| To: | Zhang Yongkang (us@chanfone.com) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88551889 - TOMOON - N/A |
| Sent: | August 26, 2019 03:46:45 PM |
| Sent As: | ecom114@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88551889
Mark: TOMOON
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Zhang Yongkang
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: August 26, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – PARTIAL REFUSAL
This refusal is limited to the following goods only: brake pads for automobiles; suspension shock absorbers for vehicles; electronically motorized skateboards; chains for cycles
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1035196 and 5308809. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Applicant has applied for the mark “TOMOON” in standard characters for “Automobile windshield sunshades; Brake pads for automobiles; Cycle bells; Fitted seat covers for vehicles; Plastic parts for vehicles, namely, automotive exterior and interior plastic extruded decorative and protective trim; Sleighs for transport purposes; Strollers; Suspension shock absorbers for vehicles; Vehicle seat cushions; Vehicles, namely, electronically motorized skateboards; Windscreen wipers for motor cars; Baby strollers; Chains for cycles; Motor cycles” in International Class 12.
The cited registrations are:
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
“MOON” – Reg. No. 1035196
In this case, the applied-for mark, “TOMOON”, and the registered mark, “MOON”, are similar as both marks contain the word “MOON”. The additional wording in the applied-for mark, “TO” does not obviate the similarity because the wording is a prepositional phrase expressing a relation to the more dominant wording, “MOON”. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
Additionally, the design element in the registered mark does not obviate the similarity. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
“MOONS’” – Reg. No. 5308809
Similarly, in this case, the applied-for mark, “TOMOON”, and the registered mark, “MOON”, are similar as both marks contain the word “MOONS’”. The pluralization and possessive form of the registered mark does not obviate the similarity. An applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar. Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark). Likewise, the ending of the registered mark includes an apostrophe. This additional matter has little, if any, trademark significance and does not otherwise affect the overall similarity of the marks in terms of commercial impression. See In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009) (noting that “[t]he absence of the possessive form in applicant’s mark . . . has little, if any, significance for consumers in distinguishing it from the cited mark”); In re Curtice-Burns, Inc., 231 USPQ 990, 992 (TTAB 1986) (finding the marks McKENZIE’S and McKENZIE “virtually identical in commercial impression”); Winn’s Stores, Inc. v. Hi-Lo, Inc., 203 USPQ 140, 143 (TTAB 1979) (noting that “little if any trademark significance can be attributed to the apostrophe and the letter ‘s’ in opposer’s mark”).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar
Comparison of the Goods
Applicant’s goods are identified as “Automobile windshield sunshades; Brake pads for automobiles; Cycle bells; Fitted seat covers for vehicles; Plastic parts for vehicles, namely, automotive exterior and interior plastic extruded decorative and protective trim; Sleighs for transport purposes; Strollers; Suspension shock absorbers for vehicles; Vehicle seat cushions; Vehicles, namely, electronically motorized skateboards; Windscreen wipers for motor cars; Baby strollers; Chains for cycles; Motor cycles” in International Class 12.
Registrants’ goods are identified as, in relevant part:
“MOON” – Reg. No. 1035196
“MOONS’” – Reg. No. 5308809
In this case, electronically motorized skateboards in the application and registration are identical. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class of purchasers are the same for these goods. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Additionally, the registration uses broad wording to describe driving and transmission chains for land vehicles, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow chains for cycles. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
In view of the above, when consumers encounter the applicant’s mark, “TOMOON”, and the registrants’ marks, “MOON” and “MOONS’”, used in connection with vehicles and vehicle parts, they are likely to make the mistaken conclusion that the goods originate from the same source. Therefore, a likelihood of confusion exists and registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.
U.S. COUNSEL REQUIREMENT
Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney. The application record indicates that applicant’s domicile is outside of the United States in China, but no attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. State or territory has been appointed to represent the applicant in this matter. All applicants whose permanent legal residence or principal place of business is not within the United States or its territories must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney at the USPTO. 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o), 2.11(a). Thus, applicant is required to be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney and must appoint one. 37 C.F.R. §2.11(a). This application will not proceed to registration without such appointment and representation. See id. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney. To appoint an attorney, applicant should (1) submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form and (2) promptly notify the trademark examining attorney that this TEAS form was submitted. Alternatively, if applicant has already retained an attorney, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Drew Ciurpita/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 114
571-272-8002
drew.ciurpita@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
