Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  September 12, 2019

 

Introduction

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Summary of Issues Applicant Must Address:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Specimen Refusal
• Prior-Filed Pending Applications

 

Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5774841 (BREATH MELODY), 5773953 (MELODY MAYER), 5731489 (LA MELODIE), 5235759 (GIRL MELODY), 4711204 (COCO MELODY) and 2331911 (SHIRA MELODY).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

In this case, the applied-for mark is MELODY in standard characters.

 

The registered marks are:     

 

5774841 - BREATH MELODY – Standard characters

5773953 - “MELODY MAYER” – Plus design elements

5731489 - LA MELODIE – Standard characters

5235759 - GIRL MELODY – Plus design elements

4711204 - COCO MELODY – Plus design elements

2331911 - SHIRA MELODY – Standard characters

 

Though some of the registrations feature design elements, it is the wording itself that is dominant (and thus more likely to cause confusion) since consumers are more likely to refer to marks by wording. For a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used when requesting the goods and/or services.  Joel Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1431 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)).  Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 

 

Though applicant’s mark MELODY does not feature any of the additional wording in the registrations, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Further, applicant’s mark MELODY is fully incorporated by the standard character registrations for BREATH MELODY and SHIRA MELODY. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Though the registered mark for LA MELODIE is spelled differently than applicant’s mark MELODY, the registration translates to “THE MELODY” and under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, applicant’s wording “MELODY” is legally equivalent to registrant’s wording “MELODY.”

 

Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a mark in a common, modern foreign language and a mark that is its English equivalent may be held confusingly similar.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi); see, e.g., In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1127-28 (TTAB 2015); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1025 (TTAB 2006).  Consequently, marks comprised of foreign wording are translated into English to determine similarity in meaning and connotation with English word marks.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Equivalence in meaning and connotation may be sufficient to find such marks confusingly similar.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d at 1127-28; In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1025.

 

The registrant’s mark for LA MELODIE is in French, which is a common, modern language in the United States.  See In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977) (French).

 

The doctrine is applied when “the ordinary American purchaser” would “stop and translate” the foreign term into its English equivalent.  Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377, 73 USPQ2d at 1696 (quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 USPQ 109, 110 (TTAB 1976)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi)(A).  The ordinary American purchaser includes those proficient in the foreign language.  In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1024. In this case, the ordinary American purchaser would likely stop and translate the mark because the French language is a common, modern language spoken by an appreciable number of consumers in the United States.

 

In further regard to the registration for LA MELODIE, though it translates to “THE MELODY” and therefore features the additional wording “THE,” when comparing similar marks, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has found that inclusion of the term “the” at the beginning of one of the marks will generally not affect or otherwise diminish the overall similarity between the marks.  See In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009) (finding WAVE and THE WAVE “virtually identical” marks; “[t]he addition of the word ‘The’ at the beginning of the registered mark does not have any trademark significance.”); In re Narwood Prods. Inc., 223 USPQ 1034, 1034 (TTAB 1984) (finding THE MUSIC MAKERS and MUSIC-MAKERS “virtually identical” marks; the inclusion of the definite article “the” is “insignificant in determining likelihood of confusion”).

 

Finally, unlike the situation with the registrations, applicant’s mark MELODY has no other features to distinguish itself among the others.

 

For these reasons, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

Applicant’s goods are identified as:

 

Class 25: Tops as clothing; Lingerie; Swimsuits; Vests; Bottoms as clothing; Slips being underclothing; Jackets; Dresses; Scarves

 

Registrant’s goods are identified in Reg. No. 5774841 (BREATH MELODY) as:

 

Class 25: Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Body shapers; Body stockings; Brassieres; Coats; Gloves; Hats; Men's socks; Men's and women's jackets, coats, trousers, vests; Panties, shorts and briefs; Pantyhose; Scarves; Shawls; Shoes; Socks; Sport stockings; Sweat-absorbent socks; Sweat suits; Underskirts; Swimming trunks

 

Registrant’s goods are identified in Reg. No. 5773953 (“MELODY MAYER”) as:

 

Class 25: Coats

 

Registrant’s goods are identified in Reg. No. 5731489 (LA MELODIE) as:

 

Class 25:  Bib overalls; Boot accessories, namely, fitted decorative covers for boots; Boots; Briefs; Dance shoes; Flip flops; Footwear; Headbands; Jeans; Knit bottoms; Knit dresses; Knit jackets; Knit shirts; Knitted gloves; Leggings; Leotards; Pants; Sandals; Scarves; Shirts; Shoes; Shorts; Skirts; Stockings; Sweaters; Sweatshirts; Tights; Vests; Ballet shoes; Ballet slippers; Head wear; Knit skirts; Overalls; Soles for footwear; Uniforms; Waist belts

 

Registrant’s goods are identified in Reg. No. 5235759 (GIRL MELODY) as:

 

Class 25: Bathing suits; Brassieres; Coats; Corsets; Footwear; Furs being clothing; Girdles; Gloves; Hats; Hosiery; Knitwear, namely, shirts, dresses, sweaters; Leg-warmers; Pajamas; Scarfs; Shawls; Singlets; Skirts; Underpants; Underwear; Clothing layettes

 

Registrant’s goods are identified in Reg. No. 4711204 (COCO MELODY) as:

 

Class 25: Boas; Bridesmaid dresses; Dress suits; Dresses; Evening dresses; Shoes; Wedding dresses

 

Registrant’s goods are identified in Reg. No. 2331911 (SHIRA MELODY) as:

 

Class 25: Shirts, pants, dresses, skirts, sweaters, jackets

 

The comparison of the parties’ goods is not based on what the parties’ may actually be doing with their mark and identified goods but rather on the plain language of the identifications themselves.

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described.  See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000).   

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration(s) has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers. 

 

Applicant’s “tops as clothing” and “bottoms as clothing” encompass all types of such goods, including registrants’ shirts, pants, trousers, vests, jeans, knit bottoms, knit shirts and skirts in all of the registrations except Reg. Nos. 5773953 and 4711204.

 

The parties’ goods are identical as applicant’s “vests” and registrants’ vests in Reg. Nos. 5774841 and 5731489

 

The parties’ goods are identical as to applicant’s “jackets” and registrants’ jackets in Reg. Nos. 5774841, 5731489, and 2331911.

 

The parties’ goods are identical as to applicant’s “dresses” and registrants’ dresses in Reg. Nos. 5731489, 5235759, 4711204 and 2331911.

 

The parties’ goods are identical as to applicant’s “scarves” and registrants’ scarves in Reg. Nos. 5774841 and 5731489.

 

The parties’ goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Regarding applicant’s lingerie, swimsuits and slips and registrants’ shirts the attached Internet evidence consists of webpages from the following sources: VictoriasSecret.com, Yandy.com and BareNecessities.com.

 

This evidence establishes that (1) the same entity commonly sells applicant’s lingerie, swimsuits and slips and registrants’ shirts and markets these goods under the same mark (e.g., Victoria’s Secret, Yandy and Bare Necessities); (2) these goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, namely, consumers can readily obtain shirts as well as lingerie, swimsuits and slips from the same online retail sources (e.g., VictoriasSecret.com, Yandy.com and BareNecessities.com); and (3) the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function, namely, they are all types of clothing. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Accordingly, since the parties’ clothing goods are identical in part and highly related in part, confusion is likely between applicant’s mark MELODY and registrants’ marks all sharing the wording “MELODY” in addition to other elements.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

Specimen Refusal

 

First Specimen

 

Registration is refused because the first specimen featuring the dress with a label is unreadable or illegible, and thus does not clearly show the applied-for mark in use in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(g)(i).  An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

Second and Third Specimens

Registration is refused because the second and third webpage specimens are not an acceptable display associated with the goods and appears to be mere advertising material.  See TMEP §904.07(a).  The specimen, thus, fails to show the applied-for mark in use in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §2.56(a). 

To be acceptable, a specimen of a webpage display must include (1) a picture or sufficient textual description of applicant’s goods that (2) shows the mark associated with the goods, and (3) a way of ordering the goods (e.g., a “shop online” or “shopping cart” button or link, an order form, or a telephone number for placing orders).  TMEP §904.03(i); see In re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282, 1286-89, 93 USPQ2d 1118, 1122-24 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Azteca Sys., Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1955, 1957-58 (TTAB 2012).  If applicant’s specimen includes a telephone number, internet address, and/or mailing address that appears only with corporate contact information, the specimen may not show sufficient means for ordering the goods.  See In re Genitope Corp., 78 USPQ2d 1819, 1822 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §904.03(i)(C)(2).  In that circumstance, the specimen may also need to include instructions on how to place an order or an offer to accept orders.  See In re Quantum Foods, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1375, 1379 (TTAB 2010); TMEP §904.03(i)(C)(2).

In this case, the specimen does not include a way of ordering the goods such as prices, a shopping cart icon, the wording “call to order” or similar point of sale information. See In re Sones, 590 F.3d at 1286-89, 93 USPQ2d at 1122-24; In re Azteca Sys., Inc., 102 USPQ2d at 1957; TMEP §§904.03(i) et seq.  Without this feature, the specimen is mere advertising material, which is generally not acceptable as a specimen for showing use in commerce for goods.  See In re Kohr Bros., 121 USPQ2d 1793, 1794 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Quantum Foods, Inc., 94 USPQ2d at 1379); In re Genitope Corp., 78 USPQ2d at 1822; TMEP §904.04(b). 

Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.  Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i).  Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services.  See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C).  Specimens comprising advertising and promotional materials must show a direct association between the mark and the services.  TMEP §1301.04(f)(ii).

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:

 

(1)       Submit a true copy of the originally submitted specimen that is clear and readable, with a statement by the person who transmitted it that it is a true copy of the specimen that was originally submitted. 

 

(2)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.

 

(3)       Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

For an overview of all the response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy these options online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.

 

Overcoming the specimen refusal will not, however, overcome the Section 2(d) refusals.

 

Applicant should note the following additional potential ground for refusal.

 

Prior-Filed Pending Applications

 

The filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 88255308 (MELODI), 88179375 (MELODY PLACE) and 86709755 (MELODY LEAGUE) precede applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced applications.  If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Response Guidelines

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.   

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/Parker Howard/

Examining Attorney

USPTO

Law Office 117

(571) 272-6548

Parker.Howard@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on September 12, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88477998

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Parker Howard/

Examining Attorney

USPTO

Law Office 117

(571) 272-6548

Parker.Howard@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from September 12, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”