To: | Disney Enterprises, Inc. (trademarks@disney.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88478657 - DISNEY·PIXAR SOUL - N/A |
Sent: | July 30, 2019 08:42:39 PM |
Sent As: | ecom105@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88478657
Mark: DISNEY·PIXAR SOUL
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Disney Enterprises, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 30, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
Prior-Filed Application
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s mark is “DISNEY·PIXAR SOUL” in stylized form.
The mark in Registration No. 4829056 is “SOUL” in stylized form with design elements.
The mark in Registration No. 4829066 is “SOUL” in standard character form.
The mark in Registration No. 5138980 is “SOUL” in standard character form.
Applicant’s mark features the wording “SOUL” and the registrant’s marks all either solely consist of or otherwise feature the identical wording “SOUL”. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Further, because applicant’s mark and registrant’s marks share identical wording, applicant’s mark is likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression as registrant’s marks when considered in connection with the relevant goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
In addition, with respect to Registration Nos. 4829066 and 5138980, applicant has merely added the wording “DISNEY·PIXAR” to these marks; however, adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).
Moreover, the wording “DISNEY·PIXAR” in applicant’s mark does not meaningfully distinguish applicant’s mark from the registered marks because it is a well-known house mark, and adding a house mark to an otherwise confusingly similar mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See In re Fiesta Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1366-67 (TTAB 2007) (finding CLUB PALMS MVP and MVP confusingly similar); In re Christian Dior, S.A., 225 USPQ 533, 534 (TTAB 1985) (finding LE CACHET DE DIOR and CACHET confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). Rather, in this case, it is likely that the applicant’s goods would be attributed to the same source as registrants’ goods. See In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-49 (TTAB 2007).
Finally, the stylization and/or design elements in applicant’s mark and the mark in Registration No. 4829056 are less significant for purposes of likelihood of confusion, as the word portion of a mark is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).
Accordingly, applicant’s mark and registrant’s marks are confusingly similar.
Comparison of the Goods
Applicant identifies the following goods:
Class 25: Clothing, footwear and headwear.
Registration No. 4829056 identifies the following goods:
Class 25: Clothing, namely, pants, drawstring pants, sweat pants, shorts, exercise tights, shirts, short sleeve shirts, tops, sleeveless tops, long-sleeve tops, sweaters, sweatshirts, t-shirts, tank tops, sports bras, jackets, hooded pullovers; headwear, namely, hats, headbands; swimwear; children's clothing, namely, pants, drawstring pants, sweat pants, shirts, short sleeve shirts, tops, sleeveless tops, sweatshirts, t-shirts, tank tops; Undergarments, children's clothing, namely, undergarments.
Registration No. 4829066 identifies the following goods:
Class 25: Clothing, namely, pants, drawstring pants, sweat pants, shorts, exercise tights, shirts, short sleeve shirts, tops, sleeveless tops, long-sleeve tops, sweaters, sweatshirts, t-shirts, tank tops, sports bras, jackets, hooded pullovers; headwear, namely, hats, headbands; swimwear; children's clothing, namely, pants, sweat pants, shirts, short sleeve shirts, tops, sleeveless tops, long-sleeve tops, sweatshirts, t-shirts, tank tops; Socks, undergarments, gloves, children's clothing, namely, undergarments.
Registration No. 5138980 identifies the following goods:
Class 25: Thermals, bandanas, shoes, flip-flops.
When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
In this case, the goods in the application are identical to, encompass, or are encompassed by the goods in the registrations. See http://www.lexico.com/en/definition/sock; http://www.lexico.com/en/definition/swimwear; http://www.amazon.com/CIOR-Barefoot-Quick-Dry-Boating-Walking/dp/B01MQ0U5YL. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are related under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS REQUIREMENT
The word “Clothing” in the identification of goods is indefinite and too broad and must be clarified because the word does not make clear the nature of the goods and could identify goods in more than one international class. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03. The following are examples of acceptable identifications: “clothing for protection against accidents, irradiation and fire” in International Class 9; “surgical gowns” in International Class 10; “pet clothing” in International Class 18; and “shirts,” “shorts,” and “pants” in International Class 25. Therefore, applicant must amend the identification to specify the type of clothing.
If applicant’s “Clothing” is in International Class 25, applicant may amend the identification to insert the word “namely,” after “Clothing” and then list the specific types of clothing items in that class (e.g., shirts, pants, coats, dresses).
Applicant may adopt the following identification in International Class 25, if accurate:
Class 25: Clothing, namely, tops as clothing, bottoms as clothing, socks, underwear, sleepwear, swimwear, and infant wear; footwear; headwear
Stylized text indicates changes.
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
advisory – Multi-Class Application Requirements
Therefore, applicant must either (1) restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid, or (2) satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on Trademark Act Section 1(b):
(1) List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.
(2) Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee(s) already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule). The application identifies goods and/or services that are classified in at least 2 classes; however, applicant submitted a fee(s) sufficient for only 1 class(es). Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.
See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1112, 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(2)-(3), 2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).
See an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
To expedite prosecution of the application, applicant is encouraged to file its response to this Office action online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), which is available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/index.jsp. If applicant has technical questions about the TEAS response to Office action form, applicant can review the electronic filing tips available online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/e_filing_tips.jsp and e-mail technical questions to TEAS@uspto.gov.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Matthew Tully/
Matthew Tully
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 105
(571) 270-5943
RESPONSE GUIDANCE