U.S. patent application number 15/794908 was filed with the patent office on 2018-12-20 for system and method for migrating to and maintaining a white-list network security model.
The applicant listed for this patent is Cisco Technology, Inc.. Invention is credited to Arvind Chari, Kannan Ponnuswamy, Navneet Yadav.
Application Number | 20180367541 15/794908 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 64657779 |
Filed Date | 2018-12-20 |
United States Patent
Application |
20180367541 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Ponnuswamy; Kannan ; et
al. |
December 20, 2018 |
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR MIGRATING TO AND MAINTAINING A WHITE-LIST
NETWORK SECURITY MODEL
Abstract
Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for migrating to
and maintaining a white-list network security model. Network
traffic identified from permit-all access logs can be analyzed to
determine whether it should be white-listed, and if so, a specific
permit-access, without logging, policy is generated for the
identified network traffic. The addition of specific permit-access
policies is repeated on permit-all access logs, at which point,
permit-all access policy is converted into deny-all access. In some
examples, a system or method can obtain hit counts, from both
hardware (eg: TCAM) and software tables, for the specific
permit-access policy to determine existence of identified network
traffic over a period of time. After analyzing hit counts, the
specific permit-access policy can either continue to exist or be
removed to maintain a white-list network security model.
Inventors: |
Ponnuswamy; Kannan; (Murphy,
TX) ; Yadav; Navneet; (Cupertino, CA) ; Chari;
Arvind; (New York, CA) |
|
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
Cisco Technology, Inc. |
San Jose |
CA |
US |
|
|
Family ID: |
64657779 |
Appl. No.: |
15/794908 |
Filed: |
October 26, 2017 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
|
|
62520862 |
Jun 16, 2017 |
|
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Current U.S.
Class: |
1/1 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L 63/20 20130101;
H04L 63/101 20130101 |
International
Class: |
H04L 29/06 20060101
H04L029/06 |
Claims
1. A method for migrating to a white-list security policy
comprising: identifying, using at least one processing device,
first network traffic associated with at least one entry recorded
in a permit-all access log recording access of network traffic
within a network according to a permit-all and log access policy;
determining, using the at least one processing device, if the first
network traffic should be forwarded in the network based on a
white-list security model; if it is determined the first network
traffic should be forwarded through the network based on the
white-list security model: generating a first specific
permit-access policy for the first network traffic; and
implementing, using the at least one processing device, the first
specific permit-access policy generated for the first network
traffic into the network by inserting the first specific
permit-access policy ahead of the permit-all and log access
policy.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the identifying the first network
traffic is based on a permit-all counter corresponding to the
permit-all access log and maintained according to the permit-all
and log access policy.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the white-list security model
includes a plurality of entities that are allowed to access the
network.
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising identifying, using the
at least one processing device, second network traffic associated
with at least one other entry recorded in the permit-all access log
recording access of network traffic within a network according to
the permit-all and log access policy; determining, using the at
least one processing device, if the second network traffic should
be forwarded in the network based on the white-list security model;
if it is determined the second network traffic should be forwarded
through the network based on the white-list security model,
generating a second specific permit-access policy for the second
network traffic; and implementing, using the at least one
processing device, the second specific permit-access policy
generated for the second network traffic into the network by
inserting the second specific permit-access policy ahead of the
permit-all and log access policy.
5. The method of claim 4, further comprising: removing the second
specific permit-access policy generated for the second network
traffic when a counter corresponding to the second specific
permit-access policy generated for the second network traffic has
not increased for a specific amount of time.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein identifying the first network
traffic associated with at least one entry recorded in a permit-all
access log comprises identifying an entry in a permit-all counter
corresponding to the entry in the permit-all access log.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the permit-all access log records
access of the network traffic within the network using events in
the network generated by one or more network assurance
appliances.
8. The method of claim 1, further comprising refraining from
generating the first specific permit-access policy for the first
network traffic, if it is determined to refrain from forwarding the
first network traffic through the network based on the white-list
security model.
9. The method of claim 1, further comprising: converting the
permit-all and log access policy into a deny-all access policy; and
applying a plurality of specific permit-access policies including
the first specific permit-access policy before applying the
permit-all and log access policy converted to the deny-all access
policy to the network traffic using the permit-all access log
recording in order to implement the white-list security model in
the network.
10. The method of claim 9, further comprising: identifying, using
the at least one processing device, second network traffic
associated with at least one other entry recorded in the permit-all
and log access log recording access of network traffic within a
network according to the permit-all and log access policy;
determining, using the at least one processing device, if the
second network traffic should be forwarded in the network based on
the white-list security model; if it is determined the second
network traffic should not be forwarded through the network based
on the white-list security model, refraining from generating a
second specific permit access policy for the second network
traffic; and applying the plurality of specific permit-access
policies including the first specific permit-access policy and
lacking the second specific permit access policy before applying
the permit-all access policy converted to the deny-all access
policy to the network traffic to block forwarding of the second
network traffic through the network.
11. A system comprising: one or more processors; and at least one
computer-readable storage medium having stored therein instructions
which, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one
or more processors to perform operations comprising: identifying
first network traffic associated with at least one entry recorded
in a permit-all access log recording access of network traffic
within a network according to a permit-all and log access policy
using events in the network generated by one or more network
assurance appliances; determining if the first network traffic
should be forwarded in the network based on a white-list security
model; if it is determined the first network traffic should be
forwarded through the network based on the white-list security
model: generating a first specific permit-access policy for the
first network traffic; and implementing the first specific
permit-access policy generated for the first network traffic into
the network by inserting the first specific permit-access policy
ahead of the permit-all and log access policy.
12. The system of claim 11, wherein the instructions which, when
executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or
more processors to perform operations comprising: identifying
second network traffic associated with at least one other entry
recorded in the permit-all access log recording access of network
traffic within a network according to the permit-all and log access
policy; determining if the second network traffic should be
forwarded in the network based on the white-list security model; if
it is determined the second network traffic should be forwarded
through the network based on the white-list security model,
generating a second specific permit-access policy for the second
network traffic; and implementing the second specific permit-access
policy generated for the second network traffic into the network by
inserting the second specific permit-access policy ahead of the
permit-all and log access policy.
13. The system of claim 11, wherein the instructions which, when
executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or
more processors to perform operations comprising refraining from
generating the first specific permit-access policy for the first
network traffic, if it is determined to refrain from forwarding the
first network traffic through the network based on the white-list
security model.
14. The system of claim 11, wherein the instructions which, when
executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or
more processors to perform operations comprising: converting the
permit-all and log access policy into a deny-all access policy; and
applying a plurality of specific permit-access policies including
the first specific permit-access policy before applying the
permit-all and log access policy converted to the deny-all access
policy to the network traffic using the permit-all access log
recording in order to implement the white-list security model in
the network.
15. The system of claim 14, wherein the instructions which, when
executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or
more processors to perform operations comprising: Identifying
second network traffic associated with at least one other entry
recorded in the permit-all access log recording access of network
traffic within a network according to the permit-all and log access
policy; determining if the second network traffic should be
forwarded in the network based on the white-list security model; if
it is determined the second network traffic should not be forwarded
through the network based on the white-list security model,
refraining from generating a second specific permit access policy
for the second network traffic; and applying the plurality of
specific permit-access policies including the first specific
permit-access policy and lacking the second specific permit access
policy before applying the permit-all and log access policy
converted to the deny-all access policy to the network traffic to
block forwarding of the second network traffic through the
network.
16. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having stored
therein instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the
processor to perform operations comprising: identifying first
network traffic associated with at least one entry recorded in a
permit-all access log recording access of network traffic within a
network according to a permit-all and log access policy;
determining if the first network traffic should be forwarded in the
network based on a white-list security model; if it is determined
the first network traffic should be forwarded through the network
based on the white-list security model: generating a first specific
permit-access policy for the first network traffic; and
implementing the first specific permit-access policy generated for
the first network traffic into the network by inserting the first
specific permit-access policy ahead of the permit-all and log
access policy.
17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 16
having stored therein instructions which, when executed by the
processor, further cause the processor to perform operations
comprising: identifying second network traffic associated with at
least one other entry recorded in the permit-all access log
recording access of network traffic within a network according to
the permit-all and log access policy; determining if the second
network traffic should be forwarded in the network based on the
white-list security model; if it is determined the second network
traffic should be forwarded through the network based on the
white-list security model, generating a second specific
permit-access policy for the second network traffic; and
implementing the second specific permit-access policy generated for
the second network traffic into the network by inserting the second
specific permit-access policy ahead of the permit-all and log
access policy.
18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 16
having stored therein instructions which, when executed by the
processor, further cause the processor to perform operations
comprising refraining from generating the first specific
permit-access policy for the first network traffic, if it is
determined to refrain from forwarding the first network traffic
through the network based on the white-list security model.
19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 16
having stored therein instructions which, when executed by the
processor, further cause the processor to perform operations
comprising: converting the permit-all and log access policy into a
deny-all access policy; and applying a plurality of specific
permit-access policies including the first specific permit-access
policy before applying the permit-all and log access policy
converted to the deny-all access policy to the network traffic
using the permit-all access log recording in order to implement the
white-list security model in the network.
20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 19
having stored therein instructions which, when executed by the
processor, further cause the processor to perform operations
comprising: identifying second network traffic associated with at
least one other entry recorded in the permit-all access log
recording access of network traffic within a network according to
the permit-all and log access policy; determining if the second
network traffic should be forwarded in the network based on the
white-list security model; if it is determined the second network
traffic should not be forwarded through the network based on the
white-list security model, refraining from generating a second
specific permit access policy for the second network traffic; and
applying the plurality of specific permit-access policies including
the first specific permit-access policy and lacking the second
specific permit access policy before applying the permit-all and
log access policy converted to the deny-all access policy to the
network traffic to block forwarding of the second network traffic
through the network.
Description
RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0001] This application claims the benefit of U.S. Application No.
62/520,862, filed Jun. 16, 2017, entitled "SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR
MIGRATING TO AND MAINTAINING A WHITE-LIST NETWORK SECURITY MODEL",
which is incorporated by reference in its entirety.
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0002] The present technology pertains to network configuration and
troubleshooting, and more specifically to white-list network
security models.
BACKGROUND
[0003] Network configurations for large data center networks are
often specified at a centralized controller. The controller can
program switches, routers, servers, and elements in the network
according to the specified network configurations. Network
configurations are inherently very complex, and involve low level
as well as high level configurations of several layers of the
network such as access policies, forwarding policies, routing
policies, security policies, QoS policies, etc. Given such
complexity, the network configuration process is error prone. In
many cases, the configurations defined on a controller, which can
reflect an intent specification for the network, can contain errors
and inconsistencies that are often extremely difficult to identify
and may create significant problems in the network.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0004] In order to describe the manner in which the above-recited
and other advantages and features of the disclosure can be
obtained, a more particular description of the principles briefly
described above will be rendered by reference to specific
embodiments thereof which are illustrated in the appended drawings.
Understanding that these drawings depict only exemplary embodiments
of the disclosure and are not therefore to be considered to be
limiting of its scope, the principles herein are described and
explained with additional specificity and detail through the use of
the accompanying drawings in which:
[0005] FIGS. 1A and 1B illustrate example network environments;
[0006] FIG. 2A illustrates an example object model for a
network;
[0007] FIG. 2B illustrates an example object model for a tenant
object in the example object model from FIG. 2A;
[0008] FIG. 2C illustrates an example association of various
objects in the example object model from FIG. 2A;
[0009] FIG. 2D illustrates a schematic diagram of example models
for implementing the example object model from FIG. 2A;
[0010] FIG. 3A illustrates an example network assurance
appliance;
[0011] FIG. 3B illustrates an example system for network
assurance;
[0012] FIG. 3C illustrates an example system for static policy
analysis in a network;
[0013] FIG. 4 illustrates an example method embodiment for network
assurance;
[0014] FIG. 5 illustrates an example method or process for
migrating to a white-list security model;
[0015] FIG. 6 illustrates an example network device in accordance
with various embodiments; and
[0016] FIG. 7 illustrates an example computing device in accordance
with various embodiments.
DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS
[0017] Various embodiments of the disclosure are discussed in
detail below. While specific implementations are discussed, it
should be understood that this is done for illustration purposes
only. A person skilled in the relevant art will recognize that
other components and configurations may be used without parting
from the spirit and scope of the disclosure.
[0018] Various embodiments of the disclosure are discussed in
detail below. While specific implementations are discussed, it
should be understood that this is done for illustration purposes
only. A person skilled in the relevant art will recognize that
other components and configurations may be used without parting
from the spirit and scope of the disclosure. Thus, the following
description and drawings are illustrative and are not to be
construed as limiting. Numerous specific details are described to
provide a thorough understanding of the disclosure. However, in
certain instances, well-known or conventional details are not
described in order to avoid obscuring the description. References
to one or an embodiment in the present disclosure can be references
to the same embodiment or any embodiment; and, such references mean
at least one of the embodiments.
[0019] Reference to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" means that
a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in
connection with the embodiment is included in at least one
embodiment of the disclosure. The appearances of the phrase "in one
embodiment" in various places in the specification are not
necessarily all referring to the same embodiment, nor are separate
or alternative embodiments mutually exclusive of other embodiments.
Moreover, various features are described which may be exhibited by
some embodiments and not by others.
[0020] The terms used in this specification generally have their
ordinary meanings in the art, within the context of the disclosure,
and in the specific context where each term is used. Alternative
language and synonyms may be used for any one or more of the terms
discussed herein, and no special significance should be placed upon
whether or not a term is elaborated or discussed herein. In some
cases, synonyms for certain terms are provided. A recital of one or
more synonyms does not exclude the use of other synonyms. The use
of examples anywhere in this specification including examples of
any terms discussed herein is illustrative only, and is not
intended to further limit the scope and meaning of the disclosure
or of any example term. Likewise, the disclosure is not limited to
various embodiments given in this specification.
[0021] Without intent to limit the scope of the disclosure,
examples of instruments, apparatus, methods and their related
results according to the embodiments of the present disclosure are
given below. Note that titles or subtitles may be used in the
examples for convenience of a reader, which in no way should limit
the scope of the disclosure. Unless otherwise defined, technical
and scientific terms used herein have the meaning as commonly
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this
disclosure pertains. In the case of conflict, the present document,
including definitions will control.
[0022] Additional features and advantages of the disclosure will be
set forth in the description which follows, and in part will be
obvious from the description, or can be learned by practice of the
herein disclosed principles. The features and advantages of the
disclosure can be realized and obtained by means of the instruments
and combinations particularly pointed out in the appended claims.
These and other features of the disclosure will become more fully
apparent from the following description and appended claims, or can
be learned by the practice of the principles set forth herein.
Overview
[0023] Disclosed herein are systems, methods, and computer-readable
media for migrating and maintaining white-list security models. The
systems, methods, and computer-readable media include identifying
first network traffic associated with at least one entry recorded
in a permit-all access log, the permit-all access log recording
access of all network traffic entering a network. The systems,
methods, and computer-readable media further include determining,
using the at least one processing device, the first network traffic
should be forwarded in the network based on a white-list security
model and when the first network traffic should be forwarded in the
network based on a white-list security model, generating a
permit-access policy for the first network traffic. The systems,
methods, and computer readable media include implementing, using
the at least one processing device, the permit-access policy
generated for the first network traffic into the network.
Description
[0024] The disclosed technology addresses the need in the art for
migrating and maintaining white-list security models within a
network. The present technology will be described in the following
disclosure as follows. The discussion begins with an introductory
discussion of network assurance and a description of example
computing environments, as illustrated in FIGS. 1A and 1B. A
discussion of network models for network assurance, as shown in
FIGS. 2A through 2D, and network assurance systems and methods, as
shown in FIGS. 3A-C, 4, 5, 6, and 7 will then follow. The
discussion concludes with a description of an example network
device, as illustrated in FIG. 6, and an example computing device,
as illustrated in FIG. 7, including example hardware components
suitable for hosting software applications and performing computing
operations. The disclosure now turns to an introductory discussion
of network assurance.
[0025] Network assurance is the guarantee or determination that the
network is behaving as intended by the network operator and has
been configured properly (e.g., the network is doing what it is
intended to do). Intent can encompass various network operations,
such as bridging, routing, security, service chaining, endpoints,
compliance, QoS (Quality of Service), audits, etc. Intent can be
embodied in one or more policies, settings, configurations, etc.,
defined for the network and individual network elements (e.g.,
switches, routers, applications, resources, etc.). However, often
times, the configurations, policies, etc., defined by a network
operator are incorrect or not accurately reflected in the actual
behavior of the network. For example, a network operator specifies
a configuration A for one or more types of traffic but later finds
out that the network is actually applying configuration B to that
traffic or otherwise processing that traffic in a manner that is
inconsistent with configuration A. This can be a result of many
different causes, such as hardware errors, software bugs, varying
priorities, configuration conflicts, misconfiguration of one or
more settings, improper rule rendering by devices, unexpected
errors or events, software upgrades, configuration changes,
failures, etc. As another example, a network operator implements
configuration C but one or more other configurations result in the
network behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent
reflected by the implementation of configuration C. For example,
such a situation can result when configuration C conflicts with
other configurations in the network.
[0026] The approaches herein can provide network assurance by
modeling various aspects of the network and/or performing
consistency checks as well as other network assurance checks. The
network assurance approaches herein can be implemented in various
types of networks, including a private network, such as a local
area network (LAN); an enterprise network; a standalone or
traditional network, such as a data center network; a network
including a physical or underlay layer and a logical or overlay
layer, such as a VXLAN or software-defined network (SDN) (e.g.,
Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) or VMware NSX networks);
etc.
[0027] Network models can be constructed for a network and
implemented for network assurance. A network model can provide a
representation of one or more aspects of a network, including,
without limitation the network's policies, configurations,
requirements, security, routing, topology, applications, hardware,
filters, contracts, access control lists, infrastructure, etc. As
will be further explained below, different types of models can be
generated for a network.
[0028] Such models can be implemented to ensure that the behavior
of the network will be consistent (or is consistent) with the
intended behavior reflected through specific configurations (e.g.,
policies, settings, definitions, etc.) implemented by the network
operator. Unlike traditional network monitoring, which involves
sending and analyzing data packets and observing network behavior,
network assurance can be performed through modeling without
necessarily ingesting packet data or monitoring traffic or network
behavior. This can result in foresight, insight, and hindsight:
problems can be prevented before they occur, identified when they
occur, and fixed immediately after they occur.
[0029] Thus, network assurance can involve modeling properties of
the network to deterministically predict the behavior of the
network. The network can be determined to be healthy if the
model(s) indicate proper behavior (e.g., no inconsistencies,
conflicts, errors, etc.). The network can be determined to be
functional, but not fully healthy, if the modeling indicates proper
behavior but some inconsistencies. The network can be determined to
be non-functional and not healthy if the modeling indicates
improper behavior and errors. If inconsistencies or errors are
detected by the modeling, a detailed analysis of the corresponding
model(s) can allow one or more underlying or root problems to be
identified with great accuracy.
[0030] The modeling can consume numerous types of smart events
which model a large amount of behavioral aspects of the network.
Smart events can impact various aspects of the network, such as
underlay services, overlay services, tenant connectivity, tenant
security, tenant endpoint (EP) mobility, tenant policy, tenant
routing, resources, etc.
[0031] Having described various aspects of network assurance, the
disclosure now turns to a discussion of example network
environments for network assurance.
[0032] FIG. 1A illustrates a diagram of an example Network
Environment 100, such as a data center. The Network Environment 100
can include a Fabric 120 which can represent the physical layer or
infrastructure (e.g., underlay) of the Network Environment 100.
Fabric 120 can include Spines 102 (e.g., spine routers or switches)
and Leafs 104 (e.g., leaf routers or switches) which can be
interconnected for routing or switching traffic in the Fabric 120.
Spines 102 can interconnect Leafs 104 in the Fabric 120, and Leafs
104 can connect the Fabric 120 to an overlay or logical portion of
the Network Environment 100, which can include application
services, servers, virtual machines, containers, endpoints, etc.
Thus, network connectivity in the Fabric 120 can flow from Spines
102 to Leafs 104, and vice versa. The interconnections between
Leafs 104 and Spines 102 can be redundant (e.g., multiple
interconnections) to avoid a failure in routing. In some
embodiments, Leafs 104 and Spines 102 can be fully connected, such
that any given Leaf is connected to each of the Spines 102, and any
given Spine is connected to each of the Leafs 104. Leafs 104 can
be, for example, top-of-rack ("ToR") switches, aggregation
switches, gateways, ingress and/or egress switches, provider edge
devices, and/or any other type of routing or switching device.
[0033] Leafs 104 can be responsible for routing and/or bridging
tenant or customer packets and applying network policies or rules.
Network policies and rules can be driven by one or more Controllers
116, and/or implemented or enforced by one or more devices, such as
Leafs 104. Leafs 104 can connect other elements to the Fabric 120.
For example, Leafs 104 can connect Servers 106, Hypervisors 108,
Virtual Machines (VMs) 110, Applications 112, Network Device 114,
etc., with Fabric 120. Such elements can reside in one or more
logical or virtual layers or networks, such as an overlay network.
In some cases, Leafs 104 can encapsulate and decapsulate packets to
and from such elements (e.g., Servers 106) in order to enable
communications throughout Network Environment 100 and Fabric 120.
Leafs 104 can also provide any other devices, services, tenants, or
workloads with access to Fabric 120. In some cases, Servers 106
connected to Leafs 104 can similarly encapsulate and decapsulate
packets to and from Leafs 104. For example, Servers 106 can include
one or more virtual switches or routers or tunnel endpoints for
tunneling packets between an overlay or logical layer hosted by, or
connected to, Servers 106 and an underlay layer represented by
Fabric 120 and accessed via Leafs 104.
[0034] Applications 112 can include software applications,
services, containers, appliances, functions, service chains, etc.
For example, Applications 112 can include a firewall, a database, a
CDN server, an IDS/IPS, a deep packet inspection service, a message
router, a virtual switch, etc. An application from Applications 112
can be distributed, chained, or hosted by multiple endpoints (e.g.,
Servers 106, VMs 110, etc.), or may run or execute entirely from a
single endpoint.
[0035] VMs 110 can be virtual machines hosted by Hypervisors 108 or
virtual machine managers running on Servers 106. VMs 110 can
include workloads running on a guest operating system on a
respective server. Hypervisors 108 can provide a layer of software,
firmware, and/or hardware that creates, manages, and/or runs the
VMs 110. Hypervisors 108 can allow VMs 110 to share hardware
resources on Servers 106, and the hardware resources on Servers 106
to appear as multiple, separate hardware platforms. Moreover,
Hypervisors 108 on Servers 106 can host one or more VMs 110.
[0036] In some cases, VMs 110 and/or Hypervisors 108 can be
migrated to other Servers 106. Servers 106 can similarly be
migrated to other locations in Network Environment 100. For
example, a server connected to a specific leaf can be changed to
connect to a different or additional leaf. Such configuration or
deployment changes can involve modifications to settings,
configurations and policies that are applied to the resources being
migrated as well as other network components.
[0037] In some cases, one or more Servers 106, Hypervisors 108,
and/or VMs 110 can represent or reside in a tenant or customer
space. Tenant space can include workloads, services, applications,
devices, networks, and/or resources that are associated with one or
more clients or subscribers. Accordingly, traffic in Network
Environment 100 can be routed based on specific tenant policies,
spaces, agreements, configurations, etc. Moreover, addressing can
vary between one or more tenants. In some configurations, tenant
spaces can be divided into logical segments and/or networks and
separated from logical segments and/or networks associated with
other tenants. Addressing, policy, security and configuration
information between tenants can be managed by Controllers 116,
Servers 106, Leafs 104, etc.
[0038] Configurations in Network Environment 100 can be implemented
at a logical level, a hardware level (e.g., physical), and/or both.
For example, configurations can be implemented at a logical and/or
hardware level based on endpoint or resource attributes, such as
endpoint types and/or application groups or profiles, through a
software-defined network (SDN) framework (e.g., Application-Centric
Infrastructure (ACI) or VMWARE NSX). To illustrate, one or more
administrators can define configurations at a logical level (e.g.,
application or software level) through Controllers 116, which can
implement or propagate such configurations through Network
Environment 100. In some examples, Controllers 116 can be
Application Policy Infrastructure Controllers (APICs) in an ACI
framework. In other examples, Controllers 116 can be one or more
management components for associated with other SDN solutions, such
as NSX Managers.
[0039] Such configurations can define rules, policies, priorities,
protocols, attributes, objects, etc., for routing and/or
classifying traffic in Network Environment 100. For example, such
configurations can define attributes and objects for classifying
and processing traffic based on Endpoint Groups (EPGs), Security
Groups (SGs), VM types, bridge domains (BDs), virtual routing and
forwarding instances (VRFs), tenants, priorities, firewall rules,
etc. Other example network objects and configurations are further
described below. Traffic policies and rules can be enforced based
on tags, attributes, or other characteristics of the traffic, such
as protocols associated with the traffic, EPGs associated with the
traffic, SGs associated with the traffic, network address
information associated with the traffic, etc. Such policies and
rules can be enforced by one or more elements in Network
Environment 100, such as Leafs 104, Servers 106, Hypervisors 108,
Controllers 116, etc. As previously explained, Network Environment
100 can be configured according to one or more particular
software-defined network (SDN) solutions, such as CISCO ACI or
VMWARE NSX. These example SDN solutions are briefly described
below.
[0040] ACI can provide an application-centric or policy-based
solution through scalable distributed enforcement. ACI supports
integration of physical and virtual environments under a
declarative configuration model for networks, servers, services,
security, requirements, etc. For example, the ACI framework
implements EPGs, which can include a collection of endpoints or
applications that share common configuration requirements, such as
security, QoS, services, etc. Endpoints can be virtual/logical or
physical devices, such as VMs, containers, hosts, or physical
servers that are connected to Network Environment 100. Endpoints
can have one or more attributes such as a VM name, guest OS name, a
security tag, application profile, etc. Application configurations
can be applied between EPGs, instead of endpoints directly, in the
form of contracts. Leafs 104 can classify incoming traffic into
different EPGs. The classification can be based on, for example, a
network segment identifier such as a VLAN ID, VXLAN Network
Identifier (VNID), NVGRE Virtual Subnet Identifier (VSID), MAC
address, IP address, etc.
[0041] In some cases, classification in the ACI infrastructure can
be implemented by Application Virtual Switches (AVS), which can run
on a host, such as a server or switch. For example, an AVS can
classify traffic based on specified attributes, and tag packets of
different attribute EPGs with different identifiers, such as
network segment identifiers (e.g., VLAN ID). Finally, Leafs 104 can
tie packets with their attribute EPGs based on their identifiers
and enforce policies, which can be implemented and/or managed by
one or more Controllers 116. Leaf 104 can classify to which EPG the
traffic from a host belongs and enforce policies accordingly.
[0042] Another example SDN solution is based on VMWARE NSX. With
VMWARE NSX, hosts can run a distributed firewall (DFW) which can
classify and process traffic. Consider a case where three types of
VMs, namely, application, database and web VMs, are put into a
single layer-2 network segment. Traffic protection can be provided
within the network segment based on the VM type. For example, HTTP
traffic can be allowed among web VMs, and disallowed between a web
VM and an application or database VM. To classify traffic and
implement policies, VMWARE NSX can implement security groups, which
can be used to group the specific VMs (e.g., web VMs, application
VMs, database VMs). DFW rules can be configured to implement
policies for the specific security groups. To illustrate, in the
context of the previous example, DFW rules can be configured to
block HTTP traffic between web, application, and database security
groups.
[0043] Returning now to FIG. 1A, Network Environment 100 can deploy
different hosts via Leafs 104, Servers 106, Hypervisors 108, VMs
110, Applications 112, and Controllers 116, such as VMWARE ESXi
hosts, WINDOWS HYPER-V hosts, bare metal physical hosts, etc.
Network Environment 100 may interoperate with a variety of
Hypervisors 108, Servers 106 (e.g., physical and/or virtual
servers), SDN orchestration platforms, etc. Network Environment 100
may implement a declarative model to allow its integration with
application design and holistic network policy.
[0044] Controllers 116 can provide centralized access to fabric
information, application configuration, resource configuration,
application-level configuration modeling for a software-defined
network (SDN) infrastructure, integration with management systems
or servers, etc. Controllers 116 can form a control plane that
interfaces with an application plane via northbound APIs and a data
plane via southbound APIs.
[0045] As previously noted, Controllers 116 can define and manage
application-level model(s) for configurations in Network
Environment 100. In some cases, application or device
configurations can also be managed and/or defined by other
components in the network. For example, a hypervisor or virtual
appliance, such as a VM or container, can run a server or
management tool to manage software and services in Network
Environment 100, including configurations and settings for virtual
appliances.
[0046] As illustrated above, Network Environment 100 can include
one or more different types of SDN solutions, hosts, etc. For the
sake of clarity and explanation purposes, various examples in the
disclosure will be described with reference to an ACI framework,
and Controllers 116 may be interchangeably referenced as
controllers, APICs, or APIC controllers. However, it should be
noted that the technologies and concepts herein are not limited to
ACI solutions and may be implemented in other architectures and
scenarios, including other SDN solutions as well as other types of
networks which may not deploy an SDN solution.
[0047] Further, as referenced herein, the term "hosts" can refer to
Servers 106 (e.g., physical or logical), Hypervisors 108, VMs 110,
containers (e.g., Applications 112), etc., and can run or include
any type of server or application solution. Non-limiting examples
of "hosts" can include virtual switches or routers, such as
distributed virtual switches (DVS), application virtual switches
(AVS), vector packet processing (VPP) switches; VCENTER and NSX
MANAGERS; bare metal physical hosts; HYPER-V hosts; VMs; DOCKER
Containers; etc.
[0048] FIG. 1B illustrates another example of Network Environment
100. In this example, Network Environment 100 includes Endpoints
122 connected to Leafs 104 in Fabric 120. Endpoints 122 can be
physical and/or logical or virtual entities, such as servers,
clients, VMs, hypervisors, software containers, applications,
resources, network devices, workloads, etc. For example, an
Endpoint 122 can be an object that represents a physical device
(e.g., server, client, switch, etc.), an application (e.g., web
application, database application, etc.), a logical or virtual
resource (e.g., a virtual switch, a virtual service appliance, a
virtualized network function (VNF), a VM, a service chain, etc.), a
container running a software resource (e.g., an application, an
appliance, a VNF, a service chain, etc.), storage, a workload or
workload engine, etc. Endpoints 122 can have an address (e.g., an
identity), a location (e.g., host, network segment, virtual routing
and forwarding (VRF) instance, domain, etc.), one or more
attributes (e.g., name, type, version, patch level, OS name, OS
type, etc.), a tag (e.g., security tag), a profile, etc.
[0049] Endpoints 122 can be associated with respective Logical
Groups 118. Logical Groups 118 can be logical entities containing
endpoints (physical and/or logical or virtual) grouped together
according to one or more attributes, such as endpoint type (e.g.,
VM type, workload type, application type, etc.), one or more
requirements (e.g., policy requirements, security requirements, QoS
requirements, customer requirements, resource requirements, etc.),
a resource name (e.g., VM name, application name, etc.), a profile,
platform or operating system (OS) characteristics (e.g., OS type or
name including guest and/or host OS, etc.), an associated network
or tenant, one or more policies, a tag, etc. For example, a logical
group can be an object representing a collection of endpoints
grouped together. To illustrate, Logical Group 1 can contain client
endpoints, Logical Group 2 can contain web server endpoints,
Logical Group 3 can contain application server endpoints, Logical
Group N can contain database server endpoints, etc. In some
examples, Logical Groups 118 are EPGs in an ACI environment and/or
other logical groups (e.g., SGs) in another SDN environment.
[0050] Traffic to and/or from Endpoints 122 can be classified,
processed, managed, etc., based Logical Groups 118. For example,
Logical Groups 118 can be used to classify traffic to or from
Endpoints 122, apply policies to traffic to or from Endpoints 122,
define relationships between Endpoints 122, define roles of
Endpoints 122 (e.g., whether an endpoint consumes or provides a
service, etc.), apply rules to traffic to or from Endpoints 122,
apply filters or access control lists (ACLs) to traffic to or from
Endpoints 122, define communication paths for traffic to or from
Endpoints 122, enforce requirements associated with Endpoints 122,
implement security and other configurations associated with
Endpoints 122, etc.
[0051] In an ACI environment, Logical Groups 118 can be EPGs used
to define contracts in the ACI. Contracts can include rules
specifying what and how communications between EPGs take place. For
example, a contract can define what provides a service, what
consumes a service, and what policy objects are related to that
consumption relationship. A contract can include a policy that
defines the communication path and all related elements of a
communication or relationship between endpoints or EPGs. For
example, a Web EPG can provide a service that a Client EPG
consumes, and that consumption can be subject to a filter (ACL) and
a service graph that includes one or more services, such as
firewall inspection services and server load balancing.
[0052] FIG. 2A illustrates a diagram of an example Management
Information Model 200 for an SDN network, such as Network
Environment 100. The following discussion of Management Information
Model 200 references various terms which shall also be used
throughout the disclosure. Accordingly, for clarity, the disclosure
shall first provide below a list of terminology, which will be
followed by a more detailed discussion of Management Information
Model 200.
[0053] As used herein, an "Alias" can refer to a changeable name
for a given object. Thus, even if the name of an object, once
created, cannot be changed, the Alias can be a field that can be
changed.
[0054] As used herein, the term "Aliasing" can refer to a rule
(e.g., contracts, policies, configurations, etc.) that overlaps one
or more other rules. For example, Contract 1 defined in a logical
model of a network can be said to be aliasing Contract 2 defined in
the logical model of the network if Contract 1 overlaps Contract 1.
In this example, by aliasing Contract 2, Contract 1 may render
Contract 2 redundant or inoperable. For example, if Contract 1 has
a higher priority than Contract 2, such aliasing can render
Contract 2 redundant based on Contract 1's overlapping and higher
priority characteristics.
[0055] As used herein, the term "APIC" can refer to one or more
controllers (e.g., Controllers 116) in an ACI framework. The APIC
can provide a unified point of automation and management, policy
programming, application deployment, health monitoring for an ACI
multitenant fabric. The APIC can be implemented as a single
controller, a distributed controller, or a replicated,
synchronized, and/or clustered controller.
[0056] As used herein, the term "BDD" can refer to a binary
decision tree. A binary decision tree can be a data structure
representing functions, such as Boolean functions.
[0057] As used herein, the term "BD" can refer to a bridge domain.
A bridge domain can be a set of logical ports that share the same
flooding or broadcast characteristics. Like a virtual LAN (VLAN),
bridge domains can span multiple devices. A bridge domain can be a
L2 (Layer 2) construct.
[0058] As used herein, a "Consumer" can refer to an endpoint,
resource, and/or EPG that consumes a service.
[0059] As used herein, a "Context" can refer to an L3 (Layer 3)
address domain that allows multiple instances of a routing table to
exist and work simultaneously. This increases functionality by
allowing network paths to be segmented without using multiple
devices. Non-limiting examples of a context or L3 address domain
can include a Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF) instance, a
private network, and so forth.
[0060] As used herein, the term "Contract" can refer to rules or
configurations that specify what and how communications in a
network are conducted (e.g., allowed, denied, filtered, processed,
etc.). In an ACI network, contracts can specify how communications
between endpoints and/or EPGs take place. In some examples, a
contract can provide rules and configurations akin to an Access
Control List (ACL).
[0061] As used herein, the term "Distinguished Name" (DN) can refer
to a unique name that describes an object, such as an MO, and
locates its place in Management Information Model 200. In some
cases, the DN can be (or equate to) a Fully Qualified Domain Name
(FQDN).
[0062] As used herein, the term "Endpoint Group" (EPG) can refer to
a logical entity or object associated with a collection or group of
endpoints as previously described with reference to FIG. 1B.
[0063] As used herein, the term "Filter" can refer to a parameter
or configuration for allowing communications. For example, in a
whitelist model where all communications are blocked by default, a
communication must be given explicit permission to prevent such
communication from being blocked. A filter can define permission(s)
for one or more communications or packets. A filter can thus
function similar to an ACL or Firewall rule. In some examples, a
filter can be implemented in a packet (e.g., TCP/IP) header field,
such as L3 protocol type, L4 (Layer 4) ports, and so on, which is
used to allow inbound or outbound communications between endpoints
or EPGs, for example.
[0064] As used herein, the term "L2 Out" can refer to a bridged
connection. A bridged connection can connect two or more segments
of the same network so that they can communicate. In an ACI
framework, an L2 out can be a bridged (Layer 2) connection between
an ACI fabric (e.g., Fabric 120) and an outside Layer 2 network,
such as a switch.
[0065] As used herein, the term "L3 Out" can refer to a routed
connection. A routed Layer 3 connection uses a set of protocols
that determine the path that data follows in order to travel across
networks from its source to its destination. Routed connections can
perform forwarding (e.g., IP forwarding) according to a protocol
selected, such as BGP (border gateway protocol), OSPF (Open
Shortest Path First), EIGRP (Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing
Protocol), etc.
[0066] As used herein, the term "Managed Object" (MO) can refer to
an abstract representation of objects that are managed in a network
(e.g., Network Environment 100). The objects can be concrete
objects (e.g., a switch, server, adapter, etc.), or logical objects
(e.g., an application profile, an EPG, a fault, etc.). The MOs can
be network resources or elements that are managed in the network.
For example, in an ACI environment, an MO can include an
abstraction of an ACI fabric (e.g., Fabric 120) resource.
[0067] As used herein, the term "Management Information Tree" (MIT)
can refer to a hierarchical management information tree containing
the MOs of a system. For example, in ACI, the MIT contains the MOs
of the ACI fabric (e.g., Fabric 120). The MIT can also be referred
to as a Management Information Model (MIM), such as Management
Information Model 200.
[0068] As used herein, the term "Policy" can refer to one or more
specifications for controlling some aspect of system or network
behavior. For example, a policy can include a named entity that
contains specifications for controlling some aspect of system
behavior. To illustrate, a Layer 3 Outside Network Policy can
contain the BGP protocol to enable BGP routing functions when
connecting Fabric 120 to an outside Layer 3 network.
[0069] As used herein, the term "Profile" can refer to the
configuration details associated with a policy. For example, a
profile can include a named entity that contains the configuration
details for implementing one or more instances of a policy. To
illustrate, a switch node profile for a routing policy can contain
the switch-specific configuration details to implement the BGP
routing protocol.
[0070] As used herein, the term "Provider" refers to an object or
entity providing a service. For example, a provider can be an EPG
that provides a service.
[0071] As used herein, the term "Subject" refers to one or more
parameters in a contract for defining communications. For example,
in ACI, subjects in a contract can specify what information can be
communicated and how. Subjects can function similar to ACLs.
[0072] As used herein, the term "Tenant" refers to a unit of
isolation in a network. For example, a tenant can be a secure and
exclusive virtual computing environment. In ACI, a tenant can be a
unit of isolation from a policy perspective, but does not
necessarily represent a private network. Indeed, ACI tenants can
contain multiple private networks (e.g., VRFs). Tenants can
represent a customer in a service provider setting, an organization
or domain in an enterprise setting, or just a grouping of
policies.
[0073] As used herein, the term "VRF" refers to a virtual routing
and forwarding instance. The VRF can define a Layer 3 address
domain that allows multiple instances of a routing table to exist
and work simultaneously. This increases functionality by allowing
network paths to be segmented without using multiple devices. Also
known as a context or private network.
[0074] Having described various terms used herein, the disclosure
now returns to a discussion of Management Information Model (MIM)
200 in FIG. 2A. As previously noted, MIM 200 can be a hierarchical
management information tree or MIT. Moreover, MIM 200 can be
managed and processed by Controllers 116, such as APICs in an ACI.
Controllers 116 can enable the control of managed resources by
presenting their manageable characteristics as object properties
that can be inherited according to the location of the object
within the hierarchical structure of the model.
[0075] The hierarchical structure of MIM 200 starts with Policy
Universe 202 at the top (Root) and contains parent and child nodes
116, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212. Nodes 116, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210,
212 in the tree represent the managed objects (MOs) or groups of
objects. Each object in the fabric (e.g., Fabric 120) has a unique
distinguished name (DN) that describes the object and locates its
place in the tree. The Nodes 116, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212 can
include the various MOs, as described below, which contain policies
that govern the operation of the system.
Controllers 116
[0076] Controllers 116 (e.g., APIC controllers) can provide
management, policy programming, application deployment, and health
monitoring for Fabric 120.
Node 204
[0077] Node 204 includes a tenant container for policies that
enable an administrator to exercise domain-based access control.
Non-limiting examples of tenants can include:
[0078] User tenants defined by the administrator according to the
needs of users. They contain policies that govern the operation of
resources such as applications, databases, web servers,
network-attached storage, virtual machines, and so on.
[0079] The common tenant is provided by the system but can be
configured by the administrator. It contains policies that govern
the operation of resources accessible to all tenants, such as
firewalls, load balancers, Layer 4 to Layer 7 services, intrusion
detection appliances, and so on.
[0080] The infrastructure tenant is provided by the system but can
be configured by the administrator. It contains policies that
govern the operation of infrastructure resources such as the fabric
overlay (e.g., VXLAN). It also enables a fabric provider to
selectively deploy resources to one or more user tenants.
Infrastructure tenant polices can be configurable by the
administrator.
[0081] The management tenant is provided by the system but can be
configured by the administrator. It contains policies that govern
the operation of fabric management functions used for in-band and
out-of-band configuration of fabric nodes. The management tenant
contains a private out-of-bound address space for the
Controller/Fabric internal communications that is outside the
fabric data path that provides access through the management port
of the switches. The management tenant enables discovery and
automation of communications with virtual machine controllers.
Node 206
[0082] Node 206 can contain access policies that govern the
operation of switch access ports that provide connectivity to
resources such as storage, compute, Layer 2 and Layer 3 (bridged
and routed) connectivity, virtual machine hypervisors, Layer 4 to
Layer 7 devices, and so on. If a tenant requires interface
configurations other than those provided in the default link, Cisco
Discovery Protocol (CDP), Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP),
Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP), or Spanning Tree Protocol
(STP), an administrator can configure access policies to enable
such configurations on the access ports of Leafs 104.
[0083] Node 206 can contain fabric policies that govern the
operation of the switch fabric ports, including such functions as
Network Time Protocol (NTP) server synchronization, Intermediate
System-to-Intermediate System Protocol (IS-IS), Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) route reflectors, Domain Name System (DNS) and so
on. The fabric MO contains objects such as power supplies, fans,
chassis, and so on.
Node 208
[0084] Node 208 can contain VM domains that group VM controllers
with similar networking policy requirements. VM controllers can
share virtual space (e.g., VLAN or VXLAN space) and application
EPGs. Controllers 116 communicate with the VM controller to publish
network configurations such as port groups that are then applied to
the virtual workloads.
Node 210
[0085] Node 210 can contain Layer 4 to Layer 7 service integration
life cycle automation framework that enables the system to
dynamically respond when a service comes online or goes offline.
Policies can provide service device package and inventory
management functions.
Node 212
[0086] Node 212 can contain access, authentication, and accounting
(AAA) policies that govern user privileges, roles, and security
domains of Fabric 120.
[0087] The hierarchical policy model can fit well with an API, such
as a REST API interface. When invoked, the API can read from or
write to objects in the MIT. URLs can map directly into
distinguished names that identify objects in the MIT. Data in the
MIT can be described as a self-contained structured tree text
document encoded in XML or JSON, for example.
[0088] FIG. 2B illustrates an example object model 220 for a tenant
portion of MIM 200. As previously noted, a tenant is a logical
container for application policies that enable an administrator to
exercise domain-based access control. A tenant thus represents a
unit of isolation from a policy perspective, but it does not
necessarily represent a private network. Tenants can represent a
customer in a service provider setting, an organization or domain
in an enterprise setting, or just a convenient grouping of
policies. Moreover, tenants can be isolated from one another or can
share resources.
[0089] Tenant portion 204A of MIM 200 can include various entities,
and the entities in Tenant Portion 204A can inherit policies from
parent entities. Non-limiting examples of entities in Tenant
Portion 204A can include Filters 240, Contracts 236, Outside
Networks 222, Bridge Domains 230, VRF Instances 234, and
Application Profiles 224.
[0090] Bridge Domains 230 can include Subnets 232. Contracts 236
can include Subjects 238. Application Profiles 224 can contain one
or more EPGs 226. Some applications can contain multiple
components. For example, an e-commerce application could require a
web server, a database server, data located in a storage area
network, and access to outside resources that enable financial
transactions. Application Profile 224 contains as many (or as few)
EPGs as necessary that are logically related to providing the
capabilities of an application.
[0091] EPG 226 can be organized in various ways, such as based on
the application they provide, the function they provide (such as
infrastructure), where they are in the structure of the data center
(such as DMZ), or whatever organizing principle that a fabric or
tenant administrator chooses to use.
[0092] EPGs in the fabric can contain various types of EPGs, such
as application EPGs, Layer 2 external outside network instance
EPGs, Layer 3 external outside network instance EPGs, management
EPGs for out-of-band or in-band access, etc. EPGs 226 can also
contain Attributes 228, such as encapsulation-based EPGs, IP-based
EPGs, or MAC-based EPGs.
[0093] As previously mentioned, EPGs can contain endpoints (e.g.,
EPs 122) that have common characteristics or attributes, such as
common policy requirements (e.g., security, virtual machine
mobility (VMM), QoS, or Layer 4 to Layer 7 services). Rather than
configure and manage endpoints individually, they can be placed in
an EPG and managed as a group.
[0094] Policies apply to EPGs, including the endpoints they
contain. An EPG can be statically configured by an administrator in
Controllers 116, or dynamically configured by an automated system
such as VCENTER or OPENSTACK.
[0095] To activate tenant policies in Tenant Portion 204A, fabric
access policies should be configured and associated with tenant
policies. Access policies enable an administrator to configure
other network configurations, such as port channels and virtual
port channels, protocols such as LLDP, CDP, or LACP, and features
such as monitoring or diagnostics.
[0096] FIG. 2C illustrates an example Association 260 of tenant
entities and access entities in MIM 200. Policy Universe 202
contains Tenant Portion 204A and Access Portion 206A. Thus, Tenant
Portion 204A and Access Portion 206A are associated through Policy
Universe 202.
[0097] Access Portion 206A can contain fabric and infrastructure
access policies. Typically, in a policy model, EPGs are coupled
with VLANs. For traffic to flow, an EPG is deployed on a leaf port
with a VLAN in a physical, VMM, L2 out, L3 out, or Fiber Channel
domain, for example.
[0098] Access Portion 206A thus contains Domain Profile 236 which
can define a physical, VMM, L2 out, L3 out, or Fiber Channel
domain, for example, to be associated to the EPGs. Domain Profile
236 contains VLAN Instance Profile 238 (e.g., VLAN pool) and
Attacheable Access Entity Profile (AEP) 240, which are associated
directly with application EPGs. The AEP 240 deploys the associated
application EPGs to the ports to which it is attached, and
automates the task of assigning VLANs. While a large data center
can have thousands of active VMs provisioned on hundreds of VLANs,
Fabric 120 can automatically assign VLAN IDs from VLAN pools. This
saves time compared with trunking down VLANs in a traditional data
center.
[0099] FIG. 2D illustrates a schematic diagram of example models
for implementing MIM 200. The network assurance models can include
L_Model 270A (Logical Model), LR_Model 270B (Logical Rendered Model
or Logical Runtime Model), Li_Model 272 (Logical Model for i),
Ci_Model 274 (Concrete model for i), and Hi_Model 276 (Hardware
model or TCAM Model for i).
[0100] L_Model 270A is the logical representation of the objects
and their relationships in MIM 200. L_Model 270A can be generated
by Controllers 116 based on configurations entered in Controllers
116 for the network, and thus represents the configurations of the
network at Controllers 116. This is the declaration of the
"end-state" expression that is desired when the elements of the
network entities (e.g., applications) are connected and Fabric 120
is provisioned by Controllers 116. In other words, because L_Model
270A represents the configurations entered in Controllers 116,
including the objects and relationships in MIM 200, it can also
reflect the "intent" of the administrator: how the administrator
wants the network and network elements to behave.
[0101] LR_Model 270B is the abstract model expression that
Controllers 116 (e.g., APICs in ACI) resolve from L_Model 270A.
LR_Model 270B can thus provide the elemental configuration
components that would be delivered to the physical infrastructure
(e.g., Fabric 120) to execute one or more policies. For example,
LR_Model 270B can be delivered to Leafs 104 in Fabric 120 to
configure Leafs 104 for communication with attached Endpoints
122.
[0102] Li_Model 272 is a switch-level or switch-specific model
obtained from Logical Model 270A and/or Resolved Model 270B. For
example, Li_Model 272 can represent the portion of L_Model 270A
and/or LR_Model 270B pertaining to a specific switch or router i.
To illustrate, Li_Model 272 L.sub.1 can represent the portion of
L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B pertaining to Leaf 1 (104). Thus,
Li_Model 272 can be generated from L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model
270B for one or more switch or routers (e.g., Leafs 104 and/or
Spines 102) on Fabric 120.
[0103] Ci_Model 274 is the actual in-state configuration at the
individual fabric member i (e.g., switch i). In other words,
Ci_Model 274 is a switch-level or switch-specific model that is
based on Li_Model 272. For example, Controllers 116 can deliver
Li_Model 272 to Leaf 1 (104). Leaf 1 (104) can take Li_Model 272,
which can be specific to Leaf 1 (104), and render the policies in
Li_Model 272 into a concrete model, Ci_Model 274, that runs on Leaf
1 (104). Leaf 1 (104) can render Li_Model 272 via the OS on Leaf 1
(104), for example. Thus, Ci_Model 274 can be analogous to compiled
software, as it is the form of Li_Model 272 that the switch OS at
Leaf 1 (104) can execute.
[0104] Hi_Model 276 is also a switch-level or switch-specific model
for switch i, but is based on Ci_Model 274 for switch i. Hi_Model
276 is the actual configuration (e.g., rules) stored or rendered on
the hardware or memory (e.g., TCAM memory) at the individual fabric
member i (e.g., switch i). For example, Hi_Model 276 can represent
the configurations (e.g., rules) which Leaf 1 (104) stores or
renders on the hardware (e.g., TCAM memory) of Leaf 1 (104) based
on Ci_Model 274 at Leaf 1 (104). The switch OS at Leaf 1 (104) can
render or execute Ci_Model 274, and Leaf 1 (104) can store or
render the configurations from Ci Model in storage, such as the
memory or TCAM at Leaf 1 (104). The configurations from Hi_Model
276 stored or rendered by Leaf 1 (104) represent the configurations
that will be implemented by Leaf 1 (104) when processing
traffic.
[0105] While Models 272, 274, 276 are shown as device-specific
models, similar models can be generated or aggregated for a
collection of fabric members (e.g., Leafs 104 and/or Spines 102) in
Fabric 120. When combined, device-specific models, such as Model
272, Model 274, and/or Model 276, can provide a representation of
Fabric 120 that extends beyond a particular device. For example, in
some cases, Li_Model 272, Ci Model 272, and/or Hi Model 272
associated with some or all individual fabric members (e.g., Leafs
104 and Spines 102) can be combined or aggregated to generate one
or more aggregated models based on the individual fabric
members.
[0106] As referenced herein, the terms H Model, T Model, and TCAM
Model can be used interchangeably to refer to a hardware model,
such as Hi_Model 276. For example, Ti Model, Hi Model and TCAMi
Model may be used interchangeably to refer to Hi_Model 276.
[0107] Models 270A, 270B, 272, 274, 276 can provide representations
of various aspects of the network or various configuration stages
for MIM 200. For example, one or more of Models 270A, 270B, 272,
274, 276 can be used to generate Underlay Model 278 representing
one or more aspects of Fabric 120 (e.g., underlay topology,
routing, etc.), Overlay Model 280 representing one or more aspects
of the overlay or logical segment(s) of Network Environment 100
(e.g., COOP, MPBGP, tenants, VRFs, VLANs, VXLANs, virtual
applications, VMs, hypervisors, virtual switching, etc.), Tenant
Model 282 representing one or more aspects of Tenant portion 204A
in MIM 200 (e.g., security, forwarding, service chaining, QoS,
VRFs, BDs, Contracts, Filters, EPGs, subnets, etc.), Resources
Model 284 representing one or more resources in Network Environment
100 (e.g., storage, computing, VMs, port channels, physical
elements, etc.), etc.
[0108] In general, L_Model 270A can be the high-level expression of
what exists in the LR_Model 270B, which should be present on the
concrete devices as Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 expression. If
there is any gap between the models, there may be inconsistent
configurations or problems.
[0109] FIG. 3A illustrates a diagram of an example Assurance
Appliance 300 for network assurance. In this example, Assurance
Appliance 300 can include k VMs 110 operating in cluster mode. VMs
are used in this example for explanation purposes. However, it
should be understood that other configurations are also
contemplated herein, such as use of containers, bare metal devices,
Endpoints 122, or any other physical or logical systems. Moreover,
while FIG. 3A illustrates a cluster mode configuration, other
configurations are also contemplated herein, such as a single mode
configuration (e.g., single VM, container, or server) or a service
chain for example.
[0110] Assurance Appliance 300 can run on one or more Servers 106,
VMs 110, Hypervisors 108, EPs 122, Leafs 104, Controllers 116, or
any other system or resource. For example, Assurance Appliance 300
can be a logical service or application running on one or more VMs
110 in Network Environment 100.
[0111] The Assurance Appliance 300 can include Data Framework 308,
which can be based on, for example, APACHE APEX and HADOOP. In some
cases, assurance checks can be written as individual operators that
reside in Data Framework 308. This enables a natively horizontal
scale-out architecture that can scale to arbitrary number of
switches in Fabric 120 (e.g., ACI fabric).
[0112] Assurance Appliance 300 can poll Fabric 120 at a
configurable periodicity (e.g., an epoch). The analysis workflow
can be setup as a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) of Operators 310,
where data flows from one operator to another and eventually
results are generated and persisted to Database 302 for each
interval (e.g., each epoch).
[0113] The north-tier implements API Server (e.g., APACHE Tomcat
and Spring framework) 304 and Web Server 306. A graphical user
interface (GUI) interacts via the APIs exposed to the customer.
These APIs can also be used by the customer to collect data from
Assurance Appliance 300 for further integration into other
tools.
[0114] Operators 310 in Data Framework 308 (e.g., APEX/Hadoop) can
together support assurance operations. Below are non-limiting
examples of assurance operations that can be performed by Assurance
Appliance 300 via Operators 310.
Security Policy Adherence
[0115] Assurance Appliance 300 can check to make sure the
configurations or specification from L_Model 270A, which may
reflect the user's intent for the network, including for example
the security policies and customer-configured contracts, are
correctly implemented and/or rendered in Li_Model 272, Ci_Model
274, and Hi_Model 276, and thus properly implemented and rendered
by the fabric members (e.g., Leafs 104), and report any errors,
contract violations, or irregularities found.
Static Policy Analysis
[0116] Assurance Appliance 300 can check for issues in the
specification of the user's intent or intents (e.g., identify
contradictory or conflicting policies in L_Model 270A).
TCAM Utilization
[0117] TCAM is a scarce resource in the fabric (e.g., Fabric 120).
However, Assurance Appliance 300 can analyze the TCAM utilization
by the network data (e.g., Longest Prefix Match (LPM) tables,
routing tables, VLAN tables, BGP updates, etc.), Contracts, Logical
Groups 118 (e.g., EPGs), Tenants, Spines 102, Leafs 104, and other
dimensions in Network Environment 100 and/or objects in MIM 200, to
provide a network operator or user visibility into the utilization
of this scarce resource. This can greatly help for planning and
other optimization purposes.
Endpoint Checks
[0118] Assurance Appliance 300 can validate that the fabric (e.g.
fabric 120) has no inconsistencies in the Endpoint information
registered (e.g., two leafs announcing the same endpoint, duplicate
subnets, etc.), among other such checks.
Tenant Routing Checks
[0119] Assurance Appliance 300 can validate that BDs, VRFs, subnets
(both internal and external), VLANs, contracts, filters,
applications, EPGs, etc., are correctly programmed.
Infrastructure Routing
[0120] Assurance Appliance 300 can validate that infrastructure
routing (e.g., IS-IS protocol) has no convergence issues leading to
black holes, loops, flaps, and other problems.
MP-BGP Route Reflection Checks
[0121] The network fabric (e.g., Fabric 120) can interface with
other external networks and provide connectivity to them via one or
more protocols, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Open
Shortest Path First (OSPF), etc. The learned routes are advertised
within the network fabric via, for example, MP-BGP. These checks
can ensure that a route reflection service via, for example, MP-BGP
(e.g., from Border Leaf) does not have health issues.
[0122] Logical Lint and Real-Time Change Analysis
[0123] Assurance Appliance 300 can validate rules in the
specification of the network (e.g., L_Model 270A) are complete and
do not have inconsistencies or other problems. MOs in the MIM 200
can be checked by Assurance Appliance 300 through syntactic and
semantic checks performed on L_Model 270A and/or the associated
configurations of the MOs in MIM 200. Assurance Appliance 300 can
also verify that unnecessary, stale, unused or redundant
configurations, such as contracts, are removed.
[0124] FIG. 3B illustrates an architectural diagram of an example
system 350 for network assurance. In some cases, system 350 can
correspond to the DAG of Operators 310 previously discussed with
respect to FIG. 3A In this example, Topology Explorer 312
communicates with Controllers 116 (e.g., APIC controllers) in order
to discover or otherwise construct a comprehensive topological view
of Fabric 120 (e.g., Spines 102, Leafs 104, Controllers 116,
Endpoints 122, and any other components as well as their
interconnections). While various architectural components are
represented in a singular, boxed fashion, it is understood that a
given architectural component, such as Topology Explorer 312, can
correspond to one or more individual Operators 310 and may include
one or more nodes or endpoints, such as one or more servers, VMs,
containers, applications, service functions (e.g., functions in a
service chain or virtualized network function), etc.
[0125] Topology Explorer 312 is configured to discover nodes in
Fabric 120, such as Controllers 116, Leafs 104, Spines 102, etc.
Topology Explorer 312 can additionally detect a majority election
performed amongst Controllers 116, and determine whether a quorum
exists amongst Controllers 116. If no quorum or majority exists,
Topology Explorer 312 can trigger an event and alert a user that a
configuration or other error exists amongst Controllers 116 that is
preventing a quorum or majority from being reached. Topology
Explorer 312 can detect Leafs 104 and Spines 102 that are part of
Fabric 120 and publish their corresponding out-of-band management
network addresses (e.g., IP addresses) to downstream services. This
can be part of the topological view that is published to the
downstream services at the conclusion of Topology Explorer's 312
discovery epoch (e.g., 5 minutes, or some other specified
interval).
[0126] Unified Collector 314 can receive the topological view from
Topology Explorer 312 and use the topology information to collect
information for network assurance from Fabric 120. Such information
can include L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B from Controllers 116,
switch software configurations (e.g., Ci_Model 274) from Leafs 104
and/or Spines 102, hardware configurations (e.g., Hi_Model 276)
from Leafs 104 and/or Spines 102, etc. Unified Collector 314 can
collect Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 from individual fabric
members (e.g., Leafs 104 and Spines 102).
[0127] Unified Collector 314 can poll the devices that Topology
Explorer 312 discovers in order to collect data from Fabric 120
(e.g., from the constituent members of the fabric). Unified
Collector 314 can collect the data using interfaces exposed by
Controller 116 and/or switch software (e.g., switch OS), including,
for example, a Representation State Transfer (REST) Interface and a
Secure Shell (SSH) Interface.
[0128] In some cases, Unified Collector 314 collects L_Model 270A,
LR_Model 270B, and/or Ci_Model 274 via a REST API, and the hardware
information (e.g., configurations, tables, fabric card information,
rules, routes, etc.) via SSH using utilities provided by the switch
software, such as virtual shell (VSH or VSHELL) for accessing the
switch command-line interface (CLI) or VSH_LC shell for accessing
runtime state of the line card.
[0129] Unified Collector 314 can poll other information from
Controllers 116, including: topology information, tenant
forwarding/routing information, tenant security policies,
contracts, interface policies, physical domain or VMM domain
information, OOB (out-of-band) management IP's of nodes in the
fabric, etc.
[0130] Unified Collector 314 can also poll other information from
Leafs 104 and Spines 102, such as: Ci Models 274 for VLANs, BDs,
security policies, Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP)
connectivity information of Leafs 104 and/or Spines 102, endpoint
information from EPM/COOP, fabric card information from Spines 102,
routing information base (RIB) tables, forwarding information base
(FIB) tables from Leafs 104 and/or Spines 102, security group
hardware tables (e.g., TCAM tables) from switches, etc.
[0131] Assurance Appliance 300 can run one or more instances of
Unified Collector 314. For example, Assurance Appliance 300 can run
one, two, three, or more instances of Unified Collector 314. The
task of data collecting for each node in the topology (e.g., Fabric
120 including Spines 102, Leafs 104, Controllers 116, etc.) can be
sharded or load balanced, to a unique instance of Unified Collector
314. Data collection across the nodes can thus be performed in
parallel by one or more instances of Unified Collector 314. Within
a given node, commands and data collection can be executed
serially. Assurance Appliance 300 can control the number of threads
used by each instance of Unified Collector 314 to poll data from
Fabric 120.
[0132] Data collected by Unified Collector 314 can be compressed
and sent to downstream services. In some examples, Unified
Collector 314 can collect data in an online fashion or real-time
fashion, and send the data downstream, as it is collected, for
further analysis. In some examples, Unified Collector 314 can
collect data in an offline fashion, and compile the data for later
analysis or transmission.
[0133] Assurance Appliance 300 can contact Controllers 116, Spines
102, Leafs 104, and other nodes to collect various types of data.
In some scenarios, Assurance Appliance 300 may experience a failure
(e.g., connectivity problem, hardware or software error, etc.) that
prevents it from being able to collect data for a period of time.
Assurance Appliance 300 can handle such failures seamlessly, and
generate events based on such failures.
[0134] Switch Logical Policy Generator 316 can receive L_Model 270A
and/or LR_Model 270B from Unified Collector 314 and calculate
Li_Model 272 for each network device i (e.g., switch i) in Fabric
120. For example, Switch Logical Policy Generator 316 can receive
L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B and generate Li_Model 272 by
projecting a logical model for each individual node i (e.g., Spines
102 and/or Leafs 104) in Fabric 120. Switch Logical Policy
Generator 316 can generate Li_Model 272 for each switch in Fabric
120, thus creating a switch logical model based on L_Model 270A for
each switch.
[0135] Switch Logical Configuration Generator 316 can also perform
change analysis and generate lint events or records for problems
discovered in L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B. The lint events or
records can be used to generate alerts for a user or network
operator.
[0136] Policy Operator 318 can receive Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model
276 for each switch from Unified Collector 314, and Li_Model 272
for each switch from Switch Logical Policy Generator 316, and
perform assurance checks and analysis (e.g., security adherence
checks, TCAM utilization analysis, etc.) based on Ci_Model 274,
Hi_Model 276, and Li_Model 272. Policy Operator 318 can perform
assurance checks on a switch-by-switch basis by comparing one or
more of the models.
[0137] Returning to Unified Collector 314, Unified Collector 314
can also send L_Model 270A and/or LR_Model 270B to Routing Policy
Parser 320, and Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 to Routing Parser
326.
[0138] Routing Policy Parser 320 can receive L_Model 270A and/or
LR_Model 270B and parse the model(s) for information that may be
relevant to downstream operators, such as Endpoint Checker 322 and
Tenant Routing Checker 324. Similarly, Routing Parser 326 can
receive Ci_Model 274 and Hi_Model 276 and parse each model for
information for downstream operators, Endpoint Checker 322 and
Tenant Routing Checker 324.
[0139] After Ci_Model 274, Hi_Model 276, L_Model 270A and/or
LR_Model 270B are parsed, Routing Policy Parser 320 and/or Routing
Parser 326 can send cleaned-up protocol buffers (Proto Buffs) to
the downstream operators, Endpoint Checker 322 and Tenant Routing
Checker 324. Endpoint Checker 322 can then generate events related
to Endpoint violations, such as duplicate IPs, APIPA, etc., and
Tenant Routing Checker 324 can generate events related to the
deployment of BDs, VRFs, subnets, routing table prefixes, etc.
[0140] FIG. 3C illustrates a schematic diagram of an example system
for static policy analysis in a network (e.g., Network Environment
100). Static Policy Analyzer 360 can perform assurance checks to
detect configuration violations, logical lint events, contradictory
or conflicting policies, unused contracts, incomplete
configurations, etc. Static Policy Analyzer 360 can check the
specification of the user's intent or intents in L_Model 270A to
determine if any configurations in Controllers 116 are inconsistent
with the specification of the user's intent or intents.
[0141] Static Policy Analyzer 360 can include one or more of the
Operators 310 executed or hosted in Assurance Appliance 300.
However, in other configurations, Static Policy Analyzer 360 can
run one or more operators or engines that are separate from
Operators 310 and/or Assurance Appliance 300. For example, Static
Policy Analyzer 360 can be a VM, a cluster of VMs, or a collection
of endpoints in a service function chain.
[0142] Static Policy Analyzer 360 can receive as input L_Model 270A
from Logical Model Collection Process 366 and Rules 368 defined for
each feature (e.g., object) in L_Model 270A. Rules 368 can be based
on objects, relationships, definitions, configurations, and any
other features in MIM 200. Rules 368 can specify conditions,
relationships, parameters, and/or any other information for
identifying configuration violations or issues.
[0143] Moreover, Rules 368 can include information for identifying
syntactic violations or issues. For example, Rules 368 can include
one or more rules for performing syntactic checks. Syntactic checks
can verify that the configuration of L_Model 270A is complete, and
can help identify configurations or rules that are not being used.
Syntactic checks can also verify that the configurations in the
hierarchical MIM 200 are complete (have been defined) and identify
any configurations that are defined but not used. To illustrate,
Rules 368 can specify that every tenant in L_Model 270A should have
a context configured configured; every contract in L_Model 270A
should specify a provider EPG and a consumer EPG; every contract in
L_Model 270A should specify a subject, filter, and/or port;
etc.
[0144] Rules 368 can also include rules for performing semantic
checks and identifying semantic violations or issues. Semantic
checks can check conflicting rules or configurations. For example,
Rule1 and Rule2 can have aliasing issues, Rule1 can be more
specific than Rule2 and thereby create conflicts/issues, etc. Rules
368 can define conditions which may result in aliased rules,
conflicting rules, etc. To illustrate, Rules 368 can specify that
an allow policy for a specific communication between two objects
can conflict with a deny policy for the same communication between
two objects if the allow policy has a higher priority than the deny
policy, or a rule for an object renders another rule
unnecessary.
[0145] Static Policy Analyzer 360 can apply Rules 368 to L_Model
270A to check configurations in L_Model 270A and output
Configuration Violation Events 370 (e.g., alerts, logs,
notifications, etc.) based on any issues detected. Configuration
Violation Events 370 can include semantic or semantic problems,
such as incomplete configurations, conflicting configurations,
aliased rules, unused configurations, errors, policy violations,
misconfigured objects, incomplete configurations, incorrect
contract scopes, improper object relationships, etc.
[0146] In some cases, Static Policy Analyzer 360 can iteratively
traverse each node in a tree generated based on L_Model 270A and/or
MIM 200, and apply Rules 368 at each node in the tree to determine
if any nodes yield a violation (e.g., incomplete configuration,
improper configuration, unused configuration, etc.). Static Policy
Analyzer 360 can output Configuration Violation Events 370 when it
detects any violations.
[0147] FIG. 4 illustrates a flowchart for an example network
assurance method. The method shown in FIG. 4 is provided by way of
example, as there are a variety of ways to carry out the method.
Additionally, while the example method is illustrated with a
particular order of blocks, those of ordinary skill in the art will
appreciate that FIG. 4 and the blocks shown therein can be executed
in any order and can include fewer or more blocks than
illustrated.
[0148] Each block shown in FIG. 4 represents one or more steps,
processes, methods or routines in the method. For the sake of
clarity and explanation purposes, the blocks in FIG. 4 are
described with reference to Assurance Appliance 300, Models 270A-B,
272, 274, 276, and Network Environment 100, as shown in FIGS. 1A-B,
2D, and 3A.
[0149] At step 400, Assurance Appliance 300 can collect data and
obtain models associated with Network Environment 100. The models
can include Models 270A-B, 272, 274, 276. The data can include
fabric data (e.g., topology, switch, interface policies,
application policies, EPGs, etc.), network configurations (e.g.,
BDs, VRFs, L2 Outs, L3 Outs, protocol configurations, etc.),
security configurations (e.g., contracts, filters, etc.), service
chaining configurations, routing configurations, and so forth.
Other information collected or obtained can include, for example,
network data (e.g., RIB/FIB, VLAN, MAC, ISIS, DB, BGP, OSPF, ARP,
VPC, LLDP, MTU, QoS, etc.), rules and tables (e.g., TCAM rules,
ECMP tables, etc.), endpoint dynamics (e.g., EPM, COOP EP DB,
etc.), statistics (e.g., TCAM rule hits, interface counters,
bandwidth, etc.).
[0150] At step 402, Assurance Appliance 300 can analyze and model
the received data and models. For example, Assurance Appliance 300
can perform formal modeling and analysis, which can involve
determining equivalency between models, including configurations,
policies, etc.
[0151] At step 404, Assurance Appliance 300 can generate one or
more smart events. Assurance Appliance 300 can generate smart
events using deep object hierarchy for detailed analysis, such as
Tenants, switches, VRFs, rules, filters, routes, prefixes, ports,
contracts, subjects, etc.
[0152] At step 406, Assurance Appliance 300 can visualize the smart
events, analysis and/or models. Assurance Appliance 300 can display
problems and alerts for analysis and debugging, in a user-friendly
GUI.
[0153] FIG. 5 provides another type of network assurance check
involving migrating to and maintaining white-list security models.
In particular, FIG. 5 provides an example method 500 for migrating
to a white list security model and subsequently maintaining the
white-list security model throughout a network.
[0154] Generally speaking, a white-list security model defines and
maintains a list or register of entities that are being provided a
particular privilege, service, mobility, access or recognition.
Entities included in the list and/or register will be accepted,
approved, and/or recognized for such purposes. Stated differently,
a white-list tests a desired input against a list of possible
correct input's. Thus, the white-list (a compilation of all the
good input values/conditions) is used to verify that the received
input satisfies one of the correct conditions. Alternatively,
black-listing or a employing a black-list security model is the
practice of identifying entities in the list or register that are
denied a particular privilege, service, mobility, access or
recognition. Stated differently, a black-list is tests a desired
input against a list of negative input's. Thus, the black-list (a
compilation of all the negative or bad conditions) is used to
verify that the input received is not one of the bad or negative
conditions included in the black list.
[0155] Within networking environments, such as the network
environment 100, typically black-list security models are
implemented. However, explicitly denying traffic via a black-list
may not be the most effective or productive way to manage and
protect a network environment. As the unauthorized and invalid
access attempts increase, a given black-list continues to grow,
which makes the black-list very challenging to maintain. Moreover,
while black-listing can stop traffic that is known to be bad (i.e.,
in included in the blacklist), black-listing cannot stop traffic
that is bad or malicious, but not known (i.e., not included in the
black-list). White-listing resolves some of these issues because it
much easier to identify and manage acceptable and good traffic than
it is to continually update a known list of bad and/or unacceptable
traffic (i.e., a black-list). Thus, FIG. 5 provides a method
through which a black-list, or other type of security network
policy, can be migrated to a white-list, wherein the white-list may
be subsequently maintained by the network. Thus, the present
disclosure involves a process that automatically converts a
black-list to a white-list, as a white-list is more secure than a
black-list because all network traffic except for traffic
associated with entries in the white-list. Stated differently, the
system and methods disclosed herein may be used to automatically
transition from an existing black-list to a white-list, using
existing network architecture components (the permit logs and
counter) to identify what traffic should be included as acceptable
and therefor included in the white-list network. The white-list can
be generated without having to take down any portions of the active
network. Stated differently, the current network implementing a
black-list model can still be employed to manage network traffic
attempting access, up and until the instant at which the black-list
is actually converted to a white-list.
[0156] Referring specifically to the steps of FIG. 5, process 500,
begins at 502, with obtaining a plurality of permit-all access logs
and permit-all counters corresponding to various components
included within a network implementing a network security policy.
The permit-all access logs and counters can be generated from
events generated for a network environment, e.g. by one or more
network assurance appliances. Additionally, the permit-all access
logs and counters can be generated in accordance with a permit-all
and log access policy. For example, a permit-all and log access
policy can be implemented that specifies to generate access logs
for all network traffic that has been or has not already been
forwarded. Further in the example, the permit-all and log access
policy can specify forwarding all network traffic that has been or
has not already been forward, e.g. according to a specific
permit-access policy.
[0157] The permit-all access logs can identify the network traffic
that enters the network and the permit-all counters maintain a
count of how many times unique network traffic enters the network.
In particular, "permit-all" logs and/or "permit all counters", such
as for example, ACL logs stored in TCAM memory, may be accessed to
determine how certain network traffic (e.g., email addresses,
users, passwords, URLs, IP addresses, domain names, file hashes,
etc.) is currently being forwarded or blocked within the network
environment 100. Such "permit-all" logs and "permit all" counters
may be maintained at hundreds of different points (e.g., at
different TCAMs) within the network environment 100. Thus, all or
substantially all of the "permit-all" logs and "permit-all"
counters may be obtained, collected, and/or aggregated.
[0158] At 504, the aggregated "permit-all" logs and "permit-all"
counters are processed to identify specific network traffic
entering the network that is associated with a specific entry in
the "permit-all" logs. More specifically, network traffic is
identified based on the entries included in the "permit-all" logs
that correspond to entries in the "permit-all" counters. For
example, assume network traffic associated with a particular IP
address is included in the "permit-all" access log, wherein the
entry includes the IP address and a time stamp (or other unique
identifier) that identifies when the entry was logged. In the
corresponding "permit-all" counter, there is an entry with a
matching time stamp (or other unique identifier) that has increased
or otherwise been incremented to indicate that entries to the
"permit-all" access log had occurred. Thus, by matching the time
stamp of the entry in the "permit-all" access log with the
"permit-all" counter, it can be determined what traffic (in this
example, the IP address) triggered the increment in the
"permit-all" counter.
[0159] At 506, a determination is made as to whether the identified
network traffic should be white-listed. In one specific example,
network traffic may be identified by a network administrator that
pre-defines what network traffic is acceptable network traffic and
therefore should be allowed within the network. At 508, when it is
determined that the traffic should be white-listed, a specific
permit-access policy and corresponding access and counters are
generated for the identified network traffic. Referring to the IP
address example above, when it is determined that network traffic
associated with the IP address should be white-listed then a
permit-access policy for traffic corresponding to the IP address is
generated. Alternatively, when it is determined that the traffic
should not be white-listed, then a specific deny-access policy is
generated.
[0160] At 510, the generated permit-access policy is inserted into
the network. For example, referring to the IP address example,
after the access policy is generated, the policy is inserted or
otherwise implemented at the applicable switch within the network
environment 100 to ensure that all traffic associated with the IP
address is properly routed (either allowed or denied). The
generated permit-access policy is inserted into the network ahead
of a permit-all access policy followed to generate the permit-all
access logs and counters. By inserting the permit-access policy
ahead of the permit-all access policy, the permit-access policy is
followed by the permit-all access policy. More specifically, the
network traffic that is white-listed, e.g. corresponding to the
permit-access policy is forwarded without being logged in the
permit-all access logs and permit-all counters according to the
permit-all access policy.
[0161] The process for identifying network traffic for
white-listing is an iterative process that may be continuously
performed so that more and more specific access policies may be
generated that govern specific network traffic routed throughout
the network environment 100 that either permit or deny specific
network traffic. Eventually, most of the traffic will be governed
by a special access policy and none of the traffic will flow
through the permit-all access log and corresponding "permit-all"
access counter. Accordingly, a true white-list based access policy
is effectively implemented in the network.
[0162] At step 512, the permit-all access policy is converted into
a deny-all access policy. Specifically, the "permit-all" access log
can be switched from a "permit-all" access log to a "deny-all"
access log and thereby migrate the network environment 100 to a
network that is governed by a full white-list security policy
network. As most traffic will be governed by one or more specific
permit-access policies inserted before the permit-all access
policy, traffic that is not governed by the specific permit-access
policies will be blocked. More specifically, traffic that is not
governed by the specific permit-access policies will be governed by
the permit-all access policy converted into a deny-all access
policy, thereby blocking the traffic it is not governed by the
specific permit-access policies.
[0163] At 514, one or more of the generated specific permit-access
policies may be removed if/when it is determined that the specific
permit-access policy is no longer needed. In particular, the
applicable access and/or counters (e.g., Specific permit policies
TCAM counters and permit policy logs and/or specific deny policies
TCAM counters and deny policy logs) for the generated specific
access policy will be analyzed and if the count is not incrementing
over a specific period of time, it may be determined that the
specific access policy is no longer needed. Thus, the log is
removed from the network environment 100.
[0164] FIG. 6 illustrates an example network device 600 suitable
for performing switching, routing, load balancing, and other
networking operations. Network device 600 includes a central
processing unit (CPU) 604, interfaces 602, and a bus 610 (e.g., a
PCI bus). When acting under the control of appropriate software or
firmware, the CPU 604 is responsible for executing packet
management, error detection, and/or routing functions. The CPU 604
preferably accomplishes all these functions under the control of
software including an operating system and any appropriate
applications software. CPU 604 may include one or more processors
608, such as a processor from the INTEL X86 family of
microprocessors. In some cases, processor 608 can be specially
designed hardware for controlling the operations of network device
600. In some cases, a memory 606 (e.g., non-volatile RAM, ROM,
etc.) also forms part of CPU 604. However, there are many different
ways in which memory could be coupled to the system.
[0165] The interfaces 602 are typically provided as modular
interface cards (sometimes referred to as "line cards"). Generally,
they control the sending and receiving of data packets over the
network and sometimes support other peripherals used with the
network device 600. Among the interfaces that may be provided are
Ethernet interfaces, frame relay interfaces, cable interfaces, DSL
interfaces, token ring interfaces, and the like. In addition,
various very high-speed interfaces may be provided such as fast
token ring interfaces, wireless interfaces, Ethernet interfaces,
Gigabit Ethernet interfaces, ATM interfaces, HSSI interfaces, POS
interfaces, FDDI interfaces, WIFI interfaces, 3G/4G/5G cellular
interfaces, CAN BUS, LoRA, and the like. Generally, these
interfaces may include ports appropriate for communication with the
appropriate media. In some cases, they may also include an
independent processor and, in some instances, volatile RAM. The
independent processors may control such communications intensive
tasks as packet switching, media control, signal processing, crypto
processing, and management. By providing separate processors for
the communications intensive tasks, these interfaces allow the
master microprocessor 604 to efficiently perform routing
computations, network diagnostics, security functions, etc.
[0166] Although the system shown in FIG. 6 is one specific network
device of the present invention, it is by no means the only network
device architecture on which the present invention can be
implemented. For example, an architecture having a single processor
that handles communications as well as routing computations, etc.,
is often used. Further, other types of interfaces and media could
also be used with the network device 600.
[0167] Regardless of the network device's configuration, it may
employ one or more memories or memory modules (including memory
606) configured to store program instructions for the
general-purpose network operations and mechanisms for roaming,
route optimization and routing functions described herein. The
program instructions may control the operation of an operating
system and/or one or more applications, for example. The memory or
memories may also be configured to store tables such as mobility
binding, registration, and association tables, etc. Memory 606
could also hold various software containers and virtualized
execution environments and data.
[0168] The network device 600 can also include an
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), which can be
configured to perform routing and/or switching operations. The ASIC
can communicate with other components in the network device 600 via
the bus 610, to exchange data and signals and coordinate various
types of operations by the network device 600, such as routing,
switching, and/or data storage operations, for example.
[0169] FIG. 7 illustrates a computing system architecture 700
wherein the components of the system are in electrical
communication with each other using a connection 705, such as a
bus. Exemplary system 700 includes a processing unit (CPU or
processor) 710 and a system connection 705 that couples various
system components including the system memory 715, such as read
only memory (ROM) 720 and random access memory (RAM) 725, to the
processor 710. The system 700 can include a cache of high-speed
memory connected directly with, in close proximity to, or
integrated as part of the processor 710. The system 700 can copy
data from the memory 715 and/or the storage device 730 to the cache
712 for quick access by the processor 710. In this way, the cache
can provide a performance boost that avoids processor 710 delays
while waiting for data. These and other modules can control or be
configured to control the processor 710 to perform various actions.
Other system memory 715 may be available for use as well. The
memory 715 can include multiple different types of memory with
different performance characteristics. The processor 710 can
include any general purpose processor and a hardware or software
service, such as service 1 732, service 2 734, and service 3 736
stored in storage device 730, configured to control the processor
710 as well as a special-purpose processor where software
instructions are incorporated into the actual processor design. The
processor 710 may be a completely self-contained computing system,
containing multiple cores or processors, a bus, memory controller,
cache, etc. A multi-core processor may be symmetric or
asymmetric.
[0170] To enable user interaction with the computing device 700, an
input device 745 can represent any number of input mechanisms, such
as a microphone for speech, a touch-sensitive screen for gesture or
graphical input, keyboard, mouse, motion input, speech and so
forth. An output device 735 can also be one or more of a number of
output mechanisms known to those of skill in the art. In some
instances, multimodal systems can enable a user to provide multiple
types of input to communicate with the computing device 700. The
communications interface 740 can generally govern and manage the
user input and system output. There is no restriction on operating
on any particular hardware arrangement and therefore the basic
features here may easily be substituted for improved hardware or
firmware arrangements as they are developed.
[0171] Storage device 730 is a non-volatile memory and can be a
hard disk or other types of computer readable media which can store
data that are accessible by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes,
flash memory cards, solid state memory devices, digital versatile
disks, cartridges, random access memories (RAMs) 725, read only
memory (ROM) 720, and hybrids thereof.
[0172] The storage device 730 can include services 732, 734, 736
for controlling the processor 710. Other hardware or software
modules are contemplated. The storage device 730 can be connected
to the system connection 705. In one aspect, a hardware module that
performs a particular function can include the software component
stored in a computer-readable medium in connection with the
necessary hardware components, such as the processor 710,
connection 705, output device 735, and so forth, to carry out the
function.
[0173] For clarity of explanation, in some instances the present
technology may be presented as including individual functional
blocks including functional blocks comprising devices, device
components, steps or routines in a method embodied in software, or
combinations of hardware and software.
[0174] In some embodiments the computer-readable storage devices,
mediums, and memories can include a cable or wireless signal
containing a bit stream and the like. However, when mentioned,
non-transitory computer-readable storage media expressly exclude
media such as energy, carrier signals, electromagnetic waves, and
signals per se.
[0175] Methods according to the above-described examples can be
implemented using computer-executable instructions that are stored
or otherwise available from computer readable media. Such
instructions can comprise, for example, instructions and data which
cause or otherwise configure a general purpose computer, special
purpose computer, or special purpose processing device to perform a
certain function or group of functions. Portions of computer
resources used can be accessible over a network. The computer
executable instructions may be, for example, binaries, intermediate
format instructions such as assembly language, firmware, or source
code. Examples of computer-readable media that may be used to store
instructions, information used, and/or information created during
methods according to described examples include magnetic or optical
disks, flash memory, USB devices provided with non-volatile memory,
networked storage devices, and so on.
[0176] Devices implementing methods according to these disclosures
can comprise hardware, firmware and/or software, and can take any
of a variety of form factors. Typical examples of such form factors
include laptops, smart phones, small form factor personal
computers, personal digital assistants, rackmount devices,
standalone devices, and so on. Functionality described herein also
can be embodied in peripherals or add-in cards. Such functionality
can also be implemented on a circuit board among different chips or
different processes executing in a single device, by way of further
example.
[0177] The instructions, media for conveying such instructions,
computing resources for executing them, and other structures for
supporting such computing resources are means for providing the
functions described in these disclosures.
[0178] Although a variety of examples and other information was
used to explain aspects within the scope of the appended claims, no
limitation of the claims should be implied based on particular
features or arrangements in such examples, as one of ordinary skill
would be able to use these examples to derive a wide variety of
implementations. Further and although some subject matter may have
been described in language specific to examples of structural
features and/or method steps, it is to be understood that the
subject matter defined in the appended claims is not necessarily
limited to these described features or acts. For example, such
functionality can be distributed differently or performed in
components other than those identified herein. Rather, the
described features and steps are disclosed as examples of
components of systems and methods within the scope of the appended
claims.
[0179] Claim language reciting "at least one of" refers to at least
one of a set and indicates that one member of the set or multiple
members of the set satisfy the claim. For example, claim language
reciting "at least one of A and B" means A, B, or A and B.
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