United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88669490
Mark: TRUMP
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: VARGA, LASZLO
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 25, 2019
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4950588 and 4325053. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
The applicant’s mark is TRUMP for spirits and liqueurs. The registered marks are:
4325053 TRUMP for wine
4950588 TRUMP NEW WORLD RESERVE for wine
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applicant’s mark TRUMP, is similar to the registered marks, TRUMP and TRUMP NEW WORLD RESERVE, as all contain the identical term TRUMP. Registration No. 4325053 and Applicant’s mark are identical. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Here the term TRUMP common to all the marks may cause confusion as to source.
Comparison of the Goods
The applicant’s goods are closely related to the registrant’s goods as they all are alcohol likely to travel through the same channels of trade to the same classes of purchasers. Various alcoholic beverages have been shown to be related goods for purposes of a Trademark Act Section 2(d) analysis. In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding GASPAR’S ALE for beer and ale likely to be confused with JOSE GASPAR GOLD for tequila); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding RED BULL for tequila likely to be confused with RED BULL for malt liquor); In re Kysela Pere et Fils Ltd., 98 USPQ2d 1261 (TTAB 2011) (holding HB for wine likely to be confused with HB and design for beer); Somerset Distilling, Inc. v. Speymalt Whiskey Distribs. Ltd., 14 USPQ2d 1539 (TTAB 1989) (holding JAS. GORDON and design for scotch whiskey likely to be confused with GORDON’S for distilled gin and vodka); Schieffelin & Co. v. Molson Cos., 9 USPQ2d 2069 (TTAB 1989) (holding BRAS D’OR for brandy likely to be confused with BRADOR for beer); Bureau Nat’l Interprofessionnel Du Cognac v. Int’l Better Drinks Corp., 6 USPQ2d 1610 (TTAB 1988) (holding trademark COLAGNAC for cola flavored liqueur likely to be confused with certification mark COGNAC for brandy).
Please see attached the following third party website evidence:
Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Action Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(c) REFUSAL – NAME IDENTIFYING A PARTICULAR LIVING INDIVIDUAL
In this case, Donald Trump is an American businessman, television personality, politician, and the 45th President of the United States. Elected on November 8, 2016, Trump won the general election on November 8, 2016 and assumed office on January 20, 2017. He is also the chairman and president of The Trump Organization, and the founder of Trump Entertainment Resorts. For these reasons, he is the subject of frequent media attention and his name is often in the public view. Please see the attached sampling of items retrieved via an Internet search.
The name “TRUMP” in the applied-for mark clearly references Donald Trump. The fact that a mark also contains other matter, in addition to a name, portrait, or signature, does not alter the requirement for written consent to register from the identified individual. See Reed v. Bakers Eng’g & Equip. Co., 100 USPQ 196, 199 (PTO 1954). Thus, the additional wording in the applied-for mark does not alter the requirement for Donald Trump’s consent to register his name.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the use of the name “TRUMP” in the proposed mark would be construed by the public as a reference to Donald Trump. Accordingly, because President Trump’s written consent is not of record, registration must be refused pursuant to Section 2(c) of the Trademark Act.
The refusal under Section 2(c) will be withdrawn if applicant provides both of the following:
1) A statement that the name shown in the mark identifies Donald Trump, a living individual whose consent is of record.
2) A written consent, personally signed by the individual whose name, signature, or portrait appears in the mark, authorizing applicant to register the identifying matter as a trademark and/or service mark with the USPTO; for example, an applicant may use, if applicable, the following: “I, Donald Trump, consent to the use and registration of my name as a trademark and/or service mark with the USPTO.”
See TMEP §§813, 813.01(a), 1206.04(a).
Applicant is advised that the written consent must include a statement of the party’s consent to applicant’s registration, and not just the use, of the identifying matter as a trademark. See Krause v. Krause Publ’ns, Inc., 76 USPQ2d 1904, 1912-13 (TTAB 2005); In re New John Nissen Mannequins, 227 USPQ 569, 571 (TTAB 1985); TMEP §1206.04(a).
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(a) FALSE ASSOCIATION REFUSAL
Registration is refused because the applied-for mark consists of or includes matter which may falsely suggest a connection with Donald Trump. Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. §1052(a). Although Trump is not connected with the goods and/or services provided by applicant under the applied-for mark, Donald Trump is so well-known that consumers would presume a connection. See id.
(1) The mark sought to be registered is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution.
(2) The mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution.
(3) The person or institution identified in the mark is not connected with the goods sold or services performed by applicant under the mark.
(4) The fame or reputation of the named person or institution is of such a nature that a connection with such person or institution would be presumed when applicant’s mark is used on its goods and/or services.
In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d at 1188-89; In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co., 103 USPQ2d 1417, 1419 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1203.03(c)(i); see also Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1375-77, 217 USPQ 505, 508-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (providing foundational principles for the current four-part test used to determine the existence of a false connection).
Here the name TRUMP is a reference to Donald Trump. The mark points uniquely and unmistakably to TRUMP as shown by the attached evidence. Trump is not connected with the goods sold. Trump’s fame is of such a nature that a connection with him would be presumed when applicant’s mark is used on its goods.
If applicant chooses to respond to the refusal(s) to register, then applicant must also respond to the following requirement(s).
INFORMALITIES
FOREIGN PRO SE APPLICANT WITH U.S. STREET ADDRESS - REQUIREMENT
Applicant must either provide documentation to support applicant’s domicile address or appoint a U.S. licensed attorney. All applications must include the applicant’s domicile address, and domicile dictates whether an applicant is required to have an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory represent the applicant at the USPTO. 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o)-(p), 2.11(a), 2.189, 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019).
An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home. 37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities. 37 C.F.R. §2.2(p); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14. 37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).
The application record lists applicant as an individual of Hungary and specifies a U.S. street address as applicant’s domicile. It is unclear from the record whether the U.S. street address provided is the place applicant resides and intends to be applicant’s principal home. If the U.S. street address of record is not applicant’s correct domicile address, applicant must provide the applicant’s correct domicile street address. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.11(b), 2.61(b), 2.189.
If applicant amends the application to list a domicile address outside of the United States or its territories, or if applicant elects not to provide documentation to support its U.S. street address as explained below, applicant must appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information. If applicant provides documentation to support its U.S. street address, the requirement to appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney will be withdrawn. Alternatively, if applicant appoints a U.S.-licensed attorney, the requirement for documentation will be withdrawn.
If the street address of record is applicant’s correct domicile address or if applicant provides a different U.S. street address as the applicant’s domicile address, and applicant elects not to appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney as its representative, then applicant must provide the following documentation to support its U.S. street address. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.11(b), 2.61(b), 2.189; Examination Guide 4-19 (Rev.) at I.A.2. Specifically, applicant must provide documentation showing the name and listed domicile address of the individual, for example one of the following:
(1) a current, valid signed rental, lease, or mortgage agreement; or (2) a current valid homeowner’s, renter’s, or motor vehicle insurance policy; or (3) a computer-generated bill issued by a utility company dated within 60 days of the application filing date.
Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.2; see 37 C.F.R. §§2.11(b), 2.61(b), 2.189.
Submitted documentation must show the name, listed address, and the date of the document but should redact other personal and financial information.
To appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney. To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form. The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any. Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).
To provide documentation supporting applicant’s domicile. Open the correct TEAS response form and enter the serial number, answer “yes” to wizard question #3, and on the “Additional Statement(s)” page, below the “Miscellaneous Statement” field, click the button below the text box to attach documentation to support the U.S. street address.
TEAS PLUS STATUS LOST –FEE
Applicant must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class because the application as filed did not meet the TEAS Plus application filing requirements. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(a), (c); TMEP §§819.01 et seq., 819.04. Specifically, applicant failed to meet the following application filing requirement(s): a consent to register the mark from the person identified in the mark (or conversely, if appropriate, a statement that the name or portrait in the mark does not identify a living individual) was not provided;
The additional fee is required even if applicant later corrects these application requirements.
PRO SE RESPONSE GUIDELINES
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TELEPHONE OR EMAIL FOR CLARIFICATION
APPLICANT MAY WISH TO SEEK TRADEMARK COUNSEL
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Kapil K. Bhanot/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
571.270.1516
Kapil.Bhanot@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
