U.S. patent application number 13/959160 was filed with the patent office on 2013-11-28 for internet communication system for secure restricted access.
This patent application is currently assigned to BEYOND BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY, LLC. The applicant listed for this patent is Beyond Broadband Technology, LLC. Invention is credited to William D. Bauer, David W. Eder, Donovan Steve White.
Application Number | 20130315396 13/959160 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 42665765 |
Filed Date | 2013-11-28 |
United States Patent
Application |
20130315396 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Bauer; William D. ; et
al. |
November 28, 2013 |
Internet Communication System For Secure Restricted Access
Abstract
Methods and apparatus permit a one-way downloadable security for
electronic signals such as cable television, free-to-air, direct
broadcast satellite, internet, electronic device enablement, and
other services. The system can allow a broadcast transmission
capability (1) to provide an encrypted signal to an individual
reception capability (2) in a manner that maintains the full
security of a traditional decryption key process while completely
eliminating any need for a trusted authority. By including a
nascent decryption key generator that may create a secure,
key-based environment from an unsecure individualized information
transmission (12), a sequence of key(s) from a root key(s) to a
derived key(s) to a temporary key(s) and ultimately to a fully
random key(s) can be generated in activating a device or a
decryption capability for a subscriber.
Inventors: |
Bauer; William D.; (Gering,
NE) ; White; Donovan Steve; (Poway, CA) ;
Eder; David W.; (Bozeman, MT) |
|
Applicant: |
Name |
City |
State |
Country |
Type |
Beyond Broadband Technology, LLC |
Gering |
NE |
US |
|
|
Assignee: |
BEYOND BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY,
LLC
Gering
NE
|
Family ID: |
42665765 |
Appl. No.: |
13/959160 |
Filed: |
August 5, 2013 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
|
|
|
|
|
|
Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
|
|
12599499 |
Nov 9, 2009 |
8503675 |
|
|
PCT/US2009/035027 |
Feb 24, 2009 |
|
|
|
13959160 |
|
|
|
|
Current U.S.
Class: |
380/278 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04N 7/17309 20130101;
H04N 21/4181 20130101; H04N 21/26613 20130101; H04N 21/4623
20130101; H04L 9/088 20130101; H04L 9/0866 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
380/278 |
International
Class: |
H04L 9/08 20060101
H04L009/08 |
Claims
1. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication comprising the steps of: establishing an internet
communication transmitter capability for said encrypted internet
communication; establishing an internet compatible individual
receiver capability responsive to a completely unknown decryption
key, unknown to said internet compatible individual receiver
capability and said internet transmitter capability; providing
unsecure individualized information associated with said internet
compatible individual receiver capability; nascently generating
said completely unknown decryption key, that was unknown to said
internet compatible individual receiver capability and said
internet transmitter capability prior to being nascently generated,
at least partially from and after providing said unsecure
individualized information; activating decryption processing of
said encrypted internet communication as a result of said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key; and
physically unlocking access to said encrypted internet
communication at said internet compatible individual receiver
capability.
2. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 1 wherein said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key at
least partially from said unsecure individualized information
comprises the step of adding cryptographic entropy for said
decryption key.
3. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 2 wherein said step of adding
cryptographic entropy for said decryption key comprises the step of
utilizing communication provider information.
4. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 3 wherein said step of
utilizing provider information to add cryptographic entropy
comprises the step of utilizing a secure communication provider
cryptographic key.
5. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 4 wherein said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key at
least partially from said unsecure individualized information
comprises the step of establishing a cryptographic key using said
unsecure individualized information and said secure communication
provider key as inputs to a cryptographic encryption function.
6. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 1 wherein said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key at
least partially from said unsecure individualized information
comprises the step of generating a cryptographic key by
mathematically functioning at least two items of information.
7. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 6 wherein said step of
generating said cryptographic key by mathematically functioning at
least two items of information comprises the step of utilizing one
item of information as a mathematical operand to perform a
transformative function on another item of information.
8. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 1 wherein said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key at
least partially from said unsecure individualized information
comprises the step of multi-step mathematically manipulating items
to support creation of a cryptographic key.
9. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted internet
communication as described in claim 8 wherein said step of
multi-step mathematically manipulating items to support creation of
a cryptographic key comprises a step selected from a group
consisting of: manipulating items through a reversible
cryptographic function to support creation of a cryptographic key;
manipulating items through a one-way cryptographic function to
support creation of a cryptographic key; manipulating items through
an encryption function to support creation of a cryptographic key;
manipulating items through a cryptographic hash function to support
creation of a cryptographic key; utilizing a random value generator
cryptographic function to support creation of a cryptographic key;
and manipulating items through a data stream location pointer
function to support creation of a cryptographic key.
10. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 1 wherein said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key at
least partially from said unsecure individualized information
comprises the step of utilizing an at least two dimensional cipher
key derivation functionality.
11. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 10 wherein said step
of utilizing an at least two dimensional cipher key derivation
functionality comprises the step: of: utilizing at least some
individual receiver capability information; and utilizing at least
some communication transmitter capability information.
12. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 1 wherein said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key at
least partially from said unsecure individualized information
comprises the step of integrating said unsecure individualized
information and communication transmitter information into a
cryptographic operation.
13. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 1 and further
comprising the step of assuring that said completely unknown
decryption key is ubiquitously secret-ed from all persons.
14. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 13 wherein said step
of assuring that said completely unknown decryption key is
ubiquitously secret-ed from all persons comprises the step of
destructively tamperproofing computer chip information within said
internet compatible individual receiver capability.
15. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 13 wherein said step
of assuring that said completely unknown decryption key is
ubiquitously secret-ed from all persons comprises the step of
eliminating any use of a cryptographic trusted authority for said
completely unknown decryption key.
16. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 15 wherein said step
of assuring that said completely unknown decryption key is
ubiquitously secret-ed from all persons comprises the step of
assuring that said completely unknown decryption key is initially
unknowable at said internet compatible individual receiver
capability.
17. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 16 wherein said step
of assuring that said completely unknown decryption key is
initially unknowable at said internet compatible individual
receiver capability comprises the step of preventing said internet
compatible individual receiver capability from any knowledge as to
how said completely unknown decryption key is generated.
18. A method of providing restricted access to an encrypted
internet communication as described in claim 1 wherein said step of
nascently generating said completely unknown decryption key from
said unsecure individualized information comprises the step of
cryptographically operating on said unsecure individualized
information as at least part of generating said completely unknown
decryption key. establishing an internet communication transmitter
capability for said encrypted internet communication; establishing
an internet compatible individual receiver capability responsive to
a completely unknown decryption key, unknown to said internet
compatible individual receiver capability and said internet
transmitter capability;
19. A system for restricted access to an electronic signal
comprising: a signal transmitter capability configured to generate
an encrypted signal; at least one individual receiver capability
responsive to a completely unknown decryption key, unknown to said
individual receiver capability and said signal transmitter
capability; an unsecure individualized information transmission to
which said signal transmitter capability is responsive; a nascent
decryption key generator responsive to said unsecure individualized
information transmission wherein said nascent decryption key
generator generates said completely unknown decryption key, that
was unknown by said individual receiver capability and said signal
transmitter capability prior to being nascently generated; an
electronic signal transmitter comprising hardware, wherein said
electronic signal transmitter is responsive to said nascent
decryption key generator; an individual signal receiver responsive
to said electronic signal transmitter; and a decryption processor
responsive to said completely unknown decryption key and configured
to physically unlock access to said encrypted signal for said
individual receiver capability.
20. A method providing restricted access to an encrypted
communication at an individual receiver comprising steps of:
providing unsecure individualized information associated with an
individual reception capability; nascently generating a completely
unknown decryption key, that was unknown to said internet
compatible individual receiver capability and said internet
transmitter capability prior to being nascently generated, at least
partially from and after providing said unsecure individualized
information; activating decryption processing of said encrypted
communication as a result of said step of nascently generating said
completely unknown decryption key; and physically unlocking access
to said encrypted communication at said individual receiver.
Description
[0001] This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser.
No. 12/599,499, filed Nov. 9, 2009, which itself is the United
States National Stage of International Application Number
PCT/US2009/035027, filed Feb. 24, 2009, each said application is
hereby incorporated herein by reference.
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0002] This invention relates initially to systems that provide
secure, subscriber access to a signal. More specifically, it
involves cable systems that provide set top receivers which require
a cryptographic unlock key or keys where the key or keys can be
held as a complete unknown without even involvement of a
centralized trusted authority for such cryptographic keys. The
invention is particularly suited to use with broadcast providers
who do not want any information available to a competitor or other
third person in order to securely prevent risk of cryptographic
attack or unauthorized hacking into the broadcast signal.
BACKGROUND
[0003] Cable-television systems are one of a myriad of electronic
applications where subscriber access is desired. Typically, the
subscriber access is provided through use of encrypted signals and
some type of decoder. For cable-television systems it is not
uncommon to have a receiver and a decoder as a set-top box from
which a television or other device may display the information
received. One of the ways in which such systems may operate is for
the set-top box to have embedded within it a decryption code or
key. This decryption code is then used by the broadcast facility to
deliver the keys necessary to provide individualized access
allowing the set-top box to decrypt a video service. The decryption
code may be a cryptographic key and is frequently provided to the
set-top box at time of manufacture. A separate third person is
often used to understand and have access to all of the codes for
the manufactured boxes. This third person is trusted to maintain
the secrecy of the various codes and is referred to as a trusted
authority. After manufacture and providing the codes to the trusted
authority, a broadcast facility who has purchased or otherwise
provided the set-top box obtains that specific box's decryption
code by utilization of the trusted authority. Unfortunately,
perfect trust is never possible. There is also uneasiness as to the
origination of the knowledge with respect to these decryption or
cryptographic keys. Generally, there is a desire not to provide any
possibility of access to one's competitors or to unknown persons
such as overseas manufacturing capabilities or the like. This is
compounded by the fact that it is not practical for each broadcast
provider to have their own manufacturing facility for their own
set-top boxes. Thus it has been a long felt desire to somehow
eliminate the need for and use of a trusted authority while yet
maintaining use of specific individualized encryption codes for
particular devices.
[0004] These desires exist because in spite of the often extreme
precautions taken to protect decryption keys, the cable industry
has more than 25 years of experience with attacks on its security
systems. Compromised authorization remains an important
consideration, and attacks such as cloning, musketeering, replaying
messages, substituting message language, insider compromises, and
vulnerability of trusted hardware still remain to name but a few.
For some time, there has existed a goal of being able to provide a
true one-way system that can securely provide broadcast signals on
a subscriber basis without any trusted authority or other risk
relative to a potential compromise of the decryption keys used.
SUMMARY DISCLOSURE OF INVENTION
[0005] The present invention provides technology and methods and
apparatus that can achieve a secure cable television or other
electronic device access that maintains the full security of a
traditional decryption key process while completely eliminating any
need for a trusted authority. It has been understood that any
system that uses a decryption key must at some time provide
knowledge of that key to the broadcast user. For example, when the
broadcast facility is ready to open access to its signal for that
subscriber, it has been known that the broadcast facility has to
access or know that subscriber's decryption key to open the access.
What is surprising is that the present invention provides a system
that shows that these two accepted beliefs are not, in fact,
requirements. From some perspectives, it is even surprising that a
system such as the present invention--where no trusted authority is
involved--can exist while providing subscriber access protected by
the very secure paradigm of a decryption key or cryptographic key
environment. Through various embodiments, the present invention
shows that various processes and hardware devices can be provided
to achieve the security of a robust encryption key while totally
avoiding any need for a trusted authority. The methods and
apparatus for restricted access to an electronic signal described
address many overall goals in a practical manner. Naturally,
further objects of the inventive technology are apparent from the
description and drawings below.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0006] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a cable television type of
system according to one embodiment.
[0007] FIG. 2 is a table of some of the cryptographic key
designations that may be used in understanding embodiments of the
present invention.
[0008] FIG. 3 is conceptual diagram of some key generation
processes that may be used in understanding embodiments of the
present invention.
[0009] FIG. 4 shows operabilities as they may exist within a
broadcast facility to achieve use of the completely unknown
cryptographic key.
[0010] FIG. 5 A-F provide illustrative, non-limiting, examples of
some possible criteria that may be applied to the various keys or
other information for some embodiments.
MODES FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
[0011] As mentioned earlier, the present invention includes a
variety of aspects, which may be combined in different ways. The
following descriptions are provided to list elements and to
describe some of the embodiments of the present invention. These
elements are listed with initial embodiments, however it should be
understood that they may be combined in any manner and in any
number to create additional embodiments. The variously described
examples and preferred embodiments should not be construed to limit
the present invention to only the explicitly described systems,
techniques, and applications. Further, this description should be
understood to support and encompass descriptions and claims of all
the various embodiments, systems, techniques, methods, devices, and
applications with any number of the disclosed processes or
elements, with each process or element alone, and also with any and
all various permutations and combinations of all processes or
elements as may be presented in this or any subsequent
application.
[0012] FIG. 1 presents a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the
invention. It provides a context to step through various hardware
elements involved, and to understand how systems according to the
present invention can provide a method of providing restricted
access to an electronic signal and a system for restricted access
to an electronic signal. At a basic level, the invention can be
understood as establishing a broadcast transmission capability (1)
that provides an encrypted signal to an individual reception
capability (2). The capability may be considered as existing at a
facility and both the capability and the facility may be dispersed
at a variety of locations, buildings, or even countries. The
encrypted signal may be provided or transmitted by wires, fibers,
or by radio wave such as shown emanating from the broadcast
transmitter (3) to some localized cable provider element (15). In
traditional cable television systems, the radio waves may be
converted and provided the through cabling, fibers, wires, or in
air to an individual subscriber receiver (6)--or more likely to a
collection of many individual subscriber receivers (6).
[0013] In general, the broadcast transmission capability (1) may be
an entire facility or a composite of facilities at many locations.
These may be configured to generate an encrypted signal for
subscribers who may each have established for them an individual
reception capability (2). A broadcast transmission capability (1)
may be configured to generate the encrypted signal and to provide
individualized access to the signal. Once subscriber payment, sign
up, or the like has been accomplished, the broadcast transmission
capability (1) may activate decryption processing of the encrypted
signal at the individual reception capability (2). This may be
accomplished by actually reconfiguring the individual reception
capability (2). A subscriber decryption processor (4) may be
reconfigured or initially configured to physically unlock access to
the encrypted signal at the individual reception capability (2).
The act of physically unlocking a device with a key can be
considered the equivalent to a key unlocking to door to allow it to
be opened, but, of course, as it is access or operability that is
being unlocked, it can occur by, through, or even within hardware,
firmware, or software.
[0014] As can be seen from the figures and an understanding of the
invention, embodiments can use traditional cable componentry, with
particular software or computer hardware configurations. For
example, a broadcast transmitter (3) can transmit a signal to one
or more cable informational service signal origination point
facilities (5), sometimes referred to in a cable context as head
ends. These facilities can each provide an identifiable source for
the subscriber signal. Once transmitted, perhaps across the cable
network or wires, the encrypted cable informational service signal
(13) can be received by a conditional access television device
receiver (11) that may be established for a subscriber. The
conditional access television device receiver (11) can be a
capability within a set-top box (7) that is part of the individual
reception capability (2). An aspect of the invention that makes
implementation easier is the fact that embodiments can provide a
cable informational service system hardware individualized
information transmission (8). As can be seen in FIG. 1, the cable
informational service system hardware individualized information
transmission (8) can be separately provided through some sort of
transmission medium. For example, as discussed later this may be
simply information transmitted via a telephone line from the
individual subscriber to the broadcast provider. As discussed later
it may be understood that this individualized information
transmission (8) may be completely unsecure and yet may not
jeopardize or even substantially increase the risk of a compromise
of the cryptographic key for that individual reception capability
(2).
[0015] In understanding the generality of the present invention, it
should be understood that although presented initially as a cable
television system, it may be applied to other systems as well. The
systems may involve some sort of an encrypted information
transmission ranging from free-to-air systems, direct to home
satellite systems, direct broadcast satellite systems, DSL,
internet providers, internet based systems, fiber to home systems,
and even systems to activate devices. Receivers may be simply
electronic devices (2) that are unlocked with individuality. Thus,
it can be understood that in certain applications instead of
establishing a broadcast transmission capability (1), a system may
be implemented in environments which establish an electronic device
enabling facility (1). This electronic device enabling facility (1)
may communicate with a conditionally operable electronic device (2)
configured to receive a service enablement signal (13) that can act
to physically unlock at least some capability for a conditionally
operable electronic device (2).
[0016] As mentioned earlier, a perhaps surprising aspect of the
invention is the fact that it can utilize cryptographic keys that
are completely unknown, that is, a completely unknown decryption
key. In this regard, it should be understood that the keys involved
are not only unknown, they are not known to a trusted authority;
they are not known to the broadcast transmission capability (1),
and they are not known to the individual reception capability (2).
Even perhaps more astounding is the fact that not only are the keys
not known to these persons; they are even not known to any person
in the entire world--and yet they are completely operable. Thus,
although the individual reception capability (2) can react to a
proper key, it does in fact not "know" that key and it cannot be
somehow pulled out of it. Similarly, although the broadcast
transmission capability (1) can utilize information and ultimately
encrypt based on the individual reception capability's (2) key, it
also does not know that key. This is important because it means no
likely tampering or device access can provide the specific key
information. In fact, embodiments of the invention act for the
first time and thus nascently, to nascently generate the completely
unknown decryption key by capabilities pursuant to embodiments of
the present invention. This means that embodiments can accomplish
assuring that the completely unknown decryption key is ubiquitously
secret-ed from all persons. Embodiments have hardware designed to
provide a nascent decryption key generator (10), that is, a
decryption key generator that for the first time creates a key
previously determined to be appropriate to a specific individual
reception capability (2). As discussed later, embodiments can
achieve this by responding to the unsecure individualized
information transmission (12) provided from the individual
reception capability (2). They can even derive the completely
unknown decryption key at least partially from the unsecure
individualized information transmission (12). In order to provide
this unsecure individualized information transmission, the
individual reception capability (2) may even include an unsecure
individualized information generator (16) that may be as simple as
a display that indicates an easily knowable identification code
(perhaps a serial number) that can then be communicated to some
facet within the broadcast transmission capability (1).
[0017] The aspect of having a completely unknown decryption key is
significant because it allows an elimination of the trusted
authority. Nobody knows the key. Thus, embodiments of the invention
can act to assure that the completely unknown decryption key is
initially unknowable at the broadcast transmission capability. They
can act to eliminate any use of a cryptographic trusted authority
for the completely unknown decryption key or keys.
[0018] Similarly, embodiments can act to assure that the completely
unknown decryption key is also initially unknowable at said
individual reception capability (2). The individual reception
capability (2) or the set-top box (7) cannot be practically
manipulated to yield knowledge on the individual keys. Further, the
individual reception capability (2) can be prevented from any
knowledge as to how the completely unknown decryption key is even
derived at the broadcast transmission capability (2). While the
individual reception capability (2) can react to an appropriately
decrypted signal, there may also be included specific tamper
proofing of chips and memories with the individual reception
capability (2). Systems can be set up to accomplish destructively
tamper proofing computer chip information within the individual
reception capability (2) so that if any inappropriate activity
occurs, the chip itself ends up destroying any potentially
compromising information.
[0019] In a general sense, an aspect of the invention is the fact
that once the unsecure individualized information transmission (12)
is received, the broadcast transmission capability (1) can act to
add cryptographic entropy and take that completely unsecure
information and utilize it to generate fully secure information. As
those in cryptography well understand, adding cryptographic entropy
means that the information involved is expanded so that any
attempts at decryption become increasingly more difficult. From
this perspective, the broadcast transmission capability (1) can
include a cryptographic decryption key entropy addition generator
(17) that can add cryptographic entropy for the decryption key or
otherwise. Cryptography can often be represented as accomplishing a
mathematical function in some specific way. Such cryptographic
functions can range from simple functions (e.g., adding one to a
value) to more complex functions (e.g. accomplishing an Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) established encryption function for a
2048-bit asymmetric key). In this sense, the nascent decryption key
generator (10) can generate a cryptographic key by mathematically
functioning one or more items of information. As can be appreciated
from the above, at least one item of information, namely, the
unsecure individualized information can be used to generate a
cryptographic key. In other embodiments, at least two items of
information can be used. Thus, designs can manipulate first item(s)
through some cryptographic function and may manipulate second
item(s) to perhaps the same or some other cryptographic function.
As one example, designs can accomplish manipulating items to
support creation of a cryptographic key by manipulating first items
through a cryptographic function, perhaps such as a reversible
cryptographic function and can then accomplish manipulating second
items through a cryptographic function, again perhaps such as the
same or a different reversible cryptographic function all as part
of supporting the creation of a cryptographic key. These functions
can be achieved by a first cryptographic function processor
(perhaps such as a first reversible cryptographic function key
generator or even a first cryptographic encryption function key
generator) and a second cryptographic function processor (perhaps
such as a second reversible cryptographic function key generator or
even a second cryptographic encryption function key generator).
[0020] Embodiments can involve an at least dual information input
mathematically functional cryptographic key generator (18). In such
a system, one item of information can even be utilized as a
mathematical operand to perform a transformative function on
another item of information. Embodiments can include a first
informational input mathematical operand processor (19) and a
second informational input transformative function processor (20).
Needless to say any functions considered to perform a cryptographic
action can be used. For example, in a preferred embodiment,
hardware can add cryptographic entropy by accomplishing a step of
utilizing some item of provider information. Thus, hardware or more
likely software designs can include a provider information input
(23) to which the nascent decryption key generator (10) may be
responsive. When two inputs are used, the system can be considered
as having an at least two dimensional cipher key derivation
processor (22), and as utilizing an at least two dimensional cipher
key derivation functionality. These two dimensions can involve
utilizing at least some reception facility information and
utilizing at least some broadcast facility information. In this
manner, the at least two inputs can be considered as a reception
facility information input (24) and a broadcast facility
information input (21). As but one example, the reception facility
information input (24) can provide an unsecure item or items of
information, such as a serial number or the like. Further, the
broadcast facility information input (21) can provide a secure item
or items of input. Each of these can be cryptographically
functioned to add entropy to an item and perhaps achieve the
desired cryptographic key.
[0021] As can be understood from the sequence of key generation
activities shown in FIG. 4, it can be understood that the initial
unsecure individualized information can yield a derived key, then
the derived key can yield a key that is temporarily used such as an
ephemeral key, then the ephemeral key can be used to issue a new
random key. Once the derived key is generated, in embodiments,
further processing can occur. For example, embodiments can further
establish a cryptographic key using the derived cryptographic key
with yet other (perhaps even unsecure) provider information to
yield an ephemeral key. For example, the derived key (perhaps
achieved by using the unsecure individualized information
transmission (12)) may be used with information perhaps such as
signal origination point identification information with both as
inputs to an encryption hash function or a cryptographic encryption
function to generate an ephemeral key. There may be a signal
origination point identification information input (25) and at
least one derived key input (26) to an encryption hash function
processor (27) or a cryptographic encryption function processor
(27) to generate the ephemeral key. As discussed, it should be
understood that whether embodied in hardware, firmware, or as
software, the term "input" may be an actual input or it may be an
internal signal or even a transient signal value that is used to
achieve the end result; there need not be a formal input
signal.
[0022] As may be appreciated from the above, embodiments may
accomplish multi-step mathematically manipulating items to support
creation of a cryptographic key. Thus, embodiments may be
considered to include a multi-step mathematically functional
cryptographic key generator (28). As a person of ordinary skill in
cryptography would well understand, a great variety of
cryptographic functions can be utilized in the key generator (28)
to manipulate an input or otherwise generate the required key based
communication. Embodiments can act to achieve manipulating items
through a reversible cryptographic function to support creation of
a cryptographic key, manipulating items through a one-way
cryptographic function to support creation of a cryptographic key,
manipulating items through an encryption function to support
creation of a cryptographic key, cryptographically encrypting items
to support creation of a cryptographic key, cryptographically
hashing items to support creation of a cryptographic key,
manipulating items through a cryptographic hash function to support
creation of a cryptographic key, utilizing a random value generator
cryptographic function to support creation of a cryptographic key,
and manipulating items through a data stream location pointer
function to support creation of a cryptographic key, to name a few
of the many options possible. Similarly, hardware or computer
memory or programming configurations can include a reversible
cryptographic function key generator (29), a one-way cryptographic
function key generator (30), a cryptographic encryption function
key generator (31), a cryptographic hash function key generator
(32), a random cryptographic key generator (33), or a data stream
location pointer function key generator (34) among other options.
The reversible cryptographic function can be a cryptographic
encryption function, and similarly, the one-way cryptographic
function can be a cryptographic hash function and their similar
generators. Of course other cryptographic functions can be used
including but not limited to: symmetric key processes, asymmetric
key processes, AES encryption processes, secure hash functions,
hash message authentication processes, and the like. All of this
may be accomplished in a hardware security module that can generate
and store keys and this may be itself held secure or even
tamperproof.
[0023] To clarify the options available for embodiments, it should
be understood that sequences and selections of functions can occur
as part of the system or to add entropy or the like. One function
can occur before another function, and even the order and selection
of the various functions can be varied. For example, after creating
an initial cryptographic key, embodiments can subsequently utilize
a random value generator cryptographic function to support creation
of a ultimate cryptographic key, and thus can include the random
cryptographic key generator (33). Even portions of data can be
selected for use and embodiments can achieve manipulating items
through a data stream location pointer function to support creation
of a cryptographic key and can include the data stream location
pointer function key generator (34).
[0024] In varying the inputs that can be utilized, it can be
understood that embodiments can achieve operating an encryption
function utilizing or somehow affected by the unsecure
individualized information together with perhaps some type of
provider information. There can even be more than one of each type
of information which can be provided or acted upon at different
times and even at differing locations so that the capability can be
directly or indirectly affected by the information somehow and thus
considered as operating with the information. For example, and as
discussed below, an encryption operation function processor (35)
can achieve cryptographically hashing or cryptographically
encrypting at least one derived cryptographic key together with
some type of signal origination point identification information
and can thus serve as an encryption hash function processor or as a
cryptographic encryption function processor. Configurations can
also support establishing at least one ephemeral cryptographic key
and the inclusion of at least one ephemeral cryptographic key
generator (36). This ephemeral cryptographic key can be used to
transmit the ultimate cryptographic key for operable use as
discussed below.
[0025] As part of a multi-step procedure, embodiments can include
secondary functions as well. These secondary functions, can act
after an initial function to further change or develop some type of
cryptographic key for ultimate use. For example, in addition to
utilizing some initial aspect of provider information, embodiments
that transmit an encrypted signal from a signal origination point
transmitter can utilize signal origination point identification
information as part of the process to establish at least one
derived cryptographic key. They can then secondarily
cryptographically operate on that at least one derived
cryptographic key and can even utilize signal origination point
identification information as at least part of discerning or
generating the completely unknown decryption key for use. From
this, it can be understood that systems can include a secondary
provider information cryptographic transformation processor (37),
or a capability that achieves a second or additional cryptographic
transformation on some item.
[0026] The keys themselves can of course have varying characters.
For instance, embodiments can achieve generating at least a 128-bit
decryption key at least partially from said unsecure individualized
information and can include an at least 128-bit decryption key
generator. Various criteria for certain of the types of keys or
other information used in some preferred embodiments are set out in
the tables in FIG. 5 A-F. As may be appreciated, these criteria may
be varied or even nonexistent in any embodiment.
[0027] As mentioned above, a variety of provider information can be
utilized. In one embodiment, the broadcast transmission capability
(1) may be manipulatively responsive to the unsecure individualized
information transmission perhaps together with some type of
provider information. It can negotiate a sign on and eventually
communicate using an appropriate decryption key or keys. As one
type of provider information possible, the cable signal origination
point may constantly broadcast a signal origination point
identification onto a cable network for the host or individual
reception capability (2).
[0028] This may be received upon first attachment or connection to
the cable network and perhaps upon every power up. For example, on
every power-up, individual reception capability (2) may receive the
broadcasted signal origination point identification message. If the
host receives a signal origination point identification that is the
same as that stored, then the host device may continue to operate
with no change (and may even continue to use the existing,
previously downloaded conditional access system). If the host
receives a signal origination point identification that is
different than the previously stored signal origination point
identification from the last cable network connection, then the
host or individual reception capability (2) may proceed with a
standard first-time or renewed sign-on process. To accomplish this,
the individual reception capability (2) may generate an on-screen
message instructing the customer to call their cable provider. This
message may also display an alpha numeric or other code to be read
or otherwise provided to the cable provider. This code may contain
unsecure identification(s) in an alphanumeric, perhaps even modulo
32 format. Upon calling the cable provider, the customer may be
requested to read the code and it can be entered at the broadcast
transmission capability (1). With this, the cable signal
origination point code may also be used together with a secure
system wide cryptographic key and the broadcasted signal
origination point identification to generate a derived key and
ultimately one or more ephemeral keys. This or these ephemeral keys
can be used to transmit or download a security element such as a
random key for enduring use. The ephemeral key or keys may be
unique only to a specific signal origination point, and may be only
used once to encrypt and deliver or download a random key.
[0029] As can be understood, by using secure system wide
cryptographic keys, and perhaps an unsecure signal origination
point identification, provider commonality information can be
integrated into the key generation process and into a cryptographic
operation. Thus, embodiments can be considered as having a
cryptographic provider commonality information integrator (48)
responsive to provider commonality information and also to
cryptographic unsecure individualized information. The unsecure
individualized information and secure provider commonality
information cryptographic integrator may be a routine within the
nascent decryption key generator (10). As may be appreciated, by
using signal origination point identification information as one
example, the system may achieve integrating the unsecure
individualized information and specific transmitter commonality
information into the cryptographic operation.
[0030] In the above example, two types of provider information are
included in the example: signal origination point identification
information, possibly a head end ID, and a secure system wide
cryptographic key, possibly considered a root key. In the example
shown, the head end identification information can be unsecure,
available information. This may be constantly transmitted, such as
on a side band or other communication. As one of ordinary skill in
the art would understand, the head end transmission may include an
authentication function. Unlike the unsecure signal origination
point identification information, embodiments can utilize a root
key that may be a secure key for system wide cryptography. This key
may even be used in the manufacture of the set-top box (7), the
manufacture of the set-top box chips, or by the broadcast provider
to establish a derived code that may be used by the set-top box
(7). One of the inputs that can be used in some type of
cryptographic function can be the secure system wide cryptographic
key or more precisely a secure system wide cryptographic key input
as one of the provider information inputs (23). Embodiments can
achieve establishing a cryptographic key using the unsecure
individualized information as one of the reception facility inputs
(24) and by using the secure system wide key input as two inputs to
a cryptographic encryption function. Thus, the cryptographic
encryption processor can be responsive to the unsecure
individualized information input and the secure system wide key
input.
[0031] As discussed in the more specific example shown, processors
can establish and comprise at least one derived cryptographic key.
This derived cryptographic key can be used to further generate an
ephemeral cryptographic key. The ephemeral cryptographic key can
then be used for securely communicating an item which may even be a
random cryptographic key perhaps for enduring use. The signal
origination point information transmitter (49) that may be
associated with the cable informational service signal origination
point facility (5) may provide information with which the at least
one ephemeral cryptographic key or generator is responsive.
Similarly, systems can have a generator that establishes at least
one ephemeral cryptographic key to perhaps be used to securely
transmit or download at least one random decryption key that is
created by at least one random decryption or cryptographic key
generator (33).
[0032] By securely sending at least one random decryption key
encrypted by at least one ephemeral cryptographic key, embodiments
can transiently use a key and thus leave it less vulnerable to
attack. A secure random decryption key transmitter (perhaps such as
the broadcast transmitter (3), may be cryptographically responsive
to at least one ephemeral cryptographic key and at least one random
decryption key generator, it can even be configured to immediately
send at least one random decryption key encrypted by at least one
ephemeral cryptographic key so there is only a one-time use of the
ephemeral key. This can be an example of having a transient
ephemeral cryptographic key based secure random decryption key
transmitter and activating decryption processing based upon at
least one random decryption key. Once transmitted, the random
decryption key can thereafter be continually and enduringly (at
least until a potential compromise event occurs as discussed below)
used in regular operation. Thus, embodiments can have an enduring
operation random decryption key based decryption processor as part
of the security processor (38) or the signal processor (39)
discussed below.
[0033] As mentioned above, there may be multiple inputs such as
multiple unsecure individualized items of information in one or
more transmissions. This can coordinate well with existing chip
structures for set-top boxes (7). In cable television systems, it
is not uncommon for the set-top box (7) to include two separate
capabilities as one or even separate chips: a security processor
(38) and a signal processor (39). In some applications, these may
be what are known or referred to as a secure microprocessor (SM) or
secure micro and a system on a chip (SOC). A security processor
(38) can be a chip or software functionality within a chip that
serves to handle the security functions, and basically opens access
to encrypted signals. It may handle the aspect of providing
decryption access functions so that the entire signal can be
processed and presented on a television or the like. The security
processor (38), can of course have its own identification codes and
thus there can be provided an individualized security process
capability identification information transmission perhaps as part
of the unsecure individualized information transmission (12).
Within the set-top box (7) there may also be a signal processor
(39) that can provide signal process capabilities. It, too, may
have individualized identification capabilities, and so the
individual reception capability (2) may be capable of providing an
individualized signal process capability identification information
transmission, also perhaps as part of the unsecure individualized
information transmission (12). With the understandings discussed
above, it can be understood that each of these unique items of
identification information can be used in the embodiments of the
present invention. As discussed above, once it is understood that
random cryptographic keys can be generated, it can be understood
that the broadcast transmission capability (1), may generate both a
security process capability random cryptographic key and a signal
process capability random cryptographic key. These keys may then be
used for enduring operation, and so embodiments may have an
enduring operation security process capability random cryptographic
key based decryption processor and an enduring operation signal
process capability random cryptographic key based decryption
processor.
[0034] Even within the signal process capability there may be a
division of functionalities, software, or even chip structure.
There may be a security partitioned signal transport capability
(40) perhaps such as assigned to transport the signal internal to
the set-top box (7). This may have partitioned or somehow set apart
functionally or physically within it a separate security
aspect--even if less than the more protective security process
capability. Similarly, the signal processor (39), may include a
video signal process capability (41) and a audio signal process
capability (42). These may process video and audio separately so
that the ultimate signal may be provided to the television or other
output device.
[0035] With this understanding, it can be appreciated how
additional inputs can be used to aid in generation of the ultimate
cryptographic key to be utilized. Each of these identification and
processing capabilities can present an opportunity for
cryptographic function input. Options may include: an
individualized security process capability identification
information input, an individualized signal process capability
identification information input, and both an individualized
security process capability identification information input and an
individualized signal process capability identification information
input. This, when combined with the various options for provider
input such as: a secure system wide cryptographic key information
input, a signal origination point identification information input,
and both a secure system wide cryptographic key information input
and a signal origination point identification information input can
expand the various hardware, software, and even process step
embodiments possible. Systems may achieve utilizing individualized
security process capability identification information, utilizing
individualized signal process capability identification
information, utilizing both individualized security process
capability identification information and individualized signal
process capability identification information, utilizing secure
system wide cryptographic key information, utilizing signal
origination point identification information, and utilizing both
secure system wide cryptographic key information and signal
origination point identification information, to name a few. From
this it can be understood how embodiments may utilize multiple
unsecure individualized information codes and may include a
multiple unsecure individualized information code transmission or
transmissions. Designs may provide for utilizing a first item of
unsecure individualized information in a cryptographic operation, a
first item of unsecure individualized information transmission,
providing first process capability individualized identification
information, and a first process capability individualized
identification information transmission. As explained in the
example above, this may be an aspect such as providing
individualized security process capability identification
information or the like. Similarly, designs may provide for
utilizing a second item of unsecure individualized information in a
cryptographic operation, providing second process capability
individualized identification information, a second process
capability individualized identification information transmission,
and a second item of unsecure individualized information
transmission. One example of this may be a step such as providing
individualized signal process capability identification
information.
[0036] In understanding the example, embodiments can include an
unsecure individualized information transmission (12), this
transmission may be set up as a simple telephone call to read the
broadcast provider certain codes. A seemingly single code could
actually be a concantonation of two codes, perhaps such as the
individualized security process capability identification
information and the individualized signal process capability
identification information. In this fashion, embodiments may
achieve utilizing multiple unsecure individualized information
codes (even if it appears to a subscriber as one) and a multiple
unsecure individualized information code transmission. This may
result in utilizing a first item of unsecure individualized
information in a cryptographic operation, and similarly, a first
item of unsecure individualized information transmission, and
utilizing a second item of unsecure individualized information in a
cryptographic operation, and similarly, a second item of unsecure
individualized information transmission. By combining a first
process capability individualized identification information and a
first process capability individualized identification information
transmission with providing second process capability
individualized identification information and a second process
capability individualized identification information transmission,
embodiments can expand security. These may include providing
individualized security process capability identification
information and an individualized security process capability
identification information transmission with providing
individualized signal process capability identification information
and an individualized signal process capability identification
information transmission. Each of these may even be unsecurely
transmitted and by unsecurely transmitting both individualized
security process capability identification information and
individualized signal process capability identification information
from the individual reception capability (2), there may be the step
of transmitting cryptographic entropy rate of zero identification
information and a cryptographic entropy rate of zero identification
information transmission. This may even be verbally conveyed to
achieve an unsecure verbal individualized information
transmission.
[0037] To achieve the step of unlocking the signal process
capability within the set-top box (7), embodiments may act to
provide or make operable a secure bootloader, that is, a device
that provides the operational basis to allow operation of the
set-top box (7) in the first place. Thus, embodiments may achieve
securely delivering a conditional access component such as an
unlock code or the like to the individual reception capability (2)
and there may be a conditional access component transmitter,
perhaps such as the cable informational service signal origination
point facility (5), the broadcast transmission capability (1) or
the like, to which the individual reception capability (2) may be
operationally responsive. Designs can achieve activating a secure
bootloader functionality at the individual reception capability (2)
and can include a secure bootloader (43). Again, each of these
aspects may exist independently or may be combined with the
multiple capabilities of the various capabilities.
[0038] As should be appreciated, various system architectures can
be used. The conceptual system elements shown may result in or
effect a key generation and personalization aspect. This may
integrate with a network operations center authorizing multiple
head ends. There may be an uplink entitlement control message (ECM)
generator and an entitlement management message (EMM) generator
that inject descrambling information to enable unlocking of one or
more subscribers. Authorization of the service content can be
handled by a cable head end controller or the like. This can handle
download of host code, a cryptographic key, and/or a conditional
access system. A subscriber authorization system may be included to
facilitate conditional access messages and the like. The host,
perhaps a set-top box (7), may contain the secure micro and system
on a chip capabilities each with key exchange capabilities. The
secure micro may contain a secure bootloader. The system on a chip
capability may allow key exchange and may further protect the
authorized content perhaps for storage or MPEG or other
compression.
[0039] Referring to FIG. 3, and can be understood how one or more
initial individualized items of information, shown as the two IDs,
the MID, that is, the secure micro identification, and the SID,
that is, the system-on-a-chip identification can be input with the
root key to be acted upon in some cryptographic operation and thus
yield a derived key. This (or these) derived key(s) can then be
combined in another cryptographic operation with the signal
origination point identification to yield an ephemeral key. This
ephemeral key can then be used, and is operable within the
individual reception capability (2), perhaps for the purpose of
transmitting a truly random key or keys. This random key or keys
can then be used in an enduring fashion to conduct operations and
receive and decrypt the paid-for subscription signal.
[0040] FIG. 4 shows similar processes in a different graphic with
additional details. It shows how within the hardware security
module in the signal origination point or in the broadcast
transmission capability (1), an input providing the signal
origination point identification and perhaps some type of key
exchange mode or even root key can be used to derive both a
security process derived key and a signal process derived key. The
security process derived key (MDK), and security process derived
key (SDK) can be used and further combined with the signal
origination point identification information in a hashing (shown)
or cryptographic encryption function to yield two ephemeral keys,
namely, a security process ephemeral key (M.times.K) and a signal
process ephemeral key (S.times.K). These two ephemeral keys can be
used to transmit two random keys, perhaps the security process
random key (MRK) and the signal process random key (SRK). Further,
these two transmissions can then be provided to both the secure
micro, or security process capability within the individual
reception capability (2), and to the SOC, or signal process
capability within the individual reception capability (2). Since
these two capabilities have a functionality to use both the derived
key or keys (previously functionalized but not known or know-able
within the individual reception capability) and the signal
origination point identification to decrypt, a decryption using the
ephemeral key can be achieved and the two random keys can be
received for enduring operation.
[0041] Thus, in at least one embodiment, transmitting the encrypted
signal from a signal origination point transmitter, or a broadcast
transmission capability (1), in a manner that utilized provider
information such as a signal origination point identification
information input, can be one way embodiments can achieve the
desired capability with a completely unknown decryption key. By
cryptographically operating on the unsecure individualized
information and perhaps on provider information as at least part of
discerning the completely unknown decryption key, systems can be
considered as having an individualized information cryptographic
transformation processor and even a provider information
cryptographic transformation processor.
[0042] As mentioned above, embodiments can provide for multiple
options for provider information or for individualized information
such as from the individual reception capability. This can not only
include secure system wide cryptographic keys, signal origination
point identifications, and derived keys, but even multiples for
each of these. For instance, with respect to the secure system wide
cryptographic keys, or perhaps the root keys, a capability may be
included to select one of many possible root keys and to accomplish
the step of choosing a particular secure system wide cryptographic
key from among a plurality of secure system wide cryptographic keys
and operating with a chosen secure system wide cryptographic
key.
[0043] The broadcast transmission capability (1) can also generate
a newly selected new cipher key for use between the individual
reception capability (1) and the broadcast facility in a nascent
decryption key re-generator. Generally, however, systems can
achieve the step of selecting a secure system wide cryptographic
key from among a plurality of secure system wide cryptographic keys
and can have a secure system wide cryptographic key multiple option
selector. As one, non limiting example, this can be achieved by
including a segmented secure system wide cryptographic key and
having the system select an item of provider information from
within the segmented secure item of provider information. As but
one way to provide a secure system wide cryptographic key multiple
option selector (45), designs can act to point to a segment of the
segmented secure system wide cryptographic key, can accomplish
pointing to a segment of information, and can include a segmented
interdata pointer (46) that can indicate a segment of secure
cryptographic code or information to be utilized to accomplish
selecting a segment of information as a secure system wide
cryptographic key.
[0044] Similar techniques can be applied with respect to the
individual reception capability cryptographic keys such as the
derived keys. A capability may be included to select one of many
possible derived keys and to accomplish the step of choosing a
particular derived key from among a plurality of derived
cryptographic keys and operating with a chosen derived
cryptographic key. This capability may similarly operate in a
manner that includes a derived cryptographic key. Systems can use a
segmented information pointing function for these keys, can
accomplish pointing to a segment of information for a derived key,
can accomplish choosing a particular derived cryptographic or other
key from among a plurality of such keys, or can otherwise achieve
either the segmented or other selection operations at any level and
in a great variety of manners.
[0045] Whether included on the broadcast transmission capability
side or on the individual reception capability side, or both, the
aspect of having multiple keys or codes available can be beneficial
if or when a potential compromise event occurred, perhaps even
something as simple as merely moving or even unplugging the set-top
box (7). Activities can be conducted to assess if there is an
enhanced risk to the cryptographic keys to be enduringly used. They
can assess continued operability based upon either of the random
cryptographic keys provided and can include a potential key
compromise assessor (43). This can be achieved perhaps simply by
discerning the existence of a location change for the individual
reception capability (2). Thus, systems can include a location
change assessor for the individual reception capability (2). Any
location change can be considered as a potential compromise event
and this can be established as a triggered key regeneration
capability within the broadcast facility or otherwise. By comparing
the signal origination point identification previously received and
relied upon with that continuously broadcasted, systems can check
for a change in signal origination point identification information
and can include a signal origination point identification
information change assessor. If such is detected, the system can
achieve re-generating a completely unknown decryption key at least
partially from the unsecure individualized information. And this
time it can be achieved with the new signal origination point
identification and its new resulting derived and other keys. In
this manner, embodiments can include a nascent decryption key
re-generator (10) and other capability that checks for a change in
signal origination point identification information. The individual
reception capability (2) can have a signal origination point
identification information change comparator (44) that can cause
re-generation of a new completely unknown decryption key at least
partially from the unsecure individualized information. The set-top
box (7) can act to re-issue the unsecure individualized information
(or even different unsecure individualized information) from the
individual reception capability (2) and a resultant unsecure
individualized information re-issue command can prompt the entire
re-generation process.
[0046] With regard to the selection among multiple root key
options, it should be understood that multiple options can be
provided within the individual reception capability (2) as well.
The individual reception capability (2) can be responsive to a
number of derived key capabilities. These can be achieved by
selecting a derived cryptographic key from among a plurality of
derived cryptographic keys for the individual reception capability
(2) and by including a derived cryptographic key multiple option
selector (47). This can occur at the broadcast facility as well,
and there may be a broadcast facility based multiple option derived
cryptographic key selector. This can be operable such as when a
derived key might have been compromised. By merely selecting one of
a plurality of derived keys or other items of information for use
in the process, the individual reception capability (2) may simply
respond to one of many keys being used.
[0047] As can be easily understood from the foregoing, the basic
concepts of the present invention may be embodied in a variety of
ways. It involves both decryption techniques as well as devices to
accomplish the appropriate decryption. In this application, the
various techniques are disclosed as part of the results shown to be
achieved by the various devices described and as steps which are
inherent to utilization. They are simply the natural result of
utilizing the devices as intended and described. In addition, while
some devices are disclosed, it should be understood that these not
only accomplish certain methods but also can be varied in a number
of ways. Importantly, as to all of the foregoing, all of these
facets should be understood to be encompassed by this
disclosure.
[0048] The discussion included in this application is intended to
serve as a basic description. The reader should be aware that the
specific discussion may not explicitly describe all embodiments
possible; many alternatives are implicit. It also may not fully
explain the generic nature of the invention and may not explicitly
show how each feature or element can actually be representative of
a broader function or of a great variety of alternative or
equivalent elements. Again, these are implicitly included in this
disclosure. It should also be understood that a variety of changes
may be made without departing from the essence of the invention.
Such changes are also implicitly included in the description. They
still fall within the scope of this invention. A broad disclosure
encompassing both the explicit embodiment(s) shown, the great
variety of implicit alternative embodiments, and the broad methods
or processes and the like are encompassed by this disclosure and
may be relied upon when drafting the claims for any subsequent
patent application. With this understanding, the reader should be
aware that this disclosure is to be understood to support any
subsequently filed patent application that may seek examination of
as broad a base of claims as deemed within the applicant's right
and may be designed to yield a patent covering numerous aspects of
the invention both independently and as an overall system.
[0049] Further, each of the various elements of the invention and
claims may also be achieved in a variety of manners. Additionally,
when used or implied, an element is to be understood as
encompassing individual as well as plural structures that may or
may not be physically connected. This disclosure should be
understood to encompass each such variation, be it a variation of
an embodiment of any apparatus embodiment, a method or process
embodiment, or even merely a variation of any element of these.
Particularly, it should be understood that as the disclosure
relates to elements of the invention, the words for each element
may be expressed by equivalent apparatus terms or method
terms--even if only the function or result is the same. Such
equivalent, broader, or even more generic terms should be
considered to be encompassed in the description of each element or
action. Such terms can be substituted where desired to make
explicit the implicitly broad coverage to which this invention is
entitled. As but one example, it should be understood that all
actions may be expressed as a means for taking that action or as an
element which causes that action. Similarly, each physical element
disclosed should be understood to encompass a disclosure of the
action which that physical element facilitates. Regarding this last
aspect, as but one example, the disclosure of a "receiver" should
be understood to encompass disclosure of the act of
"receiving"--whether explicitly discussed or not--and, conversely,
were there effectively disclosure of the act of "receiving", such a
disclosure should be understood to encompass disclosure of a
"receiver" and even a "means for receiving" Such changes and
alternative terms are to be understood to be explicitly included in
the description.
[0050] Any patents, publications, or other references mentioned in
this application for patent are hereby incorporated by reference.
In addition, as to each term used it should be understood that
unless its utilization in this application is inconsistent with a
broadly supporting interpretation, common dictionary definitions
should be understood as incorporated for each term and all
definitions, alternative terms, and synonyms such as contained in
the Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, second edition
are hereby incorporated by reference. Finally, all references
listed in the list of References To Be Incorporated By Reference or
other information statement filed with or included in the
application are hereby appended and hereby incorporated by
reference, however, as to each of the above, to the extent that
such information or statements incorporated by reference might be
considered inconsistent with the patenting of this/these
invention(s) such statements are expressly not to be considered as
made by the applicant(s).
[0051] Thus, the applicant(s) should be understood to have support
to claim and make a statement of invention to at least: i) each of
the cryptographic devices as herein disclosed and described, ii)
the related methods disclosed and described, iii) similar,
equivalent, and even implicit variations of each of these devices
and methods, iv) those alternative designs which accomplish each of
the functions shown as are disclosed and described, v) those
alternative designs and methods which accomplish each of the
functions shown as are implicit to accomplish that which is
disclosed and described, vi) each feature, component, and step
shown as separate and independent inventions, vii) the applications
enhanced by the various systems or components disclosed, viii) the
resulting products produced by such systems or components, ix) each
system, method, and element shown or described as now applied to
any specific field or devices mentioned, x) methods and apparatuses
substantially as described hereinbefore and with reference to any
of the accompanying examples, xi) the various combinations and
permutations of each of the elements disclosed, xii) each
potentially dependent claim or concept as a dependency on each and
every one of the independent claims or concepts presented, and
xiii) all inventions described herein. In addition and as to
computer aspects and each aspect amenable to programming or other
electronic automation, the applicant(s) should be understood to
have support to claim and make a statement of invention to at
least: xvi) processes performed with the aid of or on a computer as
described throughout the above discussion, xv) a programmable
apparatus as described throughout the above discussion, xvi) a
computer readable memory encoded with data to direct a computer
comprising means or elements which function as described throughout
the above discussion, xvii) a computer configured as herein
disclosed and described, xviii) individual or combined subroutines
and programs as herein disclosed and described, xix) the related
methods disclosed and described, xx) similar, equivalent, and even
implicit variations of each of these systems and methods, xxi)
those alternative designs which accomplish each of the functions
shown as are disclosed and described, xxii) those alternative
designs and methods which accomplish each of the functions shown as
are implicit to accomplish that which is disclosed and described,
xxiii) each feature, component, and step shown as separate and
independent inventions, and xxiv) the various combinations and
permutations of each of the above.
[0052] With regard to claims whether now or later presented for
examination, it should be understood that for practical reasons and
so as to avoid great expansion of the examination burden, the
applicant may at any time present only initial claims or perhaps
only initial claims with only initial dependencies. The office and
any third persons interested in potential scope of this or
subsequent applications should understand that broader claims may
be presented at a later date in this case, in a case claiming the
benefit of this case, or in any continuation in spite of any
preliminary amendments, other amendments, claim language, or
arguments presented, thus throughout the pendency of any case there
is no intention to disclaim or surrender any potential subject
matter. It should be understood that if or when broader claims are
presented, such may require that any relevant prior art that may
have been considered at any prior time may need to be re-visited
since it is possible that to the extent any amendments, claim
language, or arguments presented in this or any subsequent
application are considered as made to avoid such prior art, such
reasons may be eliminated by later presented claims or the like.
Both the examiner and any person otherwise interested in existing
or later potential coverage, or considering if there has at any
time been any possibility of an indication of disclaimer or
surrender of potential coverage, should be aware that no such
surrender or disclaimer is ever intended or ever exists in this or
any subsequent application. Limitations such as arose in Hakim v.
Cannon Avent Group, PLC, 479 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir 2007), or the like
are expressly not intended in this or any subsequent related
matter. In addition, support should be understood to exist to the
degree required under new matter laws--including but not limited to
European Patent Convention Article 123(2) and United States Patent
Law 35 USC 132 or other such laws--to permit the addition of any of
the various dependencies or other elements presented under one
independent claim or concept as dependencies or elements under any
other independent claim or concept. In drafting any claims at any
time whether in this application or in any subsequent application,
it should also be understood that the applicant has intended to
capture as full and broad a scope of coverage as legally available.
To the extent that insubstantial substitutes are made, to the
extent that the applicant did not in fact draft any claim so as to
literally encompass any particular embodiment, and to the extent
otherwise applicable, the applicant should not be understood to
have in any way intended to or actually relinquished such coverage
as the applicant simply may not have been able to anticipate all
eventualities; one skilled in the art, should not be reasonably
expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed such alternative embodiments.
[0053] Further, if or when used, the use of the transitional phrase
"comprising" is used to maintain the "open-end" claims herein,
according to traditional claim interpretation. Thus, unless the
context requires otherwise, it should be understood that the term
"comprise" or variations such as "comprises" or "comprising", are
intended to imply the inclusion of a stated element or step or
group of elements or steps but not the exclusion of any other
element or step or group of elements or steps. Such terms should be
interpreted in their most expansive form so as to afford the
applicant the broadest coverage legally permissible. The use of the
phrase, "or any other claim" is used as permitted in some countries
(such as Europe) to provide support for any claim to be dependent
on any other claim, such as another dependent claim, another
independent claim, a previously listed claim, a subsequently listed
claim, and the like. As one clarifying example, if a claim were
dependent "on claim 20 or any other claim" or the like, it could be
re-drafted as dependent on claim 1, claim 15, or even claim 715 (if
such were to exist) if desired and still fall with the disclosure.
It should be understood that this phrase also provides support for
any combination of elements in the claims and even incorporates any
desired proper antecedent basis for certain claim combinations such
as with combinations of method, apparatus, process, and the like
claims.
[0054] Finally, any claims set forth at any time are hereby
incorporated by reference as part of this description of the
invention, and the applicant expressly reserves the right to use
all of or a portion of such incorporated content of such claims as
additional description to support any of or all of the claims or
any element or component thereof, and the applicant further
expressly reserves the right to move any portion of or all of the
incorporated content of such claims or any element or component
thereof from the description into the claims or vice-versa as
necessary to define the matter for which protection is sought by
this application or by any subsequent continuation, division, or
continuation-in-part application thereof, or to obtain any benefit
of, reduction in fees pursuant to, or to comply with the patent
laws, rules, or regulations of any country or treaty, and such
content incorporated by reference shall survive during the entire
pendency of this application including any subsequent continuation,
division, or continuation-in-part application thereof or any
reissue or extension thereon.
* * * * *