U.S. patent application number 16/825761 was filed with the patent office on 2020-09-10 for system for providing end-to-end protection against network-based attacks.
The applicant listed for this patent is ORock Technologies, Inc.. Invention is credited to John Leon.
Application Number | 20200287875 16/825761 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 1000004853464 |
Filed Date | 2020-09-10 |
View All Diagrams
United States Patent
Application |
20200287875 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Leon; John |
September 10, 2020 |
SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING END-TO-END PROTECTION AGAINST NETWORK-BASED
ATTACKS
Abstract
A plurality of system nodes coupled via a dedicated private
network is described herein. The nodes offer an end-to-end solution
for protecting against network-based attacks. For example, a single
node can receive and store user data via a data flow that passes
through various components of the node. The node can be designed
such that communications internal to the node, such as the
transmission of encryption keys, are partitioned or walled off from
the components of the node that handle the publicly accessible data
flow. The node also includes a key management subsystem to
facilitate the use of encryption keys to encrypt user data.
Inventors: |
Leon; John; (Glendale,
CA) |
|
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
ORock Technologies, Inc. |
Reston |
VA |
US |
|
|
Family ID: |
1000004853464 |
Appl. No.: |
16/825761 |
Filed: |
March 20, 2020 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
|
|
|
|
|
|
Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
|
|
16450597 |
Jun 24, 2019 |
10601790 |
|
|
16825761 |
|
|
|
|
15294333 |
Oct 14, 2016 |
10333905 |
|
|
16450597 |
|
|
|
|
62242875 |
Oct 16, 2015 |
|
|
|
62255742 |
Nov 16, 2015 |
|
|
|
62295824 |
Feb 16, 2016 |
|
|
|
62255870 |
Nov 16, 2015 |
|
|
|
Current U.S.
Class: |
1/1 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L 9/3252 20130101;
H04L 9/14 20130101; H04L 63/0272 20130101; H04L 9/30 20130101; H04L
63/0478 20130101; H04L 9/3263 20130101; H04L 67/1097 20130101; H04L
63/0428 20130101; H04L 63/06 20130101 |
International
Class: |
H04L 29/06 20060101
H04L029/06; H04L 29/08 20060101 H04L029/08; H04L 9/14 20060101
H04L009/14; H04L 9/30 20060101 H04L009/30; H04L 9/32 20060101
H04L009/32 |
Claims
1.-20. (canceled)
21. A system for securely and remotely monitoring an electronic
device comprising: a router configured to transmit messages to and
receive messages from a first user device; and a processing server
configured to generate user interface data for rendering an
interactive user interface on a computing device, the interactive
user interface including a field for providing a value for a first
parameter of the first user device, the processing server further
configured to: receive a selection of a first value for the first
parameter; generate a request to provide a current value of the
first parameter, wherein the router is further configured to
transmit the request to the first user device; receive the current
value of the first parameter from the first user device via the
router; compare the current value with the selected first value;
and one of generate an alert or generate an instruction to change
the current value of the first parameter to the selected first
value in response to a determination that the comparison of the
current value with the selected first value does not yield a match,
wherein the router is configured to transmit the instruction to the
first user device.
22. The system of claim 21, wherein the processing server is
further configured to: generate a second request to provide a
current value of the first parameter for transmission to the first
user device; and determine that a response to the second request
has not been received within a threshold period of time.
23. The system of claim 22, wherein the processing server is
further configured to generate a second alert to change a value of
the first parameter to the selected first value in response to the
determination that a response to the second request has not been
received within the threshold period of time.
24. The system of claim 22, wherein the processing server is
further configured to generate a second instruction to change a
value of the first parameter to the selected first value in
response to the determination that a response to the second request
has not been received within the threshold period of time.
25. The system of claim 21, wherein the processing server is
further configured to periodically generate requests to the first
user device for current values of the first parameter.
26. The system of claim 25, wherein the processing server is
further configured to generate the requests to the first user
device for the current values of the first parameter periodically
based on at least one of a type of the first user device or a
sensitivity of the first user device to a change in value.
27. The system of claim 21, wherein the processing server is
further configured to generate the user interface data in response
to a request to configure the first user device, wherein the
interactive user interface comprises an interactive element that,
when selected, causes the user interface to display the field that
allows a user to select the first value for the first
parameter.
28. The system of claim 21, wherein the first user device is
associated with a parent device world, and wherein a second user
device is associated with a child device world.
29. The system of claim 28, wherein the processing server is
further configured to generate the user interface data in response
to a request to configure the first user device, wherein the
interactive user interface comprises an interactive element that,
when selected, causes the user interface to display the field that
allows a user to enter the selected first value for the first
parameter for association with the parent device world.
30. The system of claim 29, wherein the interactive user interface
further comprises a second interactive element that, when selected,
causes the child device world to be associated with the parent
device world such that the selected first value defines an
operation of the second user device.
31. A computer-implemented method for securely and remotely
monitoring an electronic device comprising: receiving, via a user
interface, a selection of a first value for a first parameter that
defines an operation of a first user device; generating a request
to provide a current value of the first parameter; transmitting the
request to the first user device; receiving the current value of
the first parameter from the first user device; comparing the
current value with the selected first value; and one of
transmitting an alert or transmitting an instruction to the first
user device to change the current value of the first parameter to
the selected first value in response to a determination that the
comparison of the current value with the selected first value does
not yield a match.
32. The computer-implemented method of claim 31, further
comprising: Transmitting, to the first user device, a second
request to provide a current value of the first parameter; and
determining that a response to the second request has not been
received within a threshold period of time.
33. The computer-implemented method of claim 32, further comprising
transmitting a second alert to change a value of the first
parameter to the selected first value in response to the
determination that a response to the second request has not been
received within the threshold period of time.
34. The computer-implemented method of claim 32, further comprising
transmitting, to the first user device, a second instruction to
change a value of the first parameter to the selected first value
in response to the determination that a response to the second
request has not been received within the threshold period of
time.
35. The computer-implemented method of claim 31, further comprising
transmitting, to the first user device, requests for the current
values of the first parameter periodically based on at least one of
a type of the first user device or a sensitivity of the first user
device to a change in value.
36. The computer-implemented method of claim 31, wherein the user
interface comprises an interactive element that, when selected,
causes the user interface to display a field that allows a user to
select the first value for the first parameter.
37. The computer-implemented method of claim 31, wherein the first
user device is associated with a parent device world, and wherein a
second user device is associated with a child device world.
38. The computer-implemented method of claim 37, wherein the user
interface comprises an interactive element that, when selected,
causes the user interface to display a field that allows a user to
enter the selected first value for the first parameter for
association with the parent device world.
39. The computer-implemented method of claim 38, wherein the user
interface further comprises a second interactive element that, when
selected, causes the child device world to be associated with the
parent device world such that the selected first value defines an
operation of the second user device.
40. Non-transitory, computer-readable storage media comprising
computer-executable instructions that, when executed, cause a
computing system to: process a selection of a first value for a
first parameter that defines an operation of a first user device
received via a user interface; generate a request to provide a
current value of the first parameter; transmit the request to the
first user device; compare the current value of the first parameter
received from the first user device with the selected first value;
and transmit an instruction to the first user device to change the
current value of the first parameter to the selected first value in
response to a determination that the comparison of the current
value with the selected first value does not yield a match.
Description
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0001] This application is a continuation of U.S. patent
application Ser. No. 16/450,597, entitled "SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING
END-TO-END PROTECTION AGAINST NETWORK-BASED ATTACKS" and filed on
Jun. 24, 2019, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application
Ser. No. 15/294,333, entitled "SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING END-TO-END
PROTECTION AGAINST NETWORK-BASED ATTACKS" and filed on Oct. 14,
2016, which claims priority under 35 U.S.C. .sctn. 119(e) to U.S.
Provisional Patent Application No. 62/242,875, entitled "SYSTEM FOR
PROVIDING END-TO-END PROTECTION AGAINST NETWORK-BASED ATTACKS" and
filed on Oct. 16, 2015, to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No.
62/255,742, entitled "SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING END-TO-END PROTECTION
AGAINST NETWORK-BASED ATTACKS" and filed on Nov. 16, 2015, to U.S.
Provisional Patent Application No. 62/255,870, entitled
"NETWORK-BASED SYSTEM FOR REMOTELY SECURING AND MONITORING
ELECTRONIC DEVICES" and filed on Nov. 16, 2015, and to U.S.
Provisional Patent Application No. 62/295,824, entitled "SYSTEM FOR
PROVIDING END-TO-END PROTECTION AGAINST NETWORK-BASED ATTACKS" and
filed on Feb. 16, 2016, the entire disclosures of which are hereby
incorporated by reference herein.
BACKGROUND
[0002] Many electronic devices operated by users have access to or
can be accessed via a network. For example, a user can use one
electronic device (e.g., a computer) to access another electronic
device (e.g., a set-top box) via a network. Typically, usernames
and passwords are used to restrict access to network-accessible
electronic devices. For example, the data associated with an
electronic device may only be accessed if a user provides the
correct username and password.
[0003] However, usernames and passwords offer little protection
against network-based attacks. Users often select simple or common
passwords that are easily deciphered by an unauthorized user. Once
deciphered, the unauthorized user may have access to sensitive data
and can cause physical, emotional, and/or monetary harm.
SUMMARY
[0004] One aspect of the disclosure provides a system for
double-encrypting data. The system comprises a node system, wherein
the node system comprises an encryption key management system, a
first user encryption key management system, and a processing
server, wherein the first user encryption key management system
comprises a first enterprise key management system, a first local
key management system, and a first self-encrypting drive, and
wherein the encryption key management system comprises a second
enterprise key management system; a network manager system
comprising computer hardware, wherein the network manager system is
in communication with the node system via a private network; and a
user system in communication with the network manager via a public
network, wherein the user system comprises a second user encryption
key management system, and wherein the second user encryption key
management system comprises a third enterprise key management
system, a second local key management system, and a second
self-encrypting drive. The user system further comprises first
instructions that, when executed, cause the user system to: encrypt
user data stored in the second self-encrypting drive using an
encryption key provided by the third enterprise key management
system to form encrypted user data, and transmit the encrypted user
data to the network manager system. The network manager system
further comprises second instructions that, when executed, cause
the network manager system to: encrypt the encrypted user data
using a second encryption key provided by the second enterprise key
management system to form double-encrypted user data, and transmit
the double-encrypted user data to the node system.
[0005] The system of the preceding paragraph can include any
sub-combination of the following features: where the first
instructions, when executed, further cause the user system to
transmit an instruction to the node system to process the user
data; where third instructions, when executed, cause the node
system to: decrypt the double-encrypted user data using the second
encryption key provided by the second enterprise key management
system to form second encrypted user data, decrypt the second
encrypted user data using a third encryption key provided by the
first enterprise key management system to form decrypted user data,
and process, by the processing server, the decrypted user data in
response to receiving the instruction to form processed user data;
where the third instructions, when executed, further cause the node
system to: encrypt the processed user data using the third
encryption key to form encrypted processed user data, encrypt the
encrypted processed user data using the second encryption key to
form double-encrypted processed user data, and transmit the
double-encrypted processed user data to the network manager system
via the private network; where the second instructions, when
executed, further cause the network manager system to: decrypt the
double-encrypted processed user data using the second encryption
key to form single-encrypted processed user data, and transmit the
single-encrypted processed user data to the user system via the
public network; where the third encryption key is the encryption
key; where the third enterprise key management system transmits the
encryption key to the first enterprise key management system via
the public network and the private network; where the third
enterprise key management system transmits information associated
with the encryption key to the first enterprise key management
system via the public network and the private network such that the
first enterprise key management system can generate the encryption
key; where the instruction comprises one of an instruction to
aggregate the user data, an instruction to identify trends in the
user data, or an instruction to filter the user data; where the
second instructions, when executed, further cause the network
manager system to block data packets from being transmitted via the
private network if the data packets are not encrypted; where the
first user encryption key management system is associated with the
user system; where the system further comprises: a second user
system in communication with the network manager via the public
network, wherein the second user system comprises a second user
encryption key management system, and wherein the second user
encryption key management system comprises a fourth enterprise key
management system and a third self-encrypting drive, where the
second user system comprises third instructions that, when
executed, cause the second user system to: encrypt second user data
stored in the third self-encrypting drive using a third encryption
key provided by the fourth enterprise key management system to form
encrypted second user data, and transmit the encrypted second user
data to the network manager system; where the second instructions,
when executed, further cause the network manager system to: encrypt
the encrypted second user data using the second encryption key to
form double-encrypted second user data, and transmit the
double-encrypted second user data to the node system; and where the
third enterprise key management system generates a third encryption
key, where the second self-encrypting drive transmits a request for
the third encryption key, where the second local key management
system maintains an association of encryption keys and
self-encrypting drives, and where the second local key management
system: receives the request for the third encryption key from the
self-encrypting drive, transmits a second request for the third
encryption key to the third enterprise key management system in
response to receiving the request for the third encryption key from
the second self-encrypting drive, receives the third encryption key
from the third enterprise key management system, and transmits the
third encryption key to the second self-encrypting drive such that
the second self-encrypting drive encrypts the user data using the
third encryption key.
[0006] Another aspect of the disclosure provides a system for
double-encrypting data. The system comprises: a node system,
wherein the node system comprises a processing server, a first
enterprise key management system, and a second enterprise key
management system; a network manager system comprising computer
hardware, wherein the network manager system is in communication
with the node system via a private network; and a user system in
communication with the network manager via a public network,
wherein the user system comprises a third enterprise key management
system and a self-encrypting drive, and wherein the first
enterprise key management system is associated with the user
system. The user system further comprises first instructions that,
when executed, cause the user system to: encrypt user data stored
in the self-encrypting drive using an encryption key provided by
the third enterprise key management system to form encrypted user
data, and transmit the encrypted user data to the network manager
system. The network manager system further comprises second
instructions that, when executed, cause the network manager system
to: encrypt the encrypted user data using a second encryption key
provided by the second enterprise key management system to form
double-encrypted user data, and transmit the double-encrypted user
data to the node system.
[0007] The system of the preceding paragraph can include any
sub-combination of the following features: where the first
instructions, when executed, further cause the user system to
transmit an instruction to the node system to process the user
data; where third instructions, when executed, cause the node
system to: decrypt the double-encrypted user data using the second
encryption key provided by the second enterprise key management
system to form second encrypted user data, decrypt the second
encrypted user data using a third encryption key provided by the
first enterprise key management system to form decrypted user data,
and process, by the processing server, the decrypted user data in
response to receiving the instruction to form processed user data;
where the third instructions, when executed, further cause the node
system to: encrypt the processed user data using the third
encryption key to form encrypted processed user data, encrypt the
encrypted processed user data using the second encryption key to
form double-encrypted processed user data, and transmit the
double-encrypted processed user data to the network manager system
via the private network; where the second instructions, when
executed, further cause the network manager system to: decrypt the
double-encrypted processed user data using the second encryption
key to form single-encrypted processed user data, and transmit the
single-encrypted processed user data to the user system via the
public network; and where the instruction comprises one of an
instruction to aggregate the user data, an instruction to identify
trends in the user data, or an instruction to filter the user
data.
[0008] Another aspect of the disclosure provides a system for
securely and remotely monitoring an electronic device. The system
comprises: a router configured to transmit messages to and receive
messages from a first user device; and a processing server
configured to generate user interface data for rendering an
interactive user interface on a computing device, the interactive
user interface including a field for providing a value for a first
parameter of the first user device, the processing server further
configured to: receive a selection of a first value for the first
parameter, generate a request to provide a current value of the
first parameter, wherein the router is further configured to
transmit the request to the first user device, receive the current
value of the first parameter from the first user device via the
router, compare the current value with the selected first value,
and one of generate an alert or generate an instruction to change
the current value of the first parameter to the selected first
value in response to a determination that the comparison of the
current value with the selected first value does not yield a match,
wherein the router is configured to transmit the instruction to the
first user device.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0009] Throughout the drawings, reference numbers may be re-used to
indicate correspondence between referenced elements. The drawings
are provided to illustrate example embodiments described herein and
are not intended to limit the scope of the disclosure.
[0010] FIG. 1 illustrates a multi-node environment.
[0011] FIG. 2A-2B illustrate the components of an exemplary node in
the multi-node environment of FIG. 1.
[0012] FIG. 3A illustrates an example data flow between electronic
devices and a node of FIG. 1.
[0013] FIG. 3B illustrates an example data flow between electronic
devices and the components in a node of FIG. 1 via a cellular
network.
[0014] FIG. 3C illustrates an example data flow between electronic
devices and the components in a node of FIG. 1 via a public
network.
[0015] FIG. 4 illustrates an example data flow between an
electronic device and the components in a node of FIG. 1.
[0016] FIG. 5 illustrates a detailed block diagram of the
encryption key management system of a node of FIG. 1.
[0017] FIG. 6 illustrates the redundancy of the encryption key
management systems of FIGS. 2A-2B between the nodes of FIG. 1.
[0018] FIG. 7 illustrates a process that may be implemented by a
local key management (LKM) system of FIG. 5 to provide an
encryption key to an self-encrypting drive (SED), such as the SED
of FIG. 5.
[0019] FIG. 8 illustrates an example data packet analysis through a
security information and event management (SIEM) system within a
node.
[0020] FIG. 9 illustrates an example integrated control and data
management interface network.
[0021] FIG. 10 illustrates a double-encryption environment between
a node and a user system.
[0022] FIG. 11 illustrates a grouping of IoT devices into various
device worlds.
[0023] FIGS. 12A-12C illustrate a user interface depicting the
configuration of an IoT device.
[0024] FIGS. 13A-13D illustrate a user interface depicting the
configuration of a device world.
[0025] FIGS. 13E-13G illustrate a user interface depicting the
configuration of a multi-level device world.
[0026] FIG. 14 illustrates a process that may be implemented by a
node of FIG. 1 to monitor changes in the parameters of an IoT
device.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF SPECIFIC EMBODIMENTS
Introduction
[0027] As discussed above, usernames and passwords provide little
protection against network-based attacks. Conventional data network
systems offer solutions to secure electronic devices and/or the
channel by which electronic devices communicate over a network from
unwanted intrusions, but such solutions leave gaps that can be
exploited by unauthorized users. Thus, a system that offers
end-to-end protection against network-based attacks may be
desirable. This may be especially true given the proliferation of
network-accessible data storage systems, where valuable information
is stored and accessed via a network, and/or network-accessible
electronic devices.
[0028] Accordingly, a multi-node environment is described herein in
which a plurality of nodes coupled via a dedicated private network
offer an end-to-end solution for protecting against network-based
attacks. For example, a single node can receive and store user data
via a data flow that passes through various components of the node.
The node can be designed such that communications internal to the
node, such as the transmission of encryption keys, are partitioned
or walled off from the components of the node that handle the
publicly accessible data flow. The node also includes a key
management subsystem to facilitate the use of encryption keys to
encrypt user data.
[0029] Multi-Node Architecture Overview
[0030] FIG. 1 illustrates a multi-node environment. As shown in
FIG. 1, the multi-node environment includes a plurality of nodes
110A-N that communicate with each other via a dedicated private
network 101. Each node 110A-N can be a system that includes a
variety of electronic devices and/or components, as described in
greater detail below with respect to FIGS. 2A-6. The nodes 110A-N
can be configured to control user devices, detect inconsistencies
in the operation of one or more user devices, store user data,
and/or protect stored user data from network-based attacks.
[0031] The private network 101 can be a privately accessible
network of linked networks, possibly operated by various distinct
parties, such as a personal area network, local area network, wide
area network, cable network, satellite network, cellular telephone
network, etc. or combination thereof, each with access to and/or
from the Internet. The private network 101 can provide superior
network performance through dedicated bandwidth and low latency as
compared to other publicly available networks, such as the
Internet. For example, the private network 101 can provide a direct
connection between the various nodes 110A-N in the multi-node
environment, where the communication channel providing the direct
connection cannot be accessed by electronic devices that are
configured to access a publicly available network. Because access
to the private network 101 is restricted to just the nodes 110A-N,
the risk of a network-based intrusion of the nodes 110A-N or the
data transmitted between the nodes 110A-N is greatly
diminished.
[0032] In some embodiments, as discussed below, the nodes 110A-N
also have access to publicly accessible networks, such as the
Internet. Each node 110A-N can include an access server and/or
router that enforces a separation between the publicly accessible
network and the private network 101.
[0033] Each node 110A-N can be located in a different geographic
location. For example, the node 110A can be located in a first
country (e.g., the United States of America), the node 110B can be
located in a second country (e.g., the United Kingdom), and so on.
Alternatively, each node 110A-N may reside at a common geographic
location.
[0034] In an embodiment, each node 110A-N is identical in
composition and operation. The nodes 110A-N can operate in
real-time to replicate data between or among the various nodes
110A-N to ensure that the sum of aggregate data is present in both
or all node 110A-N locations. This redundancy not only improves the
reliability of the multi-node environment, but also enhances the
threat-detecting capability of the nodes 110A-N. For example, the
nodes 110A-N may independently identify Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses from which one or more attacks on the respective node
110A-N (e.g., to disable or impair the functionality of the
respective node 110A-N) or attempted intrusions into the respective
node 110A-N have originated. A node, such as the node 110A, may
transmit a routing table that includes the IP addresses that the
node 110A has identified as a threat to one or more of the other
nodes 110B-N so that the other nodes 110B-N can update their
routing tables accordingly. Thus, by sharing routing tables between
nodes 110A-N, an address identified as a threat at one node can be
blocked by the other nodes in the environment.
[0035] The similarity in architecture between various nodes 110A-N
may enable any node 110A-N to serve as the secondary storage and/or
processing site for any other node 110A-N. Thus, a multi-node
environment that includes identically constructed nodes 110A-N may
have a built-in secondary storage site to permit the storage and/or
recovery of information. In other words, the nodes 110A-N may be
redundant. The actual pairing of primary and secondary storage
sites may be determined by taking into account a variety of
factors, such as regional legal requirements, latency, and/or the
like. The secondary storage site can have information security
safeguards equivalent to or nearly equivalent to those of the
primary site and can maintain connectivity to the primary site.
Such a multi-node environment may also include an inherent
secondary processing site to permit the resumption of system
operations when primary processing capabilities become unavailable.
The secondary processing site can have information security
safeguards equivalent to or nearly equivalent to those of the
primary site. The redundancy of the nodes 110A-N is described in
greater detail below with respect to FIGS. 2A-B and 6.
[0036] In other embodiments, the nodes 110A-N are not identical in
composition and/or operation. For example, the nodes 110A-N may
include additional components required by the jurisdiction in which
the respective node 110A-N resides to comply with one or more
security standards (or may not include components that cannot be
included in the respective node 110A-N in order to comply with one
or more security standards).
Node Composition
[0037] FIGS. 2A-2B illustrate the components of an exemplary node
110A in the multi-node environment of FIG. 1. Any of a variety of
alternate node architectures may alternatively be used for some or
all of the nodes 110A-N. Alternatively or in addition, the
architecture of the node 110A can be similar to the architecture of
the nodes 110B-N and/or the operations performed by the node 110A
can also be performed by the nodes 110B-N. As shown in FIGS. 2A-B,
the node 110A can include a security information and event
management (SIEM) system 201, a switch 212 (e.g., a CISCO CATALYST
3650 Series switch, a CISCO CATALYST 4500 Series switch, etc.), an
encryption key management system 205 (e.g., two HP Enterprise
Secure Key Managers), one or more processing servers 206 (e.g., ten
HP DL380 servers), one or more monitoring servers 207 (e.g., two HP
DL380 servers), one or more storage servers 208 (e.g., an HP SPAR
STORESERV system), and one or more backup repository servers 209
(e.g., an HP SPAR STORESERV system). The SIEM system 201 can
include a router 202 (e.g., a CISCO ASR Boundary Device), an active
threat detector 203 (e.g., a RAYTHEON SUREVIEW Threat Detector),
and a firewall 204 (e.g., a FORTINET firewall, a PALO ALTO NETWORKS
5000 Series firewall, etc.). Some or all of the components of the
node 110A can reside at a common geographic location and may be
interconnected on a local area network.
[0038] The SIEM 201 may provide boundary security. Within the SIEM
201, individual intrusion detection tools can be integrated into a
system-wide intrusion detection sub-system. The router 202 can
interface with the external world and transfer data between the
node 110A and the external world. For example, the router 202 can
transfer data between the node 110A and other nodes 110B-110N via
the private network 101. As illustrated in FIG. 2A, the router 202
can also transfer data between the node 110A and electronic devices
211 via a public network 210 (e.g., a publicly accessible network
of linked networks, such as the Internet) and/or a cellular network
220 (e.g., a private network operated by a cellular carrier or
operator). Alternatively or in addition, as illustrated in FIG. 2B,
the router 202 can transfer data between the node 110A and a server
230 via a network 240 (e.g., a public and/or private network
similar to the public network 210, the cellular network 220, and/or
the private network 101). The server 230 can be a computing system
that manages one or more of the electronic devices 211 and that
communicates with the electronic devices 211 via the public network
210 and/or the cellular network 220. Alternatively or in addition,
the server 230 can communicate with the electronic devices 211 via
a private network, such as a local area network (not shown). The
node 110A can communicate with electronic devices 211 via the
server 230. Here, because the node 110A communicates with the
server 230 via the network 240 (which can be a private network) and
the communication channel is encrypted and secure due to the
security techniques implemented by the node 110A, any unauthorized
users would not detect and cannot interfere with instructions
transmitted by the node 110A to the server 230. In the situation
that the network 240 is a private network, unauthorized users would
not even have the ability to access the network 240. Thus, the node
110A can communicate securely with the server 230 without the
unauthorized user having the ability to reject, prevent, and/or
manipulate the communication.
[0039] The active threat detector 203 can monitor network
activities and/or detect abnormal events and/or abnormal patterns
of activities. The active threat detector 203 may receive third
party threat data from external sources (e.g., via the public
network 210) to enhance the monitoring and detection functionality.
For example, the active threat detector 203 may periodically
receive updated lists or ranges of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
that have been identified as suspicious or from which malicious
activity has originated (e.g., by malware analysis software). The
lists may be in the form of a routing table (e.g., an internal
address resolution protocol (ARP) routing table) that the active
threat detector 203 can use to compare with the source and/or
destination address of incoming packets. The active threat detector
203 can be automatically updated each time the third party threat
data is received from external sources. Alternatively, the active
threat detector 203 can be updated once the received third party
threat data is approved for use by an administrator. In an
embodiment, the nodes 110A-N can share such received third party
threat data via the private network 101. Thus, if access to the
external sources is severed for one node 110A-N, that node 110A-N
can receive the third party threat data from another node 110A-N
instead.
[0040] The firewall 204 can control network activities and/or work
in tandem with real-time threat detection performed by the active
threat detector 203. Like with the active threat detector 203, the
firewall 204 can also receive third party threat data from external
sources (e.g., via the public network 210) to enhance the control
of network activities. The third party threat data may be received
from the same external sources as the active threat detector 203 or
from different external sources. The third party threat data may be
in the form of routing tables and/or lists or ranges of suspicious
or malicious IP addresses and may be used in the same manner as the
active threat detector 203 as described above. The third party
threat data can also be shared between the nodes 110A-N via the
private network 101. The threat detection activities of the active
threat detector 203 and/or the firewall 204 are described in
greater detail below with respect to FIG. 8.
[0041] In an embodiment, the SIEM 201 components 202-204 correlate
information to provide a more robust security scheme. For example,
the SIEM 201 uses information generated by the router 202, the
active threat detector 203, and/or the firewall 204 to protect data
from unauthorized access, modification, and/or deletion. If one of
the active threat detector 203 or the firewall 204 identifies
malicious activity that originates from an IP address that
otherwise was not identified in the data received from the external
sources, the active threat detector 203 and/or the firewall 204
flags the IP address as a malicious address. The active threat
detector 203 and/or the firewall 204 may then notify the other
nodes 110A-N (via the router 202) of this newly identified IP
address so that the other nodes 110A-N can be prepared to block
and/or analyze a packet that originates from or is destined for the
newly identified IP address. In this way, if one node 110A
identifies a threat, the other nodes 110B-N can be automatically
updated to recognize and prepare for the same threat.
[0042] Thus, the STEM 201 can support both external threat
detection (e.g., using third party threat data) and internal threat
detection (e.g., threats identified by a node 110A-N). Both the
third party threat data and the threat data identified by a single
node 110A-N can be shared with the other nodes 110A-N via the
private network 101 (e.g., as routing tables or updates to routing
tables) such that the routers 202, the active threat detectors 203,
and/or the firewalls 204 of each of the nodes 110A-N are configured
with the same, updated threat information.
[0043] The SIEM 201 can support a dedicated connection within the
multi-node environment to maintain a separate network within the
multi-node environment (e.g., as represented by the private network
101). The separate network (e.g., the private network 101) can be
dedicated to a single user or entity to implement the particular
technical requirements desired by the user or entity. In an
embodiment, the SIEM 201 uses Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to
switch and/or route traffic across the private network 101, the
public network 210, and/or other private or public networks not
shown (e.g., dedicated network connections, such as tunneled
connections, to an enterprise network).
[0044] The one or more processing servers 206 can execute
applications, virtual machines, and/or the like that are requested
by users attempting to access the node 110A. The one or more
processing servers 206 can also perform analytics on user data. For
example, the one or more processing servers 206 can track
historical data, scheduling data, and/or the like and provide
statistical information derived from such data. The one or more
processing servers 206 can derive this information in real-time
(e.g., as the data is received and processed by the node 110A) or
on-demand (e.g., when requested by a user) to allow a user to
review events that have already occurred. Alternatively, another
server (not shown) within the node 110A can track historical data,
scheduling data, and/or the like and provide statistical
information derived from such data.
[0045] The one or more monitoring servers 207 can be configured to
monitor the one or more processing servers 206 to ensure that the
applications executed by the one or more processing servers 206 are
running properly. The one or more monitoring servers 207 can start,
restart, stop, and/or pause any applications executed by the one or
more processing servers 206 for diagnostic purposes. The one or
more monitoring servers 207 may also control and monitor the power,
cooling, and/or other environmental elements of the node 110A. The
one or more monitoring servers 207 may also perform authentication
monitoring to ensure that users are only provided access to the
node 110A after being successfully authenticated (e.g., the one or
more monitoring servers 207 can include or act as a lightweight
directory access protocol (LDAP) server).
[0046] The one or more storage servers 208 can include one or more
self-encrypting drives (SEDs) that are each non-transitory storage
mediums (e.g., magnetic disk drives, solid state memory drives,
etc.) configured to encrypt and store received data using
encryption keys provided by another component (e.g., the encryption
key management system 205 in this case).
[0047] In some embodiments, the one or more backup repository
servers 209 are configured to store data backups and to perform
disaster recovery (e.g., data recovery) operations. In other
embodiments, the one or more backup repository servers 209 are only
configured to store data backups. The one or more backup repository
servers 209 can store backups of data associated with the STEM 201,
the switch 212, the encryption key management system 205, the one
or more processing servers 206, the one or more monitoring servers
207, and/or the one or more storage servers 208.
[0048] In an embodiment, the one or more backup repository servers
209 of one node, such as node 110A, stores data backups of data
associated with another node, such as node 110B Likewise, the one
or more backup repository servers 209 of the node 110B stores data
backups of data associated with the node 110A. Thus, the data
backup stored in one node is a mirror of the data of another node
(and allows the node with the stored data backup to act as a
redundant node). A circuit, such as a virtual circuit (not shown)
can monitor the status of each of the nodes 110A-N. If a first node
becomes inactive, the circuit notifies a second node that stores
the data backup of the inactive first node and the second node
temporarily operates as the first node (and the second node). Thus,
if the node 110A becomes inactive, the one or more backup
repository servers 209 of the node 110B operate as the node 110A,
providing the functionality that the node 110A normally would
provide.
[0049] While the backup node operates as the inactive node, the
backup node may store data, change settings, and/or make other
changes that have not been introduced in the inactive node. Before
the inactive node becomes fully active and starts operating as
normal, the backup node and the inactive node may be synched. For
example, once the inactive node becomes active again, the circuit
notifies the backup node, the backup node updates the inactive node
to include any changes that occurred since the inactive node became
inactive, and the inactive node begins operating under normal
conditions again. Thus, if the node 110A becomes active again, the
one or more backup repository servers 209 of the node 110B updates
any or all components of the node 110A such that the node 110A and
the data in the one or more backup repository servers 209
associated with the node 110A are synched, and the node 110A then
begins normal operations (and the one or more backup repository
servers 209 of the node 110B cease operating as the node 110A and
merely provide backup services as before).
[0050] In alternate embodiments, the one or more backup repository
servers 209 of a node store data backups of data associated with
that same node. If the node becomes inactive, the one or more
backup repository servers 209 of the node may operate as described
above to provide services until the node becomes active again.
[0051] In an embodiment, a node, such as the node 110A, includes
components to separate user functionality (including user interface
services) from system management functionality. For example, a
multi-node environment may utilize sub-networks for publicly
accessible system components and logically separate those
components from system-internal networks and/or functions. A node
can also include components to prevent unauthorized and/or
unintended information from being transferred through shared
multi-node environment resources. A node can include components to
partition stored information into various components residing in
separate physical domains or environments. In some embodiments, in
addition to the physical separation of stored information, the
multi-node environment maintains a separate execution domain for
each executing process running in the nodes 110A-N of the
multi-node environment.
[0052] Each node 110A-N may be a single computing device or may
include multiple distinct computing devices, such as computer
servers, logically or physically grouped together to collectively
operate as a system. The components of each node 110A-N can each be
implemented in application-specific hardware (e.g., a server
computing device with one or more ASICs) such that no software is
necessary, or as a combination of hardware and software. In
addition, the modules and components of each node 110A-N can be
combined on one server computing device or separated individually
or into groups on several server computing devices. In some
embodiments, each node 110A-N may include additional or fewer
components than illustrated in FIGS. 2A-2B.
[0053] In some embodiments, the features and services provided by
each node 110A-N may be implemented as web services consumable via
the public network 210 and/or the cellular network 220. In further
embodiments, each node 110A-N is provided by one more virtual
machines implemented in a hosted computing environment. The hosted
computing environment may include one or more rapidly provisioned
and released computing resources, which computing resources may
include computing, networking and/or storage devices. A hosted
computing environment may also be referred to as a cloud computing
environment.
[0054] Each electronic or user device 211 can be an Internet of
Things (IoT) device. As used herein, an IoT device can be any
electronic device that can collect and/or exchange data via a
network and/or that can be sensed or controlled remotely via a
network. For example, an IoT device can include a wide variety of
computing devices, including personal computing devices, terminal
computing devices, laptop computing devices, tablet computing
devices, electronic reader devices, mobile devices (e.g., mobile
phones, media players, handheld gaming devices, etc.), wearable
devices with network access and program execution capabilities
(e.g., "smart watches" or "smart eyewear"), wireless devices, home
automation devices (e.g., "smart thermostats" or "smart meters"),
sensors (e.g., sensors that measure physical data like voltage,
current, pressure, temperature, soil acidity, heart rate, blood
pressure, etc.), transportation vehicles (e.g., automobiles, train
cars, airplanes, helicopters, bicycles, motorcycles, ships, etc.),
robots, digital signs, automated teller machines, set-top boxes,
gaming consoles, entertainment systems, televisions with network
access and program execution capabilities (e.g., "smart TVs"), and
various other electronic devices and appliances. Individual IoT
devices may execute a browser application to communicate via the
public network 210 and/or the cellular network 220 with other
computing systems, such as the node 110A or the other nodes
110B-110N, in order to transmit and/or receive data (e.g., settings
or device parameter information) and/or in order to be sensed or
controlled remotely. Alternatively, an electronic device 211 can be
a device other than an IoT device (e.g., a device that does not
collect or exchange data and/or that is not sensed or controlled
remotely via a network, such as a non-network-enabled device).
[0055] As described herein, a user can access one or more nodes
110A-N via a user device (e.g., a computing device, like an
electronic device 211 or a non-IoT device, that is or is not being
monitored by the nodes 110A-N). For example, the nodes 110A-N may
be located so that they are close (in either a geographical or
networking sense) to groups of user devices. In such a
configuration, a user device may be provided access to the node
110A-N to which it is closest and/or to the node 110A-N that shares
a geographic region with the user device, rather than all user
devices being provided access to a single node 110A-N. If the node
110A-N to which a user device is closest and/or to that shares a
geographic region with the user device is offline (e.g., due to an
outage, maintenance, etc.), then the user device may be provided
access to the next closest node 110A-N, the node 110A-N assigned to
be a backup of the offline node, and/or the like.
[0056] FIG. 3A illustrates an example data flow between IoT
devices, such as electronic devices 311, and the node 110A. While
FIG. 3A illustrates three different ways that the node 110A can
communicate with various electronic devices 311, this is not meant
to be limiting. The node 110A can communicate with electronic
devices 311 using any combination of the different ways illustrated
in FIG. 3A. For example, the node 110A can communicate with
electronic devices 311A-B via a cellular network dedicated circuit
310 and the cellular network 220. The cellular network dedicated
circuit 310 may provide an interface between the node 110A and the
internal networking components of the cellular network 220. This
example is described in greater detail below with respect to FIG.
3B. As another example, the node 110A can communicate with
electronic devices 311C-D via the public network 210. This example
is described in greater detail below with respect to FIG. 3C. As
another example, the node 110A can communicate with the electronic
devices 311C-D via the network 240 and the server 230.
[0057] FIG. 3B illustrates an example data flow between IoT
devices, such as the electronic devices 311A-B, and the components
in node 110A via the cellular network 220. As illustrated in FIG.
3B, the router 202 can receive communications from and transmit
communications to the cellular network dedicated circuit 310. The
communications may be encapsulated according to a cellular carrier
protocol 320. In an embodiment, the electronic devices 311A-B are
capable of communicating via the cellular network 220. Thus, the
data transmitted between the electronic devices 311A-B and the
router 202 are encapsulated according to the cellular carrier
protocol 320. In addition, the router 202 may route such data to
the active threat detector 203 and the active threat detector 203
may route such data (e.g., after filtering none, some, or all of
the data) to the firewall 204. The data transmitted between these
components 202-204 may still be encapsulated according to the
cellular carrier protocol 320.
[0058] In an embodiment, the firewall 204 converts the data from
the cellular carrier protocol 320 to an Internet protocol (IP) 330
or another similar network-based protocol. The data may pass
through another firewall 304 before reaching the switch 212. The
switch 212 then routes the data encapsulated according to the IP
330 to one of the servers 206-208 or the one or more backup
repository servers 209.
[0059] Likewise, data from the one or more backup repository
servers 209 or one of the servers 206-208 can be transmitted to the
switch 212 and can be encapsulated according to the IP 330. The
switch 212 can forward the data to the firewall 204. The firewall
204 can then convert the data from the IP 330 to the cellular
carrier protocol 320 and the re-encapsulated data can then be
forwarded to the active threat detector 203, the router 202, and
the cellular network dedicated circuit 310 before reaching the
cellular network 220 and eventually one of the electronic devices
311A or 311B.
[0060] FIG. 3C illustrates an example data flow between IoT
devices, such as the electronic devices 311C-D, and the components
in the node 110A via the public network 210. Unlike the example
illustrated in FIG. 3B, all data transmitted between the electronic
devices 311C-D and one of the servers 206-208 or the one or more
backup repository servers 209 are encapsulated according to the IP
330. While FIGS. 3B and 3C are illustrated as separate examples,
this is not meant to be limiting. The node 110A can handle data
encapsulated according to the IP 330 received from and transmitted
to the public network 210, data encapsulated according to the
cellular carrier protocol 320 received from and transmitted to the
cellular network dedicated circuit 310, and/or data encapsulated
according to any proprietary protocol received from and transmitted
to the network 240.
[0061] End-to-End Protection
[0062] As described above, conventional data network systems may
have gaps in their security schemes. Some conventional data network
systems may allow data to be transmitted in an unsecured manner
over a public network, such as the Internet, leaving open the
possibility that the data can be captured, snooped, or otherwise
accessed by an unauthorized user. Some conventional data network
systems may store or transmit encryption keys together with
encrypted data, allowing the encrypted data to be easily
compromised. The multi-node environment described herein seeks to
close such security gaps.
[0063] For example, a node, such as one of the nodes 110A-N,
implements security protocols at an interface between the private
network 101 and the public network 210 and the internal components
of the respective node 110A-N (e.g., the STEM 201) to guard against
external cyberattacks. Security solutions at the network interface
work in tandem with system-internal controls to enforce information
flow through secure connections and configurations. As an example,
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption can be used to secure data
that is transmitted between electronic devices 211 and the node
110A via the public network 210. The node 110A can perform SSL
decryption within a secure boundary (e.g., the SIEM 201) in which
the decrypted and/or clear-text data only exists for a finite
duration of time. The node 110A can re-encrypt the decrypted data
using encryption keys securely generated by the encryption key
management system 205. The node 110A can employ a robust encryption
algorithm, such as AES-256, to encrypt the data as the data is
stored onto a storage drive, such as a storage drive included in
the storage servers 208. In an alternative embodiment, a tunnel
encryption, such as a Virtual Private Network (VPN) encryption,
protects data transmission between electronic devices 211 and the
node 110A. Communications that are entirely within the node 110A
can also be encrypted.
[0064] In an embodiment, the SIEM 201 is configured to perform
threat detection, real-time response, automatic event logging,
and/or post-event analysis. For example, the node 110A (e.g., the
STEM 201) can detect some or all unauthorized access attempts and
enforce appropriate security responses (e.g., disabling access
after multiple access failures within a predetermined period of
time). The node 110A (e.g., the SIEM 201) can perform automatic
logging of some or all security-related system events, including
successful and/or unsuccessful account login events, account
management events, object access, policy change, privilege
functions, process tracking, and/or system events. The node 110A
(e.g., the STEM 201) can also perform automatic logging of some or
all security-related web-application events, including some or all
administrator activity, authentication checks, authorization
checks, data deletions, data access, data changes, permission
changes, remote connections to the node 110A, and/or some or all
unauthorized access attempts. An event monitor and analyzer within
the node 110A (e.g., within the SIEM 201) can perform post-event
analysis and permit comprehensive security auditing and process
management.
[0065] The operations performed by the SIEM 201 at the network
interface of the node 110A include monitoring and controlling
communications sent and received via the various networks 101 and
210. Such operations performed by the SIEM 201 may work in tandem
with internal security techniques implemented by other components
of the node 110A that monitor and control communications at key
internal boundaries within the node 110A. The SIEM 201 may
implement a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue
wireless devices and to detect attack attempts and potential
compromises/breaches to the information system.
[0066] The node 110A can enforce encryption on some or all remote
access connections, whether initiated by a user or a system
administrator. Some or all data can be encrypted. Further, in some
embodiments, the node 110A configures some or all secure
connections to use managed entry points that employ boundary
protection devices (e.g., SIEMs).
[0067] In an embodiment, the node 110A (e.g., the one or more
monitoring servers 207) employs a multi-factor authentication
scheme to prevent unauthorized access. For example, the
multi-factor authentication can include a username and password, a
secure code separately transmitted to a first user device
associated with a user that is attempting to access the node 110A
via a second user device, biometrics (e.g., a fingerprint, a vein
map, a behavioral signature, such as physiological characteristics
of a user that describe a way the user interacts with an input
device (e.g., a keyboard, touch pad, mouse, etc.), etc.), and/or
the like. Through authentication, the node 110A can uniquely
identify and authenticate users and/or user processes with unique
identifiers and enforce specific strength requirements on the
identifiers. The node 110A can also require users to be authorized
with the node 110A before assigning accounts. In an embodiment, the
node 110A may, in an emergency or extraordinary situation,
temporarily permit an individual to be authenticated with an
authenticator with a reduced number of factors compared with normal
operation. In some embodiments, multi-factor login verification
data is encrypted for confidentiality.
[0068] As described herein, the node 110A can be designed such that
communications internal to the node 110A are partitioned or walled
off from publically accessible node 110A components. A multi-tier
architecture of the node 110A (e.g., the components within the STEM
201) can segment contact between application-specific information
(e.g., user data) and other system information (e.g., encryption
keys). For example, FIG. 4 illustrates an example data flow between
an electronic device 211 and the components in the node 110A. As
illustrated in FIG. 4, a first data path 410 includes
communications between the electronic device 211 and the STEM 201,
between the STEM 201 and the switch 212, between the switch 212 and
the one or more processing servers 206, between the one or more
processing servers 206 and the one or more monitoring servers 207,
and between the one or more monitoring servers 207 and the one or
more storage servers 208. A second data path 420 includes
communications (e.g., the transmission of encryption keys) between
the encryption key management system 205 and the one or more
storage servers 208. The first data path 410 and the second data
path 420 do not overlap and/or do not share communication
interfaces such that the information transmitted over one data path
cannot be accessed by components in the other data path.
Encryption Key Management (EKM) System
[0069] FIG. 5 illustrates a detailed block diagram of the
encryption key management system 205 of the node 110A. The
encryption key management system 205 includes a key management
subsystem to facilitate the use of encryption keys to encrypt user
data. For example, as illustrated in FIG. 5, the encryption key
management system 205 includes an enterprise key management (EKM)
system 501, a local key management (LKM) system 502, and one or
more self encrypting drives (SEDs) 503. While FIG. 5 illustrates a
single LKM system 502, this is not meant to be limiting. The EKM
system 501 may be associated with a plurality of LKM systems 502,
and each LKM system 502 may be associated with a separate set of
SEDs 503.
[0070] In an embodiment, the multi-node environment employs
cryptographic security controls to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of transmitted information through the deployment of
hardware and software solutions. The multi-node environment can
enforce cryptographic protection throughout the environment except
where the information is otherwise protected within the private
network 101. For example, the information may otherwise be
protected when a node 110A-N decrypts data encrypted using an SSL
channel encryption scheme and re-encrypts the data using a storage
drive encryption scheme or decrypts data using a storage drive
encryption scheme and re-encrypts the data using an SSL channel
encryption scheme.
[0071] The encryption of data files within a node 110A-N can be
performed in a variety of ways. One approach, for example, may
follow standards outlined in NIST FIPS 140-2 documentation where
all encryption keys are stored in a depository separate from a
location where the encrypted files are stored, backed up, and/or
accessed. The EKM system 501 can be configured to serve as the
depository that generates and stores all encryption keys. The EKM
system 501 can enforce encryption using the encryption keys through
native hardware control. The EKM system 501 may then communicate
with other hardware components that use encryption keys. The LKM
System 502 can manage requests from and transfers of encryption
keys to multiple storage drives (e.g., SEDs 503). For example, the
LKM system 502 can store information that indicates which
encryption keys are being used and/or have been used by a given SED
503, how often an encryption key has been used to encrypt data,
encryption key rotation information, and/or the like. The SEDs 503
can be configured to automatically encrypt data using provided
encryption keys and store such encrypted data. The SEDs 503 can use
embedded hardware to enforce in-line encryption and/or decryption.
In some embodiments, clear-text data cannot be extracted from SEDs
503. The use of in-line hardware can minimize the delay associated
with encryption and/or decryption operations. The smaller delay,
together with key generation and/or management functions included
within the encryption key management system 205, can render the
encryption process transparent to users (e.g., the user is unaware
of the encryption keys used to encrypt user data). This
transparency may increase user-friendliness and data security
because critical encryption keys never leave the secure domain of
the node 110A.
[0072] As an example, the EKM system 501 may generate one or more
encryption keys. A SED 503 can request an encryption key to be used
for encrypting data received from an electronic device 211
associated with a user via the public network 210. The request from
the SED 503 can be received by the LKM system 502. The LKM system
502 can then request a new encryption key from the EKM system 501.
The EKM system 501 can transmit the encryption key to the LKM
system 502 and the LKM system 502 can forward the encryption key to
the SED 503. The LKM system 502 can store information indicating
that the specific encryption key was sent to the specific SED 503.
The LKM system 502 can use this information along with an
encryption key rotation policy to anticipate when a new encryption
key may be needed for a SED 503. Once the requested encryption key
is received by the SED 503, the SED 503 can encrypt and/or decrypt
data received from the electronic device 211. The SED 503 may
encrypt data as data is received from the electronic device 211.
Alternatively, the SED 503 may encrypt data at regular intervals or
at a set time.
[0073] The data backup system 504 can be configured to back up data
stored in the SEDs 503. The data backup system 504 can store backup
data on the SED 503 associated with the backup (and the stored
backup data can be encrypted by the SED 503 using the same
encryption key as used to encrypt the other data stored on the SED
503). For example, the data backup system 504 can receive, from the
LKM system 502, the encryption key currently being used by the SED
503 to encrypt and decrypt data. The data backup system 504 can use
the encryption key to decrypt the encrypted data already stored on
the SED 503. The data backup system 504 can then extract encrypted
backup data from the decrypted data of the entire SED 503 and
decrypt the backup data using a key previously used by the data
backup system 504 to encrypt the backup data. The data backup
system 504 can then perform a data backup of the SED 503 (e.g., a
data backup of the encrypted data or a data backup of the decrypted
data, where the data backup system 504 decrypts the encrypted data
using the received encryption key) and replace the old decrypted
backup data with new backup data. The data backup system 504 can
receive another encryption key from the LKM system 502 or another
LKM system local to the data backup system 504 and use this
encryption key to encrypt the new data backup before storing the
new, encrypted data backup on the SED 503. The new, encrypted data
backup on the SED 503 may be stored with a different encryption
flag to identify the data as being encrypted with a different key
than the key used to encrypt the other data stored on the SED 503.
The data on the SED 503, including (or not including) the new,
encrypted data backup, may then be encrypted using a new key
provided by the LKM system 502.
[0074] If the user requests a data restore, the data backup system
504 can use the encryption key to decrypt the encrypted data
already stored on the SED 503. The data backup system 504 can then
extract encrypted backup data from the decrypted data of the entire
SED 503 and decrypt the backup data using a key previously used by
the data backup system 504 to encrypt the backup data. The data
backup system 504 can then initiate a restore of the decrypted
backup data. The backup data can be restored to the SED 503 and/or
transmitted to the user. Once the restore is complete, the data
backup system 504 can re-encrypt the decrypted backup data and
store the encrypted backup data on the SED 503 (and re-encrypt all
of the data stored on the SED 503 as described above).
[0075] Thus, in some embodiments, the data backup is encrypted by
the data backup system 504 using a first encryption key and then
the encrypted data backup (along with the other data stored on the
SED 503) is encrypted again by the SED 503 using a second
encryption key. The data backup system 504 can be a standalone
component in the encryption key management system 205 or the
functionality described above for the data backup system 504 can be
performed by the one or more backup repository servers 209.
[0076] In an embodiment, the encryption key management system 205
produces, controls, and/or distributes symmetric encryption keys
using NIST FIPS-compliant key management technology and processes.
The encryption key management system 205 can also produce, control,
and/or distribute asymmetric encryption keys using NSA-approved key
management technology and processes. The encryption key management
system 205 may obtain public key certificates under an appropriate
certificate policy from an approved service provider.
[0077] In an embodiment, the multi-node environment employs
cryptographic security controls to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of data through the deployment of hardware and software
solutions throughout the environment. The cryptographic security
controls protect data, whether at rest or in transit.
Encryption Key Management System Redundancy
[0078] FIG. 6 illustrates the redundancy of the encryption key
management systems 205A-B between nodes 110A-B. FIG. 6 illustrates
the interaction between the encryption key management systems
205A-B of nodes 110A-B, respectively, but the techniques disclosed
herein can apply to any pair or set of nodes 110A-N. As illustrated
in FIG. 6, the node 110A includes an encryption key management
system 205A that includes an EKM system 501A, a primary LKM 601A,
and a secondary LKM 602A. Similarly, the node 110B includes an
encryption key management system 205B that includes an EKM system
501B, a primary LKM 601B, and a secondary LKM 602B.
[0079] In an embodiment, the primary LKMs 601A-B are active in
normal operation and the secondary LKMs 602A-B are used for
disaster recovery. The EKM system 501A can communicate with the EKM
system 501B (and any other EKM system of any other node 110C-N) via
the switch 212A, the SIEM 201A, the private network 101, the SIEM
201B, and the switch 212B. The EKM systems 501A-B can communicate,
for example, so that both EKM systems 501A-B include the encryption
keys generated by the other EKM system 501A-B (and/or the other EKM
systems in the multi-node environment) so that an encryption key
management system of one node can operate in place of another
encryption key management system of another node when that
encryption key management system in the other node is down or
inactive.
[0080] For example, the secondary LKM 602A may be a backup copy of
the primary LKM 601B. Similarly, the secondary LKM 602B may be a
backup copy of the primary LKM 601A. The primary LKMs 601A-B may
periodically be backed up so that the secondary LKMs 602A-B have
current data. The EKM system 501A and/or the primary LKM 601A (via
the EKM system 501A) of the node 110A can monitor the primary LKM
601B of the node 110B by periodically polling the primary LKM 601B
(e.g., and determining that the LKM 601B is active if a response to
the poll is received). If the primary LKM 601B becomes unavailable
or inactive (as determined by the polling of the primary LKM 601B),
the primary LKM 601A and/or the EKM system 501A activates the
secondary LKM 602A, which then functions as the primary LKM of the
node 110B. The secondary LKM 602A can operate as the primary LKM of
the node 110B because of the exchange of encryption keys between
the EKM systems 501A-B and/or because of the periodic backups of
the primary LKM 601B (which are stored in the secondary LKM
602A).
[0081] If the primary LKM 601B becomes active again (as determined
by the polling of the primary LKM 601B), the secondary LKM 602A
synchs with the primary LKM 601B so that the primary LKM 601B has
the most up-to-date information. The secondary LKM 602A then ceases
to function as the primary LKM of the node 110B and the primary LKM
601B resumes normal operation as described herein.
Example Process for Providing an Encryption Key to an SED
[0082] FIG. 7 illustrates a process 700 that may be implemented by
the LKM system 502 to provide an encryption key to an SED, such as
the SED 503. The process 700 begins at block 702.
[0083] At block 702, a request for an encryption key is received
from a self-encrypting drive. The self encrypting drive may request
the encryption key to encrypt data received from an IoT device,
such as the electronic device 211 (e.g., settings or device
parameter information).
[0084] At block 704, a request for the encryption key is
transmitted to the enterprise key management system. The request
may be transmitted to the enterprise key management system in
response to receiving the request from the self encrypting
drive.
[0085] At block 706, the encryption key is received from the
enterprise key management system. In an embodiment, the LKM system
502 stores information associating the received encryption key with
the self encrypting drive that requested the encryption key. Such
information can include an encryption key identifier, a rotation
policy associated with the encryption key, and/or the like.
[0086] At block 708, the encryption key is transmitted to the self
encrypting drive. The self encrypting drive may use the encryption
key to encrypt and/or decrypt data stored in the self encrypting
drive.
Example Data Packet Analysis
[0087] FIG. 8 illustrates an example data packet inspection flow
800 that may be implemented in any node, such as node 110A. As
illustrated in FIG. 8 and described herein, the node 110A can
receive and transmit data packets via the private network 101
and/or via the public network 210. The node 110A may analyze these
data packets for threat detection purposes. For example, the SIEM
201 (e.g., the active threat detector 203 and/or the firewall 204)
of the node 110A performs the data packet analysis.
[0088] In some embodiments, the node 110A performs a different type
of data packet analysis based on the source and/or destination of
the respective data packet. For example, if a data packet
originates from another node (e.g., node 110B, node 110C, etc.) and
is transmitted over the private network 101, then the SIEM 201
performs a first type of analysis, conceptually represented at
location 806. If a data packet originates from an external device
(e.g., one of electronic devices 211) and is transmitted over the
public network 210 or cellular network 220 (not shown), then the
SIEM 201 performs a second type of analysis, conceptually
represented at location 802, and/or a third type of analysis,
conceptually represented at location 804. Details on the
differences between the different types of analyses are described
below.
[0089] The SIEM 201 may dedicate computing resources to perform one
or more of the analyses. For example, to perform an analysis, the
SIEM 201 can create an isolated environment to which a set of
computing resources, such as computer memory, processing power,
etc., is dedicated. The computing resources may be used by the SIEM
201 to execute, inspect, or otherwise process the contents of data
packets. The isolated environment may help prevent the contents of
such data packets from accessing other resources in the node 110A
and/or may help prevent unauthorized or unintended actions from
being executed by the contents of such data packets.
[0090] The computing resources dedicated to an isolated environment
may be different depending on the type of analysis to be performed
using the computing resources. For example, because the analysis
performed by the SIEM 201 may be different depending on the source
and/or destination of a data packet, different computing resources
can be dedicated for a particular type of analysis such that the
SIEM 201 can perform specific and different functions that are
tailored toward the types of threats that may originate from
transmissions via the private network 101 and/or transmissions via
the public network 210 or cellular network 220 (not shown).
[0091] As described herein, the node 110A may receive data packets
from external devices through the public network 210 or through the
cellular network 220 (not shown). In some instances, such data
packets may be unsecure--the contents of the data packets may
include malware, corrupted data, or otherwise suspicious
information. The second type of analysis performed by the SIEM 201,
conceptually represented at the location 802, may be deployed to
analyze inbound data packets transmitted over the public network
210 and/or the cellular network 220 (not shown) for threats. During
the second type of analysis, the SIEM 201 can retrieve the third
party threat data received from external sources. The SIEM 201 may
then perform external threat management by, for example, analyzing
the inbound data packets using the third party threat data. For
example, the third party threat data can include lists or ranges of
suspicious or malicious IP addresses and the SIEM 201 can compare
the inbound data packets with these IP addresses to identify
suspicious data packets (e.g., the SIEM 201 can analyze the header
of an inbound data packet to see if the header includes a malicious
IP address as a source address or destination address). If a match
is found, the corresponding data packet or packets are dropped and
blocked from further entry into the node 110A. As another example,
the third party threat data can include threat signatures, which
are digital signatures of existing, known threats that can be
received from external sources and stored in the node 110A (e.g.,
in a data storage device accessible by the active threat detector
203 and/or the firewall 204). The SIEM 201 can generate signatures
of inbound data packets (e.g., using the same digital signature
algorithm as used to generate the threat signatures) and compare
the generated signatures with the threat signatures. If a match is
found, the corresponding data packet or packets are dropped and
blocked from further entry into the node 110A. The SIEM 201 may use
one of a plurality of digital signature algorithms, such as the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) specified in FIPS 186-1 or its
successors, a message digest algorithm such as MD5, or other like
algorithms to generate the inbound data packet signatures.
[0092] One or more data packets that are not dropped or blocked
based on the second type of analysis may be further inspected by
the SIEM 201 using the third type of analysis, conceptually
represented at the location 804. During the third type of analysis,
the SIEM 201 may perform malware and/or behavioral analysis, which
takes into account parameters and constraints of the node 110A
and/or the public network 210 or the cellular network 220 (not
shown). For example, the SIEM 201 may store behavior information
related to the types of data packets normally transmitted and
received via the public network 210 (or the cellular network 220)
and the source and/or destination of such data packets. The SIEM
201 may then inspect the source and/or destination addresses of
current data packets and drop data packets that include unusual
source and/or destination addresses as indicated by the behavior
information. As another example, the SIEM 201 may store permitted
source and/or destination addresses. The SIEM 201 may block data
packets with an address outside of the permitted address values.
Behavioral analysis may be performed on malware. For example, a
malware specimen may be analyzed for its interactions with
computing resources such as file systems, operating system
processes and/or components, networks, etc. The SIEM 201 may
provide behavior monitoring tools and create an isolated
environment in the system to permit behavioral analysis. The SIEM
201 may perform behavioral analysis through allowing a malware
specimen to infect the isolated environment, analyze interactions
of the malware with computing resources, and/or modify computing
resources available to the isolated environment to analyze the
malware's behavior (e.g., changes in response to modification of
available computing resources).
[0093] The SIEM 201 can additionally inspect outbound data packets
(e.g., data packets transmitted by the node 110A over the public
network 210 or the cellular network 220). Such inspection may be
performed for the purpose of data logging and event management
(e.g., logging traffic events to particular destination
addresses).
[0094] The third type of analysis may be a deeper, more granular
analysis than the second type of analysis. For example, the STEM
201 may commit a larger amount of computing resources to perform
the third type of analysis as compared to the second type of
analysis. The third type of analysis may also be more resource
intensive than the second type of analysis, resulting in a longer
analysis period as compared to the second type of analysis.
[0095] As described herein, the node 110A may be coupled to other
nodes (e.g., nodes 110B and 110C) within the multi-node environment
via the dedicated private network 101. The SIEM 201 of node 110A
may route data traffic to and from an external network, such as the
public network 210, and/or to and from another node in the
multi-node environment. The SIEM 201 may perform the first type of
analysis to inspect data traffic between two nodes on the dedicated
private network 101, conceptually represented at the location 806.
The SIEM 201 can inspect both inbound and outbound data packets
(e.g., the SIEM 201 in node 110A may inspect data packets
transmitted from node 110A to node 110B and/or transmitted from
node 110B to node 110A). A neighboring node (e.g., node 110B) can
also have the ability to perform the first type of analysis when
receiving data transmitted by the node 110A or any other node in
the multi-node environment. Thus, an inspection tag may be attached
to a data packet by the SIEM 201 of the node 110A after completing
the first type of analysis such that the receiving node (e.g., node
110B) does not repeat the analysis. For example, this inspection
tag indicates whether a corresponding data packet has been
inspected by an SIEM 201 in a node within the dedicated private
network 101. The SIEM 201 may be configured to not inspect data
packets that include inspection tags indicating that the respective
data packets have already been inspected by another SIEM 201 in the
multi-node environment, thereby eliminating duplicate inspections
and increasing efficiency. As an example, the SIEM 201 may perform
firewall blocking, port analysis, and/or in-line blocking during
the first type of analysis. These techniques can block exploits
based on an analysis of the internal usage of the contents of a
data packet. For Example, a Permanent Virtual Circuit (PVC) can be
defined by the SIEM 201 and used to connect an external server to
the SIEM 201. A specific port number may be assigned to a
particular server. Data transferring from the server across the PVC
can then be restricted to use that assigned specific port number.
The firewall can be configured to permit only traffic across this
port and block all other traffic. The firewall can inspect the
packet header for permitted IP source and destination addresses and
for permitted port access. For example, specific services such as
Mail (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol or SMTP, Post Office Protocol
or POP) and WEB (HTTP port 80, SSL port 443) are commonly used to
move specific data through designated ports relative to their
services. The SIEM 201 can be configured to permit only traffic
through a port designated to the traffic type.
[0096] In relation to the components of the multi-node environment
illustrated in FIG. 2A, inbound data traffic can enter node 110A
through either public network 210 or private network 101, pass
through router 202, active threat detector 203, and firewall 204,
and be received by switch 212 if the second and/or third type of
analyses do not result in the dropping or blocking of the data
packet. Outbound data packets may pass through switch 212, firewall
204, active threat detector 203, and router 202 to either public
network 210 or private network 101. Although both public network
210 and private network 101 traffic share the same physical routes
within node 110A, the active threat detector 203 and/or the
firewall 204 can distinguish public network 210 data packets from
private network 101 data packets based on, for example, addresses
within the data packets. The active threat detector 203 and/or the
firewall 204 can then perform the types of analyses intended for
the respective types of traffic. Border Gateway Protocol is an
example protocol which may enable traffic management and
differentiation.
[0097] In an embodiment, the SIEM 201 performs the first, second,
and/or third type of analysis on all data packets transmitted or
received via the public network 210, the cellular network 220 (not
shown), or the private network 101. In other embodiments, the SIEM
201 performs the first, second, and/or third type of analysis on
selected data packets. For example, a data packet may be selected
for the first, second, and/or third type of analysis based on a
configuration of the active threat detector 203 and/or the firewall
204 (e.g., the components may be configured to analyze certain
types of data packets, data packets that have a certain source
address, etc.). As another example, a data packet may be selected
for the third type of analysis if the data packet was selected for
the second type of analysis (and passed the second type of
analysis). As another example, a data packet may be selected for
the first, second, and/or third type of analysis based on a
received threat alert (e.g., the SIEM 201 has been notified by an
external source or another node in the multi-node environment that
a threat is expected or an attack has occurred). The STEM 201 may
select the first few and/or last few data packets of a data flow
when a threat alert is received. As another example, a data packet
may be selected for the first, second, and/or third type of
analysis if data packets similar to a received or transmitted data
packet were dropped or blocked in the past.
Integrated Control and Data Management Interface
[0098] Generally, data is collected by various devices and then
pushed to a centralized database. Once at the centralized database,
the data can be processed (e.g., batch, Hadoop, etc.) and displayed
to a user. However, the transfer of data to the centralized
database can pose a security risk and cause network latency. For
example, the data is often transferred over a public network, such
as the Internet, leaving the data vulnerable to interception by
malicious actors. Often, the amount of data collected by the
various devices is very large (e.g., gigabytes to terabytes of
data) and the transfer of the data to the centralized database can
reduce the amount of bandwidth available for other traffic. To
avoid these issues, the data could be stored locally to the device
or system that generated the data. However, it may be difficult to
process data across different systems given that each of the
systems may reside on a separate private network and the data may
be stored in incompatible formats.
[0099] Accordingly, described herein is an integrated control and
data management interface that can avoid the issues described
above. For example, data may be stored in databases local to the
devices or systems that generated the data. The devices and/or
systems may also be physically coupled to the same private network.
The integrated control and data management interface can function
in the control plane of the private network, thereby gaining access
to the databases without having to access a public network (e.g.,
the integrated control and data management interface can connect to
the databases "out-of-band" (e.g., via a private network) rather
than "in-band" (e.g., via a public network)). The integrated
control and data management interface can also access and/or
process data stored in the databases local to the devices or
systems via calls (e.g., application program interface (API) calls)
to the various databases. The structure of the calls may remain
static such that even if the formatting or mapping of the data in
one or more of the databases changes, the integrated control and
data management interface can still use the same calls to access
and/or process the data. In this way, the integrated control and
data management interface can provide a single user interface for
device interaction and analysis.
[0100] FIG. 9 illustrates an example integrated control and data
management interface network 900. As illustrated in FIG. 9,
integrated control and data interface 910 is an example integrated
control and data management interface described above. The
integrated control and data interface 910 can be any physical
computing system, such as a mobile device, desktop, workstation,
server, and/or the like. The integrated control and data interface
910 can execute message-oriented middleware (MOM) that supports the
sending and receiving of messages between nodes 110A-N and
databases 920A-N
[0101] In an embodiment, the integrated control and data interface
910 communicates with the private network 101 via a controller 915.
For example, the controller 915 can represent a network operation
center (or a network management center) that includes network
monitoring equipment to control, manage, or otherwise monitor the
private network 101. The controller 915 may also include a route
optimization system (e.g., a MANAGED INTERNET ROUTE OPTIMIZER
controller) that automatically manages network protocols (e.g.,
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)) and re-routes traffic. Thus, the
integrated control and data interface 910 can access the control
plane of the private network 101 via the controller 915. In
alternative embodiments, the integrated control and data interface
910 communicates directly with the private network 101.
[0102] The databases 920A-N can be databases that store data local
to a system or device. For example, the databases 920A-N can each
be associated with a third party and store data generated by the
respective third party. The third parties can be any system or
service that generates data, such as a network-accessible ticketing
service, a system of sensors (e.g., sensors associated with oil
wells or oil pipelines), a credit card processing service, and/or
the like.
[0103] The nodes 110A-N and databases 920A-N may each be physically
located in different geographic locations. However, the nodes
110A-N and the databases 920A-N may have access to the private
network 101 and other networks, such as public networks (not
shown). Thus, the integrated control and data interface 910 can
communicate with the nodes 110A-N and the databases 920A-N via the
private network 101, thereby avoiding public networks, such as the
public network 210 or the cellular network 220, and the data
vulnerabilities associated with such networks.
[0104] The integrated control and data interface 910 can use calls
(e.g., API calls) to query the databases 920A-N and/or the
databases of the nodes 110A-N (e.g., storage servers 208) via the
private network 101. For example, the integrated control and data
interface 910 can transmit a query call to the database 920A via
the private network 101. Instead of creating artifacts associated
with the data stored in the database 920A (which can contaminate
data and/or results) and/or using private network 101 bandwidth to
transfer the data stored in the database 920A to the integrated
control and data interface 910, the integrated control and data
interface 910 can construct the query call such that any processing
associated with the query call is executed locally by the database
920A (or the system operating the database 920A) and a processed
result is transmitted to the integrated control and data interface
910 (e.g., a result that includes a response to the query). The
integrated control and data interface 910 can transmit the same
query to multiple nodes 110A-N and/or databases 920A-N such that
the integrated control and data interface 910 effectively processes
data stored locally in different databases as if the data was
actually all stored in a centralized database.
[0105] In addition, the integrated control and data interface 910
can display the results of a query (or stored data) within a single
interface, such as a single user interface, without creating
multiple connections to different nodes 110A-N and/or databases
920A-N. For example, generally to be able to view data stored in
database 920A and data stored in database 920B, a device would need
to establish a first connection (e.g., a first tunnel) with the
database 920A, collect the desired data from the database 920A,
close the first connection, separately establish a second
connection (e.g., a second tunnel) with the database 920B, and then
collect the desired data from the database 920B. The connections
may be serially established and closed because the connections are
secure and a device generally cannot establish multiple secure
connections at once, especially when such connections require the
device to connect with a network outside of the network to which
the device is associated.
[0106] However, here, the integrated control and data interface 910
may not need to establish two separate connections to access the
data stored in the databases 920A-B. Instead, the integrated
control and data interface 910 can use the internal routing
protocol of the private network 101 (because the integrated control
and data interface 910 access the private network 101 via the
control plane) to communicate with the various nodes 110A-N and/or
the databases 920A-N. For example, the database 920A may be
assigned an internal network address. The integrated control and
data interface 910 can use this internal network address to access
the database 920A (where the internal routing protocol routes
packets such that any calls initiated by the integrated control and
data interface 910 are received by the database 920A). Thus, there
is no need to serially establish and close connections to the nodes
110A-N and/or the databases 920A-N. The integrated control and data
interface 910 can access multiple nodes 110A-N and/or the databases
920A-N at the same time (e.g., the internal network address of the
database 920A can be used to display database 920A data in a first
window of the user interface and the internal network address of
the database 920B can be used to display database 920B data in a
second window of the user interface concurrently with the first
window).
Double-Encryption Network Connection
[0107] As described above with respect to FIG. 5, a node 110 can
include an encryption key management system 205, where the
encryption key management system 205 includes the EKM system 501,
the LKM 502, and one or more SEDs 503. As described above with
respect to FIG. 6, the EKM system 501 of one node 110 can
communicate with the EKM system 501 of another node 110 so that
both EKM systems 501 can exchange generated encryption keys. In
some embodiments, a node 110 can include the encryption key
management system 205 and one or more separate encryption key
management systems that are each associated with a specific user.
The encryption key management system 205 and the one or more
separate encryption key management systems can be used to secure a
network connection between the node 110 and a user system, as
described below with respect to FIG. 10.
[0108] FIG. 10 illustrates a double-encryption environment between
a node 110A and a user system 1050. As illustrated in FIG. 10, the
node 110A includes the SIEM 201A, the switch 212A, the encryption
key management system 205A, other components of the node 110A
illustrated in FIGS. 2A-2B, and a user encryption key management
system 1005A. The user encryption key management system 1005A may
include the same components as the encryption key management system
205A. For example, the user encryption key management system 1005A
includes an EKM system 1051A, an LKM 1052A, and one or more SEDs
1053A. The user encryption key management system 1005A may be
associated with a specific user (e.g., the user that manages the
user system 1050) and may be isolated from other components of the
node 110A aside from the switch 212A. For example, the data stored
in the one or more SEDs 1053A may have restricted access such that
only certain components of the node 110A can access such data
(e.g., the one or more processing servers 206 may access the data
via the switch 212A to perform one or more actions at the request
of the user system 1050). While the node 110A is depicted as having
a single user encryption key management system 1005A, this is not
meant to be limiting. The node 110A can include any number of user
encryption key management systems, where each user encryption key
management system is associated with a different user and/or user
system 1050.
[0109] The node 110A may communicate with a network manager 1010
via the SIEM 201A using a private network 1001 (e.g., a privately
accessible network of linked networks, possibly operated by various
distinct parties, such as a personal area network, local area
network, wide area network, cable network, satellite network,
cellular telephone network, etc. or combination thereof, each with
access to and/or from the Internet) only accessible to the network
manager 1010 and the node 110A Likewise, the user system 1050 may
communicate with the network manager 1010 using the public network
210. Thus, the node 110A and the user system 1050 may communicate
via the private network 1001 and the public network 210. Connection
1020 between the SIEM 201A and the network manager 1010 over the
private network 1001 may have double encryption, whereas connection
1022 between the network manager 1010 and the user system 1050 over
the public network 210 may have single encryption, as described in
greater detail below.
[0110] The network manager 1010 may be a system that includes
computer hardware (e.g., a processor, memory, modem, etc.) and that
is managed by a network provider, such as an Internet service
provider. The network provider may manage at least some components
within the public network 210. The network provider may also manage
the private network 1001 alone or in conjunction with the entity
managing the node 110A. The network manager 1010 may serve as an
interface between the private network 1001 and the public network
210. In some embodiments, the network manager 1010 can function as
a firewall by blocking data packets from being transmitted within
the private network 1001 if such data packets or the data within
such data packets are not encrypted.
[0111] The user system 1050 may be a system managed by a user that
locally stores user data (e.g., data measured by electronic or IoT
devices 211, transactional data, medical data, etc.). The user
system 1050 may include a user encryption key management system
1005B that includes the same components as the user encryption key
management system 1005A. For example, the user encryption key
management system 1005B may include the EKM system 1051B, the LKM
1052B, and one or more SEDs 1053B. The one or more SEDs 1053B may
store user data in an encrypted format (e.g., encrypted using
encryption keys generated by the EKM system 1051B). The user system
1050 may also include other storage devices, not shown, for locally
storing user data. As an illustrative example, the user system 1050
can be a system located on the premises of an entity (e.g., a
manufacturing company, a pipeline operator, a credit card company,
a hospital, etc.) that manages and/or owns the user data.
[0112] Because the user encryption key management system 1005A is
associated with the user system 1050, the user encryption key
management system 1005A and the user encryption key management
system 1005B may communicate with each other (e.g., the EKM system
1051A and the EKM system 1051B may communicate with each other) to
facilitate key exchange. The key exchange may take place to encrypt
a connection between the node 110A and the user system 1050 and to
allow the node 110A to process user data. For example, while the
user data may be stored locally in the user system 1050 (and
therefore secure), the amount of user data may be large (e.g.,
gigabytes, terabytes, etc.) and the cost of processing such data
(e.g., aggregating the data, identifying trends in the data using
machine-learning or other techniques, filtering the data, etc.) may
be high (e.g., financially expensive and expensive in terms of
computing resources needed to process the large amount of data).
Thus, the processing resources available to the node 110A could be
leveraged to perform the desired data processing. However, as
described herein, the user data may be extremely sensitive and/or
confidential. Accordingly, it may be important for a connection to
be secure before a copy of some or all of the user data is
transferred across a network.
[0113] To secure the connection 1020 and the connection 1022, the
EKM system 1051A or 1051B can generate an encryption key that is
used to encrypt some or all of the data transferred across the
connections 1020 and 1022. For example, user data stored in the one
or more SEDs 1053B may be encrypted. The LKM 1052B can retrieve an
encryption key to allow the one or more SEDs 1053B to decrypt the
user data to be transmitted to the node 110A for processing. The
LKM 1052B can then receive the same encryption key or another
encryption key from the EKM system 1051B to encrypt the user data
for transport across the connection 1022 and the connection 1020.
Alternatively, the SEDs 1053B does not decrypt the user data and
the encrypted user data is transmitted to the node 110A.
[0114] The encrypted user data passes through the connection 1022
and arrives at the network manager 1010. The EKM system 501 of the
encryption key management system 205A may generate a second,
separate encryption key that is used to encrypt data traveling
along the connection 1020. For example, the EKM system 501 may
transmit the second encryption key to the network manager 1010. The
network manager 1010 can then encrypt the encrypted user data using
the second encryption key. Thus, the user data is encrypted twice.
The network manager 1010 can then forward the double-encrypted user
data along the connection 1020 to the SIEM 201A.
[0115] The STEM 201A passes the double-encrypted user data to the
switch 212, which then forwards the double-encrypted user data to
the user encryption key management system 1005A. The user
encryption key management system 1005A can request the second
encryption key from the encryption key management system 205A via
the switch 212A and decrypt the outer encryption layer of the
double-encrypted user data using the second encryption key.
Alternatively, the SIEM 201A or the switch 212A can request the
second encryption key from the encryption key management system
205A and decrypt the outer encryption layer of the double-encrypted
user data or the double-encrypted user data can be passed to the
encryption key management system 205A for decryption of the outer
encryption layer.
[0116] Because the user data is also encrypted using an encryption
key generated by the EKM system 1051B, the EKM system 1051B
coordinates with the EKM system 1051A to indicate the encryption
key that was used to encrypt the user data. The EKM system 1051B
can either forward the encryption key to the EKM system 1051A
(e.g., by encrypting the encryption key using another encryption
key available to the EKM system 1051A and transmitting the
encrypted encryption key along the connections 1020 and 1022) or
provide the information necessary for the EKM system 1051A to
generate and/or retrieve the same encryption key. For example, both
EKM systems 1051A-B may use the same techniques to generate
encryption keys such that each generates encryption keys in the
same order or sequence. The EKM system 1051B can then indicate to
the EKM system 1051A which encryption key in sequence was used to
encrypt the user data, which then allows the EKM system 1051A to
generate and/or retrieve the appropriate encryption key for
decryption of the encrypted user data.
[0117] Once the encryption key is identified, the user encryption
key management system 1005A can use the encryption key to decrypt
the now single-encrypted user data and send the decrypted user data
to the one or more processing servers 206 via the switch 212A. The
user system 1050 may separately transmit an instruction to the node
110A via the connections 1020 and 1022 that instructs the node 110A
to perform a certain operation (e.g., data aggregation, trend
identification, data filtering, etc.) such that the one or more
processing servers 206 perform the appropriate actions on the
decrypted user data. Alternatively, the instruction can be sent in
conjunction with the encrypted user data (e.g., the instruction may
be encrypted as well and, after the instruction is decrypted, the
user encryption key management system 1005A can transmit the
decrypted instruction to the one or more processing servers 206 via
the switch 212A such that the one or more processing servers 206
process the user data accordingly to the decrypted
instruction).
[0118] After the decrypted user data is processed, the processed
user data is transmitted by the one or more processing servers 206
back to the user encryption key management system 1005A via the
switch 212A. The user encryption key management system 1005A can
encrypt the processed user data using an encryption key generated
by the EKM system 1051A or received from the EKM system 1051B
(e.g., either the same encryption key used to encrypt the user data
when transmitted by the user system 1050 or a different encryption
key). The user encryption key management system 1005A can then
request an encryption key from the encryption key management system
205A to use for encrypting the encrypted processed user data. The
encryption key provided by the encryption key management system
205A can be the same second encryption key used to encrypt the
encrypted user data by the network manager 1010 or a different
encryption key. Alternatively, the encrypted processed user data
can be passed to the switch 212A, the SIEM 201A, and/or the
encryption key management system 205A to encrypt the processed user
data a second time. Thus, the processed user data is encrypted
twice: once using an encryption key provided by the user-specific
user encryption key management system 205A and once again using an
encryption key provided by the encryption key management system
205A.
[0119] The double-encrypted processed user data can then be
transmitted by the node 110A to the network manager 1010 along the
connection 1020 through the private network 1001. The network
manager 1010 can then use the encryption key provided by the
encryption key management system 205A to decrypt the outer
encryption layer of the double-encrypted processed user data. The
network manager 1010 can then transmit the now single-encrypted
processed user data to the user system 1050 along the connection
1022 through the public network 1022. Once the user system 1050
receives the single-encrypted processed user data, then EKM system
1051B can provide an encryption key that can be used to decrypt the
encrypted processed user data (e.g., based on communications with
the EKM system 1051A to identify which encryption key was used to
encrypt the processed user data and/or to receive the encryption
key used to encrypt the processed user data). The decrypted
processed user data can then be stored in the one or more SEDs
1053B and/or other storage systems. When stored in the one or more
SEDs 1053B, the decrypted processed user data may be encrypted
using an encryption key provided by the EKM system 1051B via the
LKM 1052B.
[0120] While FIG. 10 depicts one user system 1050, this is not
meant to be limiting. For example, multiple user systems may
connect with the network manager 1010 via the public network 210.
Data transmitted between the network manager 1010 and the various
user systems (e.g., via connection 1022 and other connections, not
shown) may be encrypted using an encryption key provided by the EKM
system 1051 of the respective user system. Data transmitted between
the network manager 1010 and the node 110A (e.g., via connection
1020) may be double-encrypted, where the data encrypted using the
encryption keys provided by the EKM system 1051 of the respective
user system is encrypted again using an encryption key provided by
the EKM system 501 of the encryption key management system 205A.
Thus, the connection 1020 may carry multiple channels of
double-encrypted data, where data in each channel is encrypted
using a common encryption key (e.g., the encryption key provided by
the EKM system 501 of the encryption key management system 205A)
and a unique encryption key (e.g., the encryption key provided by
the EKM system 1051 of the user system associated with the
respective data). Alternatively, data in each channel can be
encrypted using unique encryption keys (e.g., the EKM system 501 of
the encryption key management system 205A can provide different
encryption keys to the network manager 1010, one for each
channel).
Device Worlds
[0121] As described herein, a user can access a node 110A-N to
provide login information and attributes or parameters for an IoT
device, such as one of the electronic devices 211, 311, and/or 411.
Electronic device attributes or parameters (e.g., IoT device
attributes or parameters) can include device settings (e.g., a time
of day that the electronic device operates, a temperature value if
the electronic device is a thermostat, etc.), device measurements,
and/or any other values that define the characteristics of or the
behavior of the electronic device.
[0122] When providing the login information and attributes or
parameters, the user can also group electronic devices into the
same environment or device world and assign global parameters
(e.g., world parameters) to the device world. As used herein, a
"device world" is a user-defined grouping or aggregation of
electronic devices, where each electronic device in the device
world is configured to operate according to the global parameters
assigned to the device world. The electronic devices grouped into
the same device world can be related. For example, a user may
operate a pipeline. The electronic devices may be sensors that
measure various parameters associated with the pipeline, such as
temperature, pressure, flow, etc. Because the electronic devices
are used to monitor the same structure (e.g., the pipeline), a set
of global parameters may govern how the electronic devices operate.
As another example, a first electronic device can be a thermostat
and a second electronic device can be a wearable human body
monitor. The first and second electronic devices may be configured
with a set of global parameters such that the temperature of the
person wearing the wearable human body monitor has a constant body
temperature.
[0123] Using the provided login information, the node 110A-N can
periodically poll the electronic devices in a device world, a
server that manages the electronic devices in the device world
(e.g., the server 230), and/or electronic devices not assigned to
any device world to determine whether the electronic devices are
operating according to the device attributes and/or the global
parameters. If the node 110A-N polls the electronic devices
directly and determines that an electronic device is operating
outside of the defined device attributes and/or global parameters,
the node 110A-N can generate an alert or notification to inform the
user that the electronic device is operating incorrectly and/or can
transmit a message to the electronic device to instruct the
electronic device to adjust the device parameter that has caused
the electronic device to operate outside of the defined device
attributes and/or global parameters. If the node 110A-N polls the
server that manages the electronic devices and determines that an
electronic device is operating outside of the defined device
attributes and/or global parameters based on the feedback provided
by the server, the node 110A-N can generate an alert or
notification to inform the user that the electronic device is
operating incorrectly and/or can transmit a message to the server
managing the electronic device to instruct the electronic device to
adjust the device parameter that has caused the electronic device
to operate outside of the defined device attributes and/or global
parameters.
[0124] FIG. 11 illustrates a grouping of electronic devices 1111A-D
into various device worlds 1110, 1120, and 1130. As illustrated in
FIG. 11, electronic device 1111A is assigned to device world 1110,
electronic devices 1111B-C are assigned to device world 1120, and
electronic devices 1111C-D are assigned to device world 1130. Thus,
electronic device 1111C is assigned to two different device worlds.
In such a situation, the device world 1120 and 1130 global
parameters may be set such that the values do not conflict.
Alternatively or in addition, as described in greater detail below
with respect to FIGS. 13E-13G, a multi-level device world can be
set up such that a device world acts as a parent device world and
each of the device worlds 1120 and 1130 act as a child device world
of the parent device world. The parent device world can have a set
of global parameters, and the world parameters assigned to the
device worlds 1120 and 1130 may be restricted to values that are
consistent with the set global parameter values of the parent
device world.
[0125] In an embodiment, the node 110A periodically polls the
electronic devices 1111A-D to determine the current device
settings. The node 110A can poll the electronic devices 1111A-D
directly via the public network 210, directly via the cellular
network 220, and/or indirectly via the server 230 and the private
network 240. The node 110A can poll the electronic devices 1111A-D
at regular intervals (e.g., every 5 ms, every 1 second, every 5
minutes, etc.), at times that are determined based on the type of
electronic device and/or how sensitive the electronic device or the
system that the electronic device monitors is to change (e.g., a
thermostat may be polled every 5 minutes, whereas a heart rate
monitor or a pressure sensor of a pipeline may be polled every 10
ms), on request by a user, and/or the like.
[0126] The node 110A (e.g., the one or more processing servers 206)
can receive data transmitted by the electronic devices 1111A-D
(e.g., current device settings) in response to the polling and
compare such data to the defined device attributes and/or the
global parameters to determine whether the respective electronic
device 1111A-D is operating as expected. If the values of the
current device settings fall outside of the defined device
attributes and/or the global parameters, then the node 110A (e.g.,
the one or more processing servers 206) can take action. For
example, the one or more processing servers 206 can generate an
alert or notification indicating the issue with the identified
electronic device 1111A-D. The alert or notification can be
displayed in a user interface generated by the one or more
processing servers 206 and viewed by the user. The alert or
notification can be transmitted to the router 202 for transmission
to a user device operated by the user (e.g., computer, mobile
device, tablet, etc.) as an electronic message (e.g., a text
message, a chat message, etc.). Alternatively or in addition, the
alert or notification can be transmitted to the router 202 for
transmission to a server that stores electronic messages accessible
by the user (e.g., an email server). As another example, the one or
more processing servers 206 can generate an instruction to be
transmitted to the identified electronic device 1111A-D and/or the
server 230 managing the identified electronic device 1111A-D that
causes the identified electronic device 1111A-D to adjust its
behavior such that the current device settings fall within the
defined device attributes and/or the global parameters.
Furthermore, if the node 110A does not receive a response from an
electronic device 1111A-D in response to the polling after a set
period of time (e.g., 5 seconds, 1 minute, etc.), the node 110A
(e.g., the one or more processing servers 206) may assume that the
current device settings fall outside of the defined device
attributes and/or the global parameters and proceed as described
above.
[0127] FIGS. 12A-12C illustrate a user interface 1200 depicting the
configuration of an IoT device, such as one or more of the
electronic devices 1211A-N. The user interface 1200 can be
generated by any of the nodes 110A-N (e.g., the one or more
processing servers 206) when a user accesses the respective node
110A-N to configure and store device attributes for an electronic
device. As illustrated in FIG. 12A, the user interface 1200
includes a window 1210 that displays a list of selectable installed
electronic devices 1211A-N (e.g., electronic devices for which a
user has already gone through a set up process so that the node
110A-N understands how to access the electronic device for polling
purposes and what the defined device attributes and/or global
parameters should be), an indication of whether each installed
electronic device 1211A-N is secured (e.g., whether an electronic
device 1211A-N can be accessed without a username and password or
other such security feature), and an indication of to which device
world(s) 1290A-D the respective electronic device 1211A-N is
assigned.
[0128] The window 1210 further displays a modify worlds button 1220
and an add new device button 1230. The modify worlds button 1220,
when selected, allows a user to modify the global parameters or
other settings of a device world 1290A-D, as illustrated in FIGS.
13B-13G. The add new device button 1230, when selected, allows a
user to set up a new electronic device and the user interface
displayed may be similar to the user interface 1200 illustrated in
FIG. 12C.
[0129] As illustrated in FIG. 12B, a user, using cursor 1250,
selects electronic device 1211A. Selection of any electronic device
1211A-N allows a user to enter and/or modify the electronic device
1211A-N identification information, the login information, and the
defined device attributes of the respective electronic device
1211A-N, as illustrated in FIG. 12C. For example, the user can
enter or modify a device name (e.g., here, device 1211A was
entered), a device physical, logical, and/or network address (e.g.,
a MAC address, an IP address, etc.), a username (not shown), a
pin/password, a manufacturer name, a location of the electronic
device 1211A (e.g., a virtual or geographic location), and one or
more device attributes or parameters.
[0130] The device name, address, username, pin/password,
manufacturer, and/or location information can be used by the node
110A to access the electronic device 1211A for polling purposes
and/or to change device settings. While three fields are depicted
in the window 1210 for entering device attribute or parameter
information, this is not meant to be limiting. The user may be
provided with an opportunity to set any number of device attributes
or parameters (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, etc.). As described
above, these attributes or parameters can be any values or settings
(or range of values or settings) that define the behavior or
operation of the electronic device 1211A. For example, the
attributes or parameters can be a temperature setting (e.g., 75
degrees), a time interval for measuring a physical parameter like
voltage, current, pressure, etc. (e.g., every 50 ms), a time or
date to turn on or shut off (e.g., Oct. 1, 2015, Saturday, 7 pm,
etc.), and/or the like. The attributes or parameters entered in the
user interface 1200 depicted in FIG. 12C are associated with the
electronic device 1211A itself.
[0131] FIGS. 13A-13D illustrate a user interface 1300 depicting the
configuration of a device world. The user interface 1300 can be
generated by any of the nodes 110A-N (e.g., the one or more
processing servers 206) when a user accesses the respective node
110A-N to configure and store global parameters for a device world.
As illustrated in FIG. 13A, the user interface 1300 includes the
window 1210, which includes the modify worlds button 1220. When the
modify worlds button 1220 is selected via the cursor 1250, the
window 1210 displays a list of selectable device worlds 1290A-D
that have already been set up, as illustrated in FIG. 13B. The
window 1210 also displays a create new world button 1320.
[0132] Selecting a device world 1290A-D, such as the device world
1290A, via the cursor 1250 causes the user interface 1300 to
display fields that allow a user to enter and/or modify the device
world 1290A identification information, the login information, and
the defined global parameters of the device world 1290A, as
illustrated in FIG. 13C. For example, the user can enter or modify
a device world 1290A name (e.g., here, world 1290A was entered), a
device world identification or username, a pin/password, and one or
more global parameters.
[0133] The device world 1290A name, username, and/or pin/password
can be used by the node 110A to verify that the user has access to
the device world 1290A information (e.g., by prompting the user to
enter such information when logging in). This information can also
be used in conjunction with other factors (e.g., a fingerprint
scan, a vein scan, a smart card/RFID scan, behavioral data, etc.)
to verify that the user has access to the device world 1290A
information. While three fields are depicted in the window 1210 for
entering global parameter values, this is not meant to be limiting.
The user may be provided with an opportunity to set any number of
global parameters (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, etc.). As
described above, these attributes or parameters can be any values
or settings (or range of values or settings) that define the
behavior or operation of a set of electronic devices that are
assigned to the device world 1290A. In some embodiments, the device
world 1290A inherits the attributes or parameters assigned to the
individual electronic devices that are associated with the device
world 1290A. In addition, the user is provided with the opportunity
to define a set of global parameters that encompass the inherited
attributes or parameters. For example, if a first electronic device
associated with the device world 1290A has a defined parameter of
operating at 77 degrees and a second electronic device associated
with the device world 1290A has a defined parameter of operating at
80 degrees, the user can set a global parameter that defines a
range of acceptable temperature values (e.g., between 75 and 80
degrees).
[0134] Selecting a device world 1290A-D, such as the device world
1290A, via the cursor 1250 also causes the user interface 1300 to
display a list of selectable available electronic devices 1211A-N
(e.g., electronic devices that have already been set up for polling
and/or behavior manipulation) that can be assigned to the device
world 1290A. As an example in FIG. 13C, electronic device 1211A is
selected and assigned to the device world 1290A.
[0135] Furthermore, any of the electronic devices 1211A-N can be
selected to view the parameters that would be (if the electronic
device is not assigned to the device world 1290A yet) or are (if
the electronic device is assigned to the device world 1290A
already) inherited by the device world 1290A. For example, if the
electronic device 1211A is selected via the cursor 1250, the window
1210 displays the device attributes or parameters of the electronic
device 1211A that have been inherited by the device world 1290A as
global parameters, as illustrated in FIG. 13D.
[0136] FIGS. 13E-13G illustrate the user interface 1300 depicting
the configuration of a multi-level device world. As illustrated in
FIG. 13E, the user can select the create new world button 1320 via
the cursor 1250. Selection of the create new world button 1320
causes the user interface 1300 to display two options, as
illustrated in FIG. 13F: multi-level world or single level world. A
multi-level device world is a hierarchical tier of device worlds,
where the global parameters of a parent device world govern the
global parameters of a child device world. A single level device
world is a device world in which the device world has no parent or
child device worlds (e.g., the device world is just associated with
global parameters that govern the operation of the electronic
device assigned to the device world).
[0137] Selection of the single level world option causes the user
interface 1300 to display information similar to the information
displayed in FIG. 13D. Selection of the multi-level world option
causes the user interface 1300 to display content as illustrated in
FIG. 13G. For example, the window 1210 displays fields that allow a
user to enter and/or modify the device world identification
information, the login information, and the defined global
parameters of the device world. For example, the user can enter or
modify a device world name (e.g., here, world 1290E is entered), a
device world identification or username, a pin/password, and one or
more global parameters (e.g., where the global parameters are
inherited from the child device worlds and/or set by the user in a
manner that is consistent with the global parameters of the child
device worlds).
[0138] Selecting the multi-level world option also causes the user
interface 1300 to display a list of selectable available device
worlds 1290A-D (e.g., device worlds that have already been set up)
that can be assigned to be child device worlds of the newly created
device world (e.g., the device world 1290E). The user can repeat
this process described in FIGS. 13E-13G to create any number of
parent device worlds.
Example Process for Securely Monitoring an Electronic Device
[0139] FIG. 14 illustrates a process 1400 that may be implemented
by any of the nodes 110A-N to monitor changes in the parameters of
an IoT device, such as one of the electronic devices 211, 311, 411,
1111, or 1211. For example, the process 1400 can be implemented by
the one or more processing servers 206. The process 1400 begins at
block 1402.
[0140] At block 1402, a selection of a value for a first parameter
of a first user device (e.g., IoT or electronic device) is
received. For example, a user can provide an attribute or parameter
for the first user device that represents a desired setting or mode
of behavior for the first user device. The provided first parameter
can be stored in the one or more storage servers 208 (e.g., in a
portion of an SED associated with the user and/or the first user
device).
[0141] At block 1404, a request is transmitted to the first user
device to provide a current value of the first parameter. For
example, the one or more processing servers 206 can generate a
polling message and the node 110A-N can transmit the polling
message via the router 202 and one of the public network 210, the
cellular network 220, or the private network 240 directly to the
first user device or to a server managing the first user device
(e.g., the server 230) to receive the current value.
[0142] At block 1406, the current value of the first parameter is
received from the first user device. For example, the current value
of the first parameter can be received by the router 202 and
forwarded to the one or more processing servers 206. The current
value is received directly from the first user device if the node
110A-N is in direct communication with the first user device via
the public network 210 or the cellular network 220. The current
value is received indirectly from the first user device via the
server 230 (e.g., the server 230 can poll the first user device and
store the current parameter values) if the node 110A-N is in direct
communication with the server 230 via the private network 240.
[0143] At block 1408, the current value is compared with the
selected value. For example, the selected value can be stored in
the one or more storage servers 208. The one or more processing
servers 206 can retrieve the selected value from the one or more
storage servers 208 and compare the selected value to the current
value. The comparison yields a match if the current value and the
selected value are identical or if the current value falls within a
range defined by the selected value.
[0144] At block 1410, an alert is generated and/or an instruction
is transmitted to the first user device to change the current value
of the first parameter to the selected value in response to a
determination that the current value and the selected value do not
match. For example, the one or more processing servers 206 can
generate the instruction and the router 202 can transmit the
instruction (e.g., after the instruction is transmitted from the
one or more processing servers 206 to the switch 212, the firewall
204, the active threat detector 203, and the router 202). The
instruction can be transmitted to the server 230 for relay by the
server 230 to the first user device if the node 110A-N is in direct
communication with the server 230 via the private network 240.
Terminology
[0145] All of the methods and tasks described herein may be
performed and fully automated by a computer system. The computer
system may, in some cases, include multiple distinct computers or
computing devices (e.g., physical servers, workstations, storage
arrays, cloud computing resources, etc.) that communicate and
interoperate over a network to perform the described functions.
Each such computing device typically includes a processor (or
multiple processors) that executes program instructions or modules
stored in a memory or other non-transitory computer-readable
storage medium or device (e.g., solid state storage devices, disk
drives, etc.). The various functions disclosed herein may be
embodied in such program instructions, and/or may be implemented in
application-specific circuitry (e.g., ASICs or FPGAs) of the
computer system. Where the computer system includes multiple
computing devices, these devices may, but need not, be co-located.
The results of the disclosed methods and tasks may be persistently
stored by transforming physical storage devices, such as solid
state memory chips and/or magnetic disks, into a different state.
In some embodiments, the computer system may be a cloud-based
computing system whose processing resources are shared by multiple
distinct business entities or other users.
[0146] Depending on the embodiment, certain acts, events, or
functions of any of the processes or algorithms described herein
can be performed in a different sequence, can be added, merged, or
left out altogether (e.g., not all described operations or events
are necessary for the practice of the algorithm). Moreover, in
certain embodiments, operations or events can be performed
concurrently, e.g., through multi-threaded processing, interrupt
processing, or multiple processors or processor cores or on other
parallel architectures, rather than sequentially.
[0147] The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, routines,
and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments
disclosed herein can be implemented as electronic hardware (e.g.,
ASICs or FPGA devices), computer software that runs on general
purpose computer hardware, or combinations of both. To clearly
illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software,
various illustrative components, blocks, modules, and steps have
been described above generally in terms of their functionality.
Whether such functionality is implemented as specialized hardware
versus software running on general-purpose hardware depends upon
the particular application and design constraints imposed on the
overall system. The described functionality can be implemented in
varying ways for each particular application, but such
implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a
departure from the scope of the disclosure.
[0148] Moreover, the various illustrative logical blocks and
modules described in connection with the embodiments disclosed
herein can be implemented or performed by a machine, such as a
general purpose processor device, a digital signal processor (DSP),
an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field
programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device,
discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or
any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described
herein. A general purpose processor device can be a microprocessor,
but in the alternative, the processor device can be a controller,
microcontroller, or state machine, combinations of the same, or the
like. A processor device can include electrical circuitry
configured to process computer-executable instructions. In another
embodiment, a processor device includes an FPGA or other
programmable device that performs logic operations without
processing computer-executable instructions. A processor device can
also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a
combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of
microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a
DSP core, or any other such configuration. Although described
herein primarily with respect to digital technology, a processor
device may also include primarily analog components. For example,
some or all of the rendering techniques described herein may be
implemented in analog circuitry or mixed analog and digital
circuitry. A computing environment can include any type of computer
system, including, but not limited to, a computer system based on a
microprocessor, a mainframe computer, a digital signal processor, a
portable computing device, a device controller, or a computational
engine within an appliance, to name a few.
[0149] The elements of a method, process, routine, or algorithm
described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein can
be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by
a processor device, or in a combination of the two. A software
module can reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM
memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a
CD-ROM, or any other form of a non-transitory computer-readable
storage medium. An exemplary storage medium can be coupled to the
processor device such that the processor device can read
information from, and write information to, the storage medium. In
the alternative, the storage medium can be integral to the
processor device. The processor device and the storage medium can
reside in an ASIC. The ASIC can reside in a user terminal. In the
alternative, the processor device and the storage medium can reside
as discrete components in a user terminal.
[0150] Conditional language used herein, such as, among others,
"can," "could," "might," "may," "e.g.," and the like, unless
specifically stated otherwise, or otherwise understood within the
context as used, is generally intended to convey that certain
embodiments include, while other embodiments do not include,
certain features, elements and/or steps. Thus, such conditional
language is not generally intended to imply that features, elements
and/or steps are in any way required for one or more embodiments or
that one or more embodiments necessarily include logic for
deciding, with or without other input or prompting, whether these
features, elements and/or steps are included or are to be performed
in any particular embodiment. The terms "comprising," "including,"
"having," and the like are synonymous and are used inclusively, in
an open-ended fashion, and do not exclude additional elements,
features, acts, operations, and so forth. Also, the term "or" is
used in its inclusive sense (and not in its exclusive sense) so
that when used, for example, to connect a list of elements, the
term "or" means one, some, or all of the elements in the list.
[0151] Disjunctive language such as the phrase "at least one of X,
Y, Z," unless specifically stated otherwise, is otherwise
understood with the context as used in general to present that an
item, term, etc., may be either X, Y, or Z, or any combination
thereof (e.g., X, Y, and/or Z). Thus, such disjunctive language is
not generally intended to, and should not, imply that certain
embodiments require at least one of X, at least one of Y, or at
least one of Z to each be present.
[0152] While the above detailed description has shown, described,
and pointed out novel features as applied to various embodiments,
it can be understood that various omissions, substitutions, and
changes in the form and details of the devices or algorithms
illustrated can be made without departing from the spirit of the
disclosure. As can be recognized, certain embodiments described
herein can be embodied within a form that does not provide all of
the features and benefits set forth herein, as some features can be
used or practiced separately from others. The scope of certain
embodiments disclosed herein is indicated by the appended claims
rather than by the foregoing description. All changes which come
within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are to be
embraced within their scope.
* * * * *