Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  November 25, 2019

 

 

 

 

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on August 9, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action(s) dated July 9, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.

 

Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reason(s) set forth below.  The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Refusal to register is hereby made FINAL because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5180326. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

Applicant’s mark is BISON with a design element and stylized characters for “gun locks” in International Class 13.

Registrant’s marks are is BISON TACTICAL in standard character form (5180386) and in stylized characters with a  design element (5180326) and for “Retail stores featuring firearms, ammunition, shooting equipment and accessories, audiovisual media and books; On-line retail store services featuring firearms, ammunition, shooting equipment and accessories, audiovisual media and books” in International Class 35.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods, and similarity of trade channels of the goods.  See In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, the respective marks share highly similar wording, namely, BISON.  This wording appears highly similar in appearance, and nearly identical in sound, connotation, and commercial impression between the applicant’s and registrant’s marks.  The only distinctions between the marks are the design elements and stylized characters in the applicant’s & registrant’s mark and the descriptive wording in the registrant’s marks.

In the Response to the Office action dated November 18, 2019, the applicant argued that the marks were distinguishable and able to coexist for four reasons.  First, the applicant argues that the dominant element of the applied-for mark is not the shared wording BISON, but the design element.  Second, the applicant argues that the marks do not sound similar because the registration contains the wording TACTICAL.  Third, the applicant argues that the marks have a different meaning and overall commercial impression.  Fourth, applicant argues that the shared wording in the marks are part of a crowded field and are therefore entitled to less protection.

Dominant Wording v. Design and Commercial Impression

The examining attorney address the first and third arguments together.  The applicant argues that the design forms the dominant wording versus the shared word BISON.  When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Similarly, with respect to the design element in U.S. Registration No. 5180326, the shared word elements of the marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Therefore, the differing design elementd do not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

 

Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  While applicant rightly points out that the design is quite distinctive, the shared wording overcomes that design and forms the dominant element because of the highly related goods and services. 

 

Moreover, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  The term BISON in applicant’s mark and BISON TACTICAL in the registration create a similar overall commercial impression.

In addition, consumers are often known to use shortened forms of names, and it is highly likely that registrant and its mark would be referred to as simply BISON.  Cf. In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 219 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring:  “the users of language have a universal habit of shortening full names – from haste or laziness or just economy of words”). 

Further, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the respective marks, that registrant’s services sold under the BISON TACTICAL” mark constitute a new or additional product line from the same source as the services sold under applicant’s “BISON” mark, and that registrant’s mark is merely a variation of applicant’s mark.  See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc., 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer's preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”)

 

Additional Wording Creates Different Sound

 

Applicant rightly points out that the additional wording in the registration creates a different sound.  However, this would ultimately justify the removal of matter from the word element of a registered mark and undermine the protection afforded on the Principal Register.  Although applicant’s mark BISON does not contain the entirety of the wording in the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Further, that additional wording is not sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion because it is merely descriptive of registrant’s services and has been disclaimed.  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Therefore, the disclaimed wording TACTICAL is less significant in forming a commercial impression, rendering the wording BISON the dominant element of the registrant’s mark.

 

Wording is Not a Part of a Crowded Field

 

Applicant presents an argument that the wording BISON is part of a crowded field, and that the respective marks at issue here are able to coexist.

 

Removing a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  The only exceptions are when (1) the matter common to the marks is merely descriptive or diluted, and not likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source, or (2) the compared marks in their entireties convey a significantly different commercial impression – neither of which is the case here.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii); see, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 73 USPQ2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

 

In this case, the matter common to the marks is not merely descriptive or diluted because there is only one mark seeking registration on the Principal Register in International Class 13 (applicant), and only one mark on the Principal Register using BISON for firearm related products (registrant).

 

In addition, when comparing the marks in their entireties, the marks do not convey a significantly different commercial impression from the other because of the shared use of the word BISON for highly related goods and services.  Ultimately, the disclaimed additional wording in the registered mark, and the inclusion of a design element in the application is not sufficient to offset the likelihood of confusion between the two marks. 

 

Moreover, applicant’s marketplace evidence cannot be considered at this time and are objected to because the applicant’s materials have not been properly made of record. Although applicant has discussed the contents of webpages as evidence against the refusal, applicant has not appropriately introduced this evidence.  In re Olin, 124 USPQ2d 1327, 1331 n.15 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re Powermat Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1789, 1791 (TTAB 2013); In re HSB Solomon Assocs., LLC, 102 USPQ2d 1269, 1274 (TTAB 2012)); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b). 

 

Accordingly, in the present case, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods & Services

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

Here, applicant argues that the goods and services are distinguishable for two reasons.  First, the goods and services are not the same, as the registered mark is used for retail services for firearm goods and the application is just for gun locks.  Applicant argues that these goods are not sold in retail stores, and a provided to a sophisticated purchaser.

 

The compared goods and services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  In the July 9, 2019 Office action, the examining attorney provided marketplace evidence from AMS Guns, SportCo Outdoor Emporium, Nova Armory, and Vienna Arsenal LLC establishing the relatedness of the goods and services. 

 

The examining attorney argued that consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii); see In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel related to various clothing items, including athletic uniforms); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding retail grocery and general merchandise store services related to furniture); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (finding distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids related to skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (finding various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing related to restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (finding refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery related to office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (finding trucking services related to motor trucks and buses).

 

The examining attorney now attaches seven additional pieces of marketplace evidence from Academy Sports & Outdoors, Bass Pro Shops, Blain’s Farm & Fleet, Cabela’s, Fleet Farm, Scheels, and Sportsman’s Warehouse.  The newly attached evidence underscores the original argument, that while gun locks may not be provided by the registrant, and the applicant may not in fact provide retail store services, these goods and services are nevertheless related for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

Second, applicant argues that the trade channels are dissimilar because at present time the goods are not currently advertised on the registrant’s website.  Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  Here, the plain language of the identification of goods and services, as well as the marketplace evidence shows that the gun locks and firearm retail services are “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Moreover, “‘[a] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).

 

Based on the additional marketplace evidence provided, it is clear that even assuming arguendo that applicant’s goods are provided exclusively to a sophisticated purchaser, that does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163).

 

Conclusion

 

In this case, the respective marks share highly similar wording.  The applicant must be refused registration because the shared word element – BISON – forms the dominant commercial impression that irreparably link the respective marks.  Further, the goods and services are highly related, as displayed by the previously and newly attached marketplace evidence. 

 

Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive and do not assuage the likelihood of consumer confusion.  Therefore, a consumer familiar with registrant’s mark, upon encountering the registrant’s marks on similar and related services, would be likely to mistakenly believe that the services emanate from a common source. 

 

In view of the foregoing, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is continued and made final.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)

 

 

/Joseph P. McCarthy/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 127

Phone: (571) 272-0458

joseph.mccarthy@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on November 25, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88404103

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Joseph P. McCarthy/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 127

Phone: (571) 272-0458

joseph.mccarthy@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from November 25, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”