To: | Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (trademarks@johnsonmartinlaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88311922 - PORTSIDE BBQ - 10476-0002 |
Sent: | July 08, 2019 10:35:59 PM |
Sent As: | ecom122@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88311922
Mark: PORTSIDE BBQ
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
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Reference/Docket No. 10476-0002
Correspondence Email Address: |
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SUSPENSION NOTICE
No Response Required
Issue date: July 08, 2019
This Suspension Notice is in response to applicant’s communication filed on May 31, 2019.
In a previous Office action dated April 18, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:
- Prior-Filed Applications – Advisory
- Disclaimer Requirement
Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied:
- Disclaimer Requirement
See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
ADVISORY CONTINUED AND MAINTAINED:
- Prior-Filed Applications – Advisory
See TMEP §716.01.
SUSPENSION
Action on this application is SUSPENDED pending the disposition of the previously referenced potentially-conflicting pending applications. 37 C.F.R. §2.83(c); TMEP §§716.02(c), 1208.02(c).
Applicant was previously provided information regarding pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87473509 and 87473543, which may present a bar to registration of applicant’s mark based on a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. In response, applicant unpersuasively argued that the marks in the pending applications is not likely to cause confusion with applicant’s mark.
First, applicant’s argument that the marks are not confusingly similar because the marks contain additional wording is unpersuasive because applicant’s PORTSIDE BBQ mark is confusingly similar to the cited pending PORTSIDE PIER and PORTSIDE GELATO & COFFEE applications as the marks share an identical first term. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Thus, because consumers are most likely to focus on the term PORTSIDE when requesting the services of the parties, the dominant portion of the marks that must be given greater weight in this analysis is the term PORTSIDE – which is identical between the marks.
Second, applicant’s argument that the services of the parties are unrelated is equally unpersuasive because although applicant has limited the identification of the services, the cited prior-filed applications do not contain any limitations as to the services. Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). In this case, the cited prior-filed applications use broad wording to describe “restaurant, café, and bar services” – without any limitations as to cannels of trade or classes of purchasers – which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “restaurant and bar services onboard a cruise ship, excluding cafe, ice cream parlor, and coffee shop services.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, the services of the parties are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
The trademark examining attorney has found applicant’s arguments unpersuasive and still believes there may be a likelihood of confusion between applicant’s mark and the marks in the cited prior-pending applications, should they register. Thus, this application is suspended.
Suspension process. The USPTO will periodically check this application to determine if it should remain suspended. See TMEP §716.04. As needed, the trademark examining attorney will issue a letter to applicant to inquire about the status of the reason for the suspension. TMEP §716.05.
No response required. Applicant may file a response, but is not required to do so.
/Xheneta Ademi/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 122
(571) 272-7151
xheneta.ademi@uspto.gov