U.S. patent application number 12/902869 was filed with the patent office on 2011-02-03 for secure communication between a hardware device and a computer.
This patent application is currently assigned to Aladdin Europe GmbH. Invention is credited to Michael ZUNKE.
Application Number | 20110029774 12/902869 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 39762711 |
Filed Date | 2011-02-03 |
United States Patent
Application |
20110029774 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
ZUNKE; Michael |
February 3, 2011 |
SECURE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A HARDWARE DEVICE AND A COMPUTER
Abstract
A group of secret sets is provided, each set including a key and
an assigned identifier. The sets are stored in a secure hardware
device that can retrieve the key of any of the sets using the key's
corresponding identifier. A set is stored in an application, and
the application is executed on a computer coupled to the secure
device. The application defines a session key, encrypts the session
key using the key from the set stored in the application, generates
session data including the stored set's identifier and the
encrypted session key, and sends the session data to the secure
device. The secure device obtains from the session data the
encrypted session key and the identifier, retrieves the key
corresponding to the identifier, and uses the retrieved key to
decrypt the session key. The session key is then used to encrypt
and decrypt communications between the secure device and the
computer.
Inventors: |
ZUNKE; Michael; (Kirchheim,
DE) |
Correspondence
Address: |
DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH;ATTN: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP
ONE LOGAN SQUARE, SUITE 2000
PHILADELPHIA
PA
19103-6996
US
|
Assignee: |
Aladdin Europe GmbH
|
Family ID: |
39762711 |
Appl. No.: |
12/902869 |
Filed: |
October 12, 2010 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
|
|
11685223 |
Mar 13, 2007 |
7831051 |
|
|
12902869 |
|
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Current U.S.
Class: |
713/168 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L 9/0822 20130101;
Y04S 40/20 20130101; H04L 9/3271 20130101; H04L 9/0838 20130101;
H04L 9/0897 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
713/168 |
International
Class: |
H04L 9/32 20060101
H04L009/32 |
Claims
1. A method for secure communication between a secure hardware
device connected to a computer and said computer, said method
comprising: defining a group of secret sets including at least two
secret sets, each of which includes a secret and a corresponding
assigned identifier, storing the group of secret sets in a secure
hardware device, storing a first one of said secret sets in a first
application, and executing the first application on a computer
connected to the secure hardware device, determining a first
session key, and encrypting the first session key using the secret
from the first secret set stored in the first application to form
an encrypted first session key, generating first session key
indication data including the encrypted first session key and the
identifier of the first secret, and transmitting said first session
key indication data from the computer to the secure hardware
device, obtaining from the first session key indication data the
encrypted first session key and the identifier of the first secret,
retrieving the first secret using the obtained identifier,
decrypting the encrypted first session key using the retrieved
first secret, and using the first session key for encrypting and
decrypting data transmitted between the secure hardware device and
the computer.
2. The method of claim 1, comprising the steps of: storing a second
one of said secret sets in a second application, executing the
second application on a computer connected to the secure hardware
device, determining a second session key and encrypting the second
session key using the secret from the second secret set stored in
the second application to form an encrypted second session key.
generating second session key indication data including the
encrypted second session key and the identifier of the second
secret, transmitting said second session key indication data from
the computer to the secure hardware device, obtaining from the
second session key indication data the encrypted second session key
and the identifier of the second secret; retrieving the second
secret using the obtained identifier, decrypting the encrypted
second session key using the retrieved second secret, and using the
second session key for encrypting and decrypting data transmitted
between the secure hardware device and the computer.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first application performs
the steps of determining and encrypting the first session key and
generating the first session key indication data, and the secure
hardware device performs the steps of obtaining from the first
session key indication data the encrypted first session key and the
identifier of the first secret, retrieving the first secret using
the identifier, and decrypting the encrypted first session key
using the retrieved first secret.
4. The method of claim 2, wherein the second application performs
the steps of determining and encrypting the second session key and
generating the second session key indication data, and the secure
hardware device performs the steps of obtaining from the second
session key indication data the encrypted second session key and
the identifier of the second secret, retrieving the second secret
using the identifier, and decrypting the encrypted second session
key using the retrieved second secret.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the group of secret sets is
defined by encrypting each of a group of identifiers with a master
key using a symmetrical encryption method, and the master key is
stored, and the symmetrical encryption method is implemented, in
the secure hardware device.
6. The method of claim 2, wherein the second application is an
update for the first application.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the secret sets are assigned to
different levels., and once the secure hardware device has
retrieved the first secret using the obtained identifier the secure
hardware device does not accept secrets based on identifiers of
secret sets of a level lower than that of the first secret set.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the secret sets arc assigned to
different levels and the secure hardware device only accepts
secrets of secret sets of a level higher than a set first
level.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the first application generates
said first session key based on a first random value.
10. The method of claim 2, wherein the second application generates
said second session key based on a second random value.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure hardware device
transmits an authentication value to the first application, the
first application encrypts the authentication value using the
secret of said first secret set and transmits the encrypted
authentication value to the secure hardware device, the secure
hardware device decrypts the encrypted authentication value using
the retrieved secret of the first secret set and compares the
decrypted authentication value with the generated authentication
value and, only if both authentication values are identical, the
secure hardware device uses the first session key for encrypting
and decrypting.
12. The method of claim 2, wherein the secure hardware device
generates a second authentication value and transmits said second
authentication value to the second application, the second
application encrypts the received second authentication value with
the secret of the second secret set and transmits the encrypted
second authentication value to the secure hardware device, the
secure hardware device decrypts the encrypted second authentication
value with the retrieved secret of the second secret set and
compares the decrypted second authentication value with the
generated second authentication value and, only if both
authentication values are identical, the secure hardware device
uses the second session key for encrypting and decrypting.
13. The method of claim 1, wherein the group of secret sets is
defined such that it is impossible to derive a secret from a secret
set if only the identifier of said secret set is known.
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure hardware device is
used to prevent unauthorized use of said first application.
15. A method of establishing a secure communication channel in a
renewable manner between a secure hardware device connected to a
computer and said computer, wherein a group of secret sets
including at least two secret sets, each of which includes a secret
and a corresponding assigned identifier, is stored in the secure
hardware device, and a first one of said secret sets is stored in a
first application running on said computer, said method comprising:
said first application determining a first session key, and
encrypting the first session key using the secret from the first
secret set stored in the first application to form an encrypted
first session key, generating first session key indication data
including the encrypted first session key and the identifier of the
first secret, and transmitting said first session key indication
data to the secure hardware device, and said secure hardware device
obtaining from the first session key indication data the encrypted
first session key and the identifier of the first secret,
retrieving the first secret using the obtained identifier,
decrypting the encrypted first session key using the retrieved
first secret, and using the first session key for encrypting and
decrypting data transmitted between the secure hardware device and
the computer, wherein, for renewing the session key, a second
application with a second one of said secret sets is executed on a
computer connected to the secure hardware device, said second
application determining a second session key and encrypting the
second session key using the secret from the second secret set
stored in the second application to form an encrypted second
session key, generating second session key indication data
including the encrypted second session key and the identifier of
the second secret, and transmitting said second session key
indication data to the secure hardware device, said secure hardware
device obtaining from the second session key indication data the
encrypted second session key and the identifier of the second
secret; retrieving the second secret using the obtained identifier,
decrypting the encrypted second session key using the retrieved
second secret, and using the second session key for encrypting and
decrypting data transmitted between the secure hardware device and
the computer.
16. An apparatus for changing a session key for secure
communication between a secure hardware device connected to a
computer and said computer, said apparatus comprising: a key
generator which generates a group of secret sets including at least
two secret sets, each of which includes a secret and a
corresponding assigned identifier, a processor which stores the
group of secret sets in the secure hardware device, and a selector
which stores a first one of said secret sets in a first
application, wherein the first application which includes the first
secret set executes on a computer connected to the secure hardware
device, and determines a first session key, encrypts the first
session key using the secret from the first secret set stored in
the first application to form an encrypted first session key, and
generates first session key indication data including the encrypted
first session key and the identifier of said first secret and
transmits said first session key indication data to the secure
hardware device, and wherein the secure hardware device obtains
from the first session key indication data the encrypted first
session key and the identifier of the first secret, retrieves the
first secret using the obtained identifier, and decrypts the
encrypted first session key using the retrieved secret, wherein the
first session key is used for encrypting and decrypting data
transmitted between the secure hardware device and the computer,
and wherein the selector stores a second one of said secret sets in
a second application, which is executed on a computer connected to
the secure hardware device, wherein the second application
determines a second session key, encrypts the second session key
using the secret from the second secret set stored in the second
application to form an encrypted second session key, and generates
second session key indication data including the encrypted second
session key and the identifier of the second secret, and transmits
said second session key indication data to the secure hardware
device, which obtains from the second session key indication data
the encrypted second session key and the identifier of the second
secret, retrieves the second secret using the obtained identifier,
decrypts the encrypted second session key using the retrieved
second secret, and uses the second session key for encrypting and
decrypting data transmitted between the secure hardware device and
the computer.
17. The method of claim 1, further comprising: determining a new
session key, and encrypting the new session key using the secret
from the first secret set stored in the first application to form
an encrypted new session key, generating new session key indication
data including the encrypted new session key and the identifier of
the first secret, and transmitting said new session key indication
data from the computer to the secure hardware device, obtaining
from the new session key indication data the encrypted new session
key and the identifier of the first secret, retrieving the first
secret using the obtained identifier, decrypting the encrypted new
session key using the retrieved first secret, and using the new
session key for encrypting and decrypting data transmitted between
the secure hardware device and the computer.
Description
FIELD OF INVENTION
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of secure
communication in an insecure environment.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
[0002] There exists a need for secure communication in an insecure
environment between a secure hardware device connected to a
computer and the computer. For example for stopping illegal use,
copying and distribution of a software application it is known to
amend the software application before distribution such that the
software application can only be executed on the computer when the
secure hardware device is connected to the computer. However, the
secure hardware device is connected to the computer via a common
interface, e.g. a USB port, which itself is not secure, and a
cracker can eavesdrop on the data transmitted through the insecure
interface or channel, in order to crack the software
application.
[0003] Therefore, it is an object of the present invention to
provide an improved method for secure communication between a
secure hardware device connected to a computer and the
computer.
[0004] It is a further object of the present invention to provide
an apparatus for changing a shared secret for generating a session
key for secure communication between a secure hardware device
connected to a computer and the computer.
[0005] Other objects and advantages of the invention will become
apparent as the description proceeds.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0006] In one aspect, the present invention is directed to a method
for secure communication between a secure hardware device connected
to the computer and the computer, the method comprising the steps
of:
[0007] a) defining a group of secret sets including at least two
secret sets, each of which includes a secret and an assigned
identifier,
[0008] b) storing the group of secret sets in the secure hardware
device in such a manner that the secure hardware device can
retrieve the secret of any of said secret sets from the assigned
identifier,
[0009] c) selecting a first one of said secret sets and storing
said selected first secret set in a first application,
[0010] d) delivering the first application which includes the first
secret set to a user who executes the first application on a
computer being connected to the secure hardware device,
[0011] e) wherein the first application defines a first session key
and generates first session key indication data based on the first
secret set, said first session key indication data including the
identifier of the first secret set as the only element from the
first secret set, and transmits said first session key indication
data to the secure hardware device, which retrieves, as a first
secret, the secret of the first secret set based on the identifier
included in the first session key indication data and further
retrieves the first session key from said first session key
indication data based on the first secret, so that for secure
communication the first session key for encrypting and decrypting
of data to be transmitted through the channel is shared.
[0012] With this method it is possible to share the first session
key in a secure manner through an insecure communication channel
between the secure hardware device and the computer. The thus
shared first session key can then be used by the first application
and the secure hardware device for encrypting and decrypting of the
data to be transmitted through an insecure environment between the
secure hardware device and the first application (computer).
[0013] The method can further comprise the steps of:
[0014] f) selecting a second one of said secret sets and storing
said selected second secret set in a second application,
[0015] g) delivering said second application to said user executing
the second application on a computer connected to the secure
hardware device,
[0016] h) wherein the second application defines a second session
key and generates second session key indication data based on the
second secret set, said second session key indication data
including the identifier of the second secret set as the only
element from the second secret set, and transmits said second
session key indication data to the secure hardware device, which
retrieves, as a second secret, the secret of the second secret set
based on the identifier included in the second session key
indication data and further retrieves the second session key from
said second session key indication data based on the second
secret.
[0017] With these steps it is possible, to change the shared secret
for generating or defining a session key without having to change
anything in the secure hardware device Therefore, even if the
secure hardware device is in the possession of the user, the shared
secret can be changed in a secure manner.
[0018] Further, it is possible that in step e) [0019] the first
application encrypts the generated first session key with the
secret of the first secret set and transmits the identifier of the
first secret set together with the encrypted first session key as
said first session key indication data to said hardware device, and
[0020] the secure hardware device decrypts the encrypted first
session key using the retrieved first secret.
[0021] It is further possible, that in step h) [0022] the second
application encrypts the generated second session key with the
secret of the second secret set and transmits the identifier of the
second secret set together with the encrypted second session key as
said second session key indication data to said hardware device,
and [0023] the secure hardware device decrypts the encrypted second
session key using the retrieved second secret.
[0024] Due to the encryption of the session key to be transmitted,
it can be ensured that the session key is shared in a secure
manner, even if the transmission is carried out in an insecure
environment.
[0025] In a preferred embodiment in step a) the group of secret
sets is defined by encrypting each of a group of identifiers by a
master key using a symmetrical encryption method, and in step b)
the master key is stored and the symmetrical encryption method is
implemented in the secure hardware device. With these steps it is
possible to minimize the processing power compared with an
asymmetric encryption/decryption method. Further the storage
requirements in the secure hardware device are minimized, since for
storing the group of secret sets in the secure hardware device only
the master key is to be stored and the encryption method is to be
implemented and, for example, no table including all secret sets
has to be stored in the secure hardware device.
[0026] In step b) the group of secrets can be stored in a
dynamically manner such that the secure hardware device can compute
the secret based on the identifier included in the session key
indication data. An example for such a dynamically manner is the
use of an encryption/decryption method, which can be realized as a
symmetrical or asymmetrical method.
[0027] Further, it is possible to use and implement a pseudo random
generator, which generates a series of random values which are no
predictable, if one knows at least one random value of the series
In other words, it is not possible to derive any random value of
the series from a known value of the series. However, the series of
random values depends on the starting conditions and is always the
same for one specific starting condition. Therefore, the starting
conditions of the pseudo random generator for defining the group of
secrets in step a) are also used as starting conditions for the
pseudo random generator implemented in the secure hardware device
(both pseudo random generators for steps a) and e) correspond each
other in function), so that the identifier, for example, can be
used as indicator for the x.sup.th random number of the series (for
example the first, second, third, random number).
[0028] It is further possible to realize the dynamically stored
group of the secrets by a hash function implemented in the secure
hardware device and a master key stored in the secure hardware
device. The secrets of the group of secrets are defined in step a)
by using the same hash function and the same master key and the
corresponding identifiers, so that the secret of specific secret
set can be derived in the secure hardware device by carrying out
the hash function with the transmitted identifier and the stored
master key.
[0029] Of course, it is possible to store the group of secret sets
in the secure hardware device in a static manner, for example as
look-up table In this case, the secure hardware device only reads
out the entry in the look-up table which is stored for the
transmitted identifier. Therefore, the method can be Implemented
even in secure hardware devices having weak processing power.
[0030] The second application delivered in step g) can be an update
for the first application running on the computer. Further, it is
possible that a second application delivered in step g) is a
separate application.
[0031] The secret sets can be assigned to different levels and once
a secure hardware device has retrieved a secret based on an
identifier of a secret set of a first level the secure hardware
device does not accept secrets based on identifiers of secret sets
of a level lower than the first level. If the secure hardware
device does not accept a secret, the secure hardware device does
not use the secret for retrieving a session key so that sharing a
session key for a secure communication was not successful.
[0032] Further, the secret sets can be assigned to different levels
and in the secure hardware device, which is in the possession of
the user, a first level can be set so that the secure hardware
device only accepts secrets based on identifiers of secret sets of
a level. higher than the said first level
[0033] In the method the first application can generate a random
value as the session key. Further, also the second application can
generate a random value as a session key. The random value can be a
string, a figure, or any other value which can be computed.
[0034] In a further embodiment of the method an authentication
procedure for the application communicating with the secure
hardware device can be implemented. For authentication the secure
hardware device generates an authentication value and transmits the
authentication value to the first or second application, the first
or second application encrypts the received authentication value
with the secret of the first or second secret set, respectively,
and transmits the encrypted authentication value to the secure
hardware device, which decrypts the encrypted authentication value
with the first or second secret, respectively, and compares the
decrypted authentication value with the generated authentication
value and, only if those authentication values are identical, the
secure hardware device uses the session key for encrypting and
decrypting By these steps it can be ensured that the secure
hardware device is really communicating with the first or second
application, respectively.
[0035] The authentication value can be a random value generated by
the secure hardware device.
[0036] Preferably, the group of secret sets is defined in step a)
such that it is impossible to derive a secret if only the
identifier of the secret set is known.
[0037] Further, the secure hardware device can be used to avoid
unauthorized use of the first and second application,
respectively.
[0038] In another preferred aspect, the present invention is
directed to .a method of establishing a secure communication
channel in a renewable manner between a secure hardware device
connected to a computer and said computer,
[0039] wherein a group of secret sets including at least two secret
sets, each of which includes a secret and an assigned identifier,
is stored in the secure hardware device in such a manner that the
secure hardware device can retrieve the secret of any of said
secret sets from the assigned identifier, and
[0040] a first one of said secret sets is stored in a first
application running on said computer, said method comprising the
steps of:
[0041] A) said first application defining a first session key and
generating first session key indication data based on the first
secret sets, said first session key indication data including the
identifier of the first secret set as the only element from the
first secret set, and transmitting said first session key
indication data to the secure hardware device,
[0042] B) said secure hardware device retrieving, as a first
secret, the secret of the first secret set based on the identifier
included in the first session key indication data and further
retrieving the first session key from said first session key
indication data based on the first secret, so that for the secure
communication channel the first session key for encrypting and
decrypting of data to be transmitted through the channel is shared,
wherein, for renewing the secure communication channel,
[0043] C) a second application with a second one of said secret
sets is executed on the computer connected to the secure hardware
device,
[0044] D) said second application defining a second session key and
generating a second session key indication data based on the second
secret set, said second session key indication data including the
identifier of the second secret set as the only element from the
second secret set, and said second session key indication data is
transmitted to the secure hardware device,
[0045] E) said secure hardware device retrieves, as a second
secret, the secret of the second secret set based on the identifier
included in the second session key indication data and further
retrieves the second session key from said second session key
indication data based on the second secret, so that for the secure
communication channel the second session key for encrypting and
decrypting of data to be transmitted through the channel is
shared.
[0046] By this method it is possible to renew the shared secret
between the application and the secure hardware device which is
needed to share the session key in a secure manner.
[0047] In step B) it is possible that the first application
encrypts the generated first session key with said first secret and
transmits the identifier of the first secret set together with the
encrypted first session key as said first session key indication
data to said hardware device through an insecure environment, and
that the secure hardware device decrypts the encrypted first
session key using the retrieved first secret
[0048] Further, it is possible that in step D) the second
application encrypts the generated second session key with the
secret of the second secret set and transmits the identifier of the
second secret set together with the encrypted second session key as
said second session key indication data to said secure hardware
device through an insecure environment, and that the secure
hardware device decrypts the encrypted second session key using the
retrieved second secret.
[0049] Further, the group of secret sets can be defined by
encrypting each of a group of identifiers with a master key using a
symmetrical encryption method and the master key is stored and the
symmetrical encryption method is implemented in the secure hardware
device.
[0050] The second application of step C) can be an update for the
first application or can be a separate application.
[0051] The secret sets can be assigned to different levels and once
the secure hardware device has retrieved a secret based on an
identifier of a secret set of a first level the secure hardware
device does not accept secrets based on identifiers of secret sets
of a level lower than the first level
[0052] The secret sets can be assigned to different levels and in
the secure hardware device, which is in the possession of the user,
a first level can be set so that the secure hardware device only
accepts secrets based on identifiers of secret sets of the level
higher than the said first level
[0053] As the session key defined in step A) or D) a random value
can be used.
[0054] In the method there can be further steps for authentication
of the first and second application, respectively.
[0055] For example, the authentication procedure for the
application communicating with the secure hardware device can be
implemented as follows: The secure hardware device generates an
authentication value and transmits the authentication value to the
first or second application, the first or second application
encrypts the received authentication value with the secret of the
first or second secret set, respectively, and transmits the
encrypted authentication value to the secure hardware device, which
decrypts the encrypted authentication value with the first or
second secret, respectively, and compares the decrypted
authentication value with the generated authentication value and,
only if both authentication values are identical, the secure
hardware device uses the session key for encrypting and decrypting.
By these steps it can be ensured that the secure hardware device is
really communicating with the first or second application,
respectively
[0056] The authentication value can be a random value generated by
the secure hardware device.
[0057] The group of secret sets is preferably defined such that it
is impossible to derive a secret from a secret set if only the
identifier of the secret set is known.
[0058] The secure hardware device is preferably used to avoid
unauthorized use of the first and second application,
respectively.
[0059] In the above described methods it is possible that the
secret itself retrieved by the secure hardware device based on the
identifier included in the session key indication data is used as
session key. In this case the step of retrieving the secret and the
step of retrieving the session key from the session key indication
data are in fact one single step
[0060] In a further aspect, the present invention is directed to an
apparatus for changing a shared secret for generating a session key
for secure communication between a secure hardware device connected
to a computer and said computer, said apparatus comprising a key
generator which generates a group of secret sets including at least
two secret sets, each of which includes a secret and an assigned
identifier, stores the group of secret sets in the secure hardware
device in such a manner that the secure hardware device can
retrieve the secret of any of said secret sets from the assigned
identifier, and selects a first one of said secret sets and stores
said selected first secret set in a first application, wherein the
first application which includes the first secret set is delivered
to a user who executes the first application on a computer being
connected to the secure hardware device, wherein, in order to
define and share a session key for secure communication, the first
application defines a first session key and generates first session
key indication data based on the first secret set, said first
session key indication data including the identifier of the first
secret set as the only element from the first secret set, and
transmits said first session key indication data to the secure
hardware device, which can retrieve, as a first secret, the secret
of the first secret set based on the identifier include in the
first session key indication data, and can further retrieve the
first session key from said first session key indication data based
on the first secret, and wherein the key generator selects a second
one of said secret sets and stores said selected second secret set
in a second application, which is delivered to said user executing
the second application on a computer connected to the secure
hardware device, wherein, in order to define and share a session
key for secure communication, the second application defines a
second session key and generates second session key indication data
based on the second secret set, said second session key indication
data including the identifier of the second secret set as the only
element from the second secret set, and transmits said second
session key indication data to the secure hardware device, which
can retrieve, as a second secret, the secret of the second secret
set based on the identifier Included in the second secret set
indication data and can further retrieve the second session key
from said second session key indication data based on the second
secret
[0061] In preferred embodiments the apparatus can be further
embodied such that the above described methods as well as the
further embodiments of the methods can be realized.
[0062] It is understood that the features mentioned above and those
yet to be explained below can be used not only in the respective
combinations indicated, but also in other combinations or in
isolation, without leaving the context of the present
invention.
BRIEF DESCRPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0063] The present invention may be better understood in
conjunction with the following Figures:
[0064] FIG. 1 schematically illustrates a system for secure
communication through an insecure communication channel.
[0065] FIG. 2 is a flowchart explaining steps of a method for
secure communication.
[0066] FIG. 3 is a flowchart explaining further steps of the method
for secure communication.
[0067] FIG. 4 is a flowchart of another embodiment of the method
for secure communication.
[0068] FIG. 5 is a flowchart of further steps of the further
embodiment described in FIG. 4
[0069] FIG. 6 is a flowchart describing an authentication
procedure.
[0070] FIG. 7 is a flowchart describing another preferred
embodiment of secure communication.
[0071] FIG. 8 schematically illustrates a computer for carrying out
steps of the method according to the preferred embodiments.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0072] FIG. 1 schematically illustrates a system for secure
communication in an untrusted and insecure environment. The system
comprises a computer 1 connected to a secure hardware device 2. On
the computer 1 a software application 3 is running which is
communicating with the secure hardware device 2 through an insecure
communication channel 4. The communication channel 4 is insecure
since the secure hardware device 2 as well as the computer 1 are in
the possession of a user and the hardware device 2 is connected to
the computer 1 via a common interface 5, e.g a USB port. Therefore,
the user can eavesdrop on the communication between the hardware
device 2 and the application 3.
[0073] In this embodiment, the secure hardware device 2 is used to
avoid unauthorized use of the software application 3 and uses a
symmetric encryption algorithm for communicating through the
insecure channel 4. The secure hardware device 2 has a
hardware-based encryption engine. During the runtime of the
protected application 3 the secure hardware device 2 receives
encrypted strings or data from the protected application 3. The
encrypted strings or data are encrypted with a session key defined
by the first software application 3 using the same symmetric
encryption algorithm as implemented in the secure hardware device
2. The secure hardware device 2 decrypts the received encrypted
strings or data and uses the decrypted strings or data to check
whether or not the user is authorized to use the application 3 (or
parts thereof). The necessary authorization is transmitted from the
secure hardware device 2 to the application 3 in encrypted form
using the session key.
[0074] Secure communication can be provided using the session key
for encrypting and decrypting data to be transmitted through the
insecure communication channel 4 However, the session key used for
encryption has to be shared in a secure manner.
[0075] In order to be able to share the session key in a secure
manner through the insecure communication channel 4 the software
publisher or vendor of the software application 3 carries out the
following steps (FIG. 2) before delivering the application 3 and
the secure hardware device 2 to the user, who will use the first
software application 3 and the secure hardware device 2 in the
manner illustrated in FIG. 1.
[0076] As shown in the flow chart of FIG. 2 a group of secret sets
including at least two secret sets (in this embodiment three secret
sets), each of which includes a secret and an assigned identifier,
is defined. This is done by selecting a symmetric cryptographic
algorithm (ENC(,), ENG.sup.-1(,)) by selecting a master key MK and
by defining a set of identifiers I1, I2, I3.
[0077] With the cryptographic algorithm it is possible to generate
encrypted data (ENC_data) encrypted with a selected key
(ENC(key,data)=ENC_data). The encrypted data ENC_data can be
decrypted by the reverse operation ENG.sup.- (key,ENC_data)=data.
Using the master key MK as key and the identifiers I1, I2, I3 as
data it is possible to generate secrets K1, K2, K3 (encrypted
identifiers II, I2, I3, e.g. ENC(MK,I1)=ENC_I1=K1). In this manner
it is possible to generate three secret sets, namely (K1, I1), (K2,
I2) and (K3, I3).
[0078] In the following step S2 the master key MK is stored in the
secure hardware device and the symmetric cryptographic algorithm
(ENC(,), ENC-1(,)) is implemented in the secure hardware device.
The hardware device 2 is considered to be secure since the master
key MK is stored in the hardware device 2 in a place which is
secure and is inaccessible for a cracker.
[0079] In step S3 a first one of the secret sets is selected (here
the secret set including the first secret K1 and the first
identifier I1) and is stored In the first application 3 Further,
the symmetric cryptographic algorithm is implemented in the
software application 3
[0080] Then, the thus protected software application 3 and the
secure hardware device 2 are delivered to the user (step S4) who
will connect the secure hardware device 2 with the computer 1 on
which he will execute the software application 3.
[0081] When the user starts the software application 3 for
execution, it will be first checked whether or not the user is
authorized to use the software application 3. This check requires
communication between the software application 3 and the secure
hardware device 2 through the insecure communication channel 4. In
order to protect this communication against eavesdropping the
communication will be encrypted with a session key in the following
manner
[0082] The application 3 generates a random value R (step S5 in
FIG. 3)
[0083] The application 3 encrypts the generated random value R
using the first secret K1 stored in the application 3 so that an
encrypt random value ENC_R is obtained (step S6).
[0084] The application transmits the encrypt random value ENC_R
together with the identifier I1 as session key indication data to
the secure hardware device 2 through the insecure communication
channel 4 (step S7).
[0085] The secure hardware device 2 retrieves the first secret K1
used for encrypting the random value R by encrypting the received
first identifier I1 with the master key MK stored in the secure
hardware device 2 (step S8).
[0086] Using the thus obtained first secret K1 the secure hardware
device 2 decrypts the encrypted random value (ENC.sup.-1 (K1,
ENC_R)=R; step S9), so that the secure hardware device 2 knows the
random value.
[0087] As a result of the steps S5 to S9 the session key (random
value R) generated, by the application 3 is shared with the secure
hardware device 2. Even if an eavesdropper has recorded the
transmitted first identifier I1 and the encrypted random ENC_R the
eavesdropper cannot retrieve the random value R used as the session
key. Therefore, using the session key R for decrypting and
encrypting the data to be transmitted to the insecure channel leads
to secure communication through the insecure communication channel
4 between the secure hardware device 2 and the application 3.
[0088] Of course, it is possible to limit the validity of the
session key with respect to time, transmitted data volume, and so
on. In this case, a new session key (new random value) can be
generated and shared by carrying out the above described steps S5
to S9.
[0089] In the above described embodiment the first secret K1 stored
in the application 3 is always needed to share the session key
generated by the application 3 with the secure hardware device 2 in
a secure manner. Since the application 3 is in the possession of
the user and a first secret K1 cannot be stored in an absolutely
secure manner in the application 3 it has to be assumed that the
secrecy of the secret K1 is limited in time. If, however, secrecy
has been compromised by a cracker the encrypted communication
through the insecure communication channel 4 is no longer
secure.
[0090] In this case it is possible to update the application 3 such
that the updated application 3' includes a second one of the secret
sets of the group of secret sets defined in step S1, e g second
secret K2 and second identifier I2. In order to update the
application 3 and include the second secret set, the vendor or
software publisher only needs to generate the updated application
3' (step S10 in FIG. 4), to select a second one of the secret sets
defined in step S1, e.g. K2 and I2 (step S11 in FIG. 4), store the
selected second secret set in the updated application and implement
the defined cryptographic algorithm in the updated application 3'
(step S12) and deliver the updated application 3' to the user (step
S13). It is not necessary to carry out any amendments in the secure
hardware device 2 which is already in the possession of the user.
An update of the secure hardware device 2 would lead to a more
complicated update procedure compared to a simple update of the
application 3.
[0091] In order to update the application 3 it is also possible to
generate a software update module (instead of a complete updated
software 3') in which software update module the selected secret
set is stored in step S12. In this case the software update module
including the second secret set is delivered to the user in step
S13 and the software update module, when executed, generates
together with the already installed application 3 the updated
software application 3'.
[0092] Further, it is also possible to use step S10 to generate
another software application which is not related to the software
application 3 Thus, it is possible to use the secure hardware
device 2 which is already in the possession of the user, for secure
communication between the other software application and the secure
hardware device 2 based on the second secret set without having to
carry out any amendment in the secure hardware device 2.
[0093] If the updated application 3' is started (cf. FIG. 5) and
random value R' is generated (step 14) basically the same steps as
described in connection with FIG. 3 are carried out. However,
instead of using the first secret K1 for encrypting the random
value R', the random value R' is encrypted with the second secret
K2 (cf. step S15 in the flow chart of FIG. 5). Further, the
encrypted random value ENC-R' is transmitted together with the
second identifier I2 to the secure hardware device 2 in step S16.
The secure hardware device 2 retrieves the second secret K2 using
the second identifier I2 (step S17) and obtains the random value R'
by decrypting the encrypted random value ENC_R' using the second
secret K2 (step S18).
[0094] Since the cracker only knows the first secret S1 and it is
not possible to derive the second secret S2 from the first secret
Si the cracker does not benefit from cracking the application 3 for
the updated application 3' so that the cracker is forced to crack
also the updated application 3'
[0095] It is further possible to include steps in which the
application or updated application authenticates itself for the
secure hardware device. Such steps can be carried out after step S9
in FIG. 3 or step S18 in FIG. 5. In order to authenticate the
secure hardware device 2 generates a random value RS (step 519 in
FIG. 6) and transmits the random value RS to the application (step
S20). The application generates an encrypted random value ENC_RS by
encrypting the random value RS with the corresponding secret K1,
K2, respectively, stored in the application and transmits the
encrypted random value ENC_RS to the secure hardware device 2 (step
S21). The secure hardware device 2 decrypts the encrypted random
value ENC_RS with the retrieved secret K1, K2, respectively, of
step S8 or S17 and compares the decrypted random value with the
random value RS generated (step S22). If both values are identical,
it can be assumed that the application really includes the first or
second secret K1, K2, respectively, and is communicating with the
secure hardware device 2 because only if it includes said secret K1
or K2 is the application able to correctly encrypt a value (random
value RS) which cannot be influenced by the application.
[0096] In a further embodiment the secret sets are assigned to
different levels and the secret sets are selected in the steps S3
and S10 in the order of the levels, i.e. the lowest level is
selected first and the next level is selected in the next selection
In the secure hardware device 2 it is implemented (for example in
step S2) that before retrieving a secret it is checked whether the
secure hardware device has already retrieved a secret based on an
identifier of a secret set of a level higher than the level of the
identifier received. If this is true, the secure hardware device 2
stops the communication. If this is not true, the steps S8, S9;
S17, S18 are carried out. Thus, it is possible to declare secret
sets of levels invalid which are lower than the highest level of
already used identifiers, by only using an application with secret
sets of a certain level.
[0097] In a further embodiment a level can be set in the secure
hardware device in a secure procedure In this case, the secure
hardware device only accepts secrets based on identifiers of secret
sets of a level higher than the set level.
[0098] In another preferred embodiment the vendor or software
publisher generates the group of secret sets such that at least two
secret sets exist, namely a first secret K1 together with the
assigned first identifier I1 and the second secret K2 together with
the assigned second identifier I2 and selects a symmetric
cryptographic algorithm (step S23 in FIG. 7).
[0099] In a next step (S24) both secret sets, i e. the secrets K1
and K2 and the identifiers I1, I2, are stored in the secure
hardware device 2, e g in the form of a table, and the selected
symmetric cryptographic algorithm is implemented in the secure
hardware device 2.
[0100] Then, a first one of the secret sets is selected, e.g. K1
and I1. This selected first secret set is stored in the application
(step S25). The protected application and the secure hardware
device 2 are delivered to the user (step S26).
[0101] When the user starts the application the application
transmits the first identifier I1 as session key indication data to
the secure hardware device (S26). The secure hardware device 2
compares the received identifier I1 with the stored identifiers and
retrieves the first secret K1 as session key (S28). Then, the first
secret K1 is used as shared session key for encrypting and
decrypting data to be transmitted through the insecure channel
4.
[0102] Of course, it is also possible that the application
generates a random value R, encrypts the random value and transmits
the encrypted random value together with the first identifier I1 to
the secure hardware device 2. The secure hardware device retrieves
the first secret K1 by comparing the received first identifier I1
with the identifiers stored in the hardware device and uses the
retrieved first secret for decrypting the encrypted random value
which can then be used as the shared session key
[0103] The above described embodiments can be combined in any
suitable manner. In particular any steps described above can be
combined in any suitable manner.
[0104] The steps S1-S3 and S10-S12 of methods of the preferred
embodiments as described above can be carried out on a single
computer 6 as schematically shown in FIG. 8, for example.
[0105] Although it is mentioned in the above description that a
cryptographic algorithm is implemented in the secure hardware
device (cf. steps S2 and S24) it is of course possible to use a
secure hardware device 2 which already provides the desired
cryptographic algorithm so that implementation of a cryptographic
algorithm need not to be carried out (in step S2 and S24)
[0106] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the invention
can be embodied in other forms and ways without departing from the
scope of the invention. The embodiments described herein should be
considered as illustrative and not restrictive.
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