To: | 900 F Street Owner LLC (pto@fkks.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88485588 - RIGGS - 025370.0202 |
Sent: | July 11, 2019 04:47:49 PM |
Sent As: | ecom101@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88485588
Mark: RIGGS
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Correspondence Address: FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ PC
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Applicant: 900 F Street Owner LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 025370.0202
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 11, 2019
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME
Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211. “The test for determining whether a mark is primarily merely a surname is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.” In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1505 (TTAB 2016) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see In re Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 832, 184 USPQ 421, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1211.01.
The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:
(1) Whether the surname is rare;
(2) Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;
(3) Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;
(4) Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and
(5) Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.
In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
First, please see the attached evidence from LexisNexis, establishing the surname significance of RIGGS. This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing 63,972 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data provider.
These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination. In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01. For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry. In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.
Second, Applicant’s RIGGS mark is primarily merely a surname because it does not appear to have any significant recognized meaning other than a surname. Evidence that a term has no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname is relevant to determining whether the term would be perceived as primarily merely a surname. See In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1280 (TTAB 2016); In re Petrin Corp., 231 USPQ 902, 903 (TTAB 1986); TMEP §1211.02(b)(vi). The attached evidence from the American Heritage Dictionary shows that the term RIGGS does not appear in the dictionary. See http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q= RIGGS. Thus, the term RIGGS appears to have no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname.
Third, Applicant’s RIGGS mark is primarily merely a surname because it has the look and feel of a surname. Evidence that a term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname may contribute to a finding that the primary significance of the term is that of a surname. In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1280 (TTAB 2016); see In re Giger, 78 USPQ2d 1405, 1409 (TTAB 2006); In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d 1792, 1796 (TTAB 2004); TMEP §1211.01(a)(vi). The attached evidence shows that the term RIGGS has the look and feel of a surname because it resembles other similar looking and sounding surnames, such as Biggs, Riggins and Diggs. Because the term RIGGS looks and sounds like other similar surnames, it is primarily merely a surname.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stefon_Diggs
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Riggins
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Riggins
Further, Applicant’s RIGGS mark is primarily merely a surname because it does not contain distinctive designs or stylization.
A mark deemed primarily merely a surname may be registered on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(f) based on a claim of acquired distinctiveness. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a); TMEP §§1211, 1212. Applicant may respond by asserting a claim of acquired distinctiveness based on one or more of the following:
(1) Prior Registrations: Applicant may claim ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register of the same mark for goods and/or services that are sufficiently similar to those named in the pending application. 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(1); TMEP §§1212, 1212.04. Applicant may do so by submitting the following statement, if accurate: “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services as evidenced by the ownership of active U.S. Registration No(s). {SPECIFY} on the Principal Register for the same mark for sufficiently similar goods and/or services.” TMEP §1212.04(e).
(2) Five Years’ Use: Applicant may submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services through the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate for at least the five years immediately before the date of this statement.” 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2); TMEP §1212.05(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).
(3) Other Evidence: Applicant may submit other evidence of acquired distinctiveness, with the following statement, if accurate: “The evidence shows that the mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services.” 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(3); TMEP §1212.06. Such additional evidence may include affidavits or declarations of long-term use in commerce; specific dollar sales under the mark; advertising expenditures; samples of typical advertising; and letters, affidavits, or declarations in which consumers and/or dealers assert recognition of the mark as an indicator of source. See 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(3); In re Ideal Indus., Inc., 508 F.2d 1336, 1339-40, 184 USPQ 487, 489-90 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Capital Formation Counselors, Inc., 219 USPQ 916, 919 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §§1212.06 et seq.
SEARCH OF OFFICE’S DATABASE OF MARKS
The trademark examining attorney has searched the Office’s database of registered and pending marks and has found no conflicting marks that would bar registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d). TMEP §704.02; see 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
Robert Clark
/Robert Clark/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 101
571-272-9144
robert.clark@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE