Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  November 14, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

 

Summary of Issues that Applicant Must Address

 

1.     Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal - Likelihood of Confusion

2.     Disclaimer Requirement

3.     Section 2(f) Claim-in-Part is Unacceptable and Unnecessary

 

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5834327 and 5834328.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  Please see the enclosed registrations at Attachment 1.  The registered marks both consist of a diamond design with two breaks (one in red and one with no color claimed), both for services comprising “Full service consumer and commercial banking services; financing and loan services, commercial lending services; consumer lending services; commercial lending services for businesses; providing loans for marine equipment and boats; providing loans for recreational vehicles; providing loans for aircraft; deposit services, namely, checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, provision of certificates of deposit, and individual retirement account services; ATM banking services; online banking services; online banking services accessible by means of downloadable mobile applications; financial treasury management services; financial services, namely, electronic remote check deposit services; electronic funds transfer; merchant banking services; electronic debit card transaction processing; processing of debit card payments; providing electronic processing of electronic funds transfer, ACH, credit card, debit card, electronic check, electronic payment, and electronic remote check deposit services; trust management account services; financial trust management services; trust services in the nature of trustee and fiduciary services, namely, fiduciary representative services; wealth management services.”

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).  As discussed further below, the services of the parties are legally identical.

 

Applicant’s mark is SAM’S CLUB & a design comprising a diamond with two breaks.  The marks in the cited registrations also comprise a diamond design with two breaks.  The marks are similar in appearance because the design elements both consist of a diamond design with two breaks such that the diamond appears to be formed by two L-shaped brackets.  Although applicant’s mark includes the wording “SAM’S CLUB,” the registered marks do not include any wording.  Thus, given the highly similar designs, applicant’s mark may be perceived as a composite variation of the registered mark that identifies the same source.  When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The fact that one of the marks in the cited registrations appears in the color red does not obviate the overall similarity of the marks; applicant’s mark does not include a color claim, and could thus be displayed in the color red. 

 

Relatedness of the Services

 

The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the descriptions of the services stated in the application and registrations at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe “Full service consumer and commercial banking services” and “electronic debit card transaction processing; processing of debit card payments; providing electronic processing of electronic funds transfer, ACH, credit card, debit card, electronic check, electronic payment, and electronic remote check deposit services,” which presumably encompasses all services of the types described, including applicant’s more narrowly identified services comprising “Issuance and transaction processing services of electronic credit card, debit card, gift card, and pre-paid purchase cards for the purchase of goods and services in-store, and electronically via the internet, mobile phone, and smart phone.”[1]  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the registrant’s services have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers” as applicant’s services.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.

 

Summary

 

Because applicant’s mark is very similar to registrant’s marks, and because applicant’s services are legally identical to registrant’s services, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the services.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

Disclaimer Requirement

 

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).  A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).

 

In this case, applicant must disclaim “CLUB” because it is not inherently distinctive.  This term is, at best, merely descriptive of a characteristic of applicant’s services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

 

Attachment 2 comprises an entry from Oxford dictionary, which shows that the wording “club” in the applied-for mark means “[a] commercial organization offering subscribers special benefits”.  Applicant is a commercial organization offering subscribers special benefits, as shown by the screen shots from applicant’s website at Attachment 3, wherein applicant states that applicant is

 

the membership warehouse club solution for everyday living” and “There are almost 600 clubs across the U.S and Puerto Rico and averages 136,000 square feet. Our first club opened in Midwest City, Okla. in 1983. Many clubs include sustainable features such as day-lighting with skylights, night dimming, central energy management, water-conserving fixtures, natural concrete floors and recycling.

 

(Emphasis supplied).

 

If applicant does not provide the required disclaimer, the USPTO may refuse to register the entire mark.  See In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1041, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2005); TMEP §1213.01(b).

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “CLUB” apart from the mark as shown. 

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

 

Section 2(f) Claim-in-Part is Unacceptable and Unnecessary

 

The application includes a claim of acquired distinctiveness-in-part under Trademark Act Section 2(f) as to the word “SAM” based on applicant’s ownership of several prior registrations for the mark SAM’S CLUB.  The claim of acquired distinctiveness-in-part is unacceptable because (1) the portion of the mark for which applicant is claiming acquired distinctiveness is not the same mark as shown in the registrations upon which the claim relies, and (2) the term “SAM” is not separable from the term “SAM’S” in the applied-for mark and so a claim of acquired distinctiveness as to “SAM” is not relevant to the registrability of the applied-for mark incorporating the wording SAM’S CLUB.  See TMEP §§1212.02(f)(ii); 1212.02(f)(ii)(B).

 

Applicant must therefore withdraw this inappropriate Section 2(f)-in-part claim by instructing the trademark examining attorney to delete it from the application record. 

 

Applicant is also advised that because the term “SAM’S” is inherently distinctive, a claim of acquired distinctiveness unnecessary.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); TMEP §1212.02(d). 

 

A claim of acquired distinctiveness-in-part may be construed as a concession by applicant that the portion of the applied-for mark to which the claim applies is not inherently distinctive.  See Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1358, 92 USPQ2d 1626, 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1577, 6 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1212.02(b).

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

If applicant has any questions about this Office action, please contact the undersigned examining attorney.

 

/Linda Lavache/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 106

p. 571.272.7187

linda.lavache@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.