| To: | Neural DSP Technologies Oy (bsullivan@lees-ip.com) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88243148 - CORTEX - DGE008USTM1 |
| Sent: | October 30, 2019 03:26:16 PM |
| Sent As: | ecom125@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88243148
Mark: CORTEX
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Neural DSP Technologies Oy
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Reference/Docket No. DGE008USTM1
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 30, 2019
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 09/23/2019.
In a previous Office action(s) dated 03/21/2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark. In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement(s): entity requires amendment.
Upon careful consideration of applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4937929. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
The applied-for mark is CORTEX (in standard characters) for “Software for audio processing in the field of musical instrumentation and audio amplifiers; and hardware modelers of musical instruments and audio amplifiers.”
The mark in U.S. Registration No. 4937929 is CORTEX (in standard characters) for “AUDIO PROCESSORS.”
In the present case, applicant’s mark is CORTEX and registrant’s mark is CORTEX. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of Goods
When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and/or services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).
Applicant’s software for audio processing is commonly sold alongside Registrant’s audio processors. The consumers of such goods are likely to be the same and the goods are likely to be sold through the same trade channels.
The previously attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots of goods provided by DBX Zonepro, Ashly, and Audio Technica, and the newly attached evidence from Lake, Yamaha, Blue Cat, and Behringer, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant audio processor and audio processing software goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely audio processor and audio processing software goods, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
Accordingly, the goods and/or services of applicant and the registrant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Given the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods, the refusal to register the mark pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is maintained and made FINAL.
The requirement for applicant to clarify the entity is now made final for the reasons set forth below. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(3), 2.61(b), 2.63(b); see TMEP §§803.03(i).
Applicant’s business name includes the foreign business designation “OY”; however, applicant set forth “sole proprietorship” as the legal entity in the application. This business designation is generally considered the equivalent of a “private limited company.” See TMEP app. D. Therefore, applicant must clarify the entity type in the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(3), 2.61(b); TMEP §803.03(i). Applicant may satisfy this requirement by amending the legal entity to one of those immediately listed above from Appendix D of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) for this business designation, as appropriate. See TMEP §803.03(i).
Alternatively, if applicant maintains that the legal entity in the application properly identifies applicant’s entity type, applicant must provide an explanation as to why the identified entity type is more similar to a “sole proprietorship” in this instance than to the legal entities listed in TMEP Appendix D. See id.
If, in response to the above request, applicant provides information indicating that it is not the owner of the mark, registration will be refused because the application was void as filed. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §§803.06, 1201.02(b). An application must be filed by the party who owns or is entitled to use the mark as of the application filing date. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §1201.02(b).
Based on the foregoing, the requirement to clarify the entity in the application is made FINAL.
Questions: Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
/Rachael Dickson/
Rachael Dickson
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 125
Phone: 571-272-5353
E-mail: rachael.dickson@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
