Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  February 23, 2022

 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

SECTION 2(D) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2869486 and 4798014.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark EXCEL (stylized with design) for use in connection with “Building construction services” in Class 37 and “Construction drafting” in Class 42.

 

Registration No. 2869486 is for the mark EXCEL HOMES (typed drawing form; HOMES disclaimed) for use in connection with “Custom manufacture and construction of modular homes” in Class 37 and “Design for others of modular homes” in Class 42.

 

Registration No. 4798014 is for the mark EXCEL (stylized with design) for use in connection with “Custom fabrication and installation of piping systems, vessels, equipment, tanks, buildings and vessels for industrial facilities, including refining, chemical, petrochemical, marine and power industries” in Class 37 and “Engineering services for industrial facilities, including refining, chemical, petrochemical, pipelines, marine and power industries” in Class 42.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin's Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b). Moreover, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Here, applicant’s mark, EXCEL, is confusingly similar to the registered marks, EXCEL and EXCEL HOMES.

 

As an initial matter, the dominant terms EXCEL are identical in each mark. These terms are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these terms are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective services.  Id. Therefore, because the dominant terms of the marks are identical, the marks terms are confusingly similar. 

 

While U.S. Registration No. 2869486 includes the additional term HOMES, the addition of this wording does not obviate the likelihood of confusion. First, HOMES is placed in a non-dominant location after EXCEL. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Second, registrant disclaimed HOMES as being merely descriptive (if not generic) for its services. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Thus, consumers encountering EXCEL HOMES would focus on EXCEL, not HOMES, when calling for or recalling the mark. The addition of HOMES thus fails to obviate the likelihood of confusion.

 

While applicant’s mark and U.S. Registration No. 4798014 are stylized with a design, this does not obviate the likelihood of confusion.

 

As an initial matter, applicant is reminded that when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, applicant’s mark and U.S. Registration No. 4798014 are stylized in simple serif and sans serif fonts. The stylization of the marks does not create any independent commercial impression apart from the word EXCEL, and no consumer would focus on the minor differences in font when calling for the services. As such, the minor differences in font do not obviate the likelihood of confusion.

 

Further, U.S. Registration No. 2869486 is in typed drawing form. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). As such, not only can the marks be stylized identically, but also registrant could stylized its mark in a manner that emphasized the similarities of the marks.

 

In this same vein, the design elements of applicant’s and registrant’s mark do not obviate the likelihood of confusion. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

This is particularly so in this case given the identity of the dominant terms EXCEL. Consumers calling for the marks orally by name would impart no information regarding their stylization or design, rendering these differences moot in these circumstances. It is for this reason, among others, that similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the compared marks are confusingly similar.  In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007) (citing Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (C.C.P.A. 1968)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Further, the designs do not appear to modify the commercial impressions of the mark. The design in U.S. Registration No. 4798014 is merely an underline – it only serves to emphasize the text of the mark. While applicant’s design is more complex, it nevertheless creates the impression of the crossed letters X and L, which merely appears to emphasize the meaning “excel” of the mark. Further, as noted above, this design would play no role in distinguishing the marks were they called for orally by name. As such, the addition of the design elements do not obviate the likelihood of confusion.

 

Finally, where the services of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). Put simply, consumers using EXCEL, EXCEL, and EXCEL HOMES to call for the parties’ services are more likely to associate those marks to the same source when they are used with virtually identical services.

 

Ultimately, when purchasers call for the services of applicant and registrants using EXCEL, EXCEL, and EXCEL HOMES, they are likely to be confused as to the sources of those services by the similarities between the marks. Thus, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Services

 

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, applicant’s “Building construction services” in Class 37 and “Construction drafting” in Class 42 are closely related to registrants’ “Construction and maintenance services for industrial facilities, including refining, chemical, petrochemical, marine and power industries” and “Custom manufacture and construction of modular homes” in Class 37 and “Engineering services for industrial facilities, including refining, chemical, petrochemical, pipelines, marine and power industries” and “Design for others of modular homes” in Class 42.

 

As an initial matter, applicant’s broad “building construction services” could refer to the construction of any kind of building, be it a modular home, an industrial refinery, a power plant, etc. Similarly, applicant’s construction drafting services could encompass the design of homes. Moreover, the wording “Engineering services for industrial facilities, including refining, chemical, petrochemical, pipelines, marine and power industries” in U.S. Registration No. 4798014 could include “construction engineering,” a service that encompasses design of various infrastructure buildings. See the attached Wikipedia evidence (defining Construction Engineering). Put simply, applicant’s broad wording can encompass the wording of the other parties’ services, and registrant’s Engineering services” can encompass applicant’s construction drafting services. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). 

 

Where a party’s services encompasses the services of another party, such services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)). Thus, as applicant’s services encompass registrant’s services (and U.S. Registration No. 4798014 encompasses applicant’s drafting services), the parties’ services are legally identical.

 

Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ services are related.

 

Overall, when purchasers encounter the services of applicant and registrants, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the services by the relationship between them. Thus, the services are closely related.

 

            Conclusion

 

Therefore, because the marks are confusingly similar and the services are closely related, purchasers encountering these services are likely to believe, mistakenly, that they emanate from a common source. Accordingly, there is a likelihood of confusion and registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Response to Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address all refusals and/or requirements in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Hunter Bayliss/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 113

571-272-6526

Hunter.Bayliss@USPTO.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on February 23, 2022 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90759332

 

A USPTO examining attorney has reviewed your trademark application and issued an Office action.  You must respond to this Office action in order to avoid your application abandoning.  Follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the Office action HERE.  This email is NOT the Office action.

 

(2)  Respond to the Office action by the deadline using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  Your response must be received by the USPTO on or before 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  Otherwise, your application will be abandoned.  See the Office action itself regarding how to respond.

 

(3)  Direct general questions about using USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and whether there are outstanding deadlines to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

After reading the Office action, address any question(s) regarding the specific content to the USPTO examining attorney identified in the Office action.

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO may mail or email you trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  The USPTO will only email official USPTO correspondence from the domain “@uspto.gov.”

 

·         Hiring a U.S.-licensed attorney.  If you do not have an attorney and are not required to have one under the trademark rules, we encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney specializing in trademark law to help guide you through the registration process.  The USPTO examining attorney identified above is not your attorney and cannot give you legal advice, but rather works for and represents the USPTO in trademark matters.