To: | Shenzhen Grandsun Electronic Co., Ltd. (tm@bayramoglu-legal.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88480853 - TREK - N/A |
Sent: | April 01, 2020 04:53:01 PM |
Sent As: | ecom115@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88480853
Mark: TREK
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Correspondence Address: 1540 WEST WARM SPRINGS ROAD, SUITE 100
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Applicant: Shenzhen Grandsun Electronic Co., Ltd.
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: April 01, 2020
This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued on September 17, 2019 in connection with this application. Based on information and/or documentation in applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney now issues the following new refusal: specimen not acceptable. See TMEP §§706, 711.02.
In a previous Office action dated September 17, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with the marks in Registration Nos. 5649679 and 5397173. In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement(s): amend the identification of goods and comply with the multiple class application requirements.
Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: identification of goods has been acceptably amended. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
The following advisory has also been obviated: application Serial No. 88351663 has been abandoned and will no longer be considered for likelihood of confusion purposes. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:
• NEW ISSUE: Specimen Not Acceptable
• MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED: Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous September 17, 2019 Office action, within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action. 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02. If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned. 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).
SPECIMEN NOT ACCEPTABLE
Specifically, the specimen shows the mark on headphones, but the entries for “headphones” and “earphones” were deleted from the identification of goods. Therefore, the specimen is no longer acceptable.
Examples of specimens. Specimens for goods include a photograph of (1) the actual goods bearing the mark; (2) an actual container, packaging, tag or label for the goods bearing the mark; or (3) a point-of-sale display showing the mark directly associated with the goods. See 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c); TMEP §904.03(a)-(m). A webpage specimen submitted as a display associated with the goods must show the mark in association with a picture or textual description of the goods and include information necessary for ordering the goods. TMEP §904.03(i); see 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c).
Any webpage printout or screenshot submitted as a specimen, whether for goods or services, must include the webpage’s URL and the date it was accessed or printed. 37 C.F.R. §2.56(c).
Response options. Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:
(1) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use. A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.” The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.
(2) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b) (which includes withdrawing an amendment to allege use, if one was filed), as no specimen is required before publication. This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements, including a specimen.
For an overview of the response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy these options using the online Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Here, applicant has applied to register the mark TREK in standard characters for “Humanoid robots with artificial intelligence; Wearable video display monitors; Portable media players; Wearable activity trackers; Personal digital assistants (PDA); Time clocks; Dictating machines; Telecommunication apparatus in the nature of wireless receivers in the form of jewelry; Telephone terminals” in Class 9.
The mark in Registration No. 5649679 is PRO TREK SMART in standard characters for “Smart watches; batteries; battery chargers; charging cables; electrical adapters; earphones and headphones; downloadable mobile applications and software for processing, reviewing and editing data from smart watches and mobile devices featuring global positioning systems, compasses, barometers, altimeters and thermometers” in Class 9.
And the mark in Registration No. 5397173 is PRO TREK in standard characters for “Smart watches; batteries; battery chargers; charging cables; electrical adapters; earphones and headphones; downloadable mobile applications and software for processing, reviewing and editing data from smart watches and mobile devices featuring global positioning systems, compasses, barometers, altimeters and thermometers” in Class 9.
Both of the above cited marks are owned by the same registrant, Trek Bicycle Corporation, a corporation of Wisconsin.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Here, the previously attached evidence from The American Heritage dictionary shows that PRO means “an expert in a field of endeavor” and SMART means “capable of making adjustments that resemble those resulting from human decisions, chiefly by means of electronic sensors and computing technology.” Therefore, the terms PRO and SMART in the registered marks are merely descriptive of registrant’s goods, as they are made by or for professionals and are “smartwatches” and related goods, which are capable of making adjustments by means of electronic sensors and computer technology (emphasis added). See previously attached definition of “smartwatch” from Wikipedia. Therefore, the distinctive term TREK is the dominant portion of these marks for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Here, applicant’s mark is TREK and the dominant portion of both of the registered marks is TREK. Therefore, they are highly similar in sound and appearance. Furthermore, the marks convey an overall similar commercial impression, as TREK, PRO TREK, and PRO TREK SMART could all be viewed as different product lines or variants of the same product in the general TREK brand. Therefore, the differences between the marks do not obviate the similarities between the marks, as the marks all convey the same commercial impression.
In its response, applicant argues that the marks are sufficiently different because of the additional words PRO and SMART in the registered marks. However, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b). Here, because the marks all have the same dominant element, TREK, and because the marks could all be viewed as different goods within the broader TREK brand, the marks are confusingly similar.
Moreover, the registered marks, PRO TREK and PRO TREK SMART, both incorporate the entirety of applicant’s mark, TREK. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). Therefore, in the present case, the marks are identical in part.
Because the marks look and sound similar and create the same commercial impression, they are considered similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Relatedness of Goods
The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
In this case, although applicant has deleted many of the identical goods from the application, the previously attached Internet evidence from Apple, Google, and Samsung, and the further attached evidence from Fitbit, Fossil, Huawei, Mobvoi, and Motorola establishes that registrant’s smartwatches often contain many of applicant’s goods, including time clocks, personal digital assistants, wearable activity trackers, and portable media players. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
In its response, applicant argues that because none of the goods in the application and registrations are the same, the goods are not related. However, this argument is unpersuasive. As stated above, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Additionally, applicant argues that the consumers who purchase these goods are sophisticated and will only purchase the goods after careful consideration. However, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Moreover, applicant argues that the term TREK is diluted on the register because there are a number of other registrations in Class 9 that use the term TREK. However, this argument is also unpersuasive because each of the registrations that applicant references is for specific goods such as religious DVDs, diving helmets, and software for assisting in-store shoppers that is different from applicant’s and registrant’s wearable computer goods. The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services. See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field. Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
However, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods and/or services, as in the present case, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.” See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751). Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording TREK is weak or diluted.
Because the marks are similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of applicant’s goods. Therefore, the refusal to register applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is hereby maintained and continued.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
ASSISTANCE
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Maureen Reed/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 115
571-272-0851
maureen.reed@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE