Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  July 27, 2020

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Trademark Act Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
• Potential Unlawful Use Inquiry

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

THIS REFUSAL APPLIES ONLY TO THE GOODS SPECIFIED THEREIN

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused as to the goods, namely “chemical preservatives for use in the production of a wide variety of chemicals” because of a likelihood of confusion with the commonly owned marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1128786, 5236340, 5328230, and with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5129544.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

The applicant’s mark is BIOGUARD for among other goods, chemical preservatives for use in the production of a wide variety of chemicals.

 

The registered marks are:

 

U.S. Registration No. 1128786 BIOGUARD for chlorine compounds for treating water, chemical preparation for controlling stains, chemical preparations for neutralizing excess chlorine.

 

U.S. Registration No. 5129544 BIO-GUARD for anti-microbial chemical additive for plastics sold as a component of cutting boards.

 

U.S. Registration No. 5236340 BIOGUARD for water treatment chemicals for use in swimming pools and spas.

 

U.S. Registration No. 5328230 BIOGUARD plus design for chemical analysis kit for testing swimming pool water; water treatment chemicals for use in swimming pools and spas.

 

Similarity of Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the instant case, the applicant’s mark BIOGUARD and the registered marks BIOGUARD and BIOGUARD are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.  Id.  Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

Additionally, the applicant’s mark BIOGUARD is similar to the registered mark BIO-GUARD because the compared marks are identical except for a slight difference in appearance between applicant’s mark, which appears as a compound word with no space separating the words, that is, BIOGUARD; and registrant’s mark, which appears as multiple words with a hyphen between the separate terms that is, BIO-GUARD.  As such, the marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar.  The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”). 

 

Also, the applicant’s mark BIOGUARD is similar to the registered mark BIOGUARD plus design because both marks feature the similar term BIOGUARD.

 

Although the registrant’s mark also contains a design, this portion of the mark is less significant under a Section 2(d) analysis.  When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

Here, both the applicant’s mark and the registrant’s mark feature the similar term BIOGUARD, thereby creating the same overall commercial impression.  Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of Goods/Services

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, as evidenced by the identification of goods/services in the instant application and cited registrations, the applicant’s goods, namely, “chemical preservatives for use in the production of a wide variety of chemicals” are closely related to the registrants’ goods because the goods listed are chemicals which may be used together in similar applications for common purposes.

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the application use broad wording to describe chemical preservatives for use in the production of a wide variety of chemicals, which presumably encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including registrants’ more narrow chemicals for treating water, chemical preparation for controlling stains, chemical preparations for neutralizing excess chlorine, anti-microbial chemical additive for plastics, water treatment chemicals for use in swimming pools and spas.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are related.

 

Neither the application nor the registration(s) contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., chemical supply retailers, hardware and/or recreational stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b) is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that their use of the mark extends to all goods and/or services identified in the registration.  15 U.S.C. §1057(b).  In the absence of limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in the goods and/or services in the registration, the presumption is that the goods and/or services move in all trade channels normal for such goods and/or services and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers of such goods and/or services.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Accordingly, because confusion to source is likely, registration is refused as to goods “chemical preservatives for use in the production of a wide variety of chemicals” under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant’s Options Where Refusal Applies to Specific Goods

 

Applicant may respond to the stated refusal by submitting evidence and arguments against the refusal.  In addition, applicant may respond by doing one of the following:

 

(1)  Deleting the goods to which the refusal pertains; or

 

(2)  Filing a Request to Divide Application form (form #3) to divide out the goods and/or services that have not been refused registration, so that the mark may proceed toward publication for opposition for those goods or services to which the refusal does not pertain.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.87.  See generally TMEP §§1110 et seq. (regarding the requirements for filing a request to divide).  If applicant files a request to divide, then to avoid abandonment, applicant must also file a timely response to all outstanding issues in this Office action, including the refusal.  37 C.F.R. §2.87(e).

 

If applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

Potential Unlawful Use Inquiry

 

To qualify for federal trademark/service mark registration, the use of a mark in commerce must be lawful.  Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce’”); TMEP §907; see In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); Coahoma Chemical Co., Inc. v. Smith, 113 USPQ 413 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks 1957) (concluding that “use of a mark in connection with unlawful shipments in interstate commerce is not use of a mark in commerce which the [Office] may recognize.”).  Thus, the goods and/or services to which the mark is applied must comply with all applicable federal laws.  See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) (noting that “[i]t is settled that the Trademark Act’s requirement of ‘use in commerce,’ means a ‘lawful use in commerce’”)); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §907. 

Here, the items or activities to which the proposed mark are applied may be unlawful under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§801-971 and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 21 U.S.C. §331(ll); see also 21 U.S.C. §321(ff) (on December 20, 2018, the CSA was amended to remove “hemp” from the definition of marijuana and specifically exclude “tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp (as defined under section 297A of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946)” from Schedule I, 21 U.S.C. §812(c )(17).    Therefore, to the extent the applicant’s goods are derived from cannabis plants that meet the current statutory definition of hemp, the goods may presently be lawful.  In addition a dietary supplement is deemed to be a food within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).   See 37 C.F.R. §2.69; TMEP §907.  Furthermore, under the FDCA, any product intended to have a therapeutic or medical use, and any product (other than a food) that is intended to affect the structure or function of the body of humans or animals, is a drug.  21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)  An unapproved new drug cannot be distributed or sold in interstate commerce unless it is the subject of an FDA-approved new drug application (NDA) or abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d) and 355(a), (b), & (j).

This additional information is needed because the attached Internet evidence from the applicant’s website indicates that the applicant manufactures supplements and other products with hemp and cannabinoids.  Therefore, further information is required about the nature of the applied-for goods in order to identify whether the applicant has a lawful use in commerce.

To permit proper examination of the application, applicant must submit additional information about the goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.61(b), 2.69; Cf. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1284, 73 USPQ2d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing Patent Rule 1.105(a)(1), which is the equivalent of Trademark Rule 2.61(b)); TMEP §§814, 907.  The requested information should include fact sheets, brochures, advertisements, and/or similar materials relating to the goods and/or services.  If such materials are not available, applicant must provide a detailed factual description of the goods and/or services.  Any information submitted in response to this requirement must clearly and accurately indicate the nature of the goods and/or services identified in the application. 

In addition, applicant must submit a written statement indicating whether the goods/services identified in the application comply with the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). See 37 C.F.R. §2.69; TMEP §907. 

Finally, applicant must provide written responses to the following questions:

1. Do/Will any of applicant’s identified goods include or contain marijuana, cannabis, hemp, marijuana-based preparations, cannabis-based preparations, hemp-based preparations, extracts or derivatives from marijuana, cannabis or hemp, including tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), synthetic marijuana, or any other controlled substance under the CSA?
2. Do/Will any of applicant’s identified goods include or contain hemp, hemp oil, hemp seed oil or any other ingredient or extracts derived specifically from hemp seeds or the mature stalks of the hemp plant?
3. Do or will the goods include cannabidiol (CBD)?
4. If so, will there be more than a trace amount of CBD in the goods, e.g., more than 50 parts per million (PPM)?
5. Do or will applicant’s identified goods include CBD which is derived from, oils, extracts or ingredients from plants other than Cannabis sativa L (also known as hemp, marijuana or cannabis)?
6. Do any of the applicant’s applied-for services involve the distribution of, the sale of, the possession of, or the manufacturing of the above mentioned goods?

Failure to satisfactorily respond to a requirement for information is a ground for refusing registration. See In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1758 (TTAB 2016) (affirming refusal of registration because applicant’s appeal brief failed to address the relevant refusals, including a refusal based on noncompliance with a requirement for information); In re AOP LLC, 107 USPQ2d 1644, 1651 (TTAB 2013) (“Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusal,” where applicant provided equivocal responses to examining attorney’s questions and did not address this issue in its brief).  Applicant’s failure to respond to an information requirement may result in an adverse evidentiary inference being drawn regarding applicant’s goods. Id. at 1651; In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1917, 1919 (TTAB 2008); TMEP §814. 

Please note that merely stating that information about the goods and services is available on applicant’s website is an inappropriate response to the above requirement and is insufficient to make the relevant information properly of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).

Applicant is advised that, upon consideration of the information provided by applicant in response to the above requirement, registration of the applied-for mark may be refused on the ground that the mark, as used/intended to be used in connection with the identified goods, is not lawful use in commerce. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127.  Use of a mark in commerce must be lawful use to be the basis for federal registration of the mark.   Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §2.69; In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993); In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); TMEP §907.

 

 

 

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How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Natalie M. Polzer/

Natalie M. Polzer

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571) 272-4103

natalie.polzer@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 27, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88893645

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Natalie M. Polzer/

Natalie M. Polzer

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571) 272-4103

natalie.polzer@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 27, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”