Offc Action Outgoing

SPUR

SPUR BRAND LLC

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88843375 - SPUR - JR-2020-302

To: SPUR BRAND LLC (jdritchison@comcast.net)
Subject: U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88843375 - SPUR - JR-2020-302
Sent: April 07, 2021 02:39:39 PM
Sent As: ecom117@uspto.gov
Attachments: Attachment - 1
Attachment - 2
Attachment - 3
Attachment - 4
Attachment - 5
Attachment - 6
Attachment - 7

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

U.S. Application Serial No. 88843375

 

Mark:  SPUR

 

 

 

 

Correspondence Address: 

JOHN D RITCHISON

RITCHISON LAW OFFICES, PC

115 E 9 TH ST- STE A

ANDERSON, IN 46016

 

 

 

Applicant:  SPUR BRAND LLC

 

 

 

Reference/Docket No. JR-2020-302

 

Correspondence Email Address: 

 jdritchison@comcast.net

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  April 07, 2021

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communications filed on 12/16/2020.

 

In a previous Office action dated 6/19/2020, the following issues were listed, and are hereby maintained or withdrawn/satisfied, as follows:

 

  • SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – maintained (as to one of the two previous cites).
  • SPECIMEN REFUSAL satisfied.

 

The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal under Section 2(d) as discussed below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark “P-TACTICAL SPUR” in U.S. Registration No. 5818179 for “reflex sights for firearms”.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously-attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

The marks are confusingly similar because they feature the same term “SPUR”.

 

Applicant’s mark is “SPUR” and registrant’s mark is “P-TACTICAL SPUR”.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Both marks contain the term “SPUR”. In addition to this shared term, registrant has added on the wording “P-TACTICAL” onto the applied-for mark. However, these added terms hold less weight and fail to obviate this refusal for several reasons, as discussed in the paragraphs below.  Note that although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

First, although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark. This reasoning is furthered by the fact that registrant’s specimen, which applicant presents and considered in applicant’s response, shows the goods bearing the term “SPUR” alone and separate from the wording “P-TACTICAL”, suggesting that “SPUR” is the house mark of which “P-TACTICAL” is merely a new product line within the “SPUR” line. See registrant’s specimen attached.

 

Second, the word “TACTICAL” is merely descriptive of a feature of registrant’s goods. The attached evidence from Collins Dictionary explains, “Tactical weapons or forces are those which a military leader can decide for themselves to use in a battle” while the attached evidence from Merriam Webster Dictionary defines the term as “using or being weapons or forces employed at the battlefront [as in] tactical missiles.” See attached. Thus, the term describes that registrant’s “reflex sights for firearms” are ready to be used in battle. This is important because matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark.  See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).  Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording “SPUR” the more dominant element of the mark.

 

Likewise, the letter “P” in registrant’s mark is not less distinctive because it is merely a single letter with no meaning or other impression to otherwise distinguish registrant’s mark from the applied-for mark. This is important because although there is no mechanical test to determine the dominant element of a mark, consumers would be more likely to perceive a distinctive term, even if suggestive, rather than a generic or descriptive term as the source-identifying feature of the mark.  Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1059-60 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009)).

 

Applicant’s mark contains stylization but this holds less weight because when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

This is especially true in this case, where registrant’s mark is in standard characters, which thus may appear in any font or stylization, including that of the applied-for mark. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Finally, where the goods of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Since the compared marks feature the wording “SPUR”, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods are closely related because they are identical.

 

Applicant’s goods are, in relevant part, Gun scopes; Rifle scopes; Spotting scopes”.

 

Registrant’s goods are Reflex sights for firearms which are gun scopes, as shown by registrant’s specimen, attached here.

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registration(s) are identical.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods and/or services.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

Applicant’s identification also lists other goods such as camera and camera cases that re not identical to registrant’s gun scopes. However, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In regards to applicant’s cameras and camera cases, and other goods, these are offered by the same source as gun scopes, since they both are tactical equipment used to help people see far away, and gun scopes and cameras are even integrated into the same product, as shown by the following attached internet evidence.

 

 

This attached Internet evidence, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods and markets the through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

In its response, applicant argues that the consumers considered in this case are sophisticated purchasers, and thus, are not likely to be confused as to source. However, the examining attorney is not persuaded by this reasoning since the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

 

 

 

Since the compared goods are either identical, or related as tactical equipment used to help hunters see, the goods are closely related.

 

Conclusion

 

For these reasons, consumers are likely to encounter the parties’ goods in the same market channels.  Given the strong similarities between the key elements of the parties’ marks, consumers encountering the marks in the same commercial contexts are likely to confuse the marks and mistake the underlying sources of related goods provided under the marks.  Registration is refused to prevent such confusion.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Considering all of the above, the refusal/requirement under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is hereby made FINAL.

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

Becker, Joseph (Trademark)

/Joseph Becker/

Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117

United States PTO

(571) 270-5493

Joseph.Becker1@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

  • Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

 

 

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U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88843375 - SPUR - JR-2020-302

To: SPUR BRAND LLC (jdritchison@comcast.net)
Subject: U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88843375 - SPUR - JR-2020-302
Sent: April 07, 2021 02:39:41 PM
Sent As: ecom117@uspto.gov
Attachments:

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on April 07, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88843375

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Becker, Joseph (Trademark)

/Joseph Becker/

Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117

United States PTO

(571) 270-5493

Joseph.Becker1@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from April 07, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”

 

 

 


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