Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  January 25, 2020

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on November 27, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated May 29, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks “NV5” and “NV MERCURY” in U.S. Registration Nos. 4304381 and 4595197.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement: amend the identification of goods and/or services.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: definite amended identification provided.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

In addition, the following refusal has been withdrawn: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for likelihood of confusion with the mark “NV5” in U.S. Registration No. 4304381.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Partial Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

PARTIAL SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

The stated final refusal applies to the goods identified in International Class 9 and does not bar registration in International Class 36.

 

Registration of the applied-for mark was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark “NV MERCURY” in U.S. Registration No. 4595197.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  The referenced registration as well as all other evidence and arguments asserted in the previous Office action are incorporated herein by reference.  Applicant’s arguments against the refusal have been considered and found unpersuasive.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth previously and below, the refusal is hereby made FINAL.

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark “NV MERCURY” in U.S. Registration No. 4595197.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Applicant’s mark is “NV” (in stylized form) for “magnetically encoded credit cards”.

 

Registrant’s mark is “NV MERCURY” (also in stylized form) for, in relevant part, “magnetic coded gift cards”.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

 

 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, the parties’ marks are similar in sound and appearance because they both feature the same dominant term, namely, “NV”.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Here, the term “NV” is the dominant feature of the parties’ respective marks because it is the only term in the applied-for mark and appears first or in the first term in the registered mark.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”).

 

Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Although both the applied-for mark and registered mark feature stylization in their respective marks, such stylization is insufficient to obviate the similarities between the marks because it is the word portion of marks that dominates any such stylization features.  See Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Because consumers recall and use the word portion of the mark when referring to or requesting the goods used in connection with the mark, the stylization in the parties’ respective marks is less significant in terms of consumer recognition of the source of these marks.  Moreover, the stylization in the marks is not sufficiently striking, unique, or distinctive so as to create a commercial impression separate and apart from the more dominant wording component of the marks.

 

Therefore, in view of the above, the parties’ marks share identical dominant wording and as a result are confusingly similar in sound, appearance and commercial impression.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

A likelihood of confusion also exists because the goods and/or services of the parties are legally related.  Applicant offers magnetically encoded credit cards and registrant offers magnetic coded gift cards.  These goods are related because they are often provided in the marketplace by the same entity under the same brand.  As such, when highly similar marks are used in connection with such goods, a consumer would be likely to believe that these goods originate from the same source.

 

The previous Office action included evidence of relatedness between the relevant goods, including screenshots of webpages of such providers of the relevant goods under the same mark.  For example:

 

• http://www.discovercard.com/ (Offering magnetically encoded credit cards and magnetic gift cards);

 

• http://www.homedepot.com (Offering magnetically encoded credit cards and magnetic gift cards);

 

• http://www.macys.com/ (Offering magnetically encoded credit cards and magnetic gift cards).

 

In addition to the evidence noted above, additional evidence consisting of webpage screenshots of entities that offer the relevant goods under a single source is being attached to this FINAL Office action.  For example:

 

• http://www.americanexpress.com/us/credit-cards/ (Offering magnetically encoded credit cards and magnetic gift cards);

 

• http://www.amazon.com/Credit-Cards/b?ie=UTF8&node=1266766011 (Offering magnetically encoded credit cards and magnetic gift cards);

 

• http://www.exxon.com/en/smart-card (Offering magnetically encoded credit cards and magnetic gift cards).

 

This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and/or services and markets the goods under the same mark, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Conclusion

 

Therefore, consumers who are familiar with the registrant’s credit cards offered in connection with the mark “NV MERCURY”, upon encountering applicant’s gift cards offered in connection with the mark “NV”, are likely to be confused and believe that the goods originate from the same source.

 

Applicant’s Argument and Examining Attorney’s Rebuttal

 

In essence, applicant argues that the trademark examining attorney improperly dissected the marks at issue and, when viewed in their entireties, the parties’ marks are distinguished in appearance, sound, and commercial impression and thus avoid a likelihood of confusion.  The examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument for the reasons discussed below.

 

Applicant argues that the parties’ marks differ in sound and appearance because they are comprised of different amounts of terms, syllables and have a distinct phonetic cadence.  However, as discussed in the previous Office action and above, the parties’ marks share the same dominant wording, i.e., “NV”.  Thus, they are indeed identical in part in sound.

 

Applicant further argues that the stylization in its mark consisting of a conjoined checkmark and the letter “N” results in a unitary design that sufficiently distinguishes the marks at issue.  However, as noted above, it is the word portion of marks that dominates any stylization and/or design features.  See Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Here, the initial term in both parties’ marks is the same dominant and distinctive matter, i.e., “NV”.  Because consumers recall and use the word portion of the mark when referring to or requesting the goods used in connection with a mark, any design or stylization in the applied-for mark is actually less significant in terms of consumer recognition and the commercial impression of that mark.  Here, the relevant consumer would ask for both applicant’s and registrant’s goods by name and would refer to the same initial term, i.e., “NV”.  Further, because consumers will focus on this same initial and non-descriptive term to indicate the source of the relevant goods, confusion as to the source of those goods remains highly likely.  See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am. , 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”).

 

Moreover, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, applicant argues that in terms of commercial impression, the parties’ marks elicit a different meaning.  However, when properly viewed in their entireties, the marks are indeed sufficiently similar in terms of commercial impression such that consumers would assume a connection between the parties.  In the applied-for mark, the term “NV” is an acronym or initial lettering that does not readily connote any particular meaning beyond an unknown entity.  Additionally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the letters “NV” have any particular significance as used in either applicant’s or registrant’s mark.  Thus, in both the applicant and registrant’s marks, the wording “NV” creates the same commercial impression in that it has no particular meaning and therefore appears to be arbitrary when used in connection with the respective goods.  Thus, when applied to the applicant’s goods, the wording “NV” conveys the impression of goods that relate to an “NV” entity.  In the registered mark, the wording “MERCURY” means a silver colored liquid metal.  See http://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/mercury.  Thus, when taken together and applied to the registrant’s goods, the registered mark “NV MERCURY” conveys the impression of goods that relate to an “NV” entity and a silver colored liquid metal.  Therefore, the parties’ marks convey a similar general impression of types of goods that relate to an “NV” entity. 

 

Applicant argues that consumers will perceive the identical dominant wording in the marks at issue to have different meanings because of the other wording in the registrant’s mark.  Specifically, applicant argues that “NV” in the applied-for mark connotes security, approval and acceptance reflecting high standards associated with applicant’s financial products, while the additional wording in the registered mark, i.e., “MERCURY”, transforms the meaning of “NV” to create a different impression of the registrant’s entire mark “NV MERCURY”.  However, applicant makes this assertion without any evidence that demonstrates such consumer perception of the marks.  Further, as noted above, the proper focus is the average purchaser’s general rather than specific impression of the marks.  Here, as shown above, in the context of the parties’ goods, both marks convey a general impression that relate to an “NV” entity.  Thus, it is likely, that the average purchaser would retain a general impression that the marks are sufficiently similar in meaning and commercial impression and assume a connection between the parties.

 

Applicant next argues that the goods of the parties are not related because applicant’s goods travel in limited trade channels to high net worth individuals, including to those members of an exclusive lifestyle program which requires high membership fees.  However, there is no such limitation in its application as to purchasers, nor is there any such exclusion to said purchasers in the cited registration.  Moreover, when analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers.  Here, the evidence of record which establishes that the relevant identified goods are commonly provided by a single source via a singular website.  The evidence further shows that consumers are accustomed to encountering the relevant goods in the marketplace by accessing a singular entity via its website or direct telephone contact and thus the goods at issue do indeed travel in the same trade channels. 

 

Applicant further argues that consumers of the relevant goods are sophisticated and thus not likely to be confused.  However, even if consumers of the compared goods could be considered sophisticated and discriminating, it is settled that “even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1413 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Research & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1279, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  The identity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods “outweigh any presumed sophisticated purchasing decision.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1413 (citing HRL Assocs., Inc. v. Weiss Assocs., Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1819, 1823 (TTAB 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

 

Applicant has also submitted printed or electronic copies of third-party registrations for marks containing the wording “NV” to support the argument that this wording is weak and so widely used that consumers will be able to distinguish applicant’s mark in the marketplace.  However, these registrations appear to be for goods and/or services that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application. 

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

 

However, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods and/or services, as in the present case, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.”  See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751). 

 

Furthermore, third-party registrations are entitled to little weight on the issue of confusing similarity because the registrations are “not evidence that the registered marks are actually in use or that the public is familiar with them.”  In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1167 n.5 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Moreover, the existence on the register of other seemingly similar marks does not provide a basis for registrability for the applied-for mark.  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Total Quality Grp., Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (TTAB 1999).

 

Finally, applicant should be aware that the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

In total, the marks share identical dominant wording, create a confusingly similar commercial impression, and the evidence shows that the goods are commercially related and likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by consumers.  Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the goods originate from a common source.  

 

Accordingly, in view of the above, refusal of registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is maintained and made FINAL.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: 

 

Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

PROPER RESPONSE TO PARTIAL FINAL ACTION

 

If applicant does not timely respond within six months of the issue date of this final Office action, the following classes to which the final refusal apply will be deleted from the application by Examiner’s Amendment:  International Class 9.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a); see 15 U.S.C. §1062(b).

 

In such case, the application will proceed for the following class only:  International Class 36. 

 

Applicant may respond to this final Office action by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)        A request for reconsideration that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals; and/or

 

(2)        An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with the required filing fees.

 

TMEP §715.01; see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2).

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

Rhoda Nkojo

/Rhoda Nkojo/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 117

(571) 272-8468

Rhoda.Nkojo@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on January 25, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88394087

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Nkojo, Rhoda

Examining Attorney

Law Office 117

(571) 272-8468

Rhoda.Nkojo@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from January 25, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”