Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  April 17, 2020

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Refusal to register – likelihood of confusion
• Refusal to register – mark is primarily merely a surname
• Supplemental Register – advisory
• Amendment of identification of goods
• Multiple-class application requirements

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3380344.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark SHEIN for use in connection with the following goods:

 

Jewelry; costume jewelry; necklaces; earrings; bracelets; rings; brooches; watches; hat jewelry; jewelry pins for use on hats; pins being jewelry; precious metals, unwrought or semi-wrought; jewelry accessories, namely, jewelry clips for adapting pierced earrings to clip-on earrings; jewelry findings; jewelry boxes, jewelry charms, alarm clocks, split rings of precious metal for keys.

 

The registered mark is STEVEN SHEIN for use in connection with “Bracelets; Charms; Costume jewelry; Jewelry; Pins being jewelry; Rings being jewelry.”

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant’s mark is SHEIN and registrant’s mark is STEVEN SHEIN.  Applicant merely deletes “STEVEN” from the registered mark.  Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)); In re SL&E Training Stable, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 (TTAB 2008) (holding SAM EDELMAN and EDELMAN, both for wallets and various types of bags, likely to cause confusion, noting that there are strong similarities between the marks because they share the same surname, and that consumers viewing the mark EDELMAN may perceive it as an abbreviated form of SAM EDELMAN because it is the practice in the fashion industry to refer to surnames alone).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Applicant’s mark appears in stylized font, while the registered mark appears in standard characters.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Based upon the foregoing, the marks of applicant and registrant are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

With regard to applicant’s “Jewelry,” “costume jewelry,” “bracelets,” “rings,” “pins being jewelry” and “jewelry charms,” the application and registration both include these identical goods.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

With regard to applicant’s “necklaces,” “earrings,” “brooches,” “hat jewelry,” “jewelry pins for use on hats,” and “jewelry accessories, namely, jewelry clips for adapting pierced earrings to clip-on earrings,”  the registration uses the broad wording “jewelry” to describe its goods, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow goods.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

With regard to applicant’s remaining goods, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative sample of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely watches, precious metals, jewelry findings, jewelry boxes, alarm clocks, split rings of precious metal for keys and jewelry, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

Because the marks of applicant and registrant are confusingly similar and the respective goods are closely related, a likelihood of confusion exists in the present case.  Registration therefore is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.  The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211. 

 

An applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname if the surname, when viewed in connection with the applicant’s recited goods and/or services, “‘is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.’”  Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1211.01.

 

The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:

 

(1)        Whether the surname is rare;

 

(2)        Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;

 

(3)        Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

 

(4)        Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

 

(5)        Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

 

These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination.  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01.  For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry.  In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.

 

“There is no rule as to the kind or amount of evidence necessary to show that [a] mark would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.”  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 (TTAB 2016); see TMEP §1211.01.  Each case is decided on its own facts, based on the evidence of record.  TMEP §1211.01; see In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1278 (citing In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 

 

The following are examples of evidence that is generally considered to be relevant to such a determination:  telephone directory listings, excerpted listings and articles from computerized research databases, applicant’s website, evidence in the application record showing the term used as a surname, the manner of use on specimens, dictionary definitions of the term and evidence from dictionaries showing no definition of the term.  See TMEP §1211.02(b)(i)-(b)(iii), (b)(v)-(b)(vi).

 

Please see the attached evidence below from the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, establishing the surname significance of SHEIN.  This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing 801 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers. 

 

See also the attached printout from the website House of Names discussing the origins and history of the Shein surname.  This further supports the conclusion that the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.

 

Although “SHEIN” appears to be a relatively rare surname, the statute makes no distinction between rare and commonplace surnames and even a rare surname may be unregistrable under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4) if its primary significance to purchasers is that of a surname.  See In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Beds & Bars Ltd., 122 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2017); In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1281 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re E. Martinoni Co., 189 USPQ 589, 590-91 (TTAB 1975)); TMEP §1211.01(a)(v).  There is no minimum amount of evidence needed to establish that a mark is primarily merely a surname.  See In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d at 17, 225 USPQ at 653; In re Beds & Bars Ltd., 122 USPQ2d at 1548; TMEP §1211.02(b)(i).

 

Also, evidence that a term has no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname is relevant to determining whether the term would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.  See In re Weiss Watch Co., 123 USPQ2d 1200, 1203 (TTAB 2017); In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1280 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §1211.02(b)(vi).  The attached evidence from the American Heritage Dictionary and the Columbia Gazetteer of the World shows that “SHEIN” does not appear in the either the dictionary or the gazetteer.  Thus, this term appears to have no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname. 

 

Applicant displays the surname in a stylized font.  Adding a non-distinctive design element or letter stylization to a term that is primarily merely a surname does not change the surname significance of the term.  The primary significance of such a mark would still be that of a surname.  TMEP §1211.01(b)(ii); see In re Pickett Hotel Co., 229 USPQ 760, 763 (TTAB 1986) (holding PICKETT a surname despite use of stylized lettering); cf. In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995).

 

The applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  As a result, registration is refused under Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER – ADVISORY

 

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to the Section 2(e)(4) refusal, such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

Although registration on the Supplemental Register does not afford all the benefits of registration on the Principal Register, it does provide the following advantages to the registrant:

 

(1)        Use of the registration symbol ® with the registered mark in connection with the designated goods and/or services, which provides public notice of the registration and potentially deters third parties from using confusingly similar marks.

 

(2)        Inclusion of the registered mark in the USPTO’s database of registered and pending marks, which will (a) make it easier for third parties to find it in trademark search reports, (b) provide public notice of the registration, and thus (c) potentially deter third parties from using confusingly similar marks.

 

(3)        Use of the registration by a USPTO trademark examining attorney as a bar to registering confusingly similar marks in applications filed by third parties.

 

(4)        Use of the registration as a basis to bring suit for trademark infringement in federal court, which, although more costly than state court, means judges with more trademark experience, often faster adjudications, and the opportunity to seek an injunction, actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

 

(5)        Use of the registration as a filing basis for a trademark application for registration in certain foreign countries, in accordance with international treaties.

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(d), 1091, 1094; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§19:33, 19:37 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2017).

 

If applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

The wording “brooches” in the identification of goods for International Class 14 must be clarified because it is too broad and could include goods in other international classes.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.  In particular, this wording could encompass jewelry brooches in International Class 14, Brooches for clothing in International Class 26 and Toy brooches in International Class 28.  Applicant must amend this wording to clarify the nature of the goods and reclassify them, if appropriate.  If applicant adds one or more international classes to the application it must comply with the multiple-class application requirements set forth below.

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate: 

 

International Class 14

 

Jewelry; costume jewelry; necklaces; earrings; bracelets; rings; jewelry brooches; watches; hat jewelry; jewelry pins for use on hats; pins being jewelry; precious metals, unwrought or semi-wrought; jewelry accessories, namely, jewelry clips for adapting pierced earrings to clip-on earrings; jewelry findings; jewelry boxes, jewelry charms, alarm clocks, split rings of precious metal for keys

 

International Class 26

 

Brooches for clothing

 

International Class 28

 

Toy brooches

 

Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

MULTIPLE-CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS

 

The application identifies goods in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on Trademark Act Section 1(b):

 

(1)        List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.

 

(2)        Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule).  The application identifies goods that are classified in at least three classes; however, applicant submitted a fee sufficient for only one class.  Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).

 

For an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Multiple-class Application webpage.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

.

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/William D Jackson/

Attorney Advisor - Trademarks

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 117

(571) 272-3064

William.Jackson@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

 

Search:	Public Records : Surname
Terms:	last-name(shein) maxresults(500)

 

Total number found: 801
No.	Name	Address	Phone
1.	SHEIN, A	2727 PALISADE BRONX, NY 10463-1018	718-796-2348
2.	SHEIN, A	2123 SHADY APT B9 PITTSBURGH, PA 15217-1849	412-296-9652
3.	SHEIN, A	BRONX, NY 10463	718-796-2556
4.	SHEIN, A	CHARLOTTE, NC 28273	704-277-6469
5.	SHEIN, A	CHARLOTTE, NC 28273	704-277-9617
6.	SHEIN, A	LOS ANGELES, CA 90027	323-447-9998
7.	SHEIN, A	NEW YORK, NY 10001	917-526-8174
8.	SHEIN, A	NEW YORK, NY 10013	917-306-0968
9.	SHEIN, A	NEW YORK, NY 10028	646-266-6059
10.	SHEIN, A	PEPPER PIKE, OH 44122	216-591-9020
11.	SHEIN, A	TAMPA, FL 33610	813-833-4200
12.	SHEIN, A	WATERBURY, CT 06702	203-232-0338
13.	SHEIN, A	WESTFORD, MA 01886	978-846-4969
14.	SHEIN, A	WILLOUGHBY, OH 44057	440-346-2790
15.	SHEIN, A	WILLOUGHBY, OH 44094	440-346-2790
16.	SHEIN, A	YONKERS, NY 10701	914-882-1193
17.	SHEIN, A	YONKERS, NY 10709	914-882-1193
18.	SHEIN, A	YONKERS, NY 10710	914-837-6649
19.	SHEIN, ADA	2682 W 2ND APT 4H BROOKLYN, NY 11223-6382	718-368-2261
20.	SHEIN, ADAM	2700 COZUMEL MELBOURNE, FL 32935-8197	321-507-2013
21.	SHEIN, ADAM B	6371 PORTOFINO MELBOURNE, FL 32940-7485	321-426-4415
22.	SHEIN, AIMEE	3160 WHEATLAND HELENA, MT 59602-8861	406-465-0856
23.	SHEIN, ALAN M	3105 BEDLINGTON HOLLAND, PA 18966-2901	530-517-0064
24.	SHEIN, ALAN	22639 EUCLID EUCLID, OH 44117-1622	216-410-8736
25.	SHEIN, ALAN M	2501 PENNSYLVANIA PHILADELPHIA, PA 19130-2401	215-964-7501
26.	SHEIN, ALAN	2501 PENNSYLVANIA PHILADELPHIA, PA 19130-2401	267-514-2767
27.	SHEIN, ALAN	2501 PENNSYLVANIA PHILADELPHIA, PA 19130-2401	773-331-9551
28.	SHEIN, ALAN H	40 PEPPER CREEK PEPPER PIKE, OH 44124-5281	714-496-7403
29.	SHEIN, ALAN G	4898 RONSON STE I SAN DIEGO, CA 92111-1807	858-535-1754
30.	SHEIN, ALAN	613 N SYCAMORE LOS ANGELES, CA 90036-2030	323-830-7558
31.	SHEIN, ALAN		440-346-2780
32.	SHEIN, ALAN	CLEVELAND, OH 44114	216-544-9402
33.	SHEIN, ALAN	CLEVELAND, OH 44114	216-544-9860
34.	SHEIN, ALAN	CLEVELAND, OH 44130	216-712-1008
35.	SHEIN, ALANA	4516 HORNBEAM ROCKVILLE, MD 20853-1415	240-472-2726
36.	SHEIN, ALBERT J	7324 SPRINGFIELD APT OAKLAND GARDENS, NY 11364-3022	516-796-5071
37.	SHEIN, ALEKSEY	2041 HOLLAND APT 3D BRONX, NY 10462-2941	718-822-4584
38.	SHEIN, ALEKSEY	2041 HOLLAND APT 3D BRONX, NY 10462-2941	718-822-4584
39.	SHEIN, ALEX	2 HICKMAN SYOSSET, NY 11791-1602	516-353-2768
40.	SHEIN, ALEX G	8802 MARGATE UNIT 2 PIKESVILLE, MD 21208-6377	410-504-5071
41.	SHEIN, ALISIA M	7 JONES WOODBURY, NJ 08096-3733	609-638-4900
42.	SHEIN, ALISON G	16 MARTHA EDISON, NJ 08820-4403	908-754-2854
43.	SHEIN, ALLA	328 KENDIG OWINGS MILLS, MD 21117-1370	443-278-5798
44.	SHEIN, ALLA	8802 MARGATE BALTIMORE, MD 21208-6377	443-278-5798
45.	SHEIN, ALLISON M	2091 NE 27TH LIGHTHOUSE POINT, FL 33064-7709	954-234-6547
46.	SHEIN, ALON	330 HYCLIFF STAMFORD, CT 06902-2022	203-967-1133
47.	SHEIN, ALON	9 WOODSIDE WESTPORT, CT 06880-2322	203-227-4420
48.	SHEIN, AMBER N	4526 40TH APT 1R SUNNYSIDE, NY 11104-3943	347-679-0553
49.	SHEIN, AMY	3954 VERBENA NAPA, CA 94558-1987	707-227-7236
50.	SHEIN, AMY B	241 VITTORIO CT PARK RIDGE, NJ 07656-2512	201-391-7772
51.	SHEIN, AMY F	HYDE PARK, NY 12538	845-233-1293
52.	SHEIN, AMY	NAPA, CA 94559	707-256-9391
53.	SHEIN, ANDREW B	202 S BEVERLY TAMPA, FL 33609-2920	813-309-1028
54.	SHEIN, ANDREW	6 CHURCHILL WINCHESTER, MA 01890-1008	617-584-7532
55.	SHEIN, ANDREW	TAMPA, FL 34639	813-833-4200
56.	SHEIN, ANDREY	8709 PARKCHESTER CHARLOTTE, NC 28277-5642	704-277-6469
57.	SHEIN, ANDREY	8709 PARKCHESTER CHARLOTTE, NC 28277-5642	704-277-9617
58.	SHEIN, ANDREY	8709 PARKCHESTER CHARLOTTE, NC 28277-5642	704-726-2612
59.	SHEIN, ANDREY	12636 SABAL PARK APT 202 PINEVILLE, NC 28134-7512	704-541-8434
60.	SHEIN, ANGELA	10249 SIENNA RIDGE PL SAN DIEGO, CA 92127-2868	858-312-1122
61.	SHEIN, ANGELIKA	351 E 84TH APT 12D NEW YORK, NY 10028-4456	917-902-3252
62.	SHEIN, ANGELIKA	NEW YORK, NY 10001	917-749-2282
63.	SHEIN, ANGELIKA	NEW YORK, NY 10007	917-331-8052
64.	SHEIN, ANGELIKA	NEW YORK, NY 10022	212-207-1978
65.	SHEIN, ANGELIKA	NEW YORK, NY 11229	917-749-2282
66.	SHEIN, ANITA	7945 SAILING SHORES TER BOYNTON BEACH, FL 33437-3828	561-736-9336
67.	SHEIN, ANJE	2044 N FREMONT APT CHICAGO, IL 60614-4312	847-674-4746
68.	SHEIN, ANJELICA	NORTHBROOK, IL 60062	847-323-3252
69.	SHEIN, ANNALEE	2640 LAKE SHORE UNIT 709 RIVIERA BEACH, FL 33404-4669	718-796-2348
70.	SHEIN, ANNEMARIE	3360 DREW ST MARINA, CA 93933-2115	831-384-7765
71.	SHEIN, ARIANNA	468 HAMILTON ALBANY, NY 12203-1334	518-852-5875
72.	SHEIN, ARLEEN	910 N MARTEL APT 307 LOS ANGELES, CA 90046-6655	310-493-7610
73.	SHEIN, ARLEEN	910 N MARTEL APT 307 LOS ANGELES, CA 90046-6655	323-632-1508
74.	SHEIN, ARLEEN	910 N MARTEL APT 307 LOS ANGELES, CA 90046-6655	619-602-1716
75.	SHEIN, ARTHUR H	97 WILLIAM HILLSDALE, NJ 07642-1604	201-666-0601
76.	SHEIN, ARTHUR	HACKENSACK, NJ 07601	201-615-3497
77.	SHEIN, ASYA M	2743 WAVERLY APT 6 LOS ANGELES, CA 90039-2758	213-309-6284
78.	SHEIN, ASYA	LOS ANGELES, CA 90040	213-448-0007
79.	SHEIN, ASYA	LOS ANGELES, CA 90040	323-440-3293
80.	SHEIN, AUNG Z	6062 60TH FLUSHING, NY 11378-3533	201-823-7369
81.	SHEIN, AUNG	5140 DORWIN ORLANDO, FL 32814-6724	407-595-5103
82.	SHEIN, AUNG N		407-919-8684
83.	SHEIN, AUNG T	BROOKLYN, NY 11238	718-809-4207
84.	SHEIN, AYE M	5160 VAN KLEECK APT 4B ELMHURST, NY 11373-4221	347-393-5387
85.	SHEIN, B U	3245 E CALLE BAJA WEST COVINA, CA 91792-2902	909-869-7251
86.	SHEIN, B	EDGEWOOD, WA 98372	253-987-7010
87.	SHEIN, B	GREAT BARRINGTON, MA 01230	413-528-3486
88.	SHEIN, BARBARA	10 JOSHUA DR HILLSBOROUGH, NJ 08844-3008	908-431-0514
89.	SHEIN, BARBARA C	5700 N SALEM CHURCH DOVER, PA 17315-3340	559-280-1452
90.	SHEIN, BARBARA	DILLSBURG, PA 17019	717-590-8002
91.	SHEIN, BARI S	534N TERRY MONROE TWP, NJ 08831-1881	609-655-8199
92.	SHEIN, BARRY	38 BOYLSTON BOSTON, MA 02116-4718	617-426-9640
93.	SHEIN, BARRY S	1207 E ERSKINE MANOR HL SOUTH BEND, IN 46614-2184	574-291-7563
94.	SHEIN, BARRY	PO BOX 418 EAGLE, ID 83616-0418	208-577-6834
95.	SHEIN, BARRY	226 TREMONT BOSTON, MA 02116-4726	617-426-9640
96.	SHEIN, BARRY Z	700 WASHINGTON BOSTON, MA 02135-1537	617-515-9774
97.	SHEIN, BEA I	5706 BALTIMORE UNIT 356 LA MESA, CA 91942-1653	619-698-1775
98.	SHEIN, BEN	86 CHESTER ST NANTUCKET, MA 02554-3505	508-901-5176
99.	SHEIN, BENJAMIN	121 S BROAD PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107-4533	215-732-4000
100.	SHEIN, BENJAMIN	4 CARRIAGE HOUSE LN MAMARONECK, NY 10543-1004	914-698-7196

 

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Date/Time:	Friday, April 17, 2020 2:48 PM

 

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on April 17, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88776666

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/William D Jackson/

Attorney Advisor - Trademarks

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 117

(571) 272-3064

William.Jackson@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from April 17, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”