U.S. patent application number 11/751643 was filed with the patent office on 2008-11-27 for lightweight key distribution and management method for sensor networks.
Invention is credited to Jens Mache, Chieh-Yih WAN, Mark Yarvis.
Application Number | 20080292105 11/751643 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 40072410 |
Filed Date | 2008-11-27 |
United States Patent
Application |
20080292105 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
WAN; Chieh-Yih ; et
al. |
November 27, 2008 |
LIGHTWEIGHT KEY DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT METHOD FOR SENSOR
NETWORKS
Abstract
A lightweight security framework is disclosed that combines PKI
with symmetric key cryptography to exploit the system asymmetry in
hierarchical sensor networks. The framework provides protocols for
public key exchange, session and group key generation, pair-wise
key generation, and network resource protection in a low-cost
security architecture. The security framework shifts much of the
security-related computational load off of the resource-constrained
sensor nodes and on to resource-rich base station nodes. The method
is based on the generation and management of two kinds of symmetric
keys from a set of bootstrapping asymmetric keys on each node.
Inventors: |
WAN; Chieh-Yih; (Hillsboro,
OR) ; Yarvis; Mark; (Portland, OR) ; Mache;
Jens; (Portland, OR) |
Correspondence
Address: |
CARRIE A. BOONE, P.C.
2450 Louisiana, Suite # 400-711
HOUSTON
TX
77006
US
|
Family ID: |
40072410 |
Appl. No.: |
11/751643 |
Filed: |
May 22, 2007 |
Current U.S.
Class: |
380/282 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L 63/0823 20130101;
H04L 67/12 20130101; H04L 9/0825 20130101; H04L 9/0833 20130101;
H04W 12/0431 20210101; H04L 2209/805 20130101; H04W 12/06 20130101;
H04L 63/062 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
380/282 |
International
Class: |
H04L 9/00 20060101
H04L009/00 |
Claims
1. A method to provide security protection in a sensor network, the
sensor network comprising a base station, a sensor node, and a
second sensor node, the method comprising: securely exchanging a
pair of public keys between the base station and the first sensor
node, the pair of public keys comprising a base station public key
and a sensor node public key; securely generating a session key
between the base station and the sensor node; and securely
distributing a group key, the group key allowing inauthentic
messages received by sensor nodes to be dropped quickly.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: securely exchanging a
second pair of public keys between the base station and the second
sensor node, the second pair of public keys comprising the base
station public key and a second sensor node public key; and
securely generating a second session key between the base station
and the second sensor node, the second session key being based on
the exchanged second pair of public keys; wherein group key
distribution is based on the session key and the second session
key.
3. The method of claim 1, securely exchanging a pair of public keys
between the base station and the sensor node further comprising:
the sensor node sending the sensor node public key to the base
station; the base station signing the base station public key by a
certificate authority to produce a signed base station public key;
the base station sending the signed base station public key to the
sensor node; and the sensor node using the certificate authority
public key to validate the signed base station public key.
4. The method of claim 1, securely generating a session key between
the base station and the sensor node further comprising: the sensor
node sending a first message, a certificate request, to the base
station; the base station receiving the first message and sending a
certificate including the base station public key, as a second
message, to the sensor node; the sensor node generating a third
message that contains a random number and an identifier of the
sensor node, wherein the random number and the identifier of the
sensor node are encrypted based on the base station public key,
wherein the random number is generated by the sensor node; and the
base station generating the session key and a second random number,
wherein the second random number is generated by the base
station.
5. The method of claim 4, further comprising: the base station
encrypting the random number, the second random number, the session
key, and the group key, as a fourth message, and sending the fourth
message to the sensor node; the sensor node decrypting the fourth
message and verifying the random number; the sensor node sending
the second random number, encrypted with the session key, as a
fifth message, to the base station; and the base station decrypting
the fifth message and verifying that the second random number is
valid; wherein the session key is used for secure communications
between the sensor node and the base station.
6. The method of claim 5, further comprising: the base station
recording the session key in its key table for the sensor node.
7. The method of claim 1, further comprising: the sensor node
encrypting a first message, the first message comprising an
identifier of the sensor node, an identifier of the second sensor
node, a third random number, and a fourth random number, wherein
the first message is protected by the session key shared with the
base station sent by the sensor node to the second sensor node; the
second sensor node generating a fifth random number and encrypting
the fifth random number with a second session key to form an
encrypted fifth random number, the second session key enabling
secure communication between the second sensor node and the base
station; the second sensor node concatenating the encrypted fifth
random number with the first message to form a second message and
sending the second message to the base station; and the base
station generating a pair-wise group key.
8. The method of claim 7, further comprising: the base station
encrypting a pair-wise session key into a third message using the
session key shared with the sensor node; the base station sending
the third message to the sensor node; the base station encrypting
the pair-wise group key into a fourth message using the second
session key shared with the second sensor node; and the base
station sending the fourth message to the second sensor node;
9. The method of claim 8, further comprising: the sensor node
decrypting the third message and obtaining the pair-wise group key;
and the second sensor node decrypting the fourth message and
obtaining the pair-wise group key; wherein the pair-wise group key
enables secure communication between the sensor node and the second
sensor node.
10. A method to securely exchange data between a base station and a
sensor node, the method comprising: exchanging a sensor node public
key of the sensor node with a base station public key of the base
station; distributing a session key using the sensor node public
key, the base station public key, a default group key, and a
certificate authority public key; and using the session key to
exchange data between the base station and the sensor node.
11. The method of claim 10, exchanging a sensor node public key
with a base station public key further comprising: the sensor node
sending the sensor node public key to the base station; the base
station signing the base station public key by a certificate
authority to produce a signed base station public key; the base
station sending the signed base station public key to the sensor
node; and the sensor node using the certificate authority public
key to validate the signed base station public key.
12. The method of claim 11, distributing a session key using the
sensor node public key, the base station public key, a default
group key, and a certificate authority public key further
comprising: the sensor node sending a certificate request message
to the base station as a first message; the sensor node receiving a
certificate from the base station as a second message, the
certificate comprising the base station public key; the sensor node
generating a third message by picking a random number and
encrypting the random number and a sensor node identifier using the
base station public key; the sensor node sending the third message
to the base station; the base station obtaining the random number
and the sensor node identifier from the sensor node; and the base
station sending a fourth message to the sensor node, the fourth
message comprising a session key encrypted using the sensor node
public key.
13. The method of claim 12, the base station obtaining the random
number and the sensor node identifier from the sensor node further
comprising: decrypting the third message using a base station
private key.
14. The method of claim 12, the base station sending a fourth
message to the sensor node, the fourth message comprising a session
key further comprising: generating the session key; generating a
base station random number; encrypting the random number and the
base station random number; encrypting the session key and an
ephemeral group key with the sensor node public key; and sending
the session key, encrypted random number, encrypted base station
random number, and group key to the sensor node as the fourth
message.
15. The method of claim 14, further comprising: the base station
recording the session key in its key table.
16. The method of claim 15, further comprising: the sensor node
decrypting the fourth message using a sensor node private key; the
sensor node verifying the random number; and the sensor node
sending a fifth message to the base station, the fifth message
comprising the base station random number encrypted with the
session key.
17. The method of claim 16, further comprising: the base station
decrypting the fifth message and verifying that the base station
random number matches the base station random number sent in the
fourth message.
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] This application relates to network security and, more
particularly, to a method to secure sensor networks.
BACKGROUND
[0002] Distribution of cryptographic keys forms the basis for
protection of both data and networking resources in any network.
Privacy, integrity, and authenticity are key capabilities
identified as requirements for sensor networks, particularly those
used in sensitive applications, such as healthcare. Sensor networks
are networks of embedded devices (often wireless,
resource-constrained, battery-powered, and composed in an ad hoc
and/or multi-hop communication topology) that provide a distributed
interface between the physical world and the digital world. Sensor
networks sense information about people, places, and environments,
make that information available to computers and people, and
sometimes perform automated actuation. Providing these capabilities
for sensor networks is challenging. Existing key distribution
architectures tend to introduce overheads that are too high for the
low power nodes that are typical. In addition, the ad hoc networks
that are typical in some sensor network applications require
extremely flexible and dynamic solutions.
[0003] Typical existing public key infrastructures (PKIs) provide
robust and widely deployable key distribution schemes to enable
privacy and authentication in a distributed system. However, public
key cryptography introduces a high computation and energy
consumption overhead, and thus must be used sparingly (if at all)
in sensor networks. Therefore, current security proposals for
sensor networks typically focus on symmetric cryptography, in which
either each node shares a secret key with another node (pair-wise
shared secret key) or the whole cluster of nodes share the same
secret key (group key). These shared keys are pre-distributed or
pre-configured at the time of deployment and often remain fixed
throughout the entire lifetime of the application.
[0004] Use of symmetric keys, with either dynamic key distribution
or key pre-distribution, may have several disadvantages:
[0005] Inflexible keying of symmetric keys. While symmetric group
keys are lightweight in terms of computation and memory
requirements, they do not identify the packet originator (every
node shares the same secret key). Pair-wise symmetric keying allows
authentication of packet originators, but the memory requirement to
store all pair-wise keys on each sensor node simply does not scale
with network size.
[0006] Vulnerability of pre-distributed keys to eavesdropping and
cryptanalysis. Since key length is typically limited to save
overhead in extremely resource-constrained devices and the key is
fixed throughout the application lifetime, these systems tend to be
vulnerable to exhaustive search attack or semantic analysis of
intercepted packets.
[0007] Not adaptive to changes in network topology. Secure addition
of a new node into a network typically introduces significant
communication overhead, especially when the network is large. A
network that uses pre-distributed pair-wise keys is typically
limited to a fixed member set.
[0008] Thus, there is a need for a key distribution and management
method for sensor networks.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0009] The foregoing aspects and many of the attendant advantages
of this document will become more readily appreciated as the same
becomes better understood by reference to the following detailed
description, when taken in conjunction with the accompanying
drawings, wherein like reference numerals refer to like parts
throughout the various views, unless otherwise specified.
[0010] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a sensor network, according
to some embodiments;
[0011] FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a lightweight security
framework, according to some embodiments;
[0012] FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of message exchange occurring
for a session key/group key distribution protocol used by the
lightweight security framework of FIG. 2, according to some
embodiments;
[0013] FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of the session key/group key
distribution protocol of FIG. 3, according to some embodiments;
[0014] FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of message exchange occurring
for a pair-wise key generation protocol used by the lightweight
security framework of FIG. 2, according to some embodiments;
and
[0015] FIG. 6 is a flow diagram of the pair-wise key generation
protocol of FIG. 5, according to some embodiments.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0016] In accordance with the embodiments described herein, a
lightweight security framework is disclosed that combines PKI with
symmetric key cryptography to exploit the system asymmetry in
hierarchical sensor networks. The framework combines several
techniques to enable secure data transmission with low overhead.
The lightweight security framework employs public/private keys to
authenticate sensor nodes, as well as to generate session keys from
the public/private keys. The framework also generates session keys
to authenticate and protect data sent between sensor nodes and
gateways. The framework generates pair-wise session keys on demand,
for node-to-node communication. And, the framework uses session
keys to securely distribute group keys, the group keys allowing
inauthentic messages received by sensor nodes to be dropped
quickly, to protect network resources through early packet
dropping.
[0017] This combination of occasionally used public keys, symmetric
pair-wise session keys for end-to-end data authentication and
privacy, and a group key to protect link layer network resources
enables a unique and low-cost security architecture. This security
framework shifts most of the security-related computational load
off of the resource-constrained sensor nodes and on to
resource-rich base station nodes. The methods employed by the
lightweight security framework are based on the generation and
management of two kinds of symmetric keys from a set of
bootstrapping asymmetric keys on each node.
[0018] The network consists of two types of nodes as shown in FIG.
1: base stations (BS) 20 and sensor nodes (SN) 22. Sensor nodes 22
are resource-limited devices (often battery-powered) that sense and
transmit actual data when queried. Base stations are less
constrained nodes (often line-powered) that connect to an external
network, such as the Internet 30, generate queries according to a
user specification, and collect data from the sensor nodes. The
base stations 20 and sensor nodes 22 make up a sensor network
28.
[0019] A query 24 is a message that contains configuration
parameters (e.g., the sampling rate, sample size, etc.) for the
data acquisition to be carried out on a specific sensor node.
Sensor nodes 22 form network clusters (typically with a
multiple-hop topology) around base stations 20, which control the
sensor network 28 and allow data to flow between the external
network, such as the Internet 30, and the sensor network 28.
[0020] An adversary may eavesdrop data packets (passively), modify
transmitted data packets, or actively inject bogus packets
(possibly replayed), either intending them to be received or
intending simply to drain energy of battery-powered sensor nodes
22. One remedy to these threats is for the legitimate nodes to
apply cryptographic keys to encrypt and/or sign the data (to
provide privacy and/or authenticate the source), and to drop
unauthenticated packets as early as possible.
[0021] FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a lightweight security
framework 100, for enabling secure communication between the
entities of the sensor network 28, according to some embodiments.
The lightweight security framework 100 includes a session key/group
key distribution protocol 300 (FIGS. 3 and 4) and a pair-wise key
generation protocol 400 (FIGS. 5 and 6).
[0022] As shown in FIG. 2, the lightweight security framework 100
operates according to certain assumptions. For example, the
lightweight security framework 100 assumes that the base station 20
and the sensor nodes 22 in the sensor network 28 each include a
public key/private key pair 40, a default link layer group key,
K.sub.group, 42, and a certificate authority's public key,
K.sub.CA, 44. The base station 20 and sensor nodes 22 further each
include a random number generator 46. The base station 20 includes
a key distribution center 48, including a key table 50. These
aspects of the lightweight security framework 100 are described in
more detail in the following pages.
[0023] In some embodiments, the lightweight security framework 100
is implemented as a software program, although one or more aspects
of the framework 100 may be implemented in firmware or using
hardware logic. The lightweight security framework 100 is
distributed throughout the sensor network 28.
[0024] As indicated in FIG. 2, all sensor nodes 22 of the sensor
network 28 have pre-generated public/private key pairs 40. Before
communication between a sensor node 22 and a base station 20 may
take place, a session key, K.sub.session, is generated. The
public/private key pair is used to securely obtain the session key,
K.sub.session.
[0025] The sensor node 22 shares its public key, K.sub.SN, with the
base station 20. In some embodiments, each sensor node 22 shares
its public key with the base station 20 through an out-of-band
channel. For example, the base station 20 may physically scan a
barcode sticker on the sensor node 22 to acquire its public key.
Other mechanisms for conveying the public key, K.sub.SN, to the
base station 20 are possible as well.
[0026] A trusted certificate authority (CA) signs the public key
belonging to the base station 20, K.sub.BS. The certificate
authority is an entity, whether within the sensor network 28 or
external thereto, whom all other entities agree will verify the
public key. The certificate authority may be software running on
the base station 20, an external server, and so on. The signed
public key, K.sub.BS, is designated herein as K.sub.BS*. The signed
public key, K.sub.BS*, is sent to the sensor node 22. The signed
public key, K.sub.BS*, may be sent to the sensor node 22 ahead of
time, and need not be send to the sensor node during each instance
of session key distribution.
[0027] Each sensor node 22 in the sensor network 28 has the public
key of the certificate authority, K.sub.CA, pre-programmed before
deployment in the sensor network 28. With the CA public key,
K.sub.CA, each sensor node 22 may validate the signed public key,
K.sub.BS*.
[0028] Once the sensor node 22 has the base station public key, a
session key, K.sub.session,SN, may be requested. The session key,
K.sub.session,SN, is used to securely exchange data between the
sensor node (SN) 22 and the base station 20 in the sensor network
28. The session key, K.sub.session,SN, may also support end-to-end
authentication of the data originator. The session key/group key
distribution protocol 300 of the lightweight security framework 100
is now described with reference to a hypothetical sensor node in
the sensor network 28, known as sensor node J.
[0029] When sensor node J, a new node in the sensor network 28, is
deployed, the sensor node J first attempts to establish a shared
session key with the base station 20. The shared session key
enables the sensor node J to join the sensor network 28, receive
queries from other entities in the sensor network 28, whether other
sensor nodes 22 or the base station 20, and send data to other
entities on the network 28. As with other sensor nodes 22 in the
sensor network 28, sensor node J is pre-programmed with its own
public/private key pair 40, a default link layer group key,
K.sub.group, 42, and the certificate authority's public key 44 for
this deployment.
[0030] FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the session key/group key
distribution protocol 300 of the lightweight security framework
100, according to some embodiments. The schematic diagram 300
depicts a message exchange between sensor node J and base station
20, for establishing a session key, K.sub.session, and an ephemeral
group key, K.sub.GROUP. FIG. 4 is a flow diagram closely tracking
the message exchange in FIG. 3, and provides more details about the
creation of the messages by the sensor node J and the base station
20.
[0031] Each entity on the sensor network 28 initially has a group
key, K.sub.group. All messages transmitted by the base station 20
or a sensor node 22 in the sensor network 28 may be protected at
the link layer with a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which may
be computed using the message contents and the initial group key,
K.sub.group, or the current group key, K.sub.GROUP. Each node in
sensor network 28 validates the MAC of messages before
accepting/forwarding them. Messages without an authentic MAC may be
dropped. This group key, K.sub.group, is intended for initially
obtaining network access. In some embodiments, there is a threshold
usage, after which use of the group key, K.sub.group, by an entity
causes the entity to be locked out of the network 28. Thus, it is
in the interest of the network entity to obtain a new group key,
known herein as an ephemeral group key, or K.sub.GROUP, after
accessing the network 28.
[0032] The session key/group key distribution protocol 300 is best
understood with reference to both FIGS. 3 and 4. At the start of
the session key/group key distribution protocol 300, the sensor
node J sends a "certificate request" message (M1) to the base
station 20 through the sensor network 28 (block 302). The
certificate request message may be transmitted using multiple-hop
forwarding, as one example. At the link layer, the certificate
request message, M1, like other messages, is protected by a message
authentication code (MAC), based on the default group key,
K.sub.group. The node J creates an authenticating message
authentication code (MAC) for the message prior to transmission.
Each node validates this message before accepting/forwarding it.
The base station 20 and the sensor nodes 22 have a copy of the
default link layer group key, K.sub.group. Upon receiving the
message, M1, the base station 20 sends a certificate containing the
public key of the base station, K.sub.BS, to the node J, as a new
message (M2) (block 306). The certificate message, M2, may travel
over multiple hops. In some cases, a sensor node 22 other than the
sensor node J, such as one disposed along the path from sensor node
J to the base station 20, may intercept the certificate request
message, M1, and return a cached copy of the certificate message,
M2.
[0033] The base station 20 and sensor nodes 22 have a copy of the
certificate authority's public key (FIG. 2). Accordingly, in the
session key/group key distribution protocol 300, the sensor node J
uses the certificate authority's public key, K.sub.CA, to check the
certificate received in the message, M2 (block 308). This is
considered an "expensive operation". If the certificate (M2) is
valid, then sensor node J knows the public key, K.sub.BS. If the
certificate (M2) is invalid, the sensor node J may repeat the steps
M1 and M2, using a different path to communicate with the base
station 20.
[0034] While operating in the sensor network 28, sensor nodes 22
each have a unique identifier (ID), which may be an address. In
establishing a session key, sensor node J next picks a random
number, N.sub.j, encrypts N.sub.j and its own sensor node ID with
the base station public key, K.sub.BS(block 310) and sends the
encrypted message, K.sub.public,BS (J,N.sub.j) to the base station
20 (M3) (block 312). The base station 20 decrypts the message, M3,
using its private key, to obtain sensor node J's ID and random
number, N.sub.j (block 314). The base station 20 then generates a
session key, K.sub.session,j, and a random number, N.sub.BS (block
316). The base station 20 encrypts the random numbers, N.sub.j and
N.sub.BS, as well as the keys, K.sub.session,j, and K.sub.GROUP
with the public key of sensor node J, K.sub.publicJ, as
K.sub.public,J (N.sub.BS, N.sub.j, K.sub.session,j, K.sub.GROUP) in
a message, M4, and sends M4 to sensor node J (block 318). The base
station 20 also records this new K.sub.session,j in its key table
for sensor node J (block 320).
[0035] Once it has received the message, M4, sensor node J uses its
private key to decrypt the message, M4 (block 322). This is
considered a very expensive operation. The sensor node J checks its
random number, N.sub.j, to avoid potential replay attacks. If the
random number, N.sub.j, matches the one sent in M3, sensor node J
will now have K.sub.GROUP and K.sub.session,j to be used for the
rest of the packets generated.
[0036] Next, the sensor node J send the random number generated by
the base station 20, N.sub.BS, encrypted with K.sub.session,j as
message, M5, to the base station 20 (block 324). The base station
20 decrypts the message, M5, and verifies that the random number,
N.sub.BS, matches the one sent in M4 (block 326). The base station
20 now knows that the sensor node J has received the correct
session key, K.sub.session,j. The base station 20 and the sensor
node J now share a secret session key, K.sub.session,j, and may use
it to securely exchange all messages between one another (block
326).
[0037] When the sensor node J wants to re-key its session key
K.sub.session,j, it simply repeats the steps of FIG. 4, starting
with block 310, to obtain a new session key from the base station
20. Any sensor node 22 in the sensor network 28 may forge a packet
to initiate the re-keying process, starting with step 310, but only
the authentic node (e.g., sensor node J) is capable of correctly
decrypting the new session key using its private key. Therefore the
re-keying process is secure.
[0038] On the other hand, the base station 20 may want to re-key
its session key with the sensor node J. In such a circumstance, the
base station sends a "re-key request" message, encrypted with
sensor node J's current session key, to the sensor node J. This
initiates the re-keying process, in which sensor node J again
repeats the steps of the session key/group key distribution
protocol 300 (FIG. 4), starting with step 310.
[0039] There may be circumstances in which the entities in the
sensor network 28 desire a higher security guarantee. For example,
a session key may be exposed to an adversary to forge a "re-key
request". The session key/group key distribution protocol 300
enables the base station 20 to encrypt the "re-key request" message
with its own private key and sensor node J's public key. In this
case, only the sensor node J may correctly decrypt the "re-key
request" message, and, at the same time, also verify the
authenticity (actually sent by the base station 20) of this message
using the public key, K.sub.BS, of the base station 20.
[0040] The flow diagram of FIG. 4 is a simplified representation of
the session key/group key distribution protocol 300. Alternative
paths, such as where verification of a transmitted message fails,
are not depicted. Where such failures occur, in some cases, parts
of the protocol 300 may be repeated. FIG. 4 shows how the session
and group keys are generated when each of the delineated steps is
successful.
[0041] The session key/group key distribution protocol 300 includes
several expensive public key cryptography operations at the
resource-constraint sensor nodes (in steps 308, 310, and 322).
Nonetheless, in some embodiments, the processing overhead is
acceptable because these operations are performed a single time,
when a sensor node 22 first joins the sensor network 28 or when
there is a need to re-key the session or group key. On the other
hand, low-overhead symmetric cryptography (using key,
K.sub.session,j) is used for securing communication traffic.
[0042] Thus, the lightweight security framework 100 provides the
session key/group key distribution protocol 300, for establishing
(and periodically re-establishing) a symmetric session key,
K.sub.session,j, between the sensor node J and its associated base
station 20. The session key, K.sub.session,j, is used to securely
exchange data between the sensor node J and the base station 20.
The sensor node J signs all sensed data (at the application layer)
with its session key, K.sub.session,j, and sends the data to the
base station 20. Upon receipt, the base station 20 validates the
data with its copy of the session key K.sub.session,j, and forwards
the data to a backend server. Thus, end-to-end authenticity and
integrity of data sent from the sensor node J and the base station
20 is ensured. Optionally, the session key K.sub.session,SN, may be
used to provide end-to-end encryption of data, providing
secrecy.
[0043] Similarly, any two sensor nodes 22 in the sensor network 28,
known as sensor node A and sensor node B, may use session keys, as
established in FIG. 4, to create a pair-wise key between them by
using the base station 20 as a key distribution center (KDC),
enabling more general communication patterns.
[0044] FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of the pair-wise key
generation protocol 400 of the lightweight security framework 100,
according to some embodiments. The schematic diagram 400 depicts a
message exchange 400 between sensor nodes A and B and base station
20, for establishing a pair-wise key between the sensor nodes A and
B. The sensor nodes A and B are two of the sensor nodes 22 in the
sensor network 28. FIG. 5 employs a particular type of symmetric
protocol, known as an Ottway-Rees protocol, for establishing
pair-wise keys between sensor nodes A and B. FIG. 6 is a flow
diagram closely tracking the message exchange in FIG. 5, and
provides more details about the creation of the messages by the
sensor nodes A and B and the base station 20.
[0045] The lightweight security framework 100 uses the pair-wise
key generation protocol 400 to establish pair-wise keys between any
two sensor nodes A and B. Each sensor node 22 uses its session key,
K.sub.session,a, and K.sub.session,b, respectively, to execute the
pair-wise key generation protocol 400.
[0046] The session key/group key distribution protocol 300 is best
understood with reference to both FIGS. 5 and 6. Using its session
key, K.sub.session,a, the sensor node A picks two random numbers, N
and N.sub.a, together with its sensor node ID (A) and the ID of
sensor node B (B), and encrypts them to generate a first message,
M1 (block 402). The message, M1, thus includes A, N,
K.sub.session,a(A,B,N,N.sub.a). A and N are sent in plaintext, not
encrypted, so that the sensor node B can learn the ID of the sensor
node A and the random number, without knowing the session key,
K.sub.session,a. The sensor node A sends the message, M1, to the
sensor node B (block 404).
[0047] Sensor node B picks a random number, N.sub.b, encrypts the
random number, N.sub.b, as well as N, and sensor node ID A and B,
with its session key, K.sub.session,b (block 406). The sensor node
B then concatenates the cipher text it received earlier from the
sensor node A (from message, M1) into a new message, M2 (block
408). New message, M2, contains A, K.sub.session,a(A,B,N,N.sub.a),
B, K.sub.session,b(A,B,N,N.sub.b). As illustrated in FIG. 5, sensor
node B sends the message, M2, to the base station 20 (block
410).
[0048] The base station 20 decrypts the message, M2, using the
session keys it shares with sensor nodes A and B, namely,
K.sub.session,a and K.sub.session,b, respectively (block 412),
particularly noting that the random number, N, in both parts of the
message, M2, is the same. The base station 20 then generates a
pair-wise key, K.sub.pair,a,b, for sensor nodes A and B (block
414).
[0049] The base station 20 encrypts the pair-wise key,
K.sub.pair,a,b, separately into a message, M3 (block 416), and a
message, M4 (block 418), using its shared session keys,
K.sub.session,a and K.sub.session,b, respectively. The base station
20 then sends the message, M3, including K.sub.session,a(N.sub.a,
K.sub.pair,a,b) to the sensor node A (block 420), and sends the
message, M4, including K.sub.session,b(N.sub.b, K.sub.pair,a,b) to
the sensor node B (block 422).
[0050] Both sensor nodes A and B decrypt their respective messages,
M3 and M4, verify the random numbers, N.sub.a and N.sub.b, and
obtain the pair-wise key, K.sub.pair,a,b. (Although the operations
of blocks 416 and 418, blocks 420 and 422, and blocks 424 and 426,
are shown occurring in a particular sequence, these operations may
be performed simultaneously, or in a reversed order from what is
shown in FIG. 6.)
[0051] The pair-wise key generation protocol 400 thus establishes a
session key, K.sub.pair,a,b, using the session keys,
K.sub.session,a and K.sub.session,b, shared between the sensor
nodes A and B and the base station 20. By communicating using the
session key, K.sub.pair,a,b, the privacy, integrity, and
authenticity of end-to-end communication between the sensor nodes A
and B is ensured.
[0052] Returning to FIG. 2, the lightweight security framework 100
operates in an environment in which a link-layer symmetric group
key, K.sub.group, is shared by all nodes in a connected mesh. All
nodes use the group key, K.sub.group, to compute a link-layer
message authentication code (MAC) on each packet transmitted
between entities in the sensor network 28.
[0053] The group key, K.sub.group, is used to protect network
resources, as follows. The default group key, K.sub.group, is
pre-programmed in each sensor node 22 before deployment in the
sensor network 28. The group key, K.sub.group, allows the sensor
node 22 to join the network 28. (A NULL default group key is
possible, in some embodiments, although less desirable.) The sensor
node 22 may then use the group key, K.sub.group, to compute a
link-layer MAC code on each packet to be transmitted within the
sensor network 28.
[0054] However, sensor nodes 22 that employ the default group key,
K.sub.group, for more than a threshold number of packets may be
blacklisted from the network 28. Each sensor node 22 maintains a
count of such instances. Thus, where the usage of the group key,
K.sub.group, has exceeded that threshold, the sensor node will be
unable to communicate further in the sensor network.
[0055] To avoid getting blacklisted, the sensor node 22 may obtain
a new group key, an ephemeral group key, K.sub.GROUP, from the base
station 20 using the session key/group key distribution protocol
300 (FIGS. 3 and 4). This group key, K.sub.GROUP, may be securely
distributed either using the public/private key pairs or by
leveraging the session keys also generated by the session key/group
key distribution protocol 300. A new group key may be generated and
distributed periodically.
[0056] The sensor node 22 may then authenticate each packet before
transmission, using the ephemeral group key, K.sub.GROUP. The
MAC-authenticated packet may then be transmitted to another entity
in the sensor network 28. At the receiving end, the packet is
validated. If the MAC is valid, the transmission is successful.
Packets received at the link layer without a valid MAC are dropped,
minimizing the impact of a DoS (Denial of Service) attack.
[0057] The above scheme is unique in its application to sensor
networks in its use of a symmetric session key for data protection
and a symmetric group key for network protection, both bootstrapped
from a public/private key pair.
[0058] Current security mechanisms in resource-constrained sensor
networks are based on symmetric cryptography and often do not
support dynamic key distribution and management. The lightweight
security framework 100, by contrast, combines computation-intensive
public key infrastructure (PKI) with symmetric key cryptography and
exploits the system asymmetry in a heterogeneous and hierarchical
sensor network. Additionally, the lightweight security framework
100 shifts much of the security-related computational load away
from resource-constrained sensor nodes and toward resource-rich
base stations.
[0059] Further, the protocols 300 and 400, described above, have a
relatively low code complexity, high flexibility, and a minimal
processing overhead requirement. As an example of the lightweight
security framework 100 flexibility, new sensor nodes may be
dynamically added to the sensor network. The lightweight security
framework 100 further protects the network resources and ensures
data authenticity and integrity.
[0060] The lightweight security framework 100 may be implemented in
network devices and systems, particularly for applications that
demand high security. As one example, the ability to protect the
privacy, integrity, and authenticity of health data is essential
for products that enable health-related data acquisition. The
lightweight security framework may even lower the bill of materials
cost of sensor devices (by reducing the computational complexity),
while still meeting a system's security requirements.
[0061] While the application has been described with respect to a
limited number of embodiments, those skilled in the art will
appreciate numerous modifications and variations therefrom. It is
intended that the appended claims cover all such modifications and
variations as fall within the true spirit and scope of the
invention.
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