U.S. patent application number 13/444690 was filed with the patent office on 2012-10-04 for transportation security system and associated methods.
This patent application is currently assigned to Kirsen LLC. Invention is credited to KIRILL MOSTOV.
Application Number | 20120249326 13/444690 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 36815120 |
Filed Date | 2012-10-04 |
United States Patent
Application |
20120249326 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
MOSTOV; KIRILL |
October 4, 2012 |
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED METHODS
Abstract
A security system for monitoring a shipping container being
transported by a cargo transport vehicle has a Container Security
Device (CSD) removably coupled to a shipping container wall. The
CSD monitors cargo inside the container and detects intrusions into
the vehicle and damage to the container wall. The CSD includes an
anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller, and a communication device.
The microcontroller generates an alarm signal based on a signal
from the anti-tamper sensor and records container events. The
anti-temper sensor undergoes individual and integrated sensor
processing procedures. The integrated sensor processing procedure
determines the overall container alert status using an alarm signal
from at least one sensor. The system also has a Network Operations
Center (NOC) for communicating with a telecommunications network.
The NOC receives data from each CSD, includes a data storage medium
for storing sensor data, and has an archive of the container
events.
Inventors: |
MOSTOV; KIRILL; (Berkeley,
CA) |
Assignee: |
Kirsen LLC
Systems Microtechnologies, Inc.
|
Family ID: |
36815120 |
Appl. No.: |
13/444690 |
Filed: |
April 11, 2012 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
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13195637 |
Aug 1, 2011 |
8164458 |
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13444690 |
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11343560 |
Jan 30, 2006 |
7990270 |
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13195637 |
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60648260 |
Jan 28, 2005 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
340/539.17 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G08B 13/02 20130101;
G08B 25/08 20130101; G08B 25/10 20130101; G08B 25/009 20130101;
G08B 21/0269 20130101; G06Q 10/08 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
340/539.17 |
International
Class: |
G08B 13/22 20060101
G08B013/22; G08B 1/08 20060101 G08B001/08 |
Claims
1. A security system for monitoring at least one shipping container
being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle, the
system comprising: a Container Security Device (CSD) configured to
be removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container
wall thereby utilized for monitoring a cargo inside the container
and detection of intrusion violations accompanied with partial
destruction of the container wall when in a coupled condition, the
CSD including at least one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller
and a communication device; wherein the microcontroller generates
an alert status based on an output data generated by least one
anti-tamper sensor being subjected to an individual sensor
processing procedure and then to an integrated sensor processing
procedure, the integrated sensor processing procedure makes
determination of the overall container alert status based on the
output data from said at least one sensor; and a Network Operations
Center (NOC), the NOC including a NOC communications facility
configured to communicate with at least one telecommunication
network, the NOC being configured to receive data from each of a
plurality of the CSDs and including a data storage medium
configured to store sensor data and contained an archive of the
container events.
Description
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0001] This application is a continuation application of co-pending
U.S. application Ser. No. 13/195,637, filed on Aug. 1, 2011, which
is a continuation application of U.S. application Ser. No.
11/343,560, filed on Jan. 30, 2006, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,990,270,
which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No.
60/648,260, filed on Jan. 28, 2005. Priority to each of the prior
applications is expressly claimed, and the disclosures of the
applications are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their
entireties and for all purposes.
BACKGROUND
[0002] Cargo loss due to theft has become a serious problem. Cargo
is often misappropriated by shipping company employees, cargo
handlers, and/or security-personnel. Many insurance professionals
believe that more than half of all major cargo thefts are planned
in logistics departments, by employees at the shipper or
manufacturer who are thought to be trustworthy. Certain authorities
believe that gangs operating in many metropolitan areas are
actually training some of their members in logistics so that they
will be eligible for employment at desirable trucking, warehousing
or forwarding firms.
[0003] Because of the emergence of terrorist threats and
activities, container security has become a national security
issue. Terrorists are exploiting transportation modalities such as
air, rail, truck-trailer, vessel-barge and bus. As evidenced by
recent attacks, terrorists are directing, or seeking to direct,
mobile transportation assets into office building and/or other
heavily populated areas.
[0004] Shipping containers may also be used by terrorists for the
arms shipments. Of greatest concern is the shipment of nuclear,
chemical, or biological materials that can be used to produce
weapons of mass destruction. Some of these materials are relatively
small in size and could be hidden in shipping containers without
being detected by governmental authorities. If such weapons were to
fall into the wrong hands the results could be devastating.
[0005] With the above scenarios in mind, improving container
security is desired. In one approach that is commonly in use, a
locking mechanism or security seal are applied to-container doors,
to seal the cargo within the container. However, anyone who
possesses the key or the combination, whether authorized or not,
may gain access to the interior of a container. Further, the locks
can be easily picked or removed by-other means. Thus, locking
devices are a limited deterrent to thieves or terrorists.
[0006] In another approach an electronic seal ("e-seal") may be
applied to a container. These e-seals are similar to traditional
door seals and applied to the containers via the same, albeit weak,
door hasp mechanism. These e-seals include an electronic device,
such as a radio or radio reflective device that can transmit the
e-seal's serial number and a signal if the e-seal is cut or broken
after installation. However, the e-seal does not communicate with
the interior or contents of the container and does not transmit
information related to the interior or contents to other
devices.
[0007] The e-seal typically employs either a low power radio
transceiver or uses radio frequency backscatter techniques to
convey information from an e-seal to a reader installed at, for
example, a terminal gate. The radio frequency backscatter technique
involves use of a relatively expensive, narrow band, high-power
radio technology based on a combination of radar and radiobroadcast
technologies. The radio frequency backscatter technology requires
that a reader send a radio signal of relatively high transmitted
power (i.e., 0.5-3 W) that is reflected or scattered back to the
reader with modulated or encoded data from the e-seal.
[0008] Furthermore, the e-seals are not effective at monitoring
security of the container. For example, other methods of intrusion
into the container may occur (e.g. breaching other parts of the
container such as the side walls). Further, a biological agent may
be implanted into the container through the container's standard
air vents.
SUMMARY
[0009] Present worldwide transportation security system
(transportation security system) provides cost effective and
reliable system of and method for: (1) registering any event in
connection with breach of any wall in a container; (2) detecting an
opening, a closing and a removal of the container's doors; (3)
monitoring the condition of all seals and locks on the container;
(4) monitoring a cargo conditions inside the container; (5)
detecting human or an animal inside the container; (6) monitoring
the container's movement; (7) detecting weapons of mass destruction
in the container; (8) registration of movement inside the
container; (9) measuring cargo weight inside the container; (10)
registering environmental parameters inside the container
(temperature, humidity, smoke . . . etc.); and (11) simultaneously
providing means for tracking movements of the container for reasons
of security and logistic efficiency. The integrity system may
generate false alarms with the probability equal to or better than
of 10.sup.-5:10.sup.-6.
[0010] The transportation security system provides intermodal
threat identification, detection, and notification transportation
security system. The transportation security system may be applied
to all transpiration modalities including air, rail, truck, ship,
barge and bus transport modes. The instant security system provides
inexpensive means to monitoring each shipping container. Container
tempering may be detected and reported rapidly. Thus, present
transportation security system could be a credible defense
mechanism against terrorist attempts to smuggle weapons, weapons
materials, and/or terrorist personnel by preventing unauthorized
access to shipping containers. The threat of cargo theft or piracy
is also mitigated. Thus, present transportation security system
provides governmental and law enforcement agencies with the means
to respond, in real-time, to cargo theft, piracy, and/or terrorist
attacks.
[0011] One aspect of the present application is security system for
monitoring at least one shipping container. The system includes a
Container Security Device (CSD) configured to be removably coupled
to the at least one shipping container the CSD monitors a cargo
inside the container and detects intrusion the container. The CSD
includes at least one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a
communication device. The microcontroller generates an alert status
based on an output signals from at least one sensor. The output
signals may be subjected to an individual sensor processing
procedure and then to an integrated sensor processing procedure.
The integrated sensor processing procedure makes a decision of the
container alert status based on the output status of the at least
one sensor. A Network Operations Center (NOC) includes a NOC
communications facility configured to communicate with at least one
telecommunication network. The NOC being configured to receive data
from one or more CSDs. The NOC includes a data storage medium
configured to store sensor data and contained an archive of the
container events.
[0012] In another aspect, the present application includes a
transportation security system for monitoring a plurality of
shipping containers being transported by a plurality of cargo
transport vehicles. Each of the plurality of cargo vehicles
transports at least one shipping container. The system includes a
CSD removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping
container for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detection
of intrusion violations. The CSD includes at least one sensor. The
CSD also includes a microcontroller and communication device. The
system may also include a plurality of bridges. Each bridge of the
plurality of bridges may be disposed in one cargo transport
vehicle. Each bridge may include a communication system being
configured to communicate with the CSDs and a NOC. The bridge may
also include a data storage medium configured to store data
pertaining to container events. A NOC communicates with each of the
plurality of bridges and CSDs. The NOC may receive data from one or
more of the plurality of bridges and CSDs. The NOC includes a data
storage medium configured to store one or more of sensor data and
container events.
[0013] In another aspect, the present application includes a method
for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by
at least one cargo transport vehicle. The method includes providing
a CSD configured to be removably coupled to the at least one
shipping container for monitoring a cargo inside the container and
detecting intrusion violations. The CSD includes at least one
sensor. The CSD includes a microcontroller and a CSD communications
device. The method may also include sending output data obtained
from at least one sensor to the microcontroller.
[0014] In another aspect, the present application includes a method
for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by
at least one cargo transport vehicle from a point of origin to a
destination point. The method includes providing route data
corresponding to the path traversed by at least one cargo transport
vehicle from a point of origin to a destination point. An actual
position of at least one cargo vehicle is monitored to determine
whether the actual position of the vehicle corresponds to the route
data. An alert status condition is generated when the actual
position of the vehicle does not correspond to the route data. A
NOC is notified of the alert status.
[0015] In another aspect, the present application includes a
computer readable medium having stored thereon a data structure for
packetizing data transmitted between a CSD and a bridge. The CSD
being removably coupled to at least one shipping container disposed
on a cargo transport vehicle. The bridge is disposed on the cargo
transport vehicle. The data structure includes: a container CSD
identification field containing data that uniquely identifies the
container CSD; and a field containing either CSD status data or
bridge command data depending on a course of the packet.
[0016] In another aspect, the present application includes a
computer readable medium having stored thereon a data structure for
packetizing data being transmitted between a bridge and a NOC. The
bridge being configured to monitor at least one container CSD
configured to be removably coupled to the at least one freight
shipping container disposed on a cargo transport vehicle. The
bridge being disposed on the cargo transport vehicle. The data
structure includes: a bridge identification field containing data
that uniquely identifies the container CSD; and a field containing
either bridge-status or the NOC command data depending on the
source of the packet.
[0017] In another aspect, the present application includes a
personal conditions monitoring system. The system includes a
monitoring module. The monitoring module includes sensor array and
ADC. The system includes a communication subsystem and a power
subsystem with replaceable batteries. The communication subsystem
includes transceiver and antenna.
[0018] Additional features and advantages of the invention will be
set forth in the detailed description which follows, and in part
will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art from that
description or recognized by practicing the invention as described
herein, including the detailed description which follows, the
claims and the drawings.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0019] FIG. 1 shows one exemplary transportation security system in
accordance with one embodiment.
[0020] FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the transportation security
system depicted in FIG. 1.
[0021] FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a Container Security Device
(CSD).
[0022] FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method for
detecting and registering a container intrusion signal.
[0023] FIG. 5 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by accelerometer.
[0024] FIG. 6 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a light sensor.
[0025] FIG. 7 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a strain gage.
[0026] FIG. 8 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a smoke detector.
[0027] FIG. 9 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a humidity sensor.
[0028] FIG. 10 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a temperature
sensor.
[0029] FIG. 11 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a door-opening
sensor.
[0030] FIG. 12 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a microphone.
[0031] FIG. 13 is a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a UMPR.
[0032] FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating exemplary
parameters for measuring a digital signature.
[0033] FIG. 15 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary
Mass-tomograph in accordance with one embodiment.
[0034] FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph
depicted in FIG. 15 when the container is steady.
[0035] FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph
depicted in FIG. 15 when the container is moving.
[0036] FIG. 18 shows a block diagram of one exemplary bridge.
[0037] FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of the bridge, depicted in
FIG. 18, when stationary.
[0038] FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of one exemplary portative
bridge depicted in FIG. 18.
[0039] FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of one exemplary service
bridge depicted in FIG. 18.
[0040] FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary Network
Operations Center depicted in FIG. 1.
[0041] FIG. 23 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary NOC
server depicted in FIG. 22.
[0042] FIG. 24 shows a flowchart showing one exemplary method for
monitoring container integrity.
[0043] FIG. 25 shows a diagramed depiction of personal conditions
monitoring system.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0044] FIG. 1 shows one exemplary transportation security system
100 in accordance with one embodiment. Each mode of transportation
(e.g., transportation by ship) is monitored and tracked using
transportation security system 100. A ship 110 is illustratively
shown carrying a plurality of shipping containers 130. Each
shipping container 130 has a Container Security Device ("CSD") 140
that communicates with a Network Operations Center ("NOC") 170,
preferably via a Bridge 150. When the CSD 140 detects a break-in
violation, an alert status is generated and transmitted to NOC 170,
via the Bridge 150. The CSD 140 communicates with the Bridge 150
using an Unlicensed International Frequency Band Local Area
Communication Network 160C. However, if the CSD 140 unable to
communicate with the NOC 170 through the Bridge 150, the CSD 140
may communicate with the NOC 170 via a cellular communications
channel 160A or a satellite communication channel 160B. The alert
status generated by the CSD 140, when onboard a ship for example,
includes the identity of the container 130, in which also is
located, the location of the ship 110, the time and date of the
alert status generation, and a description of the alert status. The
NOC 170, upon receipt of the alert status, may either confirm or
reject the alert status. If the alert status is confirmed, the NOC
170 may generate an alarm signal.
[0045] FIG. 2 is a block diagram further illustrating the
transportation security system 100 of FIG. 1. In particular, FIG. 2
illustratively shows communication between CSD 140, NOC 170 and
Bridge 150 in further detail. In this example, the CSD 140 is shown
communicating with the NOC 170 via cellular 160A or satellite 160B
communications. The Bridge 150 is also shown communicate with the
NOC 170 via cellular 160A or satellite 160B connection. The Bridge
150 may also communicate with the NOC 170 via an Ethernet
connection 160D, for example.
[0046] FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrates one exemplary CSD 300.
CSD 300 may, for example, represent CSD 140 of FIG. 1. The CSD 300
includes a Sensor Block 310, a local alert mechanism 320, a
Microcontroller 330, a GPS receiver 340, a Cellular Modem 350A, a
Satellite Modem 350B, a wireless LAN (WLAN) Interface 350C, an
Antenna Block 360 and a Power Unit 370. The WLAN Interface 350C
uses one of the standard type Unlicensed International Frequency
transceiver like Bluetooth Zigbee etc.
[0047] The Sensor Block 310 is illustratively shown with a Light
Sensor 310A, a Capacity Proximity Sensor 310B, an Accelerometer
310C, a Micro Power Radar (MPR) 310D, an Inductive Sensor 310E, a
RFID reader 310F, a Strain Gage 310G. The Sensor Block 310 may also
include one or more of: a Piezosensor 310H, an Ultrasonic Sensor
3101, a Microphone 310P, an Ultrasound Micropower Radar (UMPR)
310J, an Infrared Sensor 310K, a Door Opening Sensor 310L, a Seal
Break Sensor 310M, a Sensor control parameters of surrounding 310N,
as shown in FIG. 4. Sensor control parameters of surroundings 310N
may include one or more of: a Temperature Sensor, a Smoke Detector
Sensor, a Humidity Sensor, etc. The Antenna block 360 includes a
GPS antenna 360A, a Cellular antenna 360B, a Satellite antenna
360C, and a low power LAN antenna 360D.
[0048] In one example of operation, microcontroller 330 monitors
output of sensor block 310 to determine an alert status. If an
alert status is determined, microcontroller 330 may provide
Cellular modem 350A, Satellite modem 350B and/or LAN interface 350C
with a formatted message packet. This message packet may, for
example, be transmitted from the Antenna block 360 to either the
Bridge 150 or the NOC 170. Transmission message packets from the
Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 (see FIG. 1 and FIG. 2) are received
by the Antenna block 360 and directed to one or more of the
Cellular modem 350A, the Satellite modem 350B and the LAN interface
350C. Microcontroller 330 may then process the Bridge 150 and/or
the NOC 170 message packet to receive information and/or
instructions from the NOC 170, for example.
[0049] FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method 399
for detecting and registering container intrusion signals (e.g.,
alert statuses). Accelerometer 310C, Piezosensor 310H and
Ultrasonic sensor 3101, Microphone 310P output signals are
monitored by the microcontroller 330, which thus identifies sensors
310 that exceed one or more pre-set threshold levels.
[0050] Once the container 130 is loaded with its payload, the
microcontroller 330 operates in a calibration mode. The container's
130 walls may be struck several time and `images` of these hits may
be recorded and stored in a pulling library of images 425 in the
microcontroller 330 for use as calibration images pertaining to
this particular container 130. In one example, one or more
exemplary images of intrusion or damage to the container 130 may
also be stored in the library of images 425.
[0051] The microcontroller 330 identifies signals that exceed
certain threshold levels. These signals may be separated by
microcontroller 330, in Step 400, into a single hit signal 405
and/or a series of hit signals 407. Within the microcontroller 330,
a Short Time Fast Fourier Analysis is used to process the single
hit signal 405, in Step 410, and a Wavelet analysis may also be
performed, in Step 415. An image of the single hit signal is then
created. Correlation Functions in Step 420 and Theory of Sample
Recognition in Step 430 are utilized to compare the hit image to
the exemplary images stored within the library of images 425. If
the microcontroller 330 determines that the single hit image
correlates with to the images of intrusion into a damaged
container, a majority voting algorithm is applied to the single hit
image. The majority voting algorithm is a part of an integrated
sensor processing procedure 470.
[0052] The majority voting algorithm is based on major voting mark
of unrelated criteria. Each criterion may be assigned positive
and/or negative points. When the majority voting algorithm is
applied to the image of the single hit signal the decision about
intrusion attempt is based on voting process based on sum of all
points given during processing of the hit signal image. If the sum
of total points given to the hit signal image indicates that an
intrusion attempt took place, the single hit image is further
subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470, which
makes a decision as to if intrusion occurred.
[0053] The majority voting algorithm may also be applied to the
series of hit signals 407 in Step 470. If the sum of total points
given during processing of the series of hit signals 407 indicates
that intrusion, or even an intrusion attempt, occurred, the series
of hit signals 407 are subjected to an integrated sensor processing
procedure 470 which makes a decision as to if the intrusion
occurred.
[0054] If the data processed by integrated sensor processing
procedure 470 is incomplete or inconsistent, this data is sent by
the CSD 140 to the NOC 170 for a further analysis. In this case the
NOC 170 (i.e., not the CSD 140) will make the decision as to if
intrusion occurred.
[0055] The microcontroller 330 may also utilize correlation
functions 420 to compare output from the Accelerometer 310C and
other sensors like the Piezosensor 310H and/or the Ultrasonic
sensor 3101 to an exemplary image that corresponds to a signal
generating by a metal cutting instrument, for example, stored in
the library of images 425. If, in Step 420, the microcontroller 330
determines that the intrusion signal 420 correlates to the stored
signal image generated by a metal cutting instrument 425, the
intrusion signal is then further subjected to an integrated sensor
processing procedure 470 that makes a decision as to if the
intrusion took place.
[0056] Output signals from the accelerometer 310C may also be
monitored by microcontroller 330 to detect vibration of the
container wall. Once a vibration signal 402 of the container wall
is detected by the microcontroller 330, the microcontroller 330 may
process, in step 403, the vibration signal 402 to produce a wavelet
analysis and a "window" Fourier analysis for comparison, in step
440, to one or more recorded images of library of images 425 to
determine which mode of transportation is used to move the
container 130. The integrated sensor processing procedure 470 may
then be applied to these signals to determine the mode of transport
or if an intrusion took place.
[0057] An output signal from the light sensor's 310A may be
monitored by the microcontroller 330 to determine intrusion or
fire. For example, if the microcontroller 330 determines that the
output signal indicates that the measured light within the
container exceeds a certain rate of change threshold, the
microcontroller 330 may initiate further analysis of the output
signal, and/or other sensor signals, to determine if an intrusion
is occurring, and/or if there is presence of smoke: If the
microcontroller 330 determines that an intrusion has occurred
and/or smoke is present, the output signal may be subjected to
further processing by the integrated sensor procedure 470 to make
the decision that intrusion occurred or not.
[0058] Output signals from the capacitive proximity sensor's 310B,
Strain gage 310G and RFID reader 310 F outputs also may be
monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect addition or removal
of objects from the container 130. The output signals may, for
example, be analyzed by the microcontroller 330, Step 445, to
detect change in the cargo mass. If change in cargo mass is
detected, the capacitive proximity sensor output may be subjected
to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 which makes a
decision about the alert status of the container 130.
[0059] An output signal from the capacitive proximity's sensor 310B
may be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to determine if any
objects are in close proximity to locks and seals of the container
130. If any objects are detected in close proximity to the locks
and the seals of the container 130, the output signals from one or
more sensors may be further analyzed within the microcontroller 330
to determine if a break-in has occurred. If a break-in is detected
by the microcontroller 330, further analysis of these signals may
be made by the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make a
decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
[0060] Output signals from sensors are monitored by the
microcontroller 330 in control parameters of surrounding 310N.
These sensors may, for example, include a temperature sensor that
produces an output signal which may be monitored by the
microcontroller 330 to detect thermal excursions outside one or
more predetermined temperature ranges and/or to detect rates of
change in temperature that occur outside one or more predefined
rates of change. If, for example, the microcontroller 330
determines that the sensed temperature is outside predetermined
temperature ranges and/or that the rate of temperature change if
outside these predetermined limits, output signals from one or more
sensors will be further analyzed by the integrated sensor procedure
470 to decide if an intrusion occurred.
[0061] In another example, an output signal from the smoke detector
sensor may be monitored to determine if chemicals are present
within the air, and/or air clarity inside the container 130 exceeds
a predefined threshold level. If, for example, a chemical is
detected within the air, output signals from one or more sensors
will be further analyzed by the integrated sensor processing
procedure 470 to make decision as to the container 130 alert
status.
[0062] In another example, an output signal from the UMPR 310J may
be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect presence of
humans or animals within the container 130. If, for example,
presence of humans and/or animals is detected, the output signals
from one or more sensors may be further processed by the integrated
sensor procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion
occurred. The UMPR 310J may, for example, utilize the Doppler's
effect to detect movement inside the container 130. The UMPR 310J
may, for example include an ultrasonic transceiver. This sensor may
also be used to detect force entry attempts into the container 130,
based upon registration of impact drilling, gas-cutting, etc., by
utilization of the UMPR 310J as a highly sensitive UMPR-based
microphone. The later purpose is accomplished by applying a
procedure to determine, in Step 460, the integrity of the
container's wall. If the UMPR 310J output data exceeds the
threshold determined in Steps 460 and 465, application of a
procedure to determine the integrity of the walls and the cargo
movement inside the container 130 may be applied. The output data
of one or more sensors may then be further analyzed within the
microcontroller 330 for presence of humans/animals or presence of
wall integrity failure. If, for example, presence of humans/animals
and/or wall destruction are detected, the output signals from one
or more sensors 310 are subjected to the integrated sensor
procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion
occurred.
[0063] Output signals from sensor MPR 310D may be processed to
produce a radioprint (e.g., radio-imprint) based upon locations of
the objects inside the container 130. The process of development of
devices of radio-imprint described in the Appendixes A. This
radioprint may be monitored by microcontroller 330 to detect
deviations in object location, by comparing the radioprint to an
initial radio print recorded during calibration, for example.
Radioprints are built based on the analysis of all reflected
signals, including signals reflected by objects that are not
located in the direct field of the sensor. If, for example,
microcontroller 330 detects deviation between a current radioprint
and the radioprint recorded during calibration, the radioprints and
output signals from other sensors may be subjected to the
integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to determine if an
intrusion occurred.
[0064] Output signals from the infrared sensor's 310K may be
monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect warm objects within
the container. If, for example, the microcontroller 330 detects a
warm object, the output signal from one or more sensors may be
further analyzed, in Step 465, within the microcontroller 330 to
determine the presence of humans or animals by applying procedures
that determines movement inside the container 130. If, for example,
humans or animals are detected, output signals from one or more
sensors may be subjected to the integrated procedure 470 to make a
decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
[0065] An output signal from the GPS receiver 340 may be monitored
to determine a location of the CSD 140, and further to determine if
this location differs from a programmed route for the container
130. If, for example, the microcontroller 330 determines that the
current location differs from the programmed route, the output
signal may be further analyzed, in Step 435, to determine deviation
from the programmed route. If, for example, significant deviation
from the programmed route is detected, the output signals from one
or more sensors may be subjected to the integrated sensor
processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion
occurred.
[0066] In another example, the door opening sensor 310L and the
seal break sensor 310M are monitored by the microcontroller 330 to
detect changes in integrity of the doors and seals of the container
130. If the microcontroller 330 detects changes in integrity, the
output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to the
integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to
if an intrusion occurred.
[0067] Considering the workload and low performance of standalone
CSD microprocessor stemming from strict limitations to its power
consumption, a simple accelerometer signal analysis algorithm could
often be employed to determine impacts against the structure of
secured container.
[0068] FIG. 5 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by accelerometer. In order
to save CSD power, accelerometer indications are monitored in two
modes: Standby and Active. In Standby mode, accelerometers are
being checked in equal time periods, with frequency FI about 100 Hz
in, instead of constant monitoring. Sensors go offline between
checkpoints, and module's microcontroller, if not being used,
enters sleep mode.
[0069] In Standby, the accelerometer's 310C indications are read in
time intervals dT=1/F1 in Step 501. Then the accelerometer 310C is
turned on and the microcontroller 330 is in Active mode in Step
502. Then the accelerometer's values are taken in Step 503. In Step
504 the accelerometer 310C is turned off. Based on values obtained,
an absolute value of apparent acceleration vector A= {square root
over (A.sub.x.sup.2+A.sub.r.sup.2+A.sub.z.sup.2)} and its deviation
from gravity vector D=A-1 are determined in Step 505. If D does not
exceed preset threshold P1 shown in Step 506, the CSD 140 remains
in Standby show in Step 507, otherwise it enters Active mode of
accelerometer indications monitoring. P1 should be .about.0.5
g.
[0070] In Active mode, accelerometers remain online from the moment
of mode entry show in Step 508 to the moment when D remains below
PI threshold shown in Step 513 for N measurement cycles as show in
Steps 514 and 515, when S (number of cycle when D less then P1)
exceeds N, then this in itself is the condition for exiting the
Active mode as shown in Step 516, then accelerometers 301C are
turned off. D is measured and determined in each measurement cycle
shown in Step 510 and Step 511 and its maximum value maxD is
recorded as shown in Step 509. MaxD is verified upon exiting the
Active mode. If the value MaxD exceeds P2 threshold as shown in
Step 517, the majority algorithm of the integrated sensor
processing procedure 470 indicates an impact against container's
structure and time and amplitude of hit have fixed value as shown
in Step 518. If, however, the value MaxD does not exceed the
threshold P2 microcontroller returns into the Standby mode as shown
in Step 519.
[0071] FIG. 6 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a light sensor. The
algorithm is used to determine breaking in the container by changed
light intensity inside the container as the result of both
penetration of outside light and light flashes occurring in metal
cutting tools operation.
[0072] The light sensor's 310A indications are read and analyzed
with frequency about 3 Hz as show in Step 601. Sampled sensor
signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of
sensor indications are eliminated as shown in Step 602. Filtered
signal A.sup.F is compared in two stages with original sensor
readings. If A.sup.F exceeds A* by more than 2% as show in Step
603, the integrated sensor procedure 470 reports potential breaking
in the container as show in Step 609. If A.sup.F exceeds A* by more
than 5% as shown in Step 604, the integrated sensor procedure 470
reports the break in the container 130 as shown in Step 605.
However, if A.sup.F does not exceed A* by more than 5% as shown in
Step 604 the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports
high chance of breaking in the container as show in Step 609. Light
sensor is recalibrated every 15 minutes in the process of its
monitoring as show in Steps 606, 607, 608 and 610. Recalibration is
required because containers are not hermetically sealed, due to
which light intensity inside of them could change in changing
outside light conditions (at day/night).
[0073] FIG. 7 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a strain gage. The
algorithm is used to record damage (alterations) to container
structure.
[0074] The strain gage 310G is queued with frequency about 1 kHz in
15 ms-long sessions shown in Step 701. Vector of measured results
A.sub.<15> is median filtered as shown in Step 702.
Measurement sessions occur with frequency about 3 Hz. Filtered
signal A.sup.F is compared in two stages with original sensor
readings A*. If A.sup.F exceeds A.sup.* by more than 1% as show in
Step 703, the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports
potential damage to container structure as shown in Step 707. If
A.sup.F exceeds A.sup.* by more than 3% as shown in Step 704, the
integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports the break in the
container 130 as shown in Step 708. However, if A.sup.F does not
exceed A* by more than 3% as shown in Step 704, the integrated
sensor processing procedure 470 reports potential damage to
container structure as shown in Step 707. Strain gage is
recalibrated hourly in the process of its monitoring as shown in
Steps 705, 706, 709 and 710. This is required because changing
ambient temperature (at day/night) causes strain of metal container
walls.
[0075] FIG. 8 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion by s smoke detector sensor. The
algorithm is used to determine smoke content in the container due
to fire or breaking in using metal cutting instruments.
[0076] The smoke detector sensor's 310N indications are read and
analyzed with frequency about 0.1 Hz shown in Step 801. Sampled
sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations
of sensor indications are eliminated shown in Step 802. Filtered
signal A.sup.F is compared in two stages with original sensor
readings A*. If A.sup.F exceeds A* by more than 3% shown in Step
803, the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports
potential smoke content inside the container shown in Step 805. If
A.sup.F exceeds A* by more than 10%, the integrated sensor
processing procedure reports smoke content inside the container
shown in Step 806. However, if A.sup.F does not exceed A* by more
than 10%, the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports
potential smoke content inside the container shown in Step 805. The
some detector sensor 310N is calibrated once during activation of
security module.
[0077] FIG. 9 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a humidity sensor. The
algorithm is used to record relative humidity inside the
container.
[0078] The humidity sensor's 310N indications are read and analyzed
with frequency about 0.1 Hz as shown in Step 901. Sampled sensor
signal is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of
sensor indications are eliminated shown in Step 902. Filtered
signal passes two-stage evaluation. If relative humidity exceeds
85% as shown in Step 903, the integrated sensor processing
procedure 470 reports increased humidity inside the container shown
in Step 906. If relative humidity exceeds 95% as shown in Step 904,
the integrated sensor processing procedure reports high humidity
inside the container as shown in Step 905. However, if relative
humidity does not exceed 95% as shown in Step 904, the integrated
sensor processing procedure 470 reports increased humidity inside
the container shown in Step 906.
[0079] FIG. 10 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a temperature sensor.
Aside from recording the temperature inside the container in order
to manage cargo storage conditions, the algorithm is able to
monitor the rate of temperature change.
[0080] The temperature sensor's 310N indications are read and
analyzed with frequency about 0.3 Hz as shown in Step 1001. Sampled
sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations
of sensor indications are eliminated as shown in Step 1002.
Filtered signal A.sup.F is compared in two stages with original
sensor readings A*. If A.sup.F exceeds A* by more than 2.degree. C.
shown in Step 1003, the integrated sensor processing procedure 470
reports temperature change inside the containers shown in Step
1007. If A.sup.F exceeds A* by more than 5.degree. C. as shown in
Step 1006, the integrated signal processing procedure 470 reports
drastic change of temperature inside the container shown in Step
1009. However, if A.sup.F does not exceed A* by more than 5.degree.
C. as shown in Step 1006, the integrated sensor processing
procedure 470 reports temperature change inside the containers
shown in Step 1007. Temperature sensor is recalibrated every 15
minutes in the process of its monitoring shown in Steps 1004, 1005,
1008 and 1110. Recalibration is required because containers heat up
and cool down in a broad temperature range during day/night
cycle.
[0081] FIG. 11 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by an incremental door
opening sensors. In order to obtain more reliable judgment, two
sensors are installed per container door.
[0082] The door opening sensors 310L are queued with frequency 0.3
Hz. In order to eliminate random errors, each sensor is queued
thrice as shown in Step 1101, after which each sensor's condition
is determined using majorization as part of the integrated sensor
processing procedure 470 as shown in Step 1102. Based on obtained
values, a judgment is drawn about condition of each container door
as shown in Step 1103. If both sensors indicate closed door as
shown in Step 1104, the door is reported to be closed. If both
sensors indicate opened door as shown in Step 1104, the door is
reported to be opened as shown in Step 1106. If sensor indications
are inconsistent, sensor signal processing procedure reports
potential opening of the door as shown in Step 1105.
[0083] FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal by a microphone, which
enables CSD to record noise caused by container breaking tools, and
to determine possible type of tool.
[0084] The microphone 310P is queued in sessions in 2 second
intervals. This saves CSD power while avoiding the danger of
missing the noise of tools' operation. Measurement session T lasts
0.2 seconds as shown in Step 1201. At the first level of
examination, amplitude of microphone signal is verified across the
entire frequency band. If input signal A.sub.inp is below preset
threshold A.sub.min as shown in Step 1202, subsequent signal
processing is skipped until next measurement cycle as shown in Step
1201. Otherwise, power of received signal
P A = 1 T .intg. T A inp 2 t ##EQU00001##
is evaluated. If signal power exceeds preset threshold
P.sub.A>P.sub.min judgment is drawn about presence of noise
correspondent to breaking in the container as shown in Step 1203.
Second level of processing takes place then, which includes
spectrum analysis of signal power in order to determine the type of
tool used to break in the container as show in Step 1205. In this
connection, bands exhibiting signal amplitude above preset
threshold A.sub.inp.sup.f>A.sub.min.sup.f are gated out across
the entire frequency range. Spectrum power of sound
P f = 1 T .DELTA. F .intg. .DELTA. F .intg. T A inp 2 t f
##EQU00002##
is calculated for gated bandwidth LIE. Through signal processing, a
spectrum power array at different frequency bands S is generated.
Each container-breaking tool is characterized by its own array of
sound spectrum power S.sub.i*, limited from below. Tool of breaking
is determined in comparing arrays S and S.sub.i*. If arrays S
included in an array of sound spectrum power Si as shown in Step
1205, then breaking took place and tool of breaking is recognized
as shown in Step 1207. However, if arrays S is not included in an
array of sound spectrum power S.sub.i as shown in Step 1205, then
breaking took place but tool of breaking is unknown as shown in
Step 1206.
[0085] FIG. 13 illustrates a flowchart of method of detecting and
registering a container intrusion signal based on UMPR. UMPR
enables to construct a unique digital imprint of container
interior, representing arrangement of items within radar coverage.
The imprint would change reflecting changes in arrangement of
interior items.
[0086] In order to obtain the imprint, the UMPR 310J emits 2
ms-long pulses in ultrasonic frequency, such as 40 kHz as shown in
Step 1301. Meanwhile, the UMPR 310J receiver stays idle. Emitted
signal reflects repeatedly from container interior items and then
returns to the UMPR 310J, where it is received by ultrasonic
receiver. Receiver goes online for 50 ms after the pulse has been
sent as shown in Step 1302. Changes in amplitude of received signal
for this period are the imprint of container interior.
[0087] In order to compare obtained imprint against reference one
(which was obtained at the beginning of the trip and store in the
pulling library of images 425), UMPR receiver signal is sampled
with at least double frequency of emitted signal. Obtained set of N
values Y.sub.<N>, is compared against reference imprint
X.sub.<N> using correlation functions as shown in Step 1303.
For example, a function could be used based on supposition that
actual imprint could be represented on the reference basis using
correlation factors A and B and expressed as Y.sub.i=AX.sub.i+B.
Correlation factors are derived from the system of equations
A = i = l N x i t = l N y i - N ? N x i y i ( i = l N x i ) 2 - N ?
N x i 2 ; B = l N ( i = l N y i - A i = l N x i ) . ? indicates
text missing or illegible when filed ##EQU00003##
Value of correlation function formulated using least-squares
method
F = ? N ( ? - ? - B ) 2 ##EQU00004## ? indicates text missing or
illegible when filed ##EQU00004.2##
is compared against the limit F.sub.MAX, and if the limit is
exceeded as shown in Step 1304, a judgment is drawn about changes
in container interior as shown in Step 1305.
[0088] The accelerometers 310C, as shown in FIG. 3, are included
within CSD 140 and are used to create a Digital Signature (DS) and
may be used to identify location of cargo within the container.
FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating exemplary parameters
that may be used to form this DS. In FIG. 14, the following
parameters characterizing a spatial distribution of the container
130, where M is the mass of the cargo, Rm represents the
coordinates of the center of mass within the body frame, which is
strictly connected with the container itself, Ix, Iy, Iz are
components of the container moment of inertia, which characterize
the mass distribution with respect to the center of mass.
[0089] DS is thus defined by these parameters set which may define
the expected motion of the container. Changes in one or more of
these measured parameters may, therefore, correspond to certain
events during cargo transportation. For example, if DS has not
changed, the cargo is intact. If, M and Ix, Iy, Iz are the same but
Rm has changed, the cargo may not be stolen or damaged, but may
have moved within the container 130 (i.e., the coordinates of the
center of mass Rm change as the cargo moves within the container).
It may, therefore, be necessary to check fastenings of the cargo
within the container. If, for example, parameter M does not change,
but parameters Ix, Iy, Iz and Rm have changed, it is probably that
the cargo has not been stolen (it can be precisely determined based
on the degree of the parameters change). However, it is also
possible that a partial destruction of the cargo took place (e.g.,
damage resulting from inaccurate unloading). Change of the moment
of inertia with respect to the center of mass may occur due to this
destruction. If all parameters of the DS have changed, it is likely
that the container has been tampered with. The determination of DS
allows not only to reveal theft without opening the container, but
may also provide continual monitoring of the cargo's condition.
[0090] The accelerometers 310C, as shown in FIG. 3, that are
included within the CSD 140, form a Mass-tomograph 1500, as shown
in FIG. 15. The plurality of accelerometers that form the
Mass-tomograph are coupled to walls of the container 130. The
Mass-tomograph 1500 is used to construct a spatial picture of mass
distribution within the container 130. In particular, FIG. 15 shows
a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph 1500 in
accordance with one embodiment. Mass-tomograph 1500 may, for
example, be used to subtract effects of the surroundings on the
accelerometers measurements. The initial calibration of
accelerometers may occur without any cargo in the container. A
second round of measurements may occur when an object or a cargo
(e.g., cargo 1510) is placed inside the container 130. The
calibration measurements of the accelerometers are subtracted from
the second round of measurements to eliminate influence of the
container itself, and the accelerometer measurements are thus only
determined for the object 1510 mass.
[0091] FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary
Mass-tomograph 1600 that is external to container 130 and when the
container 130 is in steady position. In this embodiment, the
Mass-tomograph is used as a device to obtain imaging of the
contents of the container. In this example, the mass-tomograph 1600
monitors the whole container 130. When the container 130 is in the
steady position the quality of the spatial mass distribution of the
container mass depends on two parameters: the accuracy of
accelerometers and the distance, laccel 1620, between adjacent
accelerometers 310C that form the Mass-tomograph 1600.
[0092] FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary
Mass-tomograph 1700 when the container 130 is moving.
Mass-tomograph 1700 may, for example represent mass-tomograph 1600,
FIG. 16. In this example, the mass-tomograph 1700 scans the
container 130, as the container 130 moves gradually through the
Mass-tomograph 1700; in this example the container 130 moves with a
steady speed Vcont 1720. In this example, a high quality spatial
mass distribution inside the container 130 may be determined, since
the quality of spatial mass distribution depends only on the
accuracy of accelerometers; the perceived distance laccel 1620
between adjacent accelerometers will be minimal due to the movement
of the container.
[0093] When the CSD 140 determines an overall container alert
signal based on the decision of the integrated sensor processing
procedure 470, shown in FIG. 4, the microcontroller 330 activates
one or more local alert mechanisms (e.g., sound devices 320A and/or
light device 320B, as shown in FIG. 3) that generate a local alarm
signal. The microcontroller 330 may also activate transceivers
350A-350C to transmit a message that includes this alert via
antennas 360B-360D to the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170. The
microcontroller 330 also determines time intervals used to activate
the transceivers 350A-350C during communication with the Bridge 150
or the NOC 170. In one example, these time intervals may be
determined by the NOC 170.
[0094] The CSD 140 may be coupled to the wall of the container 130
by Rare Earth Magnets, Double-Stick Tape and/or Hot-Glue.
[0095] The CSD 140 may be coupled to the wall of the container 130
by Rare Earth Magnets, Double-Stick Tape and/or Hot-Glue.
[0096] The power unit 370 of the CSD 140, as shown in FIG. 3, may
include one or more storage batteries 370A. The power unit 370 may
also be configured to receive electrical power from a power source
of the cargo transport vehicle. In this case, if the power source
is interrupted, the power unit 370 may revert to use of the storage
batteries 370A and/or solar power, for example. In the event of a
power interruption or if the storage battery charge falls below a
threshold level, the CSD 140 may transmit, via antennas 360, a
power interrupt alarm to the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170.
[0097] The microcontroller 330 may also implement power-management
techniques to reduce power consumption. For example, one or more
time window(s) may be specified, during initialization process or
via transceivers 350A-350C, to define activation times for one or
more components of CSD 140. When not operating, (i.e., when outside
the specified time windows, the CSD 140 may switch into a sleep
(suspend) mode to avoid unnecessary power utilization. In fact,
sleep mode may account for a significant part of the life of the
CSD 140; the CSD 140 may operate over several years without need of
storage battery replacement. In one example of operation, the CSD
140 remains awake (i.e., does not switch to sleep mode) when
communicating with the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170. If the CSD
140 does not receive a signal from the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170,
the CSD 140 will only stay awake as long as necessary to insure
that no signal is present during a time windows specified. The CSD
140 may also switch from sleep to awake mode if any one anti-tamper
sensor of block 310 exceeds a certain threshold level.
[0098] FIG. 18 shows a block diagram illustrating one exemplary
Bridge 1800. Bridge 1800 may, for example, represent bridge 150 of
FIG. 1. The Bridge 1800 includes a Microcontroller unit 1810, GPS
receiver 1830, Cellular Modem 1840A, Satellite Modem 184013, WLAN
Interface 1840C, ethernet interface 1850A, User interface 1850B,
External connection interface 1850C, Antennas Block 1860 and Power
Unit 1870. The block of Antennas 1860 includes GPS antenna 1860A,
Cellular antenna 1860B, Satellite antenna 1860C, and International
Frequency Band Local Area Communication antenna 1860D. The Cellular
modem 1840A is utilized to communicate with the NOC 170 via
cellular communication channel 160A, for example. The Satellite
modem 1840B is utilized to communicate with the NOC 170 via
satellite communication channel 160B, for example. The WLAN
interface 1840C is utilized to communicate with the CSD 140 via LAN
160C. The CSD 140 communicates to the NOC 170 via the Bridge 1800.
Communication from the CSD 140 to the NOC 170 is less costly when
the Bridge 1800 is utilized to relay the communication. In one
example, it saves energy compare to when the CSD communicates with
the NOC 170 directly via cellular or satellite communications
channels. In one example, the CSD 140 transmits the system status,
including any alert status, to the Bridge 1800 upon request of the
NOC 170.
[0099] The Bridge's 1800 includes a power unit 1870 which may
receive power from a power network 1870B. In the event that this
power network 1870B is interrupted, power unit 1870 may be
configured to switch over to utilize Storage batteries 1870A. This
power interruption may be detected by the microcontroller unit
1810, for example, which may transmit an alarm message to the NOC
170. The alarm message may, for example, identify the bridge 1800
by an identification code, the location of the ship provided by the
GPS receiver 1830, the date and time of the alarm, and further
description of the alarm event (e.g., loss of ship's power).
[0100] FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Stationary
Bridge 1900 according to one embodiment. The Stationary Bridge 1900
may be placed in the areas of high container concentration, such as
places of consolidation/deconsolidation of containers, ports,
terminals, etc. Stationary Bridge 1900 may be used for continuous
communication with the NOC 170. Stationary Bridge 1900 includes the
WLAN Interface 1910 and the Ethernet interface 1920. Stationary
Bridge 1900 may not include a user interface. Further, since the
geographical location of the Stationary Bridge 1900 remains the
same, it may not require a GPS receiver.
[0101] FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Portative
Bridge 2000 according to one embodiment. The Portative Bridge 2000
may be used where containers are transported, such as on ships,
trains, etc. The Portative Bridge 2000 includes a GPS receiver
2010, a Cellular Modem 2020A, a Satellite modem 2020B, a WLAN
2020C, an External connection interface 2030 and an Antenna Block
2060. In communicating with the NOC 170, the Portative Bridge 2000
uses cellular 160A and satellite 160B communication channels. The
Portative Bridge 2000 may not have a user interface.
[0102] FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Service
Bridge 2100 according to one embodiment. The Service Bridge 2100
may be used to support and communicate with one or more CSDs 140.
The Service Bridge 2100 may include a cellular modem 2120A, a
satellite-modem 2120B, a WLAN 2120C, a user interface 2130A, an
External connection interface 2130B and an Antenna block 2160. The
service Bridge 2100 may communicates with the NOC 170 via other
Stationary and/or Portative Bridges (e.g., portative bridge 1100)
using UBFT 160C and/or through the Cellular 160A and/or satellite
160B communication channels.
[0103] FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary NOC
2200. The NOC 2200 may, for example, represent NOC 170 of FIG. 1.
The NOC 2200 may include a plurality of terminals 2210 and servers
2220 interconnected via Internet 2250. The servers 2220 may include
a Data Base 2230. The data base 2230 may, for example, be used to
store sensor data and may contained archives of container events
received from one or more CSDs 140. The data base 2230 may also
store information pertaining to the location and condition of cargo
containers. The NOC 170 may use the services of a Commercial world
wide digital cellular communication operator 2260A, configured to
communicate with the CSD 140 and/or the Bridge 150 via the cellular
communication channels 160A. The NOC 170 may also use the service
of a Commercial world wide satellite digital communication operator
2260B that configured to communicate with the CSD 140 and/or the
Bridge 150 via satellite communication channels 160B.
[0104] FIG. 23 illustrates a more detailed diagram of the system
server 2220 and its interaction with other system elements. The
server is comprised of a software complex and the database 2230.
Generally, server includes following software: database, program
for communication with CSD 2380, programs for communication with
operator terminals 2350, and program for analysis of CSD sensor
data 2370.
[0105] The database 2230 contains identification and custom data of
secured objects, their condition, CSD operation parameters and
commands issued to security modules by system operators. The
database can also include data from CSD sensors for its further
detailed examination by server means.
[0106] The CSD communication program 2380 receives CSD data during
communication session established directly or via bridge, moves the
data to server database, extracts operator commands and required
service data from the database and sends them to modules.
[0107] The operator terminal communication program 2350 could be
used for data exchange with custom terminal programs installed on
user computers, or for development of web interface accessible by
any authorized user from any computer without dedicated software
installed. Accordingly, there can be two types of operator
terminals: computer with terminal application installed 2310 and/or
computer with a web browser 2330. The computer with terminal
application installed 2310 has the advantage of quick data
exchange. The computer with web browser 2330 provides easy access
to the system. Both applications handle operator commands issuing
to CSD, their saving in the database and transfer of information
about secured objects from database to operator terminals.
[0108] The CSD sensor data analysis program 2370 is used when CSD
software is incapable to process sensor data to the level
sufficient for deciding on condition of secured object due to its
limited computing performance. The CSD sensor data analysis program
extracts CSD sensor data from the database, processes it and
concludes about the condition of CSD and secured object.
Calculation results are stored in server database 2230.
[0109] FIG. 24 shows a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method
2399 for monitoring container integrity in accordance with one
embodiment. When production of the CSD 140 takes place, the CSD 140
gets initiated in step 2400. The initiation step 2400 includes a
data packet that is downloaded into CSD's 140 microcontroller 330.
The data packet includes certain parameters that remain unchanged
during the lifetime of the CSD 140. These parameters include an
identification code for the CSD 140, an address of a server that
may be used to communicate with the CSD, and associated parameters
of communication, etc. The initiation of the CSD 140 may, for
example, be done by the Bridge 150 or other equipment (not
shown).
[0110] The operation of the CSD 140 is cyclic. Each CSD cycle lasts
one container trip/route (i.e., from the moment of uploading to
before the unloading of the container 130). At the route start, the
CSD 140 is activated by the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170. During the
CSD activation, in Step 2402, the CSD's microcontroller 330 is
cleared of any previously stored information. New information
pertaining to the container's route and movement schedule, as well
as parameters and logic that use regimes pertaining to the
container's 130 safety, are downloaded into the microcontroller
330. The CSD is placed in the active mode, in Step 2402, by the
Bridge 150 or by the server 2220 of the NOC 170.
[0111] During the container's route, condition of the container 130
and its cargo are continually or periodically monitored. During the
container's 130 route the CSD microcontroller 330 checks for an
alert status from the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 in
Step 2404. Then, in Step 2406, the microcontroller 330 checks if it
is a time for the packet of the information pertaining to the
container's condition to be sent to the NOC 170. Then in Step 2408
the microcontroller 330 also checks if the request for
communication with the NOC 170 was received from the Bridge 150. If
the NOC 170 receives a message containing an alert status from the
CSD 140, the NOC 170 sends a request to the CSD's 140 GPS receiver
340. In response to this request, the GPS receiver determines the
geographical location of the CSD 140 in Step 2410, and sends this
location information to the microcontroller 330.
[0112] The CSD 140 may also determine its geographical location by
requesting location information from the bridge 150. The
microcontroller 330 may also periodically request location
information from either the GPS receiver 340 or the bridge 150.
When the microcontroller sends the request to the GPS receiver in
Step 2420, the GPS receiver 340 determines the geographical
position of the container 130 in Step 2422.
[0113] In Step 2412 the CSD 140 establishes connection to the NOC
170. The CSD 140 communicates with the NOC 170 through the Bridge
150 using Unlicensed International Frequency Band Local Area
Communication Network 160C. However, if the CSD 140 unable to
communicate with the NOC 170 through the Bridge 150, The CSD 140
may communicate with the NOC 170 via cellular communications
channels 160A or satellite communications channels 160B. The CSD's
communication via the Bridge 150 may be less expensive and may also
save energy, as compared to contacting the NOC 170 directly via
cellular 160A or satellite 160B communication channels.
[0114] During communication, in step 2412, between the CSD 140 and
the NOC 170, the CSD 140 sends the information packet to the NOC
170. This packet may include one or more of the transmission time,
the channel of communication, level of batteries charge, location
of the CSD etc. In response to this information the NOC 170
requests that the CSD 140 perform certain commands, in Step 2414,
pertaining to further operation of the CSD 140, including a regime
for monitoring containers safety, etc. I one example, the CSD 140
may receive a command from the NOC 170 to deactivate the CSD 140.
In step 2416 the CSD verifies that the received command is a
deactivation command and, if it is, the CSD deactivates in Step
2418; otherwise Steps 2404-2416 are performed continually until a
deactivation command is received. In one example, the CSD 140 may
deactivate at route completion before the cargo is unloaded. During
this deactivation period, the CSD 140 ceases to monitor containers
and cargo safety.
[0115] Proposed system could be employed not only for providing
security to general ISO containers, but also for ensuring safety of
other moving objects, such as vehicles, boats, etc., as well as of
remote fixed objects, e.g. country houses. The difference in these
cases is the mobile module at secured object.
[0116] FIG. 25 illustrates the diagram of one potential system
application--a personal conditions monitoring system 2500. The
system could be employed for monitoring health conditions and
accumulated workload of physically weakened persons, those in need
for constant medical supervision, as well as specialists directly
engaged in potentially dangerous activities. Examples include
military and special services personnel, professional drivers,
athletes, alpinis6, etc. Generally, security module could be used
for monitoring personal conditions, accumulated physical load, for
recording events occurred to the person (falling, impacts, changes
of position of the body, traveling in transport, etc.), as well as
for recording events in the immediate vicinity of the person
(gunshots, explosions, changes of temperature and humidity,
etc.).
[0117] Monitoring module, for example could be the CSD 140, which
includes: the sensor array 310 and ADC 320, computing subsystem
comprised of the microcontroller 330 and memory unit, communication
subsystem including the transceiver 350 and the antenna 360, and
power subsystem with replaceable batteries 370. The combination of
sensors is determined by the purpose of the module. For most
applications, the accelerometers 310C could be used as they enable
to monitor position and movement of a person, his pulse and a
number of events in the surroundings, and electrodes for measuring
amplitude-time parameters of heart biopotentials (ECG) and
electrical impedance of the body to automatically estimate
functional state of cardiovascular system on the basis of data
obtained in examination of electrical activity of the heart, type
of vegetative regulation of the rhythm and central gemodynamic
parameters obtained in automatic syndromal ECG diagnostics, heart
rate variability analysis and impedancegram analysis of the
body.
[0118] In its operation, monitoring module continuously monitors
sensor indications, performs initial processing of measured values,
concludes about the condition of the person or events occurred to
him, and sends data to the server 2220. Data is sent to server if
personal conditions have changed or when certain emergency events
occur, and periodically, e.g. hourly. Data is transferred over a
wireless Wi-Fi based link 160C or using cellular networks 160B. The
server 2220 receives information from the monitoring module 140,
performs its additional processing if necessary, and stores it in
the database 2230. In emergency cases, server sends SMS
notification to phone numbers specified for the person. Terminal
program displays all data on the terminal 2310 available at the
server in real-time, notifying operator in emergency if
necessary.
[0119] It should be noted that the matter contained in the above
description or shown in the accompanying drawings should be
interpreted as illustrative and not in a limited sense. The
following claims are intended to cover all generic and specific
features described herein, as well as all statements of the scope
of the present method and system, which, as a matter of language,
might be said to fall there between.
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