United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
|
U.S. Application Serial No. 88258852
Mark: FAITH
|
|
|
Correspondence Address: |
|
|
Applicant: Jose Antonio Lopez
|
|
|
Reference/Docket No. 13497.01.T01
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
SUSPENSION NOTICE
No Response Required
Issue date: September 30, 2019
The application is suspended for the reason specified below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.67; TMEP §§716 et seq.
Prior-filed potentially conflicting pending applications. The pending applications below have an earlier filing date or effective filing date than applicant’s application. If the marks in the applications below register, the USPTO may refuse registration of applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208.02(c). Action on this application is suspended until the prior-filed applications below either register or abandon. 37 C.F.R. §2.83(c). Information relevant to the applications below was sent previously.
- U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87791427 (FAITHSOCIAL) and 87791345 (FAITHSOCIAL)
Suspension process. The USPTO will periodically check this application to determine if it should remain suspended. See TMEP §716.04. As needed, the trademark examining attorney will issue a letter to applicant to inquire about the status of the reason for the suspension. TMEP §716.05.
No response required. Applicant may file a response, but is not required to do so.
Requirement satisfied. The requirement to amend the identification of goods is satisfied. See TMEP §713.02.
Refusal and requirement maintained and continued. The following refusal and requirement are maintained and continued:
• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Mark Description Amendment Required
See TMEP §713.02. The refusal and requirement will be made final once this application is removed from suspension, unless a new issue arises. See TMEP §716.01.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
(MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
The Applicant’s mark is FAITH (+design) for "Exercise apparel, namely, T-shirts, long sleeve shirts, tank tops, sweatshirts, hats, sweatbands, shorts, pants, sweat pants, and stretch pants".
The Registrant’s mark is FAITH for, inter alia, "Footwear, boots, shoes and sandals".
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below.
COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
Applicant's mark is FAITH (+design).
Registrant's mark is FAITH.
The fact that the applied-for mark contains a design element will not obviate a likelihood of confusion here. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Further, the design only further bolsters the similar commercial impressions created by the marks of the Christian faith, which commonly uses the Latin cross to represent its messages. Applicant’s contentions that the marks are distinctly different, and that the commercial impressions of the marks are different, are unsupported by any evidence and are not persuasive here.
Applicant should note that when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Moreover, as the registered mark is in standard characters, the registered mark can be displayed in any color, font, size and/or stylization, including that of the applied-for mark. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Therefore, the registered mark could be displayed in an identical manner to the applied-for mark.
Although the applicant submits arguments regarding the appearance of the registered mark in actual use, Applicant should note that the marks are compared as they appear in the drawing of the application and in the registration; the USPTO does not consider how an applicant and registrant actually use their marks in the marketplace. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1186 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1324, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
COMPARISON OF THE GOODS
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi). The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Furthermore, the previously and presently attached Internet evidence shows numerous entities that sell both clothing, including exercise apparel, and footwear under the same mark (See previously and presently attached evidence from Adidas®, Gucci®, Kate Spade®, Michael Kors®, Nike®, Puma®, Ralph Lauren®, and Under Armour®). This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representational number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely, clothing, including exercise apparel, and footwear, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
It is noted that the applicant has attempted to narrow its goods to avoid a likelihood of confusion. However, as shown by the significant amount of evidence of record referenced above, the goods are still so related and the marks so similar that consumers would confuse the source of the goods.
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related. To reiterate, the determination of relatedness of goods is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, NOT on extrinsic evidence of actual use. Therefore, the applicant’s attempts to place undue limitations on the trade channels and class of purchasers of the relevant goods are unpersuasive.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Further, although Applicant contends that the fame of the registered marks avoids a likelihood of confusion here, it is noted that the applicant has not submitted any evidence establishing that the registered mark is viewed by relevant purchasers as a famous mark. TMEP §1207.01(d)(ix); See, e.g., In re Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Elsea, 48 USPQ2d 1400, 1409 (TTAB 1998). Fame is usually considered more significant in inter partes proceedings. See Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 102 USPQ2d 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Research in Motion Ltd. v. Defining Presence Mktg. Grp., Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1187, 1192-93 (TTAB 2012); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1027 n.11 (TTAB 2006).
In light of the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods, it is likely that consumers who encounter the parties' goods will falsely conclude that they originate from the same source.
Although Applicant’s mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If Applicant responds to the refusal, Applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.
MARK DESCRIPTION AMENDMENT REQUIRED
(MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
The following description is suggested, if accurate:
The mark consists of the stylized wording "FAITH", with the letter "T" represented by a Latin cross.
If the applicant has any questions regarding this Suspension Notice, please contact the examining attorney at the contact information provided below. Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
Yi, Crystal
/Crystal H. Yi/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 123
571.270.0763
crystal.yi@uspto.gov
