United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88452806
Mark: ALPHA DOG
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Correspondence Address: 8900 STATE LINE ROAD, STE. 500
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Applicant: Jerod Allen
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Reference/Docket No. 4994.018
Correspondence Email Address: |
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FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: March 10, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on February 20, 2020.
In a previous Office action dated August 20, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.
Applicant’s arguments against the Section 2(d) refusal have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons outlined below. Thus, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d). See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
FINAL: SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The applicant’s mark is ALPHA DOG (in standard characters) for “Backpacks” in International Class 18.
The registrant’s mark is ALPHADOG (in standard characters) for “Caps; Hats; Jackets; Pants; Shirts” in International Class 25.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark is ALPHA DOG and registrant’s mark is ALPHADOG. As shown, both marks contain the identical wording “ALPHA” and “DOG”. The compared marks are identical except for a slight difference in appearance between registrant’s mark, which appears as a compound word with no space separating the words, that is, “ALPHADOG”; and applicant’s mark, which appears as multiple words with space separating the words, that is, “ALPHA DOG”. As such, the marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar. The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant has not provided arguments against the finding that the marks are confusingly similar; therefore, along with the reasoning outlined above, the marks are considered similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Similarity of the Goods
The evidence attached to the August 20, 2019 Office action from Nike®, Adidas®, Under Armour®, and New Balance® shows evidence that third parties manufacture the goods at issue under the same name and provide and sell the goods at issue in the same store. Further, see additional evidence attached showing even more third parties that manufacture the goods at issue under the same name and provide and sell the goods at issue in the same store. (See attached). For example:
http://bananarepublic.gap.com/
In applicant’s February 20, 2020 response, applicant argues that the evidence attached to the August 20, 2019 Office action was insufficient in establishing relatedness between backpacks and caps, hats, jackets, pants, and shirts. However, the examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument. The examining attorney has attached several additional third parties that manufacture the goods at issue under the same name. This evidence clearly establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods under the same mark and the relevant goods are sold through the same trade channels. Thus, the goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.
Additionally, applicant argues there is no general rule that all goods sold under the same roof are related and just because goods are commonly sold within one store, under the same roof, or on the same website, does not necessarily imply that those goods are related. However, the examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument. Here, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). In this case, the goods at issue are commonly sold by the same third parties under the same name, as shown by the attached evidence, thus, the goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Applicant also argues that confusion is not probable because the goods at issue are typically sold in different areas of a store. However, the examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument. The location of the goods within a store is irrelevant to the likelihood of confusion analysis. As stated above, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Here, the goods are considered related because third parties commonly manufacture the goods at issue under the same name and provide and sell the goods at issue in the same store.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Considering all of the above, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is hereby made FINAL.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
Megan Aurand
/Megan Aurand/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 128
(571) 272-1614
megan.aurand@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
