United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 01, 2020

 

 SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Likelihood of confusion
• Specimen

 

The assigned examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and determined the following.

 

This Office Action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on September 9, 2020.

 

The prior Office Action(s) is/are incorporated by reference.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No(s). 2535704.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

The applicant’s mark is EXPRESS (stylized form) for vaccines for cattle.  The registrant’s mark is EXPRESS for bovine vaccine.

 

The marks are essentially identical—EXPRESS.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The goods are identical in this case.  Both parties provide cattle or bovine vaccine.  Please see the attached definitions showing that bovine, which includes cows, is cattle.  Where the goods of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The goods travel in the same channels of trade.  Or, the conditions surrounding their marketing may be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.

 

The similarities among the marks and the goods of the parties are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion.

 

The applicant’s only statement regarding the refusal is that the applicant is “related to the owner of the cited registration and is in the process of deciding how to deal with the cited registration. Applicant will submit a supplemental response that addresses this issue in due course.” 

 

A legal relationship between the parties is insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion unless the parties constitute a “single source.”  That is, the legal relationship between the parties must exhibit a “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services in connection with which the trademarks and/or service marks are used, and a “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks and/or service marks.  See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d 1359, 1361 (TTAB 1987); see also TMEP §1201.07.

 

Unity of control is presumed in instances where, absent contradictory evidence, one party owns (1) all of another entity, or (2) substantially all of another entity and asserts control over the activities of that other entity.  See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii).  Such ownership is established, for example, when one party owns all or substantially all of the stock of another or when one party is a wholly owned subsidiary of another.  See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d at 1361; TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii).  It is additionally presumed when, absent contradictory evidence, applicant is shown in USPTO records as a joint owner of the cited registration, or the owner of the registration is listed as a joint owner of the application, and applicant submits a written statement asserting control over the use of the mark by virtue of joint ownership.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii). 

 

However, in most other situations, additional evidence is required to show unity of control.  For example, if the parties are sister corporations or if the parties share certain stockholders, directors or officers in common, additional evidence must be provided to show how the parties constitute a single source.  See In re Pharmacia, Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1883, 1884 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1201.07(b)(iii). 

 

Therefore, applicant must provide a written statement explaining the nature of the legal relationship between the parties.  In addition, if neither party owns all or substantially all of the other party, and USPTO records do not show their joint ownership of the application or cited registration, applicant must provide a detailed written explanation and documentary evidence showing the parties’ “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services in connection with which the trademarks and/or service marks are used, and the parties’ “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks and/or service marks.  See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(iii).  This statement and, if necessary, explanation must be verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii)-(iii); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).  However, if one party owns all of the other entity, and there is no contradictory evidence of record, the written statement need not be verified.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(i).

 

The refusal is maintained and made FINAL.

 

MARK ON DRAWING DIFFERS FROM MARK ON SPECIMEN

 

Mark shown on drawing does not match mark on specimen.  Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the mark in the drawing in use in commerce, which is required in the application.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(g)(i).  The mark appearing on the specimen and in the drawing must match; that is, the mark in the drawing “must be a substantially exact representation of the mark” on the specimen.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.51(a)-(b); TMEP §807.12(a).

 

In this case, the specimen displays the mark as EXPRESS 5-HS.  However, the drawing displays the mark as EXPRESS.  The mark on the specimen does not match the mark in the drawing because the specimen shows the mark EXPRESS with 5-HS in the same size, font, and color, resulting in one commercial unit.  Applicant has thus failed to provide the required evidence of use of the mark in commerce.  See TMEP §807.12(a).

 

Response options.  Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)        Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) for each applicable international class that (a) shows the mark in the drawing in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services in the application or amendment to allege use, and (b) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use.

 

Examples of specimens.  Specimens for goods include a photograph of (1) the actual goods bearing the mark; (2) an actual container, packaging, tag or label for the goods bearing the mark; or (3) a point-of-sale display showing the mark directly associated with the goods.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c); TMEP §904.03(a)-(m).  A webpage specimen submitted as a display associated with the goods must show the mark in association with a picture or textual description of the goods and include information necessary for ordering the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i); see 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c). 

 

Any web page printout or screenshot submitted as a specimen, whether for goods or services, must include the webpage’s URL and the date it was accessed or printed supported by declaration.  37 C.F.R. §2.56(c).

 

(2)        Submit a request to amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b) (which includes withdrawing an amendment to allege use, if one was filed), as no specimen is required before publication.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

The USPTO will not accept an amended drawing submitted in response to this refusal because the changes would materially alter the drawing of the mark in the original application or as previously acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b); TMEP §807.14. 

 

For more information about drawings and instructions on how to satisfy these response options using the online Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Drawing webpage.

 

The applicant did not submit a substitute specimen nor provide any evidence that 5-HS is used as a grade designation.  If the applicant can provide evidence that EXPRESS is used with other grade designations to show that EXPRESS is the source indicator of the goods, then the refusal may be withdrawn.

 

The refusal is maintained and made FINAL.

 

Response to Final Office Action

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)  A response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals.

 

(2)  An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with the appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

 

/Alex Seong Keam/

Attorney-Advisor

United States Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 114

Phone: 571-272-9176

Email: alex.keam@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on October 01, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88713232

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Alex Seong Keam/

Attorney-Advisor

United States Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 114

Phone: 571-272-9176

Email: alex.keam@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from October 01, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”