United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88604859
Mark: SUTTON
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Sky Luxury Corp.
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 08, 2019
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
SUMMARY OF ISSUES THAT APPLICANT MUST ADDRESS
- Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
- Section 2(e)(4) Refusal – Primarily Merely a Surname
o Section 2(e)(4) Response Options
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
The Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applicant has applied to register the mark, SUTTON, for “dresses; jackets, pants, skirts, sweatshirts.”
The registered marks are:
S SUTTON (U.S. Registration No. 5034067) for, in part, “Clothing, namely, shirts, t-shirts, blouses, skirts, jackets, caps, parkas, overalls, coats, anoraks, sweaters, sweatshirts, trousers, gloves, caps, socks, stockings, underwear, nylon stockings, pajamas, lingerie, nightgowns, raincoats, jackets, capes, shawls, scarves, pullovers, dresses, neckties, suits, belts, suspenders, bathing suits, beach clothes, namely, beach coverups, beach footwear, sandals and beach shoes, sarongs, stoles, hats; sportswear, namely, sports jackets, sports pants, sports shirts, sports shoes; footwear and headwear”
SUTTON STUDIO (U.S. Registration No. 3572138) for “Women's clothing, namely, [ jeans, ] sweaters, blouses[, tops, shorts, slacks, pants, skirts, dresses, jackets, sweatpants, sweatshirts, loungewear, robes, and pajamas ]”
S-U-T-T-O-N STUDIO (U.S. Registration No. 1497806) for “WOMEN'S CLOTHING, NAMELY, JEANS, SWEATERS, BLOUSES, TOPS, SHORTS, SLACKS, PANTS, SKIRTS, DRESSES, JACKETS, SWEATPANTS, SWEATSHIRTS
The marks share the term, SUTTON. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Moreover, the term SUTTON is the first term in the registered marks and the only term in the applied-for mark. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
The examining attorney acknowledges the stylization and/or design elements in U.S. Registration Nos. 5034067 and 1497806, however, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
In the instant case, the marks create the same mental reaction and overall commercial impression. When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The Goods
In the instant case, the parties have highly related articles of clothing and footwear such that the goods would be marketed in the same channels of trade.
J.CREW http://www.jcrew.com/ – variety of clothing and footwear under the same mark
LANDS’ END http://www.landsend.com/ - variety of clothing and footwear under the same mark
L.L.BEAN http://www.llbean.com/ –variety of clothing and footwear under the same mark
Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
The marks are highly similar. The articles of clothing and footwear are very highly related. The similarities among the marks and the goods are so great as to be marketed in the same channels of trade and create a likelihood of confusion among consumers.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Accordingly, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME
An applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname if the surname, when viewed in connection with the applicant’s recited goods and/or services, “‘is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.’” Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1211.01.
The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:
(1) Whether the surname is rare;
(2) Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;
(3) Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;
(4) Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and
(5) Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.
In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination. In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01. For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry. In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.
Please see the attached evidence from LEXIS/NEXIS® and Whitepages.Com, establishing the surname significance of SUTTON. This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing 160,640 times as a surname in a nationwide phone directory of names and 177,443 times in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers.
Lastly, the term is not sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.
Accordingly, registration is refused under Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act.
SECTION 2(E)(4) RESPONSE OPTIONS
(1) Prior Registrations: Applicant may claim ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register of the same mark for goods and/or services that are sufficiently similar to those named in the pending application. 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(1); TMEP §§1212, 1212.04. Applicant may do so by submitting the following statement, if accurate: “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services as evidenced by the ownership of active U.S. Registration No(s). (insert U.S. Registration numbers) on the Principal Register for the same mark for sufficiently similar goods and/or services.” TMEP §1212.04(e).
(2) Five Years’ Use: Applicant may submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services through the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate for at least the five years immediately before the date of this statement.” 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2); TMEP §1212.05(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).
(3) Other Evidence: Applicant may submit other evidence of acquired distinctiveness, with the following statement, if accurate: “The evidence shows that the mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services.” 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(3); TMEP §1212.06. Such additional evidence may include “advertising expenditures, sales success, length and exclusivity of use, unsolicited media coverage, and consumer studies (linking the name to a source).” In re Change Wind Corp., 123 USPQ2d 1453, 1467 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
If applicant cannot satisfy one of the above, applicant may respond by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. See 15 U.S.C. §1091; 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a).
ADVISORY
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
ASSITANCE
/AKhan/
Asmat Khan
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 114
(571)-272-9453
asmat.khan@uspto.gov
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Total number found: 177443 |
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No. |
Name |
Address |
Phone |
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1. |
SUTTON, A |
20 W 33RD FL 2 |
917-215-0152 |
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2. |
SUTTON, A |
8 W 40TH FL 4 |
917-257-8515 |
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3. |
SUTTON, A |
43 ATHELWOLD APT 1 |
857-559-3172 |
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4. |
SUTTON, A W |
2400 INTERLACHEN APT 207 |
904-225-9019 |
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5. |
SUTTON, A |
978 REED BULL |
865-262-5511 |
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6. |
SUTTON, A |
ADAIRSVILLE, GA 30103 |
770-608-0985 |
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7. |
SUTTON, A |
ATLANTA, GA 30303 |
678-927-7632 |
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8. |
SUTTON, A |
AVONDALE ESTATES, GA 30002 |
404-287-7436 |
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9. |
SUTTON, A |
BLUE ISLAND, IL 60406 |
708-935-4724 |
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10. |
SUTTON, A |
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33325 |
954-851-3770 |
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Total number found: 71 |
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No. |
Name |
Address |
Phone |
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1. |
SUTTIN, A |
CHELMSFORD, MA 01824 |
857-251-0029 |
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2. |
SUTTIN, ADAM |
32 HOLLY |
617-610-0827 |
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3. |
SUTTIN, AMANDA |
6531 ALISA |
832-773-2193 |
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4. |
SUTTIN, APRIL |
SIMI VALLEY, CA 93063 |
805-501-1280 |
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5. |
SUTTIN, APRIL |
SIMI VALLEY, CA 93065 |
805-501-1280 |
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6. |
SUTTIN, BARBIE |
7405 W ARIZONA |
720-299-4488 |
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7. |
SUTTIN, BEN |
NEWTON, MA 02458 |
617-610-0827 |
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8. |
SUTTIN, BENJAMIN S |
32 HOLLY |
617-510-6039 |
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9. |
SUTTIN, BENJI |
9819 TITAN |
210-364-0790 |
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10. |
SUTTIN, BONNIE R |
2501 NW 59TH |
561-350-6132 |
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
