U.S. patent application number 12/017972 was filed with the patent office on 2008-09-04 for dynamic configuration of a gaming system.
This patent application is currently assigned to CYBERVIEW TECHNOLOGY, INC.. Invention is credited to Thierry Brunet de Courssou, Jean-Marie Gatto.
Application Number | 20080214309 12/017972 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 32990798 |
Filed Date | 2008-09-04 |
United States Patent
Application |
20080214309 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Gatto; Jean-Marie ; et
al. |
September 4, 2008 |
Dynamic configuration of a gaming system
Abstract
A method to enable dynamic configuration of gaming terminals
installed in one or a plurality of gaming premises whereby
certified games, certified data files and certified support
software components are activated in accordance with a
predetermined schedule or automatically in response to the observed
gaming activity. The method may include allocating an individual
PKI certificate to each executable software component and each of
its versions, binding the PKI certificate to the executable
software, associating a distinctive policy for each certificate and
then enforcing the software execution policies in accordance with
the desired authorized game configuration and schedule. The PKI
certificate's "Subject Name" (or "Issued to" field or "CommonName"
field) may be a concatenation of the software component
identification, its version number and optionally other
identification characters. The method applies equally to other
network connected gaming subsystems. The method enables a
fine-grained and secure control of the authorized software
components and thus the flexibility to securely configure the
gaming system in accordance with a schedule or in a close-loop
fashion in order to meet business objectives. In addition, a method
to enable the certification authority to bind the certificates to
the tested code is described.
Inventors: |
Gatto; Jean-Marie; (London,
GB) ; Brunet de Courssou; Thierry; (Henderson,
NV) |
Correspondence
Address: |
YOUNG LAW FIRM, P.C.;ALAN W. YOUNG
4370 ALPINE ROAD, SUITE 106
PORTOLA VALLEY
CA
94028
US
|
Assignee: |
CYBERVIEW TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Palo Alto
CA
|
Family ID: |
32990798 |
Appl. No.: |
12/017972 |
Filed: |
January 22, 2008 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
|
|
10789975 |
Feb 27, 2004 |
|
|
|
12017972 |
|
|
|
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60453627 |
Mar 10, 2003 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
463/42 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G07F 17/32 20130101;
H04L 9/3263 20130101; H04L 63/20 20130101; G06F 21/121 20130101;
A63F 2300/532 20130101; A63F 13/12 20130101; G06F 2221/2109
20130101; H04L 2209/56 20130101; H04L 9/006 20130101; H04L 2209/603
20130101; A63F 2300/5586 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
463/42 |
International
Class: |
G06F 17/00 20060101
G06F017/00 |
Claims
1. A method for a network connected gaming system to prevent
unauthorized executable files of constituent computers of the
gaming system from executing, comprising the steps of: packaging
the authorized executable files into a code signed installation
package; configuring certificate rule policies to enable execution
of the code signed installation package; enforcing the policies,
and executing the code signed installation package upon every
startup of any of the constituent computers of the gaming system or
upon a command, wherein execution of any authorized executable file
is predicated upon successfully executing the code signed
installation package into which the authorized executable file is
packaged.
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the code signing uses a
separate and unique PKI certificate for each installation
package.
3. A method for a network connected gaming system to prevent
unauthorized executable code of constituent computers of the gaming
system from executing, comprising the steps of: packaging the
authorized executable files into a code signed installation
package; configuring certificate rule policies to enable execution
of the code signed installation package; configuring enforcement of
the policies, and re-installing the code signed installation
package at every startup of any of the constituent computers of the
gaming system or upon a command, wherein execution of any
authorized executable file is predicated upon successfully
executing the code signed installation package into which the
authorized executable file is packaged.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the code signing uses a
separate and unique PKI certificate for each installation
package.
5. A method for a network connected gaming system to prevent data
of unauthorized non-executable files of constituent computers of
the gaming system from affecting game outcome, comprising the steps
of: packaging the non-executable files into a code signed
installation; configuring certificate rule policies to enable
execution of the code signed installation package; configuring
enforcement of the policies, and executing the code signed
installation package upon every startup of any of the constituent
computers of the gaming system or upon a command.
6. A method according to claim 5, wherein the code signing uses a
separate and unique PKI certificate for each installation
package.
7. A method for trusting at least one authorized non-executable
software component certified to comply with regulatory requirements
downloaded into a network connected gaming system, the gaming
system including a plurality of computers, the method comprising
the steps of: packaging the at least one non-executable file into
at least one code signed installation package; configuring
certificate rule policies to enable execution of the at least one
code signed installation package; configuring enforcement of the
policies, and re-installing the at least one code signed
installation package at every startup of any of the constituent
computers of the gaming system or upon a command.
8. A method according to claim 7, wherein the at least one code
signed package includes a separate and unique PKI certificate for
each of the at least one installation package.
9. A method for scheduling at least one authorized executable
software component installed in a network connected gaming system,
the gaming system including a plurality of gaming machines, the
method comprising the steps of: packaging at least one authorized
non-executable file that controls the scheduling of the at least
one authorized executable software component into at least one code
signed installation package, each of the at least one code signed
installation packages including a predetermined PKI certificate;
configuring certificate rule policies to enable execution of the at
least one code signed installation package in selected ones of the
plurality of gaming machines; and configuring enforcement of the
certificate rule policies; and downloading the at least one code
signed installation package into the selected ones of the plurality
of gaming machines; executing the at least one code signed
installation package.
Description
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0001] This application is a divisional of application Ser. No.
10/789,975, filed Feb. 27, 2004, which claims the benefit of
Provisional Application No. 60/453,627, filed Mar. 10, 2003, which
applications are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their
entireties and from which priority is hereby claimed under 35
U.S.C. .sctn..sctn. 119(e) and 120.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
[0002] 1. Field of the Invention
[0003] The present inventions relate generally to the field of
network connected pay computer-controlled games, either games of
skills or games of chance, and more particularly to the field of
automated monitoring and control of a large number of clusters of
pay gaming terminals. The gaming terminals may be slot machines,
video lotteries, bingo systems or lottery terminals in all their
forms; that is, desktop terminals, wall or pedestal mounted kiosks,
or full size consoles, operating either in a local area network
(LAN) or in a wide area network (WAN). The present inventions also
relate to the monitoring, control and payment systems linked to the
gaming terminals.
[0004] 2. Description of the Prior Art and Related Information
[0005] Pay entertainment and gaming systems of the prior art,
either of the cash-in or the cash-less type, are seriously limited
due to the technical choices made in order to comply with gaming
regulatory requirements. Regulators are mainly concerned with funds
that may be illegally acquired by individuals as well as with funds
that may not be acquired by legitimate winners as a result of
flaws, cheating and/or stealing. Game regulators are reluctant to
accept state-of-the-art operating systems, multimedia and Internet
technologies because of security concerns and tend to favor
antiquated technology based upon secrecy rather that "open"
state-of-the-art technology. A "Request/Authorize" method for
downloadable games has been proposed by another company (IGT's
Secure Virtual Network in a Gaming Environment, Publication No.
US2002/0116615 A1) but the method disclosed therein does not cover
how to ensure that only certified authorized components may
execute.
[0006] Although downloadable games are undeniably going to
flourish, they have yet to create confidence within the regulatory
arena.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0007] Embodiments of the present invention overcome the security
limitations of the prior art and allow game operators the
flexibility to dynamically configure their estate of gaming
terminals. It is to be noted that although the gaming industry has
coined the term "downloadable game" and that gaming standard GLI-21
entitled "Game Download System" has been published by Game
Laboratory International (GLI), the term downloadable game is
rather restrictive, as the downloading of software components to
computer terminals and computer servers is by itself pervasive in
any network distributed computer system. However, downloading
certified game components in a secure manner is a problem that has
yet to find a satisfactory solution.
[0008] Embodiments of the present invention may allocate an
individual PKI certificate to each executable software component
and each of its versions, binding the PKI certificate to the
executable software and associating a distinctive policy for each
PKI certificate. The PKI certificate's "Subject Name" (or "Issued
to" field, or "CommonName" field) may be a concatenation of the
software component identification, its version number and
optionally other identification characters, for example.
[0009] According to other embodiments, the present invention offers
a method to enable dynamic configuration of gaming terminals
installed in one or a plurality of gaming premises whereby
certified games, certified data files and certified support
software components may be activated in accordance with a
predetermined schedule or automatically in response to the observed
gaming activity. This may be accomplished by configuring and then
enforcing the software execution policies for selected PKI
certificates in accordance with the desired authorized game
configuration and schedule.
[0010] Further embodiments of the present invention offer a method
to ensure the trust of non-executable files such as initialization
or configuration files, video files, sound files, multimedia files,
file containing list of hashes, CRCs, and/or signatures. This
method relies on the certificate Software Restriction Policy as
described herein.
[0011] Still further embodiments of the invention enable the
certification authority to bind the certificates to the tested
software components.
[0012] The present invention, according to still further
embodiments thereof enables a dynamic generation of the list of
games made available to the players without transferring a
configuration file or files from the central server to the gaming
machines. For example, a method according to an embodiment of the
present invention relies on attempting to execute a game component
on which a certificate Software Restriction Policy is enforced.
[0013] Embodiments of the present invention leverage the technology
described in commonly assigned application Ser. No. 10/520,831,
filed Aug. 12, 2005 (which application is hereby incorporated
herein by reference in its entirety) in which code signing and
Software Restriction Policy enable executing authorized game
software. Code signing and Software Restriction Policy (SRP)
technologies are available in Microsoft Windows XP, Windows 2000
and Windows 2003, Embedded Windows XP as well as in future Windows
versions (as of this writing, the next version is code-named
"Longhorn") to ensure that only executable software components from
a trusted publisher, let's say "Microsoft", are allowed to run.
Code signing and Software Restriction Policy technology are applied
to executable components such as *.exe, *.dll, *.ocx, *.vbs, *.msi,
*.cab, etc. In addition, Software Installation Policy (SIP) ensures
that software components are installed in a controlled fashion.
Embodiments of the present invention extend the use of code
signing, Software Restriction Policy and Software Installation
Policy to individual software components that are allowed to
execute in a network connected gaming system by associating a
distinctive code-signing certificate to each executable software
component. Each executable software component version (usually
comprising major version, minor version, revision and build) may
have a unique certificate. A distinctive certificate may be created
for each software component version and the two entities (the
compiled code and the certificate) may be bound together by a code
signing operation, herein called "signcode.exe."
[0014] Code signed software components may be packaged together
with non-signed software components (if any) into a MSI Microsoft
installation package (MSI=Microsoft Software Installation). An MSI
package is an executable component that in turn receives a
distinctive certificate bound to its content by a code signing
operation. Only the software component version that has
successfully passed the regulatory certification process may be
allowed to run by enforcing an unrestricted policy to the
associated certificate.
[0015] Moreover, embodiments of the present invention extend the
use of code signing and Software Restriction Policy to ensure that
only authorized non-executable components are used by the
authorized executable components. This is of particular value for
configuration files or media files that may affect the game outcome
such as fixing the return to player at, for example, 95% between
5:00 PM and 11:00 PM, or at 98% during other time periods. For
this, non-executable components may be placed in code signed MSI
(Microsoft Software Installation) installation packages. Each
individual MSI package is an executable component whose execution
can be controlled by Software Restriction Policy (SRP). A
distinctive certificate may be created for each package version (a
part number is created for a preselected aggregate of
non-executable components) and the two entities may be bound
together by the code signing operation "signcode.exe." Within the
network connected gaming system, trust for non-executable
components may be established by executing the associated
authorized code signed packages using SRP upon computer startup or
alternatively on demand, resulting in the re-installation of the
original non-corrupted non-executable components. The
non-executable components may be: initialization or configuration
files, video files, sound files, multimedia files, file containing
list of hashes, CRCs, and/or signatures, for example.
[0016] For example, DRM (Digital Rights Management) technology
offered by Microsoft Windows Media Player may be used to ensure
that only authorized multimedia files may be played or viewed.
[0017] Also, RM (Rights Management) technology offered with
Microsoft Office 2003, with the associated RM services and SDK
(Software Development Kit) may be used to ensure that only
authorized data files may be accessed, viewed, copied or
modified.
[0018] Software Installation Policy (SIP) and Software Restriction
Policy (SRP) configured with an individual PKI certificate
associated to each authorized software component offer a
"Policy/Enforce" model, or in other words a "Configure the Policy
and then Enforce the Policy" model to enable network installation
(or "game download") and activation at predetermined times (or
"game scheduling") of selected authorized software components, in
order to control the software of the network connected gaming
system and offer selected games to players. This "Policy/Enforce"
method may be constructed on a demonstrable trusted base; it offers
transparent security and fine-grained auditing, contrasting with
conventional "Request/Authorize" methods that do not demonstrate
reliance on a trusted base to enforce the use of only trusted
software components.
[0019] A network-connected gaming system comprises hundreds of
authorized certified software components that may be selectively
downloaded and scheduled. Considering on-going support for 50
customers and for 200 distinctive games over a period of 5 years,
tens of thousands of software components will each need to receive
individual certificates and be certified. Accordingly, embodiments
of the present invention include an automated certification
platform. Herein, such a certification platform is denoted
"Integrated Certification Environment" or ICE. Embodiments of such
a certification platform according to the present invention are
designed to automate the stepping through the procedure that must
be done by the regulatory certification authority to produce only
authorized software components that may be dynamically installed in
a gaming system, and to prevent generation of erroneous software
components. In addition, the ICE offers support to selectively
enable the download of approved system software components using
Microsoft Software Update Services (SUS), for example.
[0020] Embodiments of the present methods rely on established
security standards and a demonstrable trusted base (as opposed to
relying on security by secrecy) in order to offer transparent
security and allow fine-grained auditing. Embodiments of the
present inventions are also applicable to any of the subsystems
available in a network connected gaming system that require
preventing non-authorized software components from executing or
affecting the game outcome, such as the gaming terminals, the game
management system (CMS or MCS) that monitor and control whole or
part of the estate of gaming machines, the progressive jackpot
systems, the bonussing systems as well as game payment verification
systems such as IGT's EasyPay and Cyberview's PVU (Payment
Verification Unit) and PVS (Payment Verification System). Gaming
subsystems may be tested against gaming standards such as those
produced by GLI; the game standards are mandated by game regulators
in accordance with local regulation and laws. The network-connected
subsystems may be located within the premises accommodating the
estate of gaming machine (connection via a LAN) or outside of the
premises (connection via a WAN).
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0021] FIG. 1 illustrates the intrinsic information that uniquely
identifies each executable software component, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0022] FIG. 2 illustrates the information uniquely identifying each
executable software component being made available into the Windows
Event Log upon execution of the software component, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0023] FIG. 3 illustrates the information (test certificate
indicator, project/product code, type of executable code, part
number, major/minor/build/version, certification lab identifier,
friendly name) uniquely identifying each executable software
component being used to generate the "Subject Name" (or "Issued to"
field, or "CommonName" field) of the individual PKI certificate
associated to each executable software component, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0024] FIG. 4 illustrates the information that may be entered in
the Extended Attributes of a PKI certificate, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0025] FIG. 5 illustrates the information that may be obtained
using the Trusted Inventory tool, according to an embodiment of the
present invention.
[0026] FIG. 6 illustrates the information that may be entered to
configure a type-certificate Software Restriction Policy rule,
according to an embodiment of the present invention. A Software
Restriction Policy (SRP) is configured using the Group Policy
Object Editor.
[0027] FIG. 7 illustrates the policies that are associated to the
active directory container used to configure the gaming machines,
according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0028] FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary cycle from the moment a game
is being created until it is first executed on a gaming terminal,
according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0029] FIG. 9 illustrates the global verification process performed
by the terminal in order to check that no unauthorized file may
execute or may affect game outcome, according to an embodiment of
the present invention.
[0030] FIG. 10 illustrates the configuration of the three parties
involved in a new game cycle detailed at FIG. 8, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0031] FIG. 11 illustrates the 12 folders created on the disk
repository of the development environment, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0032] FIG. 12 illustrates the dataflow for step 1 to step 3 for
producing the certified authorized software components, according
to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0033] FIG. 13 illustrates the dataflow for step 4 to step 12 for
producing the certified authorized software components, according
to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0034] FIG. 14 illustrates the grouping of gaming terminals and the
associated enforced policies, according to an embodiment of the
present invention.
[0035] FIG. 15 illustrates a method for enforcing a Software
Installation Policy by "linking" the policy, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0036] FIG. 16 illustrates a method for enforcing a Software
Restriction Policy by "linking" the policy, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0037] FIG. 17 illustrates the method to enforce a policy at a
predetermined time, according to an embodiment of the present
invention.
[0038] FIG. 18 illustrates the method to enforce a selected policy
as the result of observing the gaming activity, according to an
embodiment of the present invention.
[0039] FIG. 19 illustrates the method to generate dynamically the
menu list of authorized game made available to the player on each
gaming terminal, according to an embodiment of the present
invention.
[0040] FIG. 20 illustrates the method to generate a code signed
companion software component, according to an embodiment of the
present invention.
[0041] FIG. 21 illustrates the method to quickly generate
dynamically the list of game installed on each gaming terminal
using the companion software component, according to an embodiment
of the present invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0042] Reference will now be made in detail to the construction and
operation of preferred implementations of the present invention
illustrated in the accompanying drawings. The following description
of the preferred implementations of the present invention is only
exemplary of the invention. The present invention is not limited to
these implementations, but may be realized by other
implementations.
[0043] FIG. 1 illustrates Software Component Identification and
Traceability via File Properties, according to an embodiment of the
present invention. Shown at 100 in FIG. 1 is the intrinsic
information that uniquely identifies each executable software
component. The executable component source code comprises
executable code lines (e.g. X=X+1; not shown here) and associated
source code assembly information 102, 104 that comprises comment
lines 106 and assembly information. Herein, AssemblyTitle 108,
AssemblyProduct 110 and AssemblyVersion 112 are configured. The
AssemblyTitle 108 is set to CyberInv.exe that is the friendly name
of the executable software component; AssemblyProduct 110 is set to
0006-00001-00 that is the part number of the executable software
component and AssemblyVersion 112 is set to 1.0.1.0, which is the
version number of the executable software component. Once the
source code is compiled and the executable is built (CyberInv.exe
in this case), the configured assembly information is available via
the File Property of Windows 114 when right clicking on the file
CyberInv.exe and selecting "Properties" and "Version", as shown at
116. The friendly name is shown in the Description field 118, the
part number is shown in the Product Name field 120, 122 and the
version is shown in the File Version field 124.
[0044] It will be apparent to those of skill in the art of software
development that intrinsic information that uniquely identifies
each executable software component may be obtained in various
combinations of assembly directives and file property fields.
Additional information may be configured such as, for example, the
software component part number, major version number, minor version
number, build number, revision number, project name, type of
software component, language variant, game regulation variant,
friendly name, identification of the certification laboratory,
identification of the client, and other predetermined
identification identifiers. The identifiers associated with the
executable software component using source code assembly directives
may, therefore, be traceable via the File Property features of the
Windows operating system.
[0045] An example of such a configuration is
CST3000-0006-00001-00[1.0.1.0]{21} 11.about.9% S CyberInv.exe that
comprises a concatenation of identifiers that may be used in a file
name or a PKI certificate subject name. According to this example,
CST3000 is the marketing system product identification or the
project name; 0006-00001-00 is the software component part number;
[1.0.1.0] details the software component major version number,
minor version number, build number, revision number; {21} is the
software component variant identifier; 11 identifies the
certification lab that certifies the software component; .about.9
identifies the customer for which this software component is
certified; % S is the software component language variant ("S" for
Spanish in this example); CyberInv.exe is the software component
friendly name for quick identification. Spaces may be used freely
and the identifier fields may be written in any order so as to
facilitate reading. Identifier fields may be omitted whenever the
context already provides such information. The framing or delimiter
characters such as [ ], { }, .about., , % which are allowable
characters to be used in file names and certificate subject names
facilitate human recognition as well as string searches for
particular attributes (global search for all Spanish variants for
example).
[0046] In the same manner, a selected set of identification
information making up the certificate subject name may be used for
making up the file name of PKI certificate related files such as
*.CER, *.P7B and *.PVK such as to facilitate human identification,
string searches and file searches.
[0047] FIG. 2 illustrates traceability via the Windows Event Log.
Reference numeral 200 in FIG. 2 illustrates the information
uniquely identifying each executable software component being made
available to the Windows Event Log upon execution of the software
component. The Windows Event Log 202 is a repository for logging
important events; it is viewed via the Event Viewer 204. Windows
default event log bins (or containers) are Application, Security
and System. In the illustrated example, an Event Log bin 206
denominated "Cyberscan" has been added. The Cyberscan bin 206
contains traceability information in its "Source" field that is
being logged by each of the executable software components. The
software executable software component makes use of the Event Log
API to "splash" its identification information into the source
field of a predetermined bin in the Windows Event Log each time it
starts execution, or at any other time should the occurrence of an
event be traced, in order to provide an audit trail to be examined
by auditors. The part number 214, version 216 and friendly name 212
identifiers associated to the executable software component using
source code assembly directives 201 are therefore traceable via the
Event Log features of the Windows operating system. Other
information associated with the executable software component may
be splashed into the event log for additional traceability. The
"Type" field 208 may flag an important audit condition such as here
"Failure Audit" to alert the auditor.
[0048] FIG. 3 illustrates the Certificate "Issued to" Field.
Reference numeral 300 illustrates the information 308 (test
certificate indicator 318, project/product code 320, type of
executable code 322, part number 324, major/minor/build/version
326, certification lab identifier 328, friendly name 330) uniquely
identifying each executable software component being used to
generate the "Subject Name" 316 (or "Issued to" field 306, 314, or
also known as the "CommonName" field) of the individual PKI
certificate 304 associated with each executable software component,
according to an embodiment of the present invention. The friendly
name, part number and version of the executable software components
may be substantially identical to those entered in the source code
assembly 302. "Subject Name" 316 and "Issued to" field 306, 314
refer to the same information; Subject Name is preferably used
hereafter. The certificate authority 312 responsible for generating
the PKI certificate is shown in the "Issued by" field 310.
[0049] FIG. 4 at 400 illustrates the information that may be
entered in the Extended Attributes 408 of a PKI certificate 402,
according to an embodiment of the present invention. This
information may be viewed by selecting, for example, the "Details"
tab 404 of the certificate 402 and selecting "Extensions Only", as
shown at 406. Intrinsic information that uniquely identifies each
executable software component may be entered in the extended
attributes of a PKI certificate in order to attain the same purpose
as described for FIG. 3 as an alternative to entering the
information in the certificate Subject Name. In the same manner,
additional identification information to those entered in the
Subject Name may be entered in the extended attributes.
[0050] FIG. 5 illustrates traceability via the Trusted Inventory
Tool 504, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Reference numeral 500 in FIG. 5 illustrates the information that
may be obtained using the Trusted Inventory tool 504. The trusted
inventory tool 504 is a simple application that searches for
executable files through the branches of a given tree directory and
determines whether the executable software component may be trusted
by, for example, calling the Microsoft ChkTrust.exe tool. If the
executable software component is signed by a valid PKI certificate
and its executable binary data is uncorrupted (its recalculated
hash matches the code signature), the ChkTrust.exe tool returns the
authenticode "Trusted" attribute; an "Untrusted" attribute is
returned otherwise. The Trusted attributes are automatically
tabulated in a spreadsheet such as, for example, Microsoft Excel as
depicted at 506. Each line 508 in the table provides details on the
executable software component that is being examined, such as
program path location 510, friendly name 512, executable type 514,
authenticode trusted attribute 516, part number 518 and version
520. According to an embodiment of the present invention,
therefore, the part number 518, version 520 and friendly name 512
514 identifiers associated with the executable software component
using source code assembly directives 502 are traceable via the
Trusted Inventory tool.
[0051] Reference numeral 600 in FIG. 6 illustrates the information
that may be entered to configure a type-certificate Software
Restriction Policy rule. A Software Restriction Policy (SRP) 604
may be configured using the Group Policy Object Editor 606. The
type-certificate Software Restriction Policy rule 610 may be
entered in the "Additional Rules" node 608 of the Software
Restriction Policy object 614. In FIG. 6, the part number, version
and friendly name configured in the source code assembly 602 are
recognizable in the certificate subject name 612.
[0052] FIG. 7 illustrates SRP Certificate Rules Policies via the
Group Policy Management Console, according to an embodiment of the
present invention. Reference numeral 700 in FIG. 7 illustrates the
policies that are associated to the active directory container used
to configure the gaming machines referenced at 706. Policies are
managed using the Group Policy Management Console 702, 704. In this
illustration, a policy named "SRP_CyberInv" 708, 710, 712 is
selected, for the purpose of viewing a detailed report of the rules
that are configured. The report shows details in a hierarchical
order. This exemplary policy defines only one certificate rule 716
in the Software Restriction Policy node 714. The certificate
subject name 718 is set with a security level 720 of
"Unrestricted", as shown at 722, thus ensuring that only the
executable software component identified in the certificate subject
name is authorized to execute when the policy 714 is enforced. The
SRP path rules 724 must be configured such as to prevent
non-authorized software from executing. The policy 708 is enforced
when it is linked to its container object 706 herein named "Gaming
Machines."
[0053] Reference numeral 800 in FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary
cycle from the moment a game is being created until it is first
executed on a gaming terminal, according to an embodiment of the
present invention. The flowchart 800 starts at 802 when the
decision to initiate a project to develop and release a new game is
made. The game developer (Cyberscan here, for illustrative purposes
only) 804 develops a new game application 806 whose code must be
certified at 810 by a recognized certification lab 808. The
certified code must then be signed as shown at 812 using PKI
certificates produced by a certificate issuing authority (CA) 814
controlled by a trusted party 816. The trusted party 816 may be the
certification lab 808. The signed executable software components
may be packaged in code-signed MSI installation packages signed in
a manner substantially identical to the executable software
components, that is, with a unique PKI certificate whose subject
name contains part number, version and friendly name identifiers
for the MSI package. The MSI packages together with scripts may
then be copied to a removable media, such as a CD-ROM 818 for
example.
[0054] The game operator 820 receives the CD-ROM and when it
decides to deploy the new game 822, it copies the packages and
associated scripts from the removable media into a library
repository on a server 824 (the DEPLOY server in this case). The
scripts contain automation tasks such as copying to the repository
and configuring the policies.
[0055] In the case of gaming terminals connected in a LAN, each
gaming terminal 826 is controlled by the policies as soon as they
are enforced. The Software Installation Policies (SIPs) controlling
the installation of the new game automatically execute the MSI
installation packages upon policy enforcement, provided the
corresponding Software Restriction Policies have been configured to
authorize the execution of the MSI installation packages. This
process is performed at 828, 830. If no SRP authorizes the
execution of the MSI installation packages, the installation is
ignored, as shown at 832. When the MSI installation package is
authorized to execute, the software components and other files
contained in the package may be copied to the gaming terminals, as
suggested at reference numeral 834 836. Other configuration tasks
may also be carried out during the Microsoft installer installation
process such as, for example, setting the Windows registry, setting
shortcuts and installing software patches.
[0056] Download of the game software components from the game
repository to the gaming terminals may occur as soon as the
associated Software Installation Policies are enforced (and the
SRPs for the MSI installation package is permitted accordingly).
Therefore, scheduling of the download may be achieved by simply
enforcing the associated software installation policies at a given
time; this may be accomplished by having an operator manually
enforcing the SIP at a predetermined time via the group policy
management console, or having a process automatically enforcing the
SIP at a predetermined time via the API to the group policy
management console. Enforcing a policy may be achieved by linking
the selected policy to the selected policy object in the domain
controller active directory.
[0057] Game activation 840 that authorizes execution of the game
may be achieved by enforcing the associated Software Restriction
Policies. In the same manner, scheduled game activation and
deactivation in order to offer selected authorized games to the
players at predetermined authorized times may be achieved by simply
enforcing the associated Software Restriction Policies at a given
time; this may be accomplished by having an operator manually
enforce the SRP at a predetermined time via the group policy
management console, or having a process automatically enforce the
SRP at a predetermined time via the API to the group policy
management console. Enforcing a policy may be achieved by linking
the selected policy to the selected policy object in the domain
controller active directory. Alternatively, a selected executable
software component may be prevented from executing by configuring
its associated SRP security level to "disallowed."
[0058] At this stage, a global verification process 842, 844 as
described relative to FIG. 9 may advantageously be executed to
verify the trust of every software component installed on the
gaming terminal. Should the global verification fail, the gaming
terminal may be locked at 846 pending servicing by an
attendant.
[0059] When a player selects a game from a gaming terminal 838 from
a selection menu and requests execution thereof, as shown at 848,
the authenticodes of the game's executable software components are
verified by the associated enforced Software Restriction Policy as
shown at 850 before beginning execution 858. Should the
authenticode verification fail at 852, the gaming terminal may be
locked at 854 pending servicing by an attendant. If the code is
trusted, as verified by the associated enforced SRP, the game is
allowed to execute, as shown at 858.
[0060] Policy changes are automatically distributed by the Windows
server operating system throughout the network connected gaming
system at periodic intervals; this automatic process may be
disabled if required. Alternatively, the RegisterGPNotification
function may be used by the game application software executing on
each gaming terminal to check if an applicable group policy has
changed. The gaming terminal may then decide on enforcing the
policies locally immediately. The gpupdate.exe service, the
RefreshPolicy function or the RefreshPolicyEx function may be used
by the game application software executing on each gaming terminal
to enforce the configured policies. A reboot may optionally be
performed in order to recheck the gaming terminal trusted base and
ensure the policies have been completely enforced (long game
installation for example).
[0061] The RegisterGPNotification function enables an application
to receive notification when there is a change in policy. When a
policy change occurs, the specified event object is set to the
signaled state. Further information on the RegisterGPNotification
function may be found at:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/poli-
cy/policy/-registergpnotification.asp. The RefreshPolicy function
causes policy to be applied immediately on the client computer.
Further information on the RefreshPolicy function may be found at:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/p-
olicy/-refreshpolicy.asp. The RefreshPolicyEx function causes
policy to be applied immediately on the computer. The extended
function allows specifying the type of policy refresh to apply to
be specified. Further information on the RefreshPolicyEx may be
found at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/p-
olicy/refreshpolicyex.asp.
[0062] The menu of authorized games offered to the player may be
dynamically generated by each terminal without requiring the
central system to dispatch the list of authorized games or having
each terminal fetch the list of authorized games from the central
system; this may be done by having each terminal check the policies
enforced on the games. This may be accomplished by having a process
in each terminal attempt to execute each of the entry point for
each game (the parent module which is first called upon selecting a
game to play). If the execution succeeds, then the game is
authorized and may be added to the games menu offered to the
player. If the execution is denied (SRP is unlinked or the security
level is disallowed), then the game is not authorized and it is
removed from the games menu offered to the player. Similarly, if a
game entry software component file is not found, then the software
is not installed or has been removed and is removed from the games
menu offered to the player. The process of dynamically generating
the game selection menu may be optimized in many ways in order to
reduce the game time to start overhead to check if it is
authorized.
[0063] In a casino, although new games may be scheduled to be
downloaded to gaming terminals and activated at predetermined
times, it is a requirement that games may not be changed while a
player is playing. In practical terms, a player is considered to
have terminated his or her game play when the player's credit
balance remains at zero for a predetermined period of time. The
predetermined period time is sufficient for allowing the player to
enter a new bill or other form of credit instrument to continue
playing. Therefore, the game application software on each game
terminal may, according to embodiments of the present invention,
continually test for this condition (credit=0 for a predetermined
time) before checking for change in policy, enforcing the policy
changes and then updating the menu of games to be made available to
the next player.
[0064] FIG. 9 at 900 illustrates the global verification process
performed by a terminal to check that no unauthorized files are
allowed to execute or affect the game outcome. This process may be
performed by any of the subsystems connected in the gaming
systems.
[0065] The process may start with a computer cold or hot reboot 902
such that the operating system trusted base may be thoroughly
verified before the game software components are verified. The
trusted base is detailed in commonly assigned and copending
application Ser. No. 10/520,831, filed Aug. 12, 2005, and also in
Microsoft Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), also
incorporated herein by reference. Details of Microsoft's NGSCB are
located at www.microsoft.com/ngscb. During the trusted base
verification, the integrity of the Driver Signing framework, the
Windows File Protection framework and Software Restriction Policies
framework are verified. With NGSCB operating system such as
forthcoming "Longhorn," a framework called Nexus deeply integrated
directly within the hardware components (in each major chipsets)
and the BIOS which constitutes a mechanism for authenticating the
trustworthiness of the software and hardware configuration, is
booted prior to checking the integrity of the Driver Signing
framework, the Windows File Protection framework and Software
Restriction Policies framework.
[0066] On completion of the operating system boot-up 902 or at
another time, the global verification process 904 may be executed.
The CyberInv process 910, 914 is also shown and described at FIG.
5. The CyberInv process 910, 914 verifies all the executable files
in given folder trees such as 912 (*.exe, *.dll, *.ocx, *.vbs,
*.bat, *.msi, *.cab, for example) for trustworthiness. If any file
is found to be untrusted as shown at 932, then the gaming terminal
may be frozen as shown at 934 pending examination by security
personnel. A spreadsheet file 916 may be produced that list the
verification status of each executable file. If the authenticode of
all the files is trusted as shown at 918 then the CyberInv process
908, 910, 914, 924 returns at 920 a trusted status, as shown at 926
930. Consequently, all of the executable software components may be
considered to be trusted, as shown at 930.
[0067] However, it is to be noted that the fact that an executable
software component is trusted does not imply that the software
component is authorized to execute; it merely indicates that the
software executable software component has a valid authorized
authenticode certificate and that the software component binary
data is not corrupted. Checking whether an executable software
component having a valid authorized authenticode certificate is
authorized to execute requires that the applicable Software
Restriction Policy be checked. This may be performed automatically
when the software component is loaded by the operating system to
start its execution, either when dynamically building the menu of
authorized games, or each time upon starting execution of the game
when the player has selected a game to play--or using an
appropriate service that may be called by an application.
[0068] Although RM (Rights Management) and DRM (Digital Rights
Management) technology from Microsoft is readily available for
authenticating the trustworthiness of non-executable files such as
media files, Word files and emails, for example, it adds management
complexity on top of the Software Restriction Policy framework when
used in a network-connected gaming system. Addressing this,
embodiments of the present invention offer a method for a network
connected gaming system to trust non-executable files such as
initialization or configuration files, video files, sound files,
multimedia files, file containing list of hashes, CRCs, and/or
signatures. The present method relies on packaging the
non-executable files in a MSI installation package, the MSI package
being subsequently code-signed with a unique certificate and the
appropriate Software Restriction Policy is configured to enable
installation (execution in fact) of this MSI package. Executable
files and non-executable files may be packaged together for
convenience. The selected aggregate of executable files and
non-executable receives at least a part number (and preferably a
version number as well) that is used in the subject name of the
associated certificate. Consequently, according to embodiments of
the present invention, when the MSI package is installed, the
installed non-executable files are obtained from a trusted and
authorized source.
[0069] As the CyberInv process 908 has authenticated the
trustworthiness of all the *.msi files 911, therefore whenever
there is a need to ensure that the non-executable files are
trusted, the associated MSI package is re-installed. It is to be
noted that the service that performs the installation of the MSI
packages (msiexec.exe in the current versions of Windows) may be
executed with a variety of execution modifiers, such as shown at
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/techn-
et/prodtechnol/winxppro/proddocs/msiexec.asp. Of particular
interest is the c option that reinstalls a file if it is missing or
if the stored checksum of the installed file does not match the new
file's value (the log file will contain the anomalies detected for
subsequent forensic analysis), as shown at 936. In the global
verification process 904, the c option of the msiexec.exec command
may be used for re-installing every package containing
configuration files 938 (such as initialization or configuration
files, files containing list of hashes, CRCs, and/or signatures),
Flash files 940 (Macromedia Flash and Director), and other media
assets files 942 in order to ensure the trustworthiness of these
files.
[0070] Subsequent to completion of process 908, all the MSI
packages for the executable software components may be re-installed
with for example, the msiexec.exe command using the p option in
order to re-install missing authorized executable software
components (the log file will contain the anomalies detected for
subsequent forensic analysis).
[0071] Subsequent to the successful completion of the global
verification process 904, the trustworthiness of the game
application framework is established and may be started, as shown
at 906.
[0072] It is to be noted that when a player wins an amount equal to
or greater than $25,000 in a casino, there is a requirement to
check the integrity of the gaming application. With legacy gaming
terminals, the gaming terminal is powered-down and the ROMs are
extracted in order to be verified in a trusted verifier named a
"Kobetron." The Kobetron produces a signature for each of the ROMs
that is compared with the corresponding signature produced by the
certification lab. In this manner, the integrity of the all the
software components of the legacy gaming terminal, including the
operating system, the game application and the configuration data
may be verified. According to embodiments of the invention, when
executing the global verification process 904 subsequent to the
gaming terminal bootup at 902, a verification equivalent to a
"Kobetron verification" may be performed. This metaphor helps
greatly in the acceptability of downloadable game technology by
game regulators who are reluctant to accept state-of-the-art
operating systems, multimedia and network technologies.
[0073] FIG. 10 at 1000 illustrates the configuration of the three
parties involved in a new game cycle detailed at FIG. 8, according
to an embodiment of the present invention. The three parties
involved in a game cycle, according to embodiments of the present
invention, are the game developer 1002 whose facilities are located
in a given city 1004, the certification laboratory 1006 whose
facilities are located in a given city 1008 and the gaming operator
1010 located in a given city 1012. The game developer 1002 and the
certification lab 1006 may have a network 1020 of connected gaming
system(s) representative of the network connected gaming system in
place at the location (e.g., the casino) of the gaming operator
1010. In addition, the game developer 1010 and the certification
lab 1006 each may have an integrated software development
environment for compiling the game applications source code, each
capable of managing at least 200 games for 50 distinct game
operators as shown at 1044, (resulting in thousands of source code
variants due to local regulation variances). The development
environments may be kept synchronized via the secure network link
1016, 1018, 1014, 1022, 1020. A certification authority (CA) 1040
may be located at the game developer's site or may be controlled by
an authorized trusted party such as VeriSign. The game developer
site and the certification lab site may be accessible from the
outside by authorized mobile users 1034, 1028 via secure links
1022, 1018, 1030, and 1036. Logon authentication may be carried out
using, for example, smartcards as shown at 1038, 1032 or by other
secure means.
[0074] The game developer 1002 supplies the certification lab 1006
with a CD-ROM (or other media) containing the software components
to be tested, as shown at 1048. The certification lab then
certifies the software components supplied on the CD-ROM and
provides the game developer 1002 with a CD-ROM containing the
certified software components for deployment, as shown at 1046. The
CD-ROM 1046 containing the authorized software components that were
tested and certified by the certification lab 1006 may then be
provided to the game operator (e.g., the casino) for installation
and deployment on one or more of the gaming machines GM001, GM002,
GM2995 coupled to the network 1024. The certified authorized
software components are code-signed using a certificate produced in
accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, as
described hereinabove. The network 1024 is preferably not coupled
to any external network, as suggested at 1026.
[0075] FIG. 11 shows a 12-Step Integrated Certification Environment
Process, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Shown
at 1100 are the 12 folders 1110 created on the disk repository 1102
of the development environment. The 12 folders 1110 are mapped to
the 12-step procedure 1104 to 1106 involved in producing the CD-ROM
1050 containing the certified authorized software components. Each
folder contains the computer resources and instructions to carry
out each step. The folders are clearly named with the step number
and the title description of the procedure step at 1108.
[0076] FIG. 12 shows a dataflow diagram of Step #1 to Step #3 of
the Integrated Certification Environment Processor for producing
certified authorized software components, according to an
embodiment of the present invention. Step 1 at 1220 may include
obtaining a snapshot 1212 of the repository 1204 containing the
game developer's source code 1206, data files 1208 and media assets
1210 in order to configure the building environment of the
reference platform with all the source code, data files, media
asset files and resources files required to initiate the
certification process. The snapshoot files 1212 may be stored in a
repository 1218 controlled by a version configuration and control
system (SCCS) such as Microsoft Visual Source Safe 1214 (VSS) on
the DEV development computer 1216. The files may be grouped in
project directories as "Projects" such that the source files,
control files and resource files are stored in convenient
systematic fashion in the Visual Studio repository 1240 on the
development computer 1238. An inventory of the files submitted for
certification may be produced. Step 1 may be qualified as "SETUP
Projects" 1222.
[0077] Step 2 at 1232 may include compiling the source code and
producing binary executable code. Microsoft Visual Studio 1224 is
constructed so as to manage source code as projects (a project can
be a given game) regrouping all of the dependent source code, and
data files. Step 2 is also referenced as building the projects or
"BUILD Projects," as shown at 1234. Media assets may require a
different compiling environment on the DEV computer 1230 such as
the Macromedia Director 1228.
[0078] Step 3, shown at 1242 may include producing the projects MSI
packages 1244 for the source code compiled in Step 2. Relevant
non-executable file such as configuration files and media assets
may be packaged in MSI packages with the compiled source code. It
is to be noted 1246 that packages will be built again (step 8
hereafter) after code signing of EXE, DLL, OCX and other
executables (step 6 hereafter). Step 3 may be referenced as "BUILD
Packages Pass #1" 1244.
[0079] FIG. 13 shows, at 1300, the dataflow for step 4 to step 12
for producing the certified authorized software components,
according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0080] Step 4 at 1308 calls for the CyberInv.exe process 1306, for
a selected project (a Visual Studio project may typically regroup
all the software components for an entire game), perform an
inventory 1304 of the compiled software components produced by
Visual Studio 1302 on completion of the Build Project process 1234
(FIG. 12) as well as the MSI install packages produced by the Build
MSI Packages Pass #1 1244 process (FIG. 12). The CyberInv.exe 1306
process may also include any other executable software components
not directly managed under Visual Studio such as, for example, ocx,
*.vbs, *.bat, *.cab, *js. (in fact, any executable component that
is supported by the Software Restriction Policy technology).
[0081] The CyberInv.exe process 1306 produces the CyberInv.xls 1307
Excel spreadsheet file 916 shown at FIG. 9, which is examined by an
authorized user in the MS Excel program 1310. The CyberInv.xls 1307
file is copied to the folder "Step 4--CyberInv" folder in 1110 in
FIG. 11. The binary files having just been compiled are not
code-signed; consequently the authenticode field shows an
"Untrusted" status for each of the binary components. The friendly
name, file type, part number and version (including build number)
are extracted directly from the assembly information contained in
the source code, therefore truly reflecting the identity of the
source code component.
[0082] Because the build number is incremented each time the code
is recompiled in a Build operation, it is to be noted that the
version number will change accordingly. The authorized user
eliminates the rows that are irrelevant to the game to be certified
and saves the file under the CyberCert.xls 1311 file name which
contains the necessary friendly name 512, executable type 514, part
number 518 and version 520 information to compose the PKI
certificate subject name in accordance with method detailed at FIG.
3 for subsequent code signing. The program path location 510 of the
unsigned software components is also available for later retrieval
of the unsigned binary file. The CyberCert.xls 1311 file is copied
to the folder "Step 5--CyberCert" folder in 1110 in FIG. 11.
[0083] The CyberCert.xls 1311 file may be securely copied in
encrypted form to a removable media such as a floppy disk, a CD-ROM
or a USB disk 1312, or alternatively transferred to another
location by secure communication means.
[0084] The CyberCert.xls 1311 file is split into 2 files
CyberSign1.xls 1317 and CyberSign2.xls 1319. CyberSign2.xls
contains only the rows associated to the MSI packages and
CyberSign1.xls contains the rows corresponding to the other
executable file. CyberSign1.xls is copied to the "Step 6--CyberSign
(Pass #1)" folder in 1110 in FIG. 11, and CyberSign2.xls is copied
to the "Step 8--CyberSign (Pass #2)" folder.
[0085] Step 5 at 1316 includes having a certification authority
(CA) 1315 located at the game developers' site or controlled by an
authorized trusted party such as VeriSign generating certificates
in accordance with the details provided in the CyberCert.xls 1311
file, that is, with a subject name created in accordance with the
method detailed relative to FIG. 3. An automated process
CyberCert.exe 1318 executing on the off-line CA computer Windows
server named CS11 1314 may automate the generation of the PKI
public certificates 1326 and the associated private keys 1328 using
the CyberCert.xls 1311 file.
[0086] The trusted root certificate for the authorized CA 1320 is
supplied to the certification lab, the game regulators or other
parties for reference and for importing as a trusted root into the
ICE computer system and the gaming system certificates store.
[0087] The public certificates 1326 and their associated private
keys 1328 are forwarded to the DEV computer 1332 of the ICE system
in encrypted form on a removable media such as a floppy disk, a
CD-ROM or a USB disk 1324, or alternatively transferred by secure
communication means. Public certificates 1326 and their associated
private keys 1328 that are associated with the MSI packages are
copied into the "Step 6--CyberSign (Pass #1)" folder in 1110, and
the other public certificates 1326 and their associated private
keys 1328 that are associated with other software components are
copied to the "Step 8--CyberSign (Pass #2)" folder.
[0088] Step 6 1336 includes steps of code signing the non-MSI
executable components listed in the CyberSign1.xls 1317 file using
the corresponding public certificates 1326 and their private keys
1328. The code signing may be performed using the SignCode.exe
utility provided by Microsoft, or equivalent. A password may be
required for the private key depending on the security option
selected when generating the certificate at the CA. The
CyberSign.exe process 1330 may automate the code-signing of all the
non-MSI executable components listed in the CyberSign1.xls 1317
file using the friendly name, file type, part number and version
(including build number) given in each row. The CyberSign.exe
process may call the SignCode.exe utility or the equivalent API.
During the code signing process, the compiled executable software
components may be replaced at 1339 by their code-signed form. Step
6 is designated as "CodeSign Pass#1" 1338.
[0089] Step 7 at 1344 includes re-building all the MSI install
packages 1345 performed during step 3 at 1242. This time, the MSI
packages contain the non-MSI code-signed executable components.
[0090] Step 8 at 1340 includes code signing the MSI executable
components listed in the CyberSign2.xls 1319 file using the
corresponding public certificates 1326 and their private keys 1328.
The code signing may be performed using the SignCode.exe utility
provided by Microsoft, or equivalent. A password may be required
for the private key depending on the security option selected when
generating the certificate at the CA. The CyberSign.exe process
1330 may automate the code-signing of all the MSI executable
components listed in the CyberSign2.xls 1319 file using the
friendly name, file type, part number and version (including build
number) given in each row. The CyberSign.exe process may call the
SignCode.exe utility or the equivalent API. During the code signing
process, the executable MSI software components may be replaced
1341 by their code-signed form. Step 8 is designated as "CodeSign
Pass#2" at 1342. The executable MSI software components are copied
as shown at 1371 to the CD Pre-Burn repository 1372.
[0091] Because of the necessity of performing step 7, the CyberSign
1330 code-signing process to be used for the ICE (Integrated
Certification Environment) is designated a "2--Pass code-sign", as
indicated at 1334.
[0092] Step 9 1366 includes (a) configuring the software
restriction policy (SRP) 1360 for the ICE system test gaming
terminals (via the active directory 1350 in the domain controller
DC) with the certificate rules corresponding to the certificate
produced at step 5 (the *.p7b certificate at reference numeral 1326
may be converted to *.cert certificates for compatibility reasons
when configuring the SRP); (b) configuring the Software
Installation Policy (SIP) 1368 for the ICE system test gaming
terminals with the MSI packages produced at step 7, then (c) using
the GPMC (Group Policy Management Console) or equivalent service,
exporting the SIP via SIP export scripts 1362 and the SRP via SRP
export scripts 1364 (the policy export facility is available in the
Group Policy Management Console GPMC 702, 704). These SIP and SRP
export scripts may be copied into the folder "Step 9--SIP &
SRP" folder in 1110. These SIP and SRP export scripts may be later
imported in the gaming operator's 1010 gaming system for enforcing
the policies on the game components. SIP export scripts 1362 and
SRP export scripts 1364 are stored in the CD Pre-Burn repository
1372 (or into the folder "Step 10--CD Burn--Casino Release" folder
in 11110).
[0093] Step 10 at 1374 includes steps of burning at 1384 to a
CD-ROM 1376 or other removable media the content of the CD Pre-burn
repository 1372 comprising (a) the executable MSI software
components 1371; (b) the SIP export scripts 5 1362 and SRP export
scripts 1364 and (c) other automation scripts in order to automate
the installation of (a) and (b). A copy of CD-ROM 1376 may be
forwarded (a) to the gaming operator's 1010 gaming system for game
deployment (such as a casino 1379), (b) to the certification lab
1378, and (c) a trusted party 1377 such as a lawyer or in escrow
for impartial reference in case of later dispute. The CD-ROM 1376
may later be inserted at 1050 in the gaming operator's 1010 gaming
system for game deployment.
[0094] Step 11 at 1370 includes steps of (a) taking a snap-shot
1387 of the entire development environment for a selected certified
game (Visual Studio repository 1302 and Visual Source Safe
repository 1214 1218 that contains all the source file, the
compiled code-signed executable files and dependant executable
files, the non-executable files, project solution, automation
scripts, the source and compiled signed code from other development
platforms, the media assets from media development platforms such
as MacroMedia Director 1228); in (b) taking a snap-shot 1387 of the
code-signed MSI installation packages; in (c) optionally encrypting
them; and then in (d) copying them into a CD pre-burn repository
1388 (or into the folder "Step 12--CD Burn--VS Snapshot" folder in
1110).
[0095] Step 12 at 1386 includes steps of burning at 1382 to a
CD-ROM 1380 or other removable media the content of the CD Pre-burn
repository 1388 comprising the software components of step 11. A
copy of CD-ROM 1380 may be forwarded to the certification lab 1378
and to a trusted party 1377 such as a lawyer or in escrow for
impartial reference in case of later dispute.
[0096] Steps 4 to step 12 should be carried out each time a source
code is being recompiled subsequent to a modification because a
unique certificate must be associated to each build. Deviating form
this order may jeopardize certificate integrity because of the risk
of a human error that may result in the wrong certificate being
used during the code signing process.
[0097] FIG. 14 illustrates assignment of policies by banks of
gaming machines. Reference numeral 1400 in FIG. 14 shows the
grouping of gaming terminal and the associated enforced policies.
In this illustration, the Group Policy Management console 1402 may
be configured such that the active directory Organization Unit (OU)
named "Gaming Terminals--Floor"at 1404 is architectured to regroup
the gaming terminals in "banks" or sub-Organization Units (sub-OUs)
identified by 200A0x 1406, 200B0x 1408, 200C0x 1410, and 200D0x to
200K0x at reference numeral 1412. Each bank contains a
predetermined number of gaming terminals, in multiples of 8 units,
for example.
[0098] Noting the hierarchical tree composed of the OUs and sub-OUs
illustrated at 1400, all the policies 1414 apply to the OU "Gaming
Terminals--Floor" 1414 which contains all the sub-OUs 1406 1408
1410 and 1412. Using this technique, all the policies 1414 may
apply to all the 3000 gaming terminals of a large casino. In the
same manner, the policies 1416, 1418 apply to the bank 1406; the
policies 1420, 1422 apply to the bank 1408; and the policies 1424,
1426 apply to the bank 1410.
[0099] In the illustration, the exemplary game named "Roulette" is
assigned a policy named "Sbm1.5--SIP--Roulette (GLI)" 1416 which
configures the Software Installation Policy (SIP) and a policy
named "Sbm1.5--SRP--Roulette (GLI)" 1418 which configures the
Software Restriction Policy (SRP) for that game.
[0100] In the same manner, the exemplary game named "Infinity" is
assigned a policy named "Sbm1.4--SRP--Infinity (GLI)" 1424 which
configures the Software Installation Policy (SIP) and a policy
named "Sbm1.4--SRP--Infinity (GLI)" 1426 which configures the
Software Restriction Policy (SRP) for that game.
[0101] The keyword "Sbm1.4", in this example, denotes the
certification submission number 1.4, and the keyword "GLI" denotes
the certification lab GLI (Game Laboratories International)
approving the Infinity game software.
[0102] In the illustration, all of the game terminals regrouped in
the bank 200A0x shown at 1406 are, therefore, configured to execute
the Roulette game, all the game terminals in the bank 200B0x shown
at 1408 are configured to execute the Roulette game and the
Infinity game, and all the game terminals in the bank 200C0x shown
at 1410 are configured to execute the Infinity game.
[0103] FIG. 15 shows the enforcement of a Software Installation
Policy (SIP). In FIG. 14, banks of gaming terminals are configured
to execute authorized games using SIPs and SRPs policies. However,
in order for the gaming terminals to be able to install a game, the
associated Software Installation Policy must be enforced. At 1500,
FIG. 15 illustrates a method for enforcing a Software Installation
Policy by "linking" the policy, according to an embodiment of the
present invention. This is accomplished in the Group Policy
Management console 1502 by, e.g., right-clicking the selected
policy 1504, 1506 "Sbm3.3--SIP--INFINITY.sub.--95" associated to
the Infinity game with a Return To Players (RTP) percentage of 95%
and selecting the "link Enabled" attribute 1514. The software
components for the Infinity.sub.--95 game contained in the two MSI
installation packages 1510 and 1512 will subsequently be installed,
provided the associated SRPs are configured to authorize execution
of these two MSI packages (refer to description for FIG. 16).
Alternatively, the same procedure may be automated via an API
called from an appropriate application. It is to be noted that the
linking of the policy will in fact enable the enforcement of the
policy, but the policy will only be enforced on the gaming terminal
when a gpupdate command or equivalent command is performed at the
terminal; a terminal reboot may also be required for the policy to
be enforced. Also to be noted is that policy changes are
automatically distributed by the Windows server operating system
throughout the network connected gaming system at periodic
intervals; this automatic process may preferably be disabled such
as to obtain more predictable policy enforcement changes by issuing
explicit commands instead.
[0104] Package 1512 (friendly name: Infinity95.msi) contains the
executable software components for the Infinity game and package
1510 (friendly name: Infinity95.Config.msi) contains the
configuration files (the non-executable files) for the Infinity
game. Package Infinity95.Config.msi 1510 is re-installed in the
process 938.
[0105] FIG. 16 illustrates the enforcement of a Software
Restriction Policy (SRP). In FIG. 14, banks of gaming terminals are
configured to execute authorized games using SIPs and SRPs
policies. However, in order for the gaming terminals to be able to
execute the games, the policies must be enforced. FIG. 16 at 1600
illustrates a method for enforcing a Software Restriction Policy
1608 by "linking" the policy. This is accomplished in the Group
Policy Management console 1602 by, e.g., right-clicking the
selected policy 1604, 1606 "Sbm3.3--SRP--INFINITY.sub.--95"
associated to the Infinity game with a Return To Players percentage
(RTP) of 95% and selecting the "link Enabled" attribute 1624.
[0106] The certificate rules 1610, 1616 and 1620 that are
configured with the "Unrestricted" attribute 1618, 1622 authorize
the installation of the software components for the
Infinity.sub.--95 game contained in the two MSI installation
packages 1510 and 1512 by authorizing the unique PKI certificate
associated to those MSI produced in accordance with the present
method. The ."dll" executable software component 1612 is
authorized, has its security level attribute set to "Unrestricted"
and is, therefore, authorized to execute once it is installed.
[0107] The two MSI installation packages 1510 and 1512 for
installing the software components for the Infinity.sub.--95 game
have their associated unique PKI certificate 1616 and 1620
(produced in accordance with the method described herein)
configured with the "Unrestricted" security level attribute 1618,
1622 via the certificate rules 1610, thus enabling (or authorizing)
execution and installation of the software components for the
Infinity.sub.--95 game.
[0108] The ."dll" executable software component contained in the
1512 package has its security level attribute set to "Unrestricted"
thus it is authorized to execute once it is installed.
[0109] Alternatively, the same procedure may be automated via an
API called from an appropriate application. It is to be noted that
the linking of the policy will in fact enable the enforcement of
the policy, but the policy will only be enforced on the gaming
terminal when a gpupdate command or equivalent command is performed
at the terminal; a terminal reboot may also be required for the
policy to be enforced. Also to be noted is that policy changes are
automatically distributed by the Windows server operating system
throughout the network connected gaming system at periodic
intervals; this automatic process may preferably be disabled such
as to obtain more predictable policy enforcement changes by issuing
explicit commands instead.
[0110] FIG. 17 illustrates a method at 1700 to enforce a policy at
a predetermined time, according to an embodiment of the present
invention.
[0111] Enabling enforcement of policies as described relative to
FIG. 15 and FIG. 16 may be carried out interactively by an
authorized user at predetermined authorized times, or alternatively
may be controlled by a process at predetermined authorized times
via the appropriate API. At the central system 1702 (the game
download server in this illustration) at a given time 1704, a user
or a process may verify a change 1706 in the list of games to be
made available to players on a selected set of gaming terminal
banks. In case of a schedule change as shown at 1710 (or other
reasons such as introducing a new game or revoking an existing
game), policies on the domain controller 1714 are being changed
accordingly either interactively by a user in the Group Policy
Management console as described for FIG. 15 and FIG. 16, or by a
process via the equivalent APIs 1712. The changed policies are
being enabled for enforcement at 1716 in the domain controller.
[0112] In a casino, although new games may be scheduled to be
downloaded to gaming terminals and activated at predetermined
times, it is a requirement that games are not to be changed while a
player is playing. In practical terms, it is considered that a
player terminates playing when his or her credit balance remains at
zero for a predetermined period of time. The predetermined period
time should be sufficient to allow the player to enter a new bill
or other form of credit or payment instrument to continue playing.
Therefore, the game application software on each game terminal
continually tests for this condition (credit=0 for a predetermined
period of time) before checking for change in policy, enforcing the
policy changes and then updating the menu of games to be made
available to the next player.
[0113] Upon power-up, each gaming terminal 1718 executes a boot
1720, loads its operating system 1722 and enforces the policies
1724 that are configured at the time of the start-up process. When
the game application starts at 1726, it displays a menu of
authorized activated games as shown at 1727 to the player using for
example the dynamic method described relative to FIG. 19. Whenever
the player balance is non-zero 1728, 1730, the player may play as
shown at 1732 the games listed on the menu in accordance with the
enforced policies. When the player's balance reaches zero at 1734
and remains zero for a predetermined period of time, it is
considered that the player is no longer playing. The gaming
application of the gaming terminal may then verify at 1736 if a
policy has changed 1738. This may be done via the
RegisterGPNotification. The RegisterGPNotification function enables
an application to receive notification when there is a change in
policy. When a policy change occurs, the specified event object is
set to the signaled state. Additional details regarding the
RegisterGPNotification function may be found at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us-
/policy/policy/registergpnotification.asp.
[0114] At 1740, if there is no change in policy, the games listed
on the menu will be unchanged for the next player. If there is a
change in policy at 1742, the gaming terminal may enter into a
process whereby the policies are enforced as shown at 1744, using
for example the gpupdate.com service, the RefreshPolicy function or
the RefreshPolicyEx function, or equivalent services or API. It is
to be noted that the verification of change in policy and the
enforcement of the changed policies may be carried out by each
terminal independently.
[0115] The RefreshPolicy function causes policy to be applied
immediately on the client computer. Additional details regarding
the RefreshPolicy function may be found at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/p-
olicy/refreshpolicy.asp
[0116] The RefreshPolicyEx function causes policy to be applied
immediately on the computer. The extended function allows
specifying the type of policy refresh to apply. Additional details
regarding the RefreshPolicyEx function may be found at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/p-
olicy/refeshpolicyex.asp
[0117] Once the change in policy is enforced at 1744, the gaming
terminal may reboot as shown at 1748 or exit and re-enter the
gaming application, which would dynamically recreate the menu list
of games 1727 to be made available to the next player, as detailed
at FIG. 19.
[0118] A similar method relying on explicit WMI calls and
administrative templates (*.adm) may be applied to obtain the same
result in gaming environments whereby the domain controller active
directory is not available such is the case with gaming terminals
connected in WAN (Wide Area Network) whereby the network bandwidth
is limited or the network availability is poor.
[0119] An alternative method relying on SMS (System Management
Server) code download instead of SIPs (Software Installation
Policy) for installing software components and software MSI
packages may be used. However, the executable software components
remains under SRP (Software Restriction Policy) in accordance with
the unique PKI certificate generated for each component as
described in the invention.
[0120] FIG. 18 shows a close-loop enforcement of a policy,
according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 18 at
1800 illustrates a method to enforce a selected policy as the
result of observing the gaming activity. The method is directly
derived from FIG. 17 whereby the policy change 1716 takes place at
1804 and is selected from a choice of pre-configured policies, for
example in a look-up manner, whereby a policy would result in
making available to the players a menu of games 1812 (1727 in FIG.
17) to provoke a given gaming activity change which may be
monitored in real-time at 1816. The observed activity 1818 may then
be compared 1820 to predetermined businesses objectives 1822 and a
correction or modification may be applied by selecting a new policy
that would change the list of games available on a selected
aggregate of gaming terminals 1810. For example, due to a long
queue of people who want to play the Infinity game, a greater
number of banks of gaming terminals may be configured to make the
Infinity game available to players on these terminals. Another
reason for applying a new policy might be if a particular area of
the casino floor is heavily populated with players while another
area is empty. Suppressing some popular games in a highly
frequented area and adding them to the less frequently area may
help spread the player distribution within the casino or gaming
area more evenly. Yet another reason for applying a new policy
could be if the gaming activity is low, then games with a higher
RTP (return to player), let us say 98% instead of 95%, may be
activated in some areas to boost activity.
[0121] The process may involve several subsystems as illustrated in
FIG. 18: the central game control 1802 wherein policies are
selected, the domain controller 1806 that enables enforcement of
the policies 1808, a selection set of gaming terminals 1810 wherein
each gaming terminal enforces the policies and make the selected
games available to the player 1812, a central game monitoring
system 1814 that produces activity reports in real time 1816.
[0122] The process shown at 1820 of comparing the observed activity
1818 and the targeted activity 1822 and then selecting a change in
game policies 1804 may be carried out by the floor manager or the
floor director, or alternatively by a knowledge base process. In
both cases, a close-loop enforcement of policies (relying on the
unique PKI certificate SRP associated to each executable authorized
and certified software component) is achieved resulting in the
dynamic configuration of the gaming system, either for LAN
configurations (such as casino floors) or WAN configuration (such
as video lottery terminals distributed across a large geographic
area).
[0123] FIG. 19 at 1900 illustrates a method to generate dynamically
the menu list of authorized games made available to the player on
each gaming terminal, according to an embodiment of the present
invention. The dynamic configuration of a large gaming system
whereby authorized games made available to players on selected
group of gaming terminals using software restrictions policies at
the central system may result is hundreds of different game menus.
Reliance on SRPs for preventing non-authorized software components
to execute is entirely based on a sound and demonstrable trusted
base; therefore the gaming system is trusted. Getting the list of
authorized games to each gaming terminal would require
configurations files to be sent from the central system to each of
the gaming terminal; however, this would be illegal because the
change in the list of games may affect the game outcome. This is
clearly understandable when considering changing a game; let us say
Infinity.sub.--95 with a RTP or 95% with Infinity.sub.--98 with a
RTP of 98% at 10:00 PM, then back at 8:00 AM, and this each day
except during the weekend, or at other times as a result of the
closed loop process described at FIG. 18. Game regulators mandate
that the process to manage this type of change be certified with
secure means of the same order as when installing/downloading
software components using a unique PKI method.
[0124] Embodiments of the present invention, therefore, provide
secure means to update a list of authorized games to be offered to
the player. The menu of authorized games offered to the player may
be dynamically generated by each terminal without requiring the
central system to dispatch the list of authorized games or having
each terminal fetch the list of authorized games from the central
system (both are illegal without extreme precaution of the same
order as the installing/downloading of software components using a
unique PKI method because they may affect the game outcome); this
is achieved by having each terminal checking the certificate
Software Restriction Policies enforced on the games (a unique PKI
certificate being generated for each of the executable game
components in accordance with the methods detailed in this
document).
[0125] As illustrated in FIG. 19 at 1900, each terminal when
executing the gaming application 1902 gets a list of the file names
for the games available at 1904 from a trusted configuration file
(an updated trusted configuration file may have been downloaded in
a certified code signed MSI package with the last game download)
and a menu is initially compiled for this list. Attempts to execute
each of the game entry module of the games contained in the list
1906 are made. If the game entry module is not found at 1910, the
software components do not exist on the gaming terminal and the
game is removed from the menu 1912, whereupon the process iterates
to next game, as suggested at 1926 1928. If the execution of the
game entry module is denied at 1916, 1918 because the Software
Restriction Policy is preventing this game to execute, the game is
removed from the menu as shown at 1920 and the process iterates to
next game, as shown at 1926 1928. If the execution of the game
entry module is successful at 1922, then the game is authorized and
may be added to the games menu offered to the player. The process
iterates through other games in the list, as shown at 1928, 1930,
1942, 1906, if any. Once the iteration is completed at 1932, the
games menu may be composed at 1934 and the menu is displayed to the
player at 1936.
[0126] FIG. 20 shows a companion Hello component, according to
another aspect of the present invention. Reference numeral 2000 in
FIG. 20 illustrates a method to generate a code signed companion
software component. Each game comprises an aggregate of executable
and non-executable software components, usually comprising files
such as *.exe, *.dll, *.dat, *.xml. In general, all the software
components are dependent of one component named the main program or
the game entry. Starting the execution of the main game component
is a lengthy process, as a large number of dependent executable
components and graphics need to be verified (SRP verification) and
started. Currently, there is no API available in the Windows
operating system client computer for verifying the status of a
Software Restriction Policy enforcement on a given software
component applicable to that client computer.
[0127] Another embodiment of the present invention, therefore,
provides a method to quickly verify the policy enforcement on a
game without starting the entire game, in order to generate the
list of available games to be made available to the player in a
menu. For each game, a very short companion .dll file may be
created having, for example, only one line of code <<Return
"HELLO">> which would return the exemplary "HELLO" string
when called. Assuming "Infinity.dll" 2010 is the main game
component file name 2002 (or friendly name), then the companion
file may be named "Infinity.Hello.dll" 2018. Preferably, the
companion's 2018 source code would have in its assembly information
a part number 2004 as shown at 2020 and a version number 2006 as
shown at 2022 that is identical to the main component 2010 part
number 2012 and a version number 2014, but this is not mandatory.
In addition, assuming the PKI certificate's subject name 2008
associated to the Infinity.dll is "GDS.exe.0099-0001-00[1.0.101.0]
Infinity.dll" 2016, which is used for the code signing of the
Infinity.dll, we may proceed with the code signing of
Infinity.Hello.dll with the same 2026, 2028
"GDS.exe.0099-0001-00[1.0.101.0] Infinity.dll" certificate, as
shown at 2024.
[0128] It is to be noted that code signing two distinct software
executables with the same certificate is a deviation from the
method taught earlier in this document. However, the fact that the
role of the companion file is very well defined, as having for
example only one line of code <<Return "HELLO">> which
would return the "HELLO" string when called, this does not present
an issue with the regulators or the certification lab.
[0129] FIG. 21 shows steps that may be carried out to search for
games on each gaming terminal, according to yet another embodiment
of the present invention. Reference numeral 2100 in FIG. 21
illustrates a method to quickly generate dynamically the list of
games installed on each gaming terminal using the companion
software component described above. The process of dynamically
generating the game selection menu may be optimized in many ways in
order to reduce the overhead of starting the execution of a game to
check if it is authorized. However, if the aim is to sense for the
enforced SRP or SIP applied to the game or detect local
availability of the game software components, then such
optimizations (among other possible variations) should be
considered to be within the scope of the invention as defined by
the claims hereunder. According to an embodiment of the present
invention, a method is presented herewith to quickly generate the
list of available games to be made available to the player in a
menu without transfer of a file from the server. Reference 2100 is
identical to reference 1900 in FIG. 19 except for the first process
2104 whereby a file search process is performed for finding (or
enumerating) file names with the "*Hello.dll" string, the "*"
symbol being the standard wild character used in string searches. A
list of the games installed on each gaming terminal may be quickly
and dynamically generated by calling the companion software
component of the game main component instead of calling the main
component itself. The companion component may be as detailed at
FIG. 20 or may be a similar construct.
[0130] The embodiments of the present invention described herein
are also applicable to any of the subsystems available in a network
connected gaming system that require preventing non-authorized
software components to execute or affect game outcome, such as the
gaming terminals, the game management system (CMS or MCS) that
monitor and control whole or part of the estate of gaming machines,
the progressive jackpot systems, the bonussing systems as well as
game payment verification systems such as IGT EasyPay and Cyberview
PVU (Payment Verification Unit) and PVS (Payment Verification
System). Gaming subsystems are tested against gaming standards such
as those produced by GLI (Game Laboratory International); the game
standards are mandated by game regulators in accordance with local
regulation and laws. The network-connected subsystems may be
located within the premises accommodating the estate of gaming
machines (connection via a LAN) or outside of the premises
(connection via a WAN).
[0131] The methods described in the document rely on software
installation policies and Software Restriction Policies which may
be configured (a) via the domain controller active directory, as
this is advantageously the case whenever the network connection is
a LAN, and which may also be configured (b) to each of the local
computers via WMI services (Windows Management Instrumentation) or
administrative templates (.adm files) in order to configure and
enforce local group policies when a domain controller is not
available as this is the case whenever the network connection is a
WAN. Microsoft SMS (Systems Management Server) may be used as an
alternative to using software installation policies.
[0132] The methods described in the document leverage on software
installation policies and/or software restriction policies
technology implemented in Microsoft Windows operating system.
Whenever similar technology is implemented in other operating
systems such as Linux, Unix, Windows CE and QNX, it is considered
as part of the invention herein.
[0133] In an other embodiment of the invention, it order to make
game regulators more at ease with the huge shift in paradigm from
prehensile physically secured ROM based gaming machines (whereby
access to the ROM is via multiple layers of keys locks and tamper
detectors), to a totally virtual or volatile fashion of downloading
game code via a network, it may be advantageous to perform download
of the game code when the gaming machine is not operational.
Consequently, the network downloading of game code from a central
repository may not interfere with the games. This is accomplish by
terminating all gaming software in order to transform the gaming
machine into a generic PC, then transferring the game software
under the control of the operating system using pervasive network
code download available in most information technology networked
environments. An "Out-of-service" message may be displayed on the
screen to indicate that the machine is no longer playable, thus is
no longer a gaming machine. Once the game code is downloaded by the
generic PC, the game code is verified for trustworthiness and is
executed, thus transforming the generic PC back into a gaming
machine.
* * * * *
References