Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  August 10, 2020

 

This Office Action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on July 17, 2020.

 

Introduction

In the initial Office Action, dated January 17, 2020, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark, based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion, and Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive.

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusals to register are now made FINAL.

 

FINAL Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

Registration of the applied-for mark was previously refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5765972.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

            Applicant’s mark is BEST (standard characters) for “electrical stimulator that applies electrical pulses directly to tissue for the purpose of peripheral nerve regeneration” in International Class 010, as amended.

 

Registrant’s mark is BEST (standard characters) for “Electronic stimulation devices for nerves, skin, and muscles for medical use” in International Class 010.

 

Comparison of the Marks

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the initial Office Action, examining attorney found the marks identical where applicant’s mark is BEST and registrant’s mark is BEST.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.

 

In applicant’s response, applicant did not argue that the marks are not similar, and because they are identical, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the initial Office Action, examining attorney found the goods are related where applicant’s broadly worded stimulators for applying electrical pulses presumably encompasses all types of stimulators for applying electrical pulses, including registrant’s more specific stimulation devices for nerves, skin, and muscles, and therefore, the goods are legally identical.

 

In applicant’s response, applicant amended the ID to read: “electrical stimulator that applies electrical pulses directly to tissue for the purpose of peripheral nerve regeneration” and then argues the goods are not related. First, applicant argues that registrant’s goods are used for pain relief as shown by the specimen of record for registrant’s goods, while applicant’s goods are used for nerve regeneration. Therefore, applicant argues, the goods have different applications and therefore no confusion is likely. Further, applicant argues that merely because both goods are used in the medical industry does not necessarily mean that the goods are related without further evidence. Second, applicant argues that the goods are high cost and the relevant consumer is highly sophisticated and likely to exercise great care when making purchasing decisions so that confusion is unlikely. Further, applicant argues that the relevant goods require a doctor’s prescription to be purchased, and therefore, consumers are even less likely to be confused. Finally, applicant argues that its decision to use the relevant mark for the goods was done in good faith and applicant is not seeking to trade on registrant’s goodwill.

 

Examining attorney has carefully considered applicant’s arguments and respectfully disagrees.

 

First, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are not merely “both medical goods,” with only the general medical purpose providing any kind of relationship between the goods. Applicant’s electrical stimulators for the purpose of peripheral nerve regeneration and registrant’s electronic stimulation devices for nerves, skin, and muscles for medical use are both medical devices that use electronic stimulation to provide treatment. Applicant has narrowed its goods to specify that they are used solely to treat peripheral nerve regeneration. However, registrant’s electronic stimulation devices do not specify a particular condition they treat, only that they are for medical use. Applicant’s evidence of registrant’s devices being used to treat pain is not dispositive. Determinations of likelihood of confusion are based on the goods in the record, and not on evidence of actual use. Here, registrant’s devices are broad enough to encompass electric stimulators that treat all types of medical conditions, including applicant’s stimulators for peripheral nerve regeneration. Further, registrant’s goods are used on “nerves” and therefore are likely to encompass uses for peripheral nerve regeneration. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Second, the attached evidence from The University of Michigan, Cleveland Clinic, and Modern Neuropathy demonstrates that electronic stimulation devices for peripheral nerve regeneration are used to reduce pain. Additionally, registrant’s specimen shows that registrant’s goods are used to treat pain due to peripheral nerve damage. Therefore, applicant’s argument that the goods are different because registrant’s goods are used to treat pain is not persuasive. Instead, the evidence shows that the goods are in fact highly related.

 

Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Therefore, while applicant argues that the goods travel in different channels of trade, this determination is based on the identification of goods in the record, and because neither the application nor the registration includes any such limitations, the goods are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers.

 

Further, the marks at issue are identical. Where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and/or services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

Third, even if consumers of the compared goods and/or services could be considered sophisticated and discriminating, it is settled that “even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion, especially in cases such as the present one involving identical marks and related goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1413 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Research & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1279, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  The identity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods and/or services “outweigh any presumed sophisticated purchasing decision.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1413 (citing HRL Assocs., Inc. v. Weiss Assocs., Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1819, 1823 (TTAB 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

 

Finally, applicant’s good faith does not negate that consumers are likely to be confused, regardless of whether or not that was applicant’s intention.

 

 

Because the marks are similar and the goods are related, it is likely that consumers would believe that the goods emanate from a common source, and the refusal to register is now made FINAL.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

FINAL Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

Registration was previously refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature or characteristic of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if “it immediately conveys information concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of [an applicant’s] goods or services.”  In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367, 123 USPQ2d 1707, 1709 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 963, 82 USPQ2d 1828, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); TMEP §1209.01(b); see DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 

 

Determining the descriptiveness of a mark is done in relation to an applicant’s goods and/or services, the context in which the mark is being used, and the possible significance the mark would have to the average purchaser because of the manner of its use or intended use.  See In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 963-64, 82 USPQ2d 1828, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); TMEP §1209.01(b).  Descriptiveness of a mark is not considered in the abstract.  In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d at 963-64, 82 USPQ2d at 1831.

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is BEST for “electrical stimulator that applies electrical pulses directly to tissue for the purpose of peripheral nerve regeneration” in International Class 010, as amended.

 

In the initial Office Action, examining attorney found the wording BEST in the mark to be merely descriptive of a feature or characteristic of the goods because the evidence of record shows that BEST is a laudatory term, used to mean “better than all others in quality or value.” When considered in relation to applicant’s goods, examining attorney found the term BEST merely laudatory, namely, that applicant’s goods are better than all others, or BEST. Additionally, examining attorney attached evidence showing use of the term BEST by various third parties to describe a laudatory attribute of goods similar to applicant’s goods. See previously attached evidence.

 

In applicant’s response, applicant argues the mark is not descriptive. Specifically, applicant argues the evidence of record is not sufficient to show that the word BEST is descriptive for the goods because the evidence of record shows use of the term BEST with electronic muscle stimulators, while applicant’s goods are nerve stimulators.

 

Examining attorney has carefully considered applicant’s arguments and respectfully disagrees.

 

First, the previously attached evidence shows use of the term BEST with electronic stimulation devices generally, because in the initial application, applicant had described its goods as electronic stimulators generally, without specifying a specific treatment use. If the wording is used to describe electronic stimulators generally, it certainly can be inferred that it is used to describe a specific type of electronic stimulator. Further, devices used to treat peripheral nerve damage generally also treat muscle because the damage is often neuromuscular, and causes muscle weakness. Therefore, a device used to treat muscle weakness is often interchangeable with a device used to treat nerve damage. See attached evidence from WebMd, Serfinity Medical, Twin Creek Health, and Carex. However, examining attorney is also attaching the following evidence from Modern Neuropathy showing use of the term BEST to describe a feature or attribute of electronic stimulators used to treat peripheral nerve damage specifically. See attached evidence. The previously attached evidence, as well as the attached evidence from Modern Neuropathy shows that the term BEST is commonly used in relation to electronic stimulators to describe a laudatory attribute of the goods, namely, that the goods are better that others. Applicant may be using the term BEST to describe its goods as better than others. Therefore, the term BEST merely describes a laudatory attribute of applicant’s goods, namely, that they are better than others, or the BEST.

 

Additionally, applicant should note that the cited registration for the identical mark, BEST, is on the Supplemental Register. Third-party registrations featuring goods and/or services the same as or similar to applicant’s goods and/or services are probative evidence on the issue of descriptiveness where the relevant word or term is disclaimed, registered under Trademark Act Section 2(f) based on acquired distinctiveness, or registered on the Supplemental Register.  E.g., In re Morinaga Nyugyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 120 USPQ2d 1738, 1745 (TTAB 2016) (quoting Inst. Nat’l des Appellations D’Origine v. Vintners Int’l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1581-82, 22 USPQ2d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re Box Solutions Corp., 79 USPQ2d 1953, 1955 (TTAB 2006).

 

For the reasons discussed above, applicant’s mark is refused registration on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1).  Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the FINAL refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Supplemental Register Advisory

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to this refusal(s), such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

Although registration on the Supplemental Register does not afford all the benefits of registration on the Principal Register, it does provide the following advantages to the registrant:

 

(1)        Use of the registration symbol ® with the registered mark in connection with the designated goods and/or services, which provides public notice of the registration and potentially deters third parties from using confusingly similar marks.

 

(2)        Inclusion of the registered mark in the USPTO’s database of registered and pending marks, which will (a) make it easier for third parties to find it in trademark search reports, (b) provide public notice of the registration, and thus (c) potentially deter third parties from using confusingly similar marks.

 

(3)        Use of the registration by a USPTO trademark examining attorney as a bar to registering confusingly similar marks in applications filed by third parties.

 

(4)        Use of the registration as a basis to bring suit for trademark infringement in federal court, which, although more costly than state court, means judges with more trademark experience, often faster adjudications, and the opportunity to seek an injunction, actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

 

(5)        Use of the registration as a filing basis for a trademark application for registration in certain foreign countries, in accordance with international treaties.

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(d), 1091, 1094; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§19:33, 19:37 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2017).

 

Response Guidelines

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

Bechhofer, Yocheved

/Yocheved Bechhofer/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

571-272-9329

Yocheved.Bechhofer@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 10, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88650936

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Bechhofer, Yocheved

/Yocheved Bechhofer/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

571-272-9329

Yocheved.Bechhofer@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 10, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”