U.S. patent application number 11/382218 was filed with the patent office on 2007-08-16 for method and system for wireless lan dynamic channel change with honeypot trap.
This patent application is currently assigned to AirDefense, Inc.. Invention is credited to Scott Hrastar.
Application Number | 20070189194 11/382218 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 29552760 |
Filed Date | 2007-08-16 |
United States Patent
Application |
20070189194 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Hrastar; Scott |
August 16, 2007 |
Method and System for Wireless LAN Dynamic Channel Change with
Honeypot Trap
Abstract
A network security system includes a system data store capable
of storing a variety of data associated with a wireless computer
network and communication transmitted thereon, a communication
interface supporting wireless communication over the wireless
computer network and a system processor. Configuration data
associated with an access point on a wireless computer network
potentially compromised by an intruder is received. Information
contained within and/or derived from the received configuration
data is stored. Communication with the intruder is continued by
emulating the identification characteristics of the potentially
compromised access point. A channel change request is transmitted
to the potentially compromised access point to reroute
communication between the potentially compromised access point and
authorized stations such that communications may continue on a
different channel.
Inventors: |
Hrastar; Scott; (Duluth,
GA) |
Correspondence
Address: |
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
P.O BOX 1022
Minneapolis
MN
55440-1022
US
|
Assignee: |
AirDefense, Inc.
Alpharetta
GA
|
Family ID: |
29552760 |
Appl. No.: |
11/382218 |
Filed: |
May 8, 2006 |
Related U.S. Patent Documents
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Application
Number |
Filing Date |
Patent Number |
|
|
10161440 |
Jun 3, 2002 |
7042852 |
|
|
11382218 |
May 8, 2006 |
|
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60381829 |
May 20, 2002 |
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Current U.S.
Class: |
370/310 |
Current CPC
Class: |
H04L 63/1408 20130101;
H04L 63/1416 20130101; H04W 88/08 20130101; H04L 63/1491 20130101;
H04W 12/122 20210101; H04W 12/125 20210101; H04L 63/1441 20130101;
H04L 41/06 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
370/310 |
International
Class: |
H04B 7/00 20060101
H04B007/00 |
Claims
1-15. (canceled)
16. A method for wireless intrusion protection, comprising:
outlining at least one portion of a network to be protected, said
at least one portion of the network occupying a physical region,
the physical region comprising an airspace through which wireless
signals can be transmitted; defining a security policy associated
with the airspace to protect said at least one portion of the
network, the security policy at least defining a type of wireless
activity which constitutes a violation of the security policy;
deploying one or more sensor devices within said at least one
portion of the network, the one or more sensor devices being
arranged within the physical region comprising the airspace, the
one or more sensor devices being configured to cause at least a
portion of the airspace to be secured according to the security
policy; deploying a host system on the network; monitoring wireless
signals in the airspace using said one or more sensor devices;
determining whether a wireless signal is intended to communicate to
said at least one portion of the network; detecting a violation of
the security policy based at least upon the determining step and
the monitoring step; automatically initiating an action based upon
the violation in accordance with the security policy for the
airspace to protect said at least one portion of the network.
17. The method of claim 16, wherein the action comprises notifying
an administrator responsive to detection of the violation.
18. The method of claim 16, wherein the action comprises
selectively restricting one or more wireless devices associated
with the violation, thereby hindering engagement in communication
between the one or more wireless devices and the network.
19. The method of claim 18, wherein selectively restricting one or
more wireless devices does not influence communications originating
from or destined for other wireless devices.
20. The method of claim 16, wherein the network comprises a secure
wired network.
21. The method of claim 20, wherein devices residing on the secure
wired network encrypt communications.
22. The method of claim 16, wherein the network is susceptible to
attacks originating from the airspace and transmitted into the
network using an access point coupled to said at least one portion
of the network.
23. The method of claim 16, wherein the violation is associated
with an unauthorized wireless device attempting to communicate with
devices coupled to the network.
24. The method of claim 16, further comprising ignoring wireless
signals that are intended for receipt by an unrelated network.
25. The method of claim 16, wherein the violation comprises an
authorized device operating outside of predefined parameters
associated with the device.
26. The method of claim 25, wherein the predefined parameters
include a predefined physical region of operation.
27. The method of claim 25, wherein the predefined parameters
include configuration parameters.
28. The method of claim 16, wherein the violation comprises a
spoofing attack.
29. The method of claim 16, wherein the sensor devices transmit
wireless signals into the airspace to determine status of wireless
devices in the physical region.
30. The method of claim 29, wherein the status includes
connectivity status with the network.
31. The method of claim 16, wherein the one or more sensor devices
comprise a detection region of coverage.
32. The method of claim 16, wherein the one or more sensor devices
comprise a prevention region of coverage.
33. The method of claim 16, further comprising modeling coverage
associated with the one or more sensor devices.
34. The method of claim 16, wherein the action comprises filtering
wireless signals originating from a wireless device associated with
the violation.
35. A wireless intrusion protection system, comprising: one or more
monitoring modules deployed within a physical region proximate to a
network, the physical region comprising an airspace through which
wireless signals propagate, the one or more sensor devices
implementing a security policy defining at least a type of activity
which comprises a violation of the security policy and being
configured to protect the network, and to provide an indication of
the violation; a host module configured to communicate with the one
or more monitoring modules regarding security policy for the
network to be protected, and to provide central management for the
one or more monitoring modules, individually or collectively;
wherein the one or more monitoring modules are configured to
receive wireless signals propagating in the airspace and to apply
the security policy to determine whether any of the wireless
signals are associated with violations of the security policy; a
protection module configured perform an action responsive to the
indication of the security violation in accordance with the
security policy.
36. The system of claim 35, wherein action is tailored based upon
which of a plurality of policies comprising the security policy was
violated.
37. The system of claim 35, wherein the action comprises notifying
an administrator in response to a minor security policy
violation.
38. The system of claim 35, wherein the action comprises a
selective restriction of one or more wireless devices associated
with the violation of the security policy by inhibiting the
engagement of the one or more wireless devices with network devices
coupled to the network.
39. The system of claim 38, wherein the selective restriction does
not affect the operation of the network devices.
40. The system of claim 35, wherein the action comprises
selectively restricting traffic originating from a wireless device
associated with the violation.
41. The system of claim 35, wherein the airspace renders the
network vulnerable to intrusions into the network using the
airspace.
42. The system of claim 35, wherein the security policy is further
configured to identify wireless traffic destined for another
network.
43. The system of claim 35, wherein the security policy is further
configured to identify wireless traffic which does not violate the
security policy.
44. Computer readable storage media storing instructions that upon
execution by a system processor causes the system processor to
perform steps comprising: outlining at least one portion of a
network to be protected, said at least one portion of the network
occupying a physical region, the physical region comprising an
airspace through which wireless signals can be transmitted;
defining a security policy associated with the airspace to protect
said at least one portion of the network, the security policy at
least defining a type of wireless activity which constitutes a
violation of the security policy; deploying one or more sensor
devices within said at least one portion of the network, the one or
more sensor devices being arranged within the physical region
comprising the airspace, the one or more sensor devices being
configured to cause at least a portion of the airspace to be
secured according to the security policy; deploying a host system
on the network; monitoring wireless signals in the airspace using
said one or more sensor devices; determining whether a wireless
signal is intended to communicate to said at leas one portion of
the network; detecting a violation of the security policy based at
least upon the determining step and the monitoring step;
automatically initiating an action based upon the violation in
accordance with the security policy for the airspace to protect
said at least one portion of the network.
Description
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENT APPLICATIONS
[0001] This application claims the benefit, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
.sctn.119(e), of applicant's provisional U.S. patent application
Ser. No. TBA, filed May 20, 2002, entitled "SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR
NETWORK SECURITY", with attorney docket no. 19282.0001U1, which
application is hereby incorporated by this reference in its
entirety for all purposes.
[0002] This application is related to the following U.S. Patent
Applications filed Jun. 3, 2002, each of which is hereby
incorporated by this reference in its entirety for all purposes:
TABLE-US-00001 Attorney Serial Docket No. Inventors Title Number
19282.0001U2 Hrastar, "SYSTEMS AND TBA Lynn, METHODS FOR NETWORK
Sale, SECURITY" Hollingsworth 19282.0004U1 Lynn, "METHOD AND SYSTEM
TBA Hrastar FOR ACTIVELY DEFENDING A WIRELESS LAN AGAINST ATTACKS"
19282.0005U1 Hrastar, "METHODS AND TBA Lynn SYSTEMS FOR IDENTIFYING
NODES AND MAPPING THEIR LOCATIONS" 19282.0006U1 Hrastar "METHOD AND
SYSTEM TBA FOR ENCRYPTED NETWORK MANAGEMENT AND INTRUSION
DETECTION
BACKGROUND
[0003] The present invention is directed to systems and methods for
enhancing security associated with electronic communications. More
specifically, without limitation, the present invention relates to
computer-based systems and methods for assessing security risks and
identifying and responding to threats in wireless network
environments.
[0004] The Internet is a global network of connected computer
networks. Over the last several years, the Internet has grown in
significant measure. A large number of computers on the Internet
provide information in various forms. Anyone with a computer
connected to the Internet can potentially tap into this vast pool
of information.
[0005] The information available via the Internet encompasses
information available via a variety of types of application layer
information servers such as SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol),
POP3 (Post Office Protocol), GOPHER (RFC 1436), WAIS, HTTP
(Hypertext Transfer Protocol, RFC 2616) and FTP (file transfer
protocol, RFC 1123).
[0006] One of the most wide spread method of providing information
over the Internet is via the World Wide Web (the Web). The Web
consists of a subset of the computers connected to the Internet;
the computers in this subset run Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
servers (Web servers). Several extensions and modifications to HTTP
have been proposed including, for example, an extension framework
(RFC 2774) and authentication (RFC 2617). Information on the
Internet can be accessed through the use of a Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI, RFC 2396). A URI uniquely specifies the location
of a particular piece of information on the Internet. A URI will
typically be composed of several components. The first component
typically designates the protocol by which the address piece of
information is accessed (e.g., HTTP, GOPHER, etc.). This first
component is separated from the remainder of the URI by a colon
(`:`). The remainder of the URI will depend upon the protocol
component. Typically, the remainder designates a computer on the
Internet by name, or by IP number, as well as a more specific
designation of the location of the resource on the designated
computer. For instance, a typical URI for an HTTP resource might
be: [0007] http://www.server.com/dir1/dir2/resource.htm [0008]
where http is the protocol, www.server.com is the designated
computer and /dir1/dir2/resouce.htm designates the location of the
resource on the designated computer. The term URI includes Uniform
Resource Names (URN's) including URN's as defined according to RFC
2141.
[0009] Web servers host information in the form of Web pages;
collectively the server and the information hosted are referred to
as a Web site. A significant number of Web pages are encoded using
the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) although other encodings using
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) or XHTML. The published
specifications for these languages are incorporated by reference
herein; such specifications are available from the World Wide Web
Consortium and its Web site (http://www.w3c.org). Web pages in
these formatting languages may include links to other Web pages on
the same Web site or another. As will be known to those skilled in
the art, Web pages may be generated dynamically by a server by
integrating a variety of elements into a formatted page prior to
transmission to a Web client. Web servers, and information servers
of other types, await requests for the information from Internet
clients.
[0010] Client software has evolved that allows users of computers
connected to the Internet to access this information. Advanced
clients such as Netscape's Navigator and Microsoft's Internet
Explorer allow users to access software provided via a variety of
information servers in a unified client environment. Typically,
such client software is referred to as browser software.
[0011] Electronic mail (e-mail) is another wide spread application
using the Internet. A variety of protocols are often used for
e-mail transmission, delivery and processing including SMTP and
POP3 as discussed above. These protocols refer, respectively, to
standards for communicating e-mail messages between servers and for
server-client communication related to e-mail messages. These
protocols are defined respectively in particular RFC's (Request for
Comments) promulgated by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task
Force). The SMTP protocol is defined in RFC 821, and the POP3
protocol is defined in RFC 1939.
[0012] Since the inception of these standards, various needs have
evolved in the field of e-mail leading to the development of
further standards including enhancements or additional protocols.
For instance, various enhancements have evolved to the SMTP
standards leading to the evolution of extended SMTP. Examples of
extensions may be seen in (1) RFC 1869 that defines a framework for
extending the SMTP service by defining a means whereby a server
SMTP can inform a client SMTP as to the service extensions it
supports and in (2) RFC 1891 that defines an extension to the SMTP
service, which allows an SMTP client to specify (a) that delivery
status notifications (DSNs) should be generated under certain
conditions, (b) whether such notifications should return the
contents of the message, and (c) additional information, to be
returned with a DSN, that allows the sender to identify both the
recipient(s) for which the DSN was issued, and the transaction in
which the original message was sent.
[0013] In addition, the IMAP protocol has evolved as an alternative
to POP3 that supports more advanced interactions between e-mail
servers and clients. This protocol is described in RFC 2060.
[0014] The various standards discussed herein by reference to
particular RFC's are hereby incorporated by reference herein for
all purposes. These RFC's are available to the public through the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and can be retrieved from
its Web site (http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html). The specified
protocols are not intended to be limited to the specific RFC's
quoted herein above but are intended to include extensions and
revisions thereto. Such extensions and/or revisions may or may not
be encompassed by current and/or future RFC's.
[0015] A host of e-mail server and client products have been
developed in order to foster e-mail communication over the
Internet. E-mail server software includes such products as
sendmail-based servers, Microsoft Exchange, Lotus Notes Server, and
Novell GroupWise; sendmail-based servers refer to a number of
variations of servers originally based upon the sendmail program
developed for the UNIX operating systems. A large number of e-mail
clients have also been developed that allow a user to retrieve and
view e-mail messages from a server; example products include
Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Outlook Express, Netscape Messenger,
and Eudora. In addition, some e-mail servers, or e-mail servers in
conjunction with a Web server, allow a Web browser to act as an
e-mail client using the HTTP standard.
[0016] As the Internet has become more widely used, it has also
created new risks for corporations. Breaches of computer security
by hackers and intruders and the potential for compromising
sensitive corporate information are a very real and serious
threat.
[0017] Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) offer a quick and
effective extension of a wired network or standard local area
network (LAN). FIG. 1 depicts a typical LAN 190 including both
wired and wireless components. The wired component depicted in FIG.
1 includes a variety of connected systems including local servers
120, local clients 130 and network accessible data storage
components 10. By simply installing access points 180A, 180B to the
wired network (e.g., Ethernet 150 and router 140), personal
computers and laptops equipped with WLAN cards 170A, 170B can
connect with the wired network at broadband speeds.
[0018] Over the last few years, most deployments of WLANs have
conformed to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(EEE) 802.11b standard that operates over the unregulated 2.4 GHz
frequency spectrum. The 802.11b standard offers connectivity of up
to 11 Mbps--fast enough to handle large e-mail attachments and run
bandwidth-intensive applications like video conferencing. While the
802.11b standard now dominates the WLAN market, other variations of
the 802.11 standard, such as 802.11a, 802.11g, and 802.1X, are
being developed to handle increased speeds. WLAN vendors have
committed to supporting a variety of standards. The various 802.11
standards developed by the IEEE are available for download via URL:
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.11.html; these various
standards are hereby incorporated by this reference herein.
[0019] As businesses connected their LANs to the Internet 160, they
installed firewalls 145 to protect their local networks and act as
security gates to fend off unauthorized traffic coming from the
Internet's information highway such as potential hacker 135. The
mobility of air-bound, wireless networks creates security concerns
where threats can come from any direction and are not limited to
the wired infrastructure. Established security practices of
guarding a few wired entry points to the network are no longer
effective. A firewall 145 may effectively deter an attack from a
wired hacker 135 via the Internet 160; however, wireless hackers
195A, 195B typically enter the LAN 190 through access points 180A,
180B that are already behind the firewall 145. Companies must
constantly monitor their airwaves to survey wireless activity and
guard against intruders.
[0020] Because wireless communication is broadcast over radio
waves, eavesdroppers 195A, 195B who merely listen to the airwaves
can easily pick up unencrypted messages. Additionally, messages
encrypted with the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security protocol
can be decrypted with a little time and easily available hacking
tools. These passive intruders put businesses at risk of exposing
sensitive information to corporate espionage.
[0021] The theft of an authorized user's identity poses one the
greatest threats. Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs) that act as crude
passwords and Media Access Control (MAC) addresses that act as
personal identification numbers are often used to verify that
clients are authorized to connect with an access point. However,
existing encryption standards are not foolproof and allow
knowledgeable intruders to pick up approved SSIDs and MAC addresses
to connect to a WLAN as an authorized user with the ability to
steal bandwidth, corrupt or download files, and wreak havoc on the
entire network.
[0022] Outsiders who cannot gain access to a WLAN can none-the-less
pose security threats by jamming or flooding the airwaves with
static noise that causes WLAN signals to collide and produce CRC
errors. These Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks effectively shut down
the wireless network in a similar way that DoS attacks affect wired
networks.
[0023] Careless and deceitful actions by both loyal and disgruntled
employees also present security risks and performance issues to
wireless networks with unauthorized access points, improper
security measures, and network abuses. Because a simple WLAN can be
easily installed by attaching a $150 access point to a wired
network and a $100 WLAN card to a laptop, employees are deploying
unauthorized WLANs or peer-to-peer wireless connections 175 when IT
departments are slow to adopt the new technology.
[0024] Incorrectly configured access points are an avoidable but
significant hole in WLAN security. Many access points are initially
configured to broadcast unencrypted SSIDs of authorized users.
While SSIDs are intended to be passwords to verify ;authorized
users, intruders can easily steal an unencrypted SSID to assume the
identity of an authorized user.
[0025] Authorized users can also threaten the integrity of the
network with abuses that drain connection speeds, consume
bandwidth, and hinder a WLAN's overall performance. A few users who
clog the network by trading large files such as MP3 audio or MPEG
video files can affect the productivity of everyone on the wireless
network.
[0026] The systems and methods according to the present invention
provide solutions to these and other security and/or management
issues associated with WLANs and/or encrypted computer
networks.
SUMMARY
[0027] The present invention is directed to systems and methods for
enhancing network security. One preferred embodiment according to
the present invention includes a system data store (SDS), a system
processor and one or more interfaces to one or more communications
channels which may include one or more interfaces to wireless
and/or encrypted communications network over which electronic
communications are transmitted and received. The SDS stores data
needed to provide the desired system functionality and may include,
for example, received communications, data associated with such
communications, information related to known security risks and
predetermined responses to the identification of particular
security risks and situations. The SDS may include multiple
physical and/or logical data stores for storing the various types
of information. Data storage and retrieval functionality may be
provided by either the system processor or data storage processors
associated with the data store.
[0028] The system processor is in communication with the SDS via
any suitable communication channel(s); the system processor is in
communication with the one or more interfaces via the same, or
differing, communication channel(s). The system processor may
include one or more processing elements that provide electronic
communication reception, transmission, interrogation, analysis
and/or other functionality.
[0029] Each interface to a wireless network includes at least one
receiver adapted to receive wireless communications; each interface
may also, or instead, include one or more transmitters adapted to
transmit wireless communications. Each interface to a wired
network, if any, include a receiver, a transmitter, both or a
plurality of one and/or both; such receivers and/or transmitters
are adapted to receive or transmit communication over the wired
network to which the interface connects. In one preferred
embodiment, the communication interface includes at least one
wireless receiver and at least one wireless transmitter.
[0030] Accordingly, one preferred method of security enhancement
includes a variety of steps that may, in certain embodiments, be
executed by the environment summarized above and more fully
described below or be stored as computer executable instructions in
and/or on any suitable combination of computer-readable media.
Configuration data associated with an access point on a wireless
computer network potentially compromised by an intruder is
received. Information contained within and/or derived from the
received configuration data is stored. Communication with the
intruder is continued by emulating the identification
characteristics of the potentially compromised access point. In
some embodiments, communication may appear to come from an access
point that appears less secure than the potentially compromised
access point. A channel change request is transmitted to the
potentially compromised access point to reroute communication
between the potentially compromised access point and authorized
stations such that communications may continue on a different
channel.
[0031] In some embodiments, the configuration data associated with
the potentially compromised access point is received from an
intrusion detection system such as described in greater detail
below. In such embodiments, the configuration data may be included
as part of a generated security violation alarm. In other
instances, an alarm signal is received that triggers the generation
and transmission of a request for information regarding the
potentially compromised access point. Some embodiments involving an
intrusion detection system may include the intrusion detection
system while other respond to input from such a system.
[0032] Some embodiments further include the mapping of the
identification of the intruder's node and/or the mapping of the
location of the intruder's node within the wireless network. In
some instances, a notification of the triggering of the honeypot
trap can be sent to an administrator; some such notifications may
include an identification and/or location of the node associated
with the intruder in embodiments that include node identification
and location mapping.
[0033] In some embodiments, the configuration data includes one or
more risk criteria, network default data, network policy,
performance and/or usage data. This configuration information may
be received from one or more of a variety of sources including from
a configuration file, an interactive data entry interface or a
command line or from monitoring the wireless computer network.
[0034] Some embodiments may further include updating of various
types of stored information; different embodiment may update all,
none or any combination of the various types of stored information.
For instance, some embodiments can update station information
associated with the various stations in the wireless computer
network based upon the received data. Further, some embodiments can
update state information regarding the security of the wireless
computer network based upon the received data. In addition, some
embodiments can update statistics based upon the received data.
Such updates can occur each time data is received, in response to
reaching a fixed amount of such update data, in response to
reaching a fixed time or the end of a predetermined duration, or
some combination of these approaches.
[0035] Additional advantages of the invention will be set forth in
part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious
from the description, or may be learned by practice of the
invention. The advantages of the invention will be realized and
attained by means of the elements and combinations particularly
pointed out in the appended claims. It is to be understood that
both the foregoing general description and the following detailed
description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not
restrictive of the invention, as claimed.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0036] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and
constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of
the invention and together with the description, serve to explain
the principles of the invention.
[0037] FIG. 1 graphically depicts a typical LAN with both wired and
wireless components.
[0038] FIGS. 2A-E graphically depicts LANs incorporating various
preferred embodiments according to the present invention.
[0039] FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a multi-dimensional wireless
intrusion detection process according to one preferred embodiment
of the present invention.
[0040] FIG. 4 is a flow chart of an example multiple input wireless
intrusion detection process including multiple input correlation
and long-term data fusion.
[0041] FIG. 5 is a flow chart of an exemplary dynamic channel
change active defense process that includes a honeypot trap.
[0042] FIGS. 6A-B are flow charts of example station identification
and location mapping processes.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0043] Exemplary embodiments of the present invention are now
described in detail. Referring to the drawings, like numbers
indicate like parts throughout the views. As used in the
description herein and throughout the claims that follow, the
meaning of "a," "an," and "the" includes plural reference unless
the context clearly dictates otherwise. Also, as used in the
description herein and throughout the claims that follow, the
meaning of "in" includes "in" and "on" unless the context clearly
dictates otherwise. Finally, as used in the description herein and
throughout the claims that follow, the meanings of "and" and "or"
include both the conjunctive and disjunctive and may be used
interchangeably unless the context clearly dictates otherwise; the
phrase "exclusive or" may be used to indicate situation where only
the disjunctive meaning may apply.
[0044] Ranges may be expressed herein as from "about" one
particular value, and/or to "about" another particular value. When
such a range is expressed, another embodiment includes from the one
particular value and/or to the other particular value. Similarly,
when values are expressed as approximations, by use of the
antecedent "about," it will be understood that the particular value
forms another embodiment. It will be further understood that the
endpoints of each of the ranges are significant both in relation to
the other endpoint, and independently of the other endpoint.
[0045] The term "Wi-Fi" is short for wireless fidelity and is
another name for IEEE 802.11b. The foregoing discussion of
exemplary embodiments may use terminology or make reference to the
IEEE 802.11b standard, or other 802.11 variant; however, those
skilled in the art will appreciate that systems and methods of the
present invention may be applied to WLANs meeting these standards
as well as WLANs developed according to competing WLAN standards.
The phrase "frame" as used herein shall mean broadly any discretely
defined communication transmitted via a computer network and shall
not be limited to those specific frame types (control, management,
data and error) defmed according to 802.11X standards.
Architecture of a Typical Access Environment
[0046] FIGS. 2A-E depicts several LAN environments including
several preferred embodiments according to the present invention.
These figures depict a typical LAN environment as depicted in FIG.
1 having wired and wireless components. In contrast to FIG. 1,
FIGS. 2A-E include one or more hardware components supporting
preferred embodiments according to the present invention. The
depicted hardware components include a system processor, an SDS and
one or more interfaces to one or more wireless and/or encrypted
communications network over which electronic communications are
transmitted and received.
[0047] The hardware components depicted in these figures are
outlined as follows: [0048] In FIG. 2A, the hardware components
include a single device 210A that includes the a local processor
serving as the system processor and the one or more interfaces to
the wireless network. The device 210A is preferably a mobile
computer system such as a notebook computer. The local primary
and/or secondary storage of device 210A may serve as the SDS;
alternatively, portions of the SDS may be provided by other systems
capable of communicating with the device 210A such as network
addressable data storage 110, local servers 120 and/or wireless
stations 170A, 170B. In some embodiments, the device's interfaces
to the wireless network may be limited to one or more wireless
receivers. In other embodiments, the interfaces may include one or
more wireless transmitters as well as one or more transmitters. If
wireless transmitters are included, the device 210 may communicate
over LAN 190 using a wireless access point 180A, 180B. In addition,
included wireless transmitters may be used to support one or more
of the active defense measures described in greater detail below.
In some embodiments, the device 210A may further include a wired
connection (not shown) to Ethernet 150 allowing direct
communication between it and systems connected to the wired portion
of LAN 190. [0049] In FIG. 2B, the hardware components include
multiple devices 210A, 210B, 210C, 210D. Each device 210A-D
includes a local processor and one or more interfaces to the
wireless network and is preferably a mobile computer system such as
a notebook computer. The individual local processors in the
aggregate serve as the system processor. The SDS may include a
combination of storage local to each of the devices and/or external
storage accessible via the LAN 190. As described above with respect
to FIG. 2A, each device includes at least a wireless receiver but
may also include additional wireless receivers and/or wireless
transmitters. Each device may also include a wired connection (not
shown) to Ethernet 150. Finally, the devices 210A-D may further use
existing interfaces and/or incorporate additional interfaces to
allow peer-to-peer communication among themselves. [0050] In FIG.
2C, the hardware components include multiple devices 210A, 210B,
210C, 210D, 220. Each device 210A-D may include the various
components as described above with respect to FIG. 2B. Device 220
includes a local processor and one or more communication
interfaces; this device may be referred to hereinafter as the host
system. Device 220's communication interfaces may include only a
wired communication interface and may receive data related to
wireless communications as forwarded by devices 210A-D over the
wire Ethernet 150. In addition to, or instead of, the wired
communication interface, device 220 may include a one or more
wireless communication interfaces each of which may include a
wireless receiver, a wireless transmitter or both. In embodiment
where devices 210A-D support peer-to-peer communication, device 220
may in some of such embodiments participate in the peer-to-peer
communication and, in such instances, its communication interfaces
would include the appropriate communication interface to support
this participation. The system processor functionality in the
depicted embodiment may be provided by the host system alone and/or
by some combination of the devices 210A-D. The host system may in
some embodiments provide the SDS for the environment;
alternatively, the SDS may be supported by some combination of the
local storage among the devices 210A-D, the local storage in the
host system and external storage available through LAN 190. [0051]
In FIG. 2D, the hardware components include multiple devices 210A,
2101B 210C, 210D, 220, 230A, 230B. Devices 210A-D, 220 support the
same functionality and include the same range of components as
provided above with respect to FIG. 2C. In addition, devices 230A,
230B are sensor devices that monitor wireless traffic over the
wireless network. These sensor devices at least include a wireless
receiver for monitoring the traffic and a communication interface
wired (as depicted) or wireless (not shown) allowing communication
with one or more of the devices 210A-D and/or the host system 220.
In some embodiments, the sensor devices 230A, 230B may include a
wireless transmitter for supporting communication with the other
hardware components and/or for supporting various active wireless
network defensive measures as discussed below. In some embodiments,
the sensor device 230A, 230B may further include local processing
capability and or local storage capability; in some such
embodiments, the system processor and/or the SDS may incorporate
these local capabilities of the sensor devices 230A, 230B. [0052]
In FIG. 2E, the hardware components include multiple devices 220,
230A, 230B. In this embodiment, the host system 220 and sensor
devices 230A, 230B include the same functionality and range of
components as discussed above with respect to FIGS. 2D and 2E
respectively. In such embodiments, the host system 220 will
typically provide a significant portion of the system processor
functionality and will only have limited capacity to directly
receive wireless network communication. In some of these
embodiments, the host system 220 may have no wireless communication
interface.
[0053] The depicted hardware components include a system processor
potentially including multiple processing elements, that may be
distributed across the depicted hardware components, where each
processing element may be supported via Intel-compatible processor
platforms preferably using at least one PENTIUM III or CELERON
(Intel Corp., Santa Clara, Calif.) class processor; alternative
processors such as UltraSPARC (Sun Microsystems, Palo Alto, Calif.)
could be used in other embodiments. In some embodiments, security
enhancement functionality, as further described below, may be
distributed across multiple processing elements. The term
processing element may refer to (1) a process running on a
particular piece, or across particular pieces, of hardware, (2) a
particular piece of hardware, or either (1) or (2) as the context
allows. The sensor devices 230A, 230B depicted in FIGS. 2D-E may in
some preferred embodiments include more limited optimized local
processors such as a digital signal processor (DSP). Other
embodiment can use application specific integrated circuits (ASIC)
or a field programmable gate arrays (FPGA).
[0054] The depicted hardware components include an SDS that could
include a variety of primary and secondary storage elements. In one
preferred embodiment, the SDS would include RAM as part of the
primary storage; the amount of RAM might range from 64 MB to 4 GB
in each individual hardware device although these amounts could
vary and represent overlapping use such as where the host system
220 supports additional functionality such as integrated with
firewall system 145 for providing unified wired and wireless
security. The primary storage may in some embodiments include other
forms of memory such as cache memory, registers, non-volatile
memory (e.g., FLASH, ROM, EPROM, etc.), etc. The sensor devices
230A, 230B depicted in FIGS. 2D-E may in some preferred embodiments
include more limited amounts and kinds of primary storage. In one
preferred embodiments, the primary storage in the sensor devices
includes FLASH memory.
[0055] The SDS may also include secondary storage including single,
multiple and/or varied servers and storage elements. For example,
the SDS may use internal storage devices connected to the system
processor. In embodiments where a single processing element
supports all of the security analysis functionality, such as seen
in FIGS. 2A and 2E, a local hard disk drive may serve as the
secondary storage of the SDS, and a disk operating system executing
on such a single processing element may act as a data server
receiving and servicing data requests.
[0056] It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the
different information used in the security enhancement processes
and systems according to the present invention may be logically or
physically segregated within a single device serving as secondary
storage for the SDS; multiple related data stores accessible
through a unified management system, which together serve as the
SDS; or multiple independent data stores individually accessible
through disparate management systems, which may in some embodiments
be collectively viewed as the SDS. The various storage elements
that comprise the physical architecture of the SDS may be centrally
located, or distributed across a variety of diverse locations.
[0057] The architecture of the secondary storage of the system data
store may vary significantly in different embodiments. In several
embodiments, database(s) are used to store and manipulate the data;
in some such embodiments, one or more relational database
management systems, such as DB2 (IBM, White Plains, NY), SQL Server
(Microsoft, Redmond, WA), ACCESS (Microsoft, Redmond, Wash.),
ORACLE 8i (Oracle Corp., Redwood Shores, Calif.), Ingres (Computer
Associates, Islandia, N.Y.), MySQL (MySQL AB, Sweden) or Adaptive
Server Enterprise (Sybase Inc., Emeryville, Calif.), may be used in
connection with a variety of storage devices/file servers that may
include one or more standard magnetic and/or optical disk drives
using any appropriate interface including, without limitation, IDE
and SC SI. In some embodiments, a tape library such as Exabyte X80
(Exabyte Corporation, Boulder, Colo.), a storage attached network
(SAN) solution such as available from (EMC, Inc., Hopkinton,
Mass.), a network attached storage (NAS) solution such as a NetApp
Filer 740 (Network Appliances, Sunnyvale, Calif.), or combinations
thereof may be used. In other embodiments, the data store may use
database systems with other architectures such as object-oriented,
spatial, object-relational or hierarchical.
[0058] Instead of, or in addition to, those organization approaches
discussed above, certain embodiments may use other storage
implementations such as hash tables or flat files or combinations
of such architectures. Such alternative approaches may use data
servers other than database management systems such as a hash table
look-up server, procedure and/or process and/or a flat file
retrieval server, procedure and/or process. Further, the SDS may
use a combination of any of such approaches in organizing its
secondary storage architecture.
[0059] The hardware components may each have an appropriate
operating system such as WINDOWS/NT, WINDOWS 2000 or WINDOWS/XP
Server (Microsoft, Redmond, Wash.), Solaris (Sun Microsystems, Palo
Alto, Calif.), or LINUX (or other UNIX variant). In one preferred
embodiment, the devices 210A-D and/or host system 220 include a
LINUX (or other UNIX variant) operating system; although other
embodiments may include a WINDOWS/XP (or other WINDOWS family)
operating system.
[0060] Depending upon the hardware/operating system platform of the
overall environment, appropriate server software may be included to
support the desired access for the purpose of configuration,
monitoring and/or reporting. Web server functionality may be
provided via an Internet Information Server (Microsoft, Redmond,
Wash.), an Apache HTTP Server (Apache Software Foundation, Forest
Hill, Md.), an iPlanet Web Server (iPlanet E-Commerce Solutions--A
Sun--Netscape Alliance, Mountain View, Calif.) or other suitable
Web server platform. The e-mail services may be supported via an
Exchange Server (Microsoft, Redmond, Wash.), sendmail or other
suitable e-mail server. Some embodiments may include one or more
automated voice response (AVR) systems that are in addition to, or
instead of, the aforementioned access servers. Such an AVR system
could support a purely voice/telephone driven interface to the
environment with hard copy output delivered electronically to
suitable hard copy output device (e.g., printer, facsimile, etc.),
and forward as necessary through regular mail, courier,
inter-office mail, facsimile or other suitable forwarding
approach.
[0061] In one preferred embodiment, devices 210A-D and host system
220 can be configured locally or remotely, and configuration can
occur through an interactive interface and/or through a command
line interface. The interactive interface is accessible locally
whereas the command line interface is accessible either locally or
remotely. Remote access is preferably granted through the use of a
secure shell (SSH) client communicating with an SSH server running
on the device or host system.
[0062] In some preferred embodiments of the present invention, an
interactive interface is provided for configuring the access point
and various hardware components and supplying a variety of
configuration data including thresholds values of various kinds. In
one preferred embodiment, an administration program area provides
such an interface and allows: [0063] definition and configuration
of access point settings and policies; [0064] creation and/or
designation of thresholds used to trigger intrusion/detection
alarms for authorized access points; [0065] creation and/or
designation of default thresholds used to trigger
intrusion/detection alarms for non-authorized access points; and
[0066] configuration of settings for the various hardware/software
components.
[0067] The administration program area, in one preferred
embodiment, offers standard windowing interface featuring tabbed
pages for easy navigation between configuration functions. From
within each of the tabbed pages, an Edit button allows modification
of the values. After editing the data, Accept temporarily saves the
changes. Commit permanently saves and applies edits (until edited
again). Accepted changes persist until the system is restarted
whereas committed changes persist until across restarts.
Access Point Configuration
[0068] One preferred embodiment automatically attempts to detect
and record all the configured properties for all access points it
observes. The settings constitute access point "policies"-- when
access point properties deviate from those recorded, one or more
alarms can be generated. The values for an access point can be
modified manually to alter the generation of specific alarms.
Policies for off-line access points can also be created in some
embodiments using an Add feature.
[0069] The table below provides a summary of several access point
properties displayable and/or configurable in some preferred
embodiments of the present invention. TABLE-US-00002 Values
Description Access Point ID The MAC address of the access point.
Access Point Name The user-defined name of the access point.
Extended Service The name of the Extended Service Set indicating
the wireless Set ID network to which the access point belongs.
Access Point The manufacturer of the access point. In some
embodiments, this Vendor is detected by comparing the first three
bytes of its MAC address with a database of OUI numbers. Supported
Rates The data transfer rates the access point supports. In some
embodiments, this value (or these values) can be edited to specify
the supported rates. Authentication Whether the access point
accepts non-authenticated network Modes connections and/or also
accepts shared key authentication. (If connections are detected
that deviate from either of these settings, an alarm can be
generated.) Configured to Run Whether or not the access point is
configured to require WEP WEP encryption. AP Mgmt From Whether the
access point is configured to allow users to directly Wireless
Network administer its settings over the wireless network.
Authorized Access Whether this access point is authorized to be
present in the air Point space. Unauthorized access points, when
detected, can generate alarms. (In some embodiment, a change in
this value will not take effect until the system is restarted.)
[0070] For each access point, a station maintenance screen or menu
may allow the specification of the stations that are authorized to
use it. One preferred embodiment of such a screen or menu,
automatically detects all stations within the footprint of the
access points Basic Service Set (BSS) and enters their MAC
addresses in an Observed column. Such stations can be indicated as
an authorized member of the BSS by selecting them in the Observed
column and designating them as Valid. Designated stations are moved
to a Valid column. (Stations can, in some embodiments, be
designated as invalid by selecting and marking them in the Valid
column.) Stations not auto-detected can be manually entered by
specifying its MAC address in a Enter New Station input field and
triggering an Add Station feature.
Access Point Threshold Configuration and Aggregate Station
Thresholds
[0071] Systems and methods according to the present invention
generate alerts if 10 network traffic that exceeds thresholds is
detected. In one preferred embodiment, all detected or manually
configured off-line access points are listed in a Select AP pick
list. Thresholds associated with each access point in the pick list
can be edited by selecting the particular access point. Such
threshold values can be either temporary (until the next restart)
or persistent across restarts (until a further edit designated as
persistent). TABLE-US-00003 Values Description Signal Strength If
the signal strength for any station in the BSS is Threshold lower
than this value, an alarm can be generated. # of Associations Enter
the maximum number of associations per per Minute minute to allow
with all stations combined. (Preferably, this value is not higher
than twice the number of stations in the BSS.) # of Associated
Enter the maximum number of stations allowed Stations to associate
at anyone time with this access point. The number should reflect
the actual number of stations. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated.
[0072] The following table outlines a set of thresholds used in one
preferred embodiment that refer to the network characteristics
encompassing all stations and traffic in the BSS. In one preferred
embodiment, special care must be taken when creating the "byte
thresholds" that immediately follow. Several factors govern the
values entered for each: [0073] The "transmission rate" of the
access point--how much data it can transmit--is the first
consideration. If the transmission rate is only 1 megabyte per
second, the thresholds will be much lower than if the transmission
rate is 11 megabytes per second.
[0074] All four "directions" of traffic (wired to wired, wired to
wireless, wireless to wired, and wireless to wireless) must add up
to less than 100% of available bandwidth. Many administrators will
set the individual thresholds such that their combined value is
less than 80% of available bandwidth. TABLE-US-00004 Value
Description # Bytes into Enter the maximum number of bytes of data
per minute allowed into BSS from the BSS from the wired portion of
your network. If a greater number is Wired Net detected, an alarm
can be generated. # Bytes from Enter the maximum number of bytes of
data per minute allowed out of BSS to Wired the BSS to a wired
portion of your network. If a greater number is Net detected, an
alarm can be generated. # Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes
of data per minute allowed to be between transmitted within the BSS
from all stations. If a greater number is Stations in detected, an
alarm can be generated. BSS # Bytes from Enter the maximum number
of bytes of data per minute allowed to be Wired Net to transmitted
from a wired portion of the network to another wired Wired Net
portion of the network, using the access point as a bridge. If a
greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. Total Data
Enter the maximum number of data frames per minute from all
stations
[0075] TABLE-US-00005 Value Description Frames Seen combined
allowed to be transmitted. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. Total Mgmt Enter the maximum number of
management frames per Frames Seen minute from all stations combined
allowed to be transmitted. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. Total Ctrl Enter the maximum number of
control frames per minute Frames Seen from all stations combined
allowed to be transmitted. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. Total Ad hoc Enter the maximum number of ad
hoc frames per minute Frames Seen from all stations combined
allowed to be transmitted. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated.
Individual Station Thresholds
[0076] The following table outlines a set of potential thresholds
applied to any individual station in one preferred embodiment. If
any single station reaches one of these thresholds, an alarm can be
generated. TABLE-US-00006 Column Description Signal Strength If the
signal strength for any station in the BSS is Threshold lower than
this value, an alarm can be generated. # of Enter the maximum
number of associations Associations per minute any station is
allowed to make with an access per Minute point. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Bytes Enter the
maximum number of bytes of data per Transmitted minute any station
is allowed transmit. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can
be generated.
[0077] TABLE-US-00007 Column Description # of Bytes Enter the
maximum number of bytes of data per minute any station Received is
allowed to receive. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can
be generated. # of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data
frames per minute any station Transmitted is allowed to transmit.
If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of
Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames per minute any
station Received is allowed to receive. If a greater number is
detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the
maximum number of management frames per minute any Transmitted
station is allowed to transmit. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the maximum number
of management frames per minute any Received station is allowed to
receive. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of control
frames per minute any Transmitted station is allowed to transmit.
If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of
Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of control frames per minute
any Received station is allowed to receive. If a greater number is
detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Fragment Enter the
maximum number of fragment frames per minute from Frames Seen any
station that are allowed. If a greater number is detected, an alarm
can be generated. # of Decrypt Error Enter the maximum number of
decrypt error frames per minute Frames Seen from any station that
are allowed. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated.
Access Point Station Thresholds
[0078] The following table outlines a set of thresholds, in one
preferred embodiment, applied to the access point itself, and will
typically be somewhat more than the Aggregate Station thresholds.
TABLE-US-00008 Column Description Signal Strength If the signal
strength for any frame is lower than this value, an Threshold alarm
can be generated. # of Associations Whereas stations must associate
with an access point, access points per Minute do not associate
with themselves. Therefore, this value should be zero, indicating
that it does not associate. # of Bytes Enter the maximum number of
bytes of data per minute this access Transmitted point is allowed
to transmit. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated. # of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per
minute this access Received point is allowed to receive. If a
greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Data
Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames per minute this
access Transmitted point is allowed to transmit. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Data Frames
Enter the maximum number of data frames per minute this access
Received point is allowed to receive. If a greater number is
detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the
maximum number of management frames per minute this Transmitted
access point is allowed to transmit. If a greater number is
detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the
maximum number of management frames per minute this Received access
point is allowed to receive. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number
of control frames per minute this Transmitted access point is
allowed to transmit. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can
be generated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of control
frames per minute this Received access point is allowed to receive.
If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of
Fragment Enter the maximum number of fragment frames per minute
this Frames Seen access point can see before generating an alarm. #
of Decrypt Error Enter the maximum number of decrypt error frames
per minute this Frames Seen access point can see before generating
an alarm.
Default Threshold Information
[0079] In one preferred embodiment, whenever a new access point is
detected or manually entered, the specified default settings are
applied until it is manually customized. It is assumed that new or
unauthorized access points are potential hackers, so it is
preferable to set the default thresholds fairly low.
Aggregate Station Thresholds
[0080] The table below outlines a set of thresholds that refer to
the combined statistics for all stations in one preferred
embodiment. TABLE-US-00009 Column Description Signal Strength If
the signal strength for any station in the BSS associated with an
Threshold unknown access point is lower than this value, an alarm
can be generated. # of Associations Whereas stations must associate
with an access point, access points per Minute do not associate
with themselves. Therefore, this value should be zero, indicating
that it does not associate. # of Associated Enter the maximum
number of stations allowed to associate with Stations unknown
access points. The number should reflect your actual stations. If a
greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # Bytes into
BSS Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per minute allowed
into from Wired Net the BSS through unknown access points from the
wired portion of your network. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. # Bytes from Enter the maximum number of
bytes of data per minute allowed out BSS to Wired of the BSS
through unknown access points to a wired portion of Net your
network. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated. # Bytes between Enter the maximum number of bytes of
data per minute allowed to Stations in BSS be transmitted within
the BSS from all stations through unknown access points. If a
greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # Bytes from
Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per minute allowed to
Wired Net to be transmitted through unknown access points from a
wired portion Wired Net of the network to another wired portion of
the network, using the access point as a bridge. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. Total Data Enter the
maximum number of data frames per minute for all Frames Seen
stations combined allowed to be transmitted through unknown access
points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.
Total Mgmt Enter the maximum number of management frames per minute
for Frames Seen all stations combined allowed to be transmitted
through unknown access points. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. Total Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number
of control frames per minute for all Seen stations combined allowed
to be transmitted through unknown access points. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. Total Ad hoc Enter
the maximum number of ad hoc frames per minute for all Frames Seen
stations combined allowed to be transmitted through unknown access
points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated.
Individual Station Thresholds
[0081] The set of thresholds outlined in the table below apply to
any individual station in one preferred embodiment, and will
typically be lower than the Aggregate Station thresholds.
TABLE-US-00010 Column Description Signal Strength If the signal
strength for any station associated with an unknown Threshold
access point is lower than this value, an alarm can be generated. #
of Associations Enter the maximum number of associations per minute
any station per Minute is allowed to make with an unknown access
point. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.
# of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per minute any
station Transmitted is allowed transmit through unknown access
points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.
# of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per minute any
station Received is allowed to receive through unknown access
points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.
# of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames per minute
any station is Transmitted allowed to transmit through unknown
access points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated. # of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames
per minute any station is Received allowed to receive through
unknown access points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm
can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the maximum number of
management frames per minute any Transmitted station is allowed to
transmit through unknown access points. If a greater number is
detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the
maximum number of management frames per minute any Received station
is allowed to receive through unknown access points. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Ctrl Frames
Enter the maximum number of control frames per minute any
Transmitted station is allowed to transmit through unknown access
points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.
# of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of control frames per
minute any Received station is allowed to receive through unknown
access points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated. # of Fragment Enter the maximum number of fragment
frames per minute from Frames Seen any station that are allowed. If
a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of
Decrypt Error Enter the maximum number of decrypt error frames per
minute Frames Seen from any station that are allowed. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated.
Access Point Station Thresholds
[0082] The set of thresholds in the table below applies to all
unauthorized access points in one preferred embodiment.
TABLE-US-00011 Column Description Signal Strength If the signal
strength for any access point is lower than this value, Threshold
an alarm can be generated. # of Associations Enter the maximum
number of associations per minute between any per Minute access
point and stations. (It is recommended that this value not be
higher than twice the number of stations in your BSS.) # of Bytes
Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per minute allowed to
Transmitted be transmitted from any access point. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Bytes Enter the
maximum number of bytes of data per minute allowed to Received be
received by any access point. If a greater number is detected, an
alarm can be generated. # of Data Frames Enter the maximum number
of data frames per minute allowed to Transmitted be transmitted by
any Access point. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated. # of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames
per minute allowed to Received be received by any access point. If
a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt
Frames Enter the maximum number of management frames per minute
Transmitted allowed to be transmitted by any access point. If a
greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt
Frames Enter the maximum number of management frames per minute
Received allowed to be received by any access point. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Ctrl Frames
Enter the maximum number of control frames per minute allowed
Transmitted to be transmitted by any access point. If a greater
number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Ctrl Frames
Enter the maximum number of control frames per minute allowed
Received to be received by any access point. If a greater number is
detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Fragment Enter the
maximum number of fragment frames per minute allowed Frames Seen
for any access point. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can
be generated. # of Decrypt Error Enter the maximum number of
decrypt error frames per minute Frames Seen allowed for any access
point. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be
generated.
[0083] Some embodiments may allow for self-configuration of some or
all of the thresholds discussed above. Such self-configuration
could occur through a learning mode in which the systems and
methods according to the present invention monitor traffic on the
wireless computer network for the first several hours or days after
installation. In such a learning mode, alarm notifications can be
disabled. It is expected that, in the beginning, the generation of
alarms will be very high--hundreds or thousands per day depending
on actual network traffic--until thresholds in accordance with the
network's normal activity are determined. Once an accurate picture
of normal network traffic has been captured, and thresholds are
reflective of normal activity, a switch to normal operations mode
enables alarm notifications.
[0084] In one preferred embodiment, a command line interface is
provided to configure settings that are not available within the
graphical user interface. For example, the IP address of the a
hardware component can be changed, its system clock reset or set to
"sync" with a network time server. In other embodiments, the
graphical user interface and/or the command line interface can
allow significant overlap of configuration capability. Further,
some embodiments have only one or the other interface type.
Finally, some embodiments provide no interactive interface for
configuration and are limited to reading configuration data from a
file, deriving configuration data from past monitoring of the
wireless computer network or otherwise receiving this data. The
command line interface in one preferred embodiment can be accessed
either on the hardware component such as through a command shell
such as the Linux Gnome Terminal or over the network using an SSH
(preferably, version 2) client.
[0085] In one preferred embodiment, a command shell automatically
opens on the hardware component after booting. A terminal icon can
appear on the task bar at the bottom of the display; clicking the
icon opens additional terminal windows. At the command line prompt,
a command is entered to launch the command line interface.
[0086] An SSH client is launched and connected to the hardware
component's IP address. The identity of the user making the
connection is verified. At the command line prompt, enter the
following command to launch the command line interface:
Command Line Interface
[0087] In one preferred embodiment, the screen displays in the
terminal window provide five "program areas": [0088]
Network--offering options to change IP address, DNS servers,
hostname, domain name, mail server, ARP, and create "allow" and
"deny" lists. [0089] Date--allowing time and date editing, time
zone setting, and configuration of an NTP server. [0090]
Service--providing tools to fine-tune the hardware component
parameters, configure data management, and reboot and shut down the
component. [0091] Users--allowing creation, editing, and deletion
of user accounts allowed access to the graphical user interface.
[0092] Help--tips on using the application, and detailed help
topics. Network
[0093] Opening the network settings program area, the following
commands are available in one preferred embodiment: TABLE-US-00012
Command Description IP IP address config Allows modification of the
IP address, Subnet mask, and default gateway for the hardware
component logged onto. The "IP configuration" screen opens,
displaying the current network configuration and allows
modification. DNS Define DNS servers Adding or deleting a DNS
nameserver. The "Nameserver screen" opens, displaying your current
DNS server's IP address and allows addition, deletion and
modification. Note: Multiple DNS servers can in some embodiments
have an "order" for processing DNS requests. The first server on
the list (identified by the numeral 1) is the first to offer name
resolution; the second server on the list (identified by the
numeral 2) is the second to process the request if the first is
unable to do so. In order to change the order preference of
multiple servers, all must be deleted and re-entered in the desired
order for them to process DNS requests. HNAME Set hostname Changing
the name of the hardware component. The Hostname screen displays
your current hostname and allows modification. Bear in mind that
whenever the hostname is changed, its name must also be modified in
all devices that refer to it (e.g., DNS servers). DNAME Set domain
name Changing the domain to which the hardware component belongs.
The Domain name screen displays your current domain name and allows
modification. Bear in mind that whenever the domain name is
changed, it must also be modified in all devices that refer to it
(e.g., DNS servers). MRELAY Config mail relay host Configuring a
hardware component to send alarms by email. The Mail relay host
screen appears and allows entry of qualified hostnames. In one
embodiment, mail relay hosts may be referred to by IP address or
fully qualified hostname (e.g., myhostname.mydomainname.com) of a
mail server to process email alarm messages. Note: the mail server
must be configured to allow this appliance to relay email through
it, or at least to direct its mail to another mail server that will
relay it. ARP Config permanent ARP table Creating a permanent ARP
table. The ARP table screen displays your current ARP records and
allows modification. In order to protect connections between this
hardware component and remote administrators from being hijacked by
man-in-the-middle ARP "blasts" (that redirect traffic for this IP
address to an alternate MAC address), it is preferable to create
permanent ARP records for gateways and other important machines.
HALLOW Configure/etc/hosts.allow file Specifying which machines are
allowed to connect to the hardware component. The Allow list screen
displays your current list of allowed machines and allows
modification. Machines allowed to connect to this hardware
components can be specified. Only those whose IP address, subnet,
fully qualified hostname, or domain name match an entry in this
list are allowed to connect to this hardware component to run the
available administrative programs and routines. HDENY
Config/etc/host.deny file Identifying machines that may not connect
to the hardware component. The Deny list screen displays your
current list of denied machines and allows modification. Machines
not allowed to connect to this hardware component can be specified.
Anyone whose IP address, subnet, fully qualified hostname, or
domain name matches an entry in this list are not allowed to
connect to this hardware component Note: HALLOW, in one preferred
embodiment, takes precedence over HDENY. For example, if
123.456.789.963 is on the allow list, yet the subnet 123.456.789.
is on the deny list, the individual machine above is allowed to
connect to the appliance.
Date
[0094] Opening the date settings program area, the following
commands are available in one preferred embodiment: TABLE-US-00013
Command Description TIME Time/Date config Allows configuration of
the time/date for the hardware component. TZ Set time zone Allows
configuration of the time zone for the hardware component. NTP
Enable/disable NTP Allows configuration of the hardware component
to use a network time server.
[0095] Note: If you change the system time because, for example,
you move the appliance's location from the east to west coast of
the United States, you must also locate a new network time server
in the same time zone.
Services
[0096] Opening the set appliance parameters, configure data
management, and restart or shutdown the system area, the following
commands are available in one preferred embodiment: TABLE-US-00014
Command Description TUNE Tune appliance parameters Allows users to
modify some of the core values related to the environment's
functionality. DMGT Data management Allows users to modify how the
environment stores its data. REBOOT Reboot system Allows graceful
restart of the hardware component. HALT Halt system Allows graceful
shutdown of the hardware component.
Users
[0097] Opening the Users program area, the following commands are
available in one preferred embodiment: TABLE-US-00015 Command
Description NEWU Create user EDITU Edit user DELU Delete user
[0098] The functionality of these features can in one preferred
embodiment match with like functionality provided in a standard
LINUX user management facility.
[0099] Various methods and functions as exhibited in various
embodiments according to the present invention are described above
and below with respect to network security enhancement. In some
embodiments, one or more processors within architectures of the
environments as described above may execute the steps in such
methods and provide such functionality. The functionality may
spread across multiple processing elements. In other embodiments,
any suitable computer readable storage device, media or combination
of devices and/or media, including primary storage such as RAM,
ROM, cache memory, etc. or secondary storage such as magnetic media
including fixed and removable disks and tapes; optical media
including fixed and removable disks whether read-only or
read-write; paper media including punch cards and paper tape; or
other secondary storage as would be known to those skilled in the
art, may store instruction that upon execution by one or more
processors cause the one or more processors to execute the steps in
such methods and to provide such functionality.
Vulnerability Assessment and Threat Identification
[0100] Vulnerability assessment is accomplished by analyzing WLAN
traffic, and discovering access points and workstations. The system
determines how many bytes of data stations are sending and
receiving, the mean signal strength for an entire day or the hi/low
signal strength for each minute. It can distinguish between network
traffic internal to the wireless network and traffic originating
from or destined to the physical, wired-network and which stations
are the largest senders and receivers of data. The system produces
broad summaries of data that report high, low, and mean values for
a variety of traffic parameters, and detailed views that show
minute-by-minute snapshots of your traffic. Traffic parameters
include the breakdown of frame traffic (control, management, data,
and error frames) and network routing information. The system
determines if any traffic has not been encrypted, users are
authenticated, and all hardware is properly configured. The system
detects rogue deployments by identifying and locating unauthorized
WLANs and ad hoc networks (peer-to-peer networks) that violate
company policy and jeopardize security. The system identifies
suspicious WLAN traffic across unauthorized channels and
frequencies, which can be a common sign of intruders accessing your
WLAN or employees abusing their network privileges.
[0101] The systems and methods according to one preferred
embodiment use an audit of existing wireless hardware and perform a
survey the air space surrounding the wireless network prior to
activating intrusion detection. In this way, a baseline activity
level can be determined.
Step 1: Hardware Audit
[0102] Identify every access point in the wireless computer
network. Obtain or determine for each its MAC address, Extended
Service Set name, manufacturer, supported transmission rates,
authentication modes, and whether or not it is configured to run
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and wireless administrative
management. In addition, identify every workstation equipped with a
wireless network interface card, and record the MAC address of each
device. Take note of any physical features in the environment
(walls, competing electronic devices such as microwave ovens,
cordless phones, etc.) that might interfere with wireless
signals.
[0103] The hardware audit serves as the baseline against which the
systems and methods according to the present invention can compare.
That is, all access points and wireless stations should be detected
by the various embodiments of the present invention. (If an access
point or station is not detected, follow logical troubleshooting
steps.) On the other hand, it is likely that more devices than
expected will be detected. Some of these may be stations or access
points not identified or of which no one was aware. Others may be
"rogue" devices--surreptitious or unauthorized installations in the
network--or harmless equipment belonging to nearby companies, and
others may be actual hackers. Once the systems and methods
according to the present invention are in intrusion detection mode,
all detected access points and stations can be reported.
Step 2: Survey Perimeter
[0104] Preferably a mobile hardware component according to the
present invention is walked around the perimeter of the wireless
computer network in a powered up state (allowing it to collect data
as it is moved), or placed in a central location for 12 to 24 hours
to collect a larger amount of data. The benefit of a "walk-around"
survey is that it generates a nearly immediate picture of the
existing wireless "air space." The benefit of a "stationary" survey
is that over a longer period of time, is greater certainty of
detecting devices that only operate intermittently or hackers
attempting to penetrate the network off-hours. Repetition of the
survey, whether walking or stationary, should occur on all 11
channels.
Stationary Data Collection
[0105] Depending on the size of the wireless network, a hardware
component can be placed at the four corners or at intermediate
points in the Extended Service Set footprint. At each location, the
component should be allowed to passively monitor network traffic
for 12-24 hours. Hard copy of network data should be preserved
prior to each move.
Walk-around Data Collection
[0106] Simply walk around the perimeter of the wireless network
with the hardware component powered on and open to an overview
screen. The various access points and stations within the wireless
computer network can be detected. Compare this information with the
hardware audit made prior to collecting this data. Repeat this
walk-around survey for each of the eleven channels.
Step 3: Configure to "Recognize" this Network
[0107] Each access point detected should be designated as
authorized or unauthorized. Each observed station should be
designated as valid or not.
Step 4: Place Hardware Components in Discrete Locations Throughout
the Wireless Network.
[0108] Leave a component in each location from 1-3 days. Each day,
print reports to preserve captured information. Based upon this
information, specific access point and station related thresholds
can be tuned to distinguish between normal and abnormal traffic
patterns.
[0109] The intrusion detection system (IDS) engine listens to
wireless network traffic. FIG. 3 depicts one preferred process the
IDS follows in evaluating data associated with received traffic. In
the depicted exemplary process, all packets pass through four
detections systems: signature-based testing, protocol-based
testing, anomaly-based testing, and policy deviation-based testing;
other embodiments may use one or more of these tests, or other
tests, in varying combinations.
[0110] Initially, configuration information is received in step
305, typically including network default data and risk criteria.
This information can be retrieved from a file, derived or obtained
from monitoring the network and/or entered interactively at the
outset of the process. The system reads or receives frames from the
wireless network instep 310. The received frames are interrogated
as follows.
[0111] The information within the frame is interrogated to
determine if a known attack signature has been identified in step
325. Signatures encode datalink layer attack patters as
combinations of packet sequences and state. For example, active
probing emits a pattern or sequence of network requests. This
sequence can be recognized by its packet sequence signature. If the
attack signature is identified, the intrusion detection system
signals an alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator
in step 345.
[0112] If no attack signature is identified, the frame information
is passed through a protocol violation engine to determine if the
protocol used in the frame is authorized in step 330. Protocol
analysis examines whether or not protocol usage is legitimate. For
example, emitting a large number of association or disassociation
requests in a short interval is not a legitimate use of the
protocol. If the protocol used in the frame is outside of the
authorized protocol set, the intrusion detection system signals an
alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step
345.
[0113] If the protocol test passes, in step 335, the IDS checks the
frame data statistical anomalies against the SDS, or a statistics
database maintained therein. Anomaly based detection computes such
values as the mean, non-zero mean, standard deviation,
autocorrelation and peak for each time slice throughout the day.
This can be used to create a normalized statistics database for
each time slice and user. Current activity is then monitored and
compared with the recorded statistics vector. If the difference is
larger than a configurable threshold, an alert is generated.
Instead of, or in addition to, this approach, a Bayes test can be
applied to deduce the probability that the current statistics
vector is an attack as opposed to a legitimate sequence. If an
anomaly exists, the intrusion detection system signals an alarm
manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step 345.
[0114] If no anomaly is detected, the system interrogates the frame
to determine if a pre-defined policy has been violated in step 340.
Policy testing compares the observed activity with a configurable
set of activity rules stored in the SDS. For example, a rule can
declare that only specific hosts with specific addresses and
specific network cards can access the network. If a pre-defined
policy has been violated, the intrusion detection system signals an
alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step
345.
[0115] The tests outlined above and depicted in FIG. 3 are
performed serially. In other embodiments, one or more of these
tests may occur in parallel. Further, subsequent tests only occur
if a prior test was passed. In a further preferred embodiment, all
tests occur irrespective of the outcome of a prior test;
consequently, a single read frame could potentially generate an
alarm for every test performed on it.
[0116] Alerts can be in the any suitable form delivered to any
suitable platform including, without limitation, a screen display
to a monitor, a page to a pager, an outgoing voice call to
telephone, a SMS message to a mobile telephone, an e-mail message
to a valid address, posted to a Web page available via an
appropriate Web server or WAP alert to a WAP enabled device.
Various types of screen displays and reports may be used to provide
information regarding generated alarms.
[0117] In one preferred embodiment referred to as AirDefense Mobile
in U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. TBA entitled
"SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR NETWORK SECURITY" filed May 20,2002
bearing Attorney Docket No. 19282.0001U1, preferred interfaces for
reviewing and reporting alarms are described in detail. The
contents of this application are hereby incorporated by this
reference herein for all purposes.
[0118] In some embodiment, the outputs of all IDS test are then
compared and a confidence level computed in step 345. In one such
embodiment, in the case where only a statistical anomaly is
detected, it is flagged as a lower level performance alert. In the
case where one or more other violations are detected, the alarm is
elevated to an intrusion alarm.
[0119] Some embodiments may use a variety of data stores in
implementing the above process to track data across multiple
iterations of the process; such data stores can in one preferred
embodiment be part of an SDS as described above. Some such
embodiments can include a statistics database, a station database
and/or a state data store. In such embodiments, some or all of the
following steps depicted in FIG. 3 can occur.
[0120] In step 315, a station database is updated. This database
contains, in one preferred embodiment, per station and per access
point records with information describing device address,
communications state, timestamps of first and last activity, counts
of byte transmissions and local policy information describing
whether device is authorized or not for usage in the monitored
network.
[0121] In step 320 state information is updated. State refers to
whether or not the device has been seen before and whether or not
the station is unauthenticated and unassociated, authenticated,
authenticated and associated or unknown state information
associated with the wireless computer network.
[0122] In step 350, a determination is made as to whether a
particular statistics interval has been complete. If so, statistics
in an SDS are updated in step 355, and processing continues with
the next frame in step 310. Otherwise, processing simply continues
in step 310 with the next reading or receiving of a frame.
[0123] A modified and enhance version of the above approach is used
where network traffic is monitored from multiple input devices such
as with the embodiments depicted in FIGS. 2B-E. FIG. 4 depicts this
enhanced process starting at step 405.
[0124] Step 410 is analogous to step 305 from the process of
configuration information is received. As before, this is typically
done through reading system configuration files, monitoring the
network and/or interactive entry at the outset of the process. This
information typically includes network default data and risk
criteria such as access point configuration data (MAC Address of
the access point, Access Point Name, etc.), station configuration
data and various thresholds values.
[0125] In step 430, a wireless packet frame is received from each
input device (e.g., hardware components 210A-D, host system 220
and/or sensors 230A, 230B). Frames are read so that the frame
content can be interrogated.
[0126] Each read frame is interrogated by a multi-dimensional
intrusion detection system (IDS) such as detailed above with
respect to FIG. 3, and the outputs of all IDS tests are then
compared and a confidence level computed in step 435. As with the
process above, other tests in either alone, in combination with
each other or in combination with one or more of those described
above may be used in other embodiments.
[0127] In step 440, in the case where only a statistical anomaly is
detected, it is flagged as a lower level performance alert. In the
case where, in addition to the statistical anomaly, one of the
other violations has been detected, the alarm is elevated to an
intrusion alarm and an alarm manger is alerted in step 444. Other
embodiments do not rely on aggregate test outcome but determine
alarm status on single test outcomes. Further, some embodiments can
use other test types and outcome combinations to determine type and
severity of alarms generated.
[0128] If an alarm is not detected in step 440, a test to see if a
predetermined interval for gathering statistics has been reached
occurs in step 460. If the end of the pre-configured statistics
gathering interval has occurred, the SDS is updated in step 470 to
reflect the statistics gathered from the received frames over the
interval. Statistics are gathered by monitoring traffic between
network nodes, minute-by-minute statistics about BSS frame types
and traffic volumes, summaries of transmission statistics for all
stations associated with access points, current-minute transmission
statistics for all Stations, and detailed minute-by-minute
transmission statistics for any individual station in the wireless
computer network.
[0129] Data fusion occurs on a batch basis by aggregating data from
multiple databases. This process begins at step 414. The process
integrates statistical data from multiple databases that is
generated through frame monitoring and intrusion detection engines.
This approach provides a methodology for managing data received
from input devices such as hardware devices 210A-D and/or sensors
230A, 230B deployed at multiple sites and for aggregating
enterprise data at a single central system such as host 220.
[0130] The Attack and Station Profile database is read at step 418
to begin a processing loop to integrate databases from separate
sources. Correlation and pattern recognition is performed at step
420 to update the attack and station profiles in step 424. The
processing loop then sleeps at step 428 until the next processing
loop interval is to take place based on the pre-configured time
interval or trigger.
[0131] After the alarm manager is signaled in step 444, the attack
and station profile database is read in step 448; in this step,
existing attacks are queried and existing station security state is
queried. In step 450, this data is compared to the newly generated
alarm. If it is sufficiently similar, no new external notification
occurs in step 454. If it is not, a new notification message is
generated in step 454 and console display and/or external messaging
of the alarm occurs in step 458.
[0132] As described above, systems and methods according to the
present invention can automatically generate alarms whenever
certain events or conditions occur within your wireless network. In
some embodiments, an alarm manager providing an interface for
viewing can be provided; such an interface is described in greater
detail in co-pending "SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR NETWORK SECURITY"
filed May 20, 2002 bearing Attorney Docket No. 19282.0001U1. The
following table identifies alarms, alarm subtypes and severities
available in one preferred embodiment referred to as AirDefense
Mobile. TABLE-US-00016 Alarm Alarm Type Alarm Subtype Level DoS
Attack De-authenticate Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when a
hacker pretends to be an Access point and broadcasts a
"de-authenticate" message. This forces all Stations to
re-authenticate themselves, generating excessive network traffic,
and causing inconsistent connectivity and data transfer.
Disassociate Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when a hacker
pretends to be an Access point and broadcasts a "disassociate"
message. This forces all Stations to re-associate themselves with
the Access Point, generating excessive network traffic, and causing
inconsistent connectivity and data transfer. Unauthorized Not on
allow list Critical Station AirDefense Mobile detects a Station
whose MAC address is not on its Valid list. (A Valid list is
maintained by the system.) Threshold GLB CRC errors Major
AirDefense Mobile detects if CRC errors exceeded configured limits
(CRC errors are generated when checksums fail on individual
frames.) BSS assoc count Major AirDefense Mobile detects when the
number of associations within an entire BSS, in any given minute,
exceed the number specified in configuration information BSS signal
strength Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when the signal
strength in any access point falls below a specified threshold. BSS
fragments Minor AirDefense Mobile detects when the number of
fragmented frames within any minute exceed a specified threshold.
BSS decrypt errors Major AirDefense Mobile detects when the number
of decrypt error frames within any minute exceed a specified
threshold. BSS assoc stations Minor AirDefense Mobile detects when
the total number of associated Stations within an entire BSS, in
any given minute, exceed a specified number. BSS tbw in Minor
AirDefense Mobile detects when, during any minute, the number of
bytes of data entering the BSS from the wired portion of your
network exceed a set threshold. BSS tbw out Minor AirDefense Mobile
detects when, during any minute, the total number of bytes of data
going from the BSS to a wired portion of your network exceed a set
threshold. BSS tbw intra Minor AirDefense Mobile detects when,
during any minute, the total number of bytes of data originating
from and destined for the BSS exceed a specified threshold. BSS tbw
thru Minor AirDefense Mobile detects when, during any minute, the
total number of bytes of data originating from a wired portion of
the network hop through the BSS to another wired portion of the
network exceed a set threshold. BSS data Major AirDefense Mobile
detects when, during any minute, the total number of data frames in
the BSS exceed a specified threshold. BSS mgt Major AirDefense
Mobile detects when, during any minute, the total number of
management frames in the BSS exceed a specified threshold. BSS ctl
Major AirDefense Mobile detects when, during any minute, the total
number of control frames in the BSS exceed a set threshold. BSS ad
hoc Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when, during any minute, the
total number of Ad Hoc frames in the BSS exceed a specified
threshold. Note: Wireless network adaptor cards of lesser quality
will randomly generate Ad Hoc frames. AirDefense Mobile's default
threshold (1) may cause all of these spurious frames to generate an
alarm. After monitoring the network for a week or two, it may be
advisable to set the threshold to a number at or a little higher
than what the network normally generates. STA assoc count Major
AirDefense Mobile detects, during any minute, when any Station
associates with an access point more times than provided by a
specified threshold. STA signal strength Critical AirDefense Mobile
detects, during any minute, when any station's signal strength
falls below a value specified. STA fragments Minor AirDefense
Mobile detects, during any minute, when any station generates more
fragmented frames than a specified value. STA decrypt errors Major
AirDefense Mobile detects, during any minute, when any station
generates more decrypt errors than a set threshold. STA tbw
received Minor AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when
any station receives more bytes of data than a predetermined
threshold. STA tbw transmitted Minor AirDefense Mobile detects,
within any minute, when any station transmits more bytes of data
than specified in a set threshold. STA data received Major
AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when any station
receives more data frames than a specified threshold. STA data
transmitted Major AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute,
when any station transmits more data frames than a specified
threshold. STA mgt received Major AirDefense Mobile detects, within
any minute, when any station receives more management frames than a
specified threshold. STA mgt transmitted Major AirDefense Mobile
detects, within any minute, when any station transmits more
management frames than a set threshold. STA ctl receive Major
AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when any station
receives more control frames than a specified threshold. STA ctl
transmit Major AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when
any station transmits more control frames than a set threshold. ID
Theft Out of sequence Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when
frames are transmitted out of sequence. This suggests that someone
has spoofed a Station and is sending data at the same time as the
legitimate Station. Vendor out of character Critical AirDefense
Mobile compares every Station's transmissions against an internal
database of known vendor "transmission profiles" or "signatures."
If the actual network traffic does not match the vendor-profile
associated with the Station's Wireless NIC, AirDefense Mobile
assumes that the traffic originates from an unauthorized station
using a spoofed NIC. Anomalous signal strength Critical AirDefense
Mobile tracks the high, low, and mean signal strength of each
station many times a minute throughout the day. Whenever it detects
that the Station's signal strength deviates from the norm, it
generates an alarm. Access Point WEP mode changed Critical Mode
AirDefense Mobile detects when the WEP value in an access point's
beacon differs from the value it is supposed to be. (AirDefense
Mobile auto-detected the WEP property, or it was manually entered.)
Rate changed Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when the supported
transmission rate values in an access point's beacon differs from
the value it is supposed to be. (AirDefense Mobile auto-detected
the rate property, or it was manually entered.) Channel changed
Critical AirDefense Mobile detects whenever an access point changes
channels. (The channel is identified in configuration information.)
Cf changed AirDefense Mobile detects when the Point Coordination
value in an AP's beacon changes. A change in this field may
indicate that the access point was reconfigured, though this is not
necessarily a problem. (The Point Coordination field refers to the
access point's mode of collision avoidance.) Essid changed
AirDefense Mobile detects when the access point's broadcast of its
Extended BSS ID changes. The ESSID information is stored as
configuration information. Unauthorized AirDefense Mobile detects
when administration sessions are Critical AP Admin being conducted
directly with the access point. Odd Mgt. Sta tx ap mgt fr Critical
Frame AirDefense Mobile detects when a Station is transmitting a
management frame reserved for access point's use. Ap tx illegal mgt
fr Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when an access point
transmits an illegal management frame. Out of spec frame Critical
AirDefense Mobile detects when an access point transmits a frame
that does not follow 802.11b standards. Other bogus frame Critical
AirDefense Mobile detects when an access point transmits any frame
it does not understand. Ad Hoc Net AirDefense Mobile detects when
Stations are directly Critical Detected transmitting and receiving
to and from each other without using an authorized access point.
Note: Unlike all other alarms that are generated every time the
network event is detected within a minute, AirDefense Mobile will
only generate an Ad Hoc Network alarm once in the current 24 hour
period for each MAC address. AP Beacon AirDefense Mobile detects
when an access point's beacon rate Critical Rate changed.
Active Defense
[0133] In some embodiments of the present invention, one or more
active defense mechanisms may be triggered in response to alarm in
addition to, or instead of, the notification process described
above. The system may provide active defense from attacks by
broadcasting data into the wireless network as well as being able
to trap and/or map an intruder's workstation by triangulating the
position of the intruder's workstation relative to the wireless
network access points.
[0134] By introducing CRC errors into the wireless stream, the
system can actively defeat an attacker that is monitoring the
stream for patterns to crack the encryption. CRC errors are
introduced by transmitting at the same time as the detected
intruder. Due the shared medium nature of the wireless computer
network, the cause the packet transmission to be corrupted,
preventing the intruder from successfully communicating with the
network.
[0135] By introducing chaf, the system can actively defeat the
attacker by placing random frames into the stream so that the
encryption pattern becomes undetectable. Chaf is a form of
randomized packet transmission that is designed to reduce the
probability that a statistical analysis of the packet sequence
would result in breaking of the encryption key. This is done by
emitting a low-rate background transmission of packets that are
emitted using the same characteristics (e.g., address,
initialization vector, etc.) of legitimately observed traffic but
with a randomized payload.
[0136] The system can lock-down a wireless network by jamming, a
technique to prevent any unauthorized access to the wireless access
point by introducing enough noise into the wireless network that
workstations cannot physically connect to the wireless network.
Jamming is a physical layer transmission that is performed to
disrupt all unwanted wireless communications. It is equivalent to
introducing a noise signal on top of the unwanted signal
transmission such that any receiver would not be able to
successfully receive the transmission.
[0137] In a Physical Device approach, one embodiment would utilize
a standalone sensor to implement any of the Active Defense
mechanisms. Dynamic channel change can be used to reroute
authorized traffic to a different communication channel to avoid an
intruder detected on a particular channel. In this approach, a
channel change request is transmitted to the access point believed
to be compromised and authorized stations use the new channel to
communicate with the access point. This approach can also be used
to avoid interference causing problems in communication between an
access point and its authorized stations.
[0138] Some embodiments including dynamic channel change may
further use a honeypot trap that tricks the attacker into thinking
the original channel is still valid and provides the necessary
forensic information to identify the attacker. FIG. 5 depicts a
flow chart of a process starting at step 510 used in some such
embodiment incorporating the honeypot trap.
[0139] In step 520, configuration information is received. This
step is much the same as previously described steps 305 and 410 in
FIGS. 3 and 4 respectively. Step 530 represents a waiting loop that
waits until an attack has been detected. Typically, an intrusion
detection system generates a signal that triggers departure from
this loop; in some preferred embodiments, the intrusion detection
system contains the hardware and/or executes the process described
above. The signal from the intrusion detection system typically
includes an indicator of the access point believed to be under
attack.
[0140] In the case that an attack has been detected in 530,
processing is passed to step 540 to activate the honeypot trap. A
trap thread is started in step 580; the thread initializes itself
with the identity of the monitored access point believed to be
attacked. This identity typically includes the MAC address, Service
Set Identifier, encryption mode, network mode and transmission
modes. Once initialized, the thread moves to step 590, the Trap
Intruder process. This process is designed to logically fool the
identifier attacker into believing communication is still occurring
with the original access point. This is accomplished through
complete emulation of the original access point's identity and
behavior. By maintaining communication with the attacker, a trap is
created such that the attacker's physical proximity is assured as
long as communication continues. Optionally, a new identity may be
assumed such that a weaker or more vulnerable appearing access
point can be presented to the attacker. This is done by again
emulating access point functionality, but in this case with an
identity and set of characteristics that appear vulnerable. This
vulnerability appearance may be created through the use of no or
weak encryption modes or the appearance of default manufacturing
modes with known passwords and user IDs.
[0141] In step 550 a control packet is sent to the original access
point to change channels or suspend transmission while the trap is
engaged. This packet encapsulates a message indicating the above
request and may be sent in or out-of-band to the access point.
In-band refers to over-the-air transmission to the access point's
wireless network interface whereas out-of-band transmission refers
to transmission to the wired side interface of the access
point.
[0142] Processing in the main loop then returns to attack detection
in 530.
[0143] Triangulation determines the location of an attacker by
mapping her position within the deployed wireless access points.
The mapping and location detection process according to one or more
preferred embodiments of the present invention as depicted in FIGS.
6A-B are discussed in greater detail below.
[0144] The process of FIG. 6A is used to create an internal
database of IP addresses and/or names mapped to corresponding MAC
addresses. Every Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) transaction is
detected in step 605. In step 610, the information in the detected
transaction is used to update the internal database. Some
embodiments can perform the identification and location processing
such as depicted in FIG. 6B without reference to such an internal
database. This database is created and maintained in one preferred
embodiment to make the station identification and location process
easier and more efficient.
[0145] FIG. 6B depicts a process for identifying and locating a
station within the wireless network. In some embodiments, this
process can be used to pinpoint the location of a potential
attacker; in some such embodiments, activation of the process is
triggered by an intrusion detection system. In a preferred
embodiment, the process is triggered by one of the intrusion
detections systems and methods described in detail above.
[0146] In step 620, a lookup occurs in the internal database, such
as created via the process depicted in FIG. 6A, on the current MAC
address to determine if an IP or name mapping is already available.
If found, the internal database is updated in step 640 and
execution proceeds to step 645 to query the wireless sensor
array--to begin position or location resolution. As indicated
above, the internal database is one approach to acquiring the
desired information. Some embodiments may skip this step and use
either the wired network sensor or the reverse address resolution
protocol (RARP) approach discussed below.
[0147] Otherwise, an optional wired network sensor can be queried
for the name mapping in step 625. This sensor is preferably
deployed within the wired network at a location convenient to
sniffing DHCP, LDAP, DNS or other service/name mapping protocols.
If found, the internal database is updated in step 640 and
execution proceeds to step 645 to query the wireless sensor
array--to begin position or location resolution. Some embodiments
may not include such a wired network sensor; in which case this
step is skipped.
[0148] If name is still not found, execution proceeds to step 630
where a RARP request is issued. This request asks the receiver
population for the IP address of the MAC address in question. If
found, the internal database is updated in step 640 and execution
proceeds to step 645 to query the wireless sensor array--to begin
position or location resolution.
[0149] If not found, name/IP mapping is not available at current
time for this MAC address. In some embodiments, name/IP mapping may
not be desired but location or position information is in which
case the process can begin in such embodiments at step 645.
[0150] Step 645 begins the position or location resolution with a
query to the wireless sensor array. Each sensor is queried for
tracking information on the current MAC address in question. This
tracking information identifies whether the MAC is currently
observable by a given sensor, the sensor ID, and the signal
strength associated with the MAC in question. The sensor array may
include not only sensor devices (e.g., 230A, 230B) but also other
wireless nodes accessible from this process such as devices 210A-D
and/or host system 220.
[0151] From the data received via the query, the position relative
to grid of sensors is calculated in step 650 by computing the
"signal strength" distance to each sensor. This distance is
computed as the square root of the sum of squares of three sensor
signal strength values. The position is then estimated to be within
the proximity of the sensors determined to have the smallest signal
strength distance to the MAC address in question per the above
computation. Once the set of sensors is selected, the position is
further refined by selected the position as within the proximity of
the sensor within above set with the strongest signal strength. In
some embodiments, the process ends at this point with the position
information being returned.
[0152] In,embodiments maintaining a position database, this
database is updated in step 660 with the position of the MAC
address in question. The process then ends at step 670.
Encrypted Network Analysis and Management
[0153] The techniques utilized to monitor WLANs can apply in
general to monitoring and analyzing any network link using
encryption of the payload or at the IP layer and above rather than
just WLANs. In this case, Layer 1 and Layer 2 are observed and
decisions made at these layers in terms of signature, protocol,
policy and statistical anomaly analysis to assess network health
and security. This technique is thus applicable to any network
(wired or wireless) exhibiting the above encryption characteristics
of the network traffic. In other words, the multi-dimensional IDS
implemented per our framework is more broadly applicable to
managing and securing any encrypted network. In this case, a WLAN
running WEP is one particular instance of an encrypted network.
[0154] Throughout this application, various publications may have
been referenced. The disclosures of these publications in their
entireties are hereby incorporated by reference into this
application in order to more fully describe the state of the art to
which this invention pertains.
[0155] The embodiments described above are given as illustrative
examples only. It will be readily appreciated by those skilled in
the art that many deviations may be made from the specific
embodiments disclosed in this specification without departing from
the invention. Accordingly, the scope of the invention is to be
determined by the claims below rather than being limited to the
specifically described embodiments above.
* * * * *
References