Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 22, 2019

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 09/30/2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated 06/12/2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirements:  pay an additional filing fee for two classes and disclaim descriptive wording in the mark.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirements have been satisfied: pay an additional filing fee for two classes and disclaim descriptive wording in the mark.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney has carefully considered applicant’s arguments against the Section 2(d) refusal and has found them unpersuasive for the reasons discussed infra.

 

Therefore, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the Section 2(d) refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5364956.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

 

Standard of Analysis for Section 2(d) Refusal

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Facts

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark STILL BREWING (in standard characters) for use on “Beer” in International Class 32, and “Wine, alcoholic beverages except beers, alcoholic beverages, namely, spirits, vodka, whiskey, gin, bourbon” in International Class 33.

 

Registrant’s mark is 700 YEARS AND STILL BREWING STRONG (in standard characters) for “Beer” in International Class 32.

 

Similarity of Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

In this case, applicant’s proposed mark is confusingly similar to the registered mark because the marks share the dominant term STILL BREWING, which conveys to the purchaser the same commercial impression of an entity that continues to brew alcohol.   See attached dictionary evidence from the Merriam-Webster dictionary (defining “still” as “used as a function word to indicate the continuance of an action or condition” and defining the verb “brew” as “to prepare (beer, ale, etc.) by steeping, boiling, and fermentation or by infusion and fermentation”). 

 

Applicant argues, however, that registrant’s mark also includes the words “700 YEARS AND” and “STRONG”, which obviate the similarities between the marks.

 

Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Nevertheless, applicant contends that marks should be considered in their entireties and not improperly dissected.  But a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression.  In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751 (“[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.”).  Such consideration, as was done in this case, is not improper dissection.

 

But even considering the entirety of the registered mark, the addition of the wording, 700 YEARS AND STILL BREWING STRONG, does not create a different commercial impression.  In fact, contrary to applicant’s assertion, the terms only serve to reinforce the overall commercial impression of a company that continues to brew as strongly even after 700 years of business.  For this reason, consumers encountering the marks for closely related goods are likely to confuse the marks and mistake the underlying sources of the products provided under the marks.        

 

Applicant also contends that the word STILL in the applied-for mark has a different connotation than the wording STILL in the registered mark.  Applicant suggests that the word STILL in the proposed mark also means an apparatus used in distilling liquor. But other than its own supposition, applicant provides no factual evidence that consumers would in fact infer this double meaning from the applied-for mark other than the literal and obvious meaning of company that continues to brew.  A mark’s meaning is based on the impression actually created by the mark in the minds of consumers, not on the impression that the applicant states the mark is intended to convey.  See TMEP § 808.02.  Moreover, even if a consumer would in fact infer an additional meaning, as conceded by applicant, a consumer could equally understand “Applicant’s mark also means continuing to brew.” 

 

In any event, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the respective marks, that applicant’s goods sold under the “STILL BREWING” mark constitute a new or additional product line from the same source as the goods sold under the “700 YEARS AND STILL BREWING STRONG” mark with which they are acquainted or familiar, and that applicant’s proposed mark is merely a variation of registrant’s mark.  See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc., 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer’s preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).

 

Indeed, consumers are often known to use shortened forms of names, and it is highly likely that registrant’s mark would be referred to as STILL BREWING.  Cf. In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 219 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring:  “the users of language have a universal habit of shortening full names – from haste or laziness or just economy of words”).  Thus, both marks would be seen as the STILL BREWING line of beers, wine, and alcohol. 

 

Applicant also submits a list of third-party registrations to support the assertion that the wording STILL and BREWING should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.  But the mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record.  See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.  In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.  Accordingly, these registrations will not be considered.

 

But even considering the list of registrations, the weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

 

Here, applicant provides no evidence of any other registration for “STILL BREWING”.  It is this combination of wording that makes applicant’s and registrant’s mark confusingly similar.  Thus, evidence comprising of third-party registrations for marks with different commercial impressions is of limited probative value in determining the strength of a mark.  See Kay Chems., Inc. v. Kelite Chems. Corp., 464 F.2d 1040, 1042, 175 USPQ 99, 101 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1639 (TTAB 2009).  Thus, these third-party registrations noted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording is weak or diluted. 

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Relatedness of Goods

 

Applicant’s goods are closely related to registrant’s goods because the parties’ goods are identical and the goods are commonly offered by the same source.  Applicant does not argue that the goods are not related. 

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registration(s) are identical as to beer.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

As to the “Wine, alcoholic beverages except beers, alcoholic beverages, namely, spirits, vodka, whiskey, gin, bourbon” identified in applicant’s mark, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Various alcoholic beverages have been shown to be related goods for purposes of a Trademark Act Section 2(d) analysis.  In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding GASPAR’S ALE for beer and ale likely to be confused with JOSE GASPAR GOLD for tequila); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding RED BULL for tequila likely to be confused with RED BULL for malt liquor); In re Kysela Pere et Fils Ltd., 98 USPQ2d 1261 (TTAB 2011) (holding HB for wine likely to be confused with HB and design for beer); Somerset Distilling, Inc. v. Speymalt Whiskey Distribs. Ltd., 14 USPQ2d 1539 (TTAB 1989) (holding JAS. GORDON and design for scotch whiskey likely to be confused with GORDON’S for distilled gin and vodka); Schieffelin & Co. v. Molson Cos., 9 USPQ2d 2069 (TTAB 1989) (holding BRAS D’OR for brandy likely to be confused with BRADOR for beer); Bureau Nat’l Interprofessionnel Du Cognac v. Int’l Better Drinks Corp., 6 USPQ2d 1610 (TTAB 1988) (holding trademark COLAGNAC for cola flavored liqueur likely to be confused with certification mark COGNAC for brandy).

 

Here, the previously and newly attached Internet evidence, consisting of third-party websites, establishes that the same entity commonly provides beer, wine, and spirits under the same mark, through the same trade channels, which are used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Applicant contends, however, that the relevant consumers are sophisticated in the beer, wine, and alcoholic drink industry and are likely to exercise greater care in purchasing decisions.  But the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163).

 

In conclusion, because the marks are similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of applicant’s goods.  Therefore, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is continued and made final.

 

RESPONSE OPTIONS

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       A request for reconsideration that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals; and/or

 

(2)       An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with the required filing fees.

 

TMEP §715.01; see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)

 

 

/Salima Parmar Oestreicher/

Salima Parmar Oestreicher

Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571) 272-6786

Salima.Oestreicher@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on October 22, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88373453

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Salima Parmar Oestreicher/

Salima Parmar Oestreicher

Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571) 272-6786

Salima.Oestreicher@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from October 22, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”