Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  September 11, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SEARCH OF OFFICE’S DATABASE OF MARKS

 

The trademark examining attorney has searched the Office’s database of registered and pending marks and has found no conflicting marks that would bar registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  TMEP §704.02; see 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Prior Filed Application
• Section 2(e)(1) Refusal - Merely Descriptive
• Cannabis Goods Refusal
• Identification of Goods With Advisory
• FDCA Refusal

 

 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – Applies to Named Goods Only

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4706766.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark INFUSE in standard characters for, in relevant part to this refusal “scones, pastries” and “bakery goods, namely, cakes, cookies”. 

 

Registrant’s mark is INFUSED in special form for “Bakery goods; Bakery goods, namely, cakes, pastries, cupcakes, muffins, bread, wedding cakes, candy, and cake-pops; Custom-made confections and baked goods, namely, cookies, cupcakes, cakes, pastries, and chocolates; Bakery desserts; Gluten-free bakery goods; Vegan bakery goods”.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Registrant’s mark being in special form does not remove it from a likelihood of confusion with applicant’s standard character mark. A mark in typed or standard characters such as Applicant’s may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element such as Registrant’s mark generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Both marks begin with the identical term INFUSE. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Applicant’s mark is merely the present tense of registrant’s mark. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Applicant has merely removed the letter “D” from the end of registrant’s mark. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Because the marks look and sound similar and create the same commercial impression, the marks are considered similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and/or services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification. Specifically, registrant’s broad “bakery goods” encompasses applicant’s various named bakery goods of “scones, pastries…cakes, cookies”.

 

Accordingly, the goods are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.  

 

Because the marks are similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of applicant’s goods.  Therefore, applicant’s mark is not entitled to registration.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should note the following potential ground for refusal.

 

PRIOR-FILED APPLICATION

 

The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 88598220 precedes applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced application.  If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature and/or characteristic of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

Applicant has applied for the mark INFUSE in standard characters for “CBD treats for pets” 

 

Specifically, the term INFUSE is defined as “to cause to be permeated with something (such as a principle or quality) that alters usually for the better”. See attached definition from merriam-webster.com. This term is descriptive for a characteristic of applicant’s food goods, namely, they are permeated with a substance, in this case CBD, that alters them.

 

Furthermore, the attached evidence from bakemag.com, indystar.com and themanual.com demonstrates that the term INFUSE/INFUSED is often used to describe goods in applicant’s industry that are permeated with a nonintoxicating cannabidoil found in cannabis and hemp.

 

Therefore, the mark is refused for being merely descriptive.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

CBD-SPECIFIED GOODS - NO BONA FIDE INTENT TO LAWFULLY USE IN COMMERCE AS OF FILING DATE

 

Registration is refused because applicant does not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; see TMEP §907. 

 

To qualify for federal trademark/service mark registration, the use of a mark in commerce must be lawful.  Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce’”); TMEP §907; see In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); Coahoma Chemical Co., Inc. v. Smith, 113 USPQ 413 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks 1957) (concluding that “use of a mark in connection with unlawful shipments in interstate commerce is not use of a mark in commerce which the [Office] may recognize.”).  Thus, the goods and/or services to which the mark is applied must comply with all applicable federal laws.  See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) (noting that “[i]t is settled that the Trademark Act’s requirement of ‘use in commerce,’ means a ‘lawful use in commerce’”)); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §907. 

 

Here, the items or activities with which the proposed mark will be used include those that are unlawful under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§801-971. The application identifies the following cannabidiol goods:  “Confectionery made of sugar, namely, lollipops, ice cream, scones, pastries, candies; bakery goods, namely, cakes, cookies, gummies; coffee, coffee-based beverages, tea, tea-based beverages, herbal tea, herbal tea-based beverages; all of the foregoing containing CBD”. 

 

Cannabidiol (CBD) is a nonpsychoactive constituent of the cannabis plant.  Applicant’s identified goods are broad enough to include products produced from “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin” (subject to certain exceptions). 21 U.S.C. §802(16)(definition of “marihuana” – commonly referred to as “marijuana”).   

 

In order for an application to have a valid basis that could properly result in a registration, the use of the mark has to be lawful.  See In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976)  Because use of the applied-for mark in connection with such goods was not lawful as of the filing date, applicant did not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce in connection with such goods.  See In re JJ206, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1568, 1569 (TTAB 2016) (“where the identified goods are illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the applicant cannot use its mark in lawful commerce, and ‘it is a legal impossibility’ for the applicant to have the requisite bona fide intent to use the mark.”); see also In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d, 1351-1352; TMEP §907.   

 

On December 20, 2018, the CSA was amended to remove hemp from the definition of marijuana and specifically exclude “tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp (as defined under section 297A of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946)” from Schedule I, 21 U.S.C. §812(c)(17).  The goods that feature cannabidiol did not potentially comply with applicable federal laws until that date.  Because the identified goods that feature cannabidiol consist of or include items or activities that are still prohibited under the Controlled Substances Act, namely those containing cannabidiol derived from marijuana, the applicant did not have a valid basis for filing the application for such goods.  Nevertheless, to the extent the applicant’s goods will be derived solely from cannabis plants that meet the current statutory definition of hemp, the goods may presently be lawful.

 

Therefore, in order to overcome this refusal, applicant must amend the identification of goods and services to specify that all cannabidiol-containing items are “solely derived from hemp with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol [THC] concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.”  Please see the complete requirement for an acceptable identification of goods below.

 

The applicant may also present arguments and evidence against this refusal. 

 

AMENDMENT TO IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS WITH ADVISORY

 

The identification of goods will need to be clarified if the Applicant chooses to amend as explained above.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. 

 

The identification of goods “bakery goods, namely … gummies is indefinite and must be clarified because it is incongruous as gummies are not a bakery good.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. 

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate.  The wording that appears in bold and/or italics below represents the suggested changes.  Any wording that is crossed out represents matter that must be deleted from the identification.

 

International Class 030: Confectionery made of sugar, namely, lollipops, ice cream, scones, pastries, candies; bakery goods, namely, cakes, cookies; Candy gummies; coffee, coffee-based beverages, tea, tea-based beverages, herbal tea, herbal tea-based beverages; All of the foregoing goods containing CBD derived from cannabis with a delta-9 THC concentration of not more than 0.3% on a dry weight basis

 

Applicant’s goods may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods or add goods not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods will further limit scope, and once goods are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

Applicant is advised that any future specimen provided by applicant supporting use of the mark must not show unlawful use of cannabis in excess of the amount indicated above.

 

Applicant should also note that an amendment to the Identification of Goods, as outlined above, will not overcome the FDCA refusal discussed below.

 

FDCA REFUSAL– NO BONA FIDE INTENT TO LAWFULLY USE IN COMMERCE AS OF FILING DATE

 

Registration is refused because applicant does not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; see TMEP §907. 

 

This refusal issues when “(1) a violation of federal law is indicated by the application record or other evidence, such as when a court or a federal agency responsible for overseeing activity in which the applicant is involved, and which activity is relevant to its application, has issued a finding of noncompliance under the relevant statute or regulation, or (2) when the applicant’s application-relevant activities involve a per se violation of a federal law.”  In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d at 1351 (citing Kellogg Co. v. New Generation Foods Inc., 6 USPQ2d 2045, 2047 (TTAB 1988); Santinine Societa v. P.A.B. Produits, 209 USPQ 958, 964 (TTAB 1981)); TMEP §907.

 

To qualify for federal trademark/service mark registration, the use of a mark in commerce must be lawful.  Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce’”); TMEP §907; see In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); Coahoma Chemical Co., Inc. v. Smith, 113 USPQ 413 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks 1957) (concluding that “use of a mark in connection with unlawful shipments in interstate commerce is not use of a mark in commerce which the [Office] may recognize.”).  Thus, the goods to which the mark will be applied must comply with all applicable federal laws.  See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) (noting that “[i]t is settled that the Trademark Act’s requirement of ‘use in commerce,’ means a ‘lawful use in commerce’”)); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §907. 

 

The application identifies items or activities that involve a per se violation of federal law.  See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d at 1352.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of a food or beverage to which has been added a drug or a biological product for which substantial clinical investigations have been instituted and for which the existence of such investigations has been made public.  21 U.S.C. §331(ll); see also 21 U.S.C. §321(ff) (indicating that a dietary supplement is deemed to be a food within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act). 

 

Cannabidiol (CBD) is an active ingredient in an FDA-approved drug, Epidiolex®, (see http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm611046.htm copy attached) and is the subject of substantial clinical investigations before it was marketed in foods or as dietary supplements.  See FDA Regulation of Cannabis and Cannabis-derived Products: Questions and Answers http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm421168.htm copy attached. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) placed Epidiolex® on schedule V of the CSA on September 27, 2018.  Nevertheless, marijuana and CBD derived from marijuana remain unlawful.  No other cannabis-derived drug products have been approved by the FDA.  Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), any product intended to have a therapeutic or medical use, and any product (other than a food) that is intended to affect the structure or function of the body of humans or animals, is a drug.  21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) 

 

In the present case, the application identifies the following goods for which applicant has alleged a bona fide intent to use in commerce: “Confectionery made of sugar, namely, lollipops, ice cream, scones, pastries, candies; bakery goods, namely, cakes, cookies, gummies; coffee, coffee-based beverages, tea, tea-based beverages, herbal tea, herbal tea-based beverages; all of the foregoing containing CBD”. 

 

It is unlawful to introduce food or beverages containing added CBD into interstate commerce or to market CBD as, or in, dietary supplements, regardless of whether the substances are hemp-derived.  See Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on signing of the Agriculture Improvement Act and the agency’s regulation of products containing cannabis and cannabis-derived compounds.

 http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm628988.htm copy attached.  In addition, an unapproved new drug cannot be distributed or sold in interstate commerce unless it is the subject of an FDA-approved new drug application (NDA) or abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d) and 355(a), (b), & (j); see also FDA Regulation of Cannabis and Cannabis-Derived Products: Questions and Answers http://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation-cannabis-and-cannabis-derived-products-questions-and-answers copy attached.

 

In order for an application to have a valid basis that could properly result in a registration, the use of the mark has to be lawful.  See In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976)  Because introduction of such goods into commerce was not lawful as of the filing date, applicant did not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce in connection with such goods and/or the identified services.  See e.g. In re JJ206, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1568, 1569 (TTAB 2016) (“where the identified goods are illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the applicant cannot use its mark in lawful commerce, and ‘it is a legal impossibility’ for the applicant to have the requisite bona fide intent to use the mark.”); see also In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d, 1351-1352; TMEP §907.   

 

RESPONSE

 

Response guidelines.  For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

Murray Jr., George

/George Murray/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 121

(571) 270-5101

George.Murray@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on September 11, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88294131

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Murray Jr., George

/George Murray/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 121

(571) 270-5101

George.Murray@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from September 11, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”