Offc Action Outgoing

ARC

Axon Enterprise, Inc.

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90059343 - ARC - 38.0051.002

To: Axon Enterprise, Inc. (justin@jclarklawtm.com)
Subject: U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90059343 - ARC - 38.0051.002
Sent: May 22, 2021 09:42:51 AM
Sent As: ecom118@uspto.gov
Attachments:

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

U.S. Application Serial No. 90059343

 

Mark:  ARC

 

 

 

 

Correspondence Address: 

Justin Clark

J CLARK LAW FIRM PLLC

3100 WEST RAY ROAD, SUITE 201

CHANDLER, AZ,  85226

 

 

 

Applicant:  Axon Enterprise, Inc.

 

 

 

Reference/Docket No. 38.0051.002

 

Correspondence Email Address: 

 justin@jclarklawtm.com

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  May 22, 2021

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on April 30, 2021.

 

In a previous Office action dated November 4, 2020, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with three registered marks.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement:  amend the identification of services.

 

In applicant’s response, applicant amended their identification and provided arguments against the Section 2(d) Refusals.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: definite amended identification provided.  See TMEP §713.02. 

 

In addition, the following refusal has been withdrawn:  Section 2(d) refusal regarding the mark in Registration No. 4522443.  See TMEP §713.02. 

 

Lastly, after further consideration and review, and in light of applicant’s identification amendment, the Section 2(d) Refusals have changed in scope to include all of applicant’s services except for their streaming services. This is true regarding each of the cited registrations. This new scope is set forth and explained below. The Section 2(d) Refusal regarding Registration Nos. 4800027 and 4690350 is maintained and continued and all arguments and attachments provided in the previous Office action are incorporated by reference. Supplemental arguments are provided below. Further, the trademark examining attorney reserves the right to provide additional arguments and respond in greater depth to applicant’s arguments in a final Office action should one issue.

 

Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Summary of Issues:

  • Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion—Partial Refusal

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 4800027 and 4690350.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registrations.

 

Applicant’s Mark is:

·         ARC for, in pertinent part:

o   Class 38: Communication and telecommunication services, namely, electronic transmission of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication cellular and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; Communication and telecommunication services, namely, communication by electronic computer terminals and data communication by electronic mail, namely, receipt of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, the foregoing services provided over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication, cellular, and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; communication by computer terminals, namely, communication between computer terminals; delivery of data by telecommunications via wireless communication networks; electronic transmission of digital media content, namely, downloadable audio and video files, via computer and other communications networks, namely, by global and local computer networks; delivery of messages by electronic transmission; wireless electronic transmission of audio and video files via communication networks

Registrant’s Mark is:

·         ARC INFORMATION SYSTEMS for:

o   Class 38: electronic exchange of medical records across a nationwide health information network

o   Class 39: providing a website for the electronic storage of medical records

o   Class 42: compiling data for research purposes in the field of medical science and medical consultancy

o   NEW SCOPE: Cited for a likelihood of confusion with “Communication and telecommunication services, namely, electronic transmission of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication cellular and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; Communication and telecommunication services, namely, communication by electronic computer terminals and data communication by electronic mail, namely, receipt of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, the foregoing services provided over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication, cellular, and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; communication by computer terminals, namely, communication between computer terminals; delivery of data by telecommunications via wireless communication networks; electronic transmission of digital media content, namely, downloadable audio and video files, via computer and other communications networks, namely, by global and local computer networks; delivery of messages by electronic transmission; wireless electronic transmission of audio and video files via communication networks”

·         Q-ARC for:

o   Class 9: Software for quality control in industrial production; computer programs for quality assurance in industrial production; computer operating programs; computers; interfaces for computers; memories for data processing equipment; electronic image scanning apparatus; blank optical data carriers

o   Class 38: Computer aided transmission of messages and images; providing user access to computer programs in data networks; providing access to databases

o   Class 42: Computer programming; consultancy in the field of computers; preparation in the nature of development of data processing programs by order of third parties; installation and maintenance of software; updating of software; configuration in the nature of development of computer programs; recovery of computer data; leasing of computer software; technical advice relating to operation of computers, also in the field of quality assurance; quality control for others; quality management, namely, technical planning relating to quality assurance

o   NEW SCOPE: Cited for a likelihood of confusion with “Communication and telecommunication services, namely, electronic transmission of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication cellular and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; Communication and telecommunication services, namely, communication by electronic computer terminals and data communication by electronic mail, namely, receipt of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, the foregoing services provided over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication, cellular, and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; communication by computer terminals, namely, communication between computer terminals; delivery of data by telecommunications via wireless communication networks; electronic transmission of digital media content, namely, downloadable audio and video files, via computer and other communications networks, namely, by global and local computer networks; delivery of messages by electronic transmission; wireless electronic transmission of audio and video files via communication networks”

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In the present case, the marks at issue share the identical wording, “ARC.” This is the only word in applicant’s mark. Sharing this wording contributes to a strong likelihood of consumer confusion.

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Regarding Registration No. 4800027: Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Here, “ARC” is the first word in registrant’s mark and the only word in the registered mark. Thus, the marks share identical dominant elements. This contributes to the likelihood of consumer confusion.

 

Additionally, disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). “INFORMATION SYSTEMS” is disclaimed in Registration No. 4800027. This bolsters the strength of the shared wording, “ARC.”

 

In applicant’s response, applicant argues that no consideration was given to the wording “INFORMATION SYSTEMS.” This is not the case. Marks must be compared in their entireties and should not be dissected; however, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  In the instant case, the wording was considered as a part of the overall comparison of the marks. Due to the highly descriptive, if not generic nature of the wording, it was determined to carry less weight than the dominant feature of the mark, “ARC.”

 

Regarding Registration No. 4690350: The addition of “Q” to the beginning of the mark does not detract from the likelihood of consumer confusion. The marks at issue still look nearly identical and differ only by registrant’s addition of “Q-” to their mark. They also sound very similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the compared marks are confusingly similar.  In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007) (citing Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (C.C.P.A. 1968)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  While the marks differ slightly in sound, slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a likelihood of confusion.  In re Energy Telecomms. & Elec. Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

 

Applicant argues that the “Q” in “Q-ARC” stands for “QUALITY.” This is not something that can be presumed, and it is unclear what consumers would assume “Q” to stand for when interacting with this mark in the marketplace. Quality control is one of registrant’s services, however, registrant provides over 15 listed services which are not in the field of quality control. Consumers of these services may not know what the “Q” stands for. Applicant states that the “Q-ARC” registrant uses the word “quality” throughout their website. This argument is unpersuasive as it speaks to extrinsic evidence of actual use, which is not pertinent in a Section 2(d) analysis. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).

 

It should also be noted that incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, applicant’s mark is entirely incorporated within registrants’ marks. This does not detract from the likelihood of consumer confusion as there is no other wording in applicant’s mark to distinguish it from the registered marks. No other elements are present in applicant’s mark to accomplish this.

 

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the marks are similar in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial. Thus, the marks are likely to be confused.

 

Comparison of the Services

 

The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

Regarding Registration No. 4800027: In applicant’s response, applicant argues that no evidence has been provided regarding the relatedness of the services. This is because entries in applicant’s identification of services are so broad that they can be presumed to encompass registrant’s more narrowly identified services. Specifically, “communications by computer terminals” and “communication by computer terminals, namely communication between computer terminals” are broad entries that encompass any type of communications, including the exchange of medical records across an information network. As applicant has not specified that their services do not have anything to do with medical records and have not specified their own field of use, their services encompass registrant’s services. Additionally, “delivery of data by telecommunications via wireless communication networks; electronic transmission of digital media content, namely, downloadable audio and video files, via computer and other communications networks, namely, by global and local computer networks; delivery of messages by electronic transmission; wireless electronic transmission of audio and video files via communication networks” in applicant’s identification also encompasses “electronic exchange of medical records across a nationwide health information network”. This is because electronic medical records may include audio and video files. The exchange of information and delivery of data and messages could include information, data, and messages that are a part of medical records. The entries “Communication and telecommunication services, namely, electronic transmission of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication cellular and satellite networks; Communication and telecommunication services, namely, communication by electronic computer terminals and data communication by electronic mail, namely, receipt of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, the foregoing services provided over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication, cellular, and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals” are also broad and unrestricted entries. Applicant’s entries are not content or field specific. Thus, the information that is transmitted may be in the form of medical records or information found in medical records. Medical records may include data, images, audio, video, and may be in the form of documents. Without more granularity in applicant’s identification, the entries encompass registrant’s identification entry. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

Regarding Registration No. 4690350: Each party provides transmission of messages and images. Further, the messages and images referenced in registrant’s identification may include data, audio, video and documents, elements present in applicant’s identification. In this way, registrant’s services encompass applicant’s services. The transmission may include communication by and between computer terminals. Thus, communication by and between computer terminals, entries set forth in applicant’s identification, encompasses transmission of messages and images, entries set forth in registrant’s identification. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Applicant’s response contains an array of arguments regarding the field of their services, the audience for their services, including law enforcement and the military, the purpose of their services, and the like. It also contains arguments about the registrant’s services as practiced in commerce. These arguments are inapposite as they rely on extrinsic evidence of actual use. As stated above, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  Thus, all of applicant’s arguments regarding the use of these marks in commerce are not being considered.

 

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that applicant’s and registrant’s services are closely related. Thus, the marks are likely to be confused. Applicant may provide arguments in support of registration.

 

Response to Office Action

 

Response guidelines.  For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

If applicant does not timely respond to this Office action, the following services will be deleted from the application: 

 

Class 38: Communication and telecommunication services, namely, electronic transmission of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication cellular and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; Communication and telecommunication services, namely, communication by electronic computer terminals and data communication by electronic mail, namely, receipt of data, images, audio, video and documents, including text, messages, and electronic mail, the foregoing services provided over local or global communications networks, including the internet, intranets, extranets, mobile communication, cellular, and satellite networks; communications by computer terminals; communication by computer terminals, namely, communication between computer terminals; delivery of data by telecommunications via wireless communication networks; electronic transmission and streaming of digital media content, namely, downloadable audio and video files, via computer and other communications networks, namely, by global and local computer networks; delivery of messages by electronic transmission; wireless electronic transmission of audio and video files via communication networks

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a); TMEP §718.02(a). 

 

In such case, the application will then proceed with the following services only: 

 

Class 38: electronic streaming of digital media content, namely, downloadable audio and video files, via computer and other communications networks, namely, by global and local computer networks

 

See TMEP §718.02(a). 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

Rosen, Amanda

/Amanda Rosen/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 118

(571) 270-5984

Amanda.Rosen@USPTO.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

  • Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

 

 

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90059343 - ARC - 38.0051.002

To: Axon Enterprise, Inc. (justin@jclarklawtm.com)
Subject: U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90059343 - ARC - 38.0051.002
Sent: May 22, 2021 09:42:53 AM
Sent As: ecom118@uspto.gov
Attachments:

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on May 22, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 90059343

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Rosen, Amanda

/Amanda Rosen/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 118

(571) 270-5984

Amanda.Rosen@USPTO.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from May 22, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”

 

 

 


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