Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  February 13, 2020

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on November 22, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated May 29, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.  In addition, applicant was notified of a prior pending application, which has since abandoned. 

 

The trademark examining attorney has thoroughly reviewed the applicant’s response and finds that the arguments presented in response to the Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion refusal unpersuasive. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Section 2(d) Refusal is maintained and made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4667316. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Improperly Submitted Third-Party Evidence

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4667316 (SWIFT LIFT).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

The applied-for mark is SWIFT in standard characters, for “clothes hangers” in International Class 20.

 

The registrant’s mark is SWIFT LIFT in standard characters, for “furniture” in International Class 20.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applied-for mark is SWIFT in standard characters.

 

The registrant’s mark is SWIFT LIFT in standard characters.

 

Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). 

 

In the present case, the marks are identical in part because the entirety of the applicant’s mark, SWIFT, is incorporated into the registrant’s mark, SWIFT LIFT. The addition of “LIFT” in the registrant’s mark does not obviate or diminish the overall similarity between the marks. Thus, the similarity in appearance between the marks creates the same overall commercial impression in the mind of the average purchaser. The marks are considered similar for the purposes of likelihood of confusion.

 

Applicant’s Arguments

 

Applicant refers in its response to third party registrations that also contain the term SWIFT for similar goods. However, as will be mentioned below, applicant did not properly provide evidence of copies of the third-party registrations in its response. Despite the existence of a small number of similarly termed third-party registrations that coexist with the registrant’s mark containing the wording SWIFT to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.  These registrations appear to be for goods similar to those identified in applicant’s application. 

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

 

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.”  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018).  Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording SWIFT is weak or diluted. 

 

Further, applicant also argues that there are various other third-party registrations coexisting that contain common terms for both applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods. These third-party registrations (such as SALT FURNITURE CO. and SALT coexisting as noted in applicant’s response) are entitled to little weight on the issue of confusing similarity because the registrations are “not evidence that the registered marks are actually in use or that the public is familiar with them.”  In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1167 n.5 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Moreover, the existence on the register of other seemingly similar marks does not provide a basis for registrability for the applied-for mark.  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Total Quality Grp., Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (TTAB 1999).

 

Moreover, “‘[A] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).

 

Therefore, as established above, the similarity in appearance between the applied-for mark SWIFT and the registered mark SWIFT LIFT is considered confusingly similar for the purposes of likelihood of confusion.

 

Similarity of the Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The applicant’s goods are “clothes hangers” in International Class 20.

 

The registrant’s goods are “furniture” in International Class 20.

 

In addition to the previously provided evidence from IKEA, Bramble, Smart Furniture, and Safco Furniture2Go, the supplementary attached sampling of Internet evidence, consisting of the webpages of Anthropologie, Bed Bath & Beyond, Honey Can Do, Made by Design, Proman Products, and Woodlore, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures and provides the relevant goods, namely, clothes hangers and furniture, and markets these goods under the same mark. Further, as demonstrated by the provided evidence, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

• Anthropologie hanger: http://www.anthropologie.com/shop/wood-bridesmaid-hanger?category=SEARCHRESULTS&color=014
• Anthropologie furniture: http://www.anthropologie.com/furniture
• Bed Bath and Beyond hangers: http://www.bedbathandbeyond.com/store/product/natural-wood-hangers/128495?keyword=hangers
• Bed Bath & Beyond furniture: http://www.bedbathandbeyond.com/store/category/furniture/living-room-furniture/13512/?icid=L1_furniture_caL1_ca1a_im_livingroom_11656
• Honey Can Do hangers: http://honeycando.com/collections/hangers
• Honey Can Do furniture: http://honeycando.com/collections/furniture
• Made by Design hangers: http://www.target.com/p/wood-hanger-made-by-design/-/A-53308480?preselect=53186598#lnk=sametab
• Made by Design furniture: http://www.target.com/c/made-by-design-furniture/-/N-qe62q?lnk=Furniture
• Proman Products hangers: http://www.promanproducts.com/23-hangers
• Proman Products furniture: http://www.promanproducts.com/15-furniture
• Woodlore hangers: http://www.woodlore.com/hangers/
• Woodlore furniture: http://www.woodlore.com/garden-furniture/

 

Applicant’s Arguments

 

Applicant stated in its response that the registrant does not sell its products to the general public and that applicant’s products will be sold to the general public and will not “match the class of purchasers for the Registered Mark.” However, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, even though applicant states that registrant does not sell its goods online, there is no restriction based on the identification of either applicant or registrant’s goods that they are only sold online or in a brick-and-mortar store. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related. Further, as noted above, evidence of actual confusion is not required. Rather, a showing that the goods are related is enough to show that the average customer is likely to be confused as to source of the goods.

 

The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the refusal to register the applied-for mark, SWIFT, due to a likelihood of confusion with the cited registration, SWIFT LIFT, is maintained and made FINAL under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

IMPROPERLY SUBMITTED THIRD-PARTY REGISTRATIONS

 

Applicant has submitted a list of registrations.  However, the mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record.  See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.  In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.  Accordingly, these registrations will not be considered.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Harini Ganesh/

Harini Ganesh

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-5128

harini.ganesh@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on February 13, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88340997

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Harini Ganesh/

Harini Ganesh

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-5128

harini.ganesh@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from February 13, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”