To: | SHENZHEN RISHENGHUA TECHNOLOGYCO,.LTD (fkohmail@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90212846 - BRAVO - N/A |
Sent: | February 24, 2021 12:04:05 PM |
Sent As: | ecom121@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90212846
Mark: BRAVO
|
|
Correspondence Address: |
|
Applicant: SHENZHEN RISHENGHUA TECHNOLOGYCO,.LTD
|
|
Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: February 24, 2021
This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued this same day, February 24, 2021, in connection with this application. The assigned trademark examining attorney inadvertently omitted an attachment relevant to the mark in the subject application. See TMEP §§706, 711.02. Specifically, one of the registrations cited against the proposed mark was not attached.
The trademark examining attorney apologizes for any inconvenience caused by this issue.
Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
· LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(d)
· UNNECESSARY TRANSLATION CLAIM
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, the applicant’s mark BRAVO creates a similar commercial source impression to the cited registered mark BRAVO! because it incorporates the registered mark in its totality. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
The addition of the exclamation point to the registered mark does not detract from the overall similarities of the marks, because it only emphasizes the dominant wording BRAVO shared by both marks, which itself evokes applause and enthusiasm.
Although the registered mark also incorporates a design, this does not obviate the likelihood of confusion between the marks. A mark in typed or standard characters—such as the proposed mark—may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Moreover, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
For these reasons, the marks BRAVO and BRAVO! create a highly similar overall commercial impression and are confusingly similar.
The proposed mark also creates a highly similar overall commercial impression to the mark BRAVO BAMBINO, where BAMBINO identifies the intended user of the registrant’s apparel, and is disclaimed accordingly.
The remaining wording in the registered mark is descriptive when used in connection with the goods covered by the mark. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Thus, the wording BAMBINO is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording BRAVO the more dominant element of the mark.
For these reasons, the parties’ marks create a highly similar overall commercial impression, evoking approval or applause for something or someone, and are confusingly similar.
In a likelihood of confusion analysis, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
In this case, the registration for the mark BRAVO! in U.S. Registration Nos. 3798304 covers “shoes.” Shoes are encompassed in the entry “footwear” covered by the application, because shoes are footwear. Conversely, “shoes” encompass “golf shoes” and “running shoes” covered by the application, as well as “golf cleats,” which are “athletic shoes with a cleated sole, typically used when playing football.” See attached evidence from http://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cleat.
Further, the registration for the mark BRAVO BAMBINO in U.S. Registration No. 2591960 covers “children's clothing, namely pants, tops, shirts, dresses, jumpsuits, overalls, sweaters, jackets, coats, shorts, swim wear.”
In addition to various footwear, the application covers “Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, … hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Baseball caps and hats; Bathing suits; Bathing trunks; Gloves as clothing; Golf caps; … Golf shirts; … Golf pants, shirts and skirts; Hosiery; … Swim caps; Yoga pants; Yoga shirts.”
Unrestricted and broad identifications, such as the registrant’s in this case, are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described. See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000). Therefore, the broad wording used in the registration to describe the goods is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification. For example, the athletic shirts, pants, and jackets covered by the application encompass athletic shirts, pants, and jackets for children. The bathing suits and trunks covered by the application encompass bathing suits and trunks in the nature of swimwear for children.
The identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers. Therefore, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
To the extent the goods are not overlapping and thus legally identical, they are highly related because the same parties commonly provide these types of apparel goods under the same marks. See attached evidence from Puma®, Madewell® and Reebok® all of which provide athletic apparel, including shirts, pants, jackets, hats and shoes, for kids and adults, under the same marks through the same channels of trade. Thus, the parties’ goods are considered related.
The attached evidence shows that consumers expect the parties’ goods to emanate from the same sources. Therefore, consumers encountering such similar marks for highly related goods are likely to confuse the marks and/or mistake the underlying sources of goods produced under the marks. Registration is refused to prevent such confusion.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Applicant must also note the following.
Applicant’s statement regarding the mark’s translation will not be printed on any registration that may issue form this application. The statement is unnecessary because the mark would not be perceived as foreign wording by an American consumer. Therefore, the statement will be deleted. See TMEP §809.03.
ASSISTANCE
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Valeriya Painter/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 121
(571) 270-7132
valeriya.painter@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE