To: | Steve Becker (vehiclemasterspc@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90079765 - VEHICLE MASTERS PERFORMANCE CENTER - N/A |
Sent: | October 14, 2020 02:19:32 PM |
Sent As: | ecom121@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 90079765
Mark: VEHICLE MASTERS PERFORMANCE CENTER
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Steve Becker
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 14, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark is the wording “VEHICLE MASTERS PERFORMANCE CENTER” appearing in standard characters. Registrant’s marks are the wording “BRAKE MASTERS” appearing in standard characters and the stylized wording “BRAKE MASTERS” with design elements. Applicant’s mark is highly similar to registrant’s marks in appearance, sound, and commercial impression.
Regarding Registration No. 76088974, mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Here, since the applied for mark could be shown in any manner, it could be shown in a way identical to the registered mark. Therefore that the applied for mark appears in standard characters will not obviate confusion.
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
In the present case, the registered marks disclaim the wording “BRAKE.” Further, the attached evidence shows that the wording “VEHICLE PERFORMANCE CENTER” in the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of or generic for applicant’s goods and/or services. Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording “MASTERS” in the applied for and registered marks the more dominant element of the mark.
Because the marks are highly similar, purchasers are likely to believe that the services emanate from the same source. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar, and the first prong of the likelihood of confusion test is met.
Comparison of the Services
The second prong of the likelihood of confusion test is a comparison of applicant’s and registrant’s services.
Applicant’s services are:
Automotive maintenance and repair; Motor vehicle maintenance and repair; Repair, maintenance and modification of suspensions, cars, trucks, all terrain vehicles, utility vehicles, dirt bikes, street bikes, motorcycles, snow mobiles, personal water crafts. small boats; Vehicle repair and maintenance
Registrant’s services are:
1487817: Automotive brake repair services
2614011: Automotive brake service repair services
In this case, applicant’s services are closely related to registrant’s services.
The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from http://tonysautorepairs.com/, http://www.lortonauto.com/, http://www.lortonauto.com/, http://otcpowersports.com/, http://www.wickedmotorsfl.com/, and http://www.autotechservicedc.com/, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
The evidence shows that purchasers are accustomed to encountering the services of the applicant and registrant offered under the same mark. Therefore, purchasers are likely to believe the services emanate from the same source. Accordingly, the services of applicant and the registrant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis, and the second prong of the test is met.
Conclusion
Because the marks are highly similar and the services are closely related, there is a likelihood of purchaser confusion as to the source of the services. Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
AMENDMENT OF IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES REQUIRED
Applicant must correct the punctuation in the identification to clarify the individual items in the list of goods and/or services. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01(a). Proper punctuation in identifications is necessary to delineate explicitly each product or service within a list and to avoid ambiguity. Commas, semicolons, and apostrophes are the only punctuation that should be used in an identification of goods and/or services. TMEP §1402.01(a). An applicant should not use colons, periods, exclamation points, and question marks in an identification. Id. In addition, applicants should not use symbols in the identification such as asterisks (*), at symbols (@), or carets. Id.
In general, commas should be used in an identification (1) to separate a series of related items identified within a particular category of goods or services, (2) before and after “namely,” and (3) between each item in a list of goods or services following “namely” (e.g., personal care products, namely, body lotion, bar soap, shampoo). Id. Semicolons generally should be used to separate a series of distinct categories of goods or services within an international class (e.g., personal care products, namely, body lotion; deodorizers for pets; glass cleaners). Id.
Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate:
Class 037: Automotive maintenance and repair; Motor vehicle maintenance and repair; Repair, maintenance and modification of suspensions, cars, trucks, all-terrain vehicles, utility vehicles, dirt bikes, street bikes, motorcycles, snow mobiles, personal water crafts, small boats; Vehicle repair and maintenance
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
The attached evidence from http://www.hendrickbmwcharlotte.com/ shows this wording means a center where maintenance is performed to insure performance of a vehicle. Thus, the wording merely describes applicant’s goods and/or services because it describes the purpose of Applicant’s services.
Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “PERFORMANCE CENTER” and “VEHICLE” apart from the mark as shown.
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to provide one using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
ENTITY UNCERTAIN
If applicant is an individual, applicant must request that the legal entity be amended to “individual” and must indicate his or her country of citizenship. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(3)(i); TMEP §803.03(a). Alternatively, if applicant is a corporation, applicant must provide the legal name of the corporation and U.S. state or foreign country of incorporation or organization. 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(3)(ii); see TMEP §803.03(c).
If, in response to the above request, applicant provides information indicating that it is not the owner of the mark, registration will be refused because the application was void as filed. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §§803.06, 1201.02(b). An application must be filed by the party who owns or is entitled to use the mark as of the application filing date. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §1201.02(b).
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Christopher Renneker/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 121
571-272-8045
christopher.renneker@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE