To: | Millennium 2000 GmbH Hegener & Weiner (trademarkdocket@venable.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90334813 - MILLENNIUM - 42667-531478 |
Sent: | May 05, 2021 04:45:16 PM |
Sent As: | ecom116@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90334813
Mark: MILLENNIUM
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Millennium 2000 GmbH Hegener & Weiner
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Reference/Docket No. 42667-531478
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: May 05, 2021
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES TO WHICH APPLICANT MUST RESPOND:
1. Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Class 28 Goods Only
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant seeks registration of the mark MILLENNIUM (standard character mark) for, in relevant part, “Games, namely, chess sets and hand-held units for playing electronic games; chess games; chess pieces; chessboards; electronic chessboards; electronic board games; electronic chess games.”
The already-registered mark is THE MILLENNIUM MOVIE (standard character mark, MOVIE disclaimed) for, in relevant part, “board games.”
COMPARISON OF MARKS
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s mark is confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression to registrant’s mark.
That is, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751. Moreover, because consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark, that portion of a mark is often considered the dominant element. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Integrated Embedded, 102 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions). Similarly, disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Thus, the term MILLENNIUM in registrant’s mark, is the dominant element in that mark; the term THE does not have any trademark significance (see In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009); In re Narwood Prods. Inc., 223 USPQ 1034, 1034 (TTAB 1984)) and MOVIE is last and disclaimed. As such, these additional elements in registrant’s mark do not detract from the confusing similarity created by the common term in both applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
And, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b). Here, the overall commercial impression created by use of the identical term in both applicant’s and registrant’s marks is likely to lead to confusion as to the source of the goods; in other words, consumers encountering these marks are likely to mistakenly believe that the common wording identifies a common source for the goods.
Finally, the fact that both marks are in standard character format, means that both applicant and registrant may use their respective marks in any manner – including in a stylization identical to that of the other. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).
Accordingly, applicant’s mark is confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression to the cited mark.
COMPARISON OF GOODS
Moreover, the identification of goods in the cited registration is sufficiently broad so as to presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrowly-identified goods. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). That is, the wording “board games” easily encompasses the goods listed in the application. Therefore, such goods are considered legal equivalents for purposes of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, because neither applicant’s goods nor registrant’s goods have any restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers, they are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Thus, the goods of applicant are sufficiently related to the goods listed in the cited registration so that confusion is likely.
Therefore, applicant’s mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
An application with a Section 44(e) basis must include a true copy, photocopy, certification, or certified copy of a foreign registration from an applicant’s country of origin. 15 U.S.C. §1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §§1004, 1004.01, 1016. In addition, an applicant’s country of origin must be a party to a convention or treaty relating to trademarks to which the United States is also a party, or must extend reciprocal registration rights to nationals of the United States by law. 15 U.S.C. §1126(b); TMEP §§1002.01, 1004.
Therefore, applicant must provide a copy of the foreign registration from applicant’s country of origin when it becomes available. TMEP §1003.04(a). A copy of a foreign registration must consist of a document issued to an applicant by, or certified by, the intellectual property office in applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1004.01. If applicant’s country of origin does not issue registrations or Madrid Protocol certificates of extension of protection, applicant may submit a copy of the Madrid Protocol international registration that shows that protection of the international registration has been extended to applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1016. In addition, applicant must also provide an English translation if the foreign registration is not written in English. 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §1004.01(a)-(b). The translation should be signed by the translator. TMEP §1004.01(b).
If the foreign registration has not yet issued, or applicant requires additional time to procure a copy of the foreign registration (and English translation, as appropriate), applicant should so inform the trademark examining attorney and request that the U.S. application be suspended until a copy of the foreign registration is available. TMEP §§716.02(b), 1003.04(b).
If applicant cannot satisfy the requirements of a Section 44(e) basis, applicant may request that the mark be approved for publication based solely on the Section 1(a) basis. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a), 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(1); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b), 1003.04(b). Please note that, if the U.S. application satisfied the requirements of Section 44(d) as of the U.S. application filing date, applicant may retain the priority filing date under Section 44(d) without perfecting the Section 44(e) basis, provided there is a continuing valid basis for registration. See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(3)-(4); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b).
ADVISORY – RESPONSE INFORMATION
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Susan K. Lawrence/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 116, USPTO
(571) 272-9186
sue.lawrence@uspto.gov
(informal communication only)
RESPONSE GUIDANCE