Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  May 05, 2021

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES TO WHICH APPLICANT MUST RESPOND:

1.     Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Class 28 Goods Only

2. Requirement to Perfect Section 44(e) Basis

 

1. Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Class 28 Goods Only

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused with regard to the goods in class 28 because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2753321.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Applicant seeks registration of the mark MILLENNIUM (standard character mark) for, in relevant part, “Games, namely, chess sets and hand-held units for playing electronic games; chess games; chess pieces; chessboards; electronic chessboards; electronic board games; electronic chess games.” 

 

The already-registered mark is THE MILLENNIUM MOVIE (standard character mark, MOVIE disclaimed) for, in relevant part, “board games.”

 

COMPARISON OF MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant’s mark is confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression to registrant’s mark. 

 

That is, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751.  Moreover, because consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark, that portion of a mark is often considered the dominant element.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Integrated Embedded, 102 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).  Similarly, disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Thus, the term MILLENNIUM in registrant’s mark, is the dominant element in that mark; the term THE does not have any trademark significance (see In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009); In re Narwood Prods. Inc., 223 USPQ 1034, 1034 (TTAB 1984)) and MOVIE is last and disclaimed.  As such, these additional elements in registrant’s mark do not detract from the confusing similarity created by the common term in both applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

And, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Here, the overall commercial impression created by use of the identical term in both applicant’s and registrant’s marks is likely to lead to confusion as to the source of the goods; in other words, consumers encountering these marks are likely to mistakenly believe that the common wording identifies a common source for the goods.

 

Finally, the fact that both marks are in standard character format, means that both applicant and registrant may use their respective marks in any manner – including in a stylization identical to that of the other.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). 

 

Accordingly, applicant’s mark is confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression to the cited mark.

 

COMPARISON OF GOODS

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Moreover, the identification of goods in the cited registration is sufficiently broad so as to presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrowly-identified goods. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  That is, the wording “board games” easily encompasses the goods listed in the application.  Therefore, such goods are considered legal equivalents for purposes of likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, because neither applicant’s goods nor registrant’s goods have any restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers, they are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

 

Thus, the goods of applicant are sufficiently related to the goods listed in the cited registration so that confusion is likely.

 

Therefore, applicant’s mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Applicant’s options for responding to the refusal under Section 2(d).  Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the above-refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

2. Requirement to Perfect §44(e) Basis For Application Based on Section 1(a) With a Priority Claim Under Section 44(d)

 

The application specifies both a use in commerce basis under Trademark Act Section 1(a) and a claim of priority under Section 44(d) based on a foreign application.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a), 1126(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(1), (a)(4).  However, no copy of a foreign registration has been provided even though the application indicates applicant’s intent to rely on Section 44(e) as an additional basis for registration.  See 15 U.S.C. §1126(e).

 

An application with a Section 44(e) basis must include a true copy, photocopy, certification, or certified copy of a foreign registration from an applicant’s country of origin.  15 U.S.C. §1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §§1004, 1004.01, 1016.  In addition, an applicant’s country of origin must be a party to a convention or treaty relating to trademarks to which the United States is also a party, or must extend reciprocal registration rights to nationals of the United States by law.  15 U.S.C. §1126(b); TMEP §§1002.01, 1004.

 

Therefore, applicant must provide a copy of the foreign registration from applicant’s country of origin when it becomes available.  TMEP §1003.04(a).  A copy of a foreign registration must consist of a document issued to an applicant by, or certified by, the intellectual property office in applicant’s country of origin.  TMEP §1004.01.  If applicant’s country of origin does not issue registrations or Madrid Protocol certificates of extension of protection, applicant may submit a copy of the Madrid Protocol international registration that shows that protection of the international registration has been extended to applicant’s country of origin.  TMEP §1016.  In addition, applicant must also provide an English translation if the foreign registration is not written in English.  37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §1004.01(a)-(b).  The translation should be signed by the translator.  TMEP §1004.01(b).

 

If the foreign registration has not yet issued, or applicant requires additional time to procure a copy of the foreign registration (and English translation, as appropriate), applicant should so inform the trademark examining attorney and request that the U.S. application be suspended until a copy of the foreign registration is available.  TMEP §§716.02(b), 1003.04(b).

 

If applicant cannot satisfy the requirements of a Section 44(e) basis, applicant may request that the mark be approved for publication based solely on the Section 1(a) basis.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a), 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(1); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b), 1003.04(b).  Please note that, if the U.S. application satisfied the requirements of Section 44(d) as of the U.S. application filing date, applicant may retain the priority filing date under Section 44(d) without perfecting the Section 44(e) basis, provided there is a continuing valid basis for registration.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(3)-(4); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b).  

 

ADVISORY – RESPONSE INFORMATION

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  

 

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Susan K. Lawrence/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116, USPTO

(571) 272-9186

sue.lawrence@uspto.gov

(informal communication only)

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on May 05, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90334813

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Susan K. Lawrence/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116, USPTO

(571) 272-9186

sue.lawrence@uspto.gov

(informal communication only)

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from May 05, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”