U.S. patent application number 13/619478 was filed with the patent office on 2013-01-10 for policy-based auditing of identity credential disclosure by a secure token service.
This patent application is currently assigned to APPLE INC.. Invention is credited to Duane F. Buss, Thomas E. Doman, Patrick R. Felsted, Andrew A. Hodgkinson, James G. Sermersheim.
Application Number | 20130014207 13/619478 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 39764024 |
Filed Date | 2013-01-10 |
United States Patent
Application |
20130014207 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Hodgkinson; Andrew A. ; et
al. |
January 10, 2013 |
POLICY-BASED AUDITING OF IDENTITY CREDENTIAL DISCLOSURE BY A SECURE
TOKEN SERVICE
Abstract
A user defines an audit policy. The audit policy identifies one
or more triggers that, when related information is included in a
security token, trigger the performance of the audit. The audit can
include notifying the user in some manner that the trigger
occurred. The audit can require in-line confirmation of the audit,
so that the security token is not transmitted until the user
confirms the audit.
Inventors: |
Hodgkinson; Andrew A.;
(Pleasant Grove, UT) ; Buss; Duane F.; (West
Mountain, UT) ; Doman; Thomas E.; (Pleasant Grove,
UT) ; Felsted; Patrick R.; (Cedar Hills, UT) ;
Sermersheim; James G.; (Woodland Hills, UT) |
Assignee: |
APPLE INC.
Cupertino
CA
|
Family ID: |
39764024 |
Appl. No.: |
13/619478 |
Filed: |
September 14, 2012 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
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11843638 |
Aug 22, 2007 |
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13619478 |
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60895312 |
Mar 16, 2007 |
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60895316 |
Mar 16, 2007 |
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60895325 |
Mar 16, 2007 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
726/1 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L 63/0815 20130101;
G06F 21/41 20130101; H04L 63/0807 20130101; G06Q 20/40 20130101;
G06Q 20/382 20130101; H04L 63/20 20130101; G06Q 20/10 20130101;
G06Q 20/367 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
726/1 |
International
Class: |
G06F 21/00 20060101
G06F021/00 |
Claims
1. An apparatus, comprising: a machine operative as an identity
provider; a receiver to receive a request for a security token; a
transmitter to transmit said security token responsive to said
request; at least one audit policy including a trigger based on
said security token and an audit action; and an audit operator
operative to perform said audit action if said trigger occurs.
Description
RELATED APPLICATION DATA
[0001] This patent application is a continuation of co-pending U.S.
patent application Ser. No. 11/843,638, titled "POLICY-BASED
AUDITING OF IDENTITY CREDENTIAL DISCLOSURE BY A SECURE TOKEN
SERVICE", filed Aug. 22, 2007, which claims the benefit of U.S.
Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/895,312, filed Mar. 16,
2007, of U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/895,316,
filed Mar. 16, 2007, and of U.S. Provisional Patent Application
Ser. No. 60/895,325, filed Mar. 16, 2007, all of which are hereby
incorporated by reference for all purposes.
[0002] This patent application is related to U.S. patent
application Ser. No. 11/843,572 filed Aug. 22, 2007, now U.S. Pat.
No. 8,073,783, issued Dec. 6, 2011, and to U.S. patent application
Ser. No. 11/843,640, filed Aug. 22, 2007, now U.S. Pat. No.
8,074,257, issued Dec. 6, 2011, both of which claim the benefit of
U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/895,325, filed Mar.
16, 2007, of U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No.
60/895,312, filed Mar. 16, 2007, and of U.S. Provisional Patent
Application Ser. No. 60/895,316, filed Mar. 16, 2007, all of which
are all hereby incorporated by reference for all purposes.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
[0003] This invention pertains to performing on-line transactions,
and more particularly to user-controlled audits of on-line
transactions.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
[0004] When a user interacts with sites on the Internet (hereafter
referred to as "service providers" or "relying parties"), the
service provider often expects to know something about the user
that is requesting the services of the provider. The typical
approach for a service provider is to require the user to log into
or authenticate to the service provider's computer system. But this
approach, while satisfactory for the service provider, is less than
ideal to the user. First, the user must remember a username and
password for each service provider who expects such information.
Given that different computer systems impose different
requirements, and the possibility that another user might have
chosen the same username, the user might be unable to use the same
username/password combination on each such computer system. (There
is also the related problem that if the user uses the same
username/password combination on multiple computer systems, someone
who hacks one such computer system would be able to access other
such computer systems.) Second, the user has no control over how
the service provider uses the information it stores. If the service
provider uses the stored information in a way the user does not
want, the user has relatively little ability to prevent such abuse,
or recourse after the fact.
[0005] To address this problem, new systems have been developed
that allow the user a measure of control over the information
stored about the user. Windows CardSpace.TM. (sometimes called
CardSpace) is a Microsoft implementation of an identity meta-system
that offers a solution to this problem. (Microsoft, Windows, and
CardSpace are either registered trademarks or trademarks of
Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries.)
A user can store identity information with an identity provider the
user trusts. When a service provider wants some information about
the user, the user can control the release of information stored
with the identity provider to the service provider. The user can
then use the offered services that required the identity
information.
[0006] One problem with this model is that the service provider is
only concerned with making sure the service provider is not
defrauded by someone posing as the user. The service provider is
concerned with protecting their legal liability, not in protecting
the user's information. While this concern partially parallels a
concern of the user, the concerns do not overlap.
[0007] Another problem can occur if a third party is able to
convince the identity provider to release the user's information
(for example, by sufficiently "authenticating" to the identity
provider as the user): the user has no way to know this release has
occurred. Such a subversion of information, commonly termed
"identity theft" today, is a major concern to users whose
identities are stolen. Users whose identities are stolen face a
major hassle in clearing the record of the charges made improperly
in their names: this hassle can sometimes takes years to resolve
and can have major financial implications for the users in the long
term. For example, charges that are not paid are often reported to
credit bureaus and have a negative impact on the users' credit
ratings. A user who was about to take out a mortgage to purchase a
house might find themselves forced to pay a higher interest rate or
be considered a higher risk loan borrower. This kind of impact to
users can be even more onerous than the time it takes to fix the
records at the credit bureaus.
[0008] Banks also suffer as a consequence of identity theft. If a
bank makes a payment ostensibly on behalf of a user but that was
actually charged by someone who had stolen the user's identity, the
bank will probably not be able to recover the lost funds. For
example, credit card agreements often agree to limit customer
liability for fraudulent charges to $50 if the customer reports the
fraudulent charge quickly enough. As both the user and the merchant
were relying on the bank to properly authenticate the user before
issuing payment, the bank usually ends up bearing the loss for the
fraud.
[0009] Yet another problem with this model is that the use of such
systems requires that the information card(s) be stored on the
local machine. If the user is using a machine that is not generally
available to the public (for example, a work computer or a computer
in the user's home), this limitation might not be a great concern.
But if a user is attempting to perform the transaction from a
public computer, such as a computer in a public library, the user
might not want to install such information cards on the public
computer. First, it might not be possible to remove the information
cards once installed. Second, the user might forget to uninstall
the information cards, leaving them on the computer where someone
else might be able to access and use them.
[0010] A need remains for a way to addresses these and other
problems associated with the prior art.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0011] In an embodiment of the invention, a user specifies a
user-centric audit policy that can be enforced by an identity
provider. The user specifies the event (or events) that trigger an
audit and defines the actions that occur to complete the audit
policy. The identity provider complies with the terms and
conditions of the trigger and action. When the trigger occurs, the
audit action is performed, informing the user aware of the
occurrence of the trigger.
[0012] The foregoing and other features, objects, and advantages of
the invention will become more readily apparent from the following
detailed description, which proceeds with reference to the
accompanying drawings.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0013] FIG. 1 shows a sequence of communications between a client,
a relying party, and an identity provider.
[0014] FIG. 2 shows a system to perform a business transaction
without releasing sensitive information to the relying party,
according to an embodiment of the invention.
[0015] FIG. 3 shows the sequence of communications of FIG. 1
modified to support performing the business transaction without
releasing sensitive information for the relying party.
[0016] FIG. 4 shows an information card including sensitive
information used in performing a transaction with the system of
FIG. 2.
[0017] FIG. 5 shows transaction elements used in performing the
transaction in the system of FIG. 2.
[0018] FIG. 6 shows a flowchart of a procedure to perform a
transaction without disclosing sensitive information in the
computer system of FIG. 2.
[0019] FIG. 7 shows details of the identity provider of FIG. 1
equipped to provide an audit service, according to an embodiment of
the invention.
[0020] FIG. 8 shows examples of the types of audit actions that can
be performed by the audit service of FIG. 7.
[0021] FIG. 9 shows how audit actions can be transmitted to the
user in the audit service of FIG. 7.
[0022] FIGS. 10A-10B show details of screens enabling a user to
configure audit policies in the audit service of FIG. 7.
[0023] FIG. 11 shows details of transaction elements used in
performing the transaction in the audit service of FIG. 7.
[0024] FIG. 12 shows details of the memory of the identity provider
of FIG. 7, storing a data structure to manage an audit service.
[0025] FIG. 13 shows a flowchart of how the audit policy is defined
in the identity provider of FIG. 7.
[0026] FIGS. 14A-14B show a flowchart of a procedure to perform an
audit in the identity provider of FIG. 7.
[0027] FIG. 15 shows additional details about the system of FIG.
2.
[0028] FIG. 16 shows different locations from which the pluggable
card providers of FIG. 15 can be installed in the system of FIG.
2.
[0029] FIG. 17 shows the system of FIG. 2 supporting a user
authenticating a pluggable card store.
[0030] FIGS. 18A-18C show a flowchart of a procedure for processing
a newly connected pluggable card store on the machine of FIG.
2.
[0031] FIGS. 19A-19C show a flowchart of a procedure for using an
information card to perform a transaction using the machine of FIG.
2.
[0032] FIG. 20 shows a flowchart of a procedure for processing a
newly disconnected pluggable card store on the machine of FIG.
2.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT
[0033] Before explaining the invention, it is important to
understand the context of the invention. FIG. 1 shows a sequence of
communications between a client, a relying party, and an identity
provider. For simplicity, each party (the client, the relying
party, and the identity provider) may be referred to by their
machines. Actions attributed to each party are taken by that
party's machine, except where the context indicates the actions are
taken by the actual party.
[0034] In FIG. 1, computer system 105, the client, is shown as
including computer 110, monitor 115, keyboard 120, and mouse 125. A
person skilled in the art will recognize that other components can
be included with computer system 105: for example, other
input/output devices, such as a printer. In addition, FIG. 1 does
not show some of the conventional internal components of computer
system 105; for example, a central processing unit, memory,
storage, etc. Although not shown in FIG. 1, a person skilled in the
art will recognize that computer system 105 can interact with other
computer systems, such as relying party 130 and identity provider
135, either directly or over a network (not shown) of any type.
Finally, although FIG. 1 shows computer system 105 as a
conventional desktop computer, a person skilled in the art will
recognize that computer system 105 can be any type of machine or
computing device capable of providing the services attributed
herein to computer system 105, including, for example, a laptop
computer, a personal digital assistant (PDA), or a cellular
telephone.
[0035] Relying party 130 is a machine managed by a party that
relies in some way on the identity of the user of computer system
105. The operator of relying party 130 can be any type of relying
party. For example, the operator of relying party 130 can be a
merchant running a business on a website. Or, the operator of
relying party 130 can be an entity that offers assistance on some
matter to registered parties. Relying party 130 is so named because
it relies on establishing some identifying information about the
user.
[0036] Identity provider 135, on the other hand, is managed by a
party responsible for providing identity information (or other such
information) about the user for consumption by the relying party.
Depending on the type of information identity provider 135 stores
for a user, a single user might store identifying information with
a number of different identity providers 135, any of which might be
able to satisfy the request of the relying party. For example,
identity provider 135 might be a governmental agency, responsible
for storing information generated by the government, such as a
driver's license number or a social security number. Or, identity
provider 135 might be a third party that is in the business of
managing identity information on behalf of users.
[0037] The conventional methodology of releasing identity
information can be found in a number of sources. One such source is
Microsoft Corporation, which has published a document entitled
Introducing Windows CardSpace, which can be found on the World Wide
Web and is hereby incorporated by reference. To summarize the
operation of Windows CardSpace, when a user wants to access some
data from relying party 130, computer system 105 requests the
security policy of relying party 130, as shown in communication
140, which is returned in communication 145 as security policy 150.
Security policy 150 is a summary of the information relying party
130 needs, how the information should be formatted, and so on.
[0038] Once computer system 105 has security policy 150, computer
system 105 can identify which information cards will satisfy
security policy 150. Different security policies might result in
different information cards being usable. For example, if relying
party 130 simply needs a username and password combination, the
information cards that will satisfy this security policy will be
different from the information cards that satisfy a security policy
requesting the user's full name, mailing address, and social
security number. The user can then select an information card that
satisfies security policy 150.
[0039] Once the user has selected an acceptable information card,
computer system 105 uses the selected information card to transmit
a request for a security token from identity provider 135, as shown
in communication 155. This request can identify the data to be
included in the security token, the credential that identifies the
user, and other data the identity provider needs to generate the
security token. Identity provider 135 returns security token 160,
as shown in communication 165. Security token 160 includes a number
of claims, or pieces of information, that include the data the user
wants to release to the relying party. Security token 160 is
usually encrypted in some manner, and perhaps signed and/or
time-stamped by identity provider 135, so that relying party 130
can be certain that the security token originated with identity
provider 135 (as opposed to being spoofed by someone intent on
defrauding relying party 130). Computer system 105 then forwards
security token 160 to relying party 130, as shown in communication
170.
[0040] In addition, the selected information card can be a
self-issued information card: that is, an information card issued
not by an identity provider, but by computer system 105 itself. In
that case, identity provider 135 effectively becomes part of
computer system 105.
[0041] In this model, a person skilled in the art will recognize
that because all information flows through computer system 105, the
user has a measure of control over the release of the user's
identity information. Relying party 130 only receives the
information the user wants relying party 130 to have, and does not
store that information on behalf of the user (although it would be
possible for relying party 130 to store the information in security
token 160: there is no effective way to prevent such an act).
[0042] The problem with this model is, as noted above, that the
party managing relying party 130 is only concerned with protecting
itself, and not with protecting the identity information of the
user. For example, an on-line merchant might require the user to
log in to the system before the user can perform an on-line
purchase: once the user is logged in, then either the credit card
number provided to complete the transaction will be valid, or the
party that perpetrated the fraud is identified. But the on-line
merchant does not worry about protecting the credit card
information: if the user's identity is known, the user can be
responsible for the security of the credit card information.
[0043] In addition, in an on-line transaction, there is some
information that does not flow through computer system 105.
Specifically, the information that flows between relying party 130
and the party that processes the transaction (e.g., the credit card
processor) does not flow through computer system 105. Because this
information is not considered identity information by relying party
130, such information is not processed using the same rules as the
identity information.
[0044] Further, this model does not provide the user with any way
to audit the use of his or her information. If a fraud is
perpetrated, the user only finds out about the fraud in the
standard ways: when someone comes demanding payment for a
transaction the user did not approve (or, if the user is somewhat
savvy, when the user checks his or her on-line transaction
records).
[0045] Yet another problem with this model is that there are some
types of information cards that can be used without the person
using the information card having to provide any further
credentials. If such a card is available to a third party, that
third party might be able to use the information card when the
third party should not be permitted to do so. Further, as noted
above, the information card(s) used by the user need to be stored
on computer system 105. If computer system 105 is a publicly
available computer system, then the user might be reluctant to
store information card(s) on computer system 105, because the user
might be unable to remove the information card(s) or forget to do
so. That the data represented by the information cards might be
protected by the requirement of a credential from the user might
not be enough to satisfy the security needs of the user.
[0046] Now that the problems--finding a way to protect information
that is important to the user but not considered identity
information by the relying party, providing the user with audit
capability for his or her information, and not having to store the
information cards on a computer system--are understood, solutions
to the problem can be explained. FIG. 2 shows a system to perform a
business transaction without releasing sensitive information to the
relying party, to perform a transaction which can be audited by an
identity provider, and to perform a transaction without storing
information card information on computer system 105, according to
embodiments of the invention. In FIG. 2, computer system 105
includes card selector 205, receiver 210, and transmitter 215. Card
selector 205 is responsible for enabling a user to select
information card 220 that satisfies the security policy. Receiver
210 is responsible for receiving data transmitted to computer
system 105, and transmitter 215 is responsible for transmitting
information from computer system 105. These components are the same
as those found in computer system 105 as shown in FIG. 1. But
receiver 210 and transmitter 215 are also responsible for
communicating with a transaction processor, which is different from
computer system 105 in FIG. 1.
[0047] Protecting Information Important to the User that is not
Identity Information
[0048] FIG. 3 shows the sequence of communications of FIG. 1
modified to support performing the business transaction without
releasing sensitive information for the relying party. In FIG. 3,
communication 140 is the same as shown in FIG. 1: computer system
105 requests security policy 150 from relying party 130. In
communication 145, relying party 130 provides security policy 150,
which includes transaction elements 305. As discussed elsewhere,
transaction elements 305 can include any elements of the
transaction that would normally be provided by relying party 130.
Examples of transaction elements 305 can include the overall cost
of the transaction to the user and an identifier of relying party
130 (so that relying party 130 can be properly credited for the
transaction, perhaps by deposit of the cost into a bank account of
relying party 130).
[0049] Computer system 105 requests a security token from identity
provider 135 in communication 155. In response, identity provider
135 sends security token 160 back to computer system 105 in
communication 165. In generating security token 160, identity
provider 135 processes the business transaction between the user
and relying party 130. Continuing with the example of the user
purchasing some items from relying party 130, identity provider 135
can be a bank or other financial transaction processor, such as a
credit card company. As a financial transaction processor, identity
provider 135 can deduct an account of the user by the cost of the
transaction, and credit an account of relying party 130 by that
amount. Identity provider 135 can then generate a transaction
receipt, such as receipt 310, which can be included in security
token 160. In fact, if all relying party 130 requests is a
transaction receipt, then security token 160 might be nothing more
than receipt 310. Finally, computer system 105 can send security
token 160 to relying party 130 in communication 170.
[0050] Often, transaction elements 305 provided by relying party
130 will not be enough to enable identity provider 135 to process
the transaction. For example, relying party 130 is unlikely to know
any accounts of the user which could be used in processing the
transaction by identity provider 135. But relying party 130 does
not need to know which account of the user to use: relying party
130 only needs the transaction receipt. Thus, computer system 105,
recognizing that a financial transaction is to occur, can present
to the user a list of information cards that identify accounts the
user might use in completing the financial transaction. The user
can then select the appropriate information card to be used; the
account information identified by this information card can provide
enough information to identity provider 135 to permit identity
provider 135 to process the transaction.
[0051] It might happen that relying party 130, in providing
security policy 150, asks for more than just a transaction receipt.
For example, relying party 130 might want to know something about
the user. Recall that an older way to perform a transaction
involves the user logging in to the web site of the service
provider, then inputting to the web site enough information to
permit the transaction to be completed (such as credit card
information). Thus, relying party 130 in FIG. 3 might want to know
which user performed the transaction: for example, to be able to
ship purchased items to the user. This possibility introduces new
wrinkles into the operation of the claimed invention.
[0052] In one embodiment, the user can have an information card
that can satisfy the needs of all parties: the information card
identifies enough information to permit identity provider 135 to
process the transaction and generate receipt 310, and to provide
the other information relying party 130 has requested. This is a
straightforward solution to providing all the information relying
party 130 wants. The user can also, if he or she is not comfortable
providing all the information relying party 130 wants, choose to
not do business with relying party 130, instead opting for a
competitor of relying party 130 that does not request as much
information.
[0053] In another embodiment, the user might not have a single
information card that can be used to satisfy all parties' needs.
For example, the user might have one information card that includes
the financial information identity provider 135 needs to process
the transaction, and another identity card that can satisfy the
other requests of relying party 130. If a single identity provider
135 is capable of performing all the described processes, then the
user can create a single information card that can be used both to
process the transaction (to generate receipt 310) and to identify
the other information to be provided to relying party 130.
[0054] If the user does not have an information card associated
with a single identity provider 135 is not capable of providing all
of the information requested by relying party 130 in security
policy 150, then the solution is more difficult. For example, the
user's bank might be willing to store banking information for the
user, thus making the bank an identity provider capable of
processing a financial transaction. But the user's bank might not
want to store other information about the user. To address this
problem, in one embodiment the user can attempt to locate a single
identity provider 135 that can satisfy all of the requests of
relying party 130. If the user can find a single identity provider
that can provide all of the information relying party 130 wants,
then the user can establish an identity card with that identity
provider, and a security token that is responsive to all of the
requests of relying party can be generated. (The user, as discussed
above, can also choose to refuse to do business with relying party
130 in this situation.)
[0055] In another embodiment, computer system 105 parses security
policy 150 into different portions, which can be processed
separately. For example, computer system 105 can separate the
financial transaction portion of security policy 150 from the other
requested information. The user can then select one information
card to process the transaction, and a second information card to
handle the request for other information. Each information card can
be handled by a different identity provider: for example, the
user's bank might handle the financial transaction, with a
state-operated identity provider providing the other requested
information. In this situation, computer system 105 might return
two security tokens to relying party 130.
[0056] Security policy 150 from relying party 130 can impose
limitations on how receipt 310 is generated. For example, an
on-line merchant might choose to only accept payment via
PayPal.RTM., and not via a credit card. (PayPal is a registered
trademark of PayPal, Inc. in the United States.) The on-line
merchant can then specify that payment is to be made using a PayPal
account, and the card selector would eliminate from consideration
any information cards that do not offer payment via PayPal. A
person skilled in the art will recognize other ways in which
security policy 150 can limit the generation of receipt 310.
[0057] If the additional elements are stored in an information
card, access to the data in the information card might be
controlled so that the user needs to provide credentials to access
the data. In that case, the credentials can be managed in a manner
similar to the management of credentials for other information
cards.
[0058] Transaction elements 305 can be generated in any desired
manner. For example, the user can load items into a shopping cart
system offered by relying party 130. Or, relying party 130 can
offer a pre-configured package, enabling the user to select a
number of items in a single step. Relying party 130 can also store
a shopping cart from a previous visit by the user, permitting the
user to identify the list of desired items over a period of time,
rather than all at once. Relying party 130 can also transfer a
user's wish list into the shopping cart, so that the user can fill
the shopping cart based on items known to be of interest to the
user.
[0059] While the above discussion suggests that the information
card satisfying security policy 150 is one that establishes
identity, it is important to remember that the information card
does not need to actually establish the user's identity. All that
is required is that the selected information card satisfies
security policy 150. Assuming the selected information card
satisfies security policy 150, then the selected information card
"identifies" the user to the satisfaction of relying party 135,
even if the information in the information card does not actually
identify the user. Thus, for example, if security policy 150 would
be satisfied with an information card that includes a credit card
number, the selected information card does not necessarily need to
actually "identify" the user's person: for example, the user's
name.
[0060] FIG. 4 shows an information card including sensitive
information used in performing a transaction with the system of
FIG. 2. In FIG. 4, an example of information card 220 is shown in
greater detail. Information card 220 is shown as including
transaction information 405, which includes information such as the
user's name, address, age, and banking information. In particular,
information card 220 includes a bank routing number and account
number 410, which enables performing a transaction using this
account. In this example, information card 220 would permit a debit
card transaction using a bank account, but a person skilled in the
art will recognize how information card 220 could be modified to
permit other types of financial transactions. For example, account
number 410 could be a credit card number, identifying a credit card
account (in which case, there might not be a bank routing
number).
[0061] Where information card 220 is a managed information card
(that is, managed by an identity provider), the information
represented by information card 220 is not actually stored on the
user's computer. This information is stored by the identity
provider. Thus, the information displayed on information card 220
would not be the actual information stored by the identity
provider, but rather an indicator of what information is included
in information card 220.
[0062] FIG. 5 shows transaction elements used in performing the
transaction in the system of FIG. 2. In FIG. 5, an example of
transaction elements 305 is shown in greater detail. In transaction
elements 305, the relying party has provided a list of items 505 to
be purchased, the total cost 510 of the transaction, and an ID 515
of the merchant in the transaction. To this information, the user
can then add his transaction elements, such as his name, billing
address, and bank account number (as shown in information card 220
of FIG. 4). The combination of transaction elements 305 and the
additional elements is enough for the transaction processor to
carry out the transaction and issue a transaction receipt.
[0063] FIG. 6 shows a flowchart of a procedure to perform a
transaction without disclosing sensitive information in the
computer system of FIG. 2. In FIG. 6, at block 605, the elements of
a transaction are identified. These elements are typically partly
identified by the user and partly by the relying party. At block
610, the computer system receives the security policy and
transaction elements from the relying party. As discussed above
with reference to FIG. 3, the transaction elements are included as
part of the security policy, but a person skilled in the art will
recognize that the transaction elements could be sent in a
communication separate from the rest of the security policy, if
desired. At block 615, the user selects an information card that
satisfies the security policy, which is sent to the computer
system. At block 620, the computer system requests a security token
from the identity provider. At block 625, the computer system
receives a security token from the identity provider, which
includes the receipt. Finally, at block 630, the computer system
sends the security token (with the transaction receipt) to the
relying party.
[0064] As discussed above with reference to FIG. 3, in some
embodiments, it might occur that multiple security tokens could be
coming from multiple identity providers. For example, the
transaction receipt might be processed by one identity provider,
and a request for other information by the relying party might be
processed by another identity provider. A person skilled in the art
will recognize how FIG. 6 can be modified to accommodate these
alternative embodiments.
[0065] While the above discussion focuses on transactions that are
generally commercial in nature, a person skilled in the art will
recognize that embodiments of the invention can be used in other
contexts. For example, the relying party might be offering a
service that does not require a transfer of finances from the user,
but still request some non-identity information from the user. In
such a situation, embodiments of the invention can be used to
control the release of the non-identity information in a manner
that satisfies the user's security concerns.
[0066] Performing a Transaction which can be Audited by an Identity
Provider
[0067] Before explaining how the computer system of FIG. 2 enables
audit capability, it is helpful to understand how the audit service
is implemented at the back end. FIG. 7 shows details of the
identity provider of FIG. 1 equipped to provide an audit service,
according to an embodiment of the invention. In FIG. 7, identity
provider 135 is shown as including receiver 705 and transmitter
710. Receiver 705 and transmitter 710 are used for communicating
with other machines involved in the transaction. These machines can
include computer system 105 and relying party 130, shown in FIGS. 1
and 2, but a person skilled in the art will recognize that there
can be other machines participating in the transaction. For
example, in one embodiment, identity provider 135 can be
responsible for managing the identity information, but a separate
machine, termed the secure token service, can be responsible for
issuing the security token to the relying party. In that situation,
receiver 705 and transmitter 710 can also be used to communicate
with the secure token service.
[0068] Identity provider 135 also includes various data that can be
used in some form to identify users. These data, examples of which
are shown individually in FIG. 7 as data 715 and 720, are the data
that is represented in the information cards to the user on the
client machine. Although FIG. 7 shows only two pieces of data 715
and 720, a person skilled in the art will recognize that identity
provider 135 can store any number of pieces of data for any number
of users. Thus, for example, identity provider 135 might store
three pieces of data for one user, one piece of data for a second
user, six pieces of data for a third user, and so on.
[0069] Associated with each piece of data are one or more audit
policies. Further, the same audit policy can be associated with
multiple pieces of data. FIG. 7 shows three audit policies
associated with data 715 and 720, with detail shown about audit
policy 725. A person skilled in the art will recognize that there
can be any number of audit policies associated with any given
datum, potentially including none (if the user has not yet
configured an audit policy or is not concerned about being able to
audit the information referenced by the information card). Further,
a person skilled in the art will recognize that a given user with
multiple pieces of data managed by identity provider 135 can have
different numbers of audit policies associated with the individual
data, as desired. Receiver 705 enables users to define the audit
policies, including one or more triggers 730 and audit actions 735.
Trigger 730 defines the event that, when it occurs, causes audit
operator 740 to perform audit action 735. Further discussion about
trigger 730 and audit action 735 can be found with reference to
FIGS. 8-10 below.
[0070] It is also possible for identity provider 135 to store an
audit policy that is not associated directly with particular data,
or even associated with any data. For example, the user might
establish an audit policy that requests identity provider 135 to
send an e-mail message to the user any time a security token is
generated, regardless of what data is included in the security
token. One situation in which this is useful is where the relying
party wants a security token, but does not need any particular data
managed by the identity provider. Put another way, the relying
party simply wants to know if the identity provider can issue a
security token for the user: if the identity provider can issue a
security token, it establishes that the identity provider can
authenticate the user. In some situations, this can be enough
information. As an example, a merchant might have a special
arrangement with a local company that employees of the company are
offered a discount when dealing with the merchant. If a user can
authenticate to an identity provider that the merchant knows is
managed by the company and that only authenticates employees of the
company, the merchant can rely on a security token from the
identity provider as proof that the user is actually employed by
the company. Note, however, that even in this situation, there is
still some "data" being transmitted, even if the security token
does not carry any managed information about the user: the security
token identifies the identity provider. The merchant can specify
that the security token must be provided by the company's identity
provider as part of the requirements for the requested security
token.
[0071] In another embodiment, the user can define an audit policy
that is partly based on data identity provider 135 stores, but is
not directly associated with data that would be included in the
security token. As an example, a car rental agency that permits
customers to reserve vehicles over the Internet might want to know
whether the user is 25 years old, as the agency does not want to
rent vehicles to drivers under the age of 25. Or a supermarket,
which sells, among other groceries, alcohol, might want to be able
to verify that a customer to its web site is 21 years old, and thus
legally permitted to purchase alcohol. In examples like these, the
relying party is not interested a specific datum (such as the
user's age) managed by the identity provider, but rather in a value
that is derived from that datum. In the above examples, the relying
parties are interested in knowing whether the user was born a
sufficient number of years ago to meet some requirement. Note that
the question being answered in these situations is not "What is the
value?", but rather "Does the value meet certain criteria?": the
latter question can be answered with either a "Yes" or a "No"
answer. In this embodiment, where the security token transmits data
that is derived from a value managed by the identity provider, the
user might establish an audit policy that requests an e-mail
whenever the underlying datum (e.g., the user's date of birth) is
included in the security token, whenever a value derived from that
datum is transmitted, or both.
[0072] In this embodiment, the relying party can identify the
requested derived value in the security policy. The relying party
can specify this requested derived value using a Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI), which is a specific way to identify a requested
datum from the identity provider. The client might not know how to
process the request for the derived value itself, but as long as
the identity provider can process the request (by recognizing the
URI, which can be stored in the information card), the proper
security token can be generated.
[0073] One type of derived value that can be the basis of an audit
action is a receipt for a transaction. As discussed above in the
section titled "Protecting information important to the user that
is not identity information", some relying parties can request a
receipt for a transaction, such as a financial transaction, as part
of the security token. The user can specify an audit action, such
as an e-mail communication, be performed when such a receipt is
generated.
[0074] In yet another embodiment, the trigger for an audit can be
the identity of the relying party or the identity provider being
used. For example, a user might be interested in having an audit
performed whenever a transaction involving a particular merchant
occurs where the security token is generated based on the user's
authentication.
[0075] Returning briefly now to FIG. 2, it will be understood that
receiver 210 and transmitter 215 are used not only to transmit a
request for security token 160 and receive security token 160 in
response. In addition, receiver 210 and transmitter 215 can be used
to transmit audit policy 725 to identity provider 135 and to
receive communications that audit policy 725 has been triggered
(assuming audit policy 725 instructs the identity provider to
transmit a message to client 105: if audit policy 725 instructs the
identity provider to perform some other actions as a result of
audit policy 725 being triggered, client 105 might not receive a
communication from the identity provider).
[0076] FIG. 8 shows examples of the types of audit actions that can
be performed by the audit service of FIG. 7. In FIG. 8, examples of
four different types of audit actions are shown. Message 805 is a
short message service (SMS) message, which can be transmitted to,
for example, a cellular telephone. Message 810 is an example of a
message that can be transmitted to the user: for example, an
automated e-mail message. Message 810 can be any type of message:
an e-mail, a log entry, etc. Message 810 can be transmitted to
client 105, or to any other machine as specified by the user. For
example, message 810 can be an audit message transmitted to the
user's account on a multi-user server (for example, an SMTP mail
server) or to a special-purpose logging server. Message 810 can
optionally include information beyond the fact that the audit
policy was triggered: for example, details about security token 160
to be issued in response to the security policy, an identifier of
client 105 that requested security token 160, an identifier of
relying party 130, or elements of the transaction 815, among other
possibilities. (A person skilled in the art will recognize that,
depending on the available space in the message, such additional
information can also be included in SMS message 805, despite the
fact that SMS message 805 is not shown as including any such
elements.) Whether transaction elements 815 can be appended to
message 810 depends on whether or not identity provider 135 has
access to this information. In the normal course of operation,
identity provider 135 only receives the request to generate
security token 160. But the system can be modified to have the
relying party provide transaction elements 815 to identity provider
135, which would permit identity provider 135 to provide this
information to the user (if specified in the audit policy). More
information about transaction elements 815 is discussed below with
reference to FIG. 11.
[0077] A person skilled in the art will recognize that embodiments
of the invention can be extended to other forms of contact with the
user. For example, the user could provide a telephone number (such
as a cellular telephone number). Upon the triggering of an audit
policy, the audit service can call the cellular telephone number
and inform the user of the information being disclosed. This can be
done using an automated recording, with the information being
disclosed vocalized (or some approximation thereof) by the system.
Alternatively, there can be a manned station to which the audit
service is transferred: a person can then take the call (which can
be automatically dialed for the convenience of the audit service
employee, or the employee can manually dial the telephone number)
and provide a real person for the user to speak with upon receiving
the audit action. Another way in which audit services can be
provided is by logging transactions somewhere (for example, in a
database), which the user can access at a later time. Yet another
possibility would be to transmit an RSS feed of the audited
transaction to the user.
[0078] FIG. 9 shows how audit actions can be transmitted to the
user in the audit service of FIG. 7. In FIG. 9, SMS message 805 is
shown as being sent to cellular telephone 905. Message 810 is shown
as being sent to computer system 105 (the client machine that has
requested the security token for the transaction). Alternatively,
message 810 can be sent to another machine, such as machine 910.
Sending message 810 to another machine can be useful in situations
where the computer system 105 (the client) is being used by a party
masquerading as the user. If the message is sent to the machine
being used by the defrauding party, the party would obviously
confirm the fraud. But if the message is sent to another machine,
such as the user's e-mail account, the user would be able to
receive the message and become aware of the potential fraud.
[0079] FIGS. 10A-10B show examples of screen enabling a user to
configure audit policies in the audit service of FIG. 7. In FIG.
10A, screenshot 1005 is shown, offering the user a set of choices.
The choices in triggers 1010 identify some possible triggers for
the audit policy. For example, in screenshot 1005, the user has
indicated what the triggers for the associated information card
(not identified in FIG. 10A) would be if the security token
includes the user's social security number or credit card number,
but not if the security token includes the user's name or address.
Triggers 1010 can be populated automatically, based on the
information stored in the information card, or can include generic
identifiers that can then apply to any data that meets that
definition. For example, if the associated information card
includes information about more than one credit card, the selected
triggers would apply if any credit card number would be included in
the security token. Further, as discussed above with reference to
FIG. 7, triggers can include the generation of the security token,
without any reliance on particular data managed by the identity
provider, values derived from data managed by the identity provider
(for example, whether the user is old enough to drive a vehicle or
purchase alcohol), or the identity of the identity provider or the
relying party. For example, option 1015 enables a user to opt for a
trigger being a value derived from a datum managed by the identity
provider.
[0080] FIG. 10B shows some additional triggers that can be used in
audits. In FIG. 10B, triggers 1010 include options for the release
of a security token, the use of a particular identity provider,
whether the security token is being transmitted to a particular
relying party, or if a particular user is responsible for the
request of the security token. A person skilled in the art will
recognize that the triggers shown in FIGS. 10A-10B do not represent
all of the available triggers, and that there can be any other
desired triggers, including all triggers described in this
document. Other types of triggers (not checked or shown in FIGS.
10A-10B) can include the release of information such as name,
address, telephone number, instant messaging ID, SMS address,
client IP address, and so on.
[0081] A person skilled in the art will also recognize that while
triggers are generally defined based on the release of particular
types of data, triggers can be broader in scope than just the
release of data. For example, even if the security token does not
include a particular datum, if the datum is implicated in some way,
that implication can be a trigger. For example, if the identity
provider is capable of processing a transaction using a user's
credit card directly (so that the credit card number would not need
to be transmitted in the security token), the charge to the credit
card might trigger an audit policy, even though no information
included in the security token would have by itself triggered the
audit policy.
[0082] Radio buttons 1020 provide the user with the ability to
decide whether the triggers apply together or separately. In
screenshot 1005, the user has opted to have the audit occur if any
of the triggers independently occur. A person skilled in the art
will recognize that more complicated arrangements can be made,
providing the user with the ability to group triggers in various
ways. Grouped triggers would permit the user to apply different
audit actions under different conditions. A person skilled in the
art will also recognize that a similar result can be obtained with
multiple different audit policies applying to the same information
card.
[0083] Audit actions 1025 specify the result the user wants taken
when the trigger condition occurs. In screenshot 1005, the user has
specified only one audit action to be performed: that an e-mail be
sent to the user's e-mail address (jdoe@email.com). The user could
also have selected to have an SMS message sent to a cellular
telephone address, or have a voice announcement sent to a
telephone, among other possibilities. As with triggers 1010, the
possibilities in audit actions 1025 can be generated based on the
associated information card, or they can be generic audit
actions.
[0084] Inclusions 1030 identify optional information that can be
included in the message to the user. In screenshot 1005, the user
has opted to have the ID of the client requesting the security
token and the details of the transaction included in the message.
The user could optionally have also included information about the
security token. As with triggers 1010 and audit actions 1025, the
possibilities in inclusions 1030 can be generated based on the
associated information card, or they can be generic inclusion
options.
[0085] In-line confirmation option 1035 permits the user to specify
whether confirmation of the audit needs to be received before the
transaction is concluded. For example, when the user specifies
in-line confirmation of the audit, the system needs to perform the
selected audit actions and receive the user's confirmation of the
audit before transmitting the security token to the relying party.
The use of in-line confirmation permits the user to block the
transaction before the transaction is completed.
[0086] In other embodiments, information cards or identities can be
shared. A "shared" information card or identity means just what it
suggests: that a single information card or identity card can be
shared by a number of different people. It is worth understanding
the difference between the concepts of a shared information card
and a shared identity. A shared information card is a single
information card, which might be managed by an identity provider or
self-issued, but which represents data that can be used by two or
more different users.
[0087] As an example of how this might occur, consider a family.
The parents might establish a managed information card that stores
a credit card number. The parents might want to permit their
children to be able to make purchases on-line using the credit card
(although the parents would probably not want to permit unlimited
purchases, and so might use in-line audits to establish a measure
of control over their children's use of the credit card number).
The information card with the credit card number can be shared, so
that any member of the family (that is, any of the family that can
authenticate themselves to the identity provider) can use the data
represented by that information card.
[0088] In contrast, a shared identity is where two or more
different users are considered to have the same identity. This
situation can occur when a business or other group of persons all
want to be able to be able to use information cards associated with
the identity, but the persons all want to be treated as though they
were the same individual once they were authenticated. For example,
consider a business that a number of employees, all authorized to
make purchases for the business. The business can issue each of the
employees separate business credit cards, but that would require
managing a number of different credit card accounts. Instead, the
business can set up a single credit card, store the credit card
number in an information card, and arrange that any employee who
authenticates himself or herself to the identity provider is to be
treated as if he or she represented "the business", without the
employee having a separate identity. Any such employee could then
charge purchases to the single credit card number, without each
employee needing separate credit cards. Of course, in this model,
the information card is still "shared" in a technical sense, but as
far as the information card is used, all of its uses are confined
to a single identity; it just happens to be that the single
identity can be used by any number of different individuals.
[0089] One way in which shared identities can be used to provide
differing levels of access to information cards is to define roles.
A "role" identifies a capability assigned to a particular type of
person. For example, types of generic business roles might include
"assistant", "management", and "officer". Each role might have
different limits on what they can do. Continuing the example, an
assistant might be permitted to use the shared business identity to
make purchases up to $50 (for office supplies), a manager might be
permitted to make purchases up to $500 (for purchases that are
necessary for the manager's job, but within limits), and an officer
might be permitted to make purchases up to $50000 (for large-scale
purchases that affect the business's operation as a whole, based on
delegation of authority from the board of directors).
[0090] Another variation of the shared information card or shared
identity model is delegated authorization. Returning to the family
example, one of the parents might create an information card
storing the credit card number, and rather than sharing the
information card directly with the spouse, the spouse can be
delegated authority to use the information card. Delegation is
similar to sharing the information card, but leaves full control
over the information card in the hands of a single individual.
[0091] In these embodiments, where information cards are shared or
delegated, or identities are shared, other triggers can be used.
For example, triggers can include the actual identity of the user
using the information card (as opposed to the identity associated
with the business card, in the case of a shared identity). Triggers
can be associated with roles, so that when a person exceeds the
capabilities assigned to their role, an audit can be performed. A
person skilled in the art will recognize other ways in which
triggers can be based on data other than the contents of the
security token.
[0092] In addition to one person being able to audit a transaction
of another person, it is also possible to generalize the operation
of the system in the other direction. One person can indicate that
a third party is delegated responsibility (partial or whole) for
the audit of the transaction. For example, two parties might each
share an information card, but both parties could specify that only
one of the two people is responsible for receiving the audit
information. Or, one party can decide that they want to delegate
responsibility for receiving audit information about their
transactions to another party. These scenarios can be achieved in
screenshot 1005 by having the delegating user include the
delegate's information in section for audit actions 1025. For
example, screenshot 1005 might be the audit policy for Mary Doe,
who has specified in her audit policy that John Doe is to receive
the audit e-mail and authorize in-line the transaction.
[0093] FIG. 11 shows details of transaction elements used in
performing the transaction in the audit service of FIG. 7. In FIG.
11, details of transaction elements 815 are shown. Transaction
elements 815 can include item(s) 1105 being purchased, total cost
1110 of the transaction, and merchant ID 1115, among other
possibilities. In theory, any data pertinent to the transaction can
be included in transaction elements 815. Provided that such
information is received by the identity provider, the identity
provider can include the information in transaction elements 815
for provision to the user.
[0094] FIG. 12 shows details of the memory of the identity provider
of FIG. 7, storing a data structure to manage an audit service. As
discussed above with reference to FIGS. 7-9, identity provider 135
can manage the audit service. To accomplish such audit management,
identity provider 135 can store the audit policy information in a
data structure in memory. The memory can be a volatile memory, such
as a random access memory (RAM), or it can be a non-volatile
memory, such as flash memory, a hard drive, or some other memory
structure. In FIG. 12, memory 1205 is suggested to be RAM, but a
person skilled in the art will recognize how embodiments of the
invention can be implemented using memories other than RAM.
[0095] In certain locations of memory, data structure 1210 can be
stored. Data structure 1210 stores datum ID 1215, audit action
1220, and in-line flag 1225. Datum ID 1215 identifies the datum
that, when requested to be included in the security token, triggers
the performance of audit action 1220. Although datum ID 1215 uses
single tense terminology, a person skilled in the art will
recognize that datum ID 1215 can identify multiple data that can
trigger audit action 1220 when all are included in the security
token or when included individually, to accommodate the user's
preferences, as discussed above with reference to FIGS. 10A-10B.
Similarly, if the audit does not depend on a particular datum being
included in the security token, datum ID 1215 can be omitted. A
person skilled in the art will recognize that if the associated
datum includes an identifier of this audit policy, datum ID 1215 is
not needed. A person skilled in the art will further recognize that
the associations between pieces of data and audit policies can be
stored separately from both the data and the audit policies:
perhaps in a separate table stores somewhere in the memory of
identity provider 135.
[0096] Audit action 1220 can be any desired audit action, whether
an SMS message or an e-mail (potentially including additional
information), a telephone call (automated or manual), or any other
desired audit action. Finally, in-line flag 1225 specifies whether
the audit is to be approved by the user before the security token
is released. If in-line flag 1225 does not indicate that the audit
is to be performed in-line, then the security token can be
transmitted back to the client (and thence to the relying party)
before audit action 1220 is performed.
[0097] FIG. 13 shows a flowchart of how the audit policy is defined
in the identity provider of FIG. 7. At block 1305, the user
identifies the pieces of data for which the audit is to be
performed. As discussed above with reference to FIGS. 7 and
10A-10B, the audit can be associated with a single datum, with
multiple data, or with no particular datum to be included in the
security token. At block 1310, the user identifies the triggers for
the audit. As described above, the audit triggers can be data that,
when included in the security token, are considered by the user
sufficiently important to trigger an audit. At block 1315, the user
identifies the audit action to be taken. As described above, the
audit action can include an SMS message or an e-mail message
(potentially including additional information), a telephone call
(automated or manual), or some other action desired by the user. At
block 1320, the user identifies whether the audit is to be
performed in-line before the security token is transmitted to the
client (and thence to the relying party). Finally, at block 1325,
once the identity provider has all the data needed to carry out the
audit, the identity provider stores the audit policy, which is
associated with the data.
[0098] FIGS. 14A-14B show a flowchart of a procedure to perform an
audit in the identity provider of FIG. 7. In FIG. 14A, at block
1405, the identity provider receives an audit policy. FIG. 13,
discussed above, provides more detail as to how this can be
accomplished. A person skilled in the art will recognize that the
user can define the audit policy once, and it can be triggered and
performed numerous times. A person skilled in the art will further
recognize that the audit policy can be defined at a time far
removed from when the audit policy is accessed and the audit
performed.
[0099] At block 1410, the identity provider receives a request for
a security token. As discussed above with reference to FIG. 1, the
request for the security token can include the data to be included
as claims in the security token. At block 1415, the identity
provider identifies the audit policy/policies associated with the
data to be included in the security token. As discussed above with
reference to FIGS. 7 and 10A-10B, the audit policy/policies might
not be associated with a particular datum, but with other aspects
of the security token; a person skilled in the art will recognize
how FIGS. 14A-14B can be modified where the audit is not dependent
on a datum to be included in the security token. (In the remaining
discussion of FIGS. 14A-14B, the focus is on a single audit policy,
but a person skilled in the art will recognize that if there
multiple audit policies associated with the selected information
card, they can be applies sequentially, in parallel, or in any
other desired order.) At block 1420, the identity provider
identifies a trigger in the audit policy. At block 1425, the
identity provider performs an audit in response to the trigger.
This means that if the trigger occurred, the audit is performed; if
the trigger did not occur, then no audit is performed (and the rest
of FIGS. 14A-14B become irrelevant). At block 1430, the identity
provider determines if in-line confirmation of the audit is
required.
[0100] At block 1435 (FIG. 14B), assuming in-line confirmation of
the audit is required, then the identity provider waits for
confirmation. At block 1440, the identity provider determines if
confirmation is received or denied by the user. At block 1445, if
the user denied confirmation of the audit, then the transaction is
denied. Otherwise, at block 1450, the security token is transmitted
responsive to the selected information card and the relying party's
security policy. Block 1450 is also reached if, back at block 1430
on FIG. 14A, the audit policy does not require in-line
confirmation, in which case the security token can be transmitted
without waiting for confirmation of the audit.
[0101] In the description above, the focus has been on the audit
service being managed by the identity provider. But a person
skilled in the art will recognize that the audit service does not
need to be managed by the identity provider. Provided that the
audit service can interface with the party responsible for issuing
the security token, the audit service can be independent of the
identity provider. Thus, for example, embodiments of the invention
could have the audit service function performed by the secure token
service, or by a machine separate from the identity provider and
the secure token service.
[0102] While the above discussion discusses transactions that are
generally commercial in nature, a person skilled in the art will
recognize that embodiments of the invention can be used in other
contexts. For example, the relying party might be offering a
service that does not require a transfer of finances from the user,
but still request some non-identity information from the user. In
such a situation, embodiments of the invention can be used to
perform audits of such transactions.
[0103] Performing a Transaction without Storing Information Card
Information on the Computer System
[0104] FIG. 15 continues the detail of computer system 105. In FIG.
15, details of other components of computer system 105 are shown.
Computer system 105 is shown as including card selector 205, which
in FIG. 15 is shown with the alternative name of identity
selector/management user interface.
[0105] Identity selector/management user interface 205 interfaces
not only with the user, but also with identity selector service
1505, which is responsible for managing the information cards
available on computer system 105. Identity selector service 1505
interfaces with card provider registry 1510, which is responsible
for managing pluggable card providers, which in turn access card
stores, both local and pluggable. Pluggable card stores can include
card stores on discs such as disc 1515 (which could be a compact
disc (CD), digital video disc (DVD), or any other form of optical
storage), flash drive 1520, which is shown as a USB flash drive,
floppy disk 1525, cellular telephone 1530, or file transfer
protocol (FTP) server 1535 (which can be accessed via network
1540). A person skilled in the art will recognize that the
pluggable card stores shown in FIG. 15 are merely exemplary, and
that any device that can store card information can be used (for
example, a personal digital assistant (PDA)).
[0106] To manage the interface between the pluggable card stores
and the user, various card providers can be used. FIG. 15 shows
three such providers. File system card provider 1545 is responsible
for managing pluggable card stores that use a file system. In FIG.
15, file system card provider 1545 is shown as interfacing with
disc 1515, flash drive 1520, and floppy disk 1525, as these devices
typically use file systems to store information. File system card
provider 1545 can also be used to access local card store 1550,
which stores cards that are installed on computer system 105.
Bluetooth card provider 1555 is shown as interfacing with devices
that use Bluetooth: in FIG. 15, cellular telephone 1530 is shown as
providing this interface technology. FTP card provider 1560 is
shown as interfacing with FTP server 1535 via network 1540. A
person skilled in the art will recognize that there can be any
number of different interfaces, depending on the different devices
that can be used to store information cards. For example, there can
be providers to manage pluggable card stores on smartcards or HTTP
servers (not shown in FIG. 15).
[0107] Not shown in FIG. 15 are the connectors that provide the
physical interface between the various pluggable card stores and
computer system 105. These physical interfaces, which include
various connectors, can include various drives, such as a disc
drive (CD, DVD, or other optical format, among other possibilities)
or a floppy disk drive, a USB port, or a network connection (which
can be a wired or wireless connection). Other connectors can
include serial ports, parallel ports, IEEE 1394 ports (commonly
known as FireWire), telephone jacks, and so on.
[0108] As should be apparent from FIG. 15, a "pluggable card store"
does not necessarily require that the card store be carried by the
user. For example, FTP server 1535 is a machine, remote to computer
system 105, which stores information about information cards for
the user. A user would not be likely to carry FTP server 1535 in
his pocket: an FTP server is generally not considered "portable".
But because the information cards stored on FTP server 1535 can be
accessed from computer system 105 without the information cards
having to be installed on computer system 105, FTP server 1535 is
considered to be "pluggable". It is also worth noting that even
though FTP server 1535 is remote from computer system 105, the
information cards stored in FTP server 1535 are still considered to
be available at computer system 105 (although the user might have
to request a connection to FTP server 1535 to make the information
cards available at computer system 105). A person skilled in the
art will recognize other ways in which card stores can be
considered pluggable without being portable: for example, via a
secure remote connection to another machine the user trusts, such
as the user's home computer.
[0109] FIG. 16 shows different locations from which the pluggable
card providers of FIG. 15 can be installed in the system of FIG. 2.
In FIG. 16, computer system 105 is shown with card provider
registry 1510; the other elements of FIG. 15 are not shown in FIG.
16. For any of a number of reasons, card provider 1605 is to be
plugged into card provider registry 1510. These reasons can include
that computer system 105 is being started, or that a pluggable card
store is to be accessed that is accessed via card provider 1605,
among other possibilities.
[0110] Computer system 105 can install card provider 1605 from an
internal hard drive, such as hard drive 1610. When present on hard
drive 1610, card provider 1605 can reside as software 1615, which
can then be installed as pluggable card provider 1605.
Alternatively, card provider 1605 can be loaded from software 1620
on pluggable card store 1520. (While FIG. 16 shows software 1620
being installed from flash drive 1520 as the pluggable card store,
a person skilled in the art will recognize that software 1620 can
be stored on any pluggable card store.)
[0111] In yet another alternative, card provider 1605 can be
installed from software 1625, stored on machine 1630, which can be
reached from computer system 105 via a network, such as network
1540. Machine 1630 can be an external source of card provider 1625.
For example, machine 1630 can offer as a download the latest
version of card provider 1625. Computer system 105 can download and
install software 1625 as card provider 1605, which would
potentially provide the most complete set of features for accessing
pluggable card store 1520.
[0112] A person skilled in the art will recognize that hard drive
1610, pluggable card store 1520, and machine 1630 are examples of
different places from which card provider 1605 can be installed. A
person skilled in the art will recognize that there can be other
sources of software for card provider 1605, as appropriate.
[0113] FIG. 17 shows additional details about the system of FIG. 2
using of pluggable card stores. In FIG. 17, computer system 105 is
shown as including authenticator 1705. Authenticator 1705 is used
when the pluggable card store is secured in some manner. For
example, the pluggable card store can be encrypted with an
encryption key: access to the information cards stored on the
pluggable card store would require the user providing the
decryption key. Authenticator 1705 is used in this situation, to
authenticate a request to access data on a pluggable card
store.
[0114] In FIG. 17, pluggable card store 1520 is shown with card
store 1710, which stores information cards, such as information
card 1715. Pluggable card store 1520 includes credential 1720:
before a user can access data on pluggable card store 1520, the
user must provide a matching credential. Authenticator 1705 then
provides credential 1725 to pluggable card store 1520 in response
to the request for authentication, after which (assuming credential
1725 matches credential 1720) the user can access card store 1710
on pluggable card store 1520.
[0115] Credentials "match" when the user provides the appropriate
credential used to respond to the authentication request. In some
embodiments, credential 1725 matches credential 1720 by being
identical to credential 1720. In other embodiments, credential 1725
matches credential 1720 by being a corresponding, non-identical
credential--for example, if credential 1720 is a public key,
credential 1725 can match credential 1720 by being the
corresponding private key. A person skilled in the art will
recognize other ways in which credentials can "match".
[0116] Although not shown in FIG. 17, computer system 105 can
optionally store credential 1725. For example, credential 1725
might be used to authenticate to multiple card stores, not just
pluggable card store 1520. By storing credential 1725 in a store on
computer system 105, computer system 105 can provide credential
1725 to multiple card stores to authenticate the user to the
multiple card stores. In this manner, computer system 105 can
authenticate multiple card stores without the user having to
provide credentials individually for each card store that requires
authentication.
[0117] Whether computer system 105 stores credential 1725 can be a
configurable option. For example, a machine that is not a public
machine, such as a personal computer, can include such storage. The
machine can also be configured to automatically store credential
1725 in the storage, or can ask the user whether to store a
particular credential for the user. On the other hand, if a public
machine can be configured to not store the credential, or ask
whether to store the credential.
[0118] From the preceding discussion, one can see that computer
system 105 includes a framework that provides the capability of
pluggable card providers offering access to various card stores.
Computer system 105 can be in any number of different states. For
example, it might be that computer system 105 includes a pluggable
card provider, but no pluggable card store 1520 is connected to
computer system 105, and so the pluggable card provider is simply
present, without being user. Or, a card store, such as pluggable
card store 1520, can be connected to computer system 105, but
computer system 105 does not include a pluggable card provider
capable of providing access to pluggable card store 105. It can
also happen that pluggable card store 1520 is connected to computer
system 105, and there is a pluggable card provider available on
computer system 105 that could interface with pluggable card store
1520, but the pluggable card provider is not yet configured to
communicate with pluggable card store 1520. And, of course,
pluggable card store 1520 can be connected to computer system 105,
which can have a pluggable card provider available to interface,
and actually communicating, with pluggable card store 1520.
[0119] A person skilled in the art will also recognize that it is
possible for computer system 105 to exist without this framework.
For example, a brand new computer might not yet have the framework
installed to support the pluggable card providers and the pluggable
card stores. In that case, this framework can be installed on
computer system 105.
[0120] FIGS. 18A-18C show a flowchart of a procedure for processing
a newly connected pluggable card store on the machine of FIG. 2. In
FIG. 18A, at block 1805, the machine identifies a pluggable card
store available at the machine. At block 1810, the machine
determines whether a pluggable card provider is installed at the
machine: the pluggable card provider is used to access the
pluggable card store. If the machine does not have a pluggable card
provider to access the pluggable card store, then at block 1815,
the machine installs the pluggable card provider from an
appropriate source.
[0121] At block 1820, once the pluggable card store is installed to
access the pluggable card store, the machine interfaces with the
pluggable card store using the pluggable card provider. At block
1825 (FIG. 18B), the machine determines whether the pluggable card
store is locked. If so, then at block 1830 the machine receives
from the user a credential that can be used to authenticate the
user to unlock the card store. At block 1835, the machine provides
the credential to the pluggable card store.
[0122] At block 1840 (FIG. 18C), the machine determines whether the
credential was validated (in other words, that the user was
properly authenticated). If so, or if the pluggable card store was
not locked (as determined at block 1825 of FIG. 18B), then at block
1845 the pluggable card store is ready for use. Otherwise, at block
1850, the user cannot access the pluggable card store.
[0123] While FIGS. 18A-18C show one way in which a newly connected
pluggable card store can be processed to provide access to the
information cards stored on the pluggable card store, a person
skilled in the art will recognize that the pluggable card store can
be processed in other ways. For example, rather than processing the
newly connected pluggable card store when the pluggable card store
is connected to the computer system, the pluggable card store can
be processed when the user is looking for information cards. For
example, this might occur when the user is interacting with the
card selector interface at some point in FIG. 19B. Before the
information cards are presented to the user, the computer system
can discover the available pluggable card stores (including
receiving credentials from the user when appropriate) and install
the appropriate pluggable card providers in the framework if
needed. Then, once the framework would support locating information
cards within the pluggable card stores, the computer system could
proceed with receiving from the user the identification of the
selected information card.
[0124] FIGS. 19A-19C show a flowchart of a procedure for using an
information card to perform a transaction using the machine of FIG.
2. In FIG. 19A, at block 1905, the system receives a security
policy from a relying party. At block 1910, the system identifies
information cards that can satisfy the security policy.
[0125] At block 1915 (FIG. 19B), the system can present to the user
a list of all information cards available at the machine that
satisfy the security policy. Alternatively, the system can organize
information cards by pluggable card store: at block 1920, the
system presents to the user the available pluggable card stores, at
block 1925, the system receives from the user a selected pluggable
card store, and at block 1930, the system presents to the user the
list of information cards on the selected pluggable card store that
satisfy the security policy. A person skilled in the art will
recognize other ways in which the system can present to the user
the available information cards: for example, listing all
information cards available at the machine, but distinguishing
between information cards that satisfy the security policy and
information cards that do not satisfy the security policy.
[0126] At block 1935 (FIG. 19C), the system receives the user's
selected information card. At block 1940, the system requests a
security token from the identity provider. The request identifies
what data is to be used in the security token, the form of
credential to be generated, and any other data the identity
provider needs to generate the security token. At block 1945, the
system receives the security token from the identity provider.
Finally, at block 1950, the system forwards the security token to
the relying party.
[0127] FIG. 20 shows a flowchart of a procedure for processing a
newly disconnected pluggable card store on the machine of FIG. 2.
In FIG. 20, at block 2005, the machine determines that a pluggable
card store is no longer available. This can occur if the user has
disconnected the pluggable card store. For example, the user can
unplug the pluggable card store from its connector to the computer.
Or the user can sever a logical connection to the pluggable card
store, as can occur when the pluggable card store is accessed via a
network (for example, an FTP server). At block 2010, the machine
determines if the pluggable card provider that was used to access
the pluggable card store is still being used (for example, to
access another card store). If the machine determines that the
pluggable card provider is no longer in use, then at block 2015,
the machine can unplug the pluggable card provider from the
machine.
[0128] A person skilled in the art will recognize that the machine
can leave the pluggable card provider installed, even if it is not
being used (e.g., to access a pluggable card store). This is shown
by dashed arrow 2020.
[0129] An Example Use Case
[0130] A person skilled in the art will recognize that the
above-described embodiments of the inventions can be combined, to
offer functionality greater than any one of the applications
individually can provide. The following example describes one way
in which the embodiments can be combined. A person skilled in the
art will recognize other ways in which embodiments of the invention
can be combined.
[0131] Consider a user named John. John is concerned with the
proliferation of credentials that he has scattered across a number
of web sites on the Internet, because each web site requires John
to provide a username and password to access the web site's
services. John has registered with his bank's web site so that he
can review transactions in his checking, savings, and credit card
accounts. John has also registered with his local supermarket
chain, which delivers his grocery orders to his house for him,
among other web sites. John recognizes that he is having trouble
remembering all of the different username and password combinations
that the different web sites use, and wants to use information
cards to simplify the management of authenticating himself to the
various web sites. Because his bank and supermarket are both
willing to accept information cards, John can take advantage of
information cards to authenticate to both of these parties.
[0132] John is also concerned with being able to use his
information cards anywhere. Sometimes, John is at work when he
decides he wants to make a pot roast for dinner, but he does not
have a roast in his refrigerator. In the past, he has used his
supermarket's web site to order a roast and some vegetables: John
wants to continue to use the convenience of ordering groceries
on-line.
[0133] But while John trusts his co-workers, he does not want to
install his information cards on a work computer. First, John does
not have control over which machine he uses on any given day: he,
like his co-workers, just sits down at any free machine to do his
work. If he wants to be able to order groceries on-line from work,
he might have to install his information cards on every computer at
work. And ignoring the effort involved in installing his
information cards on each machine at work and keeping them
synchronized (if data should happen to change), John is worried
that he would have no control over his information cards if someone
were to steal one of the work computers, or if his company decided
to replace an older machine without warning.
[0134] John is also concerned about identity theft. He wants to be
in complete control over his information. John does not want any
information of his to be given out to a person who does not need
it, under any circumstances. And having heard rumors that people
have spent years trying to clean up their credit histories after
suffering identity theft, John wants to have the right to approve
the release of any information in advance.
[0135] So John selects an identity provider he trusts. By a
fortunate coincidence, John's bank happens to offer services as an
identity provider, so John selects his bank to manage his
information cards. John stores information with his bank--his
identity provider. Of course, his bank already has some of the
information, so John only supplements the information the bank
already has. John creates some information cards that he can use to
log into his bank's web site and his supermarket's web site. One
particular information card John creates includes all of the
information John's bank manages for him, including information
about his bank checking account--routing number, account number,
and the like. John defines some audit policies, indicating that
before any information is released from the identity provider, they
need to call him on his cell phone and get confirmation from him to
release the information.
[0136] John stores copies of the information cards he created on a
USB flash drive. He knows from personal experience that the
computers at work all have USB ports, and all recognize USB flash
drives. Because he knows he is a little careless, John password
protects the USB flash drive: until the correct password is
provided, the data stored on the USB flash drive cannot be
accessed. John feels comfortable that no-one would be able to guess
his password, so if he loses the USB flash drive, his data will be
sufficiently safe.
[0137] Sometime the following week, John decides he needs a few
ingredients to cook the dinner he wants that evening. John then
goes to his supermarket's web site and selects some groceries. When
John is finished, the supermarket's web site prompts John to
provide the information needed to complete the transaction. In
particular, the supermarket's web site asks John for his shipping
address and for the information about the account to debit for the
transaction. John opts to use the information card system to
satisfy this request.
[0138] John plugs his USB flash drive into a USB port on his work
computer. John's work computer recognizes the presence of the USB
flash drive, hums for a moment, then prompts John for the password
to the USB flash drive, which he provides. A few moments later,
John's work computer displays the information cards stored on the
USB flash drive.
[0139] John navigates to the information card on his USB flash
drive that represents his bank information, and selects it. The
work computer then says that he needs to authenticate himself to
the identity provider. John provides the appropriate credential to
the identity provider. A few moments later, John's cellular
telephone rings. John picks up his cellular telephone and answers
the call. The call is an automated call from his identity provider:
the computer at the other end of the call informs John that it is
being asked to release his shipping address and checking account
information. The machine at the other end of the call asks John to
press "1" to permit the release of information, or to press "2" to
decline to release the information. John presses "1". A few moments
later, John sees a graphic on the screen of his work computer that
the identity provider has sent the security token to his computer,
which has been forwarded to the supermarket's web site. A moment
later, John's work computer shows him the transaction details--the
list of items purchased and the total purchase price--and a
transaction receipt.
[0140] John notes the transaction in his checkbook. A moment later,
the screen shows a "Thank you!" from the supermarket's web site for
making the purchase, with a promise that his groceries will be
delivered before 5:00 PM. John makes another mental note to be home
by 5:00, so that the perishable groceries do not sit in the hot
sun. John removes his USB flash drive from the USB port on his work
computer (the computer hums for a moment, then indicates the
information cards are no longer available), and he returns to his
work.
[0141] The following discussion is intended to provide a brief,
general description of a suitable machine in which certain aspects
of the invention may be implemented. Typically, the machine
includes a system bus to which is attached processors, memory,
e.g., random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), or other
state preserving medium, storage devices, a video interface, and
input/output interface ports. The machine may be controlled, at
least in part, by input from conventional input devices, such as
keyboards, mice, etc., as well as by directives received from
another machine, interaction with a virtual reality (VR)
environment, biometric feedback, or other input signal. As used
herein, the term "machine" is intended to broadly encompass a
single machine, or a system of communicatively coupled machines or
devices operating together. Exemplary machines include computing
devices such as personal computers, workstations, servers, portable
computers, handheld devices, telephones, tablets, etc., as well as
transportation devices, such as private or public transportation,
e.g., automobiles, trains, cabs, etc.
[0142] The machine may include embedded controllers, such as
programmable or non-programmable logic devices or arrays,
Application Specific Integrated Circuits, embedded computers, smart
cards, and the like. The machine may utilize one or more
connections to one or more remote machines, such as through a
network interface, modem, or other communicative coupling. Machines
may be interconnected by way of a physical and/or logical network,
such as an intranet, the Internet, local area networks, wide area
networks, etc. One skilled in the art will appreciate that network
communication may utilize various wired and/or wireless short range
or long range carriers and protocols, including radio frequency
(RF), satellite, microwave, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) 545.11, Bluetooth, optical, infrared, cable,
laser, etc.
[0143] The invention may be described by reference to or in
conjunction with associated data including functions, procedures,
data structures, application programs, instructions, etc. which,
when accessed by a machine, result in the machine performing tasks
or defining abstract data types or low-level hardware contexts.
Associated data may be stored in, for example, the volatile and/or
non-volatile memory, e.g., RAM, ROM, etc., or in other storage
devices and their associated storage media, including hard-drives,
floppy-disks, optical storage, tapes, flash memory, memory sticks,
digital video disks, biological storage, etc. Associated data may
be delivered over transmission environments, including the physical
and/or logical network, in the form of packets, serial data,
parallel data, propagated signals, etc., and may be used in a
compressed or encrypted format. Associated data may be used in a
distributed environment, and stored locally and/or remotely for
machine access.
[0144] Having described and illustrated the principles of the
invention with reference to illustrated embodiments, it will be
recognized that the illustrated embodiments may be modified in
arrangement and detail without departing from such principles, and
may be combined in any desired manner. And although the foregoing
discussion has focused on particular embodiments, other
configurations are contemplated. In particular, even though
expressions such as "according to an embodiment of the invention"
or the like are used herein, these phrases are meant to generally
reference embodiment possibilities, and are not intended to limit
the invention to particular embodiment configurations. As used
herein, these terms may reference the same or different embodiments
that are combinable into other embodiments.
[0145] Consequently, in view of the wide variety of permutations to
the embodiments described herein, this detailed description and
accompanying material is intended to be illustrative only, and
should not be taken as limiting the scope of the invention. What is
claimed as the invention, therefore, is all such modifications as
may come within the scope and spirit of the following claims and
equivalents thereto.
* * * * *