U.S. patent application number 10/864353 was filed with the patent office on 2006-01-05 for tamper-free and forgery-proof passport and methods for providing same.
This patent application is currently assigned to SUPERCOM LTD.. Invention is credited to Eli Basson, Eli Hassan, Ilan Kander, Igor Merling, Boaz Shuman.
Application Number | 20060005050 10/864353 |
Document ID | / |
Family ID | 35459475 |
Filed Date | 2006-01-05 |
United States Patent
Application |
20060005050 |
Kind Code |
A1 |
Basson; Eli ; et
al. |
January 5, 2006 |
Tamper-free and forgery-proof passport and methods for providing
same
Abstract
A smart passport comprising a smart inlay that includes a core
substrate operative to store and exchange information contactlessly
with an external reader, at least one physical security component
coupled to the core substrate and operative to render the smart
inlay and thereby the passport tamper-proof, and a logical security
component incorporated in the core substrate and operative to
render the smart inlay and thereby the passport forgery-proof. The
physical security component is preferably selected from the group
at least one tear line and at least one patterned adhesive, both
operative to cause irreversible damage to the information storage
and communication capabilities of the passport in case of
tampering.
Inventors: |
Basson; Eli; (Kfar Sab,
IL) ; Shuman; Boaz; (Yahud, IL) ; Merling;
Igor; (Kfar Saba, IL) ; Hassan; Eli; (Hod
Hasharon, IL) ; Kander; Ilan; (Raanana, IL) |
Correspondence
Address: |
DR. MARK FRIEDMAN LTD.;C/o Bill Polkinghorn
Discovery Dispatch
9003 Florin Way
Upper Marlboro
MD
20772
US
|
Assignee: |
SUPERCOM LTD.
|
Family ID: |
35459475 |
Appl. No.: |
10/864353 |
Filed: |
June 10, 2004 |
Current U.S.
Class: |
713/194 |
Current CPC
Class: |
G06K 19/073 20130101;
G06K 19/07749 20130101; G06K 19/025 20130101 |
Class at
Publication: |
713/194 |
International
Class: |
G06F 11/30 20060101
G06F011/30 |
Claims
1. A smart inlay comprising: a. a core substrate operative to store
and exchange information contactlessly with an external reader,
said core substrate further conditioned to bind to a passport
surface; b. at least one physical security component coupled to
said core substrate and operative to render the smart inlay
tamper-proof; and c. a logical security component incorporated in
said core substrate and operative to render the smart inlay
forgery-proof.
2. The smart inlay of claim 1, wherein said core substrate includes
a contactless chip module for providing said information exchange
operativeness and an antenna connected to said chip module for
providing said information exchange operability.
3. The smart inlay of claim 1, wherein said at least one physical
security component is selected from the group consisting of at
least one tear line and at least one patterned adhesive.
4. The smart inlay of claim 3, wherein said at least one patterned
adhesive is a thermo-set adhesive.
5. The smart inlay of claim 3, wherein said at least one patterned
adhesive includes two patterned adhesives forming a composite
adhesive structure.
6. The smart inlay of claim 3, wherein said at least one tear line
is selected from the group of a local core substrate thinning and a
core substrate perforation.
7. The smart inlay of claim 1, wherein said logical security
feature includes a unique key obtained from a combination of a
first logical link, a second logical link and personal
information.
8. The smart inlay of claim 1, wherein said core substrate is made
of a material selected from the group consisting of Teslin and
Artisyn.
9. A smart passport comprising: a. a passport booklet; and b. a
smart inlay incorporated in said passport booklet, said smart inlay
further including: i. a core substrate operative to store and
exchange information contactlessly with an external reader, said
core substrate further conditioned to bind to a passport surface,
ii. at least one physical security component coupled to said core
substrate and operative to render the smart inlay tamper-proof, and
iii. a logical security component incorporated in said core
substrate and operative to render the smart inlay forgery-proof,
whereby said smart inlay provides tamper-proof and forgery-proof
properties to the passport;
10. The smart passport of claim 9, wherein said smart inlay is
attached to a passport cover.
11. The smart passport of claim 9, wherein said smart inlay is
attached to an internal page of the passport.
12. The smart passport of claim 9, wherein said at least one
physical security component is selected from the group consisting
of at least one tear line and at least one patterned adhesive.
13. The smart passport of claim 12, wherein said at least one
patterned adhesive is a thermo-set adhesive.
14. The smart passport of claim 12, wherein said at least one
patterned adhesive includes two patterned adhesives forming a
composite adhesive structure.
15. The smart passport of claim 12, wherein said at least one tear
line is selected from the group of a local core substrate thinning
and a core substrate perforation.
16. The smart passport of claim 9, wherein said logical security
feature includes a unique key obtained from a combination of a
first logical link, a second logical link and personal
information.
17. The smart passport of claim 9, wherein said core substrate is
made of a material selected from the group consisting of Teslin and
Artisyn.
18. A method for tamper-proofing and forgery-proofing a passport
comprising the steps of: a. providing a smart inlay operative to
uniquely identify an authorized bearer of the passport, said smart
inlay adaptively fitting into the passport; and b. attaching said
smart inlay to said passport.
19. The method of claim 18, wherein said step of providing a smart
inlay further includes providing an inlay that includes: i. a core
substrate operative to store and exchange information contactlessly
with an external reader, said core substrate further conditioned to
bind to a passport surface, ii. at least one physical security
component coupled to said core substrate and operative to render
said smart inlay tamper-proof, and iii. a logical security
component incorporated in said core substrate and operative to
render said smart inlay forgery-proof.
20. The method of claim 19, wherein said step of attaching said
smart inlay to said passport includes attaching said inlay to a
cover of said passport.
21. The method of claim 19, wherein said providing of an inlay that
includes at least one physical security component includes
providing at least one physical security component selected from
the group consisting of at least one tear line and at least one
patterned adhesive.
22. A method for preventing tampering in a smart passport that
includes a contactless chip physically connected to an antenna,
comprising the steps of: a. providing at least one physical
security component operative to disconnect the chip from the
antenna; and b. using said at least one physical component to
protect the smart passport form tamper attempts.
23. The method of claim 22, wherein said step of providing at least
one physical security component includes providing a smart inlay
having a core substrate holding both the chip and the antenna, said
core substrate further including at least one component selected
from the group consisting of at least one tear line positioned in
proximity to both the chip and the antenna and at least one
patterned adhesive that glues the contactless chip to the
antenna.
24. The method of claim 22, wherein said providing of a smart inlay
with at least one patterned adhesive includes providing at least
one thermo-set adhesive positioned to hold both the chip and the
antenna.
25. The method of claim 22, wherein said providing of a smart inlay
with at least one patterned adhesive includes providing two
patterned adhesives forming a composite adhesive structure
positioned to hold both the chip and the antenna.
26. The method of claim 22, wherein said providing of a smart inlay
with at least one tear line includes providing a tear line selected
from the group consisting of a local smart inlay core substrate
thinning and a smart inlay core substrate perforation.
Description
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
[0001] The present invention relates to tamper-free and
forgery-proof identification documents, and in particular to smart
passports.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
[0002] Security, particularly at major airports has become a
significant concern. No printable identification is currently
available to positively identify a passenger with high reliability.
No means is currently available to transmit such information
securely and to associate that information with user specific
permissions
[0003] All passengers entering the USA have been required to bring
a Machine Readable Travel Document (MTRD), i.e. a machine-readable
passport since October 2003. Starting October 2004, the passport is
required to contain biometric data that uniquely identifies its
bearer. This turns the passport into a "smart" passport, which
comprises a contactless chip that stores the personal biometric
information as digital information. The chip is accessed
contactlessly by a reader that retrieves the biometric information
and compares it with information stored in a database, to verify
the identity of the passport bearer. The International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) is setting the standard to be followed
by all such smart passport issuers.
[0004] Smart documents are known in the art. Smart cards have been
used to store personal information and even biometric information
about their owners to facilitate electronic transactions. The
information is stored on embedded chips, see for example U.S. Pat.
No. 6,219,439, the content of which is incorporated herein by
reference, U.S. Pat. No. 6,219,439 further describes a identifying
characteristic authentication system using a smart card having
stored physiological data of a user on a chip disposed therein, and
a fingerprint scan (or retina scan, voice identification, saliva or
other identifying characteristic data) for comparison against the
stored data. The system is self-contained so that the comparison of
the identifying characteristic data with the data stored on the
chip is done immediately on board the reader without relying upon
communications to or from an external source in order to
authenticate the user. This arrangement also prevents communication
with external sources prior to user authentication being confirmed,
so as to prevent user data from being stolen or corrupted.
[0005] U.S. Pat. No. 6,101,477 describes a smart card for
travel-related use, such as for airline, hotel, rental car, and
payment-related applications. Memory space and security features
within specific applications provide partnering organizations
(e.g., airlines, hotel chains, and rental car agencies) the ability
to construct custom and secure file structures. U.S. Pat. No.
5,291,560 describes a personal identification system based on iris
analysis. U.S. Pat. No. 5,363,453 describes a personal
identification system based on biometric fingerprint data. However,
there is no encryption of the biometric information involved.
[0006] EP 0019191B1 discloses a paper of value (e.g. an ID) with an
integrated circuit in which a checkable coding is written, the
communication with the integrated circuit preferably being effected
contactlessly via antennas. The integrated circuit is set in the
gap of an at least partly metalized carrier foil. This foil is then
laminated between two paper webs. Since the carrier foil is only
laminated in between the two paper webs, however, there is the
danger that the layers can be separated from each other relatively
easily so that the plastic inlay provided with the chip can be used
for possible forgeries. Further, this security element is a
strictly machine-checkable security element that can only be
checked by means of special detectors.
[0007] U.S. patent application 20030164611 by Schneider discloses a
security paper for producing documents of value, such as bank
notes, certificates, etc., with at least one multilayer security
element. The security element is disposed at least partly on the
surface of the security paper and has at least one visually
checkable optical effect and at least one integrated circuit. Other
recent U.S. patent applications relevant to the subject of the
present invention include applications Nos. 20040081332,
20030117262, 20030116630, 20030099379, 20030093187 and
20020143588.
[0008] All prior art solutions deal with only partial aspects of
the problem. All known solutions require basically a new product,
fabricated with processes and steps materially different from
existing processes and steps used in present day regular
(non-smart) passports. Since these processes and steps differ from
each other, there is no "standardized" manufacturing of a smart
passport. No prior art solution is known to be a full solution that
allows a regular passport to be transformed into a smart passport
without requiring major production system changes and/or major
fabrication step changes. Therefore, it would be advantageous to
provide a smart passport that will not require major overhaul of
existing methods and systems, yet fulfill its total security and
forgery/tamper-proof functions. It would be further advantageous to
find a "generic" solution that can incorporate various chips and
operating systems (OSs) into the smart passport, which can then be
issued by all authorized issuers that use such different chips and
OSs.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0009] The present invention discloses a method and system for
providing secure, tamper-free and forgery-proof smart documents, in
particular smart passports. The present invention further discloses
a smart inlay that has inventive physical security components or
"features", and which can be inserted into any standard passport,
thereby turning it into a smart passport. The smart inlay of the
present invention is functionally flexible in that provides full
accommodation of existing and emerging standards in the filed of
smart documents, in particular of smart passports. These standards
will include requirements for global interoperability, technical
reliability, practicality and durability. The emerging standards
will most likely require a digital representation of personal
biometric information on a contactless chip in the passport booklet
or in a visa The digital representation will include data. The
biometric representation may be that of a face and fingerprint or
iris. The contactless chip may be made by a variety of
manufacturers, according to the ISO 14443A/B or ISO 15693
standards. The booklet may include the smart inlay in its cover
(using a cover substantially identical with that of existing,
non-smart passports) or in a data page. In a visa, the visa sticker
will contain the chip and its antenna.
[0010] The biometric information is expected to provide a singular
match (comparison) of a person to data stored in a database for
identity verification. All digital information on the chip will be
cryptographically signed to prevent forgery. The planned biometric
storage needs include ca. 12 KB (kilo-bytes) for a face, 10 KB for
a fingerprint, 30 KB for an iris and 5 KB for text+overhead. At the
least, a smart passport will require will need 32 or 64 KBs. The
required antenna size is the same as in ID-1 size documents similar
to a credit size card. The inlay has to be mechanically reinforced
to protect the inlaid chip and antenna. Finally, the smart passport
has to be readable by a contactless reader that supports both ISO
14443A and 14443B standards.
[0011] The present invention provides a smart inlay that can
accommodate a variety of chips, for example a Philips P5CT072 72K
E.sup.2PROM or a ST Micro Electronics ST19XR34 34K E.sup.2PROM. The
present invention further provides an upgrade path from a regular
(non-smart) paper passport to a smart passport.
[0012] According to the present invention, there is provided a
smart inlay comprising a core substrate operative to store and
exchange information contactlessly with an external reader, the
core substrate further conditioned to bind to a passport surface,
at least one physical security feature coupled to the core
substrate and operative to render the smart inlay tamper-proof, and
a logical security feature incorporated in the core substrate and
operative to render the smart inlay forgery-proof.
[0013] According to the present invention there is provided a smart
passport comprising a passport booklet and a smart inlay
incorporated in the passport booklet, whereby the smart inlay
imparts tamper-proof and forgery-proof properties to the
passport.
[0014] According to the present invention there is provided a
method for tamper-proofing and forgery-proofing a passport,
comprising the steps of providing a smart inlay operative to
uniquely identify an authorized bearer of the passport, the smart
inlay adaptively fitting into the passport, and attaching the smart
inlay to the passport.
[0015] According to one feature in the method for tamper-proofing
and forgery-proofing a passport of the present invention, the step
of providing a smart inlay further includes providing an inlay with
a core substrate operative to store and exchange information
contactlessly with an external reader, the core substrate further
conditioned to bind to a passport surface; at least one physical
security component coupled to the core substrate and operative to
render the inlay tamper-proof; and a logical security component
incorporated in the core substrate and operative to render the
smart inlay forgery-proof.
[0016] According to another feature in the method for
tamper-proofing and forgery-proofing a passport of the present
invention, the step of attaching the smart inlay to the passport
includes attaching the inlay to the inside of a cover of the
passport.
[0017] According to yet another feature in the method for
tamper-proofing and forgery-proofing a passport of the present
invention, the step of attaching the smart inlay to the passport
includes attaching the inlay to at least one inside page of the
passport.
[0018] According to the present invention there is provided a
method for preventing tampering in a smart passport that includes a
contactless chip physically connected to an antenna, comprising the
steps of providing at least one physical security component
operative to disconnect the chip from the antenna and using the at
least one physical component to protect the smart passport form
tamper attempts.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0019] The invention is herein described, by way of example only,
with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein:
[0020] FIG. 1 shows a preferred embodiment of a smart inlay
according to the present invention: a) cross-section; b) top view;
c) top view of three attached smart inlays; and d) view of a smart
inlay trimed from a strip.
[0021] FIG. 2 shows embodiments of a smart passport incorporating
the smart inlay according to the present invention: a) attached to
a smart passport cover, b) inserted into the inside of a smart
passport booklet.
[0022] FIG. 3 shows schematically steps in the manufacturing of the
smart inlay: a) main process steps; b) detail of a patterned first
adhesive with "voids"; c) various adhesive patterns overlaid with
an antenna.
[0023] FIG. 4 shows schematically a summary of a set of logical
operations involved in functionalizing the smart passport and
rendering it logically forgery-proof;
[0024] FIG. 5 shows a detailed flow-chart of the operations
involved in the fabrication and functionalization of both a smart
inlet and a smart passport.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0025] The present invention discloses devices and methods for
providing secure, tamper-free and forgery-proof smart documents, in
particular smart passports. The present invention discloses in
particular a smart inlay to be used in a smart passport, and
security features that make such a smart passport tamper-proof and
forgery-proof. The present invention further provides an upgrade
path from a regular (non-smart) paper passport to a smart
passport.
[0026] FIG. 1a shows in cross section a preferred embodiment of a
smart inlay 100 according to the present invention. Smart inlay 100
comprises a core substrate (or "core layer") 102 made preferably of
synthetic sheets, e.g. from Teslin manufactured by PPG Industries
(www.ppg.com) or Artisyn manufactured by Darmic Inc.
(www.daramic.com). Each of these materials provides a number of
important advantages: each allows a judicious choice and
application of tamper-proof adhesives, for example
poly-vinyl-acetates (PVAs), thermoplastic adhesives such as
ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA) or polyethylene (PE), or the family of
thermo-set adhesives. Teslin and Artisyn are further advantageous
in that one can use most adhesives or glues that are water-based,
solvent-based or heat or pressure activated, single or dual
component. Alternatively, the core substrate material may include
Vinyl or Polyurethane based materials. Smart inlay 100 further
comprises an embedded contactless chip module 104 that includes an
encapsulated chip 106 and a lead frame 108, and tearing lines
("tear lines") 110 that provide a first main inventive security
component. Tear lines 110 are preferably positioned under the lead
frame electrodes. Alternatively, in some embodiments, the tear
lines may extend the whole width of the inlay, to provide added
bending flexibility (in addition to a weak spot) to the passport
into which the inlay is incorporated (see below). Smart inlay 100
further comprises an antenna 120 that allows two-way communication
between the chip and an outside contactless reader system (not
shown). The chip module is electrically connected to the antenna
through the lead frame. Optionally, smart inlay 100 further
comprises a cover material 112 attached to the core by a thin layer
of adhesive 114, preferably a highly solvent resistant adhesive,
and most preferably a thermo-set-type adhesive with a relatively
high bond breaking temperature, e.g. serial number 9534
manufactured by Apollo (www.apolloadhesives.com), 3M (www.3m.com)
adhesive sheet 9218, 9200 or 9328,
[0027] or Scapa Tape G175 (www.scapatapesnacom). The core substrate
has a typical thickness of 220-240 micron, while the smart inlay
has a typical size that fits in a page of a smart passport, see for
example FIG. 1b. Other dimensions in FIG. 1a are marked H1,
typically 380 microns, H2, typically 30 microns, H3, typically 350
microns and H4, typically 20-50 microns. Advantageously, the chip
may be any standard chip such as a Philips P5CT072 72K E.sup.2PROM
or a Thompson ST19XR34 34K E.sup.2PROM.
[0028] FIG. 1b shows in a top view a smart passport inlay ("smart
cover") with vinyl cover 120 (normally inserted in the "back cover"
of a passport, see below) complemented by a "dumb" section 122
(normally inserted in a "front cover" of a passport, see below),
both with typical dimensions indicated on the figure. As shown in
FIG. 1c, for efficient production purposes (described in more
detail in FIG. 3a), the smart inlay may be included in a set of
attached smart inlays on a continuous reel, in this case three
inlays 130, 132 and 134. FIG. 1d shows a single smart inlay 150,
cut away from the continuous reel. The dimensions shown in both
FIGS. 1b and 1c are exemplary only, and in no way limiting.
[0029] FIG. 2a shows a smart passport booklet 200' that includes a
smart inlay 202 incorporated into a cover 204 (usually a back,
fiber-reinforced vinyl cover, for example one manufactured by ICG
Holliston (www.icgholliston.com)). The figure further shows an
external booklet page 206 and the rest of the booklet contents 208.
FIG. 2b shows a smart passport booklet 200'' in which a smart inlay
210 is incorporated between two internal pages 212 and 214. In this
case, the inlay may be either glued to one or both of the internal
pages, attached directly to the passport backbone, or both. The
attachment to the passport backbone can be done either by sowing
part of the inlay into the backbone, by lamination to a cover or to
a page, by gluing, or by other known means.
[0030] FIG. 3a shows schematically steps in a preferred
manufacturing process of the smart inlay of the present invention.
The manufacturing is performed in a system in which a continuous
material strip 300, preferably made of Teslin or Artisyn is fed by
a reel. Smart inlay cores with a top surface 301a and a bottom
surface 301b are part of strip 300. First, a chip hole 302 and
local weakening patterns in the core layer, referred to hereinafter
generically as "tear lines" 304 are fabricated (e.g. punched) in
the feed strip in a step 350. The tear lines are designed to
provide a local weak link in the smart inlay, so that any attempt
to separate the core layer from the cover will lead to irreversible
core substrate deformation and mechanical destruction of the
antenna/chip assembly. That is, such an attempt will cause the
separation of the antenna from the chip, or the breakup of the chip
electrode/lead frame. This is one main inventive physical security
feature of the smart inlay of the present invention. The tear lines
may be in the form of perforations, preferably positioned under the
electrode area as shown in FIG. 1a or as thinned areas in the core
layer in the same places. Any attempt to tamper with the finished
inlay, e.g. trying to separate the core layer from the vinyl cover
(or from an internal cover or page if the inlay is inserted between
two booklet pages) will result in the failure described above. A
first adhesive pattern 306 designed for antenna positioning and
securing to the core (also referred to herein as "antenna base
adhesive") is deposited on top surface 301a in step 352. The
antenna base adhesive pattern may be variable in size and shape,
and may cover either partially or substantially totally the area of
the top surface. In case it covers substantially the entire inlay
surface, this may be the only adhesive layer applied in the
manufacturing process. The adhesive may be any type of adhesive,
for example PE or EVA, an adhesive such as 3M adhesive sheet 9218,
9200 or 9328, Scapa Tape G175, or a pressure sensitive adhesive
such as D74 manufactured by Colquimica (www.colquimica.pt).
[0031] In the case of the first adhesive layer being the only layer
in the process, the preferred adhesive is a thermo-set adhesive
such as serial number 9534 manufactured by Apollo
(www.apolloadhesives.com). Thermo-set adhesives behave irreversibly
and have a wide range of bond-breaking temperatures that reaches
over 200 degrees C. This makes the adhesive itself the "strong"
link in the composite layer structure, and ensures failure in
places other that the adhesive, providing yet another inventive
physical security feature. Furthermore, if the first adhesive is
the only adhesive used, it is further preferably patterned, as
explained with reference to FIG. 3c below. As used herein, a
"patterned" adhesive means any non-smooth, irregular adhesive
surface, layer thickness, or general appearance. Preferably, the
pattern follows some regular periodic form or topology such as
regular corrugations, mesh, waves, zigzag, spring-like, or other
geometric shapes. Inventively and advantageously, the first
adhesive pattern may be segmented or placed in a patterned
structure 306' that has gaps or "voids", as shown in FIG. 3b. This
allows a second adhesive (glue) layer 114' (see below) to fill the
gaps, creating a composite structure of the two glues and further
strengthening the product. In other words, the non-smooth and
non-uniform application of the first glue layer that leads to the
formation of a composite, interlaced, or intermingled structure
with the second adhesive, results in even greater resistance to
tampering and forgery. If any attempt is made to separate the smart
inlay layers, or to separate the inlay from the cover or page it is
attached to, the strong adhesive composite will cause failure in a
non-adhesive "weak spot" and result for example in the tearing of
the antenna or of the smart inlay layer materials, or in the
destruction of the chip. The glue may be also layered on the chip
area, leading to additional weak spots (added to those provided by
the tear lines) which may cause potential breakage of the chip if
an attempt is made to separate the layers.
[0032] In step 354, a chip module 308 (shown in more detail in FIG.
1a) is pressed in from the top surface into chip hole 302. In step
356, an antenna 310 is wound on top of the patterned adhesive layer
and attached (e.g. welded or soldered) to respective chip
connections on the chip lead frame. This is followed by pressing
the antenna, typically under additional heating into adhesive
pattern 306 to form a flat surface.
[0033] As mentioned, when the smart inlay (and its "dumb" section
in case of a smart cover) produced in steps 350-356 is about to be
attached to a cover, a second adhesive layer 114' (used if the
first adhesive layer does not fulfill that function) is introduced
between the inlay and the cover and used to fill any voids in glue
layer 306'. The introduction of this layer is shown in an
additional step 358. It has been determined experimentally that
attempts to peel off the inlay from the cover show distinct
tampering effects when second adhesive layer 114' is also applied
in a patterned form (independently of the form, patterning or even
presence of a first adhesive layer), as shown in both step 358 and
in a cross section in FIG. 3b, which shows a tooth-like adhesive
layer 306' or 114' formed on the core substrate. To emphasize,
patterning either or both adhesive layers advantageously improves
the security aspects of the smart inlay and passport of the present
invention. This constitutes yet another inventive physical security
feature of the present invention
[0034] FIG. 3c shows several exemplary embodiments of geometries of
patterned adhesives according to the present invention. Embodiments
A-E show a first adhesive overlaid with the antenna, and embodiment
H shows a cross section of a composite, two-adhesive structure with
the antenna in the middle. In more detail, embodiment A shows a
zigzag first adhesive pattern 360, overlaid by an antenna 362.
Embodiment B shows a series of glue segments 364 overlaid by an
antenna 366. Embodiment C shows a "stretched spring" adhesive
pattern 368 overlaid by an antenna 370. Embodiment D shows a full
adhesive strip 372 overlaid by an antenna 374. Embodiment E shows a
dot adhesive pattern 376 overlaid by an antenna 378. In all cases,
"overlaid" preferably also means that the antenna is actually sunk
into the adhesive, so that is in the same plane as the adhesive.
Methods for deposition of patterned adhesives are well known in the
art.
[0035] Embodiment H shows in cross section a composite adhesive
structure in which a first adhesive 380 and a second adhesive 382
(both having a tooth-like appearance as in FIG. 3b) are interlocked
or interlaced, locking in an antenna 384. The first adhesive is
deposited such that it has a plurality of holes, "dips" or
"valleys" in the vertical direction perpendicular to the core
substrate top surface. The antenna is wound and pressed in,
preferably under heat, as described in step 356. The second
adhesive layer is then applied, filling in the holes, dips or
valleys of the first adhesive, and locking the antenna in place in
the composite two-adhesive layer. The cross section in H is in
essence an enlargement of line 114 with thickness H4 in FIG. 1a for
a specific embodiment. Thus, the two adhesives and the antenna are
locked between a core substrate 386 and a cover 388.
[0036] The invention thus advantageously provides a number of
physical security features, some of which have been mentioned above
and some of which will be discussed in more detail now. All
physical security features are geared toward providing a
tamper-proof product. First, the tear lines mentioned and shown
with regard to FIG. 1a provide security by causing destruction of
the functional integrity of the smart inlay (e.g. separation of the
antenna from the chip or breakage of either the antenna or the
chip) in the case of any tampering attempt. Second, the use of
preferably thermo-set adhesives implies irreversibility and allows
a choice of high enough bond-breaking temperatures. This ensures
that any attempt to separate the different layers results in layers
deformation or destruction before adhesive bond breaking. Third,
the patterning of either the first or of the second adhesive (or
both coexisting together) provides additional tamper-proof security
because the adhesive competes locally in strength with the core
material.
[0037] FIG. 4 shows schematically a summary of a set of logical
operations involved in functionalizing the smart passport and
making it logically forgery-proof. The set of operations includes 5
phases, each phase including a physical operation performed on a
device, and an attendant logical operation occurring in a computer
database. In phase 400, the chip functionality is tested, resulting
in the storage (registration) of a chip serial number (CSN) and a
chip operating system serial number (OSSN) in the computer
database. The database allows to establish a unique logical link
between the CSN and the OSSN, referred to herein as "logical link
1". In phase 402, the complete circuit of the smart inlay including
the antenna are functionally tested and the results registered in
the database. In phase 404 the smart passport is functionally
tested, and a passport serial number (PSN) identifying the passport
booklet is retrieved from the booklet and registered in the
database. This establishes a second logical link between the CSN,
OSSN and PSN, referred to herein as "logical link 2". In phase 406,
the passport is issued to a particular person, and personal
information, preferably biometric (e.g. photo, iris, fingerprint,
etc.) is inserted into both the passport and the database. At this
stage, a unique link (also referred to as "logical link 3") is
created between the passport and the person to which it is issued
using a combination of some or all of logical links 1 and 2 and the
personal information. This may be done for example by creating a
unique "key" or "secret" using encription or encoding well known in
the art. The "key" or the "secret" is stored in the database and
optionally in the passport (chip) and may be retrived after
accessing its location in the chip memory using an access key. In
phase 408, the smart passport is presented at a border control
station to identify its carrier. A check is made to restore the
unique "key" or "secret" formed by the combination of logical links
1 and 2 and the personal information of the carrier. The result of
this check is matched against the stored "key" or "secret" stored
in the database and optionally in the passport. If there is no fit,
the implication is that the carrier and the passport do not match,
and/or that the passport is forged.
[0038] FIG. 5 shows a detailed flow-chart of the operations
involved in the fabrication and functionalization of both a smart
inlet and a smart passport. The process starts with the fabrication
of the smart inlay substrate, in a system that may be substantially
similar to that described for smart cards in U.S. Pat. Nos.
6,108,022 and/or 5,973,710 to Landsman. Following essentially the
steps in FIG. 3a, chip holes and weakened substrate areas (tear
lines) are made in a core substrate in step 502, followed by
spreading of the antenna glue base (first adhesive layer) in step
504, and insertion of the encapsulated chip into the hole in step
506. At this point, a chip functionality test (process 400 in FIG.
4) is run in step 536 to test Go/NoGo chip functionality and to
essentially form logical link 1 as described above. If the test
fails, the chip is rejected in step 538 and another chip is placed
in the hole. If the test is successful, the antenna is wound on the
adhesive layer in step 508, its wires are trimmed (cut) in step 510
and the antenna is welded to the chip electrodes in step 512. The
chip and antenna are then levelled flush with the top surface of
the core substrate in step 514. A second test (process 402 in FIG.
4) is run to test circuit functionality, i.e. to confirm that the
circuit is active. If the test fails, the smart inlay is marked and
trimmed into a strip in step 518 and placed in an exit tray in step
520 (resulting in the product seen in FIG. 1b). To produce a smart
cover, a blind inlay substrate material similar to the smart inlay
core is supplied in step 522, a preferrably vynil cover material is
supplied in parallel in step 524, and all three elements (smart
inlay substrate, blind inlay substrate and cover) are bound
together in step 526. The binding is preferably done by applying
the second adhesive layer to either the inlay, the cover or both.
The layers are bound under pressure and heat (depending on the type
of glue) in step 528, followed by a third test (process 404 in FIG.
4) in step 530, following which a defected smart cover is marked. A
"good" smart inlay is trimmed to strips in step 532 and placed in
an exit tray in step 534 (resulting in the product shown in FIG.
1c).
[0039] The smart passport is now prepared using the smart inlay
provided in step 534. If in the form of a smart cover, the smart
inlay is glued or attached otherwise to a passport booklet in step
550, the booklet is folded in step 552, and each individual
passport is cut in step 554. A fourth test (process 406 in FIG. 4)
is run in step 556. If the test fails (passport does not respond to
a reader), the smart passport is marked as rejected and placed in a
reject bin in step 560. If the test succeeds, the passport is ready
for issuing and placed in an exit tray in step 558.
[0040] All publications, patents and patent applications mentioned
in this specification are herein incorporated in their entirety by
reference into the specification, to the same extent as if each
individual publication, patent or patent application was
specifically and individually indicated to be incorporated herein
by reference. In addition, citation or identification of any
reference in this application shall not be construed as an
admission that such reference is available as prior art to the
present invention.
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