To: | Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ltd. (michaelkline@clevelandgolf.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88615750 - EXPLOSIVE - TM2019-16 |
Sent: | December 16, 2019 01:43:28 PM |
Sent As: | ecom123@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 Attachment - 44 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88615750
Mark: EXPLOSIVE
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Correspondence Address: ROGER CLEVELAND GOLF COMPANY, INC.
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Applicant: Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ltd.
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Reference/Docket No. TM2019-16
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: December 16, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 87875296 precedes applicant’s filing date. See attached referenced application. If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4443341 for the standard character mark XPLOSIVE BATS. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, the applied-for mark is EXPLOSIVE in standard character form. The mark in the cited registration is XPLOSIVE BATS. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
The marks share the highly similar components EXPLOSIVE and XPLOSIVE. Applicant’s mark is the correct spelling of the word “EXPLOSIVE” while registrant’s mark includes a novel spelling of the same word. The marks are thus similar in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
The addition of the word “BATS” in the registered mark does not sufficiently differentiate the marks. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
Further, the term XPLOSIVE is given great weight in comparing the marks because the additional wording “BATS” is generic for registrant’s goods and renders XPLOSIVE the dominant feature of the mark. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
The marks are thus found confusingly similar.
Comparison of the Goods
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
In this case, the goods identified in the application are “Rackets and strings for rackets” in International Class 028. The goods identified in the cited registration are “Baseball bat bags; Baseball bats; Batting gloves; Softball bat bags; Softball bats” in International Class 028. These goods are highly similar and related.
The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from a representative sampling of third party websites, establishes that the same entity commonly produces the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. See attached screenshots from FranklinSports.com, Ebay.com, Rawlings.com, and Walmart.com. This evidence also shows that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use and that the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
As additional evidence of the relatedness of the services, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely rackets and bats, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii). See attached U.S. Registration Nos. 5894543, 5858839, 5768793, 5735355, and 5770778.
The goods are similar and related. Likelihood of confusion exists, and registration is thus refused.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
In this case, the applied-for mark is EXPLOSIVE and the goods are “Rackets and strings for rackets.” The attached dictionary definition evidence shows that “explosive” is commonly defined as “resulting from or as if from an explosion.” As demonstrated by the attached industry evidence the term “explosive” is used commonly describe features and characteristics of rackets. See attached screenshots from Diademsports.com, Tennis-Warehouse.com, BoltAdvance.com, EastPotomacTennis.com, Us.DunlopSports.com, MasonTennis.com, and DicksSportingGoods.com.
Descriptiveness is considered in relation to the relevant goods. DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “That a term may have other meanings in different contexts is not controlling.” In re Franklin Cnty. Historical Soc’y, 104 USPQ2d 1085, 1087 (TTAB 2012) (citing In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591, 593 (TTAB 1979)); TMEP §1209.03(e). “It is well settled that so long as any one of the meanings of a term is descriptive, the term may be considered to be merely descriptive.” In re Mueller Sports Med., Inc., 126 USPQ2d 1584, 1590 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Chopper Indus., 222 USPQ 258, 259 (TTAB 1984)). Because the evidence of record demonstrates that the term “explosive” is commonly used in the industry to describe features and characteristics of rackets, the mark is found descriptive regardless of alternate meanings of the word “explosive.”
Further, “A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.” In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TMEP §1209.01(b). It is enough if a mark describes only one significant function, attribute, or property. In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d at 1173, 71 USPQ2d at 1371.
Accordingly, the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of features and characteristics of applicant’s goods. Registration is thus refused.
Advisory Regarding Section 1(b) Applications and the Supplemental Register
If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use. TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b). In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date. TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.
REGISTRATION IS REFUSED: FAILURE TO FUNCTION
Terms that are merely informational in nature, such as statements or laudatory phrases about goods ordinarily used in business or in a particular trade or industry, are not registrable. See In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 (TTAB 2010). Determining whether the slogan or term functions as a trademark or service mark depends on how it would be perceived by the relevant public. In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1229; In re Aerospace Optics, Inc., 78 USPQ2d at 1862; TMEP §1202.04. “The more commonly a [slogan or term] is used, the less likely that the public will use it to identify only one source and the less likely that it will be recognized by purchasers as a trademark [or service mark].” In re Hulting, 107 USPQ2d 1175, 1177 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1229); TMEP §1202.04(b).
The attached industry evidence shows that this term is commonly used by those in applicant’s particular trade or industry to indicate specific qualities of rackets. See attached screenshots from Diademsports.com, Tennis-Warehouse.com, BoltAdvance.com, EastPotomacTennis.com, Us.DunlopSports.com, MasonTennis.com, and DicksSportingGoods.com. Because consumers are accustomed to seeing this term used in this manner, when it is applied to applicant’s goods they would perceive it merely as informational matter indicating applicant’s goods share the features and characteristics of being explosive. Thus, this slogan or term would not be perceived as a mark that identifies the source of applicant’s goods.
An applicant may not overcome this refusal by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register or asserting a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f). TMEP §1202.04(d); see In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1229. Nor will submitting a substitute specimen overcome this refusal. See TMEP §1202.04(d).
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Rachel E. Desjardins/
Examining Attorney
Trademark Law Office 123
Phone: (571) 270-0104
Email: Rachel.Desjardins@USPTO.gov
(Informal communications only – Do not respond to Office action via email.)
RESPONSE GUIDANCE