To: | Australian Gold, LLC (cjmeyer@uspatent.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88505302 - LITTLE JOEY - 8183-1833 |
Sent: | November 26, 2019 03:09:36 PM |
Sent As: | ecom105@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88505302
Mark: LITTLE JOEY
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Correspondence Address: Woodard, Emhardt, Henry, Reeves & Wagner 111 MONUMENT CIRCLE, SUITE 3700
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Applicant: Australian Gold, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 8183-1833
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 26, 2019
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on September 23, 2019.
The following requirement is now satisfied: clarification of goods in Class 003
The following refusal is withdrawn: Refusal regarding Reg. No. 4910852
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2376395, 5291582, and 4910852. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant has applied for the mark LITTLE JOEY, with design, for use in connection with “outdoor skin tanning preparations, body wash, skin soaps and skin moisturizers” (as amended) in Class 003.
The cited mark in U.S. Reg. No. 2376395 is JOEY NEW YORK, in standard characters for use with “cosmetics and skin care products, namely, skin creams, skin lotions, skin cleansers, skin moisturizers, skin toners, facial masks, facial moisturizers, non-medicated acne treatment, foundations, face powders, lipsticks, blush, lip gloss, lip pencils, eyebrow pencils, eye shadows, eye liners, nail polish” in Class 003;
The cited mark in U.S. Reg. No. 5291582 is JOEY SALTS, in standard characters for use in connection with “body scrub; body lotion” in Class 003;
ARGUMENT
The applicant maintains that there is no likelihood of confusion as JOEY is a weak mark, and conveys a different commercial impression.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
With respect to the applied-for mark LITTLE JOEY and the registered marks JOEY NEW YORK and JOEY SALTS, these marks share the same dominant word “JOEY.” The wording “NEW YORK” and “SALTS” in the registered marks are disclaimed, and disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Thus, the wording “JOEY” in these registered mark is the dominant element in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, which is identical to the word “JOEY” in the applied-for mark.
Finally, the fact that the applied-for mark contains a design element, in addition to the literal elements of the mark, does not obviate the likelihood of confusion in this case. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Relatedness of the Goods
Moreover, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
As the previously attached Internet evidence reflects, the entities offering the goods of the applicant and registrant are commonly provided and marketed under the same mark.
Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Weak Mark
The applicant asserts that the term JOEY is a weak mark. The examining attorney disagrees with this assertion, noting that there are only five marks in Class 003 that include the term JOEY, with two of those being the pending applications of the applicant. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection under Section 2(d) against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods and/or services. TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1246 (TTAB 2010). Thus, this protection under Section 2(d) extends to marks registered on the Supplemental Register. TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see, e.g., In re Morinaga Nyugyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 120 USPQ2d 1738, 1743 (TTAB 2016) (citing Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 946, 16 USPQ2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Research & Trademark Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1278, 230 USPQ 49, 49 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 307-08, 198 USPQ 337, 340 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
Accordingly, given the similarity of the marks and the identical as well as related nature of the goods, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is made FINAL.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
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Caryn Glasser
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Law Office 105
Phone: (571) 270-1517
Fax: (571) 270-2517
caryn.glasser@uspt
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