U.S. patent application number 12/068674 was filed with the patent office on 2008-06-26 for systems and methods for content distribution including resending data.
This patent application is currently assigned to Sony Corporation. Invention is credited to Yoshihito Ishibashi, Jun Kitahara, Akihiro Muto, Tateo Oishi, Taizou Shirai.
Application Number | 20080154633 12/068674 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 27566721 |
Filed Date | 2008-06-26 |
United States Patent
Application |
20080154633 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Ishibashi; Yoshihito ; et
al. |
June 26, 2008 |
Systems and methods for content distribution including resending
data
Abstract
An information receiving apparatus receives identification
information and encrypted identification information and makes a
comparison between them to allow prevention of illegal utilization
of contents data. Also, a data storage apparatus can record
contents data encrypted by a content key and the content key so
that the contents data can be reproduced on other apparatuses to
improve versatility. Moreover, a management apparatus can manage
the contents data in the data storage apparatus to allow other
apparatuses to utilize it. And also, an information regulating
apparatus can verify a signature on available data to prevent
illegal utilization of the contents data. Furthermore, the data
storage apparatus can store the content key, its handling policies,
the contents data encrypted by the content key and its license
conditions information so as to safely provide the contents data.
In addition, an information recording apparatus can select favorite
contents data and store it on the data storage apparatus.
Furthermore, the information receiving apparatus can prevent
utilization of provision-prohibited contents data by a provision
prohibition list.
Inventors: |
Ishibashi; Yoshihito;
(Tokyo, JP) ; Oishi; Tateo; (Saitama, JP) ;
Muto; Akihiro; (Tokyo, JP) ; Kitahara; Jun;
(Chiba, JP) ; Shirai; Taizou; (Tokyo, JP) |
Correspondence
Address: |
FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER;LLP
901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON
DC
20001-4413
US
|
Assignee: |
Sony Corporation
|
Family ID: |
27566721 |
Appl. No.: |
12/068674 |
Filed: |
February 8, 2008 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
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09831071 |
Jun 21, 2001 |
7353541 |
|
|
PCT/JP00/06089 |
Sep 7, 2000 |
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12068674 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
705/59 ;
348/E7.056; 386/E5.004; 386/E5.025; G9B/20.002 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G10K 15/04 20130101;
H04N 2005/91342 20130101; H04L 9/3247 20130101; H04L 9/0894
20130101; G11B 20/00086 20130101; H04N 2005/91364 20130101; G11B
20/00166 20130101; H04N 21/4532 20130101; G11B 20/0021 20130101;
H04N 21/4627 20130101; H04N 7/1675 20130101; G06F 21/10 20130101;
H04N 5/913 20130101; H04N 5/9206 20130101; H04N 21/8355 20130101;
H04N 21/4334 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
705/1 |
International
Class: |
G06F 17/00 20060101
G06F017/00 |
Foreign Application Data
Date |
Code |
Application Number |
Sep 7, 1999 |
JP |
11-253660 |
Sep 7, 1999 |
JP |
11-253661 |
Sep 7, 1999 |
JP |
11-253662 |
Sep 7, 1999 |
JP |
11-253663 |
Sep 14, 1999 |
JP |
11-260638 |
Sep 20, 1999 |
JP |
11-265866 |
Sep 17, 2007 |
JP |
11-264082 |
Claims
1-104. (canceled)
105. An information sending system for sending predetermined
contents data from an information sending apparatus to an
information receiving apparatus, wherein: said information sending
apparatus comprises means for sending, together with said contents
data, data of the maximum number of times of possible resending
predefined to the contents data; and said information receiving
apparatus comprises: means for receiving, together with said
contents data, data of maximum number of times; means for
generating data of the remaining number of times of possible
resending of said contents data based on said data of maximum
number of times; and means for resending, that is, sending data of
the remaining number of times together with said contents data.
106. The information sending system according to claim 105,
wherein: said means for generating data of the number of times of
said information receiving apparatus generates, based on a source
of said contents data, a via apparatus data showing an apparatus by
way of which the contents data is sent; and said means for
resending sends said via-apparatus data together with said contents
data and said data of the remaining number of times.
107. An information sending apparatus for sending predetermined
contents data to an information receiving apparatus, comprising
means for sending to said information receiving apparatus, together
with said contents data, data of the maximum number of times of
possible resending predefined to the contents data.
108. An information receiving apparatus for receiving predetermined
contents data sent from an information sending apparatus,
comprising: means for receiving said contents data and data of the
maximum number of times of possible resending predefined to the
contents data, sent from said information sending apparatus; and
means for generating data of the remaining number of times of
possible resending of said contents data based on said data of
maximum number of times; and means for resending, that is, sending
data of the remaining number of times together with said contents
data.
109. The information receiving apparatus according to claim 108,
wherein: said means for generating data of the number of times
generates, based on a source of said contents data, a via-apparatus
data showing an apparatus by way of which the contents data is
sent; and said means for resending sends said via-apparatus data
together with said contents data and said data of the remaining
number of times.
110. An information sending method for sending predetermined
contents data from an information sending apparatus to an
information receiving apparatus, comprising: a sending step of
sending by said information sending apparatus, together with said
contents data, data of the maximum number of times of possible
resending predefined to the contents data; a receiving step of, by
said information receiving apparatus, said data of maximum number
of times together with said contents data; a number of times data
generating step of, by said information receiving apparatus,
generating data of the remaining number of times of possible
resending of said contents data based on said data of maximum
number of times; and a resending step of, by said information
receiving apparatus, sending data of the remaining number of times
together with said contents data.
111. The information sending method according to claim 110,
wherein: said number of times data generating step generates, based
on a source of said contents data, a via-apparatus data showing an
apparatus by way of which the contents data is sent; and said
resending step sends said via-apparatus data together with said
contents data and said data of the remaining number of times.
112. An information sending method for sending predetermined
contents data to an information receiving apparatus, comprising a
sending step of sending to said information receiving apparatus,
together with said contents data, data of the maximum number of
times of possible resending predefined to the contents data.
113. An information receiving method for receiving predetermined
contents data sent from an information sending apparatus,
comprising: a receiving step of receiving said contents data and
data of the maximum number of times of possible resending
predefined to the contents data sent from an information sending
apparatus; a number of times data generating step of generating
data of the remaining number of times of possible resending of said
contents data based on said data of maximum number of times; and a
resending step of sending data of said remaining number of times
together with said contents data.
114. The information receiving method according to claim 113,
wherein: said means for generating data of the number of times
generates, based on a source of said contents data, a via-apparatus
data showing an apparatus by way of which the contents data is
sent; and said means for resending sends said via-apparatus data
together with said contents data and said data of the remaining
number of times.
115. A program storage medium storing a predetermined program and
supplying the program to an information sending apparatus,
characterized in that said program comprises: a sending step of
sending to the information receiving apparatus, together with
predetermine contents data, data of the maximum number of times of
possible resending predefined to the contents data.
116. A program storage medium storing a predetermined program and
supplying the program to an information receiving apparatus,
characterized in that said program comprises: a receiving step of
receiving predetermined contents data and data of the maximum
number of times of possible resending predefined to the contents
data sent from an information sending apparatus; and a number of
times data generating step of generating data of the remaining
number of times of possible resending of said contents data based
on said data of maximum number of times; and a resending step of
sending data of the remaining number of times together with said
contents data.
117. The program storage medium according to claim 116, wherein:
said means for generating data of the number of times of said
program generates, based on a source of said contents data, a
via-apparatus data showing an apparatus by way of which the
contents data is sent; and said means for resending sends said
via-apparatus data together with said contents data and said data
of the remaining number of times.
118-395. (canceled)
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The present invention relates to an information sending
system, an information sending apparatus and its method, an
information receiving apparatus and its method, a recording and
reproducing system, a recording and reproducing apparatus and its
method, a reproducing apparatus and its method, a data storage
apparatus and its method, a data management system, a management
apparatus, a data management method, a data management and
migration method, an information provision system, an information
regulating apparatus and its method, a data utilization method, an
information provision apparatus and its method, an information
recording apparatus, a list sending apparatus and its method and a
program storage medium, and suitably applies, for instance, to an
information sending system wherein a contents holder or seller can
safely distribute the contents to contents users.
BACKGROUND ART
[0002] Conventionally, there is a system wherein information
(contents) such as music is encrypted and sent to an information
processing apparatus of a user having executed a predetermined
agreement so that the user may decrypt and utilize the contents on
the information processing apparatus.
[0003] For instance, as shown in FIG. 116, a case where two
contents sending apparatuses and one contents receiving apparatus
are provided will be described.
[0004] First contents sending apparatus 600 comprises data
encryption section 601, data encryption section 602, content key
generation section 603 and tamper resistant memory 604. Moreover,
the tamper resistant memory referred to here may be any such memory
as will not have its data easily read by a third party, and no
hardware-wise limitation is required in particular (for instance,
it may be a hard disk placed in an entry-controlled room or a hard
disk of a password-controlled personal computer). Tamper resistant
memory 604 stores distribution key K.sub.d necessary to encrypt
content key K.sub.co supplied in advance from an electronic
distribution service center (not illustrated).
[0005] In order to generate data to be delivered to contents
receiving apparatus 620, first contents sending apparatus 600
generates content key K.sub.co1 by using content key generation
section 603, and encrypts contents by using this key at data
encryption section 601. Also, content key K.sub.co1 is encrypted by
using distribution key K.sub.d at data encryption section 602.
These encrypted contents and content key K.sub.co1 are sent to
contents receiving apparatus 620.
[0006] Incidentally, like contents sending apparatus 600, second
contents sending apparatus 610 comprises data encryption section
611, data encryption section 612, content key generation section
613 and tamper resistant memory 614, and generates content key
K.sub.co2 at content key generation section 613, and encrypts
contents by using this key at data encryption section 611. Also,
data encryption section 612 encrypts content key K.sub.co2 by using
distribution key K.sub.d supplied from the electronic distribution
service center (not illustrated). Thus, second contents sending
apparatus 610 sends the encrypted contents and encrypted content
key K.sub.co2 to contents receiving apparatus 620.
[0007] Contents receiving apparatus 620 comprises sending and
receiving section 621, upper controller 622, encryption processing
section 623, memory 624, data decryption section 625, data
decryption section 626 and tamper resistant memory 627. Moreover,
as there are such an indefinite number of contents users that it
cannot be grasped how they will handle the apparatuses, the tamper
resistant memory referred to here requires its internal data to be
protected hardware-wise, and thus encryption processing section 623
is a semiconductor chip of a structure difficult to access from
outside and has a multilayered structure wherein the tamper
resistant memory inside it has characteristics making it difficult
to illicitly read data from outside such as being sandwiched
between dummy layers like aluminum layers and having a narrow range
of operating voltage or frequency. And tamper resistant memory 627
stores distribution key K.sub.d supplied in advance from the
electronic distribution service center (not illustrated).
[0008] Incidentally, while tamper resistant memories 604, 614 of
first and second contents sending apparatuses 600 and 610 are the
memories accessible from outside, methods of accessing them are
limited. It may be password or entry control. On the other hand, as
for tamper resistant memory 627 of contents receiving apparatus
620, the memory itself has a structure not to be illicitly accessed
from outside, and there is limited or no method of reading its
internal data from outside by formal means for access. Moreover,
while it is impossible to read internal data of tamper resistant
memory 627 from outside, there may be a method of access only
capable of changing data from outside if former key data or the
like is used. Also, in encryption processing section 623, it is
possible to access a memory and read predetermined data, but it is
impossible to read internal memory from outside.
[0009] Contents and content keys K.sub.co1 and K.sub.co2 sent from
first or second contents sender 600 or 610 are received by sending
and receiving section 621 and delivered to upper controller 622.
Upper controller 622 stores such data in memory 624 once, and in
the case of utilizing the contents, it delivers content key
K.sub.co and the contents to encryption processing section 623. On
receiving them, encryption processing section 623 decrypts them by
using distribution key K.sub.d stored in tamper resistant memory
627 in advance in data decryption section 625, and then decrypts
them by using content key K.sub.co in data decryption section 626,
and utilizes the contents. At this time, there are cases where it
involves accounting.
[0010] Incidentally, in an information processing system shown in
FIG. 116, there was a problem that a method had yet to be
established for preventing the contents from being illicitly
utilized such as providing illegal contents to the system or
illicitly benefiting a third party due to accounting involved in
use of contents.
[0011] Also, in such an information provision system, there are
cases where recording and reproducing apparatus 630 shown in FIG.
117 is provided, and such recording and reproducing apparatus 630
has, for instance, record medium 640 consisting of MD (Mini Disk: a
trademark) provided in a removable manner.
[0012] In this case, recording and reproducing apparatus 630
comprises sending and receiving section 631, control section 632,
encryption processing section 633, expansion section 634 and
external memory control section 635, and it stores distribution key
K.sub.d for decrypting content key K.sub.co supplied in advance
from an electronic distribution service center (not illustrated) to
encryption processing section 633 and also holds save key
K.sub.save unique to encryption processing section 633.
[0013] And recording and reproducing apparatus 630 has encrypted
contents and content key K.sub.co sent from first or second
contents sending apparatus 600 or 610 received by sending and
receiving section 631, and sends out the received encrypted
contents and content key K.sub.co to control section 632. Control
section 632 holds the encrypted contents in record medium 640 via
external memory control section 635, and sends out encrypted
content key K.sub.co to encryption processing section 633.
[0014] Thus, encryption processing section 633 decrypts encrypted
content key K.sub.co by using distribution key K.sub.d, and then
decrypts content key K.sub.co by using save key K.sub.save and
sends out content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save
to control section 632. Thus, control section 632 has content key
K.sub.co encrypted by save key K.sub.save held by record medium 640
via external memory control section 635.
[0015] Moreover, in the case of utilizing contents, in recording
and reproducing apparatus 630, control section 322 reads encrypted
contents and content key K.sub.co from record medium 640 so as to
send out the encrypted contents to expansion section 634 and also
send out encrypted content key K.sub.co to encryption processing
section 633. Thus, encryption processing section 633 decrypts
encrypted content key K.sub.co by the save key K.sub.save and sends
out acquired content key K.sub.co to expansion section 634. Thus,
expansion section 634 decrypts encrypted contents by using content
key K.sub.co and is accordingly capable of using the contents.
[0016] In such recording and reproducing apparatus 630, however,
even if record medium 630 is loaded, for instance, on a recording
and reproducing apparatus other than recording and reproducing
apparatus 630 used for recording contents by holding content key
K.sub.co encrypted by save key K.sub.save unique to encryption
processing section 633 on record medium 640 and having the save key
K.sub.save held by encryption processing section 633, the contents
recorded on record medium 640 cannot be reproduced on the other
recording and reproducing apparatus since it does not hold the save
key K.sub.save used for recording the content key K.sub.co.
[0017] Therefore, such record medium 640 had a problem that its
versatility is remarkably low in spite of being provided in a
removable manner to recording and reproducing apparatus 630.
[0018] In addition to this, recording and reproducing apparatus 630
had a problem that, even if a user wanted to utilize the contents
recorded on the record medium by recording them on another
apparatus or another record medium, they could not be easily
utilized since the record medium was provided in a removable
manner.
[0019] Furthermore, the information processing system had a problem
that, even in contents receiving apparatus 620, a method had yet to
be established for preventing received contents from being
illicitly utilized.
[0020] Moreover, contents receiving apparatus 620 to be connected
to first and second contents sending apparatuses 600 and 610 had a
problem that, as it is assumed to be owned by a user, contents
cannot be easily provided for anyone else not in possession of the
contents receiving apparatus 620.
[0021] In addition, the information processing system had a problem
that, in the case where a user uses contents receiving apparatus
620 to record a plurality of favorite contents on a predetermined
record medium and creates an album, the favorite contents had to be
read and recorded one by one in the record medium by using contents
receiving apparatus 620, which recording work was complicated.
[0022] Furthermore, the information provision system had a problem
that, in the case where any contents of which transmission was
stopped due to occurrence of a defect (occurrence of an error in
data), for instance, was sent by mistake from first and second
contents sending apparatuses 600 and 610 to contents receiving
apparatus 620, it was difficult to prevent utilization of the
contents on the contents receiving apparatus 620.
DISCLOSURE OF THE INVENTION
[0023] The present invention is implemented in consideration of the
above points, and proposes an information sending system, an
information sending apparatus, an information receiving apparatus,
an information sending method, an information receiving method and
a program storage medium to prevent contents data from being
illicitly utilized.
[0024] To find a solution to such a challenge, the present
invention provides, in an information sending system for sending
predetermined contents data from an information sending apparatus
to an information receiving apparatus, the means for holding
identification information to identify an information sending
apparatus encrypted by a distribution key unique to the information
receiving apparatus, adding identification information to contents
data in order to make a comparison with identification information
encrypted by a distribution key, and sending identification
information encrypted by a distribution key together with contents
data with identification information added in an information
sending apparatus, and provides the means for holding a
distribution key, receiving contents data with identification
information added and identification information encrypted by a
distribution key, decrypting by a distribution key identification
information encrypted by the distribution key, and comparing
identification information added to contents data with decrypted
identification information in an information receiving
apparatus.
[0025] Thus, it is possible to easily and securely determine
whether or not the contents data can be properly utilized from
results of comparing identification information added to contents
data with decrypted identification information, and an information
sending system can be implemented, which is capable of preventing
the contents data from being illicitly utilized.
[0026] Also, the present invention provides, in an information
sending apparatus sending predetermined contents data to an
information receiving apparatus, the means for holding
identification information to identify an information sending
apparatus encrypted by a distribution key unique to the information
receiving apparatus, adding identification information to contents
data in order to make a comparison with identification information
encrypted by a distribution key, and sending identification
information encrypted by a distribution key together with contents
data with identification information added.
[0027] Therefore, it is possible to provide a transmission subject
with identification information added to contents data and
encrypted identification information to be compared in order to
determine whether or not the contents data can be properly
utilized, and thus an information sending apparatus and a program
storage medium capable of preventing the contents data from being
illicitly utilized can be implemented.
[0028] Furthermore, the present invention provides, in an
information receiving apparatus for receiving predetermined
contents data sent from an information sending apparatus, the means
for holding a predetermined distribution key unique to the
information receiving apparatus, receiving contents data sent from
an information sending apparatus with identification information
added to identify the information sending apparatus and
identification information encrypted by a distribution key,
decrypting by a distribution key the identification information
encrypted by the distribution key, and comparing the identification
information added to the contents data with the decrypted
identification information.
[0029] Thus, it is possible to easily and securely determine
whether or not the contents data can be properly utilized from
results of comparing identification information added to contents
data with decrypted identification information, and accordingly an
information receiving system, an information receiving method and a
program storage medium capable of preventing the contents data from
being illicitly utilized can be implemented.
[0030] In addition, the present invention provides, in an
information sending system for sending predetermined contents data
from an information sending apparatus to an information receiving
apparatus, the means for sending, together with contents data, data
of the maximum number of times of possible resending predefined to
the contents data in an information sending apparatus, and provides
the means for receiving, together with contents data, data of
maximum number of times, generating data of the remaining number of
times of possible resending of contents data based on data of the
maximum number of times, and resending, that is, sending together
with contents data, data of the remaining number of times in an
information receiving apparatus.
[0031] Thus, it is possible to prevent contents data from being
resent more often than the predefined maximum number of times of
possible resending, and accordingly an information sending system
capable of preventing the contents data from being illicitly
utilized can be implemented.
[0032] Moreover, the present invention provides, in an information
sending apparatus for sending predetermined contents data to an
information receiving apparatus, the means for sending to an
information receiving apparatus, together with contents data, data
of the maximum number of times of possible resending predefined to
the contents data.
[0033] Therefore, it is possible to notify a transmission subject
of the predefined maximum number of times of possible resending for
contents data, and accordingly an information sending apparatus
capable of preventing the contents data from being illicitly
utilized can be implemented.
[0034] Furthermore, the present invention provides, in an
information receiving apparatus for receiving predetermined
contents data sent from an information sending apparatus, the means
for receiving contents data and data of maximum number of times of
possible resending predefined to the contents data sent from the
information sending apparatus, generating data of the remaining
number of times of possible resending of contents data based on
data of the maximum number of times, and resending, that is,
sending together with contents data, data of the remaining number
of times.
[0035] Thus, it is possible to prevent contents data from being
resent more often than the predefined maximum number of times of
possible resending, and accordingly an information receiving
apparatus, an information receiving method and a program storage
medium capable of preventing the contents data from being illicitly
utilized can be implemented.
[0036] Moreover, the present invention provides, in an information
sending method for sending predetermined contents data from an
information sending apparatus to an information receiving
apparatus, the steps of adding identification information to
identify the information sending apparatus to contents data by the
information sending apparatus, sending contents data with
identification information added and identification information to
identify the information sending apparatus encrypted by a
distribution key unique to the information receiving apparatus by
the information sending apparatus, receiving contents data with
identification information added and identification information
encrypted by a distribution key by the information receiving
apparatus, decrypting by a distribution key identification
information encrypted by the distribution key by the information
receiving apparatus, and comparing identification information added
to contents data with decrypted identification information by the
information receiving apparatus.
[0037] Thus, it is possible to easily and securely determine
whether or not the contents data can be properly utilized from
results of comparing identification information added to contents
data with decrypted identification information, and accordingly an
information sending method capable of preventing the contents data
from being illicitly utilized can be implemented.
[0038] Moreover, the present invention provides, in an information
sending method for sending predetermined contents data from an
information sending apparatus to an information receiving
apparatus, the steps of sending, together with contents data, data
of the predefined maximum number of times of possible resending to
the contents data by the information sending apparatus, receiving,
together with contents data, data of maximum number of times by the
information receiving apparatus, generating data of the remaining
number of times of possible resending of contents data based on
data of the maximum number of times by the information receiving
apparatus, and resending, that is, sending together with contents
data, data of the remaining number of times by the information
receiving apparatus.
[0039] Thus, it is possible to prevent contents data from being
resent more often than the predefined maximum number of times of
possible resending, and accordingly an information sending method
and a program storage medium capable of preventing the contents
data from being illicitly utilized can be implemented.
[0040] Moreover, the present invention is implemented in
consideration of the above points, and is intended to propose a
recording and reproducing system, a recording and reproducing
apparatus, a reproducing apparatus, a data storage apparatus, a
recording and reproducing method, a reproducing method and a
program storage medium capable of markedly improving versatility of
data storage apparatuses.
[0041] To find a solution to such a challenge, the present
invention provides, in a recording and reproducing system for
recording and reproducing predetermined contents data sent from an
information sending apparatus on a removable data storage apparatus
by a recording and reproducing apparatus, the means for encrypting
contents data by a predetermined content key, and sending a content
key and the contents data encrypted by the content key in an
information sending apparatus, and provides, in the recording and
reproducing apparatus, the means for receiving a content key and
the contents data encrypted by the content key sent from the
information sending apparatus, sending out the received content key
and the contents data encrypted by the content key to a data
storage apparatus and having them recorded thereby or having the
content key and the contents data encrypted by the content key
reproduced from the data storage apparatus to read them, and
provides, in the data storage apparatus, the means for holding a
predetermined record medium and a predetermined save key,
encrypting a content key by a save key, recording a content key
encrypted by a save key and the contents data encrypted by the
content key on a record medium or reproducing a content key
encrypted by a save key and the contents data encrypted by the
content key from the record medium, and decrypting the content key
encrypted by a save key by the save key.
[0042] Thus, to the extent that it is not necessary to hold a save
key on the recording and reproducing apparatus side, contents data
can be reproduced from a data storage apparatus by a recording and
reproducing apparatus other than one recording contents data on the
data storage apparatus, and thus a recording and reproducing system
capable of markedly improving versatility of data storage
apparatuses can be implemented.
[0043] Also, the present invention provides, in a recording and
reproducing apparatus for which a data storage apparatus having a
predetermined record medium is provided in a removable manner, the
means for controlling recording and reproducing for sending out
contents data encrypted by a predetermined content key and the
content key to a data storage apparatus, encrypting the content key
by using a predetermined save key unique to the data storage
apparatus, having the content key encrypted by the save key and the
contents data encrypted by content key recorded on a record medium,
and also having the content key encrypted by the save key and the
contents data encrypted by content key reproduced from the record
medium, decrypting the content key encrypted by a save key by using
the save key, and reading the acquired content key and the contents
data encrypted by the content key from the data storage
apparatus.
[0044] Thus, to the extent that it is not necessary to hold a save
key, the contents data can be reproduced from a data storage
apparatus recording contents data on another recording and
reproducing apparatus, and thus a recording and reproducing
apparatus, a recording and reproducing method and a program storage
medium capable of markedly improving versatility of data storage
apparatuses can be implemented.
[0045] In addition, the present invention provides, in a
reproducing apparatus for which a data storage apparatus having a
predetermined record medium is provided in a removable manner, the
means for controlling reproducing for having contents data
encrypted by a predetermined content key recorded in advance on a
record medium of the data storage apparatus and a content key
encrypted by a predetermined save key unique to the data storage
apparatus reproduced, decrypting the content key encrypted by a
save key by using the save key, and reading the acquired content
key and the contents data encrypted by the content key from the
data storage apparatus.
[0046] Thus, to the extent that it is not necessary to hold a save
key, the contents data can be reproduced from a data storage
apparatus on any recording and reproducing apparatus, and thus a
reproducing apparatus, a reproducing method and a program storage
medium capable of markedly improving versatility of data storage
apparatuses can be implemented.
[0047] Moreover, the present invention provides, in a data storage
apparatus provided in a removable manner on a recording and/or
reproducing apparatus for recording and/or reproducing
predetermined data under control of the recording and/or
reproducing apparatus, the means for holding a predetermined record
medium and a predetermined save key, communicating, that is,
sending and receiving predetermined contents data encrypted by a
predetermined content key and the content key between itself and a
recording and/or reproducing apparatus, encrypting a content key by
a save key under control of the recording and/or reproducing
apparatus, recording the content key encrypted by a save key and
contents data encrypted by the content key on a record medium or
reproducing the content key encrypted by a save key and contents
data encrypted by the content key from the record medium under
control of the recording and/or reproducing apparatus, and
decrypting the content key encrypted by a save key by using the
save key under control of the recording and/or reproducing
apparatus.
[0048] Thus, even if a recording and reproducing apparatus does not
hold a save key, the contents data can be recorded or reproduced,
and thus a data storage apparatus and a program storage medium
capable of markedly improving versatility can be implemented.
[0049] Furthermore, the present invention is implemented in
consideration of the above points, and is intended to propose a
data management system, a management apparatus, a data storage
apparatus and a data management method, a data management and
migration method and a program storage medium, which allow contents
data recorded on a data storage apparatus to be easily utilized by
various apparatuses.
[0050] To find a solution to such a challenge, the present
invention provides, in a data management system, a predetermined
data storage apparatus, a recording apparatus for recording
predetermined contents data on a data storage apparatus, a
management apparatus for capturing contents data stored in a data
storage apparatus and managing movement of the captured contents
data to various apparatuses in place of the data storage apparatus
to be connected to various apparatuses.
[0051] Therefore, it is possible to easily move the contents data
recorded on a data storage apparatus to various apparatuses under
management of a management apparatus, and thus a data management
system that allow contents data recorded on a data storage
apparatus to be easily utilized by various apparatuses can be
implemented.
[0052] Also, the present invention captures predetermined contents
data recorded in a data storage apparatus, and manages movement of
the captured contents data to various apparatuses in place of the
data storage apparatus in a management apparatus connecting various
apparatuses with a predetermined data storage apparatus.
[0053] Thus, it is possible to manage contents data recorded in a
data storage apparatus in place of the data storage apparatus and
easily move the contents data to various apparatuses, and thus a
management apparatus, a data management method and a program
storage medium that allow contents data recorded on a data storage
apparatus to be easily utilized by various apparatuses can be
implemented.
[0054] Furthermore, the present invention manages, under control of
a predetermined recording apparatus, movement of contents data to
various apparatuses in a data storage apparatus for recording
predetermined contents data, and when the various apparatuses are
connected to a predetermined management apparatus to be connected
to, it moves contents data to the management apparatus.
[0055] Therefore, it is possible to rely on a management apparatus
for management of recorded contents data and easily move the
contents data to various apparatuses via the management apparatus,
and thus a data storage apparatus, a data management and migration
method and a program storage medium that allow contents data
recorded on a data storage apparatus to be easily utilized by
various apparatuses can be implemented.
[0056] Moreover, the present invention provides, in a data
management method, the steps of recording predetermined contents
data on a predetermined data storage apparatus by a predetermined
recording apparatus, and managing, that is, capturing contents data
stored in a data storage apparatus and managing movement of the
captured contents data to various apparatuses in place of the data
storage apparatus by a management apparatus to be connected to
various apparatuses.
[0057] Thus, it is possible to easily move the contents data
recorded on a data storage apparatus to various apparatuses under
management of a management apparatus, and thus a data management
method that allows contents data recorded on a data storage
apparatus to be easily utilized by various apparatuses can be
implemented.
[0058] Furthermore, the present invention is implemented in
consideration of the above points, and is intended to propose an
information provision system, an information regulating apparatus,
an information receiving apparatus, an information provision
method, an information regulating method, a data utilization method
and a program storage medium capable of preventing contents data
from being illicitly utilized.
[0059] To find a solution to such a challenge, the present
invention provides, in an information provision system, an
information receiving apparatus for receiving predetermined
contents data that is sent and adding a signature to and sending
utilization permission data showing the received contents data, an
information regulating apparatus for verifying a signature on
utilization permission data to determine whether the utilization
permission data is illegal data and if determined so, prohibiting
the information receiving apparatus from utilizing the contents
data.
[0060] Thus, an information provision system can be implemented,
which is capable of determining by an information regulating
apparatus in advance whether the contents data received by an
information receiving apparatus will be illicitly utilized and
preventing the contents data from being illicitly utilized.
[0061] Also, in the present invention, an information regulating
apparatus connected online to a predetermined information receiving
apparatus shows predetermined contents data received from the
information receiving apparatus and has utilization permission data
with a signature added sent so as to verify the signature on the
utilization permission data and determine whether the utilization
permission data is illegal data and if determined so, the
information receiving apparatus is prohibited from utilizing the
contents data.
[0062] Thus, an information regulating apparatus, an information
regulating method and a program storage medium capable of, by
determining in advance whether the contents data received by the
information receiving apparatus will be illicitly used, preventing
the contents data from being illicitly utilized can be
implemented.
[0063] Moreover, in the present invention, an information receiving
apparatus connected online to a predetermined information
regulating apparatus receives predetermined contents data that is
sent and adds to utilization permission data showing the received
contents data a signature capable of determining whether the
contents data shown by the utilization permission data is tampered
to other contents data and then sends it to the information
regulating apparatus.
[0064] Thus, an information receiving apparatus, a data utilization
method and a program storage medium capable of, by having an
information regulating apparatus determine in advance whether
received contents data will be illicitly utilized, preventing the
contents data from being illicitly utilized can be implemented.
[0065] Furthermore, the present invention provides, in an
information provision method, the steps of sending, that is,
receiving predetermined contents data and adding a signature to and
sending utilization permission data showing the received contents
data by an information receiving apparatus, and prohibiting
utilization, that is, verifying a signature on utilization
permission data to determine whether the utilization permission
data is illegal data and if determined so, prohibiting the
information receiving apparatus from utilizing the contents data by
information regulating apparatus.
[0066] Thus, an information provision method can be implemented,
which is capable of determining by an information regulating
apparatus in advance whether the contents data received by an
information receiving apparatus will be illicitly utilized and
preventing the contents data from being illicitly utilized.
[0067] In addition, the present invention is implemented in
consideration of the above points, and is intended to propose an
information provision system, an information provision apparatus, a
data storage apparatus, an information provision method, a data
store method and a program storage medium capable of easily
providing contents data.
[0068] To find a solution to such a challenge, the present
invention provides, in an information provision system providing an
information provision apparatus with predetermined contents data
sent from an information sending apparatus, the means for
encrypting contents data by a predetermined content key, and
sending a content key and contents data encrypted by the content
key in the information sending apparatus, and provides the means
for receiving the content key and contents data encrypted by the
content key sent from the information sending apparatus, decrypting
by the content key the contents data encrypted by the content key,
inserting a digital watermark, that is, inserting by a digital
watermark predetermined information into the contents data
decrypted by the content key, and recording the contents data with
the information inserted on a removable record medium in the
information provision apparatus.
[0069] Thus, it is possible, even if an information user does not
have a contents data receiving apparatus, to record contents data
on a record medium of the information user with ensured security,
and accordingly an information provision system capable of easily
providing contents data can be implemented.
[0070] Moreover, the present invention provides, in an information
provision apparatus providing predetermined contents data sent from
an information sending apparatus, the means for receiving contents
data encrypted by a predetermined content key and the content key
sent from the information sending apparatus, decrypting by the
content key the contents data encrypted by the content key,
inserting a digital watermark, that is, inserting by a digital
watermark predetermined information into the contents data
decrypted by the content key, and recording the contents data with
the information inserted on a removable record medium.
[0071] Thus, it is possible, even if an information user does not
have a contents data receiving apparatus, to record contents data
on a record medium of the information user with ensured security,
and accordingly an information provision apparatus, an information
provision method and a program storage medium capable of easily
providing contents data can be implemented.
[0072] Furthermore, the present invention provides, in an
information provision apparatus providing predetermined contents
data sent from an information sending apparatus, the means for
creating license conditions information prescribing conditions for
using contents data based on handling policies prescribing
conditions for use of a content key sent from the information
sending apparatus together with a content key and the contents data
encrypted by the content key, and storing, that is, sending the
handling policies and the license conditions information together
with the content key and the contents data encrypted by the content
key to a predetermined removable data storage apparatus and storing
them thereon.
[0073] Thus, it is possible, even if an information user does not
have a contents data receiving apparatus, to record contents data
on a data storage apparatus of the information user with ensured
security, and accordingly an information provision apparatus, an
information provision method and a program storage medium capable
of easily providing contents data can be implemented.
[0074] In addition, the present invention provides, in an data
storage apparatus storing predetermined contents data sent from an
information provision apparatus, the means for receiving a content
key and contents data encrypted by the content key, handling
policies prescribing conditions for using the content key, and
license conditions information prescribing conditions for using the
contents data created as necessary based on the handling policies
sent from a predetermined record medium and an information
provision apparatus, and recording the content key, the contents
data encrypted by the content key, the handling policies and the
license conditions information on a record medium.
[0075] Thus, it is possible, even if an information user does not
have a contents data receiving apparatus, to record contents data
with ensured security, and accordingly a data storage apparatus, a
data storage apparatus and a program storage medium capable of
easily providing contents data can be implemented.
[0076] Furthermore, the present invention is implemented in
consideration of the above points, and implements an information
recording apparatus, a data storage apparatus, a data store method
and a program storage medium capable of easily recording a
plurality of favorite contents data.
[0077] To find a solution to such a challenge, the present
invention provides, in an information recording apparatus storing
predetermined contents data on a predetermined data storage
apparatus, the means for selecting, that is, categorizing and
managing a contents server holding a plurality of contents data and
the contents data held on the contents server, and if a desired
category and a number of contents are specified, arbitrarily
selecting a plurality of contents data equivalent to the specified
number of contents among the contents data belonging to the
specified category, and storing, that is, reading the selected
contents data from the contents server and storing it on the data
storage apparatus.
[0078] Thus, it is possible to easily select and store on a data
storage apparatus a plurality of a user's favorite contents data,
and accordingly an information recording apparatus, a data store
method and a program storage medium capable of easily recording a
plurality of favorite contents data can be implemented.
[0079] Moreover, the present invention provides, in a data storage
apparatus on which predetermined contents data is stored by an
information recording apparatus, the means for receiving a
plurality of contents data belonging to a desired category among a
plurality of categorized contents data and equivalent to a desired
number of contents sent from a predetermined record medium and the
information recording apparatus, and recording the contents data
collectively on the record medium.
[0080] Thus, a data storage apparatus, a data store method and a
program storage medium capable of recording a plurality of favorite
contents data sent from an information recording apparatus can be
implemented.
[0081] Furthermore, the present invention is implemented in
consideration of the above points, and is intended to propose an
information provision system, a list sending apparatus, an
information receiving apparatus, an information provision method,
an information receiving method, a list sending method and a
program storage medium capable of almost certainly preventing
contents data of which provision is prohibited from being
utilized.
[0082] To find a solution to such a challenge, the present
invention provides, in an information provision system, an
information sending apparatus for sending predetermined contents
data, a list sending apparatus for creating a provision prohibition
list showing contents data designated as provision-prohibited and
sending the created prohibition list, and an information receiving
apparatus for determining whether contents data sent from the
information sending apparatus is provision-prohibited based on the
provision prohibition list, and if determined so, stopping capture
of the contents data.
[0083] Thus, in an information receiving apparatus, an information
provision system can be implemented, which is capable of almost
certainly preventing provision-prohibited contents and contents
sent from a utilization-prohibited information sending apparatus
from being bought and accordingly capable of almost certainly
preventing provision-prohibited contents data from being
utilized.
[0084] Also, the present invention provides, in a list sending
apparatus for sending a predetermined list to an information
receiving apparatus receiving predetermined contents data sent from
an information sending apparatus, the means for creating a list,
that is, creating a provision prohibition list showing contents
data designated as provision-prohibited, and sending a provision
prohibition list to the information receiving apparatus.
[0085] Thus, in an information receiving apparatus, a list sending
apparatus, a list sending method and a program storage medium
capable of, based on a provision prohibition list, almost certainly
preventing provision-prohibited contents and contents sent from a
utilization-prohibited information sending apparatus from being
bought and accordingly capable of almost certainly preventing
provision-prohibited contents data from being utilized can be
implemented.
[0086] Moreover, the present invention provides, in an information
receiving apparatus receiving predetermined contents data sent from
an information sending apparatus and a predetermined list sent from
a list sending apparatus, the means for holding a list, that is,
holding a provision prohibition list showing contents data
designated as provision-prohibited sent from the list sending
apparatus, and stopping capture, that is, determining whether
contents data sent from an information sending apparatus is
provision-prohibited, and if determined so, stopping capture of the
contents data.
[0087] Thus, an information receiving apparatus, an information
receiving method and a program storage medium capable of almost
certainly preventing provision-prohibited contents and contents
sent from a utilization-prohibited information sending apparatus
from being bought and accordingly capable of almost certainly
preventing provision-prohibited contents data from being utilized
can be implemented.
[0088] Moreover, the present invention provides, in an information
providing method, the steps of sending a list, that is, creating a
provision prohibition list showing contents data designated as
provision-prohibited and sending the created provision prohibition
list by a list sending apparatus, sending predetermined contents
data by an information sending apparatus, and stopping capture,
that is, determining by an information receiving apparatus whether
contents data sent from an information sending apparatus is
provision-prohibited based on the provision prohibition list, and
if determined so, stopping capture of the contents data.
[0089] Thus, in an information receiving apparatus, an information
provision method can be implemented, which is capable of almost
certainly preventing provision-prohibited contents and contents
sent from a utilization-prohibited information sending apparatus
from being bought and accordingly capable of almost certainly
preventing provision-prohibited contents data from being
utilized.
[0090] Incidentally, in online equipment and offline equipment of
an information receiving apparatus, when sending contents data
between the online equipment and the offline equipment, history
information is created according to identification information of
the contents data and identification information of the equipment
of the source, and on receipt of a provision prohibition list, the
history information is searched, and if contents data that newly
became provision-prohibited is sent, a current provision
prohibition list held by the equipment is sent to the source of the
contents data so as to prevent any illegal contents data from
diffusing from the source equipment to any other equipment.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0091] FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing overall configuration of
an electronic music distribution system according to the present
invention.
[0092] FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing configuration of an
electronic distribution service center.
[0093] FIG. 3 is a skeleton diagram showing an example of a
periodic update of a key.
[0094] FIG. 4 is a skeleton diagram showing an example of a
periodic update of a key.
[0095] FIG. 5 is a skeleton diagram showing an example of a
periodic update of a key.
[0096] FIG. 6 is a skeleton diagram showing an example of a
periodic update of a key.
[0097] FIG. 7 is a skeleton diagram showing data contents of a user
registration database.
[0098] FIG. 8 is a skeleton diagram showing registration
information of each individual group.
[0099] FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing configuration of a
contents provider.
[0100] FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing a procedure for generating a
signature.
[0101] FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing a procedure for verifying a
signature.
[0102] FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing a method of elliptic curve
encryption.
[0103] FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing a decrypting process of
elliptic curve encryption.
[0104] FIG. 14 is a block diagram showing configuration of a
service provider.
[0105] FIG. 15 is a block diagram showing configuration of a user
home network.
[0106] FIG. 16 is a skeleton diagram served for explanation of
operation of an external memory control section.
[0107] FIG. 17 is a block diagram showing configuration of a record
medium dedicated to electronic distribution.
[0108] FIG. 18 is a block diagram showing data contents of the
equipment.
[0109] FIG. 19 is a block diagram showing data contents held by a
record medium.
[0110] FIG. 20 is a skeleton block diagram showing data flow of the
entire system.
[0111] FIG. 21 is a skeleton block diagram showing flow of a public
key certificate.
[0112] FIG. 22 is a skeleton diagram showing a contents provider
secure container.
[0113] FIG. 23 is a skeleton diagram showing a contents provider
secure container.
[0114] FIG. 24 is a skeleton diagram showing a contents provider
secure container.
[0115] FIG. 25 is a skeleton diagram showing a contents provider
secure container.
[0116] FIG. 26 is a skeleton block diagram showing a public key
certificate of a contents provider.
[0117] FIG. 27 is a skeleton block diagram showing a public key
certificate of a contents provider.
[0118] FIG. 28 is a skeleton block diagram showing a public key
certificate of a contents provider.
[0119] FIG. 29 is a skeleton diagram showing a service provider
secure container.
[0120] FIG. 30 is a skeleton diagram showing a service provider
secure container.
[0121] FIG. 31 is a skeleton diagram showing a public key
certificate of a service provider.
[0122] FIG. 32 is a skeleton diagram showing a public key
certificate of user equipment.
[0123] FIG. 33 is a diagram showing handling policies of single
contents.
[0124] FIG. 34 is a diagram showing handling policies of album
contents.
[0125] FIG. 35 is a diagram showing another example of handling
policies of single contents.
[0126] FIG. 36 is a diagram showing another example of handling
policies of album contents.
[0127] FIG. 37 is a diagram showing price information of single
contents.
[0128] FIG. 38 is a diagram showing price information of album
contents.
[0129] FIG. 39 is a diagram showing another example of price
information of single contents.
[0130] FIG. 40 is a diagram showing another example of price
information of album contents.
[0131] FIG. 41 is a diagram showing license conditions
information.
[0132] FIG. 42 is a diagram showing accounting information.
[0133] FIG. 43 is a diagram showing another example of accounting
information.
[0134] FIG. 44 is a diagram showing a list of utilization
rights.
[0135] FIG. 45 is a diagram showing utilization rights.
[0136] FIG. 46 is a diagram showing single contents.
[0137] FIG. 47 is a diagram showing album contents.
[0138] FIG. 48 is a diagram showing key data for single
contents;
[0139] FIG. 49 is a block diagram served for explanation of
encryption processing of an individual key.
[0140] FIG. 50 is a diagram showing key data for album
contents.
[0141] FIG. 51 is a timing chart showing a mutual authentication
process using symmetrical key technology.
[0142] FIG. 52 is a timing chart showing a mutual authentication
process using asymmetrical key technology.
[0143] FIG. 53 is a skeleton block diagram showing transmitting
operation of accounting information.
[0144] FIG. 54 is a skeleton block diagram showing profit
distribution processing operation.
[0145] FIG. 55 is a skeleton block diagram showing transmitting
operation of a track record of contents utilization.
[0146] FIG. 56 is a flowchart showing a procedure for distributing
and reproducing contents.
[0147] FIG. 57 is a flowchart showing a procedure of transmission
to a contents provider.
[0148] FIG. 58 is a flowchart showing a registration procedure of
settlement information.
[0149] FIG. 59 is a flowchart showing a procedure for newly
registering an equipment ID.
[0150] FIG. 60 is a flowchart showing a procedure of additional
registration of equipment.
[0151] FIG. 61 is a flowchart showing a procedure for determining
conditions for starting to change registration information.
[0152] FIG. 62 is a flowchart showing a procedure for updating
registration information.
[0153] FIG. 63 is a flowchart showing a proxy procedure for
updating registration information by a fixed apparatus.
[0154] FIG. 64 is a flowchart showing a proxy procedure for
updating registration information by a fixed apparatus.
[0155] FIG. 65 is a flowchart showing a transmission procedure of a
secure container.
[0156] FIG. 66 is a flowchart showing a transmission procedure of a
secure container.
[0157] FIG. 67 is a flowchart showing a purchasing procedure of a
home server.
[0158] FIG. 68 is a flowchart showing a procedure of tampering
check when reading data.
[0159] FIG. 69 is a flowchart showing a procedure of tampering
check when writing data.
[0160] FIG. 70 is a flowchart showing a procedure of tampering
check when rewriting data.
[0161] FIG. 71 is a flowchart showing a procedure of tampering
check when deleting data.
[0162] FIG. 72 is a flowchart showing a procedure for reproducing
contents by a home server.
[0163] FIG. 73 is a flowchart showing a procedure for reproducing
contents by a home server.
[0164] FIG. 74 is a flowchart showing a proxy purchasing procedure
of contents utilization rights by a home server.
[0165] FIG. 75 is a flowchart showing a contents change procedure
of a purchased user.
[0166] FIG. 76 is a skeleton diagram showing a rule section of a
handling policy.
[0167] FIG. 77 is a skeleton diagram showing contents of a rule
section of price information.
[0168] FIG. 78 is a skeleton diagram showing an example of changed
contents of rights.
[0169] FIG. 79 is a flowchart showing a redistributing procedure of
contents utilization rights.
[0170] FIG. 80 is a flowchart showing a purchasing procedure of
contents utilization rights by a fixed apparatus.
[0171] FIG. 81 is a skeleton diagram showing transition of a rule
section of license conditions information.
[0172] FIG. 82 is a flowchart showing a moving procedure of
management movement rights.
[0173] FIG. 83 is a flowchart showing a returning procedure of
management movement rights.
[0174] FIG. 84 is a block diagram showing information sending
system according to the present invention.
[0175] FIG. 85 is a block diagram showing information sending
system according to the present invention.
[0176] FIG. 86 is a flowchart showing a remote reproduction
procedure.
[0177] FIG. 87 is a flowchart showing a reserved purchase
procedure.
[0178] FIG. 88 is a flowchart showing a real purchase procedure
after a reserved purchase.
[0179] FIG. 89 is a flowchart showing a proxy purchasing procedure
in the case where a home server charges.
[0180] FIG. 90 is a flowchart showing a proxy purchasing procedure
in the case where equipment outside the group charges.
[0181] FIG. 91 is a conceptual diagram served for explanation of
generation management in a movement procedure of management
movement rights.
[0182] FIG. 92 is a block diagram showing configuration of a
recording and reproducing apparatus.
[0183] FIG. 93 is a flowchart showing a purchasing procedure of a
recording and reproducing apparatus.
[0184] FIG. 94 is a flowchart showing a reproducing procedure of a
recording and reproducing apparatus.
[0185] FIG. 95 is a flowchart showing a proxy procedure of
accounting information and a movement procedure of rights.
[0186] FIG. 96 is a block diagram showing data flow of an entire
electronic music distribution system.
[0187] FIG. 97 is a flowchart showing an online accounting
purchasing procedure.
[0188] FIG. 98 is a block diagram showing configuration of an
electronic music distribution system.
[0189] FIG. 99 is a block diagram showing configuration of a
hosting server.
[0190] FIG. 100 is a block diagram showing configuration of a KIOSK
terminal.
[0191] FIG. 101 is a skeleton block diagram showing data flow.
[0192] FIG. 102 is a flowchart showing a purchasing procedure of a
KIOSK terminal.
[0193] FIG. 103 is a flowchart showing a purchasing procedure of a
KIOSK terminal.
[0194] FIG. 104 is a flowchart showing a purchasing procedure of a
KIOSK terminal.
[0195] FIG. 105 is a flowchart showing a purchasing procedure of a
KIOSK terminal.
[0196] FIG. 106 is a flowchart showing another example of a
purchasing procedure of a KIOSK terminal.
[0197] FIG. 107 is a flowchart showing another example of a
purchasing procedure of a KIOSK terminal.
[0198] FIG. 108 is a diagram showing contents purchase prohibition
list.
[0199] FIG. 109 is a diagram showing a contents
redistribution/repurchase list.
[0200] FIG. 110 is a flowchart showing a procedure of contents
redistribution/repurchase.
[0201] FIG. 111 is a block diagram showing another configuration of
an electronic music distribution system.
[0202] FIG. 112 is a block diagram showing configuration of an
electronic distribution service center of personal computer
configuration.
[0203] FIG. 113 is a block diagram showing configuration of a
contents provider of personal computer configuration.
[0204] FIG. 114 is a block diagram showing configuration of a
service provider of personal computer configuration.
[0205] FIG. 115 is a block diagram showing configuration of a user
home network using a personal computer.
[0206] FIG. 116 is a block diagram showing a conventional
example.
[0207] FIG. 117 is a block diagram showing configuration of a
conventional recording and reproducing apparatus.
BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
[0208] An embodiment of the present invention will be hereinafter
described in detail with reference to the drawings.
[0209] (1) Information Distribution System
[0210] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an EMD (Electronic Music
Distribution) system 10 to which the present invention is applied.
Contents to be distributed to a user by this system are digital
data in which digital data itself has value and, in this example, a
piece of contents corresponds to music data for one tune. Contents
are provided to a user with a piece of contents as one unit
(single) or a plurality of pieces of contents as one unit (album).
The user purchases the contents (in fact, purchases a right to
utilize a content key K.sub.co) and utilizes the contents to be
provided (in fact, decodes the contents using the content key
K.sub.co to utilize the contents). Further, it goes without saying
that the system is applicable not only to music data but also to
all purchases of contents such as video, games programs and the
like.
[0211] An electronic service center (END service center) 1
transmits an individual key K.sub.i and a public key certificate of
a content provider 2 to the content provider 2, transmits a public
key certificate of a service provider 3 to the service provider 3,
transmits a delivery key K.sub.d and registration information to a
user home network 5, receives charge information or the like and
registration information corresponding to use of contents from the
user home network 5, settles an account of utilization fees based
on the charge information, and performs processing for distributing
profits to the content provider 2, the service provider 3 and the
electronic distribution service center 1 itself.
[0212] The content provider 2 has digitized contents, inserts an
electronic watermark in the contents in order to prove that the
contents is its own, compresses and encrypts the contents,
generates a handling policy of the contents, and transmits the
contents to the service provider 3 with signature data added.
[0213] The service provider 3 adds price information to the
contents supplied by the content provider 2 via a network 4
composed of a dedicated cable network, the Internet or satellite
communication, and transmits the contents to the user home network
5 with signature data added.
[0214] The user home network 5 obtains the contents sent by the
service provider 3 with the price information added, purchases a
content utilization right and executes purchase processing. The
purchased utilization right may be, for example, a reproduction
utilization right or a right to copy. Then, charge information
generated by the purchase processing is stored in an tamper
resistant memory in an encryption processing section, and is
transmitted to the electronic distribution service center 1 when
the user home network 5 obtains the delivery key K.sub.d from the
electronic distribution service center 1.
[0215] FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing functions of the
electronic distribution service center 1. A service provider
management section 11 supplies the public key certificate of the
service provider 3 and information on profit distribution to the
service provider 3, and at the same time, receives information
(price information) to be attached to the contents, if necessary. A
content provider management section 12 transmits an individual key
K.sub.i, the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key
K.sub.d, and the public key certificate of the content provider 2,
and at the same time, supplies the information on profit
distribution, and receives information (a handling policy) to be
attached to the contents, if necessary. A copying right management
section 13 transmits information indicating results of content
utilization of the user home network 5 to an organization managing
copying rights, e.g., JASRAC (Japanese Society for Rights of
Authors, Composers and Publishers). A key server 14 performs
generation, maintenance, management of keys used for the entire
system, and the individual key K.sub.i different for each content
provider is generated and the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by
the delivery key K.sub.d is generated together, which are supplied
to the content provider 2 via the content provider management
section 12, the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery
key K.sub.d is supplied to an authentication station 22, if
necessary, and the delivery key K.sub.d is supplied to the user
home network 5 via a user management section 18. In addition, a
public key and a secret key of the electronic distribution center 1
as well as a public key and a secret key peculiar to equipment
maintained by the user are all generated and managed, the public
keys are transmitted to the authentication station 22 to be
utilized for preparing a public key certificate. Further, in some
cases, a save key K.sub.save corresponding to an ID for each
apparatus peculiar to an encryption processing section 92 to be
described later is generated and maintained.
[0216] An example of periodic transmission of a key from the
electronic distribution service center 1 to the content provider 2
and a home server 51 (to be described later) forming the user home
network 5 will be described with reference to FIGS. 3 through 6.
FIG. 3 shows the delivery key K.sub.d held by the electronic
distribution service center 1, the individual key K.sub.i, the
individual key K.sub.i held by the content provider 2, and the
delivery key K.sub.d held by the home server 51 in January 2000
when the content provider starts provision of contents and the home
server 51 forming the user home network 5 starts utilization of the
contents. Further, although further description is omitted, the
content provider 2 also maintains the individual key K.sub.i
encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d corresponding to the
individual key K.sub.i.
[0217] In the example of FIG. 3, the delivery key K.sub.d and the
individual key K.sub.i are usable from the first day of a calendar
month and the last day of the month, and for example, the delivery
key K.sub.d being a version 1 having a value of "aaaaaaaa" that is
a random number of a predetermined number of bits, and the
individual key K.sub.i being a version 1 having a value "zzzzzzzz"
are usable from Jan. 1, 2000 until Jan. 31, 2000 (i.e., the content
key K.sub.co for encrypting contents that the service provider 3
delivers to the user home network 5 in a period from Jan. 1, 2000
until Jan. 31, 2000 is encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i
being the version 1, and the individual key K.sub.i being the
version 1 is encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d being the
version 1), the delivery key K.sub.d being a version 2 having a
value of "bbbbbbbb" that is a random number of a predetermined
number of bits and the individual key K.sub.i being a version 2
having a value of "yyyyyyyy" are usable from Feb. 1, 2000 until
Feb. 29, 2000 (i.e., the content key K.sub.co for encrypting
contents that the service provider 3 delivers to the user home
network 5 during the period is encrypted by the individual key
K.sub.i being the version 2, and the individual key K.sub.i being
the version 2 is encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d being the
version 2). Similarly, the delivery key K.sub.d and the individual
key K.sub.i being a version 3 is usable in March 2000, the delivery
key K.sub.d and the individual key K.sub.i being a version 4 is
usable in April 2000, the delivery key K.sub.d and the individual
key K.sub.i being a version 5 is usable in May 2000, the delivery
key K.sub.d and the individual key K.sub.i being a version 6 is
usable in June 2000.
[0218] Prior to the content provider 2 starting to provide
contents, the electronic delivery service center 1 transmits six
individual keys K.sub.i of the versions 1 through 6 that are usable
from January until June 2000 and the individual keys each encrypted
by the delivery key K.sub.d of the identical versions to the
content provider 2, and the content provider 2 receives and stores
the six individual keys K.sub.i and the individual keys K.sub.i
encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d. The contents provider 2
stores the individual keys K.sub.i for six months ad the individual
keys K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d because a
predetermined period is needed for the content provider 2 to
prepare for encryption and the like of the contents and the content
key K.sub.co before providing the contents.
[0219] In addition, prior to the home server 51 starting to utilize
the contents, the electronic distribution service center 1
transmits three delivery keys K.sub.d being the versions 1 through
3 that are usable from January until March 2000 to the home server
51, and the home server 51 receives and stores the three delivery
keys K.sub.d. The home server 51 stores the delivery keys K.sub.d
for three months in order to avoid such a situation in which
contents cannot be purchased despite a contract term during which
the contents can be purchased due to such a trouble that the home
server 51 cannot connect to the electronic distribution service
center 1 arising out of congestion of lines or the like, and in
order to reduce load of the electronic distribution service center
1 by decreasing the frequency of connection to the electronic
distribution service center 1 and controlling simultaneous accesses
of respective apparatuses to the electronic distribution service
center 1.
[0220] During the period from Jan. 1, 2000 until Jan. 31, 2000, the
delivery key K.sub.d and the individual key K.sub.i being the
version 1 are utilized in the home server 51 forming the electronic
distribution service center 1, the content provider 2 and the user
home network 5.
[0221] Transmission of the delivery key K.sub.d and the individual
key K.sub.i of the electronic distribution service center 1 to the
content provider 2 and the home server 51 on Feb. 1, 2000 will be
described with reference to FIG. 4. The electronic distribution
service center 1 transmits six individual keys K.sub.i of the
versions 2 through 7 that are usable from February 2000 until July
2000 and the individual keys each encrypted by the delivery keys
K.sub.d of the identical versions to the content provider 2, and
the content provider 2 receives the six individual keys K.sub.i and
the individual keys K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d,
overwrites the individual keys K.sub.i and the individual keys
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d that are stored
before the receipt with the received keys, and stores the new
individual keys K.sub.i and the individual keys K.sub.i encrypted
by the delivery keys K.sub.d. The electronic distribution service
center 1 transmits three delivery keys K.sub.d being the versions 2
through 4 that are usable from February 2000 until April 2000 to
the home server 51, and the home server 51 receives the three
delivery keys K.sub.d, overwrites the delivery keys K.sub.d that
are stored before receipt with the received keys, and stores the
new delivery keys K.sub.d. The electronic distribution service
center 1 stores the delivery keys K.sub.d being the versions 1
through 7 and the individual keys K.sub.i as they are. This is for
the purpose of making the delivery keys K.sub.d utilized in the
past to be available when an unexpected trouble occurs, or an
illegality occurs or is found.
[0222] During the period from Feb. 1, 2000 until Feb. 29, 2000, the
delivery key K.sub.d and the individual key K.sub.i being the
version 2 are utilized in the home server 51 forming the electronic
distribution service center 1, the content provider 2, and the user
home network 5.
[0223] Transmission of the delivery key K.sub.d and the individual
key K.sub.i of the electronic distribution service center 1 to the
content provider 2 and the home server 51 on Mar. 1, 2000 will be
described with reference to FIG. 5. The electronic distribution
service center 1 transmits six individual keys K.sub.i of the
versions 3 through 8 that are usable from March 2000 until August
2000 and the individual keys each encrypted by the delivery keys
K.sub.d of the identical versions to the content provider 2, and
the content provider 2 receives the six individual keys K.sub.i and
the individual keys K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d,
overwrites the individual keys K.sub.i and the individual keys
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d that are stored
before the receipt with the received keys, and stores the new
individual keys K.sub.i and the individual keys K.sub.i encrypted
by the delivery keys K.sub.d. The electronic distribution service
center 1 transmits three delivery keys K.sub.d being the versions 3
through 5 that are usable from March 2000 until May 2000 to the
home server 51, and the home server 51 receives the three delivery
keys K.sub.d, overwrites the delivery keys K.sub.d that are stored
before the receipt with the received keys, and stores the new
delivery keys K.sub.d. The electronic distribution service center 1
stores the delivery keys K.sub.d being the versions 1 through 8 and
the individual keys K.sub.i as they are. This is for the purpose of
making the delivery keys K.sub.d utilized in the past to be
available when an unexpected trouble occurs, or an illegality
occurs or is found.
[0224] During the period from Mar. 1, 2000 until Mar. 31, 2000, the
delivery key K.sub.d and the individual key K.sub.i being the
version 3 are utilized in the home server 51 forming the electronic
distribution service center 1, the content provider 2, and the user
home network 5.
[0225] Transmission of the delivery key K.sub.d and the individual
key K.sub.i of the electronic distribution service center 1 to the
content provider 2 and the home server 51 on Apr. 1, 2000 will be
described with reference to FIG. 6. The electronic distribution
service center 1 transmits six individual keys K.sub.i of the
versions 4 through 9 that are usable from April 2000 until
September 2000 and the individual keys each encrypted by the
delivery keys K.sub.d of the identical versions to the content
provider 2, and the content provider 2 receives the six individual
keys K.sub.i and the individual keys K.sub.i encrypted by the
delivery keys K.sub.d, overwrites the individual keys K.sub.i and
the individual keys K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d
that are stored before the receipt with the received keys, and
stores the new individual keys K.sub.i and the individual keys
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery keys K.sub.d. The electronic
distribution service center 1, transmits three delivery keys
K.sub.d being the versions 4 through 6 that are usable from April
2000 until June 2000 to the home server 51, and the home server 51
receives the three delivery keys K.sub.d, overwrites the delivery
keys K.sub.d that are stored before the receipt with the received
keys, and stores the new delivery keys K.sub.d. The electronic
distribution service center 1 stores the delivery keys K.sub.d
being the versions 1 through 9 and the individual keys K.sub.i as
they are. This is for the purpose of making the delivery keys
K.sub.d utilized in the past to be available when an unexpected
trouble occurs, or an illegality occurs or is found.
[0226] During the period from Apr. 1, 2000 until Apr. 30, 2000, the
delivery key K.sub.d and the individual key K.sub.i being the
version 4 are utilized in the home server 51 forming the electronic
distribution service center 1, the content provider 2, and the user
home network 5.
[0227] In this way, by distributing the delivery keys K.sub.d and
the individual keys K.sub.i of the future months in advance, even
if a user does not access the center at all for one or two months,
the user can purchase contents for the time being, and can received
the keys by accessing the center in a timely manner.
[0228] History data management section 15 (FIG. 2) of the
electronic distribution service center 1 maintains and manages
charge information that is information indicating results of
utilization of the contents collected by the user management
section 18, price information (any one or both of information sent
from the service provider 3 and information added to the charge
information and sent by the user) corresponding to the contents, if
necessary, and a handling policy (any one or both of information
sent from the content provider 2 and information added to the
charge information and sent by the user) corresponding to the
contents, if necessary, and outputs data when the service provider
management section 11, the content provider management section 12
or the like utilizes the charge information, the utilization
history or the like. Further, the price information and the
handling policy may not be sent from the service provider 3 or the
content provider 2, if necessary data is written in the charge
information. Profit distribution section 16 calculates profits of
the electronic distribution service center 1, the content provider
2 and the service provider 3 based on the charge information, the
price information, if necessary, and the handling policy supplied
from the history data management section 15. The information is
supplied to receipt and disbursement section 20, and in some cases,
profit distribution is performed via the receipt and disbursement
section 20, or in other cases, payment distribution is not
performed and only the information is transmitted to the service
provider management section 11, the content provider management
section 12, and the copying right management section 13, sales
itself is paid to the service provider, and the service provider 3
distributes the profit to each beneficiary. Mutual authentication
section 17 executes mutual authentication to be described later
with predetermined apparatuses in the content provider 2, the
service provider 3 and the user home network 5.
[0229] The user management section 18 has a user registration
database, and when receiving a request for registration from an
apparatus of the user home network 5, retrieves through the user
registration database, and prepares registration information to the
effect that the apparatus is to be registered or to be rejected
registration or the like depending on the recorded contents. When
the user home network 5 is composed of a plurality of apparatuses
having a function capable of connecting to the electronic
distribution service center 1, the user management section 18
provides for an apparatus to be settled in the registration
information, registers a settlement ID, and further provides for a
scope of apparatuses forming the user home network, provides for
information such as suspension of trade, and transmits the
information to a predetermined apparatus (an apparatus that can be
settled) of the user home network 5.
[0230] An example of the user registration database shown in FIG. 7
illustrates a registration state for each network group established
in the user home network 5, and a group ID indicating a group, an
ID peculiar to an apparatus forming the home network 5, and
information corresponding to the ID such as whether or not
connection is possible with the electronic distribution service
center 1, whether or not settlement processing is possible, whether
or not contents can be purchased, which apparatus performs the
settlement processing, which apparatus requests purchase of the
contents, whether or not registration is possible, or the like are
recorded in each group.
[0231] The group ID recorded in the user registration database is
allocated to each user home network, and settlement and update of
information are performed by this group unit. Therefore, in
principle, a representative apparatus in the group collectively
performs communication, settlement processing and information
update with the electronic distribution service center 1, and other
apparatuses in the group do not directly communicate with the
electronic distribution service center 1. The ID recorded in the
user registration database is the ID allocated to each apparatus
separately and is used for identifying an apparatus.
[0232] Information on whether or not connection with the electronic
distribution service center 1 recorded in the user registration
database is possible indicates whether or not it possible to
physically connect with the electronic service center 1, and even
an apparatus recorded as capable of connecting, other than an
apparatus recorded as capable of performing settlement processing,
cannot be connected to the electronic distribution service center 1
in principle. (However, if a representative apparatus in a group
does not perform settlement processing operation due to some
reason, an apparatus can be temporarily connected to the electronic
distribution service center 1 as a proxy). In addition, an
apparatus recorded as not capable of connecting outputs charge
information or the like to the electronic distribution service
center 1 via an apparatus capable of performing settlement
processing of the user home network 5.
[0233] Information on whether or not the settlement processing
recorded in the user registration database is possible indicates
whether or not the apparatus can make a settlement. When the user
home network 5 is composed of a plurality of apparatuses that are
capable of performing purchase or the like of utilization right of
contents, one apparatus that can perform settlement processing
among the apparatuses transmits charge information, price
information, if necessary, and a handling policy of all the
apparatuses registered in the electronic distribution service
center 1 of the user home network 5 to the electronic distribution
service center 1, and receives the delivery key K.sub.d and the
registration information from the electronic distribution service
center 1 according to the completion of the settlement processing.
In this way, processing of the electronic distribution service
center 1 is reduced compared with performing processing for each
apparatus.
[0234] Information on whether or not purchase processing recorded
in the user registration database indicates whether or not the
apparatus can purchase the utilization right of contents. An
apparatus that is incapable of purchasing obtains the utilization
right of the contents by performing proxy purchase (this means that
another apparatus purchases the right and all the right is
assigned. No right remains in the supplier side) of the utilization
right from another apparatus capable of purchasing, re-distribution
(this means a method in which the utilization right of contents
already purchased is purchased again with identical contents of the
utilization right or different contents of the utilization right
and supplied to another apparatus. In this case, no right remains
in the supplier side. Main purpose of re-distribution is to make a
discount. The privilege of discount is granted on condition that an
apparatus belongs to a group that uses an identical settlement ID.
This is because processing burden of the electronic distribution
service center 1 is reduced in processing within the group using
the identical settlement ID, and therefore a discount is granted in
return), or management transfer (although a content reproduction
right, particularly an indefinite reproduction right can be
transferred, which apparatus is a reproduction right receiver is
managed in a reproduction right transmitter, and when the
reproduction right is not returned, the management transfer cannot
be performed at all again, and the reproduction right can only be
returned to the reproduction right transmitter that gave the
reproduction right).
[0235] Here, a utilization method/a utilization right and purchase
method of contents will be briefly described. As a utilization
method of contents, there are two methods, namely a method in which
a user itself manages and maintains the utilization right of
contents, a method in which a user executes the utilization right
held by another apparatus and utilizes the right in the user's own
apparatus. As the utilization right of contents, there are an
unlimited reproduction right (a right without any limit on a period
and the number of times of reproduction of contents; if the
contents is music contents, the reproduction is sound reproduction,
and if the contents is a game program or the like, the reproduction
is execution), a reproduction right with limited number of times (a
right with the number contents can be reproduced is limited), an
unlimited copying right (a right without any limit on a period and
the number of times of copying contents), a copying right with
limited number of times (a right with limit on the number of times
of copying contents) (as a copying right, there are a copying right
without copy management information, a copying right with copy
management information (SCMS), other copying rights for special
purpose media, and the like) (in addition, in some cases, there is
a copying right with a limit of time), and a management transfer
right. As a method of purchasing the utilization right, there are
utilization right content change for changing contents of the
utilization right already purchased to other contents,
re-distribution for separately purchasing the utilization right
based on the right already purchased by another apparatus, proxy
purchase for having another apparatus to purchase the utilization
right on behalf of the user's apparatus, album purchase for
collectively purchasing and managing a plurality of contents
utilization rights, and the like in addition to ordinary purchase
for directly purchasing the abovementioned utilization rights.
[0236] Information written in a proxy settler recorded in the user
registration database indicates an ID of an apparatus which is made
to transmit charge information generated when the utilization right
of contents is purchased to the electronic distribution service
center 1 on behalf of the user's apparatus.
[0237] In formation written in a proxy purchaser recorded in the
user registration database indicates an ID of an apparatus which
performs purchase of the utilization right on behalf of an
apparatus that is incapable of purchasing the utilization right of
contents. However, if all the apparatuses within the group that can
perform purchase processing are appointed as proxy purchasers, it
is not specifically necessary to make a record.
[0238] Information on whether or not a registration recorded in the
user registration database is possible is updated based on
information on outstanding charge, illegal processing or the like
supplied from a settlement organization (e.g., a bank) or a credit
card company. In response to a request for registration of an
apparatus having an ID that is recorded as registration
unavailable, the user management section 18 rejects its
registration, and the apparatus rejected registration not only
cannot purchase contents of this system but also cannot transmit or
receive data between other apparatuses within the user home network
5 thereafter. In addition, in some cases, utilization of purchased
contents is also limited. (However, an apparatus may be registered
again after it is brought in the electronic distribution service
center 1 or the like and completed inspection). In addition, a
state such as "settlement unprocessed," "temporary suspension" or
the like may exist in addition to "registration available" and
"registration unavailable."
[0239] In addition, the user management section 18 is supplied
charge information, registration information, price information, if
necessary, and a handling policy from an apparatus in the user home
network 5, an outputs the charge information, price information and
the handling policy to the history data management section 15 and
supplies the delivery key K.sub.d and the registration information
to the apparatus in the user home network 5. Timing for supplying
will be described later.
[0240] Here, the registration information will be described with
reference to FIG. 8. Registration information of FIG. 8 is added a
settlement ID and a signature in addition to information in the
user registration database, and only includes information of an
identical settlement group. The settlement ID indicates an ID of a
user within the user information database (e.g., a bank account
number and a credit card number) that charge billing section 19 and
the receipt and disbursement section 20 use when performing
settlement. Generation of a signature will be described later.
[0241] Returning to FIG. 2, the charge billing section 19
calculates a charge to a user based on the charge information, the
price information, if necessary, and the handling policy supplied
from the history data management section 15, and supplies the
results to the receipt and disbursement section 20. In addition,
the charge billing section 19 supplies settlement information to
the user via the user management section 18, if necessary. The
receipt and disbursement section 20 communicates with an external
bank or the like (not shown) based on the amounts of disbursements
and utilization fees to be collected to and from the user, the
content provider 2 and the service provider 3, and executes
settlement processing. Further, in some cases, the receipt and
disbursement section 20 sends all the sales to the service provider
3, and the service provider 3 distributes profits based on
distribution money information transmitted via the profit
distribution section 16. An audit section 21 audits justification
of the charge information, the price information and the handling
policy supplied from the apparatus in the user home network 5 in
view of the handling policy supplied from the content provider 2
and the price information supplied from the service provider 3.
[0242] In addition, as the processing of the audit section 21,
there are processing for auditing matching of an amount inputted
from the user home network 5 and a total amount of distributed
profits or an amount sent to the service provider 3, and processing
for auditing whether or not, for example, a content provider ID and
a service provider ID that could not exist or a share, a price or
the like that are improbable exist in data within the charge
information supplied from the apparatus in the user home network
5.
[0243] The authentication station 22 generates a certificate of the
public key supplied from the key server 14, supplies the
certificate to the content provider 2 and the service provider 3,
and also generates a public key certificate to be stored in a mass
storage section 68 (to be described later) of the home server 51
and in small storage section 75 (to be described later) of a fixed
apparatus 52 when a user apparatus is manufactured. If the content
provider 2 does not perform authoring of contents, as an
alternative method, there are a content server 23 for holding the
contents and a content authoring 24.
[0244] FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing a configuration of
functions of the content provider 2. The content server 31 stores
contents to be supplied to a user, and supplies the contents to an
electronic watermark adding section 32. The electronic watermark
adding section 32 inserts a content provider ID in the contents
supplied from the content server 31 in the form of an electronic
watermark indicating the contents are properties of the user, and
supplies the contents to a compression section 33. The compression
section 33 compresses the contents supplied from the electronic
watermark adding section 32 by the method of ATRAC (Adaptive
Transform Acoustic Coding) (trademark) or the like, and supplies
the contents to a content encryption section 34 that is content
encryption means. Incidentally, a method such as MP3, AAC or the
like can be used as a compression method instead of ATRAC. The
content encryption section 34 encrypts the contents compressed by
the compression section 33 by a common key encryption method such
as DES (Data Encryption Standard) using a key supplied from a
content key generation section 35 (the key is hereinafter referred
to as a content key K.sub.co 9), and outputs the results to a
signature generation section 38 that is transmission means.
[0245] The content key generation section 35 generates random
numbers of a predetermined number of bits to be the content key
K.sub.co, and supplies the random numbers from which bit rows
inappropriate for encryption called a weak key (e.g.,
K.sub.co=1E1E1E1E0E0E0E0E, IEE01EE00EF00EF0 or the like) are
removed to the content encryption section 34 and the content key
encryption section 36. When an encryption algorithm without such an
inappropriate bit row is used, processing for removing an
inappropriate bit row is unnecessary. The content key encryption
section 36 encrypts the content key K.sub.co by a common key
encryption method such as DES using the individual key K.sub.i
supplied from the electronic distribution service center 1, and
outputs the results to the signature generation section 38.
Incidentally, the encryption method is not limited to DES, and a
public key encryption method such as RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
may be used.
[0246] DES is the encryption method for processing with 64 bits of
plain text as one block using a common key of 56 bits. Processing
of DES consists of a part for agitating a plain text to convert it
to an encryption text (a data agitation section) and a part for
generating a key (enlarged key) to be used in the data agitation
section from the common key (a key processing section). Since all
the algorithms of DES are made public, only basic processing of the
data agitation section will be briefly described.
[0247] First, the plain text 64 bits are divided into H0 of the
upper 32 bits and L0 of the lower 32 bits. An output of an F
function that is the agitated L0 of the lower 32 bits with the
enlarged key K1 of 48 bits supplied from the key processing section
and L0 of the lower 32 bits as inputs. The F function consists of
two types of basic conversions of "letter replacement" for
replacing a numeral value with a predetermined rule and
"permutation" for changing a bit position with a predetermined
rule. Then, H0 of the upper 32 bits and the output of the F
function are exclusively logically summed, and the results are
designated as L1. L0 is designated as H1.
[0248] Based on H0 of the upper 32 bits and L0 of the lower 32
bits, the above-mentioned processing is repeated sixteen times, and
the resulted H16 of the upper 32 bits and L16 of the lower 32 bits
are outputted as an encrypted text. Decryption is realized by
tracing the above-mentioned procedures conversely using the common
key used for encryption.
[0249] Further, although DES is shown as a common key encryption in
this embodiment, either FEAL (Fast Encryption Algorithm), IDEA
(International Data Encryption Algorithm), or E2 proposed by NTT
(trademark) or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) that is the next
encryption standard of the United States may be used.
[0250] A handling policy generation section 37 generates a handling
policy of contents and outputs the handling policy to the signature
generation section 38 corresponding to contents to be encrypted.
Further, in some cases, the handling policy generation section 37
supplies the generated a handling policy to the electronic
distribution service center 1 via communicating means (not shown),
and the data is maintained and managed. The signature generation
section 38 adds an electronic signature to the encrypted content
key K.sub.co, the encrypted individual key K.sub.i and the handling
policy, and transmits them to the service provider 3 together with
a certificate C.sub.cp of the content provider 2. (The encrypted
contents, the encrypted content key K.sub.co, the encrypted
individual key K.sub.i and the handling policy to each of which the
electronic signature is added using a secret key of the content
provider 3 are hereinafter referred to as a content provider secure
container). Further, one signature may be added to entire data
instead of adding a signature separately to respective data.
[0251] A mutual authentication section 39 mutually authenticates
with the electronic distribution service center 1, and mutually
authenticate with the service provider 3 prior to transmitting the
content provider secure container to the service provider 3, if
necessary. Since a memory 40A holds the individual key K.sub.i that
the content provider 2 must hold secretly, a tamper resistant
memory that is not easily read by a third party is desired, but no
specific hardware limitation is necessary. (For example, the memory
may be a hard disk existing in a room to which entry is managed, a
hard disk of a personal computer that is managed by a password, or
the like). In addition, since a memory 40B only stores the
individual key K.sub.i that is encrypted by the delivery key
K.sub.d and the public key certificate of the content provider 2,
the memory may be any ordinary storage device or the like since it
is information made public, there is no need to keep it secret).
Further, the memories 40A and 40B may be united.
[0252] The signature, which is attached to data or a certificate to
be described later, is data for checking tamper and authenticating
a person preparing the certificate, and is prepared by finding a
hash value by a hash function based on data that is desired to be
transmitted and using a secret key of a public key encryption.
[0253] The hash function and the signature will be described. The
hash function is a function for obtaining predetermined data that
is desired to be transmitted, compressing the data into data with a
predetermined bit length, and outputting the data as a hash value.
The hash function has a characteristic that is difficult to
estimate an input from the hash value (output), and when one bit of
the data inputted in the hash function changes, many bits of the
hash value change, and it is difficult to find out input data
having the identical hash value. As the hash function, MD (Message
Digest) 4, MD 5, SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm)-1 and the like are
used.
[0254] The signature generation section 38 of a transmission
apparatus (the content provider 2) for transmitting data and a
signature, for example, generates a signature using an elliptical
curve encryption that is a public key encryption method. The
processing will be described with reference to FIG. 10 (EC-DSA
(Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm), IEEE P1363/D3). In
step S1, M is a message, p is a characteristic, a and b are
coefficients of an elliptic curve (elliptic curve:
y.sup.2=x.sup.3+ax+b), G is a base point on the elliptic curve, r
is a digit of G, and K.sub.s is a secret key (0<K.sub.s<r).
In step S2, a random number u is generated by the random number
generation unit such that 0<u<r. In step S3, coordinates
where the base point is multiplied by u are calculated. Further, an
addition on the elliptic curve and a two times multiplication are
defined as follows:
[0255] When P=(X.sub.0,Y.sub.0), Q=(X.sub.1,Y.sub.1),
R=(X.sub.2,Y.sub.2)=P+Q, and P.noteq.Q,
X.sub.2=.lamda..sup.2-X.sub.0-X.sub.1
Y.sub.2=.lamda.(X.sub.0-X.sub.2)-Y.sub.0
.lamda.=(Y.sub.1-Y.sub.0)/(X.sub.1-X.sub.0)
[0256] When P=Q,
X.sub.2=.lamda..sup.2-2X.sub.0
Y.sub.2=.lamda.(X.sub.0-X.sub.2)-Y.sub.0
.lamda.=(3X.sub.0.sup.2+a)/2Y.sub.0
and u times the point G is calculated using the above equations
(Most understandable though slow operation method is as follows:
calculate G, 2G, 4G . . . , and add to where there is 1 by binary
number developing u corresponding (2.sup.i).times.G (i is a bit
position when counted from LSB of u)). In step S4, c=X.sub.v mod r
is calculated, in step S5, it is determined if the value is 0, and
if it is not 0, the processing proceeds to step S6, where the hash
value of the message M is calculated, and f=SHA-1 (M). Then, in
step S7, d=[(f+cK.sub.s)/u] mod r is calculated, and in step S8, it
is determined if d is 0. If d is not 0, c and will be signature
data. Assuming that r has the length of 160 bits, the signature
data has 320 bit length.
[0257] In step S5, if c is 0, the processing returns to step S2 and
a new random number is generated. If d is 0 in step S8, the
processing also returns to step S2 and another random number is
generated.
[0258] A receiving apparatus (the user home network 5) having
received the signature and the data, for example, verifies the
signature using the elliptic curve encryption that is a public key
encryption method. The processing will be described with reference
to FIG. 11. In step S10, M is a message, p is a characteristic, a
and b are coefficients of the elliptic curve (elliptic curve:
y.sup.2=x.sup.3+ax+b), G is a base point on the elliptic curve, r
is a digit of G, G and K.sub.s G are public keys
(0<K.sub.s<r). In step S11, it is inspected if the signature
data c and d satisfy 0<c, d<r. If the signature data satisfy
this, in step S12, the hash value of the message M is calculated,
and f=SHA-1 (M). Then, in step S13, h=1/d mod r is calculated, and
in step S14 h.sub.1=fh, h.sub.2=ch mod r is calculated. In step
S15, P=(X.sub.p,Y.sub.p)=h.sub.1G+h.sub.2K.sub.sG is calculated
using already calculated h.sub.1 and h.sub.2. Since a verifier of
the signature knows the public keys G and K.sub.sG, calculation can
be made as in step S3. Then, in step S16, it is determined if P is
an infinite apoastron, and if it is not an infinite apoastron, the
processing proceeds to step S17 (in fact, the determination of the
infinite apoastron is completed in step S15. That is, when an
addition of P=(X,Y), Q=(X,-Y) is performed, it has been found that
the aforementioned .lamda. cannot be calculated, and R is the
infinite apoastron. In step S17, X.sub.p mod r is calculated, and
the result is compared with the signature data c. If both the
values match, the processing proceeds to step S18, and it is
determined that the signature is correct.
[0259] If the signature is determined to be correct, it is seen
that the received data is not tampered, and is the data transmitted
from the transmission apparatus holding the secret key
corresponding to the public key.
[0260] In step S11, if the signature data c and d do not satisfy
0<c, d<r, the processing proceeds to step S19. In addition,
in step S16, if P is the infinite apoastron, the processing also
proceeds to step S19. Moreover, in step S17, if the value of
X.sub.p mod r does not match the signature data c, the processing
also proceeds to step S19. In step S19, it is determined that the
signature is not correct.
[0261] If it is determined that the signature is not correct, it is
seen that the received data is tampered or is not data transmitted
from the transmission apparatus holding the secret key
corresponding to the public key.
[0262] Further, although SHA-1 is used as the hash function in this
embodiment, any function such as MD4, MD 5 and the like may be
used. In addition, generation and verification of a signature may
be performed using an RSA encryption (ANSI X9.31-1).
[0263] Encryption and decryption of the public key encryption
method will now be described. Contrary to the common key encryption
method using an identical key (common key) in encryption and
decryption, the public key encryption method uses different keys to
be used for encryption and decryption respectively. If the public
key encryption method is used, even if one key is made public, the
other key can be kept secret, and the key that may be made public
is called a public key and the other key that should be kept secret
is called a secret key.
[0264] The elliptic curve encryption method that is representative
of the public key encryption method will be described. In FIG. 12,
in step S20, M.sub.x and M.sub.y are messages, p is a
characteristic, a and b are coefficients of an elliptic curve
(elliptic curve: y.sup.2=x.sup.3+ax+b), G is a base point on the
elliptic curve, r is a digit of G, G and K.sub.sG are public keys
(0<K.sub.s<r). In step S21, a random number u is generated
such that 0<u<r. In step S22, coordinates V that are u times
the public key K.sub.sG. Further, since scalar times on the
elliptic curve is identical with the method described in the
signature generation, description is omitted here. In step S23, the
X coordinates of V are multiplied by M.sub.x to find a balance by
p, which is X.sub.0. In step S24, the Y of V is multiplied by
M.sub.y to find a balance by p, which is Y.sub.0. Further, if the
length of the message is smaller than the number of bits of p,
M.sub.y uses a random number, and M.sub.y is cancelled in the
decryption section. In step S25, uG is calculated, and in step S26,
a cryptogram uG, (X.sub.0,Y.sub.0) is found.
[0265] Decryption of the public key encryption method will now be
described with reference to FIG. 13. In step S30, uG,
(X.sub.0,Y.sub.0) is cryptogram data, p is a characteristic, a and
b are coefficient of an elliptic curve (elliptic curve:
y.sup.2=x.sup.3+ax+b), G is a base point on the elliptic curve, r
is a digit of G, and K.sub.s is a secret key (0<K.sub.s<r).
In step S31, the encryption data uG is multiplied by the secret key
K.sub.s. In step S32, the X coordinates of (X.sub.0,Y.sub.0) among
the encryption data is taken out, and X.sub.1=X.sub.0/X.sub.v mod p
is calculated. In step S33, Y.sub.1=Y.sub.0/Y.sub.v mod p is
calculated. Then, in step S34, X.sub.1 is M.sub.x and Y.sub.1 is
M.sub.y to take out the message. Then, if M.sub.y is not the
message, Y.sub.1 is cancelled.
[0266] In this way, in the public key encryption method, with the
secret key being K.sub.s and the public keys being G, K.sub.sG, a
key to be used for encryption and a key to be used for decryption
may be different keys.
[0267] In addition, as another example of the public key encryption
method, the RSA encryption (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) is known.
[0268] FIG. 14 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the
service provider 3. A content sever 41 stores the public key
certificate and the encrypted contents of the content provider 2
that are supplied from the content provider 2. The public key
certificate of the content provider 2 is verified a signature on
the certificate by the public key of the authentication station 22
in a certificate inspection section 42, and if the verification is
successful, the public key of the content provider 2 is supplied to
the signature verification section 43. In the signature
verification section 43, the signature of the content provider 2
with respect to the handling policy stored in the content server 41
is verified using the public key of the content provider 2 that is
verified before, and if the verification is successful, the
handling policy are supplied to a pricing section 44. In the
pricing section 44, price information is prepared from the handling
policy and supplied to a signature generation section 45. In the
signature generation section 45, a signature with respect to the
price information is generated using the secret key of the service
provider 3 held in a tamper resistant memory (not shown) (as in 40A
of the content provider 2) (the content provider secure container
and the price information with an electronic signature added using
the secret key of the service provider 3 are hereinafter referred
to as a service provider secure container). Further, one signature
may be generated for the entire content provider secure container
and price information instead of adding a signature to the price
information. Then, the service provider secure container, the
public key certificate of the content provider 2 and the public key
certificate of the service provider 3 are supplied to the user home
network 5 via the network 4 (FIG. 1). A mutual authentication
section 46 mutually authenticates with the electronic distribution
service center, and if possible, mutually authenticates with the
user home network 5 via the content provide, the Internet, cable
communication or the like, if necessary.
[0269] FIG. 15 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the
user home network 5. A home server 51 receives a secure container
containing contents from the service provider 3 via the network 4,
purchases the utilization right of the contents, and performs
decryption, extension, reproduction and copying of the contents by
executing the right.
[0270] The communication section 61 communicates with the service
provider 3 or the electronic distribution service center 1 via the
network 4, and receives or transmits predetermined information. An
upper controller 62 receives a signal from inputting means 63,
displays a predetermined message or the like on displaying means
64, performing utilization right purchase processing or the like by
utilizing an encryption processing section 65, supplies encrypted
contents read out from mass storage section 68 to an extension
section 66, and stores the encrypted contents in the mass storage
section 68. The inputting means 63 transmits a signal from a remote
controller or input data from an input button to the upper
controller 62. The displaying means 64 is composed of a display
device such as a liquid crystal display, and sends an instruction
to a user and displays information. The inputting means 63 and the
displaying means 64 become a touch panel liquid crystal display or
the like, if necessary, ad may be united as one means. The
encryption processing section 65 mutually authenticates with the
service provider 3, the electronic distribution service center 1 or
encryption processing sections of other apparatuses, purchases the
content utilization right, and at the same time, performs
encryption/decryption of predetermined data, manages an external
memory that holds the content key K.sub.co and licensing conditions
information, and further stores the delivery key K.sub.d, the
charge information or the like. The extension section 66 mutually
authenticates with the encryption processing section 65 to receive
the content key K.sub.co, decrypts the encrypted contents supplied
from the upper controller 62 using the content key K.sub.co,
extends the contents by a predetermined method such: as ATRAC, and
further inserts a predetermined electronic watermark in the
contents. The external memory 67 is composed of a nonvolatile
memory such as a flash memory or a nonvolatile memory with a
back-up power source, and stores the content key K.sub.co decrypted
by the save key K.sub.save and the license conditions information.
The mass storage section 68 is a storage device such as an HDD or
an optical disk, which stores the content provider secure container
and the service provider secure container (the encrypted contents,
the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i,
the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d,
the handling policy, the price information and the signatures on
them), the public key certificate, the registration information or
the like.
[0271] The encryption processing section 65 for mutually
authenticating with the electronic distribution service center 1,
purchasing the content utilization right and, at the same time,
generating the charge information, performing decryption/encryption
of predetermined data, managing an external memory holding the
content key K.sub.co and the license conditions information, and
further storing the delivery key K.sub.d, the charge information or
the like is composed of a control section 91, a storage module 92,
a registration information inspection module 93, a purchase
processing module 94, a mutual authentication module 95, an
encryption/decryption module 96, and an external memory control
section 97. The encryption processing section 65 is composed of a
single chip IC exclusively for encryption processing, has a
multi-layered structure, and has characteristics for making it
difficult to read out data illegally from outside (tamper resistant
feature) in that a memory cell inside is sandwiched by dummy layers
such as aluminum layers and a width of voltage or frequency of
operation is narrow.
[0272] The control section 91 controls each module according to a
command from the upper controller 62, and at the same time, returns
a result from each module to the upper controller 62. The storage
module 92 stores data such as the charge information supplied from
the purchase processing module 94 and the delivery key K.sub.d, and
supplies data such as the delivery key K.sub.d when other function
blocks execute predetermined processing. The registration
information inspection module 93 inspects the registration
information supplied from the upper controller 62, and determined
whether or not to mutually authenticate with other apparatuses in
the user home network 5, whether or not to accept the charge
information, whether or not to perform re-distribution or the like
of the contents. The purchase processing module 94 generates
license conditions information anew from the handling policy and
the price information (as well as already holding license
conditions information depending on a case) included in the secure
container received from the service provider 3 to output to the
external memory control section 97 or the control section 91, and
generates charge information to output to the storage module 92.
The mutual authentication module 95 executes mutual authentication
with the electronic distribution service center 1, the encryption
processing sections of other apparatuses in the home network 5 and
the extension section 66, and generates a temporary key K.sub.temp
(a session key), if necessary to supply to the
encryption/decryption module 96.
[0273] The encryption/decryption module 96 is composed of a
decryption unit 111, an encryption unit 112, a random number
generation unit 113, a signature generation unit 114, and a
signature verification unit 115. The decryption unit 111 decrypts
the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d,
decrypts the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key
K.sub.i, and decrypts various kinds of data encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp. The encryption unit 112 encrypts the
decrypted content key K.sub.co by the save key K.sub.save held in
the storage module 92 to output to the external memory control
section 97 via the control section 91, and encrypts various kinds
of data by the temporary key K.sub.temp. The random number
generation unit 113 generates a random number of a predetermined
number of figures, and supplies the random number to the mutual
authentication module 95 or the signature generation unit 114. The
signature generation unit 114 calculates the hash value of the
message supplied from the control section 91, and generates
signature data using the random number supplied from the random
number generation unit 113 to output to the control section 91. The
signature verification unit 115 determines whether or not the
signature is correct from the message and the signature data
supplied from the control section, and output the results to the
control section 91. Further, the generation/verification method of
the signature is the same as the case described above with
reference to FIGS. 10 and 11.
[0274] The external memory control section 97 reads and writes data
by controlling the external memory 67, and performs data
verification to find if the data in the external memory has been
tampered. FIG. 16 is a block diagram illustrating operations of the
external memory control section 97. In FIG. 16, N hash values for
preventing tampering (integrity Check Value) are stored in the
storage module 92. The external memory 67 is divided into N blocks
of data regions, and each data region is made such that M sets of
content key K.sub.co and the license conditions information can be
written. In addition, other regions that can be used freely are
also prepared in the external memory 67. The hash value ICV for
preventing tampering has a hash value for all the data in the
external memory 67 corresponding to the hash value ICV. Reading
procedures and writing procedures of the external memory will be
described later using a flowchart.
[0275] The extension section 66 (FIG. 15) for decrypting and
extending contents and adding a predetermined electronic watermark
is composed of a mutual authentication module 101, a key decryption
module 102, a decryption module 103, an extension module 104, an
electronic addition module 105 and a storage module 106. The mutual
authentication module 101 mutually authenticates with the
encryption processing section 65, and outputs the temporary key
K.sub.temp to the key decryption module 102. The key decryption
module 102 decrypts by the temporary key K.sub.temp the content key
K.sub.co read out from the external memory 67 and encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp to output to the decryption module 103.
The decryption module 103 decrypts the contents recorded in the
mass storage section 68 by the content key K.sub.co to output to
the extension module 104. The extension module 104 further extends
the decrypted contents with a method such as ATRAC to output to the
electronic watermark addition module 105. The electronic watermark
addition module 105 inserts to the contents the individual ID of
the encryption processing section to which the purchase processing
has been applied using the electronic watermark technology to
output to other apparatuses or a speaker (not shown), and
reproduces music.
[0276] Key data required for the mutual authentication with the
encryption processing section 65 is stored in the storage module
106. Further, the extension section 66 is desirably provided with
the tamper resistant feature.
[0277] The external memory 67 stores the license conditions
information generated when the right is purchased in the purchase
processing module 94 and the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
save key K.sub.save. The mass storage section 68 records the secure
container, the public key certificate, the registration information
or the like supplied from the service provider 3.
[0278] The fixed apparatus 52 for recording the contents supplied
from the service provider 3 in an inserted recording medium 80 such
as an optical disk and a semiconductor memory and reproducing the
recording media is composed of a communication section 71, an upper
controller 72, an encryption processing section 73, an extension
section 74, a small storage section 75, a record reproduction
section 76, inputting means 77, displaying means 78, an external
memory 79 and a recording medium 80. Since the communication
section 71 has the same function as the communication section 61,
its description is omitted. Since the upper controller 72 has the
same function as the upper controller 62, its description is
omitted. Since the encryption processing section 73 has the same
function as the encryption processing section 65, its description
is omitted. Since the extension section 74 has the same function as
the extension section 66, its description is omitted. Although the
small storage section 75 has the same function as the mass storage
section 68, contents themselves are not stored and only the public
key certificate, the registration information or the like are
stored. The record reproduction section 76 has the recording medium
80 such as an optical disk and a semiconductor memory inserted
therein, records contents in the recording medium 80 and output the
read out contents to the extension section. Since the inputting
means 77 has the same function as the inputting means 63, its
description is omitted. Since the displaying means 78 has the same
function as the displaying means 64, its description is omitted.
Since the external memory 79 has the same function as the external
memory 67, its description is omitted. The recording medium 80 is,
for example, an MD (Mini Disk: trademark) or a storage medium
exclusively used for electronic distribution (Memory Stick using a
semiconductor memory: trademark).
[0279] A portable apparatus 53 that is carries by a user to
reproduce and enjoy music is composed of a communication section
81, an upper controller 82, an encryption processing section 83, an
extension section 84 and an external memory 85. Since the
communication section 81 has the same function as the communication
section 61, its description is omitted. Since the upper controller
82 has the same function as the upper controller 62, its
description is omitted. Since the encryption processing section 83
has the same function as the encryption processing section 65, its
description is omitted. Since the extension section 84 has the same
function as the extension section 66, its description is omitted.
Since the external memory 85 has the same function as the external
memory 67, its description is omitted. However, these memories are
not limited to a semiconductor memory, and may be any memory such
as an HDD and a rewritable optical disk.
[0280] FIG. 17 illustrates a configuration of the recording media
exclusively for electronic distribution. A recording medium 120 for
storing electronically distributed contents is composed of a
communication section 121, the encryption processing section 122,
and the external memory 123. The communication section 121 performs
transmission and reception of data with the record reproduction
section 76 of the fixed apparatus 52 (FIG. 15). Since the
encryption processing section 122 for mutually authenticating with
the fixed apparatus 52, being assigned the content utilization
right, performing decryption/encryption of predetermined data,
managing the external memory holding the content key K.sub.co, the
license conditions information and the like, and storing the save
key K.sub.save or the like has a configuration having the same
function as the encryption processing section 65, its description
is omitted. The external memory 123 stores the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the save key K.sub.save, contents encrypted by the
content key K.sub.co, the license condition information providing
conditions for use of the contents, a handling policy, if
necessary, and price information.
[0281] The recording media exclusively for electronic distribution
120 has a method of using different from the recording medium
described for the fixed apparatus 52. While the ordinary recording
medium 80 is a substitute for the mass storage section 68, the
recording medium exclusively for electronic distribution 120 is not
different from a portable apparatus that does not have the
extension section. Therefore, although an apparatus such as the
fixed apparatus 52 having the extension section 74 is necessary
when reproducing contents, the recording medium exclusively for
electronic distribution 120 can perform processing similar to that
of the home server 51 or the portable apparatus 53 concerning the
function for managing the contents or the like. Due to these
differences, while contents recorded in the ordinary recording
medium 80 cannot be reproduced by an apparatus other than the one
that has recorded the same, contents recorded in the recording
medium exclusively for electronic distribution 120 can be
reproduced by an apparatus other than the one that has recorded the
same. That is, since the ordinary recording medium 80 only has
contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co, the contents cannot
be reproduced by an apparatus other than the one that has (has
recorded) the content key K.sub.co. On the other hand, since the
recording medium exclusively for electronic distribution 120
retains not only the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co
but also the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key
K.sub.save peculiar to the recording medium exclusively for
electronic distribution, the contents can be reproduced by other
apparatuses.
[0282] That is, after performing mutual authentication between the
mutual authentication module 128 of the encryption processing
section 122 and the mutual authentication module (not shown) of the
encryption processing section 73, the recording medium exclusively
for electronic distribution 120 decrypts the content key K.sub.co
by the save key K.sub.save3, encrypts the content key K.sub.co by
the shared temporary key K.sub.temp to transmit to the encryption
processing section 73 for reproducing.
[0283] FIG. 18 is a block diagram illustrating a data recording
state in each apparatus. In the home server 51, an individual ID
for specifying an apparatus (identical with the one for specifying
the encryption processing section), an ID for settlement to be used
for charge processing (which can be substituted by the individual
ID, if necessary, or may be unnecessary because it is in the
registration information), a secret key different for each
apparatus, the save key K.sub.save, the public key of the
electronic distribution service center 1 to be used when mutually
authenticating with the electronic distribution service center 1
(unnecessary if there is the public key certificate of the
electronic distribution service center 1), the public key of the
authentication station 22 for verifying the public key certificate,
and the common key to be used when mutually authenticating with the
extension section 66 are stored in the storage module 92 in the
encryption processing section 65. These data are data that are
stored in advance when an apparatus is manufactured. On the other
hand, the delivery key K.sub.d to be periodically distributed from
the electronic distribution service center 1, the charge
information to be written upon the purchase processing, the content
key K.sub.co held in the external memory 67, and the hash value for
tamper checking of the license conditions information are data that
are stored after starting use an apparatus, and are also stored in
the storage module 92. The individual ID for specifying the
extension section and the common key to be used when mutually
authenticating with the encryption processing section 65 are stored
in the storage module 106 in the extension section 66 in advance
when an apparatus is manufactured. Further, since the encryption
processing section 65 and the extension section 66 are associated
one to one, IDs of each section may be held by respective storage
modules (since the mutual authentication is performed by the common
key, as a result, communication can only be made between the
corresponding encryption processing section and the extension
section associated with each other. However, processing may be the
mutual authentication of the public key encryption method. In this
case, a stored key is not the common key, but the secret key
peculiar to the extension section 66).
[0284] The content key K.sub.co that is encrypted by the save key
K.sub.save to be used when contents are decrypted, and the license
conditions information indicating conditions for utilizing the
content key K.sub.co are stored in the external memory 67. In
addition, the certificate (the public key certificate of an
apparatus) of the public key corresponding to the secret key for
each apparatus in the storage module 92, the registration
information, the content provider secure container (contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and its signature, the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i and
its signature, the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery
key K.sub.d and its signature, and the handling policy and its
signature), the service provider secure container (the price
information and its signature), the public key certificate of the
content provider 2, and the public key certificate of the service
provider 3 are stored in the mass storage section 68.
[0285] The encryption processing section 83 that is identical with
the encryption processing section 65 held by the home server 51 and
the external memory 85 that is identical with the external memory
67 are provided in the portable apparatus 53 (the one having the
identical internal data is omitted, e.g., the extension section).
However, data to be stored inside these memories is slightly
different as shown in the figure. As the data retained by the
storage module in the encryption processing section 83, the
individual ID for specifying an apparatus, the secret key that is
different for each apparatus, the save key K.sub.save, the public
key of the electronic distribution service center 1 to be used when
mutually authenticating with the electronic distribution service
center 1 (however, it is not necessary to have the home server 51
to perform all the procedures with the electronic distribution
service center 1 on its behalf), the public key of the
authentication station 22 for verifying the public key certificate,
and the common key to be used when mutually authenticating with the
extension section 84 are stored. These data are data that are
stored in advance when an apparatus is manufactured. In addition,
the hash value for checking tamper of the content key K.sub.co and
the license conditions information to be retained in the external
memory 85, the ID for settlement, if necessary, the delivery key
K.sub.d, and (a part of) the registration information (if the
purchase processing is not performed, the ID for settlement and the
delivery key K.sub.d are not necessary) are data to be stored after
starting an apparatus, which are also stored (if the purchase
processing is performed, the charge information is stored as well).
The certificate of the public key corresponding to the secret key
for each apparatus in the encryption processing section 83, the
contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and its signature
(in addition, in some cases, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the individual key K.sub.i and its signature, if necessary, the
individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d and
its signature, the handling policy and its signature, if necessary,
and the price information and its signature are also stored), the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save to be
used for decrypting the contents, the license conditions
information indicating conditions for utilizing the contents are
stored in the external memory 85. A public key certificate for the
content provider 2 and the public key certificate for the service
provider 3 are also stored, if necessary.
[0286] The recording medium 80 is provided in the fixed apparatus
52 in addition to the configuration of the home server 51. The
recording medium 80 may be an ordinary MD or CD-R, or may be a
storage medium exclusively for electronic distribution. In the
former case, although data to be stored is decrypted contents with
a copy prohibit signal added, encrypted contents may be naturally
included (the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key
K.sub.save may be stored together. Then, only an apparatus that
stores the contents can reproduce the contents. This is because the
save key K.sub.save is different for each apparatus).
[0287] In addition, as the storage medium, FIG. 19 is possible. In
the storage medium exclusively for electronic distribution 120, the
individual ID of the recording medium, the secret key different for
each recording medium, the public key certificate corresponding to
the secret key (which may be recorded in the external memory 123),
the save key K.sub.save to be used for encrypting the content key
K.sub.co (which are generally different for each storage medium),
the public key of the electronic distribution service center 1
(which is not required if there is not communication with the
center or if the public key certificate of the electronic
distribution service center 1 exists in the external memory 123),
the public key of the authentication station, the hash value for
inspecting tamper of the external memory 123, and (a part of) the
registration information are stored in a storage module 125 in the
encryption processing section 122. The contents encrypted by the
content key K.sub.co (and its signature), and the content key
K.sub.co and the license conditions information encrypted by the
save key K.sub.save are stored in the external memory 123, and the
handling policy (and its signature), the price information (and its
signature), the public key certificate of the content provider 2,
and the public key certificate of the service provider 3 are also
stored, if necessary.
[0288] FIGS. 20 and 21 are drawings for illustrating information to
be transmitted and received among the electronic distribution
service center 1, the content provider 2, the service provider 3,
and the user home network 5. The content provider 2 adds the public
key certificate (whose details will be described later) of the
content provider 2 to the content provider secure container (whose
details will be described later) and sends it to the service
provider 3. In addition, the content provider 2 transmits the
handling policy and its signature, and the certificate of the
content provider 2 to the electronic distribution service center 1,
if necessary.
[0289] The service provider 3 verifies the public key certificate
of the content provider 2, obtains the public key of the content
provider 2, and verifies the signature of the received content
provider secure container (in some cases, verifies only the
handling policy). After successfully verifying the signature, the
service provider 3 takes out the handling policy from the content
provider secure container, and generates the price information
based on the handing policy, and makes it the service provider
secure container by adding the signature to the price information
(details will be described later). The content provider secure
container, the service provider secure container, the public key
certificate of the content provider 2, and the public key
certificate of the service provider 3 (whose details will be
described later) are transmitted to the user home network 5. In
addition, the service provider 3 transmits the price information
and its signature, and the public key certificate of the service
provider 3 to the electronic distribution service center 1, if
necessary.
[0290] After verifying the received secure containers, the user
home network 5 performs the purchase processing based on the
handling policy and the price information included in the secure
containers, generates the charge information to store in the
storage module in the encryption processing section, generates the
license conditions information, decrypts the content key K.sub.co
and re-encrypts the same by the save key K.sub.save, and stores the
license conditions information and the re-encrypted content key
K.sub.co in the external memory 67. Then, the user home network 5
decodes the content key K.sub.co by the save key K.sub.save along
the license conditions information, and decrypts the contents by
the key to utilize. The charge information is encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp at a predetermined timing, added a
signature, and transmitted to the electronic distribution service
center 1 together with the handling policy and the price
information, if necessary.
[0291] The electronic distribution service center 1 calculates
usage fees based on the charge information and the price
information, and calculates profits of each of the electronic
distribution service center 1, the content provider 2 and the
service provider 3. The electronic distribution service center 1
further compares the handling policy received from the content
provider 2, the price information and the handling policy, if
necessary, received from the service provider 3, and the handling
policy and the price information received from the user home
network 5, and monitors whether or not illegality such as tampering
of the handling policy or illegal addition of prices has occurred
in the service provider 3 or the user home network 5.
[0292] Moreover, the electronic distribution service center 1
transmits the public key certificate of the content provider to the
content provider 2, and transmits the public key certificate of the
service provider to the served provider 3. In addition, since the
public key certificate prepared according to each apparatus is
embedded in each apparatus when the apparatus is shipped from a
factory, the electronic distribution service center 1 transfers the
data concerning the public key certificate of each apparatus to the
factory.
[0293] FIG. 22 illustrates the content provider secure container.
The content provider secure container 1A includes the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and its signature, the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i and
its signature, the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery
key K.sub.d and its signature, and the handling policy and its
signature. The signature is data generated by applying the secret
key K.sub.scp of the content provider 2 to a hash value generated
by applying the hash function to each piece of data. Further,
although a signature is generated separately for each of the key
data (the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key
K.sub.i and the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery
key K.sub.d) and added in the case of FIG. 22, each piece of key
data (the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key
K.sub.i and the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery
key K.sub.d) may be consolidated into one, and one signature may be
generated for the consolidated data and added. By consolidating the
key data to be always used together into one and adding a signature
to the consolidated data, one verification of the signature is
sufficient.
[0294] FIG. 23 illustrates another example of the content provider
secure container. The content provider secure container 1B includes
the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and its
signature, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key
K.sub.i and its signature, and a handling policy and its
signature.
[0295] FIG. 24 illustrates another example of the content provider
secure container. The content provide secure container 1C includes
the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co, the content key
K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i, the individual
key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d, a handling
policy and signatures. The signature is data generated by applying
the secret key K.sub.scp of the content provider 2 to a hash value
generated by applying a hash function to the contents encrypted by
the content key K.sub.co, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
individual key K.sub.i, the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the
delivery key K.sub.d, and a handling policy.
[0296] FIG. 25 illustrates another example of the content provider
secure container. The content provider secure container 1D includes
the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co, the content key
K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i, a handling policy
and signatures. The signature is data generated by applying the
secret key K.sub.scp of the content provider 2 to a hash value
generated by applying a hash function to the contents encrypted by
the content key K.sub.co, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
individual key K.sub.i, and a handling policy.
[0297] FIG. 26 illustrates the public key certificate of the
content provider 2. The public key certificate 2A of the content
provider 2 includes a version number of the public key certificate,
a serial number of the public key certificate to be allocated to
the content provider 2 by the authentication station, an algorithm
and a parameter used for the signature, a name of the
authentication station, an effective period of the public key
certificate, a name of the content provider 2, the public key
K.sub.pcp of the content provider 2, and signatures. The signature
is data generated by applying the secret key K.sub.sca of the
authentication station to a hash value generated by applying a hash
function to the version number of the public key certificate, a
serial number of the public key certificate to be allocated to the
content provider 2 by the authentication station, an algorithm and
a parameter used for the signature, a name of the authentication
station, an effective period of the public key certificate, and a
name of the content provider 2, the public key K.sub.pcp of the
content provider 2.
[0298] FIG. 27 illustrates another example of the public key
certificate of the content provider 2. The public key certificate
2B of the content provider 2 includes a version number of the
public key certificate, a serial number of the public key
certificate to be allocated to the content provider 2 by the
authentication station, an algorithm and a parameter used for the
signature, a name of the authentication station, an effective
period of the public key certificate, a name of the content
provider 2, the public key K.sub.pcp of the content provider 2, the
individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d, and
signatures. The signature is data generated by applying the secret
key K.sub.sca of the authentication station to a hash value
generated by applying a hash function to a version number of the
public key certificate, a serial number of the public key
certificate to be allocated to the content provider 2 by the
authentication station, an algorithm and a parameter used for the
signature, a name of the authentication station, an effective
period of the public key certificate, a name of the content
provider 2, the public key K.sub.pcp of the content provider 2, and
the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key
K.sub.d.
[0299] FIG. 28 illustrates yet another example of the public key
certificate of the content provider 2. The public key certificate
2B of the content provider 2 includes a version number of the
public key certificate, a serial number of the public key
certificate to be allocated to the content provider 2 by the
authentication station, an algorithm and a parameter used for the
signature, a name of the authentication station, an effective
period of the public key certificate, a name of the content
provider 2, the public key K.sub.pcp of the content provider 2, a
predetermined type of data that is a part of the individual key
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d, and signatures. The
signature is data generated by applying the secret key K.sub.sca of
the authentication station to a hash value generated by applying a
hash function to a version number of the public key certificate, a
serial number of the public key certificate to be allocated to the
content provider 2 by the authentication station, an algorithm and
an parameter used for the signature, a name of the authentication
station, an effective period of the public key certificate, a name
of the content provider 2, the public key K.sub.pcp of the content
provider 2, and a predetermined type of data that is a part of the
individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d.
[0300] FIG. 29 illustrates the service provider secure container.
The service provider secure container 3A is comprised of price
information and signatures. The signature is data generated by
applying the secret key K.sub.ssp of the service provider 3 to a
hash value generated by applying a hash function to price
information, if necessary.
[0301] FIG. 30 illustrates another example of the service provider
secure container. The service provider secure container 3B includes
the content provider secure container, price information and
signatures. The signature is data generated by applying the secret
key K.sub.ssp of the service provider 3 to a hash value generated
by applying a hash function to the content provider secure
container and the price information.
[0302] FIG. 31 illustrates the public key certificate of the
service provider 3. The public key certificate 4A of the service
provider 3 includes a version number of the public key certificate,
a serial number of the public key certificate to be allocated to
the content provider 3 by the authentication station, an algorithm
and a parameter used for the signature, a name of the
authentication station, an effective period of the public key
certificate, a name of the service provider 3, the public key
K.sub.pcp of the service provider 3, and signatures. The signature
is data generated by applying the secret key K.sub.sca of the
authentication station to a hash value generated by applying a hash
function to a version number of the public key certificate, a
serial number of the public key certificate to be allocated to the
service provider 3 by the authentication station, an algorithm and
a parameter used for the signature, a name of the authentication
station, an effective period of the public key certificate, and a
name of the service provider 3, the public key K.sub.pcp of the
service provider 3.
[0303] FIG. 32 illustrates the public key certificate of the user
apparatus. The public key certificate 5A of the user apparatus
includes a version number of the public key certificate, a serial
number of the public key certificate to be allocated to the user
apparatus (more precisely the encryption processing section (a
exclusive use ticket)) by the authentication station, an algorithm
and a parameter used for the signature, a name of the
authentication station, an effective period of the public key
certificate, a name of the user apparatus, the public key K.sub.pu
of the user apparatus, and the signatures. The signature is data
generated by applying the secret key K.sub.sca of the
authentication station to a hash value generated by applying a hash
function to the version number of the public key certificate, a
serial number of the public key certificate to be allocated to the
user apparatus by the authentication station, an algorithm and a
parameter used for the signature, a name of the authentication
station, an effective period of the public key certificate, and a
name of the user apparatus, the public key K.sub.pu of the user
apparatus.
[0304] FIGS. 33 and 34 shows a data format of a handling policy
that is generated for each single content or album content by the
content provider 2 and shows contents of a utilization right
purchasable by the user home network 5.
[0305] In the data of the handling policy for the single content
(FIG. 33), a type of the data, a type of the handling policy, an
effective period of the handling policy, an ID of the contents, an
ID of the content provider, an ID of the handling policy, a version
of the handling policy, a regional code, usable apparatus
conditions, usable user conditions, an ID of the service provider,
generation management information, the number of rules including
the purchasable utilization right indicated by the handling policy,
address information indicating the storage position of the rules,
the rules stored in the position indicated by the address
information, the public key certificate and signatures.
[0306] The rule is composed of a rule number given as a serial
number for each utilization right, a utilization right content
number indicating the utilization right contents, its parameter, a
minimum sales price, a profit amount of the content provider, a
profit ratio of the content provider, a data size, and transmission
information.
[0307] In addition, data of a handling policy for the album
contents (FIG. 34), a type of data, a type of the handling policy,
an effective period of the handling policy, an ID of the album, a
version of the handling policy, an ID of the contents, an ID of the
content provider, an ID of the handling policy, a version of the
handling policy, a regional code, usable apparatus conditions,
usable user conditions, an ID of the service provider, the number
of a handling policy of single contents forming the album, address
information indicating a storing position of the handling policy of
the single content, a data packet of the handling policy of the
single content stored in the position indicated by the address
information, generation management information, the number of rules
including the purchasable utilization right indicated by the
handling policy, address information indicating the storage
position of the rules, the rules stored in the position indicated
by the address information, the public key certificate and
signatures.
[0308] Further, similar to the rule of the handling policy of the
single content, the rules is composed of a rule number given as a
serial number for each utilization right, a utilization right
content number indicating the utilization right contents, its
parameter, a minimum sales price, a profit amount of the content
provider, a profit ratio of the content provider, a data size, and
transmission information.
[0309] In these a handling policy, a type of data indicates that
the data is the data of a handling policy, and a type of the
handling policy indicates which of single or album contents the
handling policy is. The effective period of the handling policy
indicates a usage period of the handling policy by a date on which
the period expires, or by the number of days from a date to be a
basis when the use has started to a data when the period expires.
An ID of the contents and an ID of the album indicates the
purchasable single contents or album contents indicated by the
handling policy, an ID of the content provider indicates the ID of
the content provider 2 that has provided for the handling
policy.
[0310] In addition, an ID of the handling policy is for identifying
the handling policy, and is used, for example, for identifying the
handling policy in the case in which a plurality of a handling
policy are set for identical contents. A version of the handling
policy indicates revision information of a policy that is revised
according to a use period. Therefore, the handling policy is
managed by the ID of the handling policy and the version of the
handling policy.
[0311] A regional code indicates a region where a handling policy
is usable by coding the region, and can assign a code indicating a
specific region limiting regions where the handling policy is
usable and a code that can make the handling policy usable in all
the regions to the regional code. Usable apparatus conditions
indicate conditions of an apparatus that can utilize the handling
policy, and usable user conditions indicate conditions of a user
who can utilize the handling policy.
[0312] An ID of a service provider indicates an ID of a service
provider 3 that utilizes a handling policy, and the ID of the
service provider includes an ID of a specific service provider 3
limiting a service provider 3 that can use the handling policy and
an ID that makes the handling policy usable for a plurality of
(all) the service providers.
[0313] Moreover, generation management information indicates a
maximum number of times contents can be re-purchased. A signature
is affixed to the entirety ranging from a type of data to a public
key certificate excluding the signature from a handling policy. An
algorithm and a parameter used in preparing the signature and a key
to be used for verification of the signature are included in the
public key certificate. In addition, in rules, a utilization right
content number is a number added for each utilization right
content, and a parameter indicates a parameter of right contents. A
minimum sales price indicates a minimum sales price in selling
single or album contents according to the utilization right
contents, a profit amount and a profit ratio of a content provider
indicates an amount of a profit that a content provider 2 can
obtain when the single contents and the album contents are
purchased, and a profit ratio to the sales price. A data size
indicates data size of transmission information, and the
transmission information consists of a point to be added to a user
through a purchase of the utilization right set by the content
provider 2, mileage information made up of a discount amount of the
utilization right according to the point, and various kinds of
information set by the content provider 2, if necessary.
[0314] Here, in the handling policy of the album contents, a
plurality of rules indicate a purchase form of the album. In
addition, in a handling policy of a plurality of single contents
stored in the handling policy of the album contents, rules stored
in the handling policy indicate a purchase form of the single
contents in the album such as a form in which respective
corresponding single contents can be independently purchased as a
single tune out of the album, or a form in which respective
corresponding single contents can be purchased as an album tune
only (that is, can only be purchased together with other single
contents as an album).
[0315] Therefore, in a handling policy of album contents, it is
defined such that either of album contents or single contents that
can be soled as a single tune can be selected to be purchased in
the manner in which the album contents are purchased based on rules
of the handling policy and the single contents are purchased as a
single tune.
[0316] In addition, in a handling policy of album contents, with
the addition of a signature to the entire album contents, tamper or
the like can be checked for a handling policy of each single
content as well together with the handling policy of the album
contents simply by verifying the signature without respectively
verifying the handling policy of the single contents stored in the
handling policy, hence, the verification of a signature can be
thereby simplified.
[0317] Incidentally, in a handling policy of single and album
contents, presence or absence of a verification of a signature can
be stored, if necessary, which indicates whether or not the
verification of a signature is executed to the contents. This is
because the verification of a signature takes time, and, if
information on presence or absence of the verification of a
signature with respect to a handling policy is stored, makes the
verification of a signature of contents to be executed or not to be
executed according to the information.
[0318] In addition, in a handling policy of album contents,
although it stores a handling policy of a plurality of single
contents forming the album, it may not store a handling policy of
the plurality of single contents.
[0319] Moreover, in a handling policy of single and album contents,
since a profit amount and a profit ratio of a content provider can
be managed altogether by the electronic distribution service center
1, the handling policy can be formed excluding the profit amount
and the profit ratio of the content provider.
[0320] FIGS. 37 and 38 illustrate a data format of price
information, and the price information is generated for each a
handling policy of single contents to be given by a content
provider 2 and for each a handling policy of album contents in a
service provider 3, and indicates a price of the single contents
and the album contents.
[0321] In the data of the handling policy for the single content
(FIG. 37), a type of the data, a type of the price information, an
effective period of the price information, an ID of the contents,
an ID of the service provider, an ID of the price information, a
version of the price information, a regional code, usable apparatus
conditions, usable user conditions, an ID of the content provider,
an ID of the handling policy to which the price information is
added, the number of rules including the purchasable utilization
right indicated by the price information, address information
indicating the storage position of the rules, the rules stored in
the position indicated by the address information, the public key
certificate and signatures.
[0322] The rule is composed of a rule number given as a serial
number for each utilization right, a profit amount of the service
provider, a profit ratio of the service provider, a price, a data
size, and transmission information.
[0323] In addition, in the data of the handling policy for the
single content (FIG. 38), a type of the data, a type of the price
information, an effective period of the price information, an ID of
the album, an ID of the service provider, an ID of the price
information, a version of the price information, a regional code,
usable apparatus conditions, usable user conditions, an ID of the
content provider, an ID of the handling policy to which the price
information is added, the number of pieces of price information of
single contents forming the album, address information indicating a
storage position of the price information of the single contents, a
data packet of the price information of the single contents stored
in the position indicated by the address information, the number of
rules including the purchasable utilization right indicated by the
price information, address information indicating the storage
position of the rules, the rules stored in the position indicated
by the address information, the public key certificate and
signatures.
[0324] Similar to the rule of the price information for the single
contents, the rule is composed of a rule number given as a serial
number for each utilization right, a profit amount of the service
provider, a profit ratio of the service provider, a price, a data
size, and transmission information.
[0325] In the above-mentioned price information, a type of data
indicates that the data is the data of price information, and a
type of the price information indicates which of single or album
contents the price information is. The effective period of the
price information indicates a usage period of the price information
by a date on which the period expires, or by the number of days
from a date to be a basis when the use has started to a data when
the period expires. An ID of the contents and an ID of the album
indicates the purchasable single contents or album contents
indicated by the price information, an ID of the service provider
indicates the ID of the service provider 3 that has prepared the
price information.
[0326] In addition, an ID of the price information is for
identifying the price information, and is used, for example, for
identifying the price information in the case in which a plurality
of pieces of price information are set for identical contents. A
version of the price information indicates revision information of
price information that is revised according to a use period.
Therefore, the price information is managed by the ID of the price
information and the version of the price information.
[0327] A regional code indicates a region where price information
is usable by coding the region, and can assign a code indicating a
specific region limiting regions where the price information is
usable and a code that can make the price information usable in all
the regions to the regional code. Usable apparatus conditions
indicate conditions of an apparatus that can utilize the price
information, and usable user conditions indicate conditions of a
user who can utilize the price information. An ID of a content
provide indicates an ID of a content provider 2 that has provided
for a handling policy to which the price information is added. An
ID of the handling policy is for identifying the handling policy to
which the price information is added.
[0328] Moreover, a signature is affixed to the entirety ranging
from a type of data to a public key certificate excluding the
signature from price information. An algorithm and a parameter used
in preparing the signature and a key to be used for verification of
the signature are included in the public key certificate.
[0329] In addition, in rules, a rule number uses a rule number of a
rule indicated by a corresponding a handling policy as it is. A
profit amount and a profit ratio of a service provider indicates an
amount of profit that a service provider 3 can obtain when single
contents and album contents are purchased and a profit ration to a
price, and the price indicates a sales price of the single contents
and the album contents that are set by the service provider 3 based
on utilization right contents and a corresponding minimum sales
price. A data size indicates data size of transmission information,
and the transmission information consists of a point to be added to
a user through a purchase of the utilization right set by the
service provider 3, mileage information made up of a discount
amount of the utilization right according to the point, and various
kinds of information set by the service provider 3, if
necessary.
[0330] Here, when generating price information, the service
provider 3 can set all the purchasable utilization right indicated
by a corresponding a handling policy as a purchasable right
indicated by the price information, and at the same time, can set a
utilization right arbitrary selected out of all the purchasable
utilization right indicated by the handling policy, thus, can
select a utilization right provided for by the content provider
2.
[0331] In addition, in price information of album contents, a
plurality of rules provides for a sales price corresponding to a
purchase form of an album. Further, in price information of a
plurality of single contents stored in the price information of the
album contents, rules of price information of single contents that
can be soled as a single tune provides for a sales price of single
contents that can be sold as the single tune.
[0332] Therefore, in price information of album contents, the price
information is made such that a sales price of an album and a sales
price of single contents that can be sold as a single tune can be
recognized by one piece of the price information.
[0333] In addition, in price information of album contents, with
the addition of a signature to the entire album contents, tamper or
the like can be checked for price information of each single
content as well together with the price information of the album
contents simply by verifying the signature without respectively
verifying the signature of price information of the single contents
stored in the price information, hence, the verification of a
signature can be thereby simplified.
[0334] Incidentally, in price information of a single and an album,
presence or absence of a verification of a signature with respect
to contents as in the above-mentioned a handling policy concerning
FIGS. 33 and 34. In addition, in price information of album
contents, although it stores price information of a plurality of
single contents forming the album, it may not store price
information of the plurality of single contents.
[0335] Moreover, in price information of single and album contents,
since a profit amount and a profit ratio of a service provider can
be managed altogether by the electronic distribution service center
1, the price information may be formed excluding the profit amount
and the profit ratio of the service provider.
[0336] FIG. 41 illustrates a data format of license conditions
information, and the license conditions information is prepared,
when a user purchases contents, based on a handling policy of the
purchased contents in an apparatus in the user home network 5, and
indicates utilization right contents selected by the user among
utilization right contents indicated by the handling policy.
[0337] In data of license conditions information, a type of data, a
type of license conditions information, an effective period of the
license conditions information, an ID of contents, an ID of an
album, an ID of an encryption processing section, an ID of a user,
an ID of a content provider, an ID of a handling policy, version of
the handling policy, an ID of a service provider, an ID of price
information, a version of price information, an ID of license
conditions information, a rule number attached to a reproduction
right (utilization right) as a serial number, a utilization right
content number, a remaining number of time of reproduction, an
effective period of the reproduction right, a rule number attached
to a copying right (utilization right) as a serial number, a
utilization right content number, a remaining number of times of
copying, generation management information, and an ID of an
encryption section having a reproduction right are stored.
[0338] In license conditions information, a type of data indicates
that the data is data of the license conditions information, a type
of license conditions information indicates whether the license
conditions information is license conditions information of single
contents or album contents. An effective period of license
conditions information indicates a usage period of the license
conditions information by a data when the period expires, the
number of days from a day to be a basis of start using until a data
when the period expires.
[0339] An ID indicating purchased single contents is described in
an ID of contents, and an ID indicating an album is described in an
ID of an album only when the album is purchased. In fact, if
contents are purchased as a single, the ID indicating the purchased
single contents is described in an ID of the contents, and if
contents are purchased as an album, IDs of all the single contents
forming the album are described in the ID of contents and an ID
indicating the purchased album is described in the ID of an album.
Therefore, just looking at the ID of an album, whether purchased
contents are a single or an album can be easily determined.
[0340] An ID of an encryption processing section indicates an
encryption processing section of an apparatus in the user home
network 5 that performed purchase processing of contents. When an
apparatus in the user home network 5 that purchased contents is
shared by a plurality of users, an ID of a user indicates a
plurality of users sharing an apparatus.
[0341] In addition, an ID of a content provider indicates an ID of
a content provider 2 that has provider for a handling policy used
for preparing license conditions information, and an ID of a
handling policy indicates a handling policy used for preparing the
license conditions information. An version of a handling policy
indicates revision information of a handling policy used for
preparing license conditions information. An ID of a service
provider indicates an ID of a service provider 3 that has prepared
price information used for preparing license conditions
information, and an ID of price information indicates price
information used for preparing the license conditions information.
A version of price information indicates revision information of a
handling policy used for preparing license conditions information.
Therefore, a content provider 2 or a service provider 3 that has
provided contents purchased by a user can be found by the ID of a
content provider, the ID of a handling policy, the version of a
handling policy, the ID of a service provider, the ID of price
information and the version of price information.
[0342] An ID of license conditions information is attached by an
encryption processing section of an apparatus in a user home
network 5 that has purchased contents, and is used for identifying
the license conditions information. A rule number of a reproduction
right indicates a serial number attached to a reproduction right
among a utilization right, and uses a rule number of a rule
indicated by a corresponding handling policy or price information
as it is. Utilization right contents indicate contents of a
reproduction right to be described later. A remaining number of
times of reproduction indicates a remaining number of times of
reproduction among a number of times of reproduction set in advance
to contents, and an effective period of a reproduction right
indicates a corresponding reproduction available period of
purchased contents by a date and time when the period expires.
[0343] In addition, a rule number of a copying right indicates a
serial number attached to a copying right among a utilization
right, and uses a rule number of a rule indicated by a
corresponding handling policy and price information as it is.
Utilization right contents indicate contents of a copying right to
be described later. A remaining number of times of copying
indicates a remaining number of times of copying among a number of
times of copying set in advance to purchased contents.
[0344] Moreover, generation management information indicates, when
contents are re-purchased, a remaining number of times the contents
can be re-purchased. An ID of an encryption processing section
having a reproduction right indicates an encryption processing
section having a reproduction right at the current time, and when
management is shifted, an ID of an encryption processing section
having a reproduction right is changed.
[0345] Incidentally, in license conditions information, an
effective period may be provided for with respect to a copying
right, and when the effective period is provided for, a period for
purchased contents in which copying is available is indicated by a
date and time when the period expires, or the like.
[0346] FIG. 42 indicates charge information, and the charge
information is generated, when contents are purchased, by an
apparatus in the user home network 5 based on a handling policy and
price information corresponding to the contents.
[0347] In data of charge information, a type of data, an ID of an
encryption processing section, an ID of a user, an ID of contents,
an ID of a content provider, an ID of a handling policy, a version
of a handling policy, an ID of a service provider, an ID of price
information, a version of price information, an ID of license
conditions information, a rule number, a profit amount and a profit
ratio of a content provider 2, a profit amount and a profit ratio
of a service provider, generation management information, a data
size of transmission information set by a content provider, the
transmission information set by the content provider, a data size
of transmission information set by a service provider, transmission
information set by the service provider, and an ID of a
supplier.
[0348] In charge information, a type of data indicates that the
data is charge information, and an ID executes purchase processing
of contents and indicates an encryption processing section of an
apparatus that has generated the charge information. When a
plurality of users share an apparatus in a user home network 5 that
has purchased the contents, an ID of a user indicates a plurality
of users who share the apparatus, and ID of contents indicates the
purchased contents (single contents and album contents).
[0349] In addition, an ID of a content provider indicates an ID of
a content provider 2 that has provided for a handling policy used
for a purchase processing (an ID of a content provider included in
the handling policy), and an ID of a handling policy indicates a
handling policy used for the purchase processing. A version of a
handling policy indicates revision information of a handling policy
used for purchase processing. An ID of a service provider indicates
an ID of a service provider 3 that has prepared price information
used for purchase processing (an ID of a service provider included
in the price information), and an ID of price information indicates
price information used for the purchase processing. A version of
price information indicates revision information of price
information used for purchase processing.
[0350] An ID of license conditions information indicates an ID of
license conditions information that has been prepared upon purchase
processing, and a rule number indicates a rule number attached to a
purchased utilization right as a serial number. A profit amount and
a profit ratio of a content provider indicate an amount of dividend
that is distributed to a content provider 2 through purchase of
contents and its ratio to sales, and a profit amount and a profit
ratio of a service provider indicate an amount of dividend that is
distributed to a service provider 3 through purchase of contents
and its ratio to sales.
[0351] Moreover, generation management information indicates a
generation of purchased contents. In addition, a data size
indicating a handling policy used for purchase processing and
transmission information are stored as they are in a data size of
transmission information set by a content provider and the
transmission information set by the content provider, and a data
size indicating price information used for purchase processing and
transmission information are stored as they are in a data size of
transmission information set by a service provider and the
transmission information set by the service provider. An ID of a
supplier indicates an apparatus of a supplier that has applied
purchase processing, and the ID is accumulated every time
re-purchase of contents is conducted.
[0352] Incidentally, in charge information, since a profit amount
and a profit ratio of a content provider and a profit amount and a
profit ratio of a service provider may be managed altogether by the
electronic distribution service center 1, the charge information
may be formed excluding the profit amount and the profit ratio of
the content provider as shown in FIG. 43.
[0353] FIG. 44 shows contents of a purchasable utilization right,
and as the utilization right, there are roughly a reproduction
right, a copying right, a right content changing right, a
re-purchase right, an additional purchase right, and a management
transfer right.
[0354] The reproduction right includes an unlimited reproduction
right that does not have limitations on a period or the number of
times of reproduction, a reproduction right with a period
limitation that limits a reproduction period, a reproduction right
with a cumulating time limitation that limits cumulating time of
reproduction, and a reproduction right with a number of times
limitation that limits the number of times of reproduction. The
copying right includes an unlimited copying right without a period
limitation, a number of times limitation and copy management
information (e.g., the serial copy management: SCMS), a copying
right with a number of times limitation and without copy management
information that limits the number of times of copying but does not
have copy management information, a copying right with copy
management information that does not have a period limitation and a
number of times limitation but adds and provides copy management
information, and a copying right with a number of times limitation
and copy management information that limits the number of times of
copying, and adds and provides copy management information.
Incidentally, in addition to the above, as a copying right, there
are a copying right with a period limitation that limits a copy
available period (including the one that adds copy management
information and the one that does not add the copy management
information), and a copying right with a cumulating time limitation
that limits a cumulating time of copying (i.e., a cumulating time
required for reproduction of copied contents) (including the one
that adds copy management information and the one that does not add
the copy management information), and the like.
[0355] In addition, the right contents changing right is a right
for changing contents of a right already purchased to other
contents, and the re-purchase right is a right for separately
purchasing a utilization right based on a right purchased by other
apparatuses as described above. The additional purchase right is a
right for purchasing and adding to independently purchased contents
other contents of an album including the contents, and the
management transfer right is a right for transferring a purchased
right to change an owner.
[0356] An specific example of utilization right contents shown in
FIG. 33, etc. will now be described. In fact, as shown in FIG. 45A,
as data of the unlimited reproduction right, information on an
effective period of a reproduction right that indicates an
effective period of a reproduction right by a date on which the
period expires, or the number of days from a date to be a basis of
starting an effective period until a date on which the period
expires, or the like is stored in a region of utilization right
contents. As shown in FIG. 45B, as data of the reproduction right
with a period limitation, information on an effective period of the
reproduction right that indicates an effective period of a
reproduction right by a date on which the period expires, or the
number of days from a date to be a basis of starting an effective
period until a date on which the period expires, or the like is
stored in a region of utilization right contents.
[0357] As shown in FIG. 45C, as data of the reproduction right with
a cumulating limitation, information on an effective period of the
reproduction right that indicates an effective period of a
reproduction right by a date on which the period expires, or the
number of days from a date to be a basis of starting an effective
period until a date on which the period expires, or the like, and
information on the number of days and time indicating a limitation
of accumulating time contents can be reproduced are stored in a
region of utilization right contents. As shown in FIG. 45D, as data
of the reproduction right with a number of times limitation,
information on an effective period of the reproduction right that
indicates an effective period of a reproduction right by a date on
which the period expires, or the number of days from a date to be a
basis of starting an effective period until a date on which the
period expires, or the like, and information on the number of times
of reproduction indicating the number of times contents can be
reproduced are stored in a region of utilization right
contents.
[0358] In addition, as shown in FIG. 45E, as data of the unlimited
copying right without copy management information, information on
an effective period of the copying right that indicates an
effective period of a copying right by a date on which the period
expires, or the number of days from a date to be a basis of
starting an effective period until a date on which the period
expires, or the like is stored in a region of utilization right
contents. As shown in FIG. 45F, as data of the copying right with a
number of times limitation and without copy management information,
information on an effective period of the copying right that
indicates an effective period of a copying right by a date on which
the period expires, or the number of days from a date to be a basis
of starting an effective period until a date on which the period
expires, or the like, and information on the number of times of
copying that indicates the number of times contents can be copied
are stored in a region of utilization right contents.
[0359] In addition, as shown in FIG. 45G, as data of the copying
right with copy management information, information on an effective
period of the copying right that indicates an effective period of a
copying right by a date on which the period expires, or the number
of days from a date to be a basis of starting an effective period
until a date on which the period expires, or the like is stored in
a region of utilization right contents. As shown in FIG. 45H, as
data of the copying right with a number of times limitation and
copy management information, information on an effective period of
the copying right that indicates an effective period of a copying
right by a date on which the period expires, or the number of days
from a date to be a basis of starting an effective period until a
date on which the period expires, or the like, and information on
the number of times of copying that indicates the number of times
contents can be copied are stored in a region of utilization right
contents.
[0360] Moreover, as shown in FIG. 45I, as data of the right
contents changing right, information on an effective period of the
right contents changing right that indicates an effective period of
a right content changing right by a date on which the period
expires, or the number of days from a date to be a basis of
starting an effective period until a date on which the period
expires, or the like, an old rule number for retrieving utilization
right contents before change, and a new rule number for retrieving
utilization right contents after change are stored in a region of
utilization right contents. Incidentally, as utilization right
contents, a plurality of kinds of contents exist for each
utilization right content in one reproduction right with period
limitation as a plurality kinds of reproduction right with period
limitation exist by setting the period. Therefore, since it is
difficult to manage utilization right contents only by a
utilization right contents number, in the right contents changing
right, utilization right contents are managed by a rule number
attached for each of a plurality of contents for each of these
utility right contents.
[0361] As shown in FIG. 45J, as data of the repurchase right,
information on an effective period of the repurchase right that
indicates an effective period of a repurchase right by a date on
which the period expires, or the number of days from a date to be a
basis of starting an effective period until a date on which the
period expires, or the like, an old rule number for retrieving
utilization right contents before repurchase, and a new rule number
for retrieving utilization right contents after repurchase, and
maximum distribution generation information that indicates the
maximum number of times contents can be repurchased are stored in a
region of utilization right contents.
[0362] As shown in FIG. 45K, as data of the additional purchase
right, information on an effective period of the additional
purchase right that indicates an effective period of an additional
purchase right by a date on which the period expires, or the number
of days from a date to be a basis of starting an effective period
until a date on which the period expires, or the like, and a
minimum holding contents number and a maximum holding contents
number indicating single contents already purchased among a
plurality of single contents forming album contents are stored in a
region of utilization right contents.
[0363] As shown in FIG. 45L, as data of the management transfer
right, information on an effective period of the management
transfer right that indicates an effective period of a management
transfer right by a date on which the period expires, or the number
of days from a date to be a basis of starting an effective period
until a date on which the period expires, or the like is stored in
a region of utilization right contents.
[0364] Incidentally, as such utilization right contents, for
example, when data of a game is divided into a plurality of
contents, a contents purchase right for purchasing the contents in
accordance with a predetermined order may be provided for. Further,
as shown in FIG. 45M, as data of the contents purchase right,
information on an effective period of the contents purchase right
that indicates an effective period of a contents purchase right by
a date on which the period expires, or the number of days from a
date to be a basis of starting an effective period until a date on
which the period expires, or the like, an ID of contents already
purchased, an old rule number for retrieving utilization right
contents already purchased, and a new rule number for retrieving
utilization right contents to be purchased anew are stored in a
region of utilization right contents. In this way, a game program
having a series of stories is made to be purchased, and contents
(game) themselves can be upgraded.
[0365] FIG. 46 shows a data format of single contents, and in data
of the single contents, a type of data, a type of contents, an
effective period of contents, a category of contents, an ID of
contents, an ID of a content provider, an encryption method of
contents, a data length of encrypted contents, the encrypted
contents, a public key certificates and a signature are stored.
[0366] In the single contents, the type of data indicates that the
data is data of the contents, and the type of contents indicates
that the contents are a single. The effective period of contents
indicates a distribution period of the contents by a data on which
the period expires, the number of days from a data to be a basis
when distribution is started until the period expires, or the like.
The category of contents indicates whether the contents are music
data, program data, video data, or the like, and the ID of contents
is for identifying the single contents.
[0367] The ID of a content provider indicates an ID of a content
provider 2 having the single contents. The encryption method of
contents indicates an encryption method used for encryption of the
contents (e.g., DES). The signature is attached to the entirety
from the type of data to the public key certificate excluding the
signature from data of the single contents. An algorithm and a
parameter used in preparing the signature as well as a key to be
used for verification of the signature are included in the public
key certificate.
[0368] In addition, FIG. 47 indicates a data format of album
contents, and in data of the album contents, a type of data, a type
of contents, an effective period of contents, an ID of an album, an
ID of a content provider, the number of single contents, address
information of single contents, single contents, a public key
certificates and a signature are stored.
[0369] In the album contents, the type of data indicates that the
data is data of the contents, and the type of contents indicates
that the contents are an album. The effective period of contents
indicates a distribution period of the contents by a data on which
the period expires, the number of days from a data to be a basis
when distribution is started until the period expires, or the like,
and the ID of an album is for identifying the album contents.
[0370] The ID of a content provider indicates an ID of a content
provider 2 having the album contents. The number of single contents
indicates the number of single contents forming an album, the
address information indicates a storage position of single contents
forming the album, and is a data packet of a plurality of single
contents forming the album that are actually stored in a position
indicated by the address information. In addition, the signature is
attached to the entirety from the type of data to the public key
certificate excluding the signature from data of the single
contents. An algorithm and a parameter used in preparing the
signature as well as a key to be used for verification of the
signature are included in the public key certificate.
[0371] In addition, in album contents, with the addition of a
signature to the entire album contents, tamper or the like can be
checked for each single content as well together with the album
contents simply by verifying the signature without respectively
verifying the single contents stored in the album contents, hence,
the verification of a signature can be thereby simplified.
[0372] FIG. 48 shows a data format of a key for single contents,
and in key data for the single contents, a type of data, a type of
key data, an effective period of a key, an ID of contents, an ID of
a content provider, a version of a key, an encryption method of a
content key K.sub.co, an encrypted content key K.sub.co, an
encryption method of an individual key K.sub.i, an encrypted
individual key K.sub.i, a public key certificated and a signature
are stored.
[0373] In the key data for single contents, the type of data
indicate that the data is data of a key, the type of key data
indicates the key data is for single contents. The effective data
of a key indicates a usage period of a key (a content key K.sub.co
and an individual key K.sub.i) shown in the key data by a data on
which the period expires, the number of days from a data to be a
basis when use is started until the period expires, or the like,
and the ID of contents indicates single contents to be encrypted by
the content key K.sub.co. The ID of a content provider holds
contents and indicates an ID of a content provider 2 that has
generated the content key K.sub.co.
[0374] The version of a key indicates revision information of a key
(a content key K.sub.co and an individual key K.sub.i) that has
been revised according to a usage period. The encryption method of
contents key K.sub.co indicates an encryption method (e.g., DES)
used for encryption of the content key K.sub.co using an individual
key K.sub.i, and the encrypted content key K.sub.co indicates a
content key K.sub.co that has been encrypted using the individual
key K.sub.i by the encryption method. The encryption method of an
individual key K.sub.i indicates an encryption method (e.g.,
Triple-DES-CBC) for encrypting an individual key K.sub.i using a
delivery key K.sub.d, and the encrypted individual key K.sub.i
indicates an individual key K.sub.i that has been encrypted using a
delivery key. K.sub.d by the encryption method. The signature is
attached to the entirety from the type of data to the public key
certificate excluding the signature from data of the single
contents. An algorithm and a parameter used in preparing the
signature as well as a key to be used for verification of the
signature are included in the public key certificate.
[0375] Here, the delivery key K.sub.d and the individual key
K.sub.i are delivered from a content provider 2, always united by
key data for single contents. Then, in the key data for single
contents, one signature is added to the entire data. Therefore, in
an apparatus having received the key data for single contents, it
is not necessary to separately verify signatures with respect to an
encrypted content key K.sub.co and an encrypted key K.sub.i, the
signatures are deemed to be verified with respected to the
encrypted content key K.sub.co and the encrypted individual key
K.sub.i simply by verifying one signature of the key data for
single contents, hence, the verification of a signature with
respect to the encrypted content key K.sub.co and the encrypted
individual key K.sub.i can be thereby simplified.
[0376] Incidentally, an individual key K.sub.i is encrypted with an
ID of a content provider that encrypts a content key K.sub.co using
the individual key K.sub.i. A method for encrypting an individual
key K.sub.i together with an ID of a content provider by an
encryption method called the CBC of a triple DES will be described
with reference to FIG. 49. That is, with such an encryption method,
after connecting a predetermined initial value and an individual
key K.sub.i (64 bits), the individual key K.sub.i is encrypted by
an encryption method by the CBC mode of triple DES, and after
connecting a first value of a resulting 64 bits with an ID (64
bits) of a content provider, the individual key K.sub.i is
encrypted by an encryption method by the CBC mode of triple DES
using the delivery key K.sub.d again, thereby obtaining a second
value of 64 bits. In such an encryption method, data of 16 bites
connecting the first value and the second value becomes the
encrypted individual key K.sub.i that is stored in key data for
single contents (in this case, the first value corresponds to first
64 bit data of the encrypted individual key K.sub.i to be stored in
the key data for single contents, and the second value becomes 64
bit data following the first value among the encrypted individual
key K.sub.i to be stored in the key data for single contents).
[0377] In addition, FIG. 50 shows key data for album contents, and
in the key data for album contents, a type of data, a type of key
data, an effective period of a key, an ID of an album, an ID of a
content provider, a version of a key, the number of key data for
single contents to be used for encrypting single contents forming
an album, address information indicating a storage position of the
key data, a key data packet stored in a position indicated by the
address information, a public key certificate and a signature are
stored.
[0378] In the key data for album contents, the type of data
indicate that the data is data of a key, the type of key data
indicates the key data is for album contents. The effective data of
a key indicates a usage period of a key (a content key K.sub.co)
shown in the key data by a data on which the period expires, the
number of days from a data to be a basis when use is started until
the period expires, or the like, and the ID of an album indicates
album contents consisting of single contents to be encrypted by the
content key. K.sub.co. The ID of a content provider indicates an ID
of a content provider 2 that encrypts album contents.
[0379] The version of a key indicates revision information of a key
(a content key K.sub.co) revised according to a usage period. The
signature is attached to the entirety from the type of data to the
public key certificate excluding the signature from data of the
single contents. An algorithm and a parameter used in preparing the
signature as well as a key to be used for verification of the
signature are included in the public key certificate.
[0380] In addition, in key data for album contents, with the
addition of a signature to the entire album contents, tamper or the
like can be checked for key data of each single content as well
together with key data of the album contents simply by verifying
the signature without respectively verifying key data for a
plurality of single contents stored in key data for the album
contents, hence, the verification of a signature can be thereby
simplified.
[0381] FIG. 51 illustrates operations of mutual authentication of
an encryption processing section 65 and an extension section 66, in
which one common key uses DES that is a common key encryption. In
FIG. 51, given that A is an extension section 66 and B is an
encryption processing section 65, the encryption processing section
65 generates a random number R.sub.B of 64 bits, and transmits
R.sub.B and ID.sub.B that is its own ID to the extension section 66
via an upper controller 62. The extension section 66 having
received the transmission generates a random number R.sub.A anew,
encrypts R.sub.A, R.sub.B and ID.sub.B using a key K.sub.AB in a
CBC mode of DES, and returns them to the encryption processing
section 65 via the upper controller 62.
[0382] The CBC mode of DES is a method for applying exclusive OR to
immediately preceding output and input and encrypting them when
conducting encryption. In this example,
X=DES(K.sub.AB,R.sub.A+IV) IV=initial value, +: exclusive OR
Y=DES(K.sub.AB,R.sub.B+X)
Z=DES(K.sub.AB,ID.sub.B+Y)
and outputs are X, Y, Z. In these equations, DES (K.sub.AB,
R.sub.A+IV) represents encrypting data R.sub.A+IV with DES using a
key K.sub.AB, Y=DES (K.sub.AB, R.sub.B+X) represents encrypting
data R.sub.B+X with DES using the key K.sub.AB, and Z=DES
(K.sub.AB, ID.sub.B+Y) represents encrypting data ID.sub.B+Y with
DES using the key K.sub.AB.
[0383] The encryption processing section 65 having received the
data decrypts the received data with the key K.sub.AB, and inspects
whether R.sub.B and ID.sub.B match transmitted data. When the data
passes the inspection, the extension section 66 is authenticated as
a legal one. Subsequently, a session key (i.e., a temporary key
K.sub.temp, which is generated by a random number) SK.sub.AB,
R.sub.B, R.sub.A and SK.sub.AB are encrypted using the key K.sub.AB
in a CBC mode of DES and transmitted to the extension section 66
via the upper controller 62. The extension section 66 having
received the transmission decrypts the received data with the key
K.sub.AB, and inspects whether R.sub.B and R.sub.A match the one
transmitted by the extension section 66. When the data passes the
inspection, the encryption processing section 65 is authenticated
as a legal one, and the data SK.sub.AB is used for subsequent
communications as a session key. Further, in examining the received
data, if illegality or mismatching is found, mutual authentication
is deemed failed and the processing is terminated.
[0384] FIG. 52 illustrates operation of mutual authentication
between a mutual authentication module 95 in an encryption
processing section 65 of a home server 51 and a mutual
authentication module (not shown) in an encryption processing
section 73 of a fixed apparatus 52 using an elliptical curve
encryption of 160 bit length that is a public key encryption. In
FIG. 52, given that A is an encryption processing section 73 and B
is an encryption processing section 65, the encryption processing
section 65 generates a random number R.sub.B of 64 bits, and
transmits it to a fixed apparatus 52 via an upper controller 62 and
a transmission section 61. The fixed apparatus 52 having received
the random number generates a random number R.sub.A of 64 bits anew
and a random number A.sub.K smaller than a sample number p in the
encryption processing section 73. Then, the fixed apparatus 52
finds a point A.sub.V that is a base point G multiplied by A.sub.K,
connects R.sub.A, R.sub.B, A.sub.V (x coordinates and Y
coordinates) (64 bits+64 bits+160 bits+160 bits=448 bits), and
generates signature data A.Sig with a secret key held by itself
with respect to the data. Further, since scalar times of a base
point is the same as the method described in the generation of a
signature of FIG. 10, its description is omitted. Connection of
data is such data of 32 bits which, when data A of 16 bits and data
B of 16 bits are connected, data of upper 16 bits is A and data of
lower 16 bits is B. Since generation of a signature is the same as
the method described in the generation of a signature of FIG. 10,
its description is omitted.
[0385] Then, the encryption processing section 73 transfers
R.sub.A, R.sub.B and A.sub.V as well as the signature data A.Sig to
the upper controller 72, and the upper controller 72 adds a public
key certificate for the fixed apparatus 52 (stored in a small
storage section 75), and transmits them to a home server 51 via a
communication section 71. Since the public key certificate is
illustrated in FIG. 32, its detailed description is omitted. The
home server 51 having received this verifies a signature of the
public key certificate of the fixed apparatus 52 in the encryption
processing section 65. Since the verification of the signature is
the same as the method described in the verification of the
signature of FIG. 11, its description is omitted. Then, the
encryption processing section 73 inspects whether the random number
RB among the transmitted data is identical with the one transmitted
by the encryption processing section 65, and if it is identical,
verifies the signature data A.Sig. When the verification is
successful, the encryption processing section 65 authenticates the
encryption processing section 73. Further, since the verification
of the signature is the same as the method described in the
verification of the signature of FIG. 11, its description is
omitted. Then, the encryption processing section 65 generates a
random number B.sub.K smaller than the sample number p, finds a
point B.sub.V that is the base point G times B.sub.K, connects
R.sub.B, R.sub.A and B.sub.V (x coordinates and Y coordinates), and
generates signature data B.Sig with a secret key held by itself
with respect to the data. Finally, the encryption processing
section 65 transfers R.sub.B, R.sub.A and B.sub.V as well as the
signature data B.Sig to the upper controller 62, and the upper
controller 62 adds a public key certificate for the home server 51
(stored in a mass storage section 68) and transmits them to the
fixed apparatus 52 via the communication section 61.
[0386] The fixed apparatus 52 having received this verifies the
signature of the public key certificate of the home server 51 in
the encryption processing section 73. Then, the fixed apparatus 52
inspects whether the random number R.sub.A among the transmitted
data is identical with the one transmitted by the encryption
processing section 73, and if it is identical, verifies the
signature data B.Sig. When the verification is successful, the
encryption processing section 73 authenticates the encryption
processing section 65.
[0387] When both the data was successful in verification, the
encryption processing section 65 calculates B.sub.K A.sub.V
(although B.sub.K is a random number, since A.sub.V is a point on
an elliptic curve, scalar times calculation of a point on an
elliptic curve is necessary), the encryption processing section 73
calculates A.sub.K B.sub.V, and the lower 64 bits of X coordinates
of these points are used for subsequent communications as a session
key (a temporary key K.sub.temp) (if the common key encryption is
the common key encryption of the 64 bit key length). Incidentally,
the session key to be used for communication is not limited to the
lower 64 bit of the X coordinates, but the lower 64 bits of the Y
coordinates may be used. Further, in secret communication after
mutual authentication, data is not only encrypted with the
temporary key K.sub.temp, but also a signature may be added to the
encrypted transmission data.
[0388] In verifying a signature and received data, if illegality or
mismatching is found, mutual authentication is deemed failed and
the processing is terminated.
[0389] FIG. 53 illustrates operations when a settlement available
apparatus in the user home network 5 transmits charge information
to the electronic distribution service center 1. The settlement
available apparatus in the user home network 5 retrieves an object
apparatus that it should settle on behalf of the network from
registration information, conducts mutual authentication, and has
the charge information encrypted with the shared temporary key
K.sub.temp (which is different for each mutual authentication)
sharing the charge information and sent (a signature is attached to
the data then). After finishing processing for all the apparatuses,
the settlement available apparatus mutually authenticates with the
electronic distribution service center 1, encrypts all the charge
information with the shared temporary key, attaches signature data
to these, and transmits them to the electronic distribution service
center 1 together with a handling policy and price information, if
necessary. Further, since an ID of a handling policy, an ID of
price information and the like that are necessary for distribution
of an amount are included in the charge information to be
transmitted to the electronic service center 1 from the user home
network 5, a handling policy or price information with large
information amount is not necessarily transmitted. The user
management section 18 receives this. The user management section 18
verifies signature data with respect to the received charge
information, registration information, handling policy and price
information. Since the verification of a signature is the same as
the method described in FIG. 11, details are omitted. Then, the
user management section 18 decrypts the charge information with the
temporary key K.sub.temp that is shared for mutual authentication,
and transmits the charge information to the history data management
section 15 together with the handling policy and the price
information.
[0390] Incidentally, in this embodiment, data to be transmitted
after mutual authentication is encrypted with the temporary key
K.sub.temp if necessary. For example, since, if contents of a
content key K.sub.co and a handling key K.sub.d are seen, data is
illegally utilized, it is necessary to encrypt them with the
temporary key K.sub.temp and makes them invisible from outside. On
the other hand, since, even if contents of charge information and
license conditions information are seen, data cannot be illegally
utilized, it is not always necessary to encrypt them with the
temporary key K.sub.temp, but damages to parties relating to
receipt of an amount are generated if, for example, an amount of
charge information is tampered or usage conditions of license
conditions information is tampered to be loose. Therefore, tamper
is prevented by attaching a signature to the charge information or
the license conditions information. However, a signature may be
attached if a content key K.sub.co or a delivery key K.sub.d is
transmitted.
[0391] Then, a transmitting side generates a signature to data to
be transmitted or data that is the data encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp, and transmits the data and the signature. The
receiving side obtains data by verifying the signature if the
transmitted data is not encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp,
or obtains data by decrypting the data with the temporary key
K.sub.temp after verifying the signature if the transmitted data is
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp. In this embodiment, data
to be transmitted after mutual authentication may be applied
encryption by a signature or a temporary key K.sub.temp, if
necessary.
[0392] The user management section 18 receives a delivery key
K.sub.d from the key server 14, encrypts it with a shared temporary
key K.sub.temp to add signature data, prepares registration
information from the user registration database, and transmits the
delivery key K.sub.d, the signature data and the registration
information encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp to a
settlement available apparatus in the user home network 5. Since a
method of preparing registration information is just as described
in FIG. 8, its detailed description is omitted here.
[0393] When executing settlement, the chart billing section 19
receives charge information, a handling policy, if necessary, and
price information from the history data management section 15,
calculates a charge amount billed to a user, and transmits billing
information to the user. The receipt and disbursement section 20
communicates with a bank, or the like, and executes settlement
processing. On that occasion, if there is information such as
outstanding fees or the like of the user, the information is
transmitted to the charge billing section 19 and the user
management section 18 in the form of a settlement report, reflected
on the user registration database, and referred to upon subsequent
user registration processing or settlement processing.
[0394] The settlement available in the user home network 5 having
received the delivery key K.sub.d, the signature data and the
registration data encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp updates
stored registration information, at the same time, inspects the
registration information, and if registration is made, encrypts the
delivery key K.sub.d with the temporary key K.sub.temp after
verifying the signature data, updates a delivery key K.sub.d stored
in the storage module in the encryption processing section, and
deletes charge information in the storage module. Subsequently, the
settlement available apparatus retrieves an object apparatus that
it should settle on behalf of the network from the registration
information, conducts mutual authentication for each apparatus
found by the retrieval, encrypts the delivery key K.sub.d read out
from the storage module of the encryption processing section with a
temporary key K.sub.temp that is different for each apparatus found
by the retrieval, and attaches a signature for each apparatus to
send it to each apparatus together with the registration
information. The processing ends when all the object apparatuses
that the apparatus should settle on behalf of the network are
finishes.
[0395] The object apparatus having received the data inspects the
registration information as the settlement available apparatus did,
decrypts the delivery key K.sub.d with the temporary key K.sub.temp
after verifying the signature data, updates the delivery key
K.sub.d in the storage module, and deletes charge information.
[0396] Further, for an apparatus marked "registration unavailable"
in the registration item of the registration information, since fee
is not charged, update of the delivery key K.sub.d and deletion of
the charge information are not conducted (contents of the
registration items may be various cases that are not described such
as stoppage of every actions including use, stoppage of purchase
processing, state in which processing was conducted normally).
[0397] FIG. 54 illustrates operations of profit distribution
processing of the electronic distribution service center 1. The
history data management section 15 maintains and manages charge
information transmitted from the user management section 18, a
handling policy, if necessary, and price information. The profit
distribution section 16 calculates profit for each of the content
provider 2, the service provider 3 and the electronic distribution
service center 1 from the charge information, the handling policy,
if necessary, and the price information transmitted from the
history data management section 15, and transmits the results to
the service provider management section 11, the content provider
management section 12 and the receipt and disbursement section 20.
The receipt and disbursement section 20 communicates with a bank or
the like, and conducts settlement. The service provider management
section 11 transmits distribution information received from the
profit distribution section 16 to the service provider 2. The
content provider management section 12 transmits the distribution
information received from the profit distribution section 16 to the
content provider 3.
[0398] The audit section 21 receives charge information, a handling
policy and price information from the history data management
section 15, and audits if there is any inconsistency in data. For
example, the audit section 21 audit if a price in the charge
information coincides with data of the price information, if a
distribution ratio is coincides, or the like, and audits if the
handling policy and the price information coincide each other. In
addition, as processing of the audit section 21, there are
processing for auditing the coincidence between an amount received
from the user home network 5 and a total amount of a distributed
profit or an amount transferred to the service provider 3, and
processing for auditing whether or not, for example, a content ID
or a service provider ID that could not exist or an impossible
share, price or the like is included in data in the charge
information supplied from an apparatus in the user home network
5.
[0399] FIG. 55 illustrates operations of processing in the
electronic distribution service center 1 for transmitting
utilization results of contents to JASRAC. The history data
management section 15 transmits charge information indicating
utilization results of contents by a user to the copyright
management section 13 and the profit distribution section 16. The
profit distribution section 16 calculates a billing amount to
JASRAC and a payment amount from the charge information, and
transmits payment information to the receipt and disbursement
section 20. The receipt and disbursement section 20 communicates
with a bank or the like, and executes settlement processing. The
copyright management section 13 transmits the utilization results
of contents by the user to JASRAC.
[0400] Processing of the EMD system will now be described. FIG. 56
is a flow chart illustrating processing of distribution and
reproduction of contents of this system. In step S40, the content
provider management section 12 of the electronic distribution
service center 1 transmits an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by a
delivery key K.sub.d and a public key certificate of the content
provider 2 to the content provider 2, and the content provider 2
receives this. Details of the processing will be described later
with reference to a flow chart of FIG. 57. In step S41, a user
operates an apparatus (e.g., the home server 51 of FIG. 15) of the
user home network 5, and registers the apparatus of the user home
network 5 in the user management section 18 of the electronic
distribution service center 1. Details of this registration
processing will be described later with reference to a flow chart
of FIG. 59. In step S42, the user management section 18 of the
electronic service center 1, after mutually authenticating with the
user home network 5 as described above with reference to FIG. 52,
transmits the delivery key K.sub.d to the apparatus of the user
home network 5. The user home network 5 receives the key. Details
of this processing will be described with reference to a flow chart
of FIG. 62.
[0401] In step S43, the signature generation section 38 of the
content provider 2 generates a content provider secure container,
and transmits it to the service provider 3. Details of this
processing will be described later with reference to a flow chart
of FIG. 65. In step S44, the signature generation section 45 of the
service provider 3 generates a service provider secure container,
and transmits it to the user home network 5 via the network 4.
Details of this transmission processing will be described later
with reference to a flow chart of FIG. 66. In step S45, the
purchase module 94 of the user home network 5 executes purchase
processing. Details of the purchase processing will be described
later with reference to a flow chart of FIG. 67. In step S46, a
user reproduces contents in an apparatus of the user home network
5. Details of the reproduction processing will be described later
with reference to a flow chart of FIG. 72.
[0402] FIG. 57 is a flow chart illustrating details of processing,
which corresponds to S40 of FIG. 56, in which the electronic
distribution service center 1 transmits an individual key K.sub.i,
an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by a delivery key K.sub.d and a
public key certificate to the content provider 2, and the content
provider 2 receives these. In step S50, the mutual authentication
section 17 of the electronic distribution service center 1 mutually
authenticates with the mutual authentication section 39 of the
content provider 2. Since the mutual authentication processing was
described in FIG. 52, its details are omitted. When it is confirmed
that the content provider 2 is a legal provider with the mutual
authentication, in step S51, the content provider 2 receives the
individual key K.sub.i, the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the
delivery key K.sub.d and the certificate transmitted from the
content provider management section 12 of the electronic
distribution service center 1. In step S52, the content provider 2
stores the received individual key K.sub.i in the tamper resistant
memory 40A, and stores the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the
delivery key K.sub.d and the certificate in the memory 40B.
[0403] In this way, the content provider 2 receives an individual
key K.sub.i, an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by a delivery key
K.sub.d and a certificated from the electronic distribution service
center 1. Similarly, in an example in which processing of the flow
chart shown in FIG. 56 is conducted, the service provider 3, in
addition to the content provider 2, receives an individual key
K.sub.i (which is different from the individual key K.sub.i of the
content provider 2), an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by a
delivery key K.sub.d and a certificate from the electronic
distribution service center 1 with similar processing as that in
FIG. 57.
[0404] Further, the memory 40A is desirably a tamper resistant
memory whose data is not read out by a third party because it
maintains an individual key K.sub.i that should be maintained
secretly by the content provider 2, but hardware limitation is not
necessary (e.g., a hard disk in a room to which entry is
controlled, a hard disk of a personal computer whose password is
controlled, or the like may suffice). In addition, the memory 40B
may be any apparatus such as an ordinary storage apparatus or the
like because it only stores an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by
a delivery key K.sub.d and a certificate of the content provider 2
(does not need to be kept secret). Further, the memories 40A and
40B may be united.
[0405] FIG. 58 is a flow chart illustrating processing in which the
home server 51 registers settlement information in the user
management section 18 of the electronic distribution service center
1. In step S60, the home server 51 mutually authenticates a public
key certificate stored in the mass storage section 68 with the
mutual authentication section 17 of the electronic distribution
service center 1 in the mutual authentication module 95 of the
encryption processing section 65. Since this authentication
processing is similar to that described with reference to FIG. 52,
description is omitted here. A certificate that the home server 51
transmits to the user management section 18 of the electronic
distribution service center 1 in step S60 includes data (a public
key certificate of a user apparatus) shown in FIG. 32.
[0406] In step S61, the home server decides whether or not a
registration of an individual's settlement information (such as a
user's credit card number, a settlement organization's account
number, or the like) is a new registration, and if it is decided
that it is a new registration, the processing proceeds to step S62.
In step S62, a user input the individual's settlement information
using the inputting means 63. The data is encrypted in the
encryption unit 112 using a temporary key K.sub.temp, and is
transmitted to the user management section 18 of the electronic
distribution service center 1 via the communication section 61.
[0407] In step S63, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 takes out an ID of an
apparatus from the received certificate, and retrieves through the
user registration database shown in FIG. 7 based on the ID of an
apparatus. In step S64, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 decides whether or not
registration of an apparatus having the received ID is possible,
and if it is decided that the registration of an apparatus having
the received ID is possible, the processing proceeds to step S65,
and the user management section 18 decides whether or not the
apparatus having the received ID is a new registration. In step
S65, if it is decided that the apparatus having the received ID is
a new registration, the processing proceeds to step S66.
[0408] In step S66, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 issues a settlement ID
anew, and at the same time, decrypts the settlement information
encrypted by the temporary key, registers the settlement ID and
settlement information by associating them with an ID of the
apparatus in the settlement information database that stores an
apparatus ID, a settlement ID, settlement information (an account
number, a credit card number or the like), transaction suspension
information, and the like, and registers a settlement ID in the
user registration database. In step S67, the user management
section 18 prepares registration information based on data
registered in the user registration database. Since this
registration information is described in FIG. 8, its details are
omitted.
[0409] In step S68, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 transmits the prepared
registration information to the home server 51. In step S69, the
upper controller 62 of the home server 51 stores the received
registration information in the mass storage section 68.
[0410] In step S61, if it is decided that the registration of the
settlement information is an updated registration, the processing
proceeds to step S70, and the user inputs the individual's
settlement information using the inputting means 63. The data is
encrypted in the encryption unit 112 using a temporary key
K.sub.temp, and transmitted to the user management section 18 of
the electronic distribution service center 1 via the communication
section 61 together with the registration information already
issued upon settlement registration.
[0411] In step S64, if it is decided that registration of an
apparatus having a received ID is indispensable, the processing
proceeds to step S71, where the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 prepares registration
information of registration rejection, and the processing proceeds
to step S68.
[0412] In step S65, if it is determined that the apparatus having
the received ID is not a new registration, the processing proceeds
to step S72, where the user management section 18 of the electronic
distribution service center 1 decrypts the settlement information
encrypted by the temporary key, and updates and registers it in the
settlement information registration database by associating it with
the ID of the apparatus, and the processing proceeds to step
S67.
[0413] In this way, the home server 51 is registered in the
electronic distribution service center 1.
[0414] FIG. 59 is a flow chart illustrating processing for
registering an ID of an apparatus in registration information anew.
Since mutual authentication processing in step S80 is similar to
the processing described in FIG. 52, details are omitted. Since
step S81 is the same as step S63 of FIG. 58, its description is
omitted. Since step S82 is the same as step S64 of FIG. 58, its
description is omitted. In step S83, the user management section 18
of the electronic distribution service center 1 sets a registration
item corresponding to an apparatus ID in the user registration
database as "registration," and registers the apparatus ID. In step
S84, the user management section 18 of the electronic distribution
service center 1 prepares registration information as shown in FIG.
8 based on the user registration database. Since step S85 is the
same as step S68 of FIG. 58, its description is omitted. Since step
S86 is the same as the step S69 of FIG. 58, its description is
omitted.
[0415] In step S82, if it is decided that registration of an
apparatus having a received ID is indispensable, the processing
proceeds to step S87, where the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 prepares registration
information of registration rejection, and the processing proceeds
to step S85.
[0416] In this way, the home server 51 is registered in the
electronic distribution service center 1.
[0417] FIG. 60 is a flow chart illustrating processing in
additionally registering another apparatus via an already
registered apparatus. Here, an example in which the home server 51
is already registered and the fixed apparatus 52 is registered
therein will be described. In step S90, the home server 51 mutually
authenticates with the fixed apparatus 52. Since mutual
authentication processing is similar to the processing described in
FIG. 52, its description is omitted. In step S91, the home server
51 mutually authenticates with the electronic distribution service
center 1. In step S92, the home server 51 transmits the
registration information read out from the mass storage section 68
and the certificate of the fixed apparatus 52 obtain when mutually
authenticating with the fixed apparatus 52 in step S90 to the
electronic distribution service center 1. Since step S93 is the
same as step S81 of FIG. 59, its description is omitted. Since step
S94 is the same as step S82 of FIG. 59, its description is omitted.
Since step S95 is the same as step S83 of FIG. 59, its description
is omitted. In step S96, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 prepares registration
information anew with information of the fixed apparatus 52 added
in addition to the registration information received from the home
server 51. Since step S97 is the same as step S85 of FIG. 59, its
description is omitted. Since step S98 is the same as step S86 of
FIG. 59, its description is omitted.
[0418] Then, in step S99A, the home server 51 transmits the
received registration information to the fixed apparatus 52, and in
step S99B, the fixed apparatus 52 stores the received registration
information in the small storage section 75.
[0419] In step S94, if it is decided that registration of an
apparatus having a received ID is indispensable, the processing
proceeds to step S99, where the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 prepares registration
information indicating that only the fixed apparatus 52 is rejected
registration (therefore, the home server 51 stays registered), and
the processing proceeds to step S97 (the fact that the home server
51 has succeeded in mutual authentication with the electronic
distribution service center 1 means that the home server 51 is
registrable).
[0420] In this way, the fixed apparatus 52 is additionally
registered in the electronic distribution service center 1 by the
processing procedures indicated in FIG. 60.
[0421] Timing for a registered apparatus to conduct update of a
registration (update of registered information) will now be
described. FIG. 61 illustrates processing procedures for
determining whether or not to conduct update of registered
information based on various conditions, and in step S600, the home
server 51 determines whether or not a predetermined period that is
decided in advance has passed since obtaining a delivery: key
K.sub.d, registration information or charge information by a clock
(not shown) and a determination section (not shown). If a positive
result is obtained here, this means that the predetermined period
has passed since obtaining a delivery key K.sub.d, registration
information or charge information, then, the processing proceeds to
step S607, where the home server 51 executes update processing of
registration information. This processing will be described later
in FIG. 62.
[0422] On the other hand, if a negative result is obtained in step
S600, this means that a predetermined period has not passed since
obtaining a delivery key or charge information, that is updating
conditions of registration information with respect to passage of a
period has not been met, and then, the processing proceeds to step
S601.
[0423] In step S601, the home server 51 determines whether or not
the number of times of purchasing contents has reached a prescribed
number of times. If a positive result is obtained here, the
processing moves to step S607, where the home server 51 executes
registration information updating processing, whereas, if a
negative result is obtained in step S601, this means that updating
conditions of registration information has not been met with
respect to the number of times of purchasing contents, thus, the
processing proceeds to step S602.
[0424] In step S602, the home server 51 determines whether or not a
purchase amount of contents has reached a prescribed amount. If a
positive result is obtained here, the processing moves to step
S607, where the home server 51 execute registration information
updating processing, whereas, if a negative result is obtained in
step S602, this means that updating conditions of registration
information has not been met with respect to a purchase amount of
contents, the processing proceeds to the following step S603.
[0425] In step S603, the home server 51 determines whether or not
an effective period of a delivery key K.sub.d has expired. As means
for determining whether or not an effective period of a delivery
key K.sub.d has expired, whether or not a version of a delivery key
K.sub.d of distributed data coincides with a version of any of
three versions of delivery keys K.sub.d stored in the storage
module 92, or whether or not a version of a delivery key K.sub.d of
distributed data is older than a version of the latest delivery key
K.sub.d. If the versions does not coincide or if the version of the
delivery key is older than the version of the latest delivery key
K.sub.d, this means that the effective period of the delivery key
K.sub.d in the storage module 92 has expired, and the home server
51 obtains a positive result in step S603, thus the processing
proceeds to step S603, where the home server 51 executes updating
processing of registration information. On the other hand, if a
negative result is obtained in step S603, this means that the
updating conditions of registration information has not been met
with respect to an effective period of a delivery key K.sub.d, then
the processing proceeds to the following step S604.
[0426] In step S604, the home server 51 determines if there is a
change in a network configuration, such as whether or not another
apparatus has been connected to the home server 51 anew, or whether
or not another apparatus connected to the home server 51 has been
disconnected. If a positive result is obtained here, this means
that there has been a change in the network configuration, and
then, the processing proceeds to step S607, where the home server
51 executes the updating processing of registration information. On
the other hand, if a negative result is obtained in step S604, this
means that the updating conditions of registration information is
not met with respect to a network configuration, and the processing
proceeds to the following step S605.
[0427] In step S605, the home server 51 determines whether or not
there has been a registration information updating request from a
user, and if there has been a registration information updating
request, the processing proceeds to step S607, where the home
server 51 executes the updating processing of registration
information, and if there has been no registration information
updating request, the processing proceeds to step S606.
[0428] In step S606, the home server 51 conducts the update
determination in the above-mentioned steps S600 through S605 with
respect to other apparatuses connected to the home server 51, if a
determination result indicating that updating should be made is
obtained, the processing proceeds to step S607, where the home
server 51 executes the updating processing of registration
information, whereas, if a determination result indicating that
updating should be made is not obtained, the home server 51 repeats
similar processing from the above-mentioned step S600. Thus, the
home server 51 can obtain timing for executing the updating
processing of registration information. Further, another apparatus
may check its own update starting conditions and send a request to
the home server 51 by itself instead of the home server 51 checking
update starting conditions of another apparatus.
[0429] FIG. 62 is a flow chart illustrating operations for a
registered apparatus updating a registration (update of registered
information), executing settlement processing, and receiving
re-distribution of a delivery key K.sub.d. Since mutual
authentication processing in step S100 is similar to the processing
described in FIG. 52, its description is committed. In step S101,
the home server 51 encrypts charge information stored in the
storage module 92 using a temporary key K.sub.temp in the
encryption unit 112 of the encryption processing section 96,
generates a signature by the signature generation unit 114, and
adds a signature. Then, the home server 51 transmits the encrypted
charge information and its signature to the electronic distribution
service center 1 together with a handling policy, price information
and registration information stored in the mass storage section 68.
Further, at this moment, the handling policy and the price
information may not be sent by a model. This is because, in some
cases, the content provider 2 and the service provider 3 have
transmitted them to the electronic distribution service center 1 in
advance, or necessary information among the handling policy and the
price information is included in the charge information.
[0430] Since step S102 is the same as step S81 of FIG. 59, its
description is omitted. Since step S103 is the same as step S82 of
FIG. 59, its description is omitted. In step S104, the user
management section 18 of the electronic distribution service center
1 verifies a signature by the signature verification unit 115,
decrypts received charge information by a temporary key K.sub.temp
(if an electronic signature is attached to the received data, it is
verified by the signature verification unit 115), and (if received)
transmits the charge information to the history data management
section 15 together with the handling policy and the price
information. The history data management section 15 having received
this maintains and manages the received data.
[0431] In step S105, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 verifies a registration
item corresponding to an apparatus ID in the user registration
database, and at the same time, updates data. For example, the data
is such data as a registration date or a charge status (not shown).
Since step S106 is the same as step S84 of FIG. 59, its description
is omitted. In step S107, the user management section of the
electronic distribution service center 1 encrypts a delivery key
K.sub.d supplied from the key server 14 by a temporary key
K.sub.temp, and transmits the delivery key K.sub.d to the home
server 51 together with registration information.
[0432] In step S108, the home server 51 stores the received
registration information in the mass storage section 68. In step
S109, the home server 51 inputs the received registration
information in the encryption processing section 65, where the home
server 51 verifies an electronic signature included in the
registration information by the signature verification unit 115,
and at the same time, causes the unit to confirm if an apparatus ID
of the home server 51 is registered, and when the verification is
successful and it is confirmed that the charge processing is
completed, the processing proceeds to step S110. In step S110, the
home server 51 input the received delivery key K.sub.d to the
encryption processing section 65. In the encryption processing
section 65, the home server 51 decrypts the received delivery key
K.sub.d using a temporary key K.sub.temp by the decryption unit 111
of the encryption/decryption module 96, stores (updates) the
delivery key K.sub.d in the storage module 92, and deletes charge
information held in the storage module 92 (this makes settlement
completed).
[0433] In step S103, if it is decided that registration of an
apparatus having the received ID is impossible, the processing
proceeds to step S11, where the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 prepares registration
information indicating that registration is rejected, and the
processing proceeds to step S112. In step S112, which is different
from step S107, only registration information is transmitted to the
home server 51.
[0434] In step S109, if verification of a signature included in the
registration information is failed, or if "registration possible"
is not written in an item of "registration" (e.g., charge
processing failed purchase processing not available, registration
rejected--functions of the encryption processing section including
processing such as reproduction stopped, transaction temporarily
stopped--charge processing successful, but purchase is stopped due
to some reason, etc. are possible) included in the registration
information, the processing proceeds to step S113, and a
predetermined error processing is performed.
[0435] In this way, the home server 51 updates registration
information, at the same time, transmits charge information to the
electronic distribution service center 1, and receives supply of a
delivery key K.sub.d in return.
[0436] FIGS. 63 and 64 illustrate flow charts describing processing
for settlement, update of registration information, and update of a
delivery key K.sub.d. In step S120, the mutual authentication
module 94 of the home server 51 and a mutual authentication module
(not shown) of a fixed apparatus mutually authenticate. Since
mutual authentication processing is the same as the processing
described in FIG. 52, its description is omitted. Further, as
described in the mutual authentication processing, since the home
server 51 and the fixed apparatus 52 mutually exchange
certificates, it is assumed that they know their IDs each other. In
step S121, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 reads out
registration information of the mass storage section 68, and causes
the encryption processing section 65 to inspect the information.
The encryption processing section 65 having received the
registration information from the upper controller 62 verifies a
signature in the registration information, decides if the ID of the
fixed apparatus exists, and if the ID of the fixed apparatus exists
in the registration information, the processing proceed to step
S122.
[0437] In step S122, the encryption processing section 65 decides
whether or not the ID of the fixed apparatus 52 is registered in
the registration information, and if the ID of the fixed apparatus
52 is registered, the processing proceeds to step S123. In step
S123, the encryption processing section 73 of the fixed apparatus
52 reads out charge information stored in the storage module, and
encrypts the information in the encryption unit using a temporary
key K.sub.temp. In addition, the encryption processing section 73
generates a signature corresponding to the charge information in
the signature generation unit. Since the generation of an signature
was described in FIG. 10, its description is omitted. The upper
controller 72 having received the charge information encrypted by
the temporary key K.sub.temp and its signature reads out a
corresponding handling policy and price information from the small
storage section 75, if necessary, and transmits the charge
information encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp and its
signature as well as the handling policy and the price information
corresponding to the charge information, if necessary, to the home
server 51.
[0438] The home server 51 having received the data stores the
handling policy and the price information, if received, in the mass
storage section 68, and at the same time, inputs the charge
information encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp and its
signature in the encryption processing section 65. The encryption
processing section 65 having received the charge information
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp and its signature
verifies the signature for the charge information encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp by the signature verification unit 115 of
the encryption/decryption module 96. Since the verification of a
signature is the same as the processing described in FIG. 11, its
details are omitted. Then, the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 decrypts the charge information
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp.
[0439] In step S124, the home server 51 mutually authenticates with
the mutual authentication section 17 of the electronic distribution
service center 1, and shares a temporary key K.sub.temp2. In step
S125, the home server 51 encrypts the charge information
transmitted from the fixed apparatus 52 by the encryption unit 112
of the encryption/decryption module 96 using the temporary key
K.sub.temp2. At this moment, the home server 51 may encrypts the
charge information of the home server 51 as well. In addition, the
home server 51 generates a signature corresponding to the charge
information encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2 by the
signature generation unit 114 of the encryption/decryption module
96. The upper controller 62 having received the charge information
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2 and its signature reads
out a handling policy, price information and registration
information from the mass storage section 68, if necessary, and
transmits the charge information encrypted by the temporary key
K.sub.temp2 and its signature, as well as the handling policy, the
price information and the registration information, if necessary,
to the user management section 18 of the electronic distribution
service center 1.
[0440] In step S126, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 retrieves through the user
registration database. In step S127, the user management section 18
decides whether or not the home server 51 and the fixed apparatus
52 are registered as registrable in the item "registration" in the
user registration database, and if it is decided that they are
registered, the processing proceeds to step S128. In step S128, the
user management section 18 of the electronic distribution service
center 1 verifies a signature for the charge information encrypted
by the temporary key K.sub.temp2, and decrypts the charge
information by the temporary key K.sub.temp2. Then, the user
management section 18 transmits the charge information as well as
the handling policy and the price information, if received, to the
history data management section 15. The history data management
section 15 having received the charge information as well as the
handling policy and the price information, if received, manages and
stores the data.
[0441] In step S129, the user management section 18 of the
electronic distribution service center 1 updates the user
registration database (charge data receipt data and time, issued
data and time of registration information, date and time of a
delivery key, etc.). In step S130, the user management section 18
of the electronic distribution service center 1 prepares
registration information (e.g., an example of FIG. 8). In step
S131, the user management section 18 of the electronic distribution
service center 1 encrypts the delivery key K.sub.d received from
the key server 14 of the electronic distribution service center 1
by the temporary key K.sub.temp2, and generates a signature for the
delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2.
Then, the user management section 18 transmits the delivery key
K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2 and the
signature for the delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp2.
[0442] In step S132, the home server 51 receives the registration
information, the delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp2 and the signature for the delivery key K.sub.d
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2. The upper controller 62
of the home server 51 inputs the delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by
the temporary key K.sub.temp2 and the signature for the delivery
key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2 in the
encryption processing section 65. In the encryption processing
section 65, the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 verifies the signature for the
delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2,
the decryption unit 111 of the encryption/decryption module 96
decrypts the delivery key K.sub.d using the temporary key
K.sub.temp2, and the encryption unit 112 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 re-encrypts the encrypted delivery
key K.sub.d using the temporary key K.sub.temp shared with the
fixed apparatus 52. Finally, the signature generation unit 114 of
the encryption/decryption module 96 generates a signature
corresponding to the delivery key K.sub.d encrypted using the
temporary key K.sub.temp, and returns the delivery key K.sub.d
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp and the signature for the
delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp. The
upper controller 62 having received the delivery key K.sub.d
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp and the signature for the
delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp,
transmits them to the fixed apparatus 52 together with the
registration information transmitted from the electronic
distribution service center 1.
[0443] In step S133, the upper controller 72 of the fixed apparatus
52 overwrites and stores the received registration information in
the small storage section 75. In step S134, the encryption
processing section 73 of the fixed apparatus 52 verifies a
signature of the received registration information, decides whether
or not the item with respect to "registration" in the ID of the
fixed apparatus 52 is marked "registration possible," and if it is
marked "registration possible," the processing proceeds to step
S135. In step S135, the upper controller of the fixed apparatus 52
inputs the delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary key
K.sub.temp and the signature for the delivery key K.sub.d encrypted
by the temporary key K.sub.temp in the encryption processing
section 73. The encryption processing section 73 verifies the
signature for the delivery key K.sub.d encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp, decrypts the delivery key K.sub.d using the
temporary key K.sub.temp, updates the delivery key K.sub.d in the
storage module of the encryption processing section 73, and at the
same time, deletes the charge information (further, in some case,
the charge information is not deleted, but is attached a mark
indicating it is settled).
[0444] In step S121, if the ID of the fixed apparatus 52 is not
included in the registration information, the processing proceeds
to step S136, the registration information addition processing
described in FIG. 60 is started, and the processing proceeds to
step S123.
[0445] In step S127, if the ID of the home server 51 and the ID of
the fixed apparatus 52 are not marked "registration possible" with
respect to the item "registration" in the user registration
database, the processing proceeds to step S137. Since the step S137
is the same as step S130, its details are omitted. In step S138,
the user management section 18 of the electronic distribution
service center 1 transmits the registration information to the home
server 51. In step S139, the home server 51 transmits the
registration information to the fixed apparatus 52.
[0446] In step S122, the item "registration" with respect to the ID
of the fixed apparatus 52 in the registration information is not
marked "registration possible," or in step S134, the item
"registration" with respect to the ID of the fixed apparatus 52 in
the registration information is not marked "registration possible,"
the processing ends.
[0447] Further, processing on behalf of the network according to
this system is described as only for processing of the fixed
apparatus 52, all pieces of charge information of all the
apparatuses connected to the home server 51 and the home server 51
itself may be collected and processed altogether. Then,
registration information and delivery keys K.sub.d of all the
apparatuses are updated. (In this embodiment, received registration
information and a delivery key K.sub.d are not checked at all in
the home server 51. If processing of the home server 51 itself is
performed altogether, they should be checked and updated).
[0448] Processing in which the content provider 2 transmits a
content provider secure container to the service provider 3, which
corresponds to step S43 of FIG. 56, will be described with
reference to a flow chart of FIG. 65. In step S140, the electronic
watermark adding section 32 of the content provider 2 inserts
predetermined data indicating the content provider 2, for example,
a content provider ID, in the contents read out from the content
server 31 in the form of an electronic watermark, and supplies it
to the compression section 33. In step S141, the compression
section 33 of the content provider 2 compresses the contents in
which the electronic watermark is inserted by a predetermined
method such as ATRAC, and supplies to the content encryption
section 34. In step S142, the content key generation section 35
generates a key to be used as a content key K.sub.co, and supplies
it to the content encryption section 34 and the content key
encryption section 36. In step S143, the content encryption section
34 of the content provider 2 encrypts the compressed contents in
which the electronic watermark is inserted by a predetermined
method such as DES using the content key K.sub.co.
[0449] In step S144, the content key encryption section 36 encrypts
the content key K.sub.co with the individual key K.sub.i supplied
from the electronic distribution service center 1 by the processing
of step S40 of FIG. 56 by a predetermined method such as DES. In
step S145, the handling policy generation section 37 provides for a
handling policy of the contents, and generates a handling policy
indicated in FIGS. 33 and 34. In step S146, the signature
generation section 38 of the content provider 2 generates
signatures for the encrypted contents, the encrypted content key
K.sub.co, the encrypted individual key K.sub.i, and the handling
policy supplied from the handling policy generation section 37.
Since the generation of a signature was described with reference to
FIG. 10, its description is omitted here. In step S147, the content
provider 2 transmits the encrypted contents and its signature, the
encrypted content key K.sub.co and its signature, the encrypted
individual key K.sub.i and its signature, the handling policy and
its signature (these four data with signatures will be hereinafter
referred to as a content provider secure container), the
certificate of the content provider 2 obtained from the
authentication station in advance to the service provider 3 using a
transmission section (not shown).
[0450] As described above, the content provider 2 transmits the
content provider secure container to the service provider 3.
[0451] Processing in which the service provider 3 transmits a
service provider secure container to the home server 51 will now be
described with reference to a flow chart of FIG. 66. Further,
description is made assuming that the service provider 3 stores the
data transmitted from the content provider 2 in the content server
41 in advance. In step S150, the certificate verification section
42 of the service provider 3 reads out the certificate of the
content provider 2 from the content server 41, and verifies the
signature in the certificate. Since the verification of a signature
is the same as the method described with reference to FIG. 11, its
details are omitted. If there is no tamper in the certificate, the
public key K.sub.pcp of the content provider 2 is taken out.
[0452] In step S151, the signature verification section 43 of the
service provider 3 verifies the signature of the content provider
secure container transmitted from the transmission section of the
content provider 2 with the public key K.sub.pcp of the content
provider 2. (In some cases, only the signature of the handling
policy is verified). If the verification of the signature is failed
and tamper is found, the processing is terminated. Further, since
the verification of a signature is the same as the method described
with reference to FIG. 11, its details are omitted.
[0453] If there is no tamper in the content provider secure
container, in step S152, the pricing section 44 of the service
provider 3 prepares price information described in FIGS. 37 and 38
based on the handling policy. In step S153, the signature
generation section 45 of the service provider 3 generates a
signature corresponding to the price information, and prepares a
service provider secure container by combining the content provider
secure container, the price information and the signature of the
price information.
[0454] In step S154, the transmission section (not shown) of the
service provider 3 transmits the certificate of the service
provider 3, the certificate of the content provider 2 and the
service provider secure container to the transmission section 61 of
the home server 51, and completes the processing.
[0455] In this way, the service provider 3 transmits the service
provider secure container to the home server 51.
[0456] Details of the purchase processing of the home server 51
after receiving the proper service provider secure container
corresponding to step S45 of FIG. 56 will be described with
reference to the flow chart of FIG. 67. After the home server
executes the registration information update processing described
above with reference to FIGS. 61 and 62 in step S161, in step S162,
the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs the
registration information read out from the mass storage section 68
of the home server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of
the home server 51. After verifying the signature of the
registration information by the signature verification unit 115 of
the encryption/decryption module 96, the encryption processing
section 65 having received the registration information decides if
the item "purchase processing" for the ID of the home server 51 is
marked "purchase possible," and at the same time, inspects if the
item of registration is marked "registration possible," and in case
of "purchase possible" and "registration possible," the processing
proceeds to step S163. Further, the signature verification and
inspection of "registration possible" and "purchase possible" may
be performed in the registration information inspection module 93.
In step S163, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs
the public key certificate of the content provider 2 read out from
the mass storage section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51.
[0457] After verifying the signature of the certificate of the
content provider 2 by the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, the encryption processing section
65 having received the public key certificate of the content
provider 2 takes out the public key of the content provider 2 from
the public key certificate. If it is confirmed that there is not
tamper as a result of the verification of the signature, the
processing proceeds to step S164. In step S164, the upper
controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs the contents read out
from the mass storage section 68 of the home server 51 in the
encryption processing section 65 of the home server 51. The
encryption processing section 65 having received the contents
verifies the signature of the contents by the signature
verification unit 115 of the encryption/decryption module 96, and
if it is confirmed that no tamper is made, the processing proceeds
to step S165. In step S165, the upper controller 62 of the home
server 51 inputs the content key K.sub.co read out from the mass
storage section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51.
[0458] The encryption processing section 65 having received the
content key K.sub.co verifies the signature of the content key
K.sub.co by the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, and if it is confirmed that tamper
is not made, the processing proceeds to step S166. In step S166,
the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs the individual
key K.sub.i read out from the mass storage section 68 of the home
server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of the home
server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having received the
individual key K.sub.i verifies the signature of the individual key
K.sub.i by the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, and if it is confirmed that tamper
is not made, the processing proceeds to step S167.
[0459] In step S167, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the handling policy read out from the mass storage section
68 of the home server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of
the home server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having
received the handling policy verifies the signature of the handling
policy by the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, and if it is confirmed that tamper
is not made, the processing proceeds to step S168. In step S168,
the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs the public key
certificate of the service provider 3 read out from the mass
storage section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51.
[0460] After verifying the signature of the certificate of the
service provider 3 by the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, the encryption processing section
65 having received the public key certificate of the service
provider 3 takes out the public key of the service provider 3 from
the public key certificate. If it is confirmed that tamper is not
made as a result of the verification of the signature, the
processing proceeds to step S169. In step S169, the upper
controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs the price information
read out from the mass storage section 68 of the home server 51 in
the encryption processing section 65 of the home server 51. The
encryption processing section 65 having received the price
information verifies the signature of the price information by the
signature verification unit 115 of the encryption/decryption module
96, and if it is confirmed that tamper is not made, the processing
proceeds to step S170.
[0461] In step S170, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
displays information of purchasable contents (e.g., a purchasable
utilization form, a price, or the like) using the displaying means
64, and a user selects a purchase item using the inputting means
63. A signal inputted from the inputting means 63 is transmitted to
the upper controller 62 of the home server 51, and the upper
controller 62 generates a purchase command based on the signal and
inputs the purchase command in the encryption processing section 65
of the home server 51. Further, the input processing may be
performed upon starting the purchase processing. The encryption
processing section 65 having received this generates charge
information and license conditions information from the handling
policy inputted in step S167 and the price information inputted in
step S169. Since the charge was described in FIG. 42, its details
are omitted. Since the license conditions information was described
in FIG. 41, its details are omitted.
[0462] In step S171, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 stores the charge information generated in
step S170 in the storage module 92. In step S172, the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 transmits the
license conditions information generated in step S170 to the
external memory control section 97 of the encryption processing
section 65. After checking tamper of the external memory 67, the
external memory control section 97 having received the license
conditions information writes the license conditions information in
the external memory 67. Tamper check in writing the license
conditions information will be described latter with reference to
FIG. 69. In step S173, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 decrypts the individual key K.sub.i inputted
in step S166 by the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 using the delivery key K.sub.d
supplied from the storage module 92. Then, the control section 91
of the encryption processing section 65 decrypts the content key
K.sub.co inputted in step S165 by the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 using the previously decrypted
individual key K.sub.i. Finally, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 decrypts the content key K.sub.co
by the decryption unit 112 of the encryption/decryption module 96
using the save key K.sub.save supplied from the storage module 92.
In step S174, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key
K.sub.save is stored in the external memory 67 via the external
memory control section 97 of the encryption processing section
65.
[0463] If it is determined that the home server 51 is an apparatus
that cannot perform purchase processing in step S162, if it is
determined that the signature of the public key certificate of the
content provider 2 is not correct in step S163, if it is determined
that the signature of the contents encrypted by the content key
K.sub.co is not correct in step S164, if it is determined that the
signature of the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery
key K.sub.d is not correct, if it is determined that the signature
of the handling policy is not correct in step S167, if it is
determined that the signature of the certificate of the service
provider 3 is not correct in step S168, or if it is determined that
the signature of the price information is not correct in step S169,
the processing proceeds to step S176, where the home server 51
performs error processing. Further, only a signature for the
content key K.sub.co and the individual key K.sub.i may be verified
by uniting the processing of step S165 and step S166.
[0464] As described above, the home server 51 stores the charge
information in the storage module 92, and at the same time, after
decrypting the content key K.sub.co by the individual key K.sub.i,
encrypts the content key K.sub.co by the save key K.sub.save and
causes the external memory 67 to store it.
[0465] The fixed apparatus 52 also stores the charge information in
the storage module of the encryption processing section 73 by the
similar processing, and at the same time, decrypts the content key
K.sub.co by the individual key K.sub.i, encrypts the content key
K.sub.co by the save key K.sub.save2 (which is different from the
key of the home sever 51), and causes the external memory 79 to
store it.
[0466] FIG. 68 is a flow chart describing a method of tamper check
that the external memory control section 97 of the encryption
processing section 65 performs when reading out data from the
external memory 67. In step S180 of FIG. 68, the external memory
control section 97 of the encryption processing section 65
retrieves a position of data to be read out from the external
memory 67 (e.g., first data of the first block of FIG. 16). In step
S181, the external memory section 97 of the encryption processing
section 65 calculates a hash value (a hash value of the entire
first block of FIG. 16) with respect to all data in an identical
block including data that is planned to be read out in the external
memory 67. At this moment, data other than the data that is planned
to be read out (e.g., a content key 1 and license conditions
information 1) is destroyed after used for the hash value
calculation. In step S182, the hash value calculated in step S181
and a hash value (ICV.sub.1) stored in the storage module 92 of the
encryption processing section 65 are compared. If the hash values
coincide, the memory control section 97 transits the data read out
in step S181 to the control section 91 via the external memory
control section 97, and if the hash values do not coincide, the
processing proceeds to step S183, where the external memory control
section 97 prohibits writing thereafter assuming that the memory
block is tampered (wrong block). For example, given that the
external memory is a flash memory of 4 MB, it is assumed that the
memory is divided into 64 blocks. Therefore, 64 hash values are
stored in the storage module. In case of reading out data, a
location where the data is first retrieved, and a hash value with
respect to all data in an identical block including the data is
calculated. Tamper is checked by determining whether or not the
hash value coincides with the hash value corresponding to the block
in the storage module (see FIG. 16).
[0467] In this way, the external memory control section 97 of the
encryption processing section 65 performs tamper check of the
external memory 67, and reads out data.
[0468] FIG. 69 is a flow chart describing a method of tamper check
that the external memory control section 97 of the encryption
processing section 65 performs when writing data in the external
memory 67. In step S190A of FIG. 69, the external memory control
section 97 of the encryption processing section 65 retrieves a
location in the external memory 67 in which data can be written. In
step S191A, the external memory control section 97 of the
encryption processing section 65 determines whether or not there is
a vacant area in the external memory 67, and if it is determined
that there is a vacant area, the processing proceeds to step S192A.
In step S193A, the external memory control section 97 compares the
hash value calculated in step S192A and the hash value stored in
the storage module 92 of the encryption processing section 65, and
if the hash values coincide, the processing proceeds to step S194A.
In step S194A, the external memory control section 97 writes data
in a region in which data is planned to be written. In step S195A,
the external memory control section 97 of the encryption processing
section 65 recalculates a hash value with respect to all data in
the data block in which the data is written. In step S196A, the
control section 91 updates the hash value in the storage module 92
of the encryption processing section 65 to the hash value
calculated in step S195A.
[0469] In step S193A, if the calculated hash value is different
from the hash value in the storage module 92, the control section
91 regards the memory block as a wrong block (e.g., changes the
hash value to a value indicating a wrong block), and the processing
proceeds to step S190A.
[0470] If it is determined that there is no vacant area in the
external memory 67 in step S191A, the processing proceeds to step
S198A, and in step S198A, the external memory control section 97
returns a writing error to the control section 91, and terminates
the processing.
[0471] In a method for renewing (updating) the external memory
control section 97 to the external memory 67, as shown in FIG. 70,
the external memory control section 97 of the encryption processing
section 65 retrieves a location to which data in the external
memory 67 is to be renewed. In step S192B, the external memory
control section 97 of the encryption processing section 65
calculates a hash value with respect to all data in a data block
that is planned to be renewed. In step S193B, the external memory
control section 97 compares the hash value calculated in step S192B
and the hash value stored in the storage module 92 of the
encryption processing section 65, and if the hash values coincide,
the processing proceeds to step S194B. In step S194B, the external
memory control section 97 renews data in a region that is planned
to be renewed. In step S195B, the external memory control section
97 of the encryption processing section 65 calculates a hash value
with respect to all data in the data block to which the data is
written. In step S196B, the control section 91 updates the hash
value in the storage module 92 of the encryption processing section
65 to the hash value calculated in step S195B.
[0472] In step S193B, if the calculated hash value is different
from the hash value in the storage module 92, the control section
91 regards the memory block as a wrong block (e.g., changes the
hash value to a value indicating a wrong block), and considers that
the renewal is failed.
[0473] Method for deleting data of the external memory 79 will be
described with reference to FIG. 71. In step S190C, the external
memory control section of the encryption processing section 73
retrieves a location in which data of the external memory 79 will
be deleted. In step S192C, the external memory control section of
the encryption processing section 73 calculates a hash value with
respect to all data in a data block that is planned to be deleted.
In step S193C, the external memory control section compares the
hash value calculated in step S192C and the hash value stored in
the storage module (not shown) of the encryption processing section
73, and if the hash values coincides, the processing proceeds to
step S194C. In step S194C, the external memory control section
deletes data that is planned to be deleted in the region that is
planned to be deleted. In step S195C, the external memory control
section of the encryption processing section 73 recalculates a hash
value with respect to all the data in the data block in which the
data that is planned to be deleted is deleted. In step S196C, the
encryption processing section 73 updates the hash value in the
storage module to the hash value calculated in step S195C.
[0474] In step S193C, if the calculated hash value is different
from the hash value in the storage module, the encryption
processing section 73 regards the memory block as a wrong block
(e.g., changes the hash value to a value indicating a wrong block),
and considers that the deletion is failed.
[0475] Details of processing in which the homes server 51
reproduces contents corresponding to step S46 of FIG. 56 will be
described with reference to flow charts of FIGS. 72 and 73. In step
S200, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs an ID
corresponding to contents that the upper controller 62 is
instructed by the inputting means 63 of the home server 51 to
reproduce in the encryption processing section 65 of the home
server 51. In step S201, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 that has received the ID of the contents to
be reproduced transmits the content ID to the external memory
control section 97 of the encryption processing section 65, and
causes the external memory control section 97 to retrieve a content
key K.sub.co and license conditions information corresponding to
the content ID. At this moment, the control section 91 confirms
that the license conditions information is a right that can be
reproduced. In step S202, the external memory control section 97 of
the encryption processing section 65 calculates a hash value of a
data block including the content key K.sub.co and the license
conditions information, and transmits the hash value to the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65. In step S203,
the control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65
determines whether or not the hash value stored in the storage
module 92 of the encryption processing section 65 and the hash
value received in step S202 coincide, and if the hash values
coincide, the processing proceeds to step S204.
[0476] In step S204, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 updates license conditions information, if
necessary. For example, if a utilization right in the license
conditions information is a commutation ticket, the control section
91 performs processing such as for subtracting the number of times.
Therefore, in case of a buy only right or the like that does not
need to be updated, the processing jumps to step S208 (not shown).
In step S205, the external memory control section 97 rewrites the
updated license conditions information transmitted from the control
section 91 to the external memory 67 and updates it. In step S206,
the external memory control section 97 recalculates a hash value
with respect to all the data in the rewritten data block, and
transmits it to the control section 91 of the encryption processing
section 65. In step S207, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 rewrites the hash value stored in the storage
module 92 of the encryption processing section 65 to the hash value
calculated in step S206.
[0477] In step S208, the encryption processing section 65 and the
extension section 66 mutually authenticates, and shares the
temporary key K.sub.temp. Since the mutual authentication
processing was described with reference to FIG. 51, its details are
omitted. In step S209, the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 decrypts the content key K.sub.co
read out from the external memory 97 by the save key K.sub.save
supplied form the storage module 92. In step S210, the encryption
unit 112 of the encryption/decryption module 96 re-encrypts the
content key K.sub.co by the temporary key K.sub.temp previously
shared with the extension section 66. In step S211, the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 transmits the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp to
the extension section 66 via the upper controller 62.
[0478] In step S212, the key decryption module 102 of the extension
section 66 decrypts the content key K.sub.co by the temporary key
K.sub.temp supplied from the mutual authentication module 101. In
step S213, the upper controller 62 reads out contents from the mass
storage section 68, and supplies them to the extension section 66.
The encryption module 103 of the extension section 66 having
received the contents decrypts the contents using the content key
K.sub.co supplied from the key decryption module 102. In step S214,
the extension module 104 of the extension section 66 extends the
contents with a predetermined method, for example, such a method as
ATRAC. In step S215, the electronic watermark addition module 105
inserts the data instructed by the encryption processing section 65
in the contents in the form of a watermark (the data handed to the
extension section from the encryption processing section is not
limited to the content key K.sub.co, but includes reproduction
conditions (an analogue output, a digital output, an output with
copy control signal (SCMS)), an apparatus ID that purchased the
content utilization right and the like. Data to be inserted is an
ID of an apparatus that purchased the content utilization right
(i.e., an apparatus ID in the license conditions information) or
the like. In step S216, the extension section 66 reproduces music
via a speaker (not shown).
[0479] In this way, the home server 51 reproduces contents.
[0480] FIG. 74 is a flow chart illustrating details of processing
in which the home server 51 purchases a content utilization right
on behalf of the fixed apparatus 52. In step S220, the home server
51 and the fixed apparatus 52 mutually authenticates. Since the
mutual authentication processing is similar to the processing
described in FIG. 52, its description is omitted. In step S221, the
upper controller 62 of the home server 51 causes the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51 to inspect registration
information read out from the mass storage section 68 of the home
server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having received the
registration information from the upper controller 62 causes the
signature verification unit 115 of the encryption/decryption module
96 to verify a signature attached to the registration information
by a public key of the electronic distribution service center 1
supplied form the storage module 92 of the encryption processing
section 65. After successful verification of the signature, the
control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 decides
if an ID of the fixed apparatus is registered in the registration
information and the items of "registration" and "purchase" are
marked "registration possible" and "purchase possible," and if it
is decided that the item is marked "registration possible," the
processing proceeds to step S222 (Further, the fixed apparatus 52
also inspects the registration information and decides that the
home server is "registration possible.") Since steps S225 to S227
are similar to steps S160 to S171 of FIG. 67, their details are
omitted.
[0481] In step S228, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 decrypts the individual key K.sub.i encrypted
by the delivery key K.sub.d inputted in step S225 by the decryption
unit 111 of the encryption/decryption module 96 using the delivery
key K.sub.d supplied from the storage module 92. Then, the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 decrypts the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i
inputted in step S225 by the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 using the individual key K.sub.i.
Then, the control section 91 of the encryption processing section
65 re-encrypts the content key K.sub.co by the encryption unit 112
of the encryption/decryption module 96 using the temporary key
K.sub.temp that was shared with the fixed apparatus 52 at the time
of the mutual authentication of step S220. In step S229, the
control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65
generates signatures using the signature generation unit 114 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 with respect to the content key
K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp and the license
conditions information generated in step S226, and transmits them
to the upper controller 62. The upper controller 62 of the homes
server 51 having received the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp, the license conditions information and
their signatures reads out the contents (including a signature;
hereinafter the same) encrypted by the content key K.sub.co from
the mass storage section 68, and transmits the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp, the license conditions
information, their signatures and the contents encrypted by the
content key K.sub.co to the fixed apparatus 52.
[0482] In step S230, the fixed apparatus 52 having received the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp, the
license conditions information, their signatures and the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co outputs the contents
encrypted by the contents key K.sub.co to the record reproduction
section 76 after verifying the signature. The record reproduction
section 76 of the fixed apparatus 52 having received the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co stores the contents encrypted
by the content key K.sub.co in the recording medium 80.
[0483] In step S231, the encryption processing section 73 of the
fixed apparatus 52 decrypts the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the temporary key K.sub.temp by the decryption unit of the
encryption/decryption module using the temporary key K.sub.temp
that was shared with the homes server 51 at the time of the mutual
authentication in step S220. Then, the control section of the
encryption processing section 73 re-encrypts the content key
K.sub.co by the encryption unit of the encryption/decryption module
using the save key K.sub.save2 supplied from the storage module of
the encryption processing section 73.
[0484] In step S232, the encryption processing section 73 of the
fixed apparatus 52 transmits the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the save key K.sub.save2 and the license conditions information
received in step S230 to the external memory control section of the
encryption processing section 73, and causes the external memory 79
to save them. Since processing in which the external memory control
section writes data in the external memory was described in FIG.
69, details are omitted.
[0485] In this way, the home sever 51 purchases a content
utilization right, charge information is stored in the home server
51 side, and a utilization right is transferred to the fixed
apparatus 52.
[0486] FIG. 75 is a flow chart illustrating processing for changing
a purchased content utilization right to another utilization form
to purchase it. Since steps S240 to S245 are similar to the
processing described in FIG. 67, its description is omitted. In
step S246, the encryption processing section 65 of the home server
51 causes the external memory control section 97 of the encryption
processing section 65 to read out license conditions information of
contents whose utilization right is changed. Since reading out of
data from the external memory 67 was described with reference to
FIG. 68, its details are omitted. If the license conditions
information is correctly read out in step S246, the processing
proceeds to step S247.
[0487] In step S247, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
displays information of content whose utilization right contents
can be changed (e.g., a utilization form or a price whose
utilization right contents can be changed) using the display means
64, and a user selects utilization right contents update conditions
using the inputting means 63. The signal inputted from the
inputting means 63 is transmitted to the upper controller 62 of the
home server 51, and the upper controller 62 generates a utilization
right content change command based on the signal and inputs the
utilization right contents change command in the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51. The encryption
processing section 65 having received this generates charge
information and new license conditions information from the
handling policy received in step S243, the price information
received in step S245 and the license conditions information read
out in step S247.
[0488] Since step S248 is similar to step S171 of FIG. 67, its
detailed description is omitted. In step S249, the control section
91 of the encryption processing section 65 outputs the license
conditions information generated in step S247 to the external
memory control section 97 of the encryption processing section 65.
The external memory control section 97 overwrites the received
license conditions information in the external memory 67 and
updates it. Since the method of rewriting (updating) method to the
external memory 67 of the external memory control section 97 was
described in FIG. 70, its details are omitted.
[0489] In step S246, if license conditions information
corresponding to the content ID attached to the right contents
change command was not found in the external memory 67, or if
tamper was found in a storage block of the external memory in which
the license conditions information is stored (which has been
described with reference to FIG. 68), the processing proceeds to
step S251, and predetermined error processing is performed.
[0490] In this way, the home server 51 can purchase a new right
using an already purchased right (described in the license
conditions information), a handling policy and price information,
and change utilization right contents.
[0491] FIGS. 76 and 77 illustrate concrete examples of a rule
portion of a handling policy and price information. In FIG. 76, the
handling policy is composed of a rule number attached to each
utilization right as a serial number, a utilization contents number
indicating utilization right contents, its parameter, a minimum
sales price, and a profit ratio of a content provider, in which,
for example, five rules are written. Since a rule 1 has a
utilization right contents number 1 as a right item, it is seen
from FIG. 44 that the right is a right without a reproduction
right, time and number of times limitations. In addition, it is
seen that there is no specific description in the item of a
parameter. The minimum sales price is 350, and a share of the
content provider 2 is 30% of the price. Since a rule 2 has a
utilization right contents number 2 as the right item, it is seen
from FIG. 44 that the right is a right with a reproduction right
and time limitation and without number of times limitation. In
addition, it is seen from the item of a parameter that a
utilization possible period is one hour. The minimum sales price is
100, and the share of the content provider 2 is 30% of the price.
Since a rule 3 has a utilization right contents number 6 as the
right item, it is seen from FIG. 44 that the right is a right
without a reproduction right (without a copy control signal),
without time limitation and with number of times limitation. In
addition, it is seen from the item of a parameter that the
utilization possible number of times is one. The minimum sales
price is 30, and the share of the content provider 2 is 30% of the
price.
[0492] Since a rule 4 has a utilization right contents number 13 as
the right item, it is seen from FIG. 44 that the right is
utilization contents change. It is seen from the item of a
parameter that a changeable rule number from #2 (with a
reproduction right, with time limitation and without number of
times limitation) to #1 (without a reproduction: right, time and
number of times limitation). The minimum price is 200, and the
share of the content provider 2 is 20% of the price. The minimum
sales price is presented lower than that of the rule 1 because it
is considered that an already purchased right it traded in and
repurchased, and the share of the content provider 2 is presented
lower than that of the rules 1 in order to increase the share of
the electronic distribution service center 1 that performs actual
work (since the content provider 2 has no work at the time of right
contents change).
[0493] Since a rule 5 has a utilization right contents number 14 as
the right item, it is seen from FIG. 44 that the right is
redistribution. It is seen from the item of a parameter that
redistribution possible conditions is that an apparatus having the
rule number #1 (without a reproduction right, time and number of
times limitation) purchases and redistribute the rules number #1
(without a reproduction right, time and number of times
limitation). The minimum sales price is 250, and the share of the
content provider 2 is 20% of the price. The minimum sales price is
lower than that of the rule 1 because it is considered that an
apparatus having an already purchased right repurchases identical
contents, and the share of the content provider 2 is presented
lower than that of the rule 1 in order to increase the share of the
electronic distribution service center 1 that performs actual work
(since the content provider 2 does not have work at the time of
redistribution).
[0494] In FIG. 77, the price information is composes of a rule
number attached to each utilization right as a serial number, a
parameter and price information. Five rules are also described in
this price information. A rule 1 is price information corresponding
to the rule #1 of the handling policy, and indicates that a price
is 500 and a share of the service provider 3 is 30% when the
utilization contents number #1 is purchased. Therefore, out of 500
paid by a user, the content provider 2 takes 150, the service
provider 3 takes 150, and the electronic distribution service
center 1 takes 200. Since rules 2 to 5 are similar, their details
are omitted.
[0495] Further, in rules 4 and 5, the share of the service provider
2 is fewer than that of the rule 1 because a user apparatus
performs distribution work on behalf of the service provider 2, and
the electronic distribution service center 1 performs collection of
prices.
[0496] In addition, although the rule numbers are serial numbers
from #1 to #5 in this example, this is not necessarily the case.
Since a person preparing price information sets a utilization
contents number and a number for each rule number, and arranges
ones extracted from the numbers, the rule numbers are not generally
serial numbers.
[0497] FIG. 78 illustrates a specific example when the right
contents change described in FIG. 75 is performed. The handling
policy is composed of a rule number attached to each utilization
right as a serial number, a utilization contents number indicating
utilization right contents, it parameter, a minimum sales price,
and a profit ratio of a content provider, the price information is
composes of a rule number attached to each utilization right as a
serial number, a parameter and price information, and the license
conditions information is composed of a rule number attached to
each utilization right as a serial number, a utilization right
contents number indicating utilization right contents, and its
parameter. The home server 51 has already purchased a right with a
reproduction right with the rule number #2 and time limitation, and
the rule number #2 is described in the license conditions
information indicating right contents, which indicates that
remaining utilization possible time is thirty minutes, and
accumulated two hours of purchase has been performed so far. If it
is tried to change the right from with time limitation to without
time limitation now, it is seen from a rule 3 of the handling
policy, a rule 3 of the price information and the license
conditions information that the right can be changed to without a
reproduction right, time and number of times limitation with 200,
and the license conditions information changes to without a
reproduction right, time and number of times limitation of the rule
number #1 and the utilization right contents number (a parameter in
case of the utilization right contents number #1 will be described
later. In addition, in this example, changing the right contents
once after buying a right with time limitation is cheaper than
directly buying a right without a reproduction right, time and
number of times limitation. Thus, it is better to put a discount
considering accumulated utilization time.
[0498] FIG. 79 is a flow chart illustrating details of processing
in which the home server 51 purchases a content utilization right
for the fixed apparatus 52 and redistributes the utilization right.
Since steps S260 to S264 are similar to steps S220 to S225 of FIG.
74, their detailed description is omitted. In step S265, the
encryption processing section 65 of the home server 51 causes the
external memory control section 97 of the encryption processing
section 65 to read out from the external memory 67 license
conditions information and the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the save key K.sub.save corresponding to contents that is tried to
be redistributed. Since a method of reading out from the external
memory 67 by the external memory control section 97 was described
in FIG. 68, its details are omitted. If successfully read out, the
processing proceeds to step S266.
[0499] In step S266, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
displays information whose contents can be redistributed (e.g., a
utilization form or a price whose contents can be redistributed)
using the display means 64, and a user selects redistribution
contents conditions using the inputting means 63. Further, this
selection processing may be performed at the time of starting the
redistribution processing in advance. The signal inputted from the
inputting means 63 is transmitted to the upper controller 62 of the
home server 51, and the upper controller 62 generates a
redistribution command based on the signal and inputs the
redistribution command in the encryption processing section 65 of
the home server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having
received this generates charge information and new license
conditions information from the handling policy and the price
information received in step S264, and the license conditions
information read out in step S265.
[0500] Since step S267 is similar to step S171 of FIG. 67, its
detailed description is omitted. In step S268, the control section
91 of the encryption processing section 65 decrypts the content key
K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save read out in step S265
by the decryption unit 111 of the encryption/decryption module 96
using the save key K.sub.save supplied from the storage module 92.
Then, the control section 91 of the encryption processing section
65 re-encrypts the content key K.sub.co by the encryption unit 112
of the encryption/decryption module 96 using the temporary key
K.sub.temp that was shared with at the time of mutual
authentication in step S260. Finally, the signature generation unit
114 of the encryption/decryption module 96 generates signatures
corresponding to the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp and the new license conditions information
generated in step S266, and returns it to the control section 91 of
the encryption processing section 65.
[0501] Since processing of steps S269 to S272 is similar to steps
S229 to S232 of FIG. 74, its details are omitted.
[0502] In this way, the home server 51 can perform redistribution
of contents by creating new license conditions information from a
utilization right (license conditions information) it owns and a
handling policy, price information, and transmitting the
information to the fixed apparatus 52 together with the content key
K.sub.co and contents it owns.
[0503] FIG. 80 is a flow chart illustrating details of processing
in which the home server 51 transmits license conditions
information and content key K.sub.co to the fixed apparatus 52 and
the fixed apparatus 52 purchases a content utilization right. In
step S280, the encryption processing section 73 of the fixed
apparatus 52 decides whether or not a total of charges of charge
information stored in the storage module of the encryption
processing section 73 has reached an upper limit, and if it has not
reached the upper limit, the processing proceeds to step S281
(Further, the decision may be made by an upper limit of the number
of charge processing instead of the upper limit of charges).
[0504] In step S281, the upper controller 72 of the fixed apparatus
52 inputs the registration information read out from the small
storage section 75 of the fixed apparatus 52 in the encryption
processing section 73 of the fixed apparatus 52. The encryption
processing section 73 having received the registration information
decides if the item of "purchase processing" for the ID of the
fixed apparatus 52 is marked "purchase possible" after verifying a
signature of the registration information by a signature
verification unit of an encryption/decryption module (not shown),
and if it is "purchase possible," the processing proceeds to step
S282.
[0505] Since step S282 is similar to step S220 of FIG. 74, its
details are omitted. Since step S283 is similar to step S221 of
FIG. 74, its details are omitted (the home server 51 decides
whether or not the fixed apparatus 52 is registered, and the fixed
apparatus 52 decides whether or not the home server 51 is
registered). Since step S284 is similar to step S265 of FIG. 79,
its details are omitted. Since step S285 is similar to step S268 of
FIG. 79, its details are omitted. In step S286, the control section
91 of the encryption processing section 65 generates signatures
with respect to the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp and the license conditions information read out in
step S284 using the signature generation unit 114 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, and transmits them to the upper
controller 62. The upper controller 62 of the home server 51 having
received the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key
K.sub.temp and the license conditions information and their
signatures reads out the contents encrypted by the content key
K.sub.co, the handling policy and its signature, if necessary, and
the price information and its signature from the mass storage
section 68, and transmits the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp and the license conditions information,
the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co, the handling
policy and its signature, and the price information and its
signature to the fixed apparatus 52.
[0506] Since step S287 is similar to step S230 of FIG. 74, its
details are omitted. Since step S288 is similar to step S225 of
FIG. 74, its details are omitted. In step S289, the upper
controller 72 of the fixed apparatus 52 displays information whose
contents can be redistributed (e.g., a utilization form or a price
whose contents can be redistributed) using the display means 78,
and a user selects redistribution contents conditions using the
inputting means 77. Further, this selection processing may be
performed at the time of starting the redistribution processing in
advance. The signal inputted from the inputting means 77 is
transmitted to the upper controller 72 of the fixed apparatus 52,
and the upper controller 72 generates a redistribution command
based on the signal and inputs the redistribution command in the
encryption processing section 73 of the fixed apparatus 52. The
encryption processing section 73 having received this generates
charge information and new license conditions information from the
handling policy, the price information and the license conditions
information received in step S286.
[0507] In step S290, the encryption processing section 73 of the
fixed apparatus 52 stores the charge information generated in step
S289 in a storage module (not shown) of the encryption processing
section 73. In step S291, the encryption processing section 73 of
the fixed apparatus 52 decrypts the content key K.sub.co encrypted
by the temporary key K.sub.temp received in step S286 by a
decryption unit (not shown) of the encryption processing section 73
using the temporary key K.sub.temp shared in step S282. Then, the
encryption processing section 73 of the fixed apparatus 52 encrypts
the content key K.sub.co by an encryption unit (not shown) of the
encryption processing section 73 using the save key K.sub.save2
supplied form a storage module (not shown) of the encryption
processing section 73.
[0508] In step S292, the encryption processing section 73 of the
fixed apparatus 52 transmits the license conditions information
generated in step S289 and the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the save key K.sub.save2 generated in step S291 to an external
memory control section (not shown) of the encryption processing
section 73. The external memory control section having received the
license conditions information and the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the save key K.sub.save2 writes the license conditions
information and the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key
K.sub.save2 in the external memory 79. Since the tamper check in
writing was described with reference to FIG. 69, its details are
omitted.
[0509] In this way, the fixed apparatus 52 can receive
redistribution of contents by receiving a utilization right
(license conditions information) owned by the home server 51, a
handling policy, price information, a content key K.sub.co, and
contents from the home server 51, and creating new license
conditions information in the fixed apparatus 52.
[0510] FIG. 81 illustrates a managed transfer right. Managed
transfer means an operation capable of transferring a reproduction
right from an apparatus 1 to an apparatus 2, which is the same as
normal transfer in that the right is transferred from the apparatus
1 to the apparatus 2, but is different from normal transfer in that
the apparatus 2 cannot retransfer the received reproduction right
(the apparatus 1 after transferring a reproduction right cannot
retransfer the reproduction right as in the normal transfer). The
apparatus 2 having received the reproduction right by the managed
transfer can return the reproduction right to the apparatus 1, and
after returning the reproduction right, the apparatus 1 can
transfer the reproduction right again and the apparatus 2 cannot
continue to transfer the reproduction right. In order to realize
these, a purchaser of the managed transfer right and a current
holder of the managed transfer right are managed in the license
conditions information (here, it is assumed that the managed
transfer can only be performed if the utilization content number #1
is held, but this can be extended to the utilization right content
number #2).
[0511] In FIG. 81, since the rule 1 of the handling policy was
described in FIG. 78, its details are omitted. Since a right item
of the rule 2 is the utilization right content number 16, it is
seen from FIG. 44 that the right is the managed transfer right. In
addition, it is seen that there is no specific description in the
item of a parameter. The minimum sales price is 100, and the share
of the content provider 2 is 50% of the price. The share of the
content provider 2 is presented higher than that of the rule 1
because, since the service provider 3 does not perform actual work
at all, its share is transferred to the share of the content
provider 2.
[0512] In FIG. 81, since the rule 1 of price information was
described in FIG. 78, its details are omitted. The rule 2 is price
information of the rule #2 of a handling policy, and indicates that
the price is 100 and the share of the service provider 3 is 0% when
the utilization right content number #16 is purchased. Therefore,
out of 100 paid by a user, the content provider 2 takes 50, the
service provider 3 takes 0, and the electronic distribution service
center 1 takes 50.
[0513] In FIG. 81, the user first purchases the rule number #1
(without a reproduction right, time and number of times
limitation). However, the user does not have the managed transfer
right then (the state of a in FIG. 81). Then, the user purchases
the managed transfer right (since these operations happens in an
instance, it looks as if the user purchased all at a time).
Concerning the rule number of the license conditions, an ID of an
encryption processing section indicating a purchase (hereinafter
referred to as a purchaser) is ID1 (e.g., an ID of the home server
51), and an ID of an encryption processing section holding the
reproduction right (hereinafter referred to as a holder) is ID2
(the state of b in FIG. 81). If this is transferred to the fixed
apparatus 52 by performing the managed transfer, in the rule
section of the license conditions information held by the home
server 51, the purchase is still ID1, but the holder is changed to
ID2. In addition, in the rule section of the license conditions
information held by the fixed apparatus 52 having received the
reproduction right by the managed transfer, the purchase is ID1 and
the holder is ID2, which is the same as the license conditions
information of the home server 51.
[0514] FIG. 82 is a flow chart illustrating details of the transfer
processing of the managed transfer right. In FIG. 82, since step
S300 is similar to step S220 of FIG. 74, its details are omitted.
In addition, since step S301 is similar to step S221 of FIG. 74,
its details are omitted. Since step S302 is similar to step S246 of
FIG. 75, its details are omitted. In step S303, the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51 inspects the rule
section of the read out license conditions information, and decides
if the use right is without the reproduction right, time and number
of times limitation and with the managed transfer right. If it is
decided that there is the managed transfer right, the processing
proceeds to step S304.
[0515] In step S304, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 decides if both the purchaser and the holder
of the managed transfer right are the ID of the home server 51. If
it is decided that both the purchase and the holder of the managed
transfer right is the ID of the home server 51, the processing
proceeds to step S305. In step S305, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 rewrites the holder of the managed
transfer right of the license conditions information to the ID of
the fixed apparatus 52. In step S306, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 outputs the license conditions
information rewritten in step S305 to the external memory control
section 97 of the encryption processing section 65. The external
memory control section 97 of the encryption processing section 65
having received the license conditions information overwrites the
license conditions information on the external memory 67. Since the
method of rewriting and storing data of the external memory 67 was
described in FIG. 70, their details are omitted. Since steps S307
to S311 are similar to steps S268 to S272 of FIG. 79, their details
are omitted.
[0516] If the managed transfer right was not included in the
license conditions information in step S303, or if the purchase or
the holder of the managed transfer right was not the home server 51
in step S304, the processing is terminated.
[0517] In this way, the right for reproducing contents from the
home server 51 to the fixed apparatus 52 can be transferred.
[0518] FIG. 83 is a flow chart illustrating processing for
returning the managed transfer right from the fixed apparatus 52
currently holding the managed transfer right to the home server 51
that is the purchaser of the managed transfer right. In FIG. 83,
since step S320 is similar to step S220 of FIG. 74, its details are
omitted. Since step S321 is similar to step S221 of FIG. 74, its
details are omitted, but it is inspected if the other's ID is
registered in each of the home server 51 and the fixed apparatus
52. If it is decided that the IDs are registered, the processing
proceeds to step S322. Since step S322 is similar to step S246 of
FIG. 75, its details are omitted, but data of an identical content
ID is read out in both the home server 51 and the fixed apparatus
52. If data is correctly read from the external memory, the
processing proceeds to step S323. Since step S323 is similar to
step S303 of FIG. 82, its details are omitted, but it is decided
that both the home server 51 and the fixed apparatus 52 have the
managed transfer right. If it is decided that there is the managed
transfer right, the processing proceeds to step S324.
[0519] In step S324, the encryption processing section 65 of the
home server 51 decides if the purchaser of the managed transfer
right is the ID of the homes server 51 and the holder is the ID of
the fixed apparatus 52. If it is decided that the purchaser of the
managed transfer right is the ID of the home server 51 and the
holder is the ID of the fixed apparatus 52, the processing proceeds
to step S325. Similarly, the encryption processing section 73 of
the fixed apparatus 52 decides if the purchaser of the managed
transfer right is the ID of the home server 51 and the holder is
the ID of the fixed apparatus 52. If it is decided that the
purchaser of the managed transfer right is the ID of the home
server 51 and the holder is the ID of the fixed apparatus 52, the
processing proceeds to step S325.
[0520] In step S325, the record reproduction section 76 of the
fixed apparatus 52 deletes contents from the recording medium 80
(however, since encrypted data simply remains, the contents needs
not be deleted by force). In step S326, the encryption processing
section 73 of the fixed apparatus 52 causes an external memory
control section (not shown) of the encryption processing section 73
to delete the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key
K.sub.save2 stored in the external memory 79 and the license
conditions information. Since the deletion method of data of the
external memory 79 was described in FIG. 71, its details are
omitted.
[0521] In step S327, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 generates license conditions information in
which the holder of the managed transfer right of the license
conditions information to the ID of the home server 51. In step
S328, the control section 91 of the encryption processing section
65 outputs the license conditions information generated in step
S327 to the external memory control section 97 of the encryption
processing section 65. The external memory control section 97 of
the encryption processing section 65 having received the license
conditions information overwrites and stores the license conditions
information in the external memory 67. Since the method for
rewriting and storing in the external memory 67 was described in
FIG. 70, its details are omitted.
[0522] If the registration information was tampered or the ID of
the other apparatus was not registered in the homes server 51 or
the fixed apparatus 52 in step S321, or if the content key or the
license conditions information with respect to predetermined
contents was not found in the external memory or the memory block
including these was tampered in the home server 51 or the fixed
apparatus 52 in step S322, the processing proceeds to step S329 and
error processing is performed.
[0523] If the managed transfer right did not exist in the license
conditions information in the home server 51 or the fixed apparatus
52 in step S323, or if the purchase was the home server 51 and the
holder was not the fixed apparatus 52 in the home server 51 or the
fixed apparatus 52 in step S324, the processing is terminated.
[0524] In this way, a right for reproducing contents can be
returned from the fixed apparatus 52 to the home server 51.
[0525] Further, although contents and the content key K.sub.co or
the like are described as one, these may exist in plural if
necessary.
[0526] In addition, although the content provider 2 and the service
provider 3 is handled separately, they may be united as one.
Moreover, the method of the content provider 2 may be applied to
the service provider 3 as it is.
[0527] (2) Encryption Processing by Using an Individual Key
[0528] The content provider 2 encrypts contents a content key that
the content provider 2 itself prepared as described above with
reference to FIG. 9. In addition, the content provider 2 receives
an individual key peculiar to a content provider from the
electronic distribution service center 1 and an individual key
encrypted by a delivery key, and encrypts the content key by the
individual key. Thus, the content provider 2 supplies the contents
encrypted by the content key, the content key encrypted by the
individual key, and the individual key encrypted by the delivery
key to the user home network 5 via the service provider 3.
[0529] The user home network 5 decrypts the individual key peculiar
to a content provider using the delivery key received from the
electronic distribution service center 1. Thus, the user home
network 5 can decrypts the content key that is encrypted by the
individual key peculiar to a content provider and supplied from the
content provider 2. The user home network 5 having obtained the
content key can decrypt contents by the content key.
[0530] Here, while an individual key is peculiar to each content
server, a delivery key is only one kind. Therefore, the user home
network 5 can decrypt an individual key from each content provider
if it has one kind of delivery key. Accordingly, the user home
network 5 does not need to have an individual key peculiar to each
content provider, and can purchase contents of all content
providers simply by having a delivery key.
[0531] In addition, each content provider cannot decrypt individual
keys (encrypted by a delivery key) peculiar to other content
providers by not having a delivery key. Thus, stealing of contents
among content providers can be prevented.
[0532] Here, in order to clarify the above-mentioned configurations
of the embodiments and each means of the inventions described in
the claims, characteristics of the present invention will be
described as follows by adding the embodiment (only one example)
corresponding to each means in parenthesis following each means.
However, this description does not mean that each means is limited
to the described examples of course.
[0533] That is, in the information transmission system of the
present invention is provided with a memory for saving individual
key (e.g., a tamper resistant memory 201 of FIG. 84) held by a
content provider or a content seller transmitting information such
as contents (e.g., a content transmission apparatus 200 of FIG.
84), means for encrypting a content key K.sub.co by an individual
key K.sub.i (e.g., a data encryption section 203 of FIG. 84), means
for generating a handling policy in which use conditions or the
like of the content key K.sub.co are described (e.g., a handling
policy generation section 206 of FIG. 84), means for generating a
digital signature with respect to various kinds of data (e.g., a
signature generation section 207 of FIG. 84), means for verifying
signature data generated with respect to various kinds of data
(e.g., a signature verification section 222 of FIG. 84) held by a
user purchasing contents (e.g., a content receiving apparatus 210
of FIG. 84), means for comparing an ID indicating a generator of
the content key K.sub.co and an ID of a generator of the handling
policy (e.g., a comparator 226 of FIG. 84), and means for saving a
delivery key (e.g., a tamper resistant memory 221 of FIG. 84).
[0534] In addition, the information transmission system of the
present invention is provided with a memory for saving an
individual key (e.g., a tamper resistant memory 201 of FIG. 85)
held by a content provider or a content seller transmitting
information such as contents (e.g., a content transmission
apparatus 200 of FIG. 85), a memory for saving a key certificate
(e.g., a memory 202 of FIG. 85), means for encryption a content key
K.sub.co by an individual key K.sub.i (e.g., a data encryption
section 203 of FIG. 85), means for verifying signature data
generated with respect to various kinds of data (e.g., a signature
verification section 222 of FIG. 85) held by a user purchasing
contents (e.g., a content receiving apparatus 210 of FIG. 85), and
means for saving a delivery key (e.g., a tamper resistant 221 of
FIG. 85).
[0535] (3) Remote Reproduction Processing
[0536] Remote reproduction processing for receiving a reproduction
command from an apparatus holding contents (e.g., the homes server
51) by an apparatus that does not hold a reproduction right of
contents (e.g., the fixed apparatus 52) and reproducing the
contents will be described.
[0537] FIG. 86 shows remote reproduction processing procedures, and
first, in step S401, the home server 51 and the fixed apparatus 52
mutually authenticate after a content ID of contents that are to be
remotely reproduced by an input operation of a user is inputted in
the upper controller 62. Since the mutual authentication processing
is similar to the processing described in FIG. 52, its description
is omitted. In step S402, the upper controller 62 of the home
server 51 causes the encryption processing section 65 of the home
server 51 to inspect registration information read out from the
mass storage section 68 of the home server 51. The encryption
processing section 65 having received the registration information
from the upper controller 62 causes the signature verification unit
115 of the encryption/decryption module 96 to verify a signature
attached to the registration information by a public key of the
authentication station 22 supplied form the storage module 92 of
the encryption processing section 65. After successful verification
of the signature, the encryption processing section 65 decides if
the item of "registration" is marked "registration possible," and
if it is decided that the item is marked "registration possible,"
the processing proceeds to step S403. Further, the fixed apparatus
52 side also inspects the registration information, and decides
that the home server 51 is marked "registration possible."
[0538] In step S403, the upper controller 62 generates a
reproduction command including a content ID of contents to be
remotely reproduced, and in subsequent step S404, the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51 causes the external
memory control section 97 of the encryption processing section 65
to read out a content key K.sub.co encrypted by a save key
K.sub.save and license conditions information corresponding to the
contents to be remotely reproduced from the external memory 67.
Since a method for reading out data from the external memory 67 by
the external memory control section 97 is as described in FIG. 68,
its details are omitted. If succeeded in reading out, the
processing proceeds to step S405.
[0539] In step S405, the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 decrypts the content key K.sub.co
read out from the external memory 67 by the save key K.sub.save
supplied from the storage module 92. After encrypting the content
key K.sub.co by the temporary key K.sub.temp in step S406, the
encryption unit 112 of the encryption/decryption module 96 encrypts
the reproduction command by the temporary key K.sub.temp in step
S407.
[0540] In the subsequent step S408, the home server 51 reads out
the contents (encrypted by the content key K.sub.co) to be remotely
reproduced from the mass storage section 68, and transmits the
contents to the fixed apparatus 52 together with the content key
and the reproduction command encrypted by the temporary key
K.sub.temp in the above-mentioned steps S406 and S407.
[0541] In step S409, the fixed apparatus 52 decrypts the content
key and the reproduction command received from the home server 51
by the temporary key K.sub.temp, and in step S410, the encryption
processing section 73 and the extension section 74 mutually
authenticate and share the temporary key K.sub.temp2. Then, in step
S411, the encryption processing section 73 encrypts the content key
K.sub.co and the reproduction command by the temporary key
K.sub.temp2 shared with the extension section 74 in the
above-mentioned step S410. In step S412, the encryption processing
section 73 transmits the content key K.sub.co and the reproduction
command encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp2 to the extension
section 74, and in step S413, the extension section 74 decrypts the
content key K.sub.co and the reproduction command by the temporary
key K.sub.temp2.
[0542] In step S414, the extension section 74 decrypts the contents
received from the home server 51 in the above-mentioned step S408
by the content key K.sub.co decrypted in the above-mentioned step
S413 in accordance with the reproduction command decrypted in the
above-mentioned step S413. Then, in step S415, the extension
section 74 extends the decrypted contents by a predetermined method
such as the ATRAC. In step S416, the upper controller 72 inserts
data instructed by the encryption processing section 73 in the
contents in the form of an electronic watermark. Incidentally, the
data handed from the encryption processing section 73 to the
extension section 74 is not limited to the content key K.sub.co and
the reproduction command, but includes reproduction conditions (an
analog output, a digital output, an output with copy control signal
(SCMS)), an ID of an apparatus that has purchased a content
utilization right, or the like. The data to be inserted is the ID
of the apparatus that has purchased the content utilization right,
i.e., an ID of an apparatus in the license conditions information.
In step S417, the extension section 74 reproduces music via a
speaker (not shown).
[0543] In the above-described configuration, since the home server
51 transmits the contents and the reproduction command of the
contents as well as the content key K.sub.co to the fixed apparatus
52, the fixed apparatus 52 that does not hold the reproduction
right of the contents can reproduce the contents using the
reproduction command and the content key K.sub.co. Therefore,
according to the above-described configuration, the contents can be
reproduced in a plurality of apparatuses (a fixed apparatus, etc)
connected to an apparatus holding the contents (an apparatus having
the reproduction right of the contents).
[0544] (4) Reservation Purchase Processing
[0545] Reservation purchase processing for performing a purchase
reservation of contents by performing key conversion of the
contents in advance before an effective period of a delivery key is
expired will be described. In step S451 of reservation purchase
processing procedures indicated in FIG. 87, the home server 51
performs registration information update decision processing, and
the processing proceeds to step S452. Since the registration
information update decision processing is as described in FIGS. 61
and 62, its detailed description is omitted. However, in the
reservation purchase processing, decision of a registration
information update timing based on a number of purchase and a
purchase price described in steps S601 and S602 of FIG. 61 may not
be performed.
[0546] In step S452, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the registration information read out from the mass storage
section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption processing
section 65 of the home server 51. After verifying a signature of
the registration information by the signature verification unit 115
of the encryption/decryption module 96, the encryption processing
section 65 having received the registration information decides
whether or not the items of "purchase processing" and
"registration" with respect to the ID of the home server 51 are
marked "purchase possible" and "registration possible," and if they
are marked "purchase possible" and "registration possible," the
processing proceeds to step S453. In step S453, the upper
controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs the public key
certificate of the content provider 2 read out from the mass
storage section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51. After verifying a
signature of the public key certificate of the content provider 2
by the signature verification unit 115 of the encryption/decryption
module 96, the encryption processing section 65 having received the
public key certificate of the content provider 2 takes out a public
key of the content provider 2 from the public key certificate. If
it is confirmed that no tamper is made as a result of the
verification of the signature, the upper controller 62 proceeds to
step S454.
[0547] In step S454, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the content key K.sub.co read out from the mass storage
section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption processing
section 65 of the home server 51. The encryption processing section
65 having received the content key K.sub.co verifies a signature of
the content key K.sub.co by the signature verification unit 115 of
the encryption/decryption module 96, and if it is confirmed that no
tamper is made, the processing proceeds to step S455.
[0548] In step S455, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the individual key K.sub.i read out from the mass storage 68
of the home server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of
the home server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having
received the individual key K.sub.i verifies a signature of the
individual key K.sub.i by the signature verification unit 115 of
the encryption/decryption module 96, and if it is confirmed that no
tamper is made, the processing proceeds to step S456.
[0549] Here, if one signature is attached to the entirety of the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i and
the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d,
steps S454 and S455 can be united and the signature verification
processing can be simplified.
[0550] In step S456, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 decrypts the individual key K.sub.i inputted
in step S455 by the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 using the delivery key K.sub.d
supplied from the storage module 92. Then, the control section 91
of the encryption processing section 65 decrypts the content key
K.sub.co inputted in step S454 using the individual key K.sub.i
previously decrypted. Finally, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 encrypts the content key K.sub.co
by the encryption unit 112 of the encryption/decryption module 96
using the save key K.sub.save supplied from the storage module
92.
[0551] In step S457, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save
key K.sub.save is saved in the external memory 67 via the external
memory control section 97 of the encryption processing section
65.
[0552] In addition, if it is decided in step S452 that the home
server 51 is an apparatus that cannot perform purchase processing,
or it is decided in step S453 that the signature of the public key
certificate of the content provider 2 is not correct, or if it is
decided in step S454 that the signature of the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i is not correct, or if its
is decided in step S455 that the signature of the individual key
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d is not correct, the
processing proceeds to step S458, where the home server 51 performs
error processing.
[0553] As described above, after decrypting the content key
K.sub.co by the individual key K.sub.i, the home server 51
re-encrypts the content key K.sub.co by the save key K.sub.save,
and causes the external memory 67 to store it. Since this
reservation purchase processing does not actually purchase
contents, among the purchase processing described above with
reference to FIG. 67, processing for charge information in the
registration information update determination processing of step
S161, processing for purchased contents corresponding to step S164,
processing for a handling policy corresponding to step S167,
processing for public key verification of a service provider
corresponding to step S168, processing for signature verification
of price information corresponding to step S169, and save
processing of charge information and license conditions information
corresponding to steps S170 through S172 may not be performed.
[0554] Incidentally, in the case of the reservation purchase
processing of FIG. 87, although the home server 51 did not prepare
license conditions information, the home server 51 may prepare
license conditions information and set its utilization right
content number (i.e., a right item) in a state without a right such
as an initial value (e.g., #0 that does not exist), or the
like.
[0555] In this way, in the reservation purchase processing, by
saving the content key K.sub.co in the external memory 67 before an
effective period of the delivery key K.sub.d expires, the home
server 51 can purchase contents encrypted by the saved content key
K.sub.co regardless of a period of the delivery key K.sub.d.
[0556] Here, the purchase processing of contents for which purchase
reservation is made by saving the content key K.sub.co in the
external memory 67 in the home server 51 will be described. In step
S471 of the purchase processing procedures shown in FIG. 88, the
home server 51 performs the registration information update
determination processing, and the processing proceeds to step S472.
Since the registration information update determination processing
is as described in FIGS. 61 and 62, its details are omitted.
However, in the purchase processing, determination of a
registration information update timing based on the delivery key
K.sub.d described in step S603 of FIG. 61 may no be performed.
[0557] In step S472, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the registration information read out from the mass storage
section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption processing
section 65 of the home server 51. After verifying a signature of
the registration information by the signature verification unit 115
of the encryption/decryption module 96, the encryption processing
section 65 having received the registration information decides if
the items of "purchase processing" and "registration" are marked
"purchase possible" and "registration possible," if they are marked
"purchase possible" and "registration possible," the processing
proceeds to step S473. In step S473, the upper controller 62 of the
home server 51 inputs the public key certificate of the content
provider 2 read out from the mass storage section 68 of the home
server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of the home
server 51. After verifying a signature of the public key
certificate of the public key certificate of the content provider 2
by the signature verification unit 115 of the encryption/decryption
module 96, the encryption processing section 65 having received the
public key certificate of the content provider 2 takes out a public
key of the content provider 2 from the public key certificate. If
it is confirmed that no tamper is made as a result of the
verification of the signature, the processing proceeds to step
S474.
[0558] In step S474, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the contents read out from the mass storage section 68 of
the home server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of the
home server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having
received the contents verifies a signature of the contents by the
signature verification unit 115 of the encryption/decryption module
96, and if it is confirmed that no tamper is made, the processing
proceeds to step S475.
[0559] In step S475, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the handling policy read out from the mass storage section
68 of the home server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of
the home server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having
received the handling policy verifies a signature of the handling
policy by the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, and if it is confirmed that no
tamper is made, the processing proceeds to step S476. In step S476,
the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 inputs the public key
certificate of the service provider 3 read out from the mass
storage section 68 of the home server 51 in the encryption
processing section 65 of the home server 51. After verifying a
signature of the public key certificate of the service provider 3
by the signature verification unit 115 of the encryption/decryption
module 96, the encryption processing section 65 having received the
public key certificate of the service provider 3 takes out a public
key of the service provider 3 from the public key certificate. If
it is confirmed that no tamper is made as a result of the
verification of the signature, the processing proceeds to step
S477.
[0560] In step S477, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
inputs the price information read out from the mass storage section
68 of the home server 51 in the encryption processing section 65 of
the home server 51. The encryption processing section 65 having
received the price information verifies a signature of the price
information by the signature verification unit 115 of the
encryption/decryption module 96, and if it is confirmed that no
tamper is made, the processing proceeds to step S478.
[0561] In step S478, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
displays information of purchasable contents (e.g., a purchasable
utilization form, a price or the like) using the display means 64,
and a user selects a purchase item using the inputting means 63.
Further, selection processing of a purchase item may be performed
prior to the purchase processing. A signal inputted from the
inputting means 63 transmitted to the upper controller 62 of the
home server 51, and the upper controller 62 generates a purchase
command based on the signal and inputs the purchase command in the
encryption processing section 65 of the home server 51. The
encryption processing section 65 having received this generates
charge information and license conditions information from the
handling policy inputted in step S475 and the price information
inputted in step S477. Since the charge information is as descried
in FIG. 42, its details are omitted. In addition, since the license
conditions information is as described in FIG. 41, its details are
omitted.
[0562] In step S479, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 saves the charge information generated in
step S478 in the storage module 92. Then, in step S480, the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 transmits the
license conditions information generated in step S478 to the
external memory control section 97 of the encryption processing
section 65. After checking tamper of the external memory 67, the
external memory control section 97 having received the license
conditions information writes the license conditions information in
the external memory 67. Since the tamper check in writing is as
described in FIG. 69, its detailed description is omitted.
(Further, if license conditions information without a right is
already written, the license conditions information is rewritten
and updated by the rewriting processing described in FIG. 70).
[0563] Incidentally, if it is decided in step 472 that the home
server 51 is an apparatus that cannot perform purchase processing
or is not registered, or if it is decided in step S473 that a
signature of the public key certificate is not correct, or if it is
decided in step S474 that a signature of the contents encrypted by
the content key K.sub.co is not correct, or if it is decided in
step S475 that a signature of the handling policy is not correct,
or if it is decided in step S476 that a signature of the price
information is not correct, the processing proceeds to step S481,
where the home server 51 performs error processing.
[0564] As described above, the home server 51 completes the
purchase processing of contents by storing the charge information
of the contents that a user selected to purchase in the storage
module 92 and, at the same time, storing the license conditions
information in the external memory 67. In the purchase processing,
the signature verification of the content key K.sub.co (step S454)
and the signature verification of the individual key K.sub.i (step
S455) as well as the substitute processing of the content key
K.sub.co that have already been performed in the purchase
processing described with reference to FIG. 87 are not
performed.
[0565] With the above-described configuration, as the home server
51 saves the content key K.sub.co in the external memory 67 by the
reservation purchase processing before the delivery key K.sub.d is
updated, even if the delivery key K.sub.d required when decrypting
the content key K.sub.co is updated, the contents can be purchased
when an effective period of the delivery key K.sub.d is expired
because the content key K.sub.co is already saved in the external
memory 67.
[0566] (5) Proxy Purchase Processing
[0567] Proxy purchase processing for giving and receiving contents
between apparatuses having different registration information,
i.e., apparatuses belonging to different groups will be described.
In this proxy purchase processing, when contents are given and
received between the home server 51 and a portable apparatus or the
like that is an apparatus external to a group of the home server
51, the case in which the home server 51 side is charged and the
case in which the apparatus external to a group is charged will be
respectively described. In this case, the fixed apparatus 52
described with reference to FIG. 15 will be described as the
apparatus external to a group.
[0568] FIG. 89 shows processing procedures in which the home server
51 passes contents to an apparatus external to a group and performs
charge processing, and in step S501, the home server 51 and the
apparatus external to a group mutually authenticate. In step S502,
the home server 51 and the apparatus external to a group exchange
registration information each other, and inspects the other's
registration information in the subsequent step S503.
[0569] That is, the home server 51 causes the encryption processing
section 65 to inspect the registration information received from
the apparatus external to a group. The encryption processing
section 65 having received the registration information from the
apparatus external to a group causes the signature verification
unit 115 of the encryption/decryption module 96 to inspect a
signature attached to the registration information by a public key
supplied from the storage module 92 of the encryption processing
section 65. After successful verification of the signature, the
control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 decides
whether or not an ID of the apparatus external to a group is
registered in the registration information and the items of
"purchase processing" and "registration" is marked "purchase
possible" and "registration possible." In addition, the apparatus
external to a group having received the registration information of
the home server 51 also decides in the similar manner whether or
not an ID of the home server 51 is registered in the registration
information of the home server 51, and the item of "registration"
is marked "registration possible.". Then, when each confirms that
the other apparatus is registered, the processing proceeds to step
S504.
[0570] Since steps S504 to S510 are the processing similar to that
of steps S161 to S171 of FIG. 67, its details are omitted.
[0571] In step S511, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 decrypts the individual key K.sub.i encrypted
by the delivery key K.sub.d inputted in step S508 by the decryption
unit 111 of the encryption/decryption module 96 using the delivery
key K.sub.d supplied from the storage module 92. Then, the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 decrypts the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i
inputted in step S508 by the decryption unit 111 of the
encryption/decryption module 96 using the previously decrypted
individual key K.sub.i. Then, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 re-encrypts the content key
K.sub.co by the encryption unit 112 of the encryption/decryption
module 96 using the temporary key K.sub.temp that was shared by the
apparatus external to a group at the time of mutual authentication
of step S501. In step S512, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 generates signatures for the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp and
the license conditions information generated in step S509 using the
signature generation unit 114 of the encryption/decryption module
96, and transmits them to the upper controller 62. The upper
controller 62 of the home server 51 having received the content key
K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary Key K.sub.temp, the license
conditions information and their signatures reads out the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co from the mass storage section
68, and transmits the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp, the license conditions information, their
signatures and the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co
to the apparatus external to a group.
[0572] In step S513, the apparatus external to a group having
received the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key
K.sub.temp, the license conditions information, their signatures
and the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co outputs the
contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co to the record
reproduction section 76 of the apparatus external to a group. The
record reproduction section 76 of the apparatus external to a group
having received the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co
saves the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co in the
recording medium 80.
[0573] In step S514, the encryption processing section 73 of the
apparatus external to a group verifies the signature received from
the home server 51 in the above-mentioned step S512, and at the
same time, decrypts content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp decrypts by the decryption unit of the
encryption/decryption module using the temporary key K.sub.temp
that was shared with the home server 51 at the time of
authentication of step S501. Then, the control section of the
encryption processing section 73 re-encrypts the content key
K.sub.co by the encryption unit of the encryption/decryption module
using the save key K.sub.save2 supplied from the storage module of
the encryption processing section 73.
[0574] In step S515, the encryption processing section 73 of the
apparatus external to a group transmits the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the save key K.sub.save2 and the license conditions
information received in step S513 to the external memory control
section of the encryption processing section 73, and causes the
external memory 79 to save them. Since the processing in which the
external memory control section writes data in the external memory
was described in FIG. 69, its details are omitted.
[0575] In this way, the home server 51 purchases a content
utilization right, charge information is saved in the home server
51 side, and a utilization right is transferred to the apparatus
external to a group. Thus, the home server 51 makes payment for the
content utilization right transferred to the apparatus external to
a group.
[0576] FIG. 90 shows processing procedures in which the home server
51 passes contents to the apparatus external to a group and the
apparatus external to a group performs charge processing, and in
step S551, the apparatus external to a group decides whether or not
a total of charges of the charge information stored in the
encryption processing section 73 (FIG. 15) has reached an upper
limit, and if it has not reached the upper limit, the processing
proceeds to step S552. (Further, decision may be made by an upper
limit of the number of charge processing rather than the upper
limit of the total charges).
[0577] In step S552, the upper controller 72 of the apparatus
external to a group inputs the registration information read out
from the external memory 79 in the encryption processing section
73. After verifying a signature of the registration information by
the signature verification unit of the encryption/decryption module
provided it inside, the encryption processing section 73 having
received the registration information decides whether or not the
item of "purchase processing" for an ID of the apparatus external
to a group (the fixed apparatus 52) is marked "purchase possible,"
and if it is marked "purchase possible," the processing proceeds to
step S553.
[0578] In step S553, the home server 51 and the apparatus external
to a group mutually authenticates. Since the mutual authentication
processing is similar to the processing described in FIG. 52, its
description is omitted. In step S554, the home server 51 and the
apparatus external to a group exchange information each other, and
inspect the other's registration information each other in the
subsequent step S555.
[0579] That is, the home server 51 causes the encryption processing
section 65 to inspect the registration information received from
the apparatus external to a group. The encryption processing
section 65 having received the registration information from the
apparatus external to a group causes the signature verification
unit 115 of the encryption/decryption module 96 to verify a
signature attached to the registration information by the public
key supplied from the storage module 92 of the encryption
processing section 65. After successful verification of the
signature, the control section 91 of the encryption processing
section 65 decides whether or not the ID of the apparatus external
to a group is registered in the registration information, and the
item of "registration" is marked "registration possible." In
addition, the apparatus external to a group having received the
registration information of the home server 51 also decides in the
similar manner whether or not the ID of the home server 51 is
registered in the registration information of the home server 51,
and the item of "registration." is marked "registration possible."
Further, similar processing is performed by the apparatus external
to a group as well. Then, when each apparatus has confirmed that
the other's apparatus is registered, the processing proceeds to
step S556.
[0580] In step S556, the control section 91 of the home server 51
reads out the already purchased content key from the external
memory 67 via the external memory control section 97, decrypts the
content key K.sub.co by the save key K.sub.save in the subsequent
step S557, and at the same time, re-encrypts it by the temporary
key K.sub.temp to generates signatures for them.
[0581] In step S558, the home server 51 transmits the content key
encrypted by the save key K.sub.temp generated in step S557, and
the contents, the handling policy and the price information read
out from the mass storage section 68 to the apparatus external to a
group. In step S559, the apparatus external to a group saves the
contents received from the home server 51 in the recording medium
80.
[0582] After the apparatus external to a group (the fixed apparatus
52) verifies the signatures of the handling policy, the price
information and the like in step S560, in step S561, the upper
controller 72 of the apparatus external to a group displays
information of purchasable contents (e.g., a purchasable
utilization form, a price or the like) using the displaying means
78, and a user selects a purchase item using the inputting means
77. Further, selection processing of a purchase item may be
performed prior to the proxy purchase processing. The signal
inputted from the inputting means 77 is transmitted to the upper
controller 72, and the upper controller 72 generates a purchase
command based on the signal and inputs the purchase command in the
encryption processing section 73. The encryption processing section
73 having received this generates charge information and license
conditions information from the handling policy and the price
information inputted in step S560. Since the charge information was
described in FIG. 42, its details are omitted. Since the license
conditions information was described in FIG. 41, its details are
omitted.
[0583] In step S562, the encryption processing section 73 saves the
charge information generated in step S561 in the storage module in
the encryption processing section 73. In step S563, with respect to
the content key encrypted in step S557, the encryption processing
section 73 verifies a signature, and at the same time, decrypts the
signature by the temporary key K.sub.temp, and re-encrypts it by
the save key K.sub.save2. Then, in step S564, the content key
K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save2 is saved in the
external memory 79 from the encryption processing section 73.
[0584] In this way, since the home server 51 transfers the already
purchased content utilization right to the apparatus external to a
group and the apparatus external to a group saves the charge
information, the apparatus external to a group makes payment for
the content utilization right transferred from the home server
51.
[0585] In the above-described configuration, by exchanging the
registration information each other between the apparatuses having
different registration information as described in the
above-mentioned steps S502 and S554, contents held by one apparatus
can be transferred to the other apparatus after confirming that the
other apparatus is a registered apparatus. Therefore, according to
the above-described configuration, contents can be given and
received between apparatuses belonging to different groups.
[0586] Further, although a signature of contents was verified in
performing purchase processing in the above-mentioned embodiment,
the processing is sometimes omitted because it takes time. In
addition, whether or not verification is sometimes necessary is
described in a handling policy or price information, and operations
are performed in accordance with it.
[0587] (6) Data Format of Various Kinds of Data
[0588] The electronic distribution service center 1 adds an ID of
the content provider 2 in an individual key K.sub.i for each
content provider 2, encrypts the entirety of the individual key
K.sub.i and the ID of the content provider 2 using the delivery key
K.sub.d, and delivers the obtained data to a corresponding content
provider 2 as the encrypted individual key K.sub.i.
[0589] The content provider 2 stores the encrypted individual key
K.sub.i given by the electronic distribution service center 1 in
this way in key data for single contents as it is, and delivers it
to an apparatus in the user home network 5 via the service provider
3. Then, in the electronic music distribution system 10, the
deliver key K.sub.d for decrypting the encrypted individual key
K.sub.i included in the key data is held only by the apparatus in
the user home network 5, thereby substantially certainly preventing
the ID of the content provider 2 that is encrypted together with
the individual key. K.sub.i to be tampered between the content
provider 2 and the apparatus in the user home network 5 that
purchases the contents.
[0590] Therefore, the apparatus in the user home network 5 can
easily and certainly check whether or not single contents and album
contents as well as a handling policy are legal data by comparing
an ID of the content provider 2 included in the single contents and
album contents as well as a handling policy and an ID of the
content provider 2 that is included in the key data and encrypted
together with the individual key K.sub.i, even if signatures of
single contents and album contents are tampered during delivery and
illegal contents are supplied, or a signature of a handling policy
of the like is tampered during delivery.
[0591] Thus, in the electronic music distribution system 10, for
example, purchase processing of illegal contents or generation of
charge information for distributing profit illegally to a third
party based on an illegal handling policy can be substantially
certainly prevented, thereby preventing content data to be
illegally utilized.
[0592] Incidentally, in such an electronic music distribution
system 10, an ID of the service provider 3 may be encrypted and
delivered in the same manner as an ID of the content provider 2, in
which case, for example, even if an ID of the service provider 3
included in charge information is tampered (i.e., a signature of
price information is tampered) to illegally obtain profit, this can
be easily and certainly prevented.
[0593] In addition, FIG. 91 shows generation management by transfer
processing of a managed transfer right. As described above with
reference to FIGS. 33 and 34, how many generations of reproduction
rights can be transferred at the most is stored in a handling
policy as generation management information. Therefore, when the
handling policy is given to a predetermined first apparatus in the
user home network 5 from the content provider 2 via the service
provider 3 and purchase processing is executed in the encryption
processing section in the first apparatus, the encryption
processing section detects generation management information
included in the handling policy, and detects a maximum number of
time the contents indicated by the generation management
information can be repurchased.
[0594] Then, when purchase processing of contents to which the
handling policy is attached according to the detected maximum
number of times contents can be repurchased, the encryption
processing section prepares license conditions information based on
the handling policy, stores the ID of the encryption processing
section in the license conditions information, and at the same
time, stores a number of times found by deducting one from the
maximum number of times contents can be repurchased (i.e., a
remaining number of time contents can be repurchased) as generation
management information.
[0595] In addition, when the purchased contents are supplied from a
content provider 2 in which the encryption processing section is
not provided, although the encryption processing section prepares
charge information based on a handling policy, the encryption
processing section stores a predetermined value set in advance that
indicates neither encryption processing section as an ID of a
supplier in the charge information.
[0596] Then, when the contents to which purchase processing was
applied can be redistributed by the generation management
information included in the license conditions information, a first
apparatus redelivers the contents from the first apparatus to a
second apparatus in the user home network 5 together with the
license conditions information, if necessary. In the second
apparatus, when executing purchase processing to the redelivered
contents, the encryption processing section inside the second
apparatus prepares the license conditions information attached to
the contents again, stores the ID of the encryption processing
section in the license conditions information prepared again, and
at the same time, stores a number of times found by deducting one
from the remaining number of times content can be repurchased
stored in the first apparatus (i.e., a new remaining number of
times contents can be repurchased) as generation management
information. In addition, the encryption processing section stores
the ID of the encryption processing section in the first apparatus
as an ID of a supplier in the charge information prepared along the
purchase processing.
[0597] Then, thereafter, if the contents to which the purchase
processing is applied by the generation management information
included in the license conditions information has been repurchased
for the maximum number of times the purchase processing is possible
set in advance, the second apparatus determines that redelivery is
impossible and does not redeliver the contents.
[0598] Thus, in the electronic music distribution system 10, by
providing for the maximum number of times contents can be
repurchased in the handling policy in advance by the generation
management information as described above, and managing a remaining
number of times the contents can be repurchased in the license
conditions information for each purchase processing of the
contents, illegal repurchase can be prevented.
[0599] In addition, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
by accumulating and storing an ID of a supplier of the contents by
charge information upon repurchasing the contents, a supply route
of the contents can be specified from the ID of the supplier of the
charge information, if necessary, and, when illegal contents flows
into the system, a supplier of the illegal contents can be
retrieved and eliminated.
[0600] Incidentally, in the electronic music distribution system
10, since an apparatus in the user home network 5 provides the
contents on behalf of the content provider 2 or the service
provider 3 upon repurchasing the contents, for example, in the
electronic distribution service center 1, profits can be returned
to the apparatus by adding a discount point that can be used upon
purchasing contents to a user having the apparatus of a supplier of
repurchase of the contents based on an ID of the supplier included
in the charge information.
[0601] In above-described configuration, in the electronic music
distribution system 10, in the case in which contents is provided
to an apparatus in the user home network 5 via from the content
provider 2 via the service provider 3, the content provider 2
generates single contents and album contents in which the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and the ID of the content
provider 2 are stored, and at the same time, generates handling
policies of the single contents and the album contents in which the
ID of the content provider 2 is stored, and also generates key data
for the single contents and the album contents in which the content
key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i, the
individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d or the
like are stored.
[0602] Then, the content provider 2 transmits the single contents
and the album contents, the handling policies of the single
contents and the album contents, and the key data for the single
contents and the album contents as a content provider secure
container.
[0603] Here, the content provider 2 then uses the individual key
K.sub.i supplied from the electronic distribution service center 1
as an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d,
whereas the electronic distribution service center 1 adds an ID of
the content provider 2 to the individual key K.sub.i and encrypts
the entirety of these using the delivery key K.sub.d. Then, the
delivery key K.sub.d used for this encryption is held only by an
apparatus in the user home network 5 other than the electronic
distribution service center 1.
[0604] Therefore, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d
can be provided from the content provider 2 to an apparatus in the
user home network 5 via the service provider 3 while preventing
tampering, thus, in the apparatus, by comparing the ID of the
content provider 2 obtained by decrypting the individual key
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d and the IDs of the
content provider 2 included in the single contents and the album
contents as well as the handling policies of the single contents
and the album contents respectively, whether or not signatures of
the handling policies of the single contents and the album contents
as well as the handling policies of the single contents and the
album contents can be easily and certainly detected.
[0605] As a result, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
provision of illegal contents to a user or generation of charge
information for a third party to illegally obtain profit using a
handling policy can be prevented, thus, illegal utilization of
contents by a third party can be prevented.
[0606] In addition, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
a maximum number of times contents can be repurchased is stored in
a handling policy provided from the content provider 2, and at the
same time, a remaining number of times contents can be repurchased
is stored in the license conditions information in the apparatus
each time the contents are repurchased between apparatuses in the
user home network 5.
[0607] Therefore, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
an apparatus in the user home network 5 can manage a remaining
number of times contents can be repurchased by the license
conditions information, thus, illegal repurchase exceeding the
maximum number of times contents can be repurchased can be
prevented.
[0608] According to the above-described configuration, by directly
attaching an ID of the content provider 2 to contents encrypted
from the content provider 2 (i.e., storing an ID of the content
provider 2 in data of single contents and album contents) or
indirectly attaching it (i.e., attaching a handling policy in which
an ID of the content provider 2 is stored), providing an ID of the
content provider 2 encrypted together with the individual key
K.sub.i using the delivery key K.sub.d together with the content to
which the ID of the content provider 2 is attached to an apparatus
in the user home network 5, decrypting the encrypted ID of the
content provider 2 in the apparatus, and comparing the obtained ID
of the content provider 2 and the ID of the content provider 2
attached to the contents, whether or not the contents can be
legally utilized can be easily and certainly determined, thus, an
electronic music distribution system that can prevent contents from
illegally utilized.
[0609] In addition, by storing a maximum number of times contents
can be repurchased in a handling policy provided form the content
provider 2, and at the same time, storing a remaining number of
times the contents can be repurchased in the license conditions
information in the apparatus to manage the number of times the
contents can be repurchased, illegal repurchase exceeding the
maximum number of times the contents can be repurchased can be
prevented.
[0610] (7) Configuration of a Record Reproduction Apparatus
[0611] In the electronic music distribution system 10, a record
reproduction apparatus 250 shown in FIG. 92 is provided as an
apparatus in the user home network 5. In the record reproduction
apparatus 250, an electronic distribution only recording medium 251
that is a data storage apparatus is detachably provided.
[0612] The record reproduction apparatus 250 can record contents
electronically distributed from the service provider 3 via the
network 4 in the electronic distribution only recording medium 251
and reproduce the contents from the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251.
[0613] Actually, the record reproduction apparatus 250 is composed
of a communication section 260 that is receiving means, an upper
controller 261 that is record reproduction controlling means, an
encryption processing section 262, an extension section 263 that is
content decrypting means, inputting means 264, displaying means
265, and a mass storage section 266. The communication section 260
communicates with the electronic distribution service center 1, and
at the same time, communicates with the service provider 3 via the
network 4.
[0614] The upper controller 261 once hold a content provider secure
container and a service provider secure container received by the
communication section 260 in the mass storage section 266 by
controlling the record reproduction apparatus 250 and the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 based on an
operation instruction inputted via the inputting means 264 at the
time of purchase processing.
[0615] Then, the upper controller 261 causes the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 to execute purchase
processing, thereby reads out contents encrypted by a corresponding
content key K.sub.co, a content key K.sub.co encrypted by an
individual key K.sub.i, and an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by
a delivery key K.sub.d from the mass storage section 266, decrypts
the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d by
a delivery key K.sub.d read out from the storage module 311 of the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, decrypts the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i by the decrypted individual
key K.sub.i, encrypts the obtained content key K.sub.co by a save
key K.sub.save read out from the storage module 311 of the
encryption processing section 301, and records the contents
encrypted by the read out content key K.sub.co and the content key
K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251.
[0616] In addition, the upper controller 261 reads out a content
key K.sub.co encrypted by a temporary key K.sub.temp1 (shared by
the encryption processing section 262 and the encryption processing
section 301 by mutual authentication) from the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251, and supplies a content key
K.sub.co encrypted by a temporary key K.sub.temp2 (shared by the
encryption processing section 262 and the extension section 263 by
mutual authentication) and contents encrypted by the content key
K.sub.co to the extension section 263 to decrypt the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co using the content key
K.sub.co by controlling the record reproduction apparatus 250 and
the electronic distribution only recording medium 251 based on an
operation instruction inputted via the inputting means 264 at the
time of reproduction processing.
[0617] Incidentally, since the inputting means 264 and the
displaying means 265 have functions similar to those of the
inputting means 63 and the displaying means 64 respectively, their
descriptions are omitted.
[0618] The encryption processing section 262 is composed of a
control section 270, a storage module 271, a registration
information inspection module 272, a purchase processing module
273, a mutual authentication module 274, and an
encryption/decryption module 275. Incidentally, the encryption
processing section 262 is composed of an encryption processing only
IC of a single chip in the same manner as the encryption processing
section 65, and has a characteristic that illegally reading out
data from outside is difficult (tamper resistant feature).
[0619] In the encryption processing section 262, since the control
section 270, the storage module 271, the registration information
inspection module 272, the purchase processing module 273, and the
encryption/decryption module 275 have functions similar to those of
the control section 91, the storage module 92, the registration
information inspection module 93, the purchase processing module
94, and the encryption/decryption module 96 of the homes server 51,
their descriptions are omitted.
[0620] In addition, the mutual authentication module 274 executes
mutual authentication with the extension section 263 and the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251, and generates a
temporary key K.sub.temp (session key) to be shared with the
extension section 263 and the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251, if necessary.
[0621] The encryption/decryption module 275 is composed of a
decryption unit 280, an encryption unit 281, a random number
generation unit 282, a signature generation unit 283, and a
signature verification unit 284. Since the decryption unit 280, the
encryption unit 281, the random number generation unit 282, the
signature generation unit 283, and the signature verification unit
284 have functions similar to those of the decryption unit 111, the
encryption unit 112, the random number generation unit 113, the
signature generation unit 114, and the signature verification unit
115 of the home server 51 respectively, their descriptions are
omitted.
[0622] The extension section 263 is composed of a mutual
authentication module 290, a key encryption module 291, a
decryption module 292, an extension module 293, an electronic
watermark addition module 294, and a storage module 295. Since the
mutual authentication module 290, the key decryption module 291,
the decryption module 292, the extension module 293, the electronic
watermark addition module 294, and the storage module 295 have
functions similar to those of the mutual authentication module 101,
the key decryption module 102, the decryption module 103, the
extension module 104, the electronic watermark addition module 105,
and the storage module 106 of the home server 51 respectively,
their descriptions are omitted.
[0623] In addition, the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 is made to execute purchase processing to prepare charge
information, and hold the prepared charge information, and is
composed of a communication section 300 that is communicating
means, an encryption processing section 301 that is content key
encryption means and content key decryption means, an external
memory control section 302 that is record reproducing means, and an
external memory 303 that is recording medium.
[0624] The communication section 300 transmits and receives data
between the upper controller 261 of the record reproduction
apparatus 250. The encryption processing section 301 is made up of
a circuit configuration similar to the encryption processing
section 65 of the home server 51, and has a characteristic that
illegal read out of data from outside is difficult (tamper
resistant feature). In addition, the encryption processing section
301 is composed of a control section 310, a storage module 311 that
is save key holding means, a registration information inspection
module 312, a purchase processing module 313, a mutual
authentication module 314, and an encryption/decryption module
315.
[0625] Since the control section 310, the storage module 311, the
registration information inspection module 312, the purchase
processing module 313, the mutual authentication module 314, and
the encryption/decryption module 315 have functions similar to
those of the control section 91, the storage module 92, the
registration information inspection module 93, the purchase
processing module 94, the mutual authentication module 95, and the
encryption/decryption module 96 of the home server 51 respectively,
their descriptions are omitted. Incidentally, the
encryption/decryption module 315 is composed of a decryption unit
320, an encryption unit 321, a random number generation unit 322, a
signature generation unit 323, and a signature verification unit
324.
[0626] The external memory control section 302 performs tamper
check, if necessary, in addition to reading and writing data in and
from the external memory 303. Various kinds of recording media such
as a writable optical disk, a hard disk, or a semiconductor memory
can be applied as the external memory 303. Therefore, a structure
that can read out data from these recording media is necessary as
the external memory control section 302, which performs reading and
writing by adding a recording medium control section (not shown),
if necessary. Further, since details of the tamper check processing
were described in FIGS. 68 to 71, their descriptions are
omitted.
[0627] Here, in such an electronic distribution only recording
medium 251, a save key K.sub.save peculiar to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 is held by the storage
module 311 of the encryption processing section 301. In the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251, when the content
key K.sub.co is recorded in the external memory 303, the content
key K.sub.co is encrypted by the save key K.sub.save, and when the
encrypted content key K.sub.co is reproduced from the external
memory 303, the content key K.sub.co is decrypted by the storage
key K.sub.save and transmitted to the record reproduction apparatus
250.
[0628] Therefore, contents recorded in a recording medium by a
conventional record reproduction apparatus cannot be reproduced by
an apparatus (i.e., an apparatus holding a save key K.sub.save
different from a save key K.sub.save that has encrypted the
contents) other than an apparatus that has recorded the contents in
the recording medium (i.e., an apparatus holding a save key
K.sub.save peculiar to an encryption processing section that has
encrypted a content key K.sub.co to be recorded in the recording
medium), whereas the contents recorded in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 can be reproduced by any
apparatus as far as it has a configuration similar to that of the
above-mentioned record reproduction apparatus 250 even if it does
not hold a save key K.sub.save.
[0629] Incidentally, in such a record reproduction apparatus 250,
since contents are recorded in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 together with the content key K.sub.co by
executing purchase processing, the record reproduction apparatus
250 can be configured without using the encryption processing
section 262 and the extension section 263 for the purpose of only
recording the contents.
[0630] In addition, in such a record reproduction apparatus 250,
since the electronic distribution only recording medium 251 is
detachably provided, and contents can be reproduced from the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 that has recorded
the contents and the content key K.sub.co in another apparatus, the
record reproduction apparatus 250 can be used without connecting to
the electronic distribution service center 1 and the network 4 by
having a reproduction function only.
[0631] However, in the user home network 5, when contents and a
content key K.sub.co are recorded in the electronic distribution
recording medium 251 in the record reproduction apparatus 250
connected to the network 4 as described above, and the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 is used for reproducing the
contents in a record reproduction not connected to the electronic
distribution service center 1 or the network 4, it is possible that
collection of charge information held by the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 is difficult in the
electronic distribution service center 1.
[0632] Thus, in the electronic distribution only recording medium
251, for example, charge information in the storage module 311 is
periodically retrieved from the control section 310 in the
encryption processing section 301, and if there is uncollected
charge information in the electronic distribution service center 1,
contents can only be reproduced only one from purchase processing
until the charge information is collected by applying reproduction
limitation to corresponding contents, and at the same time, managed
transfer of the contents is not performed as well.
[0633] In this way, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
a user owning the electronic distribution only recording medium 251
is prevented from reproducing contents illegally. Incidentally, as
a reproduction limitation due to uncollected charge information,
for example, by setting a number of times contents can be
reproduced from purchase processing until charge information is
collected in advance, counting the number of times of reproducing
contents from the point of the purchase processing, and when the
system detects that the charge information is uncollected, the
reproduction limitation can be effectively functioned. That is,
when it is detected that the charge information is uncollected, the
number of times corresponding contents have already been reproduced
at this point and the number of times of the reproduction
limitation set in advance, and when the number of times the
contents have already been reproduced has reached the set number of
times of reproduction limitation, the contents cannot be
reproduced.
[0634] In addition, as such a reproduction limitation, a period
(time) may be used. That is, by setting time during which contents
can be reproduced, if charge information is uncollected after the
set time has passed since purchase processing, the contents cannot
be reproduced. Further, in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251, limitation contents of the reproduction
limitation may be held by associating it with charge information in
the storage module 311 of the encryption processing section 301, or
may be held by associating it with the license conditions
information in the external memory 303. In addition, by storing
reproduction limitation (the number of times or a period) in a
handling policy and/or price information, at the time of purchase
processing, the electronic distribution only recording medium 251
may take out information of the reproduction limitation from the
handling policy and/or the price information, prepare license
conditions information including this, and hold the prepared
license conditions information in the external memory 303.
[0635] Here, purchase processing executed in the record
reproduction apparatus 250 will be described using a flow chart
shown in FIG. 93. In step S700, in the state in which a content
provide secure container and a service provider secure container
distributed from the service provider 3 via the network 4 are once
held in the mass storage section 266, the upper controller 261 in
the record reproduction apparatus 250 decides an effective period
(version) of a delivery key K.sub.d stored in the storage module
311 in the encryption processing section 301 via the control
section 310 of the encryption processing section 301 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251, and if the
delivery key K.sub.d is effective, the processing proceeds to step
S701.
[0636] In step S701, the upper controller 261 determines whether or
not a total of charges of charge information stored in the storage
module 311 in the encryption processing section 301 via the control
section 310 of the encryption processing section 301 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 has reached an
upper limit set in advance, and if the total of the charges has not
reached the upper limit, the processing proceeds to step S702.
Incidentally, in step S701, instead of determining whether or not
the total of charges has reached the upper limit, for example, the
upper controller 261 may determine whether or not there is any room
the a storage area of charge information in the storage module 311,
and if there is room in the storage area, the processing may
proceed to step S702. In addition, in step S701, the upper
controller 261 may determine whether or not a number of charge
information (i.e., a number of times of purchases) stored in the
storage module 311 has reached a number (of upper limit) set in
advance.
[0637] In step S702, the upper controller 261 reads out a public
key certificate of the content provider 2 included in the content
provider secure container in the mass storage section 266, and
transmits the read out public key certificate of the content
provider 2 to the encryption processing section 301 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251. Thus, in the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, the control section 310 verifies a
signature of the public key certificate of the content provider 2
in the signature verification unit 324 in the encryption/decryption
module 315, and if it is confirmed that not tamper is made to the
public key certificate as a result of the verification of the
signature, takes out a public key of the content provider 2
included in the public key certificate, and the processing proceeds
to step S703.
[0638] In step S703, the upper controller 261 reads out key data of
the contents included in the content provider secure container in
the mass storage section 266, and transmits the read out key data
to the encryption processing section 301 in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251. Thus, in the encryption
processing section 301 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251, the upper controller 261 verifies a signature
of the key data in the signature verification unit 324 in the
encryption/decryption module 315, and if it is confirmed that no
tamper is made to the key data as a result of the verification of
the signature, the processing proceeds to step S704.
[0639] In step S704, the upper controller 261 read out a handling
policy of the contents included in the content provider secure
container in the mass storage section 266, and transmits the read
out handling policy to the encryption processing section 301 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251. Thus, in the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, the control section 310 verifies a
signature of the handling policy in the signature verification unit
324 in the encryption/decryption module 315, and if it is confirmed
that no tamper is made to the handling policy as a result of the
verification of the signature, the processing proceeds to step
S705.
[0640] In step S705, the upper controller 261 reads out a public
key certificate of the service provider 3 included in the service
provider secure container in the mass storage section 266, and
forwards the read out public key certificate of the service
provider 3 to the encryption processing section 301 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251. Thus, in the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, the control section 310 verifies a
signature of the public key certificate of the service provider 3
in the signature verification unit 324 in the encryption/decryption
module 315, and if it is confirmed that no tamper is made to the
key data as a result of the verification of the signature, the
processing proceeds to step S706.
[0641] In step S706, the upper controller 261 reads out price
information of the contents included in the service provider secure
container in the mass storage section 266, and transmits the read
out price information to the encryption processing section 301 in
the electronic distribution only recording medium 251. Thus, in the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, the control section 310 verifies a
signature of the price information in the signature verification
unit 324 in the encryption/decryption module 315, and if it is
confirmed that no tamper is made to the handling policy as a result
of the verification of the signature, the processing proceeds to
step S707.
[0642] In step S707, the upper controller 261 displays information
of purchasable contents in the displaying means 265, and when a
user selects and designates desired contents via the inputting
means 264, generates a purchase command corresponding to the
selected and designated contents, and sends it to the encryption
processing section 301 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251. Thus, the control section 310 of the
encryption processing section 301 generates charge information and
license conditions information based on the handling policy (the
handling policy whose signature was verified in step S704) and the
price information (the price information whose signature was
verified in step S706) in the purchase processing module 313, and
the processing proceeds to step S708. Incidentally, selection and
designation of desired contents by a user via the inputting means
264 may be performed in advance prior to the purchase
processing.
[0643] In step S708, the control section 310 in the encryption
processing section in the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 saves the charge information (the charge information
generated in step S707) in the storage module 311, and in the
subsequent step S709, forwards the license conditions information
(the license conditions information generated in step S707) to the
external memory 303 via the external memory control section 302,
thereby writing the license conditions information in the external
memory 303. In addition, the license conditions information may be
written in a tamper prevention region (as in the external memory of
FIG. 16) in the same manner as writing the data described above in
FIG. 69. Incidentally, the license conditions information may be
saved in the storage module 311 of the encryption processing
section 301 in the electronic distribution only recording medium
251.
[0644] In step S710, the control section 310 of the encryption
processing section 301 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 decrypts the encrypted individual key K.sub.i
included in the key data (the key data whose signature ware
verified in the above-mentioned step S703) using the delivery key
K.sub.d (the delivery key K.sub.d that was confirmed effective in
the above-mentioned step S700) in the decryption unit 320 of the
encryption/decryption module 315.
[0645] Then, in the decryption unit 320, the control section 310
decrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co included in the key
data using the individual key K.sub.i that was previously
decrypted. Subsequently, the control section 310 gives the
decrypted content key K.sub.co and the save key K.sub.save stored
in the storage module 311 to the encryption unit 321, and encrypts
the content key K.sub.co using the save key K.sub.save in the
encryption unit 321.
[0646] In step S711, the control section 310 of the encryption
processing section 301 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 forwards the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the save key K.sub.save in step S710 to the external memory 303 via
the external memory control section 302, and saves the encrypted
content key K.sub.co in the external memory 303, and the processing
proceeds to step S712. In addition, the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the save key K.sub.save may be written in a tamper
prevention region (as in the external memory of FIG. 16) in the
similar manner as at the time of writing data described above in
FIG. 69). Incidentally, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
save key K.sub.save may be saved in the storage module 311 of the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251.
[0647] In step S712, the upper controller 261 in the record
reproduction apparatus 250 reads out the encrypted contents
included in the content provider secure container in the mass
storage section 266, and forwards the read out encrypted contents
to the electronic distribution only recording medium 251, thereby
storing the encrypted contents in the external memory 303 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251.
[0648] Incidentally, in the step S712, the upper controller 261 may
save the handling policy whose signature was verified in
corresponding step S704 and the price information whose signature
was verified in step S706 in the external memory 303 together with
the encrypted contents. In addition, the encrypted contents (or,
the contents and the handling policy as well as the price
information) may not be saved in the external memory 303 in the
step S712, and may be saved in the external memory 303 in a step
prior to the step S712.
[0649] In such purchase processing, if an effective period of the
delivery key K.sub.d is expired in step S700, if the total of
charges of the charge information has reached the upper limit in
step S701, if it is decided in step S702 that the public key
certificate of the content provider 2 is not correct, if it is
decided in step S703 that the signature of the key data is not
correct, if it is decided in step S704 that the signature of the
handling policy is not correct, if it is decided in step S705 that
the public key certificate of the service provider 3 is not
correct, and if it is decided in step S706 that the signature of
the price information is not correct, the processing proceeds to
step S713 in each case, where error processing is executed.
Incidentally, in such purchase processing, although a case in which
a signature of contents is not verified is shown, the signature of
the contents may be verified in any of the steps prior to saving
the contents in the external memory 303.
[0650] Incidentally, if data is transmitted and received between
the record reproduction apparatus 250 and the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251, a signature is attached to
the data on the transmission side, and the signature is verified on
the receiving side.
[0651] As described above, the record reproduction apparatus 250
executes the purchase processing in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, thereby recording the contents encrypted
by the content key K.sub.co in the external memory 303 of the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 and the content
key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save peculiar to the
encryption processing section 301 of the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251.
[0652] In addition, reproduction processing executed in the record
reproduction apparatus 250 will be described with reference to a
flow chart shown in FIG. 94. In step S720, the upper controller 261
in the record reproduction apparatus 250 forwards an ID of the
contents that is instructed by a user via the inputting means 264
to be reproduced to the encryption processing section 301 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251.
[0653] In step S721, by forwarding an ID of the contents given from
the upper controller 261 to the external memory control section
302, the control section 310 of the encryption processing section
301 in the electronic distribution only recording medium 251 reads
out the encrypted content key K.sub.co and license conditions
information corresponding to the ID from the external memory 303
via the external memory control section 302, and forwards the read
out encrypted content key K.sub.co to the decryption unit 320 of
the encryption/decryption module 315, and at the same time,
forwards the license information to the control section 310.
Further, the external memory control section 302 may perform tamper
check in the similar manner as at the time of reading out data
described above for FIG. 68 when reading out the encrypted content
key K.sub.co and license conditions information from the external
memory 303. Incidentally, in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251, the encrypted content key K.sub.co and the
license conditions information may be held in the storage module
311 of the encryption processing section 301 and may be read out
from the storage module 311.
[0654] In addition to this, the control section 310 of the
encryption processing section 301 retrieves charge information in
the storage module 311 based on an ID of the contents in step S722,
and in the subsequent step S723, determines whether or not there is
charge information corresponding to the ID of the contents in the
storage module 311, and if the charge information corresponding to
the ID has already been collected by the electronic distribution
service center 1 and does not exist in the storage module 311, the
processing proceeds to step S724.
[0655] In step S724, the control section 310 of the encryption
processing section 301 updates the license conditions information,
if necessary. That is, if utilization right contents included in
the license conditions information is, for example, a number of
times right, the control section 310 indicates to subtract the
number of times of reproduction indicated by the number of times
right. Then, the encryption processing section 301 saves the
updated license conditions information in the external memory 303
via the external memory control section 302. At this point, the
external memory control section 302 may perform tamper check as at
the time of rewriting data described above for FIG. 70.
Incidentally, the license conditions information may be updated and
saves in the storage module 311 of the encryption processing
section 301.
[0656] Subsequently, in step S725, the control section 310 of the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251 performs mutual authentication with the
encryption processing section 262 of the record reproduction
apparatus 250 using each other's mutual authentication modules 314
and 274, and shares the temporary key K.sub.temp1, and the
processing proceeds to step S726. Incidentally, since the mutual
authentication processing procedures were described above for FIG.
51, their detailed description are omitted.
[0657] In step S726, the control section 310 of the encryption
processing section 301 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 decrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co by
the save key K.sub.save stored in the storage module 311 in the
decryption unit 320, and forwards the decrypted content key
K.sub.co to the encryption unit 321. Then, the control section 310
encrypts the content key K.sub.co in the encryption unit 321 using
the temporary key K.sub.temp1 shared with the mutual authentication
module 274 in step S625, and the processing proceeds to step
S727.
[0658] In step S727, the control section 310 of the encryption
processing section 301 in the electronic distribution only
recording media 251 transmits the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the temporary key K.sub.temp1 to the encryption processing section
262 of the record reproduction apparatus 250.
[0659] In step S728, the control section 270 of the encryption
processing section 262 in the record reproduction apparatus 250
takes the encrypted content key K.sub.co transmitted from the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 in the decryption
processing unit 280 of the encryption/decryption module 275, in
step S725, decrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co using the
temporary key K.sub.temp1 shared with the mutual authentication
module 314 in the decryption unit 280, and forwards the decrypted
content key K.sub.co to the encryption unit 281.
[0660] Then, in step S729, the control section 270 of the
encryption processing section 262 in the record reproduction
apparatus 250 performs mutual authentication with the extension
section 263 using each other's mutual authentication modules 274
and 290, and shares the temporary key K.sub.temp2. Incidentally,
since the mutual authentication processing procedures was described
above for FIG. 51, their detailed description is omitted.
[0661] Thus, in step S730, the control section 270 of the
encryption processing section 262 in the record reproduction
apparatus 250 encrypts the content key K.sub.co using the temporary
key K.sub.temp2 shared with the extension section 263 by the
encryption unit 281, thereby forwarding the encrypted content key
K.sub.co to the extension section 263 in the subsequent step
S731.
[0662] In step S732, the key decryption module 291 of the extension
section 263 takes in the encrypted content key K.sub.co given by
the encryption processing section 262, decrypts the encrypted
content key K.sub.co using the temporary key K.sub.temp2 shared
with the encryption processing section 262, and forwards the
decrypted content key K.sub.co to the decryption module 292.
[0663] In step S733, the decryption module 292 of the extension
section 263 is at this point given the encrypted contents read out
from the external memory 303 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 by the upper controller 261, decrypts the
encrypted contents using the content key K.sub.co given by the key
decryption module 291, and forwards the decrypted contents to the
extension module 293.
[0664] In step S734, the extension module 293 of the extension
section 263 extends the contents given by the decryption module 292
by a predetermined method such as ATRAC, and forwards the extended
contents to the electronic watermark addition module 294. In step
S735, the electronic watermark module 294 of the extension section
263 inserts predetermined data such as an ID of the encryption
processing section 301 of the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 instructed by the control section 270 of the
encryption processing section 262 in the form of an electronic
watermark in the extended contents given by the extension module
293.
[0665] Then, in step S736, by forwarding the contents obtained in
the extension section 263 to, for example, a speaker (not shown),
the upper controller 261 of the record reproduction apparatus 250
generates music based on the contents via the speaker. Thus, the
record reproduction apparatus 250 can reproduce contents in this
way.
[0666] Here, if charge information corresponding to the ID of the
contents is stored in the storage module 311 in step S723, the
control section 310 of the encryption processing section 301 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 refers to the
reproduction limitation at the time when charge information is
uncollected in step S737, and determines whether or not the
contents whose charge information is uncollected satisfy
reproduction available conditions.
[0667] Then, if the contents do not satisfy the reproduction
available conditions (i.e., if the contents have already been
reproduced for the number of times defined in the reproduction
limitation, or if a reproduction available period has lapsed), the
control section 310 of the encryption processing section 301
terminates this reproduction processing. On the other hand, if the
contents satisfy the reproduction available conditions (i.e., if
the number of times of reproduction of the contents is less than
the number of times defined by the reproduction limitation), the
processing proceeds to step S724, where the control section 310
updates the license conditions information, if necessary.
Incidentally, the reproduction limitation to be used when chare
information is uncollected may be held in the storage module 311 of
the encryption processing section 301 in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 or the external memory 303,
or may be stored in data of a handling policy or price information,
or the like.
[0668] Incidentally, the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 may be provided in the home server 51 described above
for FIG. 15 or the fixed apparatus 52.
[0669] As described above, although, in the record reproduction
apparatus 250, the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co
and the content key K.sub.co can be generated from the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 and the contents encrypted
by the content key K.sub.co can be decrypted by the content key
K.sub.co, until charge information is collected, the content can be
utilized in accordance with the reproduction limitation set in
advance, and after the charge information is collected, the content
can be utilized in accordance with utilization right contents
purchased by the purchase processing.
[0670] In the above-mentioned configuration, the electronic music
distribution system 10 is provided with the record reproduction
apparatus 250 to which the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 is detachably inserted as an apparatus in the user home
network 5, and when the contents encrypted by the content key
K.sub.co, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key
K.sub.i and the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery
key K.sub.d (i.e., a content provider secure container and a
service provider secure container) are transmitted from the service
provider 3, controls the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 by the record reproduction apparatus 250 to execute
purchase processing, records the contents encrypted by the content
key K.sub.co in the electronic distribution only recording medium
251 in the external memory 303, and at the same time, decrypts the
individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d by the
delivery key K.sub.d, decrypts the content key K.sub.co encrypted
by the individual key K.sub.i by the individual key K.sub.i, and
encrypts the decrypted content key K.sub.co by the save key
K.sub.save peculiar to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 to record in the external memory 303. Incidentally, in
the electronic distribution only recording medium 251, the save key
K.sub.save is saved in the storage module 311 of the encryption
processing section 301 having tamper resistant feature in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251.
[0671] In addition, by controlling the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 at the time of reproduction processing, the
record reproduction apparatus 250 reads out the contents encrypted
by the contents key K.sub.co and the content key K.sub.co encrypted
by the save key K.sub.save from external memory 303, decrypts the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save by the
save key K.sub.save, thereby taking out the contents encrypted by
the content key K.sub.co and the decrypted content key K.sub.co in
the electronic distribution only recording medium 251. Then, the
record reproduction apparatus 250 decrypts the contents encrypted
by the content key K.sub.co using the content key K.sub.co using
the encryption processing section 262 and the extension section
263.
[0672] Therefore, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
although the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save are
recorded in the external memory 303 by the record reproduction
apparatus 250 in the electronic distribution only recording medium
251, since the contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and
the decrypted content key K.sub.co are read out from the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251, it is not necessary to save
a save key peculiar to the encryption processing section 262 in the
record reproduction apparatus 250. Thus, in the electronic music
distribution system 10, since other apparatuses different from the
record reproduction apparatus 250 in which the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 records contents can
reproduce the contents using the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 if the apparatuses have the encryption
processing section 262 and the extension section 263 similar to
those of the record reproduction apparatus 250, generality of the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 can be
dramatically improved.
[0673] In addition, in the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251, even if contents or a content key K.sub.co is illegally
read out from the external memory 303, by holding the save key
K.sub.save used in encrypting the content key K.sub.co for
decrypting contents in the storage module 311 in the encryption
processing section 301 having tamper resistant feature, the save
key K.sub.save can be prevented from being illegally read out,
thereby enabling to prevent the contents from being illegally
utilized.
[0674] Moreover, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
due to the increased generality of the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251, until charge information for contents
recorded in the electronic distribution only recording medium 251,
by limiting utilization of the contents (limiting a number of times
and a period of reproduction and copying), illegal utilization of
the contents can be prevented while the charge information is
uncollected.
[0675] According to the above-mentioned configuration, a save key
K.sub.save peculiar to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 detachably inserted in the record reproduction apparatus
250 is held in the electronic distribution only recording medium
251, the record reproduction apparatus 250 transmits the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co, the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i, and the individual key
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 at the time of purchase
processing, and in the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251, after recording the contents encrypted by the content
key K.sub.co in the external memory 303 and decrypting the
encrypted individual key K.sub.i by the delivery key K.sub.d,
decrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co by the individual key
K.sub.i, encrypts the obtained content key K.sub.co by the save key
K.sub.save to record in the external memory 303, and takes out the
contents encrypted by the content key K.sub.co and the content key
K.sub.co decrypted by the save key K.sub.save from the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 at the time of reproduction
processing to decrypt the contents, thereby enabling reproduction
of the contents from the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 even if the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 is inserted in another record reproduction apparatus 250
different from the record reproduction apparatus 250 used for
recording the contents, thus an electronic music distribution
system that can dramatically increase generality of the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 can be realized.
[0676] Incidentally, in such an electronic music distribution
system 10, the delivery key K.sub.d is not held in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251, or the delivery key K.sub.d
is not used even if it is held, and after decrypting the content
key K.sub.co encrypted by the individual key K.sub.i by the
individual key K.sub.i at the time of recording contents by the
record reproduction apparatus 250, the content key K.sub.co may be
encrypted using the temporary key K.sub.temp mutually
authentication and shared with the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251, and the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
temporary key K.sub.temp may be transmitted to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 together with the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co.
[0677] In addition, although the content provider 2 is applied as
an information transmission apparatus in the present invention, the
content provider 2 and the service provider 3 may be applied as the
information transmission apparatus.
[0678] (8) Proxy Processing of Charge Information and Managed
Transfer Processing of a Utilization Right
[0679] The electronic distribution only recording medium 251
described above for FIG. 92, for example, when inserted in the home
server 51 that is a management apparatus in the user home network 5
that is the data management system described above for FIG. 15 as
an apparatus to be connected to the electronic distribution service
center 1, can transmit charge information held in the storage
module 311 of the encryption processing section 301 to the home
server 5, thus can cause the electronic distribution service center
1 to collect the charge information from the home server 51.
[0680] Thus, in the electronic distribution only recording medium
251, although, when holding charge information, for preventing
illegal utilization of contents, a utilization right of the
contents (a right for reproducing the contents) cannot be
transferred to another apparatus (transfer with limitation, managed
transfer) together with the contents, or deleted (deletion cannot
be executed unless the charge processing is completed), when
transmitting the charge information to the homes server 51 in this
way, the utilization right of the contents can be transferred to
another apparatus (transfer with limitation, managed transfer)
together with the contents corresponding to the charge information
in accordance with the transfer processing procedures of the
managed transfer right described above for FIG. 82.
[0681] Incidentally, when a utilization right of contents is
transferred to another apparatus together with the contents from
the electronic distribution only recording medium 251, an apparatus
having obtained the contents and their utilization right can return
the contents and their utilization right only to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251, if necessary. However,
since the electronic distribution only recording medium 251 can be
carried freely, it is sometimes difficult to easily return the
contents and their utilization right from another apparatus.
[0682] Therefore, for example, the home server 51 (FIG. 15) as an
apparatus in the user home network 5 connected to the electronic
distribution service center 1, when taking in charge information
held in the electronic distribution only recording medium 251,
takes in corresponding contents and their utilization right
altogether from the electronic distribution only recording medium
251, and manages the taken in contents and their utilization right
on behalf of the electronic distribution only recording medium
251.
[0683] Actually, proxy processing of charge information executed in
the home server 51 and transfer (transfer with limitation, managed
transfer) of a right (utilization right) for reproducing contents
will be described with reference to a flow chart shown in FIG. 95.
In step S740, the electronic distribution only recording medium 251
is inserted in the home server 51, and when a user inputs an
execution instruction of proxy processing of charge information and
transfer processing of a utilization right via the inputting means
63 in this state, with the upper controller 62 controlling the home
server 51 and the electronic distribution only recording medium
251, the control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65
in the home server 51 mutually authenticates with the encryption
processing section 301 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 using each other's mutual authentication
modules 95 and 314 and shares the temporary key K.sub.temp.
[0684] Then, in step S741, the control section 310 of the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251 forward the charge information held in
the storage module 311 to the encryption unit 321 in the
encryption/decryption module 315, encrypts the charge information
by the temporary key K.sub.temp in the encryption unit 321, and
forwards the encrypted charge information to the signature
generation unit 323.
[0685] In addition, the control section 310 of the encryption
processing 301 reads out in ID of a content provider, an ID of a
handling policy and a handling policy corresponding to a version of
the handling policy included in the charge information, and an ID
of a service provider, an ID of price information and price
information corresponding to a version of the price information
from the external memory 303 via the external memory control
section 302, and forwards the read out handling policy and price
information to the signature generation unit 323. Thus, the control
section 310 of the encryption processing section 301 attach
signatures to the charge information and the handling policy
encrypted by the temporary K.sub.temp as well as the entire price
information (or individually) in the signature generation unit 323,
and transmits the charge information and the handling policy as
well as the price information to which the signatures are attached
to the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 via the
communication section 300.
[0686] Incidentally, in the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251, since a third party illegal obtains profit if charge
information is tampered during transmission, a signature is always
attached to the charge information and whether or not tamper is
made is checked. In addition, since there is no specific hindrance
even if contents of the charge information are seen, the charge
information may be sent without encryption. In the home server 51,
proxy processing of charge information and transfer processing of a
utilization right can be executed without using a handling policy
and price information. Therefore, in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, the handling policy and the price
information may be transmitted to the home server 51, if
necessary.
[0687] In step S742, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51
forwards the charge information and the handling policy as well as
the price information transmitted from the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251 to the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65. Thus, the control section 91
verifies the signatures attached to the charge information and the
handling policy as well as the price information in the signature
verification unit 115 in the encryption/decryption module 96, and
if these are not tampered, decrypts the charge information
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp by the temporary key
K.sub.temp.
[0688] Then, in step S743, the control section 310 of the
encryption processing section 301 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251 retrieves an ID of contents indicated by
the charge information (the charge information transmitted to the
home server 51 in step S741, which remains as it is unless deleted
in the storage module 311) held in the storage module 311 at this
point in step S742, and reads out all corresponding license
conditions information and contents encrypted by the content key
K.sub.co from the external memory 303 via the external memory
control section 302 based on the retrieved ID of the contents.
[0689] By forwarding the read out content key K.sub.co to the
decryption unit 320 of the encryption/decryption module 315, the
control section 310 of the encryption processing section 301
decrypts the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the wave key
K.sub.save by the save key K.sub.save held in the storage module
311 in the decryption unit 320, and then encrypts the decrypted
content key K.sub.co by the temporary key K.sub.temp in the
encryption unit 321. Then, after attaching signatures to the
content key K.sub.co together with the license conditions
information and the encrypted contents read out from the external
memory 303 in the signature generation unit 323, the control
section 310 transmits them to the homes server 51 via the
communication section 300. Incidentally, signatures may be attached
to the license conditions information, the contents and the content
key K.sub.co individually, or may be attached to the entirety of
the license conditions information, the contents and the content
key K.sub.co. Moreover, a signature may be attached to
contents.
[0690] Subsequently, in step S744, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 in the home server 51 takes in the
license conditions information and the encrypted contents
transmitted form the electronic distribution only recording medium
251 as well as the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp via the upper controller 62, and after verifying the
signatures attached to the license conditions information and the
encrypted contents as well as the content key K.sub.co encrypted by
the temporary key K.sub.temp in the signature verification unit
115, if these are not tampered, decrypts the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp by the temporary key
K.sub.temp.
[0691] Thus, in step S745, the upper controller 62 in the home
server 51 saves in the mass storage section 68 the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co obtained from the encryption
processing section 65 (the contents whose signature was verified in
step S744) and the handling policy and the price information
obtained if necessary (the handling policy and the price
information whose signatures were verified in step S742).
Incidentally, in step S745, recording processing in the mass
storage section 68 to be executed may be executed immediately after
data is transmitted in steps S741 and S743.
[0692] In addition, in step S746, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 in the home server 51 saves the
charge information (the charge information whose signature was
verified in step S742) in the storage module 92, and at the same
time, changes the ID of the encryption section (the ID of the
encryption section of the apparatus that applied purchase
processing to the contents) stored in the license conditions
information (the license conditions information whose signature was
verified in step S744) to its own ID (i.e., the ID of the
encryption processing section 65 in the home server 51) to update
the license conditions information.
[0693] Then, in step S747, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 in the home server 51 encrypts the content
key K.sub.co (the content key K.sub.co decrypted in step S744) by
the save key K.sub.save held in the storage module 92 in the
encryption unit 112 in the encryption/decryption module 96, and
saves the license conditions information (the license conditions
information updated in step S746) in the external memory 67
together with the encrypted content key K.sub.co via the external
memory control section 97. Incidentally, since the tamper check
upon writing data in the external memory 67 is executed in the
similar manner as in the processing procedures described above for
FIG. 69, its description is omitted.
[0694] Then, in step S748, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 in the home server 51 saves the chare
information, the encrypted contents, the content key K.sub.co, the
license conditions information, the handling policy and the price
information transmitted form the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 respectively in this way, and transmits
processing completion data indicating that the proxy processing of
the charge information and the transfer of the utilization right
have been completed to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251 via the upper controller 62.
[0695] Thus, in step S749, when receiving the processing completion
data transmitted from the home server 51, the control section 310
of the encryption processing section 301 in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 deletes the contents
encrypted by the content key K.sub.co, the content key K.sub.co
encrypted by the save key K.sub.save, the license conditions
information (i.e., the license conditions information transmitted
to the home server 51 in step S743), and the handling policy and
the price information (i.e., those transmitted to the home server
51 in step S742), if necessary, in the external memory 303
respectively via the external memory control section 302.
Incidentally, since the tamper check at the time of deleting data
in the external memory 303 is executed in the similar manner as in
the processing procedures described above for FIG. 71, its
description is omitted.
[0696] In addition to this, in step S750, the control section 310
of the encryption processing section 301 in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 deletes the charge
information (i.e., the charge information transmitted to the home
server 51 in step S741) in the storage module 311, thereby
completing the processing procedures.
[0697] As described above, in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251, by transmitting the charge information held
in the storage module 311 in the encryption processing section 301
to the home server 51 together with the corresponding contents and
the content key K.sub.co, as well as the license conditions
information to the home server 51, and at this point, deleting the
charge information, the contents, the content key K.sub.co and the
license conditions information transmitted to the home server 51
from the inside storage module 311 and the external memory 303, the
contents are managed by the home server 51.
[0698] Then, in the home server 51, when the contents were taken in
from the electronic distribution only recording medium 251, since
the ID of the encryption processing section of the license
conditions information taken in together with the contents was
changed and the home server 51 itself was made an owner of the
contents, the contents can be transferred to another apparatus in
accordance with the transfer processing procedures of the managed
transfer right described above for FIG. 82, and the contents
returned from each apparatus can be taken in accordance with the
return processing procedures of the managed transfer right
described above for FIG. 83.
[0699] In the above-mentioned configuration, the electronic music
distribution system 10 caused the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 to execute purchase processing using the
record reproduction apparatus 250 that is a recording apparatus,
and causes the electronic distribution only recording medium 251 to
hold a right for reproducing contents, license conditions
information and charge information together with the contents.
Then, in order to cause the electronic distribution service center
1 to collect the charge information held by the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251, when the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 is inserted in the home
server 51 in the user home network 5, the home server 51 takes in
the charge information held in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 251 together with the corresponding contents,
utilization right and license conditions information to manage the
contents in stead of the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251.
[0700] Therefore, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
contents of which the home server 51 takes up management from the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 in the user home
network 5 and its utilization right can be managed and transferred
to another apparatus, recording medium or electronic distribution
recording medium 251, and the same time, these apparatuses,
recording medium and electronic distribution only recording medium
251 can return the contents to the home server 51, thus the
contents obtained by purchase processing in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 can be easily utilized for
another apparatus, recording medium and the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251 in the user home network 5 under the
management of the home server 51.
[0701] In addition, in the electronic distribution only recording
medium 251, since limitation is attached to a purchased utilization
right if charge information is held, the charge information needs
to be collected by the home server 51 connected to the electronic
distribution service center 1. Then, in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 251, if management of the corresponding
contents is transferred to the home server 51, free regions is
easily secured in the external memory 302, thus unnecessary
deletion of already held contents can be prevented in the purchase
processing of contents.
[0702] Moreover, in the user home network 5, since the contents
that is applied purchase processing and obtained in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 is stored and managed in
this way by the home server 51, contents more than the volume that
can be held in the electronic distribution only recording medium
251 (i.e., depending on a storage volume of the external memory
303) can be easily owned.
[0703] According to the above-mentioned configuration, by moving
the contents that is applied purchase processing and held in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 251 using the record
reproduction apparatus to the home server 51 in the user home
network 5 together with their charge information, and managing and
concurrently storing the contents in the home server 51, the
contents whose management is taken up from the electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 can be managed and
transferred to another apparatus, recording medium or electronic
distribution only recording medium 251 in the user home network 5,
thus an electronic music distribution system in which the contents
recorded in the electronic distribution only recording medium 251
can be easily utilized by various kinds of apparatuses such as
another apparatus and recording medium in the user home network 5
can be realized.
[0704] (9) Online Charge Purchase Processing
[0705] In such an electronic music distribution system 10, a system
can be constructed by connecting online the electronic distribution
service center 1 that is an information control apparatus and the
service provider 3 that is an information transmission apparatus
via a network, and at the same time, connecting online the service
provider 3 and the home network 5 (actually, the home server 51
that is an information receiving apparatus).
[0706] A flow of data through the entire electronic music
distribution system 10, when constructed, is shown in FIG. 96.
Since the transmission of data from the content provider 2 to the
service provider 3, and the transmission of data from the service
provider 3 to the user home network 5 are similar to the data flow
described above for FIG. 20, their detailed descriptions are
omitted.
[0707] The user home network 5 (the home server 51) encrypts charge
information, attaches a signature to the encrypted charge
information, and transmits it to the electronic distribution
service center 1 via the service provider 3. Incidentally, although
information required in the electronic distribution service center
1 such as information required for settlement is included in the
handling policy and the price information used for purchase
processing, since such various kinds of information is also
included in the charge information, the user home network 5 (the
home server 51) is made not to transmit handling policy and price
information to the electronic distribution service center 1 at the
time of purchase processing.
[0708] In addition, update of a delivery key K.sub.d and
registration information (not shown) is also performed between the
electronic distribution service center 1 and the user home network
5 via the service provider 3. Thus, the user home network 5 does
not need to switch a communication route to be used in
communicating data with the service provider 3 and the electronic
distribution service center 1 and can reduce processing of a
communication section compared with the example of an establishment
of a system described for FIG. 1.
[0709] Incidentally, in the case in which transmission and
reception of data are performed between the user home network 5
(the home server 51) and the electronic distribution service center
1, the service provider 3 is used as a communication route between
the user home network 5 (the home server 51) and the electronic
distribution service center 1, and the data cannot be tampered.
[0710] Here, in the home server 51 in the user home network 5, in
some case, charge information generated by purchase processing is
saved in the storage module 92 in the encryption processing section
65 and the saved charge information (which may be plurality of
pieces) are transmitted to the electronic distribution service
center 1 altogether at a predetermined timing, and in other cases,
the generated charge information is transmitted to the electronic
distribution service center 1 while performing purchase processing.
Incidentally, in some cases, in online charge purchase processing
for transmitting the generated charge information to the electronic
distribution service center 1 while performing purchase processing,
whether or not to execute the online charge purchase processing is
described in the handling policy or the price information.
[0711] The online charge purchase processing to be executed in the
home server 51 will be described with reference to a flow chart
shown in FIG. 97. In step S760, the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65 in the home server 51 decides an
effective period (version) of the delivery key K.sub.d stored in
the storage module 92 under the control of the upper controller 62,
and if the delivery key K.sub.d is effective, the processing
proceeds to step S761.
[0712] In step S761, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 determines whether or not a total of charges
of the charge information stored in the storage module 92 has
reached an upper limit set in advance, and if the total of the
charges has not reached the upper limit, the processing proceeds to
step S762. Incidentally, since the charge information is not saved
in the storage module 92 if the charge information generated at
this point is transmitted to the electronic distribution service
center 1 while performing purchase processing, the control section
91 of the encryption processing section 65 does not execute the
processing of step S761, and the processing proceeds to step
S762.
[0713] Since steps S762 through S766 execute processing similar to
steps S162 through S169 described above for FIG. 67, respectively,
their detailed descriptions are omitted. In step S767, the upper
controller 62 of the home server 51 displays information (e.g., a
purchasable utilization form, price or the like) of purchasable
contents using the displaying means 64, thus, a user can select a
purchase item using the inputting means 63. Then, a signal inputted
from the inputting means 63 is forwarded to the upper controller 62
of the home server 51, and the upper controller 62 generates a
purchase command based on the signal and forwards the purchase
command to the control section 91 of the encryption processing
section 65. Incidentally, such input processing may be performed at
the start of online charge purchase processing.
[0714] When the purchase command is given by the upper controller
62, the control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65
generates charge information and license conditions information
based on the handling policy whose signature was verified in step
S764 and the price information whose signature was verified in step
S766. Incidentally, at this point, the control section 91 generates
charge information and license conditions information using an RAM
(Random Access Memory) for executing data processing provided in
the encryption processing section 65, and holds the generated
charge information and the license conditions information in the
RAM as they are.
[0715] Then, in step S768, the control section 91 of the encryption
processing section 65 in the home server 51 mutually authenticates
with the mutual authentication section 17 of the electronic
distribution service center 1 using the mutual authentication
module 95, and shares the temporary key K.sub.temp with the
electronic distribution service center 1.
[0716] Subsequently, in step S769, after encrypting the charge
information by the temporary key K.sub.temp using the encryption
unit 112 of the encryption/decryption module 96, the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 in the home
server 51 attaches a signature using the signature generation unit
114, and transmits the charge information to the electronic
distribution service center 1 via the service provider 3.
Incidentally, the home server 51 encrypts the charge information by
the temporary key K.sub.temp prior to the transmission to the
electronic distribution service center 1. This is for the purpose
of protecting privacy of a user purchasing the contents. In
addition, the home server 51 sometimes transmits unencrypted charge
information to the electronic distribution service center 1 with a
signature attached.
[0717] In step S770, when receiving the charge information
encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp transmitted from the home
server 51, the electronic distribution service center 1 verifies a
signature attached to the charge information, and if no tamper is
made, decrypts the charge information encrypted by the temporary
key K.sub.temp using the temporary key K.sub.temp shared with the
home server 51, thereby storing the decrypted charge information in
the history data management section 15.
[0718] Then, in step S771, upon saving the charge information in
this way, the electronic distribution service center 1 generates
receipt data indicating that the charge information is received,
attaches a signature to the generated receipt data, and transmits
the data to the home server 51 via the service provider 3. Thus,
the control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 in
the home server 51 takes in the receipt data transmitted from the
electronic distribution service center 1 sequentially via the
communication section 61 and the upper controller 62, verifies a
signature attached to the receipt data by the signature
verification unit 115, and if the receipt data is not tampered,
deletes the charge information held in the RAM, and the processing
proceeds to step S772.
[0719] Since steps S772 through S774 sequentially executes
processing similar to steps S172 through S174 described above for
FIG. 67, their detailed description is omitted. Incidentally, steps
S772 through S774 may be executed in any order. In addition, since
registration information update processing executed in step S775 is
similar to the registration information update processing described
above for FIGS. 61 and 62, its detailed description is omitted.
Moreover, since step S776 executes error processing in the similar
manner as in step S176 described above for FIG. 67, its detailed
description is omitted. Incidentally, in such online charge
purchase processing, contents, a handling policy and price
information encrypted by the content key K.sub.co are held in the
external memory 67 via the external memory control section 97 in
any of the steps after signatures attached to these are
verified.
[0720] Further, in step S770, when determining that illegal data
exists due to tampering of charge information, or the like as a
result of verifying a signature of the charge information, the
electronic distribution service center 1 does not save the charge
information in a history data management section. Then, in step
S771, the electronic distribution service center 1 generates
receipt rejection data indicating that the charge information is
not received because it is illegal data, and transmits the data to
the homes server 51 via the service provider 3. At this point, when
the receipt rejection data transmitted from the electronic
distribution service center 1 is received by the communication
section 61, the upper controller 62 of the home server 51 causes
the control section 91 of the encryption processing section 65 to
terminate purchase processing based on the receipt rejection data,
and at the same time, notifies a user via the displaying means 64
that contents the user is trying to purchase cannot be
purchased.
[0721] As described above, in the online charge purchase processing
executed in the home server 51, contents can be purchased only when
the electronic distribution service center 1 permits purchase
processing during the purchase processing. Further, although the
electronic distribution service center 1 transmits receipt data and
receipt rejection data as they are in this embodiment, the data may
be transmitted with a signature added after the data is encrypted
by the temporary key K.sub.temp, and in the home server 51, after
verifying the signature attached to the encrypted receipt data and
receipt rejection data, the encrypted receipt data and receipt
rejection data is decrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp, and
whether or not the charge information has been collected may be
confirmed based on the decrypted receipt data and receipt rejection
data.
[0722] In the above-described configuration, in the electronic
music distribution system 10, if online charge purchase processing
is executed in the home server 51, the electronic distribution
service center 1 receives charge information transmitted from the
home server 51 during the purchase processing, determines whether
or not the charge information is illegal data by verifying a
signature attached to the charge information, and when it is
determined that the charge information is legal data as a result
(i.e., when the home server 51 receives receipt data), causes the
home server 51 to execute purchase processing continuously and
purchase contents.
[0723] On the other hand, in the electronic music distribution
system 10, when the electronic distribution service center 1
determines that charge information is illegal data during purchase
processing executed in the home server 51 (i.e., when the home
server 51 receives receipt rejection data), the electronic
distribution service center 1 causes the home server 51 to
terminate the purchase processing and prohibits purchasing
contents.
[0724] Therefore, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
even if charge information transmitted from the home server 51 to
the electronic distribution service center 1 is tampered (charge
information is tampered outside the encryption processing section
65, or on a communication route between the home server 51 and the
electronic distribution service center 1), for example, object of
purchase contents are changed to other contents, or a utilization
right of contents is changed to other utilization rights, these
illegal contents and illegal utilization right can be prevented
from being purchased.
[0725] In addition, even if charge information transmitted from the
home server 51 to the electronic distribution service center 1 is
tampered, or price of contents, or a distributed party of profit
from purchase of contents is changed, purchasing the contents for
an illegal price or a third party's gaining illegal profit can be
prevented.
[0726] According to the above-described configuration, by
connecting online the electronic distribution service center 1 and
the user home network 5, transmitting charge information generated
at this time to the electronic distribution service center 1 while
the home server 51 executes purchase processing, determining
whether or not the charge information is legal data by the
electronic distribution service center 1, and when it is determined
that the charge information is illegal data, causing the home
server 51 to terminate the purchase processing to prevent the
contents from buying, illegal purchase of the contents and their
utilization right due to tamper of the charge information can be
prevented, thus an electronic music distribution system that can
prevent contents from being illegally utilized can be realized.
[0727] Incidentally, although the electronic distribution service
center 1 determines whether or not to permit purchase of contents
based on charge information transmitted from the home server 51,
utilization permission data describing contents that a user tries
to purchase or a utilization right is transmitted from the home
server 51 like license conditions information, and the electronic
distribution service center 1 may determine whether or not to
permit purchase or utilization of the contents based on the
utilization permission data.
[0728] (10) Configuration of an Information Provision Apparatus
[0729] In FIG. 98 in which parts corresponding to FIG. 1 are shown
by identical symbols, the electronic music distribution system 10
with such a configuration is provided with an information provision
apparatus 330. The information provision apparatus 330 is composed
of a hosting server 331 holding an encrypted multiplicity of
contents supplied from the content provider 2 and an information
provision terminal (hereinafter referred to as a KIOSK terminal)
332 set in, for example, a simple retailing shop (i.e., KIOSK).
[0730] In the KIOSK terminal 332, a recording medium 333 that is a
recording medium consisting of, for example, an MD (trademark) or
an electronic distribution only recording medium 334 described
above for FIG. 17 can be inserted detachably. The KIOSK terminal
332 holds price information prepared on an information provider
side that manages the KIOSK terminal 332, reads out contents
desired by a customer who is an information user from the hosting
server 331 via a private cable or a satellite communication, and,
by executing purchase processing as the home server 51 in the user
home network 5 does, records the contents desired by the customer
in a recording medium 333 the customer has or an electronic
distribution only recording medium 334.
[0731] Incidentally, the KIOSK terminal 332 receives a public key
certificates a delivery key K.sub.d, registration information or
the like transmitted from the electronic distribution service
center 1, and in return transmits charge information, license
conditions information, or the like according to a utilization
right of contents to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334. Thus, the electronic distribution service center 1
performs processing of profit distribution on the content provider
2, an information supplier (the service provider 3 in FIG. 1) or
the like based on the charge information given by the KIOSK
terminal 332. In addition, the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334 sometimes performs purchase processing in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 when purchasing a
utilization right from the KIOSK terminal 332, in which case, it is
necessary to transmit the charge information to the electronic
distribution service center 1 via an apparatus in the user home
network 5.
[0732] Here, FIG. 99 shows a configuration of the hosting server
331. The hosting server 331 is composed of a communication section
340, a control section 341 and a server 342. The communication
section 340 communicates with the content provider 2 and the KIOSK
terminal 332, and transmits and receives predetermined information.
When a content provider secure container is transmitted from the
content provider 2 by controlling the communication section 340 and
the server 342, the control section 341 holds encrypted contents
included in the content provider secure container in the server
342, and at the same time, transmits key data, a handling policy or
the like included in the content provider secure container to the
KIOSK terminal 332 via the communication section 340.
[0733] In addition, when given a read out request command from the
KIOSK terminal 332, the control section 341 reads out corresponding
contents from the server 342, and transmits the read out contents
to the KIOSK terminal 332 via the communication section 340.
Incidentally, a communication route of a read out request command
of contents and a route of contents may be different.
[0734] FIG. 100 shows a configuration of the KIOSK terminal 332,
and the KIOSK terminal 332 is composed of a communication section
350 that is receiving means, an upper controller 351 that is
storing means for controlling the KIOSK terminal 332, an encryption
processing section 352 that is license conditions information
preparing means, an electronic watermark insertion section 353 that
is electronic watermark inserting means, a price processing section
354, inputting means 355, displaying means 356, and a KIOSK
terminal sever 357.
[0735] The communication section 350 communicates with the hosting
server 331 and the electronic distribution service center 1, and
transmits and receives predetermined information. Since the upper
controller 351 has a function similar to that of the upper
controller 62 of the home server 51, its description is omitted.
The encryption processing section 352 is composed of a control
section 360, a storage module 361, a registration information
inspection module 362, a purchase processing module 363, a mutual
authentication module 364 and an encryption/decryption module 365.
Since the control section 360, the storage module 361, the
registration information inspection module 362, the purchase
processing module 363 and the mutual authentication module 364 have
functions similar to those of the corresponding control section 91,
storage module 92, registration information inspection module 93,
purchase processing module 94 and mutual authentication module 95
in the home server 51 respectively, their descriptions are
omitted.
[0736] The encryption/decryption module 365 is composed of a
decryption unit 370, an encryption unit 371, a random number
generation unit 372, a signature generation unit 373 and a
signature verification unit 374. Since the decryption unit 370, the
encryption unit 371, the random number generation unit 372, the
signature generation unit 373 and the signature verification unit
374 have functions similar to those of the corresponding decryption
unit 111, encryption unit 112, random number generation unit 113,
signature generation unit 114 and signature verification unit 115
in the home server 51 respectively, their descriptions are
omitted.
[0737] The electronic watermark insertion section 353 is composed
of a mutual authentication module 380, a key decryption module 381,
a decryption module 382, an electronic watermark addition module
383 and a storage module 384. In the electronic watermark insertion
section 353, although the mutual authentication module 380, the key
decryption module 381, the decryption module 382, the electronic
watermark addition module 383 and the storage module 384 have
functions similar to those of the corresponding mutual
authentication module 101, key decryption module 102, decryption
module 103, electronic watermark addition module 105 and storage
module 106 in the extension section 62 of the home server 51
respectively, contents decrypted by a content key are not extended,
but, for example, with an ID of a holder of the KIOSK terminal 332
inserted in the contents, are forwarded to the recording medium 333
and the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 as they
are (as digital data). However, in the electronic watermark
insertion section 353, in some cases, contents that are an output
of the decryption module 382 are extended, if necessary,
recompressed using another compression algorithm, and the output is
forwarded to the electronic watermark addition module 383.
[0738] The price processing section 354 displays on the displaying
means 356 information of price with respect to a utilization right
of contents a customer has purchased upon purchase processing, and
when price is inserted from a price insertion opening provided in
the KIOSK terminal 332, determines whether or not the inserted
price is insufficient, and if the price is insufficient, notifies
the customer of information of insufficient amount via the
displaying means 356, or if the price is too much, notifies the
customer of information of an amount of change via the displaying
means 356, and returns the change from a price return opening.
[0739] The inputting means 355 forwards to the upper controller 351
various kinds of information such as selection information of
contents or the like inputted via an operation button. The
displaying means 356 is composed of a predetermined display device
such as a liquid crystal display, issues an instruction to a
customer, and displays information. Incidentally, the inputting
means 355 and the display means 356 can be configured by uniting
them by a touch panel type liquid crystal display or the like.
[0740] The KIOSK terminal server 357 has a function similar to the
mass storage section 68 of the home server 51, and holds key data
(an encrypted content key K.sub.co, an encrypted individual key
K.sub.i (not shown)) transmitted from the hosting server 331, a
handling policy, and price information prepared on the KIOSK side,
or the like. Incidentally, the KIOSK terminal server 357 may hold
encrypted contents.
[0741] Then, when a customer inserts the recording medium 333 or
the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 in a media
insertion opening provided in the KIOSK terminal 332, the KIOSK
terminal 332 displays a purchase guide, information of purchasable
contents, or the like via the display means 356, and as a result,
if a customer selects and designates desired contents via the
inputting means 355, reads out the selected and designated contents
from the hosting server 331 to apply purchase processing, and
records the contents in the recording medium 333 or the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334.
[0742] Incidentally, FIG. 101 illustrates information transmitted
among the content provider 2, the hosting server 331 and the KIOSK
terminal 332. The content provider 2 attaches a public key
certificate of the content provider to a content provider secure
container, and sends the content provider secure container to the
hosting server 331.
[0743] The hosting server 331 verifies a public key certificate of
the content provider 2, obtains a public key of the content
provider 2, and verifies a signature of the received content
provider secure container using the obtained public key. After
succeeding in verifying the signature, the hosting server 331 takes
out encrypted contents from the content provider secure container,
holds the taken out encrypted contents in the server 342, and at
the same time, transmits the remaining key data (an encrypted
content key K.sub.co or an encrypted individual key K.sub.i (not
shown)), a handling policy and the like to the KIOSK terminal
332.
[0744] The KIOSK terminal 332 holds the received key data (an
encrypted content key K.sub.co or an encrypted individual key
K.sub.i (not shown)), a handling policy and the like, and at the
same time, holds price information prepared on an information
provider side that manages the KIOSK terminal 332.
[0745] Here, purchase processing that is actually executed in the
KIOSK terminal 332 will be described with reference to flow charts
shown in FIGS. 102 through 105. In step S780, when a customer
inserts a medium (the recording medium 333 or the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334) in the KIOSK terminal 332,
in step S781, the upper controller 351 of the KIOSK terminal 332
determines whether or not the inserted medium is the recording
medium 333 (in this embodiment, for example, an MD (trademark)),
and if the inserted medium is the recording medium 333, the
processing proceeds to step S782.
[0746] In step S782, the upper controller 351 causes the displaying
means 356 to display information such as purchasable contents
(i.e., a tune), price and the like, and in this state, the customer
selects and designates desired contents and inserts money in the
price insertion opening, the processing proceeds to step S783. In
step S783, the upper controller 351 checks whether or not the money
inserted by the customer is insufficient compared with charged
price, and if it is not insufficient (money inserted by the
customer may be more than the price), the processing proceeds to
step S785. Incidentally, in step S783, if the money inserted by the
customer is insufficient compared with the charged price, the
processing proceeds to step S784, where the upper controller 351
instructs the customer via the displaying means 356 to insert an
insufficient portion of money in the price insertion opening.
[0747] In step S785, the upper controller 351 reads out from KIOSK
terminal 357 a handling policy, price information and key data
corresponding to the contents selected and designated by the
customer, and forward them to the encryption processing section 352
to instruct the control section 360 to execute the purchase
processing.
[0748] Then, in step S786, the control section 360 of the
encryption processing section 352 executes purchase processing of,
for example, a copying right with copy management information
(SCMS) in which a number of times of copying is limited to one
(i.e., copying from the KIOSK terminal 332 to the recording medium
333) with respect to the contents selected and designated by the
customer based on the handling policy and the price information
given by the upper controller 351. As a result, the charge
information is held in the storage module 361.
[0749] Incidentally, after recording contents in the recording
medium 333, in order to prevent the contents from being illegally
copied from the recording medium 333 to another recording medium
333, the KIOSK terminal 332 executes purchase processing of the
copying right with copy management information. However, although a
copying right without copy control information with a number of
times limitation or the recording medium 333 in this embodiment is
an MD (trademark) as long as it can prevent illegal copying,
purchase processing of a copying right and the like with limitation
according to various kinds of medium such as a memory stick
(trademark) may be executed.
[0750] Then, in step S787, in the decryption unit 370 of the
encryption/decryption module 365, the control section 360 of the
encryption processing section 352 takes out an encrypted individual
key K.sub.i and an encrypted content key K.sub.co included in key
data given by the upper controller 351, decrypts the encrypted
individual key K.sub.i using the delivery key K.sub.d stored in the
storage module 361, and decrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co
using the obtained individual key K.sub.i.
[0751] Subsequently, in step S788, the control section 360 of the
encryption processing section 352 mutually authenticates with the
electronic watermark insertion section 353 using each other's
mutual authentication modules 364 and 380, and shares the temporary
key K.sub.temp, and the processing proceeds to step S789. In step
S789, the control section 360 of the encryption processing section
352 encrypts the decrypted content key K.sub.co using the temporary
key K.sub.temp in the encryption unit 371 of the
encryption/decryption module 365. Then, in step S790, the control
section 360 of the encryption processing section 352 forwards the
content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key K.sub.temp to
the electronic watermark insertion section 353.
[0752] In step S791, in the key decryption module 381, the
electronic watermark insertion section 353 decrypts the encrypted
content key K.sub.co given by the encryption processing section 352
using the temporary key K.sub.temp (shared with the encryption
processing section 352) given by the mutual authentication module
380.
[0753] Then, in step S792, the upper controller 351 transmits a
read out request of contents selected and designated by a customer
(e.g., including an ID of contents) to the hosting server 331 via
the communication section 350, reads out encrypted contents
selected and designated by the customer from the hosting server
331, and forwards the contents to the electronic watermark
insertion section 353. Incidentally, when having read out the
encrypted contents from the hosting server 331 in this way, since
the encrypted contents can be saved in the KIOSK terminal server
357, if the customer selects and designates contents, the upper
controller 351 may first retrieve contents held by the KIOSK
terminal server 357, and if there is not corresponding contents in
the KIOSK terminal server 357, read out the contents from the
hosting server 331. In addition, read out of contents may be
executed in steps before step S792.
[0754] In step S793, after decrypting the encrypted contents given
by the upper controller 351 using the decrypted content key
K.sub.co in the decryption module 382, the electronic watermark
insertion section 353 inserts, for example, an ID of a holder of
the KIOSK terminal 332 in the form of an electronic watermark in
the decrypted contents in the electronic watermark addition module
383.
[0755] Incidentally, an ID of a holder of the KIOSK terminal 332 is
used as data of the watermark attached to the contents in order to
specify the KIOSK terminal 332 that provided the contents when the
contents recorded in the recording medium 333 (or the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334) are illegally copied.
[0756] Then, in step S794, the electronic watermark insertion
section 353 forwards the contents in which the electronic watermark
is inserted to the recording medium 333 as they are (in the form of
digital data), thereby recording the contents designated by the
customer in the recording medium 333.
[0757] Subsequently, in step S795, the upper controller 351 uses
the price processing section 354 determines whether or not money
inserted in the price insertion opening by the customer is more
than a charged price, and if the money is more than the charged
price, returns the balance as change from the price returning
opening.
[0758] In this way, in step S796, the customer receives the change
if there is change, and at the same time, receives the recording
medium 333.
[0759] Incidentally, when the customer purchases a utilization
right of contents in this way, the upper controller 351 of the
KIOSK terminal 332 transmits the charge information prepared at the
point to the electronic distribution service center 1. Thus, the
electronic distribution service center 1 makes a settlement based
on the charge information, thereby collecting a part of the price
paid by the customer from the holder of the KIOSK terminal 332
according to the utilization right to which the purchase processing
was applied.
[0760] On the other hand, when the customer inserted the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 in the KIOSK terminal 332 in
step S800, in order to identify that the medium is the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 by identification processing
of media in the subsequent step S801 (i.e., if the medium inserted
in the KIOSK terminal 332 by the customer is identified as the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 by the
identification processing of contents described above for step
S781), the upper controller 351 proceeds to step S802.
Incidentally, if the medium is identified as the recording medium
333 in this step S801, processing of step S782 and the subsequent
steps are executed.
[0761] In step S802, the upper controller 351 sets a purchasable
utilization right to contents (e.g., an unlimited reproduction
right, a reproduction right with a period limited, a reproduction
right with an accumulated time limited, a reproduction right with a
number of times limited, an unlimited copying right, a copying
right with a number of times limited, or the like) together with
the purchasable contents (i.e., a name of a tune) and a price via
the displaying means 356, and causes the displaying means 356 to
display the information of the set contents of utilization right,
and when the customer selects and designates desired contents via
the inputting means 355 and, at the same time, selects and
designates contents of a desired utilization right, the processing
proceeds to step S803.
[0762] In steps S803, the upper controller 351 inquires whether or
not the purchase price of the utilization right will be settled
later via the displaying means 356. Then, when the customer selects
to pay the price on the spot via the inputting means 355, the upper
controller 351 in turn solicits the customer to insert money in the
price insertion opening via the displaying means 356, and the
processing proceeds to step S804. Incidentally, since step S804
executes processing similar to the processing described above for
step S783, its description is omitted. In addition, since step S805
to which the processing can proceed from step S804 executes
processing similar to the processing described above for step S784,
its description is omitted.
[0763] Then, in step S806, the upper controller 351 inquires the
customer whether or not the purchase processing may be executed by
the KIOSK terminal 332 via the display means 356. If the customer
selects that the KIOSK terminal 332 may execute the purchase
processing via the inputting means 355, the processing proceeds to
step S807.
[0764] Since processing similar to the processing described above
for step S785 is executed in step S807, its description is omitted.
Then, in step S808, the control section 360 of the encryption
processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332 executes the
purchase processing of the utilization right selected and
designated by the customer in the purchase processing module 363
based on the handling policy and the price information given by the
upper controller 351, prepares license conditions information and
charge information, and holds the charge information in the storage
module 361, and then the processing proceeds to step S809. since
processing similar to the processing described above for step S787
is executed in step S809, its description is omitted.
[0765] Incidentally, as an ID of an encryption processing section
to be stored in data of license conditions information (i.e., an ID
of the encryption processing section that prepared the license
conditions information), an ID of the encryption processing section
122 in the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 is
stored. (However, an ID of the encryption processing section 352 in
the KIOSK terminal 332 may be stored. At this point, in some cases,
an ID of the encryption processing section 122 in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 to which the contents was
transferred is saved in the KIOSK terminal server 357, and
thereafter transmitted to the electronic distribution service
center 1 and managed).
[0766] Then, in step S810, the control section 360 of the
encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332
mutually authenticates with the encryption processing section 122
of the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 using each
other's mutual authentication modules 364 and 128, and shares the
temporary key K.sub.temp, and the processing proceeds to step
S811.
[0767] In step S811, the control section 360 of the encryption
processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332 encrypts the
decrypted content key K.sub.co and the license conditions
information respectively in the encryption unit 371 of the
encryption/decryption module 365 using the temporary key
K.sub.temp. Incidentally, since, among the content key K.sub.co and
the license conditions information, even if contents of the license
conditions information are seen, there is no specific problem, only
the content key K.sub.co may be encrypted. Then, the control
section 360 of the encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK
terminal 332 generates signatures for all of (or a part of) the
content key K.sub.co encrypted (by the temporary key K.sub.temp)
and the license conditions information (in some cases, it is
encrypted) in the signature generation unit 373, and returns them
to the upper controller 351.
[0768] Then, in step S812, the upper controller 351 in the KIOSK
terminal 332 reads out the encrypted contents selected and
designated by the customer from the hosting server 331 or the KIOSK
terminal server 357 as in step S792. (Incidentally, as a timing,
reading out of the contents may be executed before step S812).
Then, the read out contents, the contents key K.sub.co encrypted
(by the temporary key K.sub.temp), and the license conditions
information, the signatures for the content key K.sub.co encrypted
(by the temporary key K.sub.temp) and the license conditions
information, as well as the handling information and the price
information read out form the KIOSK terminal server 357 are
transmitted to the electronic distribution only recording medium
334 via the upper controller 351.
[0769] In step S813, the control section 124 of the encryption
processing section 122 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334 verifies the signatures for the content key
K.sub.co encrypted (by the temporary key K.sub.temp), the handling
information, the price information and the license conditions
information given by the KIOSK terminal 332 in the signature
verification unit 135, and thereafter decrypts the encrypted
content key K.sub.co and the encrypted license conditions
information, if necessary, respectively, using the temporary key
K.sub.temp in the decryption unit 132. Then, the control section
124 decrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co using the save key
K.sub.save held in the storage module 125 in the encryption unit
132.
[0770] Then, in step S814, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 saves the contents encrypted by the
content key K.sub.co, the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the
save key K.sub.save, the handling policy, the price information and
the license conditions information in the external memory 123 via
the external memory control section 130. Incidentally, the content
key K.sub.co encrypted by the save key K.sub.save and the license
conditions information are saved in a tamper checked region in the
external memory 123 by the external memory control section 130.
[0771] Then, although processing for the upper controller 351 in
the KIOSK terminal 332 proceeds to steps S815 and S816 in order,
since steps S815 and S816 executes processing similar to the
processing described above for steps S795 and S796 respectively,
their descriptions are omitted.
[0772] Incidentally, since the upper controller 351 of the KIOSK
terminal 332 transmits the encrypted contents, the encrypted
content key K.sub.co, the handling policy, the price information
and the license conditions information to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334, but holds the charge
information in the storage module 361 inside, the charge
information is transmitted to the electronic distribution service
center 1. Thus, the electronic distribution service center 1 makes
a settlement based on the charge information, thereby collecting a
part of the price paid by the customer from the holder of the KIOSK
terminal 332 according to the utilization right to which the
purchase processing was applied.
[0773] Here, in the settlement of the price described above for
step S803, when the customer selects to make a settlement of the
purchase price of the utilization right on a later date via the
inputting means 355, processing for the upper controller 351 in the
KIOSK terminal 332 proceeds to step S820. Incidentally, since
processing from this step S820 to the subsequent step S823 is
similar to the processing from step S807 to the subsequent step
S810, their descriptions are omitted. However, the charge
information generated in step S821 is not saved in the storage
module 361 of the encryption processing section 352.
[0774] Then, in step S824, the control section 360 of the
encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332
encrypts the decrypted content key K.sub.co, the license conditions
information and the charge information respectively in the
encryption unit 371 of the encryption/decryption module 365 using
the temporary key K.sub.temp. Incidentally, since, even if contents
of the license conditions and the charge information other than the
content key K.sub.co are seen, there is no specific problem, only
the content key K.sub.co may be encrypted. Then, the control
section 360 of the encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK
terminal 332 generates signatures for all of (or each of) the
content key K.sub.co encrypted (by the temporary key K.sub.temp),
the encrypted license conditions information and the encrypted
charge information in the signature generation unit 373, and
transmits the content key K.sub.co encrypted by the temporary key
K.sub.temp, the encrypted license conditions information, the
encrypted charge information and their signatures to the upper
controller 351.
[0775] Then, in step S825, the upper controller 351 in the KIOSK
terminal 332 reads out the encrypted contents selected and
designated by the customer from the hosting server 331 or the KIOSK
terminal server 357 as in step S792. (Incidentally, as a timing,
reading out of contents may be executed in steps before this step
S812).
[0776] Then, the encrypted content key, the content key K.sub.co
encrypted (by the temporary key K.sub.temp), the handling
information, the price information, the encrypted license
conditions information and the encrypted charge information, as
well as the signatures generated for all of (or each of) the
entirety of the content key K.sub.co encrypted (by the temporary
key K.sub.temp), the encrypted license conditions information and
the encrypted charge information are transmitted to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 via the upper controller
351. In addition, the handling policy and the price information may
be transmitted from the KIOSK terminal 332 to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334, if necessary.
[0777] In step S826, the external memory control section 130 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 saves the
encrypted contents in the external memory 123. Incidentally, the
external memory control section 130 saves the handling information
and the price information in the external memory 123, if
necessary.
[0778] Then, in step S827, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 performs verification of the signatures
for the content key K.sub.co encrypted (by the temporary key
K.sub.temp), the encrypted license conditions information and the
encrypted charge information given by the KIOSK terminal 332 in the
signature verification unit 135, and decrypts the encrypted content
key K.sub.co, the encrypted license conditions information and the
encrypted charge information respectively using the temporary key
K.sub.temp in the decryption unit 132. (If the license conditions
information and the charge information are not encrypted, it is
unnecessary to decrypt them). Then, the control section 124
encrypts the decrypted content key K.sub.co using the save key
K.sub.save saved in the storage module 125 in the encryption unit
132.
[0779] Then, in step S828, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 saves the charge information in the
storage module 125. Subsequently, in step S829, the control section
124 of the encryption processing section 122 in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 saves the encrypted content
key K.sub.co and the license conditions information in the external
memory 123 via the external memory control section 130.
Incidentally, the content key K.sub.co and the license conditions
information are saved in a region for which tamper checked was
applied in the external memory 123.
[0780] Further, if contents are recorded in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 with conditions of
settlement in a later day as described above, and charge
information is also saved in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334, the electronic distribution service center 1
thereafter cannot collect the charge information from the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 until the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 is inserted in an
apparatus connected to the electronic distribution service center
1. Thus, the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 may
be inserted in an apparatus not connected to the electronic
distribution service center 1, and contents are likely to be
illegally utilized with no payment of prices.
[0781] Therefore, in such an electronic distribution only recording
medium 334, after recording contents, the control section 124 of
the encryption processing section 122 in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 retrieves charge information
of the storage module 125 in a predetermined timing, and if
uncollected charge information is saved, applies limitation of a
number of times, time or the like to a corresponding utilization
right of the contents until the charge information is collected,
thereby allowing utilization of the contents within the limitation.
In this way, illegal utilization of the contents is prevented.
[0782] In addition, in such purchase processing, since the charge
information and the license conditions information that were
generated in the purchase processing, and the handling policy that
was used for the generation, or the like do not remain in the KIOSK
terminal 332, the electronic distribution service center 1 collects
prices from a customer holding the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334 at this point, and distributes a part of the
prices to a holding of the KIOSK terminal 332.
[0783] In addition, in the processing described above for step
S806, if the customer selects that the purchase processing is
executed by the electronic distribution only recording medium 334
via the inputting means 355, the processing proceeds to step S840,
where the upper controller 351 in the KIOSK terminal 332 reads out
contents selected and designated by the customer from the hosting
server 331 and the KIOSK terminal server 357 as in step S792, and
at the same time, reads out corresponding key data, a handling
policy and price information from the KIOSK terminal server 357 and
transmits these to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334.
[0784] Incidentally, after mutually authenticating with the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334, the KIOSK
terminal 332 may share the temporary key K.sub.temp, encrypt the
contents (encrypted by the content key K.sub.co), the key data, the
handling policy and the price information by the temporary key
K.sub.temp, if necessary, and attach signatures to entire or a part
of the data.
[0785] In step S841, the control section 124 of the encryption
processing section 122 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334 saves the contents (encrypted by the content
key K.sub.co) in the external memory 123 via the external memory
control section 130, and at the same time, saves the handling
policy and the price information in the external memory 123 via the
external memory control section 130, if necessary.
[0786] Then, in step S842, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 executes purchase processing in the
purchase processing module 127, and prepares license conditions
information and charge information based on the handling policy and
the price information. Incidentally, since the procedures of the
purchase processing are the same as steps S163 to S170 described
above for FIG. 67, their detailed description is omitted.
[0787] Subsequently, in step S843, after decrypting the encrypted
individual key K.sub.i included key data using the delivery key
K.sub.d held in the storage module 125 in the decryption unit 131,
the control section 124 of the encryption processing section 122 in
the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 decrypts the
encrypted content key K.sub.co included in the key data using the
decrypted individual key K.sub.i. Then, the control section 124
encrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co using the save key
K.sub.save held in the storage module 125 in the encryption unit
132.
[0788] Then, in step S844, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 mutually authenticates with the
encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332 using
each other's mutual authentication modules 128 and 364, and shares
the temporary key K.sub.temp.
[0789] Then, in step S845, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 encrypts charge information using the
temporary key K.sub.temp in the encryption unit 132, and after
attaching a signature to the charge information in the signature
generation unit 134, transmits the encrypted charge information and
the signature to the KIOSK terminal 332 via the communication
section 121. Incidentally, although a signature is attached to
charge information so as not to be tampered, the charge information
may be transmitted to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334 without encrypting. If the charge information is not
encrypted, the temporary key K.sub.temp may not be shared between
the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 and the KIOSK
terminal 332.
[0790] In step S846, the upper controller 351 in the KIOSK terminal
332 forwards the charge information and the signature transmitted
from the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 to the
encryption processing section 352. Thus, in step S847, the
signature verification unit 374 of the encryption processing
section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332 verifies the signature for
the charge information, and after succeeding in verifying the
signature, decrypts the charge information using the temporary key
K.sub.temp and saves it in the storage module 361.
[0791] Then, in step S848, the control section 360 of the
encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332
generates a charge processing completion notice indicating that the
charge processing is completed, and attaches a signature to the
charge processing completion notice in the signature generation
unit 373, forward the charge processing completion notice with the
signature attached to the upper controller 351, and at the same
time, transmits it to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334 via the upper controller 351. Thus, the upper controller
351 simply determines whether or not the charge processing has been
complete without specifically verifying the signature based on the
charge processing completion notice. In addition, the control
section 124 of the encryption processing section 122 in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 verifies the
signature of the charge processing completion notice in the
signature verification unit 135, thereby recognizing the completion
of the charge processing.
[0792] Then, in step S849, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 saves the content key K.sub.co encrypted
by the save key K.sub.save and the license conditions information
in a region to which tamper check was applied in the external
memory 123 via the external memory control section 130.
[0793] Subsequently, although the KIOSK terminal 332 sequentially
executes processing of steps S850 and S851, since the processing is
similar to the processing executed in steps S815 and S816, its
description is omitted.
[0794] In this way, when purchase processing is performed in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334, charge
information is held in the KIOSK terminal 332, and the charge
information is transmitted to the electronic distribution service
center 1 from the KIOSK terminal 332.
[0795] Incidentally, in step S803, if the customer selects that
purchase price of the utilization right will be settled on a later
date, in step S860 shown in FIG. 106, the upper controller 351 of
the electronic distribution only recording medium 334 may transmits
the encrypted contents, the key data, the handling policy and the
price information to the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334 in the state of the content provider secure container
transmitted from the content provider 2. Then, if state data of the
content provider secure container is transmitted to the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 from the KIOSK terminal 332
in this way, since a signature is already attached to the content
provider secure container in the content provider 2, the KIOSK
terminal 332 transmits the data to the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334 without specifically attaching a
signature.
[0796] In addition, in step S803, if the customer selects that
purchase price of the utilization right will be settled on a later
date, the KIOSK terminal 332 may execute purchase processing to be
described with reference to a flow chart shown in FIG. 107. That
is, in step S870, the upper controller 351 in the KIOSK terminal
332 instructs the control section 360 of the encryption processing
section 352 to execute the purchase processing. Incidentally, since
the processing of this step S870 is similar to the processing of
step S785, its detailed description is omitted.
[0797] Then, in step S871, in the decryption unit 370 after
decrypting the encrypted individual key K.sub.i using the delivery
key K.sub.d held in the storage module 361, the control section 360
of the encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332
decrypts the encrypted content key K.sub.co using the decrypted
individual key K.sub.i, and the processing proceeds to step S872.
Incidentally, since the processing of step S872 is similar to the
processing described above for step S810, its description is
omitted.
[0798] Subsequently, in step S873, the control section 360 of the
encryption processing section 352 in the KIOSK terminal 332
encrypts the decrypted content key K.sub.co using the temporary key
K.sub.temp in the encryption unit 371, and generates a signature
for the content key K.sub.co encrypted (by the temporary key
K.sub.temp) in the signature verification unit 373, if necessary,
and the processing proceeds to step S874, and in this step S874, in
the signature generation unit 373 the control section 360 transmits
the encrypted contents, the content key K.sub.co encrypted (by the
temporary key K.sub.temp) and its signature, the handling policy
and the price information to the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334 via the upper controller 351.
[0799] In Step S875, after verifying the signature of the content
key K.sub.co encrypted (by the temporary key K.sub.temp) in the
signature verification unit 135, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 decrypts the encrypted content key
K.sub.co using the temporary key K.sub.temp in the decryption unit
131. Then, the control section 124 encrypts the decrypted content
key K.sub.co using the save key K.sub.save held in the storage
module 125 in the encryption unit 132.
[0800] Then, in step S876, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 executes purchase processing in the
purchase processing module 127, and after preparing license
conditions information and charge information based on a handling
policy and price information, the processing proceeds to step S877,
where the control section 124 saves the charge information in the
storage module 125.
[0801] Subsequently, in step S878, the control section 124 of the
encryption processing section 122 in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334 saves the encrypted contents, the
handling policy and the price information in the external memory
123 via the external memory control section 130, and then in step
S879, saves the encrypted content key K.sub.co and the license
conditions information in a region to which tamper check was
applied of the external memory 123 via the external memory control
section 130. Incidentally, in step S878, since the control section
124 puts various kinds of information included in the handling
policy and the price information in the license conditions
information, the handling policy and the price information may be
saved in the external memory 123, if necessary.
[0802] In this way, the KIOSK terminal 332 can execute purchase
processing for a utilization right of contents with respect to the
recording medium 333 and the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334, and record the contents in the recording medium 333 and
the electronic distribution only recording medium 344.
[0803] Incidentally, since decrypted contents are recorded in the
recording medium 333, a customer holding the recording medium 333
can easily utilize the contents using a reproduction apparatus that
does not have an extension section and an encryption section, and
does not need to connect to the service provider 3 and the
electronic distribution service center 1 according to the recording
medium 333.
[0804] In addition, although a customer holding the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 cannot utilize contents
unless the customer uses a reproduction apparatus provided with an
extension section (or, alternatively an encryption processing
section) as in the home server 51 described above for FIG. 15,
since the reproduction apparatus does not need to be connected to
the electronic distribution service center 1 or the service
provider 3 either directly or indirectly, contents can be utilized
with an apparatus such as a reproduction apparatus used for
establishing the user home network 5.
[0805] In the above-mentioned configuration, in the electronic
music distribution system 10, if the recording medium 333 is
inserted in the KIOSK terminal 332, purchase processing is executed
in the KIOSK terminal 332, thereby inserting data of an electronic
watermark in decrypted contents to record in the recording medium
333.
[0806] In addition, if the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334 is inserted in the KIOSK terminal 332, purchase
processing is executed either in the KIOSK terminal 332 or the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334, thereby
recording encrypted contents and a content key K.sub.co as well as
license conditions information in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334.
[0807] Therefore, in such an electronic music distribution system
10, even if a customer does not own an apparatus or the like for
establishing the user home network 5 connected to the service
provider 3 or the electronic distribution service center 1, the
customer can secure safety to record contents in the recording
medium 333 and the electronic distribution only recording medium
334 that the customer owns using the KIOSK terminal 332 installed
in the simple retail store, respectively.
[0808] That is, since contents is recorded in the recording medium
333 in a state in which a copy control signal such as SCMS is
attached or by managing copies by an electronic watermark (a
copying right with copy management information), illegal copying of
the contents can be prevented. Incidentally, as an electronic
watermark signal, a copy control signal (a signal for controlling
copy possible/impossible), a reproduction control signal (a signal
for controlling reproduction possible/impossible), an ID of any
apparatus (an ID of a KIOSK terminal or an ID of an electronic
distribution only recording medium 334), or the like can be
envisaged, and one or a plurality of them may be embedded.
[0809] In addition, since a utilization right (unlimited, a number
of times limitation, a time limitation, etc.) selected in the
purchase processing and a limitation which is applied on a
utilization right until charge information is collected in case of
the purchase processing to be settled on a later date is managed by
license conditions information in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334, illegal utilization of contents can be
prevented in this case as well.
[0810] According to the above-mentioned configuration, since
contents are recorded in the recording medium 333 and the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 by the KIOSK
terminal 332, the contents can be easily provided to a user who
does not own an apparatus for establishing a user home network 5
while securing safety of the contents in the recording medium 333
and the electronic distribution recording medium 334.
[0811] In addition, since an information provider holding the KIOSK
terminal 332 (the service provider 3 in FIG. 1) provides price
information, and therefore content provision fees are distributed
to the information provider in any of the systems in FIGS. 103, 105
and 106, these systems are not substantially different from those
in FIGS. 101, 102 and 104 in which money is directly collected.
[0812] (11) Provision of Contents to be an Album in a Kiosk
Terminal 332
[0813] In addition to such a configuration, in the case of the
information provision apparatus 330, keyword information such as an
artist, gender of the artist, a type of a tune (enka, rock'n roll,
etc.), a season imagined from a tune, a location (sea, mountain,
etc.), a time of a day (evening, morning, etc.), and the like that
are generated by the information provider owning the KIOSK terminal
332 generated with respect to contents to be saved in the hosting
server 331 is saved in the KIOSK terminal server 357 of the KIOSK
terminal 332. Incidentally, as another example, in some cases, the
content provider 2 generates this keyword information and saves it
in a server 342 that is a content server in the hosting server 331
or the KIOSK terminal server 357.
[0814] In addition, various kinds of provision information (e.g., a
commercial, content information, etc.) generated by the information
provider that is different for each content or keyword (not
necessarily different) is saved in the KIOSK terminal server 357 of
the KIOSK terminal 332. Incidentally, the content provider 2 may
generate the provision information and save it in the server 342 of
the hosting server 331 and the KIOSK terminal server 357 of the
KIOSK terminal 332, or provision information generated by the
content provider 2 or received from the information provider may be
collected as one content by linking it to contents. (That is,
provision information is embedded in the top, middle, last or the
like of music (contents) so that the music and the provision
information cannot easily be separated as one tune).
[0815] The upper controller 351 that is selecting means and storing
means of the KIOSK terminal 332 prepares a data table in which a
plurality of contents saved in the server 342 of the hosting server
331 are categorized based on the keyword information, and saves the
prepared data table in the KIOSK terminal server 357. Incidentally,
an ID of contents corresponding for each category are registered in
the data table. In addition, the data table may be generated by the
control section 341 of the hosting server 331, and saved in the
server 342 or the KIOSK terminal server 357. Moreover, if the data
table is saved in the server 342, the control section 341 of the
hosting server 331 transmits keyword information for the contents
to the KIOSK terminal 332 via the communication section 340,
thereby saving the keyword information in the KIOSK terminal server
357 by the upper controller 351 in the KIOSK terminal 332.
[0816] Then, in the KIOSK terminal 332, if a customer inserts an
electronic distribution only recording medium 334, the upper
controller 351 reads out a keyword corresponding to contents that
can be applied purchase processing from the KIOSK terminal server
357, and notifies the customer of the keyword via the displaying
means 356. Incidentally, the upper controller 351 may at this time
notifies the customer of the keyword for the contents to which
purchase processing can be applied read out from the KIOSK terminal
server 357 together with information on a tune name or a price for
the contents via the displaying means 356.
[0817] When the customer selects and designates, for example, a
keyword (the number of keywords may be plural) corresponding to
desired contents and a number contents to which the customer wishes
to apply purchase processing, the inputted data is transmitted to
the upper controller 351 as a signal, and the upper controller 351
having received the signal generates a random number by a random
number generation program (not shown) held by itself based on the
number of contents designated by the customer, or causes the random
number generation unit 372 that is random number generating means
to generate a random number by controlling the control section 360
of the encryption processing section 352. Incidentally, in some
cases, the upper controller 351 transmits the keyword and the
random number to the hosting server 331 via the communication
section 350. In addition, since the random number is used for
selecting contents at random, all the contents belonging to a
category of a keyword may be applied purchase processing, or
contents belonging to a category of a keyword may be applied
purchase processing in the order of appearing on the data table
without forcing to generate a random number.
[0818] The upper controller 351 retrieves a data table in the KIOSK
terminal server 357 based on the random number data previously
generated and the keyword inputted via the inputting means 355.
Then, the upper controller 351 arbitrarily selects an ID of
contents in the number designated by the customer based on the
random number data out of a plurality of IDs belonging to a
category corresponding to the keyword, and reads out contents
corresponding to the selected ID of the contents from the hosting
server 331.
[0819] In addition, as another example, the control section 341 of
the hosting server 331 arbitrarily selects an ID of contents in the
number designated by the customer based on the random number data
out of a plurality of IDs of contents belonging to a category
corresponding to the keyword by retrieving the data table in the
server 342 based on the random number data and the keyword
transmitted from the KIOSK terminal 332, reads out contents
corresponding to the selected ID of the contents from the server
342, and at the same time, transmits read out each content to the
KIOSK terminal 332 via the communication section 340.
[0820] In this way, the KIOSK terminal 332 executes the
above-mentioned purchase processing for FIGS. 103 to 105 and FIG.
106 with respect to the plurality of contents transmitted from the
hosting server 331, and records each of the contents altogether in
the external memory 123 that is a recording medium via the external
memory control section 130 that is a recording medium in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334. Thus, the KIOSK
terminal 332 can easily make an album by recording a plurality of
tunes altogether that belong to a category a customer prefers in
the electronic distribution only recording medium 334.
[0821] In addition, in the purchase processing in the KIOSK
terminal 332, the KIOSK terminal 332 records the above-mentioned
provision information and contents (or, as described above, the
provision information and the contents may behave like one content)
in the external memory 123 altogether via the external memory
control section 130 of the electronic distribution only recording
medium 334. Upon reproducing the contents, in order to have a
customer listen to the provision information, a reproduction order
of the contents can be provided for, for example, a limitation
clause may be added to the license conditions information. Then, in
the purchase processing of the contents, the customer can select
whether to add or not to add provision information, and if the
provision information is added, purchase price can be lowered or
free in return for it. Thus, the customer can obtain a utilization
right of contents inexpensively than usual, and even in such a
case, the content provider 2 and the service provide 3 (in this
embodiment, a owner of the KIOSK terminal 332) can obtain a profit
from provision information fees (so called commercial fees) via the
electronic distribution service center 1.
[0822] In addition, in the KIOSK terminal 332, in the case in which
a plurality of contents are recorded as an album in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334, the control section 360 of
the encryption processing section 352 selects, for example, a
reproduction right with a number of times limitation that can
reproduce contents only once as a utilization right for these
contents. Moreover, when preparing license conditions information,
the control section 360 of the encryption processing section in the
KIOSK terminal 332 or the control section 124 of the encryption
processing section 122 in the electronic distribution only
recording medium 334 stores an ID that shows that the contents were
recorded in the KIOSK terminal 332 as an ID of the service provider
3 that is stored in the license conditions information. For
example, if an Id of the service provider 3 is 64 bits, the upper
16 bits are designated as a group number and the lower 48 bits are
designated as a serial number, and as an ID allocated to the KIOSK
terminal 332 that a single information provider owns, an ID with a
group number identical to all the apparatuses and a serial number
of the lower 48 bits is different for each apparatus. Then, in
order to identify whether or not the contents recorded in the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 are those
recorded in the KIOSK terminal 332, the contents is identified by a
group number of an ID of a service provider included in license
conditions information. (That is, a group number is allocated for
each information provider).
[0823] Then, in the KIOSK terminal 332, if the customer inserts the
electronic distribution only recording medium 334 again and
requests to record a plurality of contents as an album, the control
section 360 of the encryption processing section 352 takes out
license conditions information from the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334, and retrieves the contents that were
recorded in the KIOSK terminal 332 and were already reproduced
based on the license conditions information.
[0824] In this way, in the KIOSK terminal 332, new contents can be
recoded that deletes (overwrites) were recorded in the KIOSK
terminal 332 of the information provider and already reproduced
without deleting contents that were recorded by the KIOSK terminal
332 of the identical information provider but have not reproduced
at all or contents that were recorded by a KIOSK terminal of
another information provider different from the KIOSK terminal 332
of the identical information provider in the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334.
[0825] In the above-mentioned configuration, the electronic music
distribution system 10 prepares a data table for categorizing a
plurality of contents saved in the server 342 of the hosting server
331 by the upper controller 351 of the KIOSK terminal 332, and
saves the data table in the KIOSK terminal server 357.
[0826] Then, when the customer who has inserted the electronic
distribution only recording medium 334 in the KIOSK terminal 332
designates a keyword indicating the customer's own preference, a
number of contents to be purchased altogether, and whether or not
to insert/not insert provision information (commercial, etc.), if
necessary, the KIOSK terminal 332 generates a random number data
based on the designated number of contents, specifies IDs of many
contents belonging to a category of the designated keyword from the
data table, and at the same time, arbitrarily selects IDs of the
designated number of contents based on the random number data from
the IDs of the specified contents, reads out contents corresponding
to the selected IDs of the contents from the hosting server 331,
and records the arbitrarily selected plurality of contents and the
provision information (commercial, etc.), if necessary, altogether
in the electronic distribution only recording medium 334.
[0827] Therefore, it is possible to record a plurality of contents
(tunes) belonging to a category according to a preference of a
customer altogether in the electronic distribution recording medium
334 to easily make an album. In addition, since a random number is
used for selection of contents, even if contents are recorded again
in the electronic distribution only recording medium 334, a
customer can listen to different contents with relatively high
probability, and it is also possible to make it unclear which tunes
are recorded, therefore, fun of listening to music can be provided
to a customer.
[0828] Moreover, since a number of reproduction times of contents
and an apparatus used for recording the contents are managed in the
electronic distribution recording medium 334, if the contents are
recorded again in the electronic distribution only recording medium
334 in the KIOSK terminal 332, inadvertent deletion of contents
that were recorded in the KIOSK terminal 332 but have not
reproduced at all or contents recorded by an apparatus different
from the KIOSK terminal 332 can be prevented.
[0829] According to the above-mentioned configuration, in the
information provision apparatus 330, since a number of contents
saved in the hosting server 331 are categorized and managed based
on a predetermined keyword by the KIOSK terminal 332, when a
customer utilizing the KIOSK terminal 332 designates a keyword
indicating the customer's own preference and a desired number of
contents, contents in the number designated by the customer are
arbitrarily selected, and the selected contents are read out from
the hosting server 331 and recorded in the electronic distribution
only recording medium 334, the plurality of contents belonging to a
category according to the customer's preference can be recorded
altogether, thus a plurality of contents according to the
customer's preference can be easily recorded.
[0830] In addition, a customer can obtain a utilization right of
contents inexpensively by saving provision information with
contents altogether.
[0831] Further, although the information provision apparatus 330
that is an information recording apparatus is configured by
connecting the hosting server 331 and the KIOSK terminal 332 by a
special purpose cable, a communication satellite or the like in the
electronic music distribution system 10, it may be configured by
providing the hosting server 331 integrally in the KIOSK terminal
332, or providing the hosting server 331 inside the content
provider 2.
[0832] In addition, as a medium used as a recording medium 333,
various kinds of media other than an MD (trademark) can be applied
if a copying limitation can be added as in a medium corresponding
to SCMS.
[0833] Moreover, although the KIOSK terminal 332 is installed in a
simple retail store, it can be installed in various places such as
in a large scale store, a public facility, or the like.
[0834] Moreover, as a utilization right of purchasable contents,
not only a number of times right that can only be reproduced once
but also a utilization right whose effective period is limited is
envisaged, and when applying purchase processing in the KIOSK
terminal 332, contents whose effective period has expired can be
deleted.
[0835] Furthermore, although a customer is allowed to selected
whether or not to attach provision information to contents, a
customer may be forced to attach provision information to all
contents depending on the contents.
[0836] (12) Purchase Prohibition Processing of Contents
[0837] Here, a purchase prohibition list preparation section (not
shown in FIG. 2) is provided in the electronic distribution service
center 1 (FIG. 2) that is a list transmission apparatus, and the
purchase prohibition list preparation section prepares a purchase
prohibition list of contents indicated in FIG. 108. An ID of
contents being objects of purchase prohibition, an ID of a content
provider being an object of utilization suspension, and an ID of a
service provider being an object of utilization suspension are
stored in the purchase prohibition list of contents, and an
electronic signature of the electronic distribution service center
1 is attached to the entire list.
[0838] In the purchase prohibition list of contents, the ID of
contents being an object of purchase prohibition indicates contents
that have become objects of purchase prohibition because a defect
(an error) has occurred in data, provision of contents has been
suspended due to some reason by a provider of contents (a content
provider 2 and a service provider 3), or the like. In addition, the
ID of a content provider and the ID of the service provider being
objects of utilization suspension indicate a content provider 2 and
a service provider 3 that have become unable to be utilized for
purchase of contents because they have been deprived of a sales
right of contents due to illegal distribution of contents being
objects of purchase prohibition, they are unable to distribute
contents due to bankruptcy or the like.
[0839] The electronic distribution service center 1 transmits a
purchase prohibition list of an apparatus (in this embodiment, the
home server 51 that is an online apparatus) in the user home
network 5 connected online to the electronic distribution service
center 1 via a predetermined transmitting means (not shown).
[0840] The home server 51 receives the purchase prohibition list of
contents transmitted from the electronic distribution service
center 1 by the communication section 61, and the upper controller
62 forwards the purchase prohibition list to the encryption
processing section 65. After verifying an electronic signature
attached to the purchase prohibition right in the signature
verification unit 115, the encryption processing section 65 saves
the purchase prohibition list in, for example, the mass storage
section 68 that is a list holding means via the upper controller 62
if the purchase prohibition list is not tampered. Incidentally, the
home server 51 may save the purchase prohibition list transmitted
from the electronic distribution service center 1 in the mass
storage section 68 without verifying the signature attached to it,
and verify the signature when using the purchase prohibition list
in purchase processing, or the like.
[0841] Then, when a content provider secure container and a service
provider secure container are transmitted from the content provider
2 via the service provider 3, the upper controller 62 forwards, for
example, a handling policy included in the content provider secure
container or price information included in the service provider
secure container to the encryption processing section 65, and at
the same time, reads out a purchase prohibition list of contents
from the mass storage section 68 and forwards it to the encryption
processing section 65.
[0842] The control section 91 that is take-in suspension processing
means of the encryption processing section 65 retrieves information
in the purchase prohibition list of contents using an ID of the
content provider indicating a provider of contents included in the
handling policy or the price information, an ID of the service
provider, or and an ID of contents to be provided. Then, if the ID
of the content provider included in the handling policy or the
price information, the ID of the service provider, or and the ID of
contents exists in the purchase prohibition list of contents, the
control section 91 does not purchase the contents, and executes
purchase processing only if the ID of the content provider included
in the handling policy or the price information, the ID of the
service provider, or and the ID of contents does not exist in the
purchase prohibition list.
[0843] In this way, even if contents being objects of purchase
prohibition are inadvertently transmitted, the home server 51 can
prevent purchase of the contents, and at the same time, prevent
purchase of contents transmitted from the content provider 2 or the
service provider 3 that is an object of utilization suspension.
Incidentally, when receiving a purchase prohibition list of
contents, the home server 51 can prohibit purchase of contents
based on a regular purchase prohibition list prepared in the
electronic distribution service center 1 by verifying an electronic
signature of the purchase prohibition list.
[0844] In addition, in the electronic distribution service center
1, each time new contents becomes object of purchase prohibition
other than the contents registered in the purchase prohibition list
of contents, or a new content provider 2 or service provider 3
becomes an object of utilization suspension other than the content
provider 2 or the service provider 3 registered in the purchase
prohibition list, the purchase prohibition list of contents is
updated and the updated purchase prohibition list is transmitted to
the home server 51.
[0845] Thus, each time a purchase prohibition list is transmitted
from the electronic distribution service center 1, the home server
51 updates a purchase prohibition list in the mass storage section
68. Incidentally, if the purchase prohibition list is updated, the
electronic distribution service center 1 is made such that a
receiving side of a purchase prohibition list can identify if the
purchase prohibition list is the one newly updated by attaching a
date of the update (update date), a number (serial number), or the
like to the purchase prohibition list.
[0846] Here, a fixed apparatus, a portable apparatus, an electronic
distribution only recording medium, and the like (these are
collectively hereinafter referred to as offline apparatuses) that
are not connected online to the electronic distribution service
center 1 are provided in the user home network 5, and the home
server 51 transmits a purchase prohibition list of contents to an
offline apparatus when the offline apparatus is connected, and
causes the offline apparatus to save the purchase prohibition list.
Incidentally, since an offline apparatus is not always connected to
the home server 51, even if a purchase prohibition list of contents
is updated in the electronic distribution service center 1, a
purchase prohibition list held inside the purchase prohibition list
may not be updated accordingly.
[0847] Thus, if an offline apparatus is connected, the home server
51 compares purchase prohibition lists held by them, and if the
purchase prohibition list held by the home server 51 is new than
the purchase prohibition list held by the offline apparatus,
transmits its purchaser prohibition list to the offline apparatus,
and causes the offline apparatus to update it.
[0848] In addition, if offline apparatuses are connected each
other, as in the case in which the home server 51 and an offline
apparatus are connected, the home server 51 compares purchase
prohibition list held by them, and as a result, an offline
apparatus holding the latest purchase prohibition list among the
purchase prohibition lists held by them transmits the purchase
prohibition list to the other offline apparatus and causes the
other offline apparatus to update the purchase prohibition list,
and in this way, each offline apparatus update a purchase
prohibition list even if it is not connected to the home server
51.
[0849] Incidentally, if purchased contents are prohibited
purchasing after its purchase or a provider of purchased contents
(a content provider 2 and a service provider 3) becomes an object
of utilization suspension after purchase of the contents, each
apparatus (a home server 51 and an offline apparatus) in the user
home network 5 does not prohibit utilization of the contents that
are prohibited purchasing after its purchase or contents purchased
from the provider (the content provider 2 and the service provider
3) that has become an object of utilization suspension before the
utilization suspension, but prohibits redistribution and repurchase
of the contents.
[0850] Therefore, when redistributing and repurchasing already
purchased contents, each apparatus (the home server 51 and the
offline apparatus) in the user home network 5 detects whether or
not an ID of contents that are objects of the redistribution and
the repurchase is registered in the purchase prohibition list, and
if the ID of contents that are objects of the redistribution and
the repurchase is registered in the purchase prohibition list, does
not perform the redistribution and the repurchase of the
contents.
[0851] In addition, at the time of such redistribution and
repurchase, each apparatus (the home server 51 and the offline
apparatus) in the user home network 5 detects whether or not an ID
of a content provider and an ID of a service provider included in a
handling policy and price information corresponding to contents
that is object of the redistribution and the repurchase are
registered in the purchase prohibition list, and if the ID of a
content provider and the ID of a service provider (indicating a
provider of the contents) corresponding to contents that is object
of the redistribution and the repurchase are registered in the
purchase prohibition list, does not perform redistribution and
repurchase of the contents.
[0852] In addition, although, at the time of redistribution and
repurchase, each apparatus (the home server 51 and the offline
apparatus) detects whether or not contents that are objects of the
redistribution and the repurchase is prohibited purchasing and
whether or not the provider of the contents (the content provider 2
and the service provider 3) has become an object of utilization
suspension based on the purchase prohibition of contents, if the
purchase prohibition list then held is not the latest one, even if
the contents that is objects of the redistribution and the
repurchase are prohibited repurchase in the latest purchase
prohibition list, possibly transmits them to the other apparatus
without knowing it.
[0853] Thus, if contents are redistributed and repurchased, each
apparatus (the home server 51 and the offline apparatus) registers
an ID of the redistributed and repurchased contents, an ID of a
content provider and an ID of a service provider indicating
providers of the contents, and an ID of an encryption processing
section provided in an apparatus of a redistributor/repurchaser of
the contents in a redistribution/repurchase list of contents shown
in FIG. 109, and saves the redistribution/repurchase list in, for
example, a mass storage section. Incidentally, each time
redistribution and repurchase of contents are performed, each
apparatus updates and saves a redistribution/repurchase list.
[0854] Then, when receiving a purchase prohibition list of contents
from another apparatus (i.e., when the home server receives a
purchase prohibition list from the electronic distribution service
center 1, and when the offline apparatus receives a purchase
prohibition list from the home server 51 or another offline
apparatus), each apparatus (the home server 51 and the offline
apparatus) retrieves information in the redistribution/repurchase
list based on the ID of the contents that are objects of purchase
prohibition, the ID of the content provider and the ID of the
service provider that are objects of utilization suspension, which
are registered in the purchase prohibition list.
[0855] As a result, if the ID of the contents that are objects of
purchase prohibition, the ID of the content provider and the ID of
the service provider that are objects of utilization suspension are
registered in the redistribution/repurchase list (in other words,
if the contents that has become objects of purchase prohibition and
the contents purchased from the provider (the content provider 2
and the service provider 3) that has become an object of
utilization suspension are redistributed and repurchased), each
apparatus (the home server 51 and the offline apparatus) determines
that an apparatus (a home server 51 or an offline apparatus) of the
other party that redistributed and repurchased the contents that
have become objects of purchase prohibition or the contents
purchased from the provider (the content provider 2 and the service
provider 3) that has become an object of utilization suspension is
likely to have an old purchase prohibition list before update, and
transmits a purchase prohibition list to the other party's
apparatus (i.e., when the other party's apparatus is connected)
based on the ID of the corresponding encryption processing section
in the redistribution/repurchase list and causes the other party's
apparatus to update its purchase prohibition list.
[0856] Here, redistribution processing and repurchase processing of
contents performed among apparatuses of the user home network 5
will be described in the case of the home server 51 with reference
to a flow chart shown in FIG. 110. That is, in step S890, the upper
controller 62 in the home server 51 reads out a purchase
prohibition list of contents from the mass storage section 68,
causes the signature verification unit 115 of the encryption
processing section 65 to verify a signature of this purchase
prohibition list, and as a result, if the purchase prohibition list
is a correct data, the processing proceeds to step S891.
[0857] In step S891, the upper controller 62 retrieves information
in the information prohibition list based on an ID of contents that
are objects of the redistribution processing and the repurchase
processing, verifies whether or not the ID of contents that are
objects of the redistribution processing and the repurchase
processing is registered in the purchase prohibition list (i.e.,
whether or not contents that are objects of redistribution and
repurchase are objects of purchaser prohibition), and if the ID of
the contents is not registered in the purchase prohibition list
(i.e., the contents that are objects of the redistribution and the
repurchase are not objects of purchase prohibition), the processing
proceeds to step S892.
[0858] In step S892, the upper controller 62 retrieves information
in the purchase prohibition list based on an ID of a content
provider indicating a provider of contents that are objects of
redistribution and repurchase (an ID of a content provider stored
in a handling policy), verifies whether or not the ID of the
content provider is registered in the purchase prohibition list
(i.e., whether or not a content provider 2 that is a provider of
the contents that are objects of the redistribution and the
repurchase is an object of utilization suspension), and if the ID
of the content provider is not registered in the purchase
prohibition list (i.e., the content provider 2 that is a provider
of the contents that are objects of the redistribution and the
repurchase is not an object of utilization suspension), the
processing proceeds to step S893.
[0859] In step S893, the upper controller 62 retrieves information
in the purchase prohibition list based on an ID of a service
provider indicating a provider of contents that are objects of the
redistribution and the repurchase (an ID of a service provider
stored in price information), verifies whether or not the ID of the
service provider is registered in the purchase prohibition list
(i.e., whether or not a service provider 3 that is a provider of
contents that are objects of the redistribution and the
repurchase), and if the ID of the service provider is not
registered in the purchase prohibition list (i.e., the service
provider 3 that is a provider of the contents that are objects of
the redistribution and the repurchase is not an object of
utilization suspension), the processing proceeds to step S894.
[0860] In step S894, the upper controller 62 reads out a
redistribution/repurchase list of contents from the mass storage
section 68 and forwards it to the control section 91 of the
encryption processing section 65, and the control section 91
verifies a signature attached to the redistribution/repurchase list
using the signature verification unit 115, and if the
redistribution/repurchase list is correct data, the processing
proceeds to step S895.
[0861] In step S895, when a public key certificate of an offline
apparatus that is a counterpart of redistribution processing and
repurchase processing, is sent from the offline apparatus, the
upper controller 62 receives this by the communication section 61,
and forwards the received public key certificate to the control
section 91 of the encryption processing section 65. Then, the
control section 91 performs mutual authentication with the
counterpart offline apparatus by this public key certificate using
the mutual authentication module 95, and as a result, when the
counterpart offline apparatus is authenticated, the processing
proceeds to step S896, where the control section 91 additionally
registers an ID of an encryption processing section in the offline
apparatus included in the public key certificate (the public key
certificate used for the mutual authentication in step S895) in the
previously verified redistribution/repurchase list of contents, and
at the same time, additionally registers a corresponding ID of
contents that are objects of the redistribution and the repurchase,
ID of a content provider and ID of a service provider, and the
processing proceeds to step S897.
[0862] In step S897, the control section 91 regenerates a signature
of the redistribution/repurchase list obtained in step S896 using
the signature generation unit 14, forwards the
redistribution/repurchase list whose signature was regenerated to
the mass storage section 68 via the upper controller 62, and saves
the redistribution/repurchase list in the mass storage section 68
in the following step S898.
[0863] Then, in step S899, the upper controller 62 redistributes
and repurchases the contents that are objects of the redistribution
and the repurchase.
[0864] Incidentally, when the upper controller 62 determines that
data is not correct because the purchase prohibition list is tamper
or the like in step S890, the processing proceeds to step S900,
where the upper controller 62 detects whether or not an apparatus
in which the upper controller 62 is provided is the home server 51,
and in this case, since the apparatus in which the upper controller
62 is provided is the home server 51, the processing proceeds to
step S901, where the upper controller 62 obtains a purchase
prohibition list again from the electronic distribution service
center 1.
[0865] In addition, in step S900, if the apparatus executing the
redistribution and the repurchase of contents is an offline
apparatus in step S900, the processing proceeds to step S902, where
the apparatus executing the redistribution and the repurchase of
the contents obtains a purchase prohibition list again from an
apparatus that is a counterpart of the redistribution processing
and the repurchase processing of the contents (the home server 51
or another apparatuses).
[0866] Then, when having obtained the purchase prohibition list in
this way, the home server 51 and the offline apparatus verifies a
signature of the purchase prohibition list, and if the purchase
prohibition list is correct data, the processing proceeds to step
S891.
[0867] As described above, if an ID of contents that are objects of
redistribution and repurchase, an ID of a content provider
indicating a provider of the contents and an ID of a service
provider do not exist in a purchase prohibition list, the home
server 51 determines that the contents of the redistribution and
the repurchase are not objects of purchase prohibition and are not
those provided from a content provider 2 and a service provider 3
that are objects of utilization suspension, and redistributes and
repurchases the contents that are objects of the redistribution and
the repurchase with a counterpart offline apparatus. In addition,
at this moment, the home server 51 updates a
redistribution/repurchase list of contents and saves it in the mass
storage section 68.
[0868] On the other hand, if an ID that are objects of
redistribution and repurchase are registered in a purchase
prohibition list in step S891, if an ID of a content provider
indicating a provider of the contents is registered in the
purchaser prohibition list in step S892, or if an ID of a service
provider indicating a provider of the contents is registered in the
purchaser prohibition list in step S893, the upper controller 62 in
the home server 51 determines that the contents that are objects of
the redistribution and the repurchase are objects of purchase
prohibition or that the contents are those provided from a content
provider 2 or a service provider 3 that is object of utilization
suspension, executes error processing in step S904, thereby
suspends the redistribution and the repurchase of the contents that
are objects of redistribution and repurchase.
[0869] Incidentally, if it is determined that a
redistribution/repurchase list in the step 894 of contents is
incorrect data because it is tampered or the like as a result of
verification of the redistribution/repurchase list in the step 894,
and if it is determined that a purchase prohibition list is
incorrect data because it is tampered or the like as a result of
verification of a signature of the purchase prohibition list of
contents in step S902, the upper controller 62 executes error
processing and suspends redistribution and repurchase of the
contents that are objects of the redistribution and the
repurchase.
[0870] Thus, even if purchased contents become objects of purchase
prohibition or a provider of the contents (a content provider 2 and
a service provider 3) becomes an object of utilization suspension,
the home server 51 can prohibit redistribution and repurchase of
the contents. Incidentally, other offline apparatuses excluding the
home server 51 in the user home network 5 can execute
redistribution/repurchase processing as the home server 51 does,
thereby prohibiting redistribution and repurchase of purchased
contents that has become objects of purchase prohibition or
contents that were purchased from a provider (a content provider 2
and a service provider 3) of contents that have become objects of
utilization suspension.
[0871] Further, in the home server 51, when a purchase prohibition
list of contents transmitted by the electronic distribution service
center 1 via a predetermined transmission means is transmitted by
the communication section 61, the upper controller 62 forwards the
purchase prohibition list of the contents to the encryption
processing section 65, and causes the signature verification unit
115 of the encryption processing section 65 to verify the
signature. Subsequently, the upper controller 62 reads out a
redistribution/repurchase list of contents from the mass storage
section 68, transmits it to the encryption processing section 65,
and causes the signature verification unit 115 of the encryption
processing section 65 to verify the signature.
[0872] Then, if an ID of contents that are objects of purchase
prohibition registered in a purchase prohibition list of contents
is registered in a redistribution/repurchase list, the upper
controller 62 transmits the purchase prohibition list to a
counterpart offline apparatus or the like that has redistributed
and repurchased the contents that are objects of purchase
prohibition, thereby causing the counterpart offline apparatus to
update the purchase prohibition list. Similarly, if an ID of a
content provider or an ID of a service provider that is an object
of utilization suspension registered in the purchase prohibition
list is registered in the redistribution/repurchase list of
contents, the upper controller 62 transmits the purchase
prohibition list to a counterpart offline apparatus or the like
that has redistributed or repurchased contents purchased from a
content provider 2 or a service provider 3 that has become an
object of utilization suspension, thereby causing the counterpart
offline apparatus to update the purchase prohibition list.
[0873] Thus, between the home server 51 connected online to the
electronic distribution service center 1 and an offline apparatus,
by executing retrieval processing in a redistribution/repurchase
list based on a purchase prohibition list each time the purchase
prohibition list is obtained, even if contents already
redistributed and repurchased becomes objects of purchase
prohibition or a provider of the contents (a content provider 2 and
a service provider 3) becomes an object of utilization suspension,
it is possible to prevent the contents from being redistributed and
repurchased again.
[0874] Incidentally, between offline apparatuses, by executing
processing similar to the retrieval processing in a
redistribution/repurchase list performed between the home server 51
and an offline apparatus, even if contents already redistributed
and repurchased becomes objects of purchase prohibition or a
provider of the contents (a content provider 2 and a service
provider 3) becomes an object of utilization suspension, it is
possible to prevent the contents from being redistributed and
repurchased again.
[0875] In the above-mentioned configuration, the electronic music
distribution system 10 prepares a purchase prohibition list of
contents by the electronic distribution service center 1, and
transmits the prepared purchase prohibition list to the home server
51 in the user home network 5 connected online to the electronic
distribution service center 1. In addition, in the user home
network 5, the home server 51 transmits the purchase prohibition
list of contents to an offline apparatus not connected online to
the electronic distribution service center 1, and at the same time,
purchase prohibition lists held by offline apparatuses are compared
with each other among the offline apparatuses at the time of
communication, and if one is the purchase prohibition list updated
later than the other, the apparatuses mutually hold this new
purchase prohibition list.
[0876] Then, in the user home network 5, if contents are
distributed from a content provider 2 via a service provider 3, or
if contents are transmitted from another apparatus in the user home
network 5, each apparatus (a home server 51 and an offline
apparatus) determines whether or not the contents are objects of
purchase prohibition and the content provider 2 and the service
provider 3 that are providers of the contents are objects of
utilization prohibition using a purchase prohibition list, and when
the contents are objects of purchase prohibition or the content
provider 2 and the service provider 3 are objects of utilization
prohibition, suspends purchase of the contents.
[0877] Therefore, in such an electronic music distribution system
10, each apparatus (the home server 51 and an offline apparatus) in
the user home network 5 can prevent contents that are objects of
purchase prohibition or contents provided from a content provider 2
and/or a service provider 3 that are objects of utilization
prohibition from being purchased.
[0878] In addition, in the electronic music distribution system 10,
if contents redistributed and repurchased among apparatuses in the
user home network 5 has become objects of purchase prohibition, or
if a content provider 2 and a service provider 3 that are providers
of the contents have become objects of utilization suspension,
since the apparatuses transmit a purchase prohibition list to a
counterpart apparatus that has executed the redistribution
processing and the repurchase processing of the contents based on
an ID of an encryption processing section in a
redistribution/repurchase list of contents, diffusion of illegal
contents from the counterpart apparatus to other apparatuses can be
prevented.
[0879] According to the above-mentioned configuration, since a
purchase prohibition list of contents is prepared in the electronic
distribution service center 1, the purchase prohibition list is
held by each apparatus (the home server 51 and an offline
apparatus) in the user home network 5, and each apparatus in the
user home network 5 suspends purchase of contents that are objects
of purchase prohibition and contents transmitted from a content
provider 2 and a service provider 3 that are objects of utilization
prohibition based on the purchase prohibition list, in each
apparatus in the user home network 5, purchase of the contents that
are objects of purchase prohibition and the contents provide from
the content provider 2 or the service provider 3 can be prevented,
thus it is possible to realize an electronic music distribution
system that is capable of substantially certainly preventing
contents that are objects of provision prohibition to be
utilized.
[0880] Incidentally, although an ID of contents that are objects of
purchase prohibition, and IDs of a content provider 2 and a service
provider 3 that are objects of utilization prohibition are
respectively registered in a purchase prohibition list, it is
sufficient that at least an ID of contents that are objects of
purchase prohibition is registered.
[0881] In addition, although a purchase prohibition list of
contents is held in a mass storage section in each apparatus in the
user home network 5, the purchase prohibition list may be held in
various kinds of storage media such as an external memory.
[0882] Moreover, although an encryption processing section
determines whether or not contents to be purchased are objects of
purchase prohibition based on a purchase prohibition list in each
apparatus in the user home network 5, this determination processing
may be executed by an upper controller.
[0883] Furthermore, in such an electronic music distribution system
10, when illegal contents flow into the system, if an ID of the
contents can be found, purchase of the illegal content in an
apparatus in the user home network 5 can be prevented.
[0884] Furthermore, if it is found that contents that are objects
of purchase prohibition is held in an apparatus in the user home
network 5 by verifying a purchase prohibition list, information
indicating that redistribution and the repurchase of the contents
are prohibited may be embedded in a predetermined region in license
conditions information corresponding to the contents. Similarly,
with respect to contents purchased from a content provider 2 and a
service provider 3 that are object of utilization prohibition,
information indicating that redistribution and the repurchase of
the contents are prohibited may be embedded in a predetermined
region in license conditions information corresponding to the
contents. Thus, when redistributing and repurchasing contents, the
contents that are objects of redistribution and repurchase can be
easily identified by looking at corresponding license conditions
information without retrieving through a purchase prohibition list
of contents.
[0885] (13) Other Configuration of an Electronic Music Distribution
System
[0886] FIG. 111 illustrates an electronic music distribution system
400 of another configuration. In such an electronic music
distribution system 400, personal computers (hereinafter referred
to as personal computers for signal processing) 403 and 406 for
signal processing between a content provider 404 consisting of two
personal computers 402 and 403 for a content server and for signal
processing and a service provider 407 consisting of two personal
computers 405 and 406 for a content server and for signal
processing as well are connected to an electronic distribution
service center 401 of a personal computer configuration.
[0887] In addition, the personal computer 403 for signal processing
of the content provider 404 is connected to the personal computer
406 for signal processing of the service provider 407, and a home
server 409 of a personal computer configuration provided in a user
home network 408 is also connected via a network 4.
[0888] In the user home network 408, a fixed apparatus 410 such as
a fixed type record reproduction apparatus and a portable apparatus
411 such as a portable type record reproduction apparatus and a
portable type communication terminal (a portable type information
apparatus, a cellular phone, or the like) are connected to the home
server 409.
[0889] As shown in FIG. 112, in the electronic distribution service
center 401, an RAM (Random Access Memory) 417, an ROM (Read Only
Memory) 418, a display 419, an input section 420, a hard disk drive
(HDD) 421 and a network interface 422 are connected to a control
section 415 such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit) via a bus
416.
[0890] In this case, the control section 415 can execute processing
similar to that of the service provider management section 11, the
content provider management section 12, the copyright management
section 13, the key server 14, the history data management section
15, the profit distribution section 16, the mutual authentication
section 17, the user management section 18, the charge billing
section 19, the disbursement and receipt section 20 and the audit
section 21 in the electronic distribution service center 1
described above for FIG. 2 in accordance with various kinds of
programs stored in the ROM 418 in advance by reading out and
developing the programs on the RAM 417.
[0891] In addition, the control section 415 records a key used for
the entire system (a delivery key K.sub.d and an individual key
K.sub.i, etc.), and various kinds of information such as charge
information, price information, a handling policy, and a user
registration database in a hard disk of the hard disk drive 421,
thereby holding and managing these various kinds of
information.
[0892] Moreover, the control section 415 can communicate with the
content provider 404, the service provider 407, the user home
network 408, JASRAC and the like via the network interface 422,
thus, can give and receive various kinds of information such as a
delivery key K.sub.d, an individual key K.sub.i encrypted by the
delivery key K.sub.d, charge information, price information, a
handling policy, registration information utilization results of
contents with the content provider 404, the service provider 407,
the user home network 408, JASRAC and the like.
[0893] In this way, the electronic distribution service center 401
of a personal computer configuration can realize a function similar
to that of the electronic distribution service center 1 described
above for FIG. 2 in accordance with various kinds of programs.
[0894] Incidentally, in the electronic distribution service center
410, although the input section 420 and the display 419 may not be
provided because these are not specifically used, the input section
420 and the display section 419 may be used for confirming various
kinds of information recorded in the hard disk drive 421.
[0895] In addition, in the electronic distribution service center
401, various kinds of programs may be recorded in a hard disk of
the hard disk drive 421 instead of the ROM 418.
[0896] FIG. 113 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the
content provider 404 in which the personal computer for a content
server (hereinafter referred to as a personal computer for a
server) 402 is configured with an RAM 427, an ROM 428, a display
429, an input section 430, a hard disk drive 431 storing contents
to be supplied to a user in a hard disk, and an IEEE (Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 1394 interface 432 connected
to a control section 430 such as a CPU via a bus 426.
[0897] In addition, in the content provider 404, the personal
computer for signal processing 403 is configured with an RAM 437,
an ROM 438, a display 439, an input section 440, a hard disk drive
441, a network interface 442 for connection with the electronic
distribution service center 401 and the service provider 407, an
IEEE1394 interface 432 of the personal compute for a server 402 and
an IEE1394 interface 444 connected via an IEEE1394 cable 443
connected to a control section 435 such as a CPU via a bus 436.
[0898] In this case, the control section 425 of the personal
computer 402 reads out a predetermined program stored in the ROM
428 in advance and develops it on the RAM 427, thereby operating in
accordance with the program, and when a read-out instruction of
contents is transmitted from the control section 435 of the
personal computer 403 for signal processing via the IEE1394 cable
443, takes in the read-out instruction via the IEEE 1394 interface
432, reads out the contents from a hard disk of the hard disk drive
431 based on the taken in read-out instruction of the contents, and
at the same time, transmits the read out contents to the personal
computer for signal processing 403 from the IEEE1394 interface 432
via the IEEE1394 cable 443.
[0899] Incidentally, in the personal computer 402 for a server,
although the input section 430 and the display 429 may not be
provided by not specifically using the input section 430 and the
display 429, the input section 430 and the display 429 may be used
for confirming contents recorded in the hard disk drive 431,
storing new contents in the hard disk drive 431 and deleting
contents.
[0900] In addition, in the personal computer 402 for a server, a
program may be recorded in the hard disk of the hard disk drive 431
in advance instead of the ROM 428.
[0901] On the other hand, in the content provider 404, the control
section 435 of the personal computer 403 for signal processing
records an individual key K.sub.i, an individual key K.sub.i
encrypted by a delivery key K.sub.d and a public key certificate of
the content provider 404 in the hard disk of the hard disk drive
439, thereby maintaining and managing the individual key K.sub.i,
the individual key K.sub.i encrypted by a delivery key K.sub.d and
the public key certificate of the content provider 404.
[0902] And, the control section 435 can executes processing similar
to that of the electronic watermark addition section 32, the
compression section 33, the content encryption section 34, the
content key generation section 35, the content key encryption
section 36, the handling policy generation section 37, the
signature generation section 38 and the mutual authentication
section 39 of the contents provider 2 described above with
reference to FIG. 9 in accordance with predetermined various kinds
of programs by reading out the predetermined various kinds of
programs, which are stored in the ROM 438 in advance, and
developing them on the RAM 437.
[0903] Thus, the personal computer for signal processing 403 can
give and receive a delivery key K.sub.d, an individual key K.sub.i
encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d, a handling policy, and a
content provider secure container with the electronic distribution
service center 401 and the service provider 407 via the network
interface 442.
[0904] In this way, the content provider 404 of a personal computer
configuration can realize a function similar to that of the content
provider 2 described above for FIG. 9 in accordance with various
kinds of programs.
[0905] Incidentally, in the personal computer 403 for signal
processing, although the input section 440 and the display 439 may
not be provided by not specifically using the input section 400 and
the display 439, the input section 440 and the display 439 may be
used for confirming an individual key K.sub.i, an individual key
K.sub.i encrypted by the delivery key K.sub.d, a public key
certificate of the content provider 404, or the like recorded in
the hard disk drive 441.
[0906] In addition, in the personal computer 403 for signal
processing, various kinds of programs may be recorded in the hard
disk of the hard disk drive 441 instead of the ROM 438. Further, in
the personal computer for signal processing 403, an individual key
K.sub.i may be held by giving tamper resistant feature to the RAM
437.
[0907] Further, in the content provider 404, although the personal
computer for signal processing 403 and the personal computer for a
server 402 are connected via the IEEE1394 cable 443, the personal
computer for signal processing 403 and the personal computer for a
server 402 may be line connected via a predetermined signal cable
such as a USB (Universal Serial Bus) cable, an RS-232C cable, or
the like, or wireless connected via predetermined wireless
communicating means.
[0908] FIG. 114 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the
service provider 407, and the personal computer 405 for a server is
configured with an RAM 447, an ROM 448, a display 449, an input
section 450, a hard disk drive 451 storing a content provider
secure container and a public key certificate of the content
provider 404 in a hard disk, and IEEE1394 interface 452 connected
to a control section 445 such as a CPU via a bus 446.
[0909] In addition, in the service provider 407, the personal
computer for signal processing 406 is configured with an RAN 456,
an ROM 457, a display 458, an input section 449, a hard disk drive
460, a network interface 461 for connection with the electronic
distribution service center 401 and the content provider 404, an
IEEE1394 interface 463 connected with an IEEE1394 interface 452 of
the personal computer for a server 405 via an IEEE1394 cable 462,
and a modem 46 for connecting with the user home network 408 via
the network 4 connected to a control section 454 such as a CPU via
a bus 455.
[0910] In this case, the control section 445 of the personal
computer for a server 405 reads out a predetermined program stored
in the ROM 448 in advance and develops it on the RAM 447, thereby
operating in accordance with the program, and when a content
provider secure container and a public key certificate of contents
provider 404 are give together with writing instruction of these
from the control section 454 of the personal computer for signal
processing 406 via the IEEE1394 cable 462, takes in the writing
instruction via the IEEE1394 interface 452, writes the content
provider secure container and the public key certificate of the
content provider 404 in the hard disk of the hard disk drive 451
based on the taken in writing instruction, and at the same time,
when an read-out instruction of a content provider secure container
and a public key certificate of the content provider 404 is given
from the control section 454 of the personal computer 406 for
signal processing via the IEEE1394 cable 462, takes in the read-out
instruction via the IEEE1394 interface 452, reads out the content
provider secure container and the public key certificate of the
content provider 404 from the hard disk of the hard disk drive 451
based on the taken in read-out instruction, and at the same time,
transmits the read out content provider secure container and public
key certificate of the content provider 404 to the personal
computer for signal processing 406 from the IEEE1394 interface 452
via the IEEE1394 cable 462.
[0911] Incidentally, in the personal computer for a server 405,
although the input section 450 and the display 449 may not be
provided by not specifically using the input section 450 and the
display 449, the input section 450 and the display 449 may be used
for confirming a content provider secure container and a public key
certificate of the content provider 404 recorded in the hard disk
drive 451.
[0912] In addition, in the personal computer for a server 405, a
program may be recorded in the hard disk of the hard disk drive 451
in advance instead of the ROM 448.
[0913] On the other hand, in the service provider 407, the control
section 454 of the personal computer for signal processing 406
records a public key certificate of the service provider 407 in the
hard disk of the hard disk derive 460, and maintains and manages a
secret key of the service provider 407 giving tamper resistant
feature to the RAM 456.
[0914] The control section 454 reads out predetermined various
kinds of programs stored in the ROM 457 and develops then on the
RAM 456, thereby capable of executing processing similar to that of
the certificate verification section 42, the signature verification
section 43, the pricing section 44, the signature generation
section 45 and the mutual authentication section 46 of the service
provider 3 described above for FIG. 14 in accordance with the
various kinds of programs.
[0915] Thus, the personal computer for signal processing 406 can
give and receive price information, a content provider secure
container, or the like with the electronic distribution service
center 401 and the content provider 407 via the network interface
442, and at the same time, transmit a service provider secure
container to the user home network 408 via the modem 464.
[0916] In this way, the service provider 407 of a personal computer
configuration can realize a function similar to that of the service
provider 3 described above for FIG. 14 in accordance with various
kinds of programs.
[0917] Incidentally, in the personal computer 406 for signal
processing, although the input section 459 and the display 458 may
not be provided by not specifically using the input section 459 and
the display 458, the input section 459 and the display 458 may be
used for confirming a public key certificate of the service
provider 407 or the like recorded in the hard disk drive 460.
[0918] In addition, in the personal computer for signal computer
406, various kinds of programs may be recorded in the hard disk of
the hard disk drive 460 in advance instead of the ROM 457.
[0919] Moreover, in the service provider 407, although the personal
computer for signal processing 406 and the personal computer for a
server 405 are connected via the IEEE1394 cable 462, the personal
computer for signal processing 406 and the personal computer for a
server 405 may be line connected via a predetermined signal cable
such as a USB cable, an RS-232C cable or the like, or may be
wireless connected via predetermined wireless communicating
means.
[0920] FIG. 115 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the
user home network 408, and the home server 409 of a personal
computer configuration is configured with an RAM 467, an ROM 468, a
display 469, an input section 470, a hard disk drive 471, an
IEEE1394 interface 472, a modem 473 for connecting with the service
provider 407 via the network 4, and a network interface 474 for
connection with the electronic distribution service center 401
connected to a control section 465 such as a CPU via a bus 466.
[0921] In addition, in the user home network 408, the fixed
apparatus 410 is configured with an RAM 77, an ROM 478, a display
479, an input section 480, a record reproduction section 481, a
media interface 483 for a recording medium 482, and an IEEE1394
interface 495 connected with the IEEE1394 interface 472 of the home
server via an IEEE1394 cable 484 connected to a control section 475
such as a CPU via a bus 476.
[0922] Moreover, in the user home network 408, the portable
apparatus 411 is configured with an RAM 492, an ROM 493, a display
494, an input section 495, and an IEEE1394 interface 497 connected
with the IEEE1394 interface 472 of the home server via an IEEE1394
cable 496 connected to a control section 490 such as a CPU via a us
491.
[0923] In this case, the control section 465 of the home server 409
reads out various kinds of programs stored in the ROM 468 in
advance and develops them on the RAM 467, thereby capable of
executing processing similar to that of the upper controller 62,
the encryption processing section 65 and the extension section 66
of the home server 51 described above for FIG. 15 in accordance
with the various kinds of programs.
[0924] In addition, the display 469 of the home server 409 has a
function similar to that of the displaying means 64 of the home
server 51 described above for FIG. 15, and the input section 470 of
the home server 409 has a function similar to that of the inputting
means 63 of the home server 51 described above for FIG. 15.
Moreover, the hard disk drive 471 of the home server 409 has a
function similar to that of the mass storage section 68 of the home
server 51 described above for FIG. 15, and at the same time, the
modem 473 and the network interface 474 as well as the IEEE1394
interface 472 has a function similar to that of the communication
section 61 of the home server 51 described above for FIG. 15, and
the RAM 467 of the home server 409 has a function similar to that
of the external memory 67 of the home server 51 described above for
FIG. 15.
[0925] Therefore, the home server 409 of a personal computer
configuration can realize a function similar to that of the home
server 51 described above for FIG. 15 in accordance with the
various kinds of programs.
[0926] Incidentally, in the home server 409, various kinds of
programs may be recorded in the hard disk of the hard disk drive
471 in advance instead of the ROM 468, or the hard disk drive 471
may be caused to function in the similar manner as the external
memory 67 described above for FIG. 15. In addition, in the home
server 409, the modem 473 and the network interface 474 may be a
single interface such as a modem depending on a communication form
with the service provider 407 and the electronic distribution
service center 401. Moreover, in the home server 409, the fixed
apparatus 410 and the portable apparatus 411 may be line connected
via a predetermined signal cable such as an USB cable or an RS-232C
cable, or may be wireless connected via predetermined wireless
communicating means.
[0927] On the other hand, in the user home network 408, the control
section 475 of the fixed apparatus 410 reads out various kinds of
programs stored in the ROM 478 in advance and develops them on the
RAM 477, thereby capable of executing processing similar to the
upper controller 72, the encryption processing section 73 and the
extension section 74 of the fixed apparatus 52 described above for
FIG. 15 in accordance with the various kinds of programs.
[0928] In addition, the display 479 of the fixed apparatus 410 has
a function similar to the displaying means 78 of the fixed
apparatus 52 described above for FIG. 15, and at the same time, the
input section 480 has a function similar to that of the inputting
means 77 of the fixed apparatus 52 described above for FIG. 15, and
the IEEE1394 interface 485 has a function similar to that of the
communication section 71 of the fixed apparatus 52 described above
for FIG. 15. Moreover, the record reproduction section 481 of the
fixed apparatus 410 has a function similar to that of the record
reproduction section 76 of the fixed apparatus 52 described above
for FIG. 15, and at the same time, the recording medium 482 has a
function similar to the recording medium 80 of the fixed apparatus
52 described above for FIG. 15, and the RAM 477 of the fixed
apparatus 410 has a function similar to that of the external memory
79 and the small storage section 75 of the fixed apparatus 52
described above for FIG. 15.
[0929] Therefore, the fixed apparatus 410 of the user home network
408 can realize a function similar to that of the fixed apparatus
52 of the user home network 5 described above for FIG. 15 in
accordance with various kinds of programs.
[0930] Incidentally, in the fixed apparatus 410, by providing a
hard disk drive anew, various kinds of programs may be recorded in
a hard disk of the hard disk drive in advance instead of the ROM
478, or the hard disk drive may be caused to function in the
similar manner as the external memory 79 and the small storage
section 75 of the fixed apparatus 52 described above for FIG. 15.
In addition, in the fixed apparatus 410, if the recording medium
482 is a semiconductor memory configuration, the control section
475 may be caused to realize a function of the record reproduction
section 481 in accordance with a predetermined program.
[0931] In the user home network 408, the control section 490 of the
portable apparatus 411 reads out various kind of programs stored in
the ROM 493 in advance and develops them on the RAM 492, thereby
capable of executing processing similar to that of the upper
controller 82, the encryption processing section 83 and the
extension section 84 of the portable apparatus 53 described above
for FIG. 15 in accordance with the various kinds of programs.
[0932] In addition, the RAM 492 of the portable apparatus 411 has a
function similar to that of the external memory 85 of the portable
apparatus 53 described above for FIG. 15, and the IEEE1394
interface 497 has a function similar to that of the communication
section 81 of the portable apparatus 53 described above for FIG.
15. Moreover, in the portable apparatus 411, the display 494 and
the input section 495 can be utilized at the time of reproducing
contents.
[0933] Therefore, the portable apparatus 411 of the user home
network 408 can realize a function similar to that of the portable
apparatus 53 of the user home network 5 described above for FIG. 15
in accordance with various kinds of programs.
[0934] Incidentally, in the portable apparatus 411, a detachable
recording medium may be provided for recording and reproducing
contents.
[0935] In the above-mentioned configuration, in such an electronic
music distribution system 400, the electronic distribution service
center 401, the content provider 404, the service provider 407 and
the home server 409 of the user home network 408 are respectively
configured as a personal computer configuration.
[0936] Therefore, in the electronic music distribution system 400,
the electronic distribution service center 401, the content
provider 404, the service provider 407 and the home server 409 do
not need to be produced in a hardware configuration anew, and the
system can be easily constructed using these personal computers
simply by installing various kinds of programs in an existing
personal computer.
[0937] According to the above-mentioned configuration, by
constructing the electronic music distribution system 400 using the
electronic distribution service center 401, the content provider
404, the service provider 407 and the home server 409 of a personal
computer configuration, an existing personal computer can be easily
used as the electronic distribution service center 401, the content
provider 404, the service provider 407 and the home server 409,
thus the system can be easily and simply constructed.
[0938] Further, in such an electronic music distribution system
400, although the case in which the electronic distribution service
center 401, the content provider 404, the service provider 407, the
home server 409, the fixed apparatus 410 and the portable apparatus
411 are operated in accordance with various kinds of programs
stored in the ROMs 418, 428, 438, 448, 457, 468, 478 and 493 in
advance has been described, by installing a program storing medium
recording various kinds of programs in the electronic distribution
service center 401, the content provider 404, the service provider
407, the home server 409, the fixed apparatus 410 and the portable
apparatus 411, distribution service center 401, the content
provider 404, the service provider 407, the home server 409, the
fixed apparatus 410 and the portable apparatus 411 may be operated
respectively in accordance with the various kinds of programs
stored in the program storing medium and various kinds of programs
transferred to a hard disk or the like from the program storing
medium.
[0939] Incidentally, a program storing medium used for operating
distribution service center 401, the content provider 404, the
service provider 407, the home server 409, the fixed apparatus 410
and the portable apparatus 411 may be realized not only by a
package medium such as a CD-ROM (Compact Disk-Read Only Memory) but
also a semiconductor memory and a magnetic disk in which a program
is temporarily or permanently stored. In addition, as means for
storing a program in these program storing media, a line or
wireless communication medium such as a local area network, the
Internet, the digital satellite broadcast, or the like may be
utilized, or a program may be stored with interposition of various
kinds of communication interfaces such as a router or a modem.
INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY
[0940] The present invention can be utilized for an information
transmission apparatus such as a provider for providing contents
such as music, video, a game program or the like, an information
receipt apparatus such as a personal computer or a cellular phone
for receiving the provided contents, and a network system that is
constructed from these information transmission apparatus and
information receipt apparatus.
* * * * *