0029] In the same way, the size of the protected data described in
embodiment 4 is shown using the reserved bits. The bits may show
the size directly, or the index of the table which defines the
size. For example, three bits of R is used to show the index of the
table with 8 patterns of the sizes as follows:
[0030] Size_table[8]={0, 16, 32, 128, 256, 512, 1024, all}
[0031] RRR(001) shows that 16 bytes of UP data from the beginning
are protected. The size may include the header size. RRR (000)
shows no protection, RRR(111) shows all the data is protected.
Embodiment 7
[0032] How settings and parameters for integrity protection in this
invention, such as methods of integrity protection, the number of
protected bits and etc., shown in the previous embodiments, are
configured in the UE and 5G network node (such as gNB) is
described. When the UE connects to the 5G network, registration
procedure or handover procedure as defined in 5G specifications are
carried out in 5G network during which the UE sends the settings or
parameters on integrity protection as well as other information on
UE's capabilities to the network. At network side, the settings or
parameters are decided based on the information sent from the UE,
security policy of network operators, requirements of the
applications or services provided to the UE. The decided settings
and parameters are sent to the UE with integrity and
confidentiality protection. These settings and parameters (both
ones received from UE and currently used) are also transferred from
source network node to target network node during handover with
integrity and confidentiality protection. During registration or
handover, the network node check whether the current settings and
parameters are sufficient, and change the current ones depending on
the requirements, or reject the UE's access if the UE doesn't have
the required capabilities.
[0033] Our disclosure includes:
[0034] (1) Configuring settings and parameters for integrity
protection for user data in this invention, such as methods of
integrity protection, the number of protected bits and etc., before
starting a communication between a mobile terminal and a network,
e.g., the configurations include at least one limitation data
rate/processing load, handling of important data, or protected data
size, etc.
[0035] (2) During the communication, data rate/processing load or
importance of the user plane data are monitored to decide the
action for the received data.
[0036] (3) Based on the decision, integrity check is carried out
(execute), or the user plane data is discarded or stored without
integrity check.
[0037] Our disclosure includes: [0038] Method for partial integrity
check [0039] Comprising the steps of
[0040] (1) Configuring a method of integrity protection for part of
user data and the number of protected bits before starting a
communication between a mobile terminal and a network,
[0041] (2) An integrity for the part of the UP data is checked by
calculating the MAC-I for the data of the configured size at sender
and receiver.
[0042] This application is based upon and claims the benefit of
priority from Indian patent applications No. 201841005966, filed on
Feb. 16, 2018, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein in
its entirety by reference.
REFERENCE SIGNS LIST
[0043] 101 UE [0044] 102 RAN [0045] 103 AMF [0046] 104 UPF
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