Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  August 09, 2021

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

STATUS OF THE APPLICATION

 

This Office Action responds to applicant’s Petition to Revive dated July 16, 2021, where applicant:

 

(1)   Provided arguments against the Section 2(d) Refusal;

(2)   Submitted a substitute specimen;

(3)   Amended the identification of goods; and

(4)   Stated a domicile address had been provided

 

The examining attorney has reviewed the applicant’s response and determined the following:

 

(1)   Applicant’s identification of goods is acceptable and made of record, therefore the Identification/Classification of Goods/Services Requirement and the Clarification of Number of Classes to be Registered Requirement are satisfied;

(2)   Applicant’s specimen is acceptable and made of record, therefore the Specimen Requirement is satisfied;

(3)   Examining attorney has withdrawn the Advisory: Prior-filed Pending Applications; and

(4)   Applicant’s arguments against the Section 2(d) Refusal are not persuasive, applicant’s did not address the Disclaimer Requirement, and applicant’s domicile remains unacceptable, therefore the Section 2(d) Refusal, Disclaimer Requirement, and Domicile Requirement are maintained and made FINAL. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Disclaimer Requirement
• Domicile Requirement

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4315791. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b). See the previously attached registrations.

 

Applicant’s mark is SPOTON VIRTUAL FENCE (in standard character form) for “wireless electronic animal confinement system; downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application for use in connection with an electronic animal confinement system for tracking animal location, management of confinement perimeter, and providing escape notifications” in International Class 009.

 

The mark in Registration No. 4315791 is SPOT ON DOG (with design) for, in relevant part, “leashes, collars and harnesses for pets” in International Class 018.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

In the present case, the following du Pont factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark, SPOTON, and the mark in Registration No. 4315791, SPOT ON DOG, are highly similar in appearance, sound, and commercial impression. Specifically, both marks contain the highly similar terms SPOT ON/SPOTON. These terms are identical in pronunciation and highly similar in appearance with the only difference being the term appearing as a compound term in the applied-for mark and as two separate words in the registered mark. The TTAB has commonly held that the same terms appearing as a compound term in one mark and as two separate terms in another as being confusingly similar. See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar.  The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”).

 

Moreover, the shared dominant terms, SPOTON/SPOT ON, are the entirety of the applied-for mark and the first terms in the registered mark and therefore are more likely to be impressed upon the minds of consumers. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Moreover, the additional terms VIRTUAL FENCE in the applied-for mark and DOG in the registered mark do not obviate confusion. These terms are descriptive for the provided goods and either have been or must be disclaimed and therefore is less significant in creating a commercial impression in the mark. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). In the present case, the dominant portion of the registered mark is SPOT ON which is highly similar to the applied-for mark SPOTON.

 

Furthermore, the design element in the registered mark does not obviate confusion. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

In response to this refusal, the applicant did not provide any arguments that the marks are not confusingly similar. In fact, the applicant admitted that the analysis of confusion “is not incorrect under normal circumstances.” However, the applicant did argue that the shared terms in the mark are weak and/or diluted in the relevant industry and therefore the registrant’s mark is entitled to limited protection.

 

Specifically, the applicant argues that the wording SPOT ON is diluted and entitled to limited protection in applicant’s and registrant’s industry. However, the applicant provides no evidence other than conclusory statements in connection with this argument.

 

First, the applicant incorrectly states that multiple overlapping registrations have been cited. Specifically, the applicant states: “Applicant asks for reconsideration on the very account of the characteristics specific to the words used and its industry, specific to the mark, and as evidenced by the existing cited marks that also overlap yet achieved registration.” This argument is incorrect and confusing as only a singular registration, Registration No. 4315791, SPOT ON DOG, was ever cited against the applied-for mark. There was originally an advisory regarding prior-filed pending applications, however, both of the pending applications were also owned by the registrant. A mark cannot become diluted merely because a single entity owns several renditions of the mark in connection with similar goods. Evidence that a mark is diluted requires proof of numerous third-party entities using the mark. The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods. See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field. Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

 

Second, the applicant states “a search of trademarks with the terms Spot and On reveals multiple filings of various dog products and an general internet search reveals even more.” This conclusory statement is insufficient to make such evidence of record. Neither the third-party registrations nor the internet webpages the applicant vaguely alludes to are included in the record. Applicant’s internet materials have not been properly made of record and are objected to. To properly introduce Internet evidence into the record, an applicant must provide (1) an image file or printout of the downloaded webpage, (2) the date the evidence was downloaded or accessed, and (3) the complete URL address of the webpage. See In re I-Coat Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b). To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal. In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03. Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are merely conclusory statements not supported by evidence properly made of record.

 

Therefore, the applicant’s arguments that the shared wording SPOTON/SPOT ON is diluted and entitled to limited protection are not persuasive.

 

For these reasons, applicant’s and registrant’s marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the present case, the applicant’s animal containment system and related software are related to the registrant’s leashes, collars, and harnesses for pets. Specifically, the goods are all for use in pet containment. Previously attached evidence, consisting of webpages from DogWatch, PetSafe, and PuppieMate, and newly attached evidence from SportDog, Dogtra, Educator, Extreme Dog Fence, Canine Company, and Dog Guard, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Additional evidence from PetCo, Chewy, and PetValu, establishes that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

In response to this refusal, the applicant did not provide any arguments that the goods are not related. In fact, the applicant admitted that the analysis of confusion “is not incorrect under normal circumstances.” Therefore, it is presumed that the applicant concedes that the goods are related.

 

In sum, the key elements of the parties’ marks are highly similar and the goods are related and likely to be encountered together in the marketplace. For these reasons, consumers are likely to mistakenly believe that applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods emanate from a common source or are connected in some way.

 

Accordingly, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is maintained and made FINAL. The requirements below are also maintained and made FINAL.

 

DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENT

 

Applicant must disclaim the wording “VIRTUAL FENCE” because it is merely descriptive of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of applicant’s goods. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

 

Previously attached evidence from American Heritage dictionary establishes that VIRTUAL means “existing or resulting in essence or effect though not in actual fact, form, or name,” and FENCE means “to surround or enclose with a fence or other barrier.” The wording VIRTUAL FENCE refers to a system that surrounds or encloses an area with a barrier existing or resulting in essence or effect.

 

Moreover, previously attached evidence from Tractive, On Pasture, and RSPCA, and newly attached evidence from NoFence, Western Farmer-Stockman, and AG Info, establishes that the term VIRTUAL FENCE is used descriptively to refer to confinement systems using GPS technology as opposed to physical barriers. This evidence establishes that consumers have seen this term used descriptively and would understand its meaning as such.

 

Furthermore, the applied-for goods are an animal containment system. Therefore, the wording VIRTUAL FENCE is merely descriptive of the applicant’s goods, namely, that the provided goods are an animal containment system that using GPS technology as opposed to physical barriers to surrounds or encloses an area.

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “VIRTUAL FENCE” apart from the mark as shown. 

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to provide one using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

DOMICILE REQUIREMENT

 

In response to the domicile requirement the applicant merely stated: “The applicant includes the domicile.” However, no amendment to the previously unacceptable domicile address was made. Therefore, it is unclear if the applicant is attempting to argue that the original domicile address is the applicant’s domicile or if the applicant merely forgot to update the domicile address while filing the petition to revive. If the applicant forgot to amend the domicile, they should do so in response to this action. If they intend to argue that the original address is acceptable, this argument is not persuasive based on the evidence that the address is a United States Postal Service center and because the applicant has failed to provide documentation proving that such address is their domicile as was required.

 

Applicant must clarify its domicile street address because the domicile address of record identifies the address of a United States Postal Service center and does not appear to be applicant’s permanent legal place of residence or principal place of business. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.11(b), 2.189; TMEP §601.01(b)(1). A domicile address must identify either (1) the permanent legal place of residence, which is the place an individual applicant resides and intends to be the applicant’s principal home; or (2) the principal place of business, which is the juristic applicant’s headquarters where its senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities. See37 C.F.R. §2.2(o)-(p); TMEP §803.05(a). All applications must include the applicant’s domicile address, which is required for a complete application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(a)(1), 2.32(a)(2), 2.189.  

 

In this case, the application record lists applicant as a juristic entity and specifies applicant’s domicile as 7 Perimeter Road, Manchester, New Hampshire 03101. Previously attached evidence and newly attached evidence, establishes that this is the address for a United States Postal Service center and therefore is not the applicant’s domicile. A valid domicile address must identify the location of applicant’s headquarters where the entity’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities. See37 C.F.R. §2.2(o)-(p); TMEP §601.01(b)(1). 

 

Response options. Applicant must provide its domicile street address. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(2), 2.189; TMEP §803.05. Alternatively, applicant may provide documentation showing that the listed address is, in fact, applicant’s domicile. See37 C.F.R. §2.11(b); TMEP §601.01(b)-(b)(1).

 

To provide applicant’s domicile street address. After opening the correct Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form and entering the serial number, (1) answer “yes” to wizard question #5 and click “Continue;” (2) on the “Owner Information” page, in the “Domicile Address” field, uncheck the box stating the domicile and mailing address are not the same; and (3) below the checkbox provide applicant’s domicile street address. Applicant’s domicile street address will be hidden from public view if it is entered into the “Domicile Address” field. However, any street address listed in the “Mailing Address” field will be publicly viewable.

 

To provide documentation to support applicant’s domicile address. Applicant should provide the most recent documentation showing that the address is the applicant’s business headquarters, for example one of the following: (1) the most recent final annual or quarterly report or other similar report; or (2) a current certificate of good standing for the corporation or other business entity issued by a federal or state government agency. TMEP §601.01(b)-(b)(1); see 37 C.F.R. §2.11(b). Submitted documentation must show the name, listed domicile address, and the date of the document but should redact other personal and financial information.

 

To provide this documentation, open the correct TEAS response form and enter the serial number, answer “yes” to wizard question #3, and on the “Additional Statement(s)” page, below the “Miscellaneous Statement” field, click the button below the text box to attach documentation to support the street address.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

/Fox, Lyal/

Lyal Fox

Examing Attorney

Law Office 113

571-270-7884

lyal.fox@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 09, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90079290

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Fox, Lyal/

Lyal Fox

Examing Attorney

Law Office 113

571-270-7884

lyal.fox@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 09, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”